Historical Development of Regionalism in Northeast Asia
The geographical definition of Northeast Asia includes six countries: the two Koreas, Japan, China, Taiwan, Russia, and Mongolia. However, if we define Northeast Asia “regionally,” taking the dynamics of international politics into account, the United States can also be included. The United States’ strengthening of its identity as an East Asian country is evidenced by the East Asia Summit, the Six-Party Talks, and the Pivot to Asia policy; therefore, it can be regarded as a part of Northeast Asia. Indeed, discussing the situation in Northeast Asia without considering US policy is impossible.
The situation in Northeast Asia is unique in that while the number of countries in the region is relatively small, the region includes many of the world’s major powers: the United States, Russia, China, and Japan. Due to this reason, geopolitical competition between the major powers still remains strong in Northeast Asia, but compared to the other regions of Asia, regionalism in institutional terms is very underdeveloped. “Polarity,” a key concept in international politics, can be used to examine the historical development of regionalism in Northeast Asia, the trajectory of which can be divided into bipolar, unipolar, and post-unipolar periods.
The bipolar order of the United States and the Soviet Union emerged immediately after World War II. In Northeast Asia, the civil war in China and the Korean War led to the collapse of the post-World War II US-Soviet “Grand Alliance.” With the signing of the San Francisco Treaty (1951), China embraced the policy of leaning to the Soviet side while Japan embraced the United States . With China and Japan aligned with the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively, there was little room for Northeast Asian regionalism to be discussed.
Next came the unipolar order, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of US hegemony. Even before the unipolar order was established, the United States was already adjusting the San Francisco system that had excluded China and engaging with China through the normalization of US-China relations. During the US unipolar order, the regional concept of “Asia-Pacific,” which was centered on economic cooperation, gained prominence. If, in the previous bipolar period, South Korea and Japan had played a central role in developing the concept of the Pacific as a means of attracting the United States, in this period, the United States also came to define itself as a member of Asia amidst the growth of East Asian countries such as the “Four Asian Dragons.”
Lastly, there is the post-unipolar order. As US hegemony declines and China’s rise continues, the unipolar order centered on the United States has begun to falter, ushering in the interregnum period, in which no new authority is created. The United States has put forward another regional concept, “the Indo-Pacific,” to contain or blockade China. This new regional concept is aimed at strengthening cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India, facilitating the creation of a new bloc centered on countries with shared values. China, on the other hand, is trying to overcome containment through the “Belt and Road Initiative,” which encompasses the Eurasian continent and the Indian Ocean.
Currently, South Korea has been active in improving relations with Japan while cooperating with the American-led Indo-Pacific strategy, while North Korea has chosen to stay close to Russia, sending troops to Russia in the wake of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Under these circumstances, it is very difficult for the countries of Northeast Asia to construct a shared identity. Indeed, the geopolitics of the United States, China, and Russia have come to accelerate the formation of blocs rather than foster regionalism.
There are several important variables that will come to determine the future of regionalism in Northeast Asia. The first is the direction and extent of U.S.-China competition at the global level. The second is regional competition between China and Japan. The third is the degree to which North and South Korea will play an active role as partners in that competition. Finally, the fourth is the degree to which Mongolia and Russia will be interested in regionalism as passive actors. While the order remains in flux, and regionalism in Northeast Asia may come to be swept up in great power geopolitics, the flip side is that the direction in which regionalism in Northeast Asia unfolds may determine the fluid shape of the post-unipolar order. This is why the changes and developments in Northeast Asia regionalism remain greatly important.
Chang Joon OK, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, The Academy of Korean Studies. Email: okchangjoon@aks.ac.kr