The intelligence factor in diplomacy: The Failure of the 1941 U.S.-Japan Negotiations and the asia pacific war

12/06/2007 - 16:00

12 June 200716.00 - 17.30 hrs

By Prof Tosh Minohara, affiliated fellow; Graduate School of Law and Politics, Kobe University

PJ Veth building
Nonnensteeg 1-3
2311VJ Leiden
IIAS Conference room, 519 

If there ever was Rubicon in the road to Pearl Harbor, it was on November 26, 1941, when Togo - the leading proponent against war - lost all hope for peace. Togo was not a pacifist by any means but he was, however, quite cognizant of the reality that war with the U.S. was a futile endeavor. If so, then what pushed Togo to the brink that he felt Japan had "no choice but to rise?" Was it, as many Japanese historians claim, because the Hull Note was so uncompromising that it basically amounted to an ultimatum?

In light of the recently uncovered documents on prewar Japanese SIGINT from the National Archives II in College Park, the National Security Agency in Fort Meade, the Japanese Diplomatic Records Office (DRO) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, and the British National Archives (formerly, PRO) in Kew Gardens, the purpose of this presentation will be two-fold: first, to briefly overview the completely obscure history of the Japanese Black Chamber; and second, to examine/evaluate the intelligence dimension of policy formulation in Tokyo in addition to the impact SIGINT had upon decision making, most notably at the critical juncture of November 1941 during the U.S.-Japan negotiations. In conclusion, a more rational explanation behind the hitherto unexplained Togo hensetsu (volte-face) will be given which will support the contingency theory in the road to the Asia Pacific War.