China's 'shame offensive' directed at Thailand?
<p>Southeast Asia has become a major focus of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as it constitutes a significant sea lane for China’s maritime trade. Mainland Southeast Asia also offers China alternative routes to seaports for its landlocked provinces; the sub-region is hence included in Beijing’s plan to develop transport links and industrial parks. Thailand has realised that situating itself in China's blueprint is economically beneficial and Thai leaders have expressed their support for the BRI since its first launch. Thai Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha, for example, has lauded that this initiative would enhance Thai-Chinese strategic partnership. However, Prayut was not among the heads of government attending the inaugural Belt and Road Initiative Summit during 14-15 May 2017 in Beijing. How can we interpret this event to understand the current stage of Sino-Thai relations and the broader Southeast Asia’s relations with China?</p>
The Sino-Thai relationship has been cordial, marked by no major conflicts. Beijing’s endorsement of the 2014 military coup in Bangkok has even deepened ties, as the Thai military has favoured China’s policy in many aspects. Therefore, the recent lack of an invitation for Thailand’s premier to the BRI summit raised eyebrows among policy analysts, the media and members of the public. The Thai leader was the only absent leader from the sub-region, and the Chinese must have also understood that the omission would cause Thailand to ‘lose face’. Small countries in the Pacific that don’t lie on the major maritime routes were even invited. So, what were the reasons for Prayut’s exclusion from the summit?
There are in fact two possible reasons for that exclusion. The first is the delay in the Sino-Thai high-speed railway project. The project started in 2012, but the political situation in Thailand terminated the earlier deal due to parliamentary disapproval and Yingluck was ousted by the military coup in 2014. Despite Beijing’s endorsement of the military government in Bangkok, Thailand renegotiated the deal. It eventually announced it would finance the entire project domestically rather than with credit from China, although it would grant concessions to China for the construction of railways and the operation of trains. Yet there are still a number of unresolved issues on which the Chinese will not give. These include the use of Chinese workers and Chinese materials, which would contravene Thai laws and regulations.
The second reason may be related to Prayut’s acceptance of United States President Donald Trump’s invitation to visit the White House later this year. Beijing may want to signal Bangkok that it will not tolerate being treated as second choice in Thailand’s diplomatic games. Before the BRI summit, United States President Donald Trump made a phone call to three Southeast Asian leaders, including those of the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand with invitations to Washington. While Philippine President Duterte was non-committal, the Thai government accepted the invitation and enthusiastically arranged an official visit, on 3 October 2017. These diplomatic snubs may suggest that China is departing from its ‘charm offensive’ strategy and that it is now more willing to exercise political pressure explicitly when its interests are even indirectly affected. Southeast Asia states may need to craft a more careful hedging strategy in order to deal with the dissatisfied rising power.
China’s charm offensive diplomacy has focused on carrots, but now it is more willing to use its stick. Beijing is not reluctant to adopt shaming and intimidation when its national interests are affected. It looks like minor diplomatic intimidation, but it allowed Beijing to send a message about its unhappiness with the current situation. However, China has still offered Thailand a second chance, as it invited Prayut to attend the BRICS summit in Xiamen in September 2017.
Furthermore, Beijing’s more assertive approach may also develop into a situation in which regional states need to choose sides. In the case of Southeast Asia, China is now pressuring the region to favour China’s regional leadership. Singapore’s position in both the South China Sea disputes and in supporting the American role clearly does not align with Beijing’s objectives. The omission of Singapore’s leader from the BRI Summit has also suggested Beijing’s unhappiness with the city-state’s strategic posture in favour of Washington. In Thailand’s case, the likelihood of Thai-American appeasement may also play a role besides the railway issue. Beijing is perhaps sending a signal that it is unsatisfied being treated only as a political cushion and secondary power on which Bangkok can fall back whenever its relations with Washington grow rough.
Pongphisoot (Paul) Busbarat, Visiting Fellow, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore (p_busbarat@iseas.edu.sg).