Governments and Markets in East Asia. The politics of economic crises

A first chapter deals with political theory, mostly a typology of political elites. A distinction is made between elite integration (consensus about the rules of the political game; more or less easy access to decision-makers) and elite differentiation (diversity as to organisations and functions, a degree of autonomy). In the course of this chapter the subject matter is narrowed down to the question under what conditions an economic crisis leads to political elite consensus and thus to democratic stability. A short second chapter deals with the economic aspects of the Asian crisis. Whereas most observers attribute the crisis to domestic shortcomings, especially in the financial sector, the author holds that unprecedented massive attacks by financial speculators on weak currencies were primarily responsible. This view is not further substantiated. Chapter 3 describes the configurations of the political elites in the five countries covered by the study, to wit Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea and the Philippines, before the crisis. The following chapters provide more or less detailed histories of how national elites reacted to the crisis. Chapter 4 deals with Indonesia, the only country with divided elites; chapter 5 with Thailand and the Philippines, both countries characterised by fragmented elites before the cisis, and chapter 6 with Malaysia and South Korea, which had (semi)consensual elites. In the last three chapters the author attempst to show that the elite reactions to the crisis follow the paths posited by the theory outlined in chapter 1. The question, of course, is whether the argument is convincing. To my mind that is not the case. To some extent this is also due to the author. Although the chapters are relatively short, the author presents rather detailed histories of what happened in each country. It becomes clear then that, apart from the earlier configuration of elites, in each case a number of other variables have played a role and have determined the outcome, including the personalities of the main actors. As a result, in my mind doubts remain as to the validity, and the usefulness, of the theoretical typology of elites upon which the author's argument hinges. For instance, the elite configuration in Malaysia before as well as after the crisis is called consensual. Nevertheless, a pivotal event just after the crisis struck was the falling out between Prime Minister Mahathir and Deputy Prime Minister Anwar. At first their disagreement appeared to be a dispute about policy, but then Anwar was expelled from the political party Mahathir led, and the next day "the police filed affidavits that charged Anwar with sodomy and abuses of power to cover up his alleged sexual affairs" (p.79). Anwar protests his innocence, but is arrested and convicted to six years in jail. It is true that this event prompted existing opposition parties to unite, and led to the formation of a new party under the presidency of Anwar's wife, but Mahathir still won the parliamentary elections. That the opposition's actions were allowed can be taken as proof of a certain degree of elite consensus about the rules of the political game, but also as an indication that Mahathir had no fear that he would lose the elections. If he would have had this fear, he would, I think, have taken still other measures.

The author is an economist. Unfortunately, he had to work with a political science theory that is, to say the least, rather vague. (Had to, because one of its originators was also his thesis supervisor). One wonders how this theory would characterise the present political elites in the U.S. Probably as very consensual.

Benno Galjart

(Emeritus Professor of Development Sociology, University of Leiden).