Between west and east

Gagan Preet Singh

The US, the authors of the book contend, is in a political crisis, for its democracy, which has been a matter of pride for centuries, is a cause of distress now. Democracy, in its present form, is a bar to future prosperity, and what has so far brought prosperity may also roll back the American dream. Democracy seems to have lost the grip over the History, and to restore the balance, the authors, as well as Francis Fukuyama, who could have been the third author of the book, suggest some reforms, which will restore the US to its commanding heights, and the prosperity shall reign again.

The authors think that democracy is not ‘self-correcting’ or infallible, and the nightmares of the founding fathers of the US constitution has become true, as, which is the case at present, they had dreaded ‘direct democracy with a strong tendency towards instability, lack of wisdom, and majority tyranny’. The democracy of the US has become, as Francis Fukuyama calls it, ‘vetocracy’, by which ‘well-organized special interest groups bent on preserving their share of the spoils have, through lobbying and campaign contributions, captured the budget and law making process’, and, as a result, the system ‘ends up pandering to short-term populist sentiments and serving those with the clout to make sure their interests prevail’ (p.26). The elections, so far thought to be the means to elect the best executive, have become ‘popularity contests’. The authors are also critical of the social media, which they think is devoid of serious deliberation, as ‘greater bandwidth has narrowed the scope of information’, and they believe that ‘cyber-powered direct democracy can undermine instead of bolster good governance’. The social media can help a ‘disparate crowd’ to capture power, ‘but it cannot sustain them in the seats of power’ (p.87).

The authors in their case study of the ‘Golden State’ of California show that how the state is in a crisis, for it spends more on prisons than on higher education, its economy is ‘mired in debt and political gridlock’, as nearly eight per cent of the state budget goes to debt service, and there is no investment for the future. The root of this crisis is, to quote Plato, rule by the popular ‘appetite’, as the rulers are short-sighted and lack wisdom to shape a prosperous future for all.

On the other hand, China has made an impressive growth in recent years, which the authors contend is because of the efficient political system of China, and which is based on the Middle Kingdom’s ‘institutional civilization’ and ‘draws on the millennial heritage of pragmatic rule by learned and experience elites—mandarins—based on merit, not by the choice of the public’ (p.23). The governance of China is insulated from short-term populist pressures, and this has helped China in achieving impressive growth rate. For the political voices of China’s middle classes are also becoming more assertive, China, the authors predict, is at the verge of a political breakdown.

In this way, both China and the US are facing a grim future. The US has a legitimate democratic but dysfunctional system of governance; China has an efficient system of governance but which faces the challenges of democratic deficit and, in the long term, a political crisis. Both the situations are undesirable in a world which is highly interdependent, and in which collapse of any one power will affect all other actors. The authors propose that the ‘intelligent governance’ is the solution for both, and they define it as a system of governance

which devolves power and meaningfully involves citizens in matters of their competence while fostering legitimacy and consent for delegated authority at higher levels of complexity. Devolving, involving, and decision division are the key elements of intelligent governance that will reconcile knowledgeable democracy and accountable meritocracy. (p.13)

In other words, as the authors have put up very well, ‘China would need to lighten up while the US would need to tighten up’. For the US, the tightening up will mean, merely, abolition of the party system and the direct elections of the executive, which is necessary to protect the executive from short-term populist pressures and for an effective governance. The authors call it as ‘disenfranchisement disguised as participation’, for they propose a pyramidal form of indirect democracy, at the bottom of which the public will elect their representatives, who will in turn elect their own representatives to the lower house of the parliament. There will also be an upper house which will consist of members appointed by the lower house, members appointed by the executive, and ‘eligible citizens’. The executive will represent all sections of the society and will be insulated from populist pressures.

In the last three chapters, the authors propose, on the similar lines, reforms for the governance of California, G-20, and the EU. On the other hand, for China, they propose devolution of the centralized power, and the involvement of the masses at the bottom level, but, as the authors have repeatedly argued, the meritocratic bureaucracy is the best form of governance, and there is no need to introduce bi-party or multi-party western style government, or even direct elections in China.

The book warrants a serious consideration, as most of the best minds of the world seem to be in agreement with the authors. But at the grass root level, the public, at least in the present times, will strongly resent authors’ proposals, however sincere they may be.