Double Feature

It also offers us a longer-term perspective on America’s role in Southeast Asia. She takes little account of the role of Americans – and occasionally their state – in nineteenth-century Southeast Asia: we do not hear of the pepper-traders in northern Sumatra, nor of the adventurers in northern Borneo, though the Baptists in Burma – there before the British conquerors – are mentioned. Her focus is, as her subtitle indicates, on the inter-war period. But she might perhaps have criticised her colleagues not for starting in 1941 or 1945 but for regarding those as the crucial dates for American involvement in the region. Surely it did not become a focus until 1950. The ‘Cold War’ – and in particular the triumph of the CCP and the ‘loss’ of China – are indeed the ‘turning-points’ that historians seek, even if that should not make the study of Southeast Asia, or of Vietnam, merely a Cold War study, as Foster rightly suggests has often happened.

The title indeed prompts a question. What was striking about the whole period up to 1950 was surely that the US did not project its power. That negative role indeed helped to determine the role of others. It enhanced the ambitions of the Japanese, who were to be all the more frustrated in 1941. It was only in December that year, however, that the US indicated that it would support the British in the event of invasion, and only after that could the British reassure the Dutch.

No doubt the author recognises that, and the closing section of her final chapter offers some account of the reaction to the Manchuria incident. ‘Japan became like a sore tooth’, a curious simile runs, ‘ – everyone felt compelled to poke at it, … but no one really wanted to know how serious the problem was.’ (p. 158) The subsequent pages rise above that level, but still are barely adequate. If she felt a need to defend her treatment of the subject, she would surely argue that she is concerned with power of kinds other than those the title would normally imply. The book, however, is weakened by an emphasis on them that displaces that larger context. She recognises the paradox in the US position – a world power with only limited interest in the region – but rather misses a dimension of it. ‘The United States projected its power during these years in ways which have eluded the gaze of traditional diplomatic historians, but which structured the choices, dreams, and possibilities perceived by Southeast Asians and Europeans.’ (p. 13) But she seems to have elided the diplomatic historians, and indeed missed some of the contributions they have made even to her topic.

Parts of her case are thus made to appear more novel than they really are. ‘(S)cholars rarely know, let alone consider the implications of, the fact that from about 1910 the United States was the key recipient of exports from British Malaya, and in most years from the Netherlands Indies.’ (p. 185n.) Surely it is widely known among scholars of the region at least. They also know of the low-level intelligence contacts among the governments of the region, well discussed in Chapter One. More might have been said of Quezon’s ambivalence over the prospects for an independent Philippines. The ‘diplomatic historians’ offer evidence of his hopes of protection from the British Commonwealth and of the concern of the British that they might be burdened with an additional responsibility.

Foster looks rather to the ‘power’ represented by US trade and investment, focused mainly on oil and rubber, and thus largely on the Indies. She also discusses the penetration of American consumer goods and American movies. What their impact was remains unclear. Scholars of popular culture suggest that audiences and individuals in audiences react in ways not expected by the auteurs. The author relates a nice story of a French traveller who finds montagnards watching their first Chaplin. They found none of his antics at all amusing, but laughed uproariously at the ‘young heroine … weeping glycerin tears’. (p. 96)

In such cases assessing impact is certainly problematic. Here indeed the argument seems least well supported. Foster has read widely and explored unusual sources. But too often she makes statements or extrapolations that seem to have no clear basis just when they most need them. ‘Americans touted the benefits of American cultural products for Southeast Asia. … they believed that American cultural influence produced modernity. But equally important, many Americans believed that if Southeast Asians did develop along this American path, these Southeast Asians would evolve, perhaps slowly but steadily, into people deserving of self-rule.’ (p. 74) The backing for such generalisations seems insufficient. Some of it comes from consular reports. Whether that justifies talking of ‘Americans’ or ‘many Americans’ seems doubtful. Those phrases appear too often.

A review often terminates with what some see as nit-picking. Penultimately, this reviewer finds that Foster has created a governor-general of the Straits Settlements (pp. 32, 98), and put Sir George Grindle in the Foreign Office (p. 66). Patrons could stay as long as they wished in Malayan cinemas, she notes, and so four-hour shows ‘closely approximated the length of traditional entertainments’ (p. 101). But the practice of sitting through long shows was true in Britain, too: in the reviewer’s remote youth, a ticket would allow you to stay as long as you liked, and see the A or B movie a second time should you wish.

Ultimately, he has to conclude that he was stimulated by the book, but also irritated. And the reason was rather fundamental. The author’s case has been exaggerated rather than made.

Nicholas Tarling from the New Zealand Asia Institute (The University of Auckland) is a historian, academic, and author. He specializes in Southeast Asian history, and has written on eighteenth and nineteenth century Malaysia, North Borneo, Philippines, and Laos; especially foreign involvement in these countries. Email: n.tarling@auckland.ac.nz