The World in 2020 According to China

What is most interesting about the contributions to this volume is that they represent an internal Chinese conversation regarding China’s international relations, both economic and political, and its rise to a position as a world power. For those of us who do not speak Chinese and who dabble mostly in commentary or translations from an elite group of ‘China watchers’, of who are often outside the source, this volume offers a unique glimpse behind the curtain.

A point of clarification: as the views expressed in the contributions to this volume assert to divulge the world in 2020 according to none other than China itself, on such a basis will this review be framed. This framework for discussion is well within bounds considering the contributors. The contributors to this volume are prominent academics in the fields of economics and international relations, established at elite Chinese universities, and some even serving in advisory roles to government entities, playing an active role in setting Chinese vision and defining Chinese understanding of the world.

Foreign policy as identity and China's rise

Mao Zedong is famously quoted as having stated, “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” yet in practice China has seemingly abandoned the ideologies of old in exchange for a pragmatism that so often keeps China a mystery to her neighbors and the outside world. The World in 2020 According to China leads the reader, very quickly, to the conclusion that China wants its cake and to eat it too (apologies for the cliché). No real surprise, nor points for criticism. China is not alone in having these kinds of desires. Desires, however, reflect and inform specific means to an end. The desires as articulated throughout this work are logically troubling. They suggest a deeper set of normative debates occurring beneath the surface of discussions regarding strategy and foreign policy.

China sees itself as playing a role in the international order foremost in Asia, though increasingly globally as well. There are a few angles to this that are important and reoccurring: China is significant both in size and economic capacity and therefore warrants a place among the great powers; China has successfully trended toward modernity by Chinese means and self-reflection, thus deserves commendation and recognition; China has been, and continues to be, the counterweight to unipolarity and the promoter of a multipolar world. Each of these points in practice holds up and is evidenced in the foreign policy record and official statements of the Chinese Communist Party.

Chinese foreign policies in Central or Western Asia and Africa reflect both the economic expansion and prowess of the People’s Republic of China and a sincere conviction that a level playing field coupled with proactive engagement can afford success to those involved. So where is the logical discrepancy? China is internationally oriented in so far as such an orientation does not infringe upon ‘Chinese-ness’. Stated more succinctly, China seeks recognition and a place in the international order to the extent the international order remains external to China and does not threaten China’s perceived uniqueness.

This is a classic case of rising power syndrome, with all the accouterments one might expect to find burdening the minds of an ancient and proud civilization. Increased economic prosperity, military capability, and diplomatic engagement with the outside world reveals a host of additional responsibilities that the rising power in question is eager to cease upon, while at the same time being entirely ill prepared to live up to their expectations of themselves, let alone the expectations of the world. This intellectual struggle is painfully evident throughout each of the pieces in this volume. Therefore it is not surprising that one cannot help but be inclined to believe the repeated acknowledgement of China’s rise and rightful place at the table in charting international norms, is an acknowledgement made with hesitation. Caveats abound, and sufficient room is made in assertions that would provide China enough space to complete its ascent.

Wealth as power

“An ascent to where?” one might ask. One aspect to China’s rise you will not find supported in this volume, nor mentioned for that matter, is the role of the military. The assent, so eagerly pursued, is one focused on economic development and premised on further reforms and opening up that began famously under Deng Xiaoping. There is clear consensus: the reforms and opening up are far from complete. The levels of critique on this point vary in severity, though it is consistently accepted that a measured approach to reforms and opening up is a necessary evil. A haphazard or rushed dealing in what amounts to increased economic freedoms and global integration is perceived as being foolish.

For all of the hesitation, self-consciousness, and sense of entitlement to a place among the other great powers, China continues to demonstrate an ability to cope and achieve based on Chinese terms. The World in 2020 According to China demonstrates that those terms have been carefully considered and are based on a fundamental set of assumptions that confrontation over things material will be to China’s disadvantage, but that challenging the normative structure of the international order in a measured way, may produce the fruit necessary for China to achieve the greatness and status it seeks.

The most fertile field for this strategy to unfold in is that of economics, trade, and commerce. It is in this forum, where the fantasy of ‘win-win’ situations dominate and the persuasiveness of wealth can carry an idea to the horizon with ease, that China seeks to present its challenge to the world. There is an evident resignation that China must quickly master the rules, as established by the United States, and play the game. In doing so, the groundwork will be laid for the effective promotion of amendments or counterpoints to a decaying, unipolar world order.

The great challenge to the existing order, however, is never described in great detail. It seems to amount only to the logical inconsistency, previously mentioned, of becoming internationally engaged while keeping things foreign at bay. In a sense, there is nothing new at all to this kind of Chinese strategy. Arguably, this self-imposed limit, a handicap, is one of the original contributing factors to China’s fall from global and regional prominence during the century of humiliation. It seems necessary for China to grapple with its modern condition in new ways if it seeks to achieve its stated goals, a sentiment subtly expressed in this volume by Zhou Fanying:

For a rising power like China, it should know that any foreign policy purely based on pragmatic purposes will not help it play a leading role in the international society. As a country expected by many to play a bigger role, China should drive home the fact that the adoption of purely pragmatic policies will not work. In the process of the evolution of the East Asian order, China should thoroughly ponder over its long-term role orientation in the regional order, and correspondingly adopt a range of concrete diplomatic policies.” (2014, p. 179)

It should be reassuring to the casual reader that the contemplation and discussion taking place in China, on China’s role in the world, its rise, and its hopes is based on a set of thoughtful and considered intellectual exercises, not the firebrand ideology that troubled so many in the past.

The world in 2020 looks like it will be one of great consequence. It will be a world in transition, more so than it is now, that holds many hopes for China. The multipolar nature of the international order will be guided by cooperative engagement among world powers that will promote a stabilizing set of fairer norms.

There is a rawness and level of sincerity to The World in 2020 According to China that we too often do not get a chance to confront, or fail to acknowledge when discussing China. The unique insights, though they certainly can be challenged and debated, show how a powerful China is not a foregone conclusion. The success and potential of the People’s Republic of China is based on a history and tradition that is alien to many academics and politicians, but that is evidenced here to be increasingly a part of a modern world, rendering it, somehow, familiar; a sign that the future may be more hopeful than we fail to admit in the midst of present struggles and concerns.

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Christopher Robichaud, former International Investment Specialist with the U.S. Department of Commerce and current Ph.D. student in the School of Asia Pacific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (chriro14@apu.ac.jp)