The Tiananmen Incident in the Twilight of Mao's Era: A Re-evaluation

Leiden, 20 February 2007
16.00 - 17.00 hrs

IIAS Fellow Lecture by Warren Sun (Monash University, Chinese Studies Program)

Venue
P.J. Veth Building
Nonnensteeg 1-3
2311 VJ Leiden
Room 329

Abstract
The first Tiananmen crisis of April 1976 is one of the crucial, if inadequately understood, moments in the history of the People's Republic of China. Using recently available as well as more long-standing sources, the paper provides an alternative analysis to a widely accepted interpretation that the crisis resulted from the radical "gang of four's" posthumous criticism of Premier Zhou Enlai, while during the crisis itself the radicals forged an alliance with Hua Guofeng and other establishment beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution since both groups felt threatened by popular support for Deng Xiaoping, and the two groups jointly carried out a harsh suppression of the protesters in Tiananmen Square. The actual dynamics were quite different. There were very few criticisms of Zhou after his death, the most important, in all likelihood, was not ordered by the "gang," and the critical context of limited mourning for Zhou had been imposed by Chairman Mao Zedong at the time of the Premier's death. During the crisis, the predominant tendency of nearly all Politburo members was to manage the crisis through restraint, with beneficiary Wu De and radicals Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan particularly notable in this regard. Although compromised by pressures of the crisis, in the longer term the common interests of the beneficiaries were much greater with Deng's old revolutionaries than with the radicals. Meanwhile, the radicals themselves were far from united, with Jiang Qing clashing with Wang and Zhang over the use of lethal force, one of many indications during the 1972-76 period that the very concept of a "gang of four" is exaggerated. Finally, despite an unprecedented situation where, due to ill health, Mao was unable to exercise close control, and the Politburo took important decisions without reference to him, the Chairman still dominated the process and played a key role in limiting bloodshed, a result at variance to much of the mythology surrounding the event.

Information
International Intsitute for Asian Studies
Marloes Rozing
P.O. Box 9515
2300 RA Leiden
T +31-(0)71-527 3317
F +31-(0)71-527 4162
m.rozing@.let.leidenuniv.nl