Reading the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

At the same time, what makes the SCO even more puzzling is that it is an international organization developed, promoted, and maintained by China. Beijing’s rapid movement during the 1990s, from the difficult task of delineating and disarming its shared borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, to promoting a multilateral organization and establishing growing economic and security ties with the Central Asian countries, attest to more than just conventional power politics. Instead, the creation of the ‘Shanghai Five’ – the precursor to the SCO – in the mid-1990s, promoted a climate that not only began to alleviate Central Asian (as well as Russian) suspicion about China’s intentions, but also laid the groundwork for a regional political community. As the volume edited by Michael Fredholm indicates, China’s engagement of Central Asian states in various collaborative initiatives during the 1990s, and the subsequent institutionalization of SCO, make conspicuous Beijing’s socializing propensity. In this respect, the seventeen chapters included in Fredholm’s collection provide what is probably one of the most detailed accounts to date of the SCO as an organisation for the regional security governance of Central Asia.

Contextualizing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The meticulous study of the SCO provided by the volume edited by Fredholm ensures that the contributions make available a comprehensive overview of the institutional history and practices of the organisation. Usually, commentators take as their point of reference the 2005 rejection of theUSapplication for a SCO observer status, and therefore label the organisation as an ‘Asian NATO’, an ‘OPEC with nuclear bombs’, or a ‘club for dictators’. In contrast to such disparaging assessments, the accounts provided in Fredholm’s volume depict the SCO as a mechanism for complex interaction on a wide range of economic, energy, security, and socio-cultural issues. This point of departure assist in unveiling the contextual dynamics and processes that both spur and sustain the SCO mechanism.

The book offers a detailed account of the organisational structure of the SCO. The vivid account depicts not only the aims and intentions of the organisation, but also illustrates the interplay between its permanent and non-permanent institutional arrangements. The picture that emerges is of an elaborate interaction between frameworks for informal discussion and regularised institutional processes. Thus, by demonstrating the complexity and diversity of institutions, initiatives, and interactions, the volume edited by Fredholm makes conspicuous that the SCO is much more than a geopolitical tool for either Moscow or Beijing. In fact, the book makes clear that the reading of the SCO as a type of anti-Western Sino-Russian alliance misunderstands both the content and character of the bilateral relationship between Beijing and Moscow, as well as the broader dynamics of Central Asian international affairs.

In fact, it is very often the perceptions of the Central Asian republics that tend to get excluded (and occluded) in the analysis of the SCO. Fredholm’s collection distinguishes itself by devoting an entire section on the motivations and rationale of the individual member states of the organisation. Such a parallel assessment has definitely been missing in the literature and offers a much-needed insight into the involvement and input of the Central Asian republics in the agenda of the SCO. What is particularly worthwhile about the contributions to the volume edited by Fredholm is its indication that despite the conspicuous divergences between the motivations of the SCO member states, the organisation nevertheless manages not only to identify areas of common interest, but also to build consensus and to construct agreement around shared aims and initiatives. The volume is quite explicit that this observation should not be read as an indication for the emergence of a regional integration similar to either that of the European Union (EU) or that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the contrary, the contributors to Fredholm’s collection are quite clear that the SCO is a state-centric, top-down project driven by the regimes of the member states and is quite distinct from the regionalizing frameworks embedded in both the EU and NATO. However, and crucially, the SCO indicates the emergence of cooperation in a region and between countries where such patterns of interactions are both rare and unusual.

Conclusion

Promoted as an organization for Central Asian cooperation that seeks to maintain regional stability and advance economic relations, the SCO not only reiterates Beijing’s increasing clout in international life, but also boosts its credentials by emphasizing the peaceful foreign policy intentions and commitment to regional security. Its ability to foster discussions and agreements between its members is already an important achievement. And this is at least one reason why the SCO is significant and should be taken seriously. In this respect, the accounts provided in the volume edited by Fredholm challenges many of the dominant interpretations of the SCO. At the same time, the contributions offer a veritable picture of SCO’s dynamics. The book’s contextual assessment of the organisation’s design and practices offers useful counterpoint to the prevailing narratives that will be welcomed both by those following Central Asian affairs and by those interested in the patterns of new regionalism, especially in Asia. At the same time, it is expected that the volume edited by Fredholm would benefit both students and scholars of post-Soviet politics, Security Studies, and international relations.