The struggle for autonomy

Despite their geographical proximity, the large differences in power and political structure, demography, country size , economic development, ethnic composition and religious affiliations between the states in Southeast Asia, who share few if any commonalities, can cause uneasy situations and wars. The establishment of the ASEAN security organization in 1967 was largely in response to the Cold War insecurities that threatened their autonomy and I would say that it was its raison d’etre. The first member states - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines - had one thing in common: a shared non-communist ideology. Today’s Organization includes all ten Southeast Asian states, except Timor Leste. The concerns are primarily with national sovereignty, economic development and security. Underlying objectives and goals are often directing the ways to the relations.
A national and nationalist view, which is often an important tool in their policy outputs - according to the author - drives ASEAN. He calls it “soft regionalism” because members don’t give up their independent sovereign rights. I note that the states of the OAS and OAU will not give away their sovereign rights to solve disputes. The UN is not a world government in which sovereignty is vested. The author sees the ASEAN way as a conflict avoiding rather than a problem solving one; consultation and consensus are traditional ways employed by the ASEAN states. I am not aware that this is a common traditional way, but at least in Indonesia mussyawarrah and muffakah (deliberation and consensus) are pillars of society. Wars between the member states have not erupted even though there are serious disputes; territorial claims, transborder drugs trafficking, terrorist activities, trafficking of persons are major challenges to good neighbourship and bilateral relations. The ASEAN organization is an umbrella providing shelter for engaging in constructive talks and to establish cohesion.

Challenges

The author poses that the reinvention of ASEAN in the ASEAN Community (AC) is a political and strategic response to the rise of China and the reactive American and Japanese postures. It is clear that the political configuration has drastically changed since the Cold War.
Security was and is most important for the states to provide the political framework for them to function in an international system regulated by interstate relations. The author sees no common SEA political culture. Until the 1990s the internationally relevant macro political division was between communist and non-communist SE Asia. Now the threats to the region are coming from within Asia itself. The greatest concern is in the area of maritime security regarding the South China Sea. China rejects any claim of sovereignty over maritime territory by the littoral states.
With regard to the economic benefits of the South China Sea, the author poses that sovereign rights should be solved and borders determined. This looks uncertain in its outcome. China is busy militarizing the South China Sea, creating new islands  as a symbolic act, following its own law in flagrant denial of international maritime law. The United States maintain that they have the right to sail the SCS in accordance with this law. Their maritime trade and that of Japan through the South China Sea amounts to trillions of dollars. The ASEAN strategy has been to guard the status quo in the SCS and not to alienate China. I believe that a pro-active ASEAN may be able to force a break-through with China, by proposing a code of behaviour which benefits all parties, a fair share for each state in the fishery incomes and natural resources, participating and cooperating in conservation and protection of the maritime spaces, and sharing in the costs of patrolling the waters. The difficulty is that China strategically refuses to regard the organization as a partner in the disputes; it engages in bilateral talks. Yet in combatting piracy and armed robbery against ships, the Regional Agreement of 2000 was reached in which China cooperates with ASEAN and other Asian states. A vigilant USA does not encourage bilateral relations between the different states and China. This reality makes the situation highly volatile. There are no easy solutions to the South China Sea conflicts.
The author discusses threats from terrorism and transnational crime coming from non-state actors who are not limited by borders as accepted in the international system and can affect relations between states. Whereas the September 11 terrorist attack was an act on USA territory, it had repercussions for the region. The USA was looking at Southeast Asia as a front for its war on Islamic terrorists, yet the leaders “enlisted in that war with varying degrees of enthusiasm.” Especially Indonesia and Malaysia with their majority Muslim populations, took a stance against the war in Iraq to satisfy their own people. The support from Southeast Asian leaders for the USA was not based on what the USA saw as their nationalist interest, but on their own interest. What linked their counterterrorist campaigns to each other and the USA was the transboundary networking of terrorists with links to Al-Qaeda. Traditional partners like the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore too are aware of the sensitivities within their societies. The author maintains that the local counterterrorists explicitly reject the identification of terrorism with religion as is explicitly mentioned in the 2002 ASEAN Summit Declaration. It is an effort to neutralize negative reactions in the Muslim community. Other serious threats to security include trans-border drugs trafficking and the trafficking in persons.

Reviewer’s remarks

The author uses the term nation-state as a benchmark for the states in the region, without providing a theoretical underpinning. The caveat probably is in getting lost in the web of theories which have their origin in Western Europe. Given the integrating processes of state formation and nation-building, in which these states still find themselves in varying degrees, the term seems rather premature. One notes a sharp difference between Indonesia and Malaysia; Indonesia relentlessly tries to bring a sense of unity into the island state after Dutch colonial administration, which was based on divide and rule. The Bhinneka Tungal Ika (Unity in Diversity) and Panca Sila (Five Pillars) ideologies brought the idea to bear in a society of belonging, by having a shared history and a shared future. Malaysia differentiates between the bumi putra (people of Malay descent) and the Chinese and Indian populations, who are not accorded the same rights. The Neher/Marley scale for democracy, as referred to by the author, marks Indonesia as the only democratic state in the region (2014). This too may qualify this huge island-nation to be termed a nation-state. If foreign policy tools which are utilized in SEA are those of traditional statecraft, the question is: was there a common SE Asian form of state craft?
Last but not least. Professor Weatherbee has written an invaluable textbook which I recommend to be required reading for everyone engaged in the academic fields of trade and politics and for those with a fascination for this intriguing, dynamic part of the world. 

Reviewed by Ingrid Mitrasing, independent scholar (ingrid.mitrasing2@gmail.com).

Citation:
Mitrasing, I. 2016. A review of Weatherbee, D.E. 2015. International relations in Southeast Asia: the struggle for autonomy, posted online on 7 June 2016: newbooks.asia/review/struggle-autonomy