The Depoliticising of Ethnicity in China
Echoing Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s critique of colour-blind racism in America, China’s approach to depoliticising ethnic issues tends to downplay legitimate concerns about the role of race or ethnicity in persistent social and economic inequalities. 1 This approach not only minimises the need for meaningful policy change but also fails to acknowledge the socio-economic privileges associated with the Han majority. Moreover, it overlooks the unique contributions of Indigenous knowledge and the deep connections to nature that minority groups hold, which are critical to the cultural and environmental richness of the nation.
In essence, the discourse surrounding China’s ‘second-generation ethnic policy’ and the push for ‘depoliticisation’ of its ethnic policies warrants a thorough examination. It mirrors the scepticism and critique surrounding colour-blindness observed by scholars studying Western societies. Therefore, a closer look at these issues requires understanding how China acknowledges multiple ethnic identities while simultaneously ensuring national cohesion and social harmony.
Ethnic governance in China
China’s management of its ethnic minorities is marked by a strategy that seeks to balance tolerance and integration. Historically, this approach has involved a nuanced alternation between leniency and stringency, reflecting the dual objectives of the nation’s policies: to acknowledge certain aspects of ethnic diversity while ultimately encouraging cultural assimilation. 2 The country’s demographic makeup – a predominant Han Chinese majority that comprises about 92 percent of China’s vast population coexisting with various ethnic minorities 3 – often sets the stage for this intricate dynamic in ethnic governance. 4
The Chinese government’s acknowledgement of ethnocultural pluralism is encapsulated through the representation of a pan-ethnic Zhonghua Minzu 中华民族 “Chinese nation,” which encompasses all ethnic groups under this modern Han-centric national identity. 5 While policies have been introduced to benefit ethnic minorities, including educational programs in native languages, scepticism persists regarding the true extent of support for ethnocultural diversity due to its Han-dominant perspective in national policymaking.
China’s ethnic governance strategy is said to be heavily influenced by the duoyuan yiti多元一体 “pluralist-unity” framework, proposed by Fei Xiaotong in the 1980s. 6 This concept posits that all of China’s ethnic groups, despite their linguistic, cultural, and religious differences, move from ‘diverse origins’ (duoyuan 多元or pluralism) to a ‘single body’ (yiti 一体or unity) constituting the Chinese Nation. This ideology underpins China’s narrative on ethnic integration, which is deemed vital for national unity and stability. 7
Mural of China’s ethnic minorities at the National Museum of Chinese Writing, Anyang. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons user Gary Todd)
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In its ‘pluralist-unity’ model, China recognises ethnic diversity while promoting a unified national identity. This approach permits a degree of ethnic expression, 8 particularly in areas such as minority language usage 9 and cultural festivities. 10 However, any overt demands for increased autonomy are denounced as unlawful challenges to the established social harmony. Within this political landscape, for example, promoting education based on one’s native language from these minority groups, in accordance with the constitutional language rights of ethnic minorities in China, requires tactful expression to avoid inciting widespread protests. 11 This delicate balance highlights the complexity of navigating ethnic identity within a framework that seeks unity while acknowledging diversity.
The ‘pluralist unity’ concept is not without contradictions in practice. For example, it promotes multiculturalism yet prioritises Mandarin as the national language that must be taught to minority children in preschools, often at the expense of non-dominant languages. 12 An inherent contradiction lies in its ambiguity, signifying a plurality of ethnicities or nationalities while emphasising a singular and unified Zhonghua中华nation or race.
The ‘pluralist-unity’ ideal, therefore, presents a dilemma. It encompasses a wide range of ethnicities and cultures but tends towards the commonality in a unified Zhonghua nation. This paradox has profoundly influenced China’s ethnic policies, offering a foundation for those advocating “unified community of the Chinese nation” and those who see diversity as a pathway to uniformity. 13 This approach significantly impacts the education of Indigenous peoples in state-run schools in terms of choice for language of instruction in classrooms.
In multiethnic China, the Han community often emerges as the principal symbol of the nation’s modern identity. Historically, ethnic minorities have been portrayed as less advanced, in need of guidance towards modern norms of the Han peers. This viewpoint, which is labelled ‘Han chauvinism,’ underscores the Han-centric tendency in defining national identity. 14
Depoliticising ethnicity
China’s ‘second-generation ethnic policy’ has sparked a scholarly debate, not censored by the government, about the role of ethnicity in modern China. 15 This vision, not a formal legal policy document but spearheaded by scholars such as Ma Rong, advocates a paradigm shift in managing ethnic diversity. 16 Central to this debate is the ‘depoliticisation’ of ethnic identities, a proposal urging a rethinking of minority policies to foster a sustainable solution to ethnic conflicts in minority areas, ultimately creating lasting peace and stability in ethnically diverse regions.
Proponents of the ‘second-generation ethnic policy’ argue that ethnicity should cease to be a defining factor in the social and economic trajectory of China’s ethnic minorities. It argues that classification of nationality (minzu) since the 1930s has inadvertently ‘politicised’ ethnicities by categorising these groups as political entities with territorial affiliations in their corresponding ‘autonomous’ states or provinces, thus having a negative impact on national cohesion.
Despite differing in their political and historical backgrounds, there are notable similarities between the ‘depoliticisation’ approach in China and the idea of ‘colour-blindness’ held by some in Western societies, particularly the United States. In the West, ‘colour-blindness’ has been critiqued for perpetuating the belief that racial and ethnic barriers no longer hinder the progress of historically marginalised groups. 17 This ideology promotes the illusion of a ‘post-racial’ society, where the existence of inequality and its causes is often overlooked, and diversity is celebrated only to a certain extent. This perspective, despite its liberal roots, may inadvertently conceal the racial and ethnic underpinnings of inequality, hindering true progress toward equal treatment. 18
The depoliticisation notion emerging from China’s ‘second-generation ethnic policy’ debate strikingly echoes the discourse on colour-blindness by advocating for the reduction of ethnicity’s political significance. However, it risks oversimplifying the differences between ethnic groups concerning economic, educational, and social development. By advocating for depoliticisation of the group rights of ethnic minorities, the argument disregards structural inequalities associated with ethnicities that account for the underlying socio-economic disparities between the Han majority and ethnic minorities.
Dak Lhagyal is a McKenzie Postdoctoral Fellow at the Asia Institute, The University of Melbourne. Email: fnu.lajiadou@unimelb.edu.au
This article is a shortened version of an article originally published by Melbourne Asia Review, Asia Institute, University of Melbourne.