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Researching
Central Asia

Central and Inner Asia: New Challenges for Independent Research

The study of Central and Inner Asia faces a multitude of challenges,
brought about by the break-up of the Soviet Union, the emergence of new states,
the rise of China, the development of new national narratives, and a diminishing interest
from Europe and the United States. This edition of the Focus addresses some of the problems,
and proposes new policies to promote the proper understanding of a region that,
to many, lies in a disregarded area on the map of the world.

The Central Mongolian Steppe. Image reproduced under a Creative Commons license, courtesy of Bernard Thaller on Flickr.com

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The study of Central and Inner Asia faces a multitude of challenges, brought about by the break-up of the Soviet Union, the emergence of new states, the rise of China, the development of new national narratives, and a diminishing interest from Europe and the United States. This edition of the Focus addresses some of the problems, and proposes new policies to promote the proper understanding of a region that, to many, lies in a disregarded area on the map of the world.

Page 26 | Irina Morozova discusses how the legacy of socialism and Soviet academic traditions is still very strong in numerous Central and Inner Asian states, yet many of the 'new' nationalist symbols are being used without a proper understanding of their background and evolution.

Page 27 | Nomadic societies have proved difficult to fit into Marxist theory, and their social and political organisation has always been hotly debated in Soviet anthropology and historiography. **Nikolai Kradin** shows how, with the fall of the Soviet Union, many scholars instead turned towards a new theoretical approach, namely that of a more nationalistic civilization theory.

Page 28 | Jigjid Boldbaatar puts forth that, since the early 1990s, Mongolian historiography has been productive in developing a new understanding of Mongolian history; away from the dogmatism of Soviet thinking and Marxist-inspired theories of successive formative stages, from the primitive to the socialist society.

Page 29 | Access to data on the history of Mongolia, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang shows some great differences. **Morris Rossabi** illustrates how independent research on Mongolia, although certainly not without its problems, is very well feasible, yet how that of Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang is still hampered by many obstacles.

Page 30 | According to **Timur Dadabaev**, the collection of oral history in Central Asia poses its own set of problems; the way in which people interpret their Soviet past is often determined by their current situation.

Page 31 | Ablet Kamalov discusses the bias and unreliability of archival documents, which are commonly regarded as independent and objective. Unfortunately, the Soviet archives are often determined by official narratives that need careful analysis and understanding.

Page 32 | Andrew Wachtel's contribution discusses the enormous obstacles that Central and Inner Asian scholars face. A lack of disciplinary training, the language barrier (English), and their relative academic isolation in their own country, prevent local scholars from actively participating in global debates on, and publishing about, their region.

Page 33 | Nargis Kassenova presents a general trend in Central and Inner Asian Studies, which still remains largely determined by political developments: a growing interest from scholars from other Asian regions; a substitution of Soviet trained scholars by young academics with a better knowledge of English; and, simultaneously, more research conducted and presented in local languages.

Page 34 | Geo-political developments in the last twenty-five years have had a substantial influence on Central and Inner Asian Studies. **Alexander Cooley** discusses how the War on Terror led to an increased, but brief period of Western interest in the region, while the Colour revolutions of 2003-2005 in some of the former Soviet republics led to a growing mistrust by the local establishments of foreign (read: Western) presence and research.

Consolidating efforts

2015 will be a year of deepening and consolidating a number of IIAS programmes. Three of the institute's major flagship initiatives – the Urban Knowledge Network Asia, the Critical Heritage Graduate programme, the Asia-Africa connections – are in full swing, whilst IIAS's engagement in the Mellon-funded research-led initiative, 'Rethinking Asian Studies in a Global Context', with its 17 events planned in a two-year span, is proceeding nicely. And last but not least, ICAS 9, scheduled for 5-9 July in Adelaide (Australia), will serve as another milestone in the already advanced process of globalising the IIAS vision.

Philippe Peycam

THROUGH THE INITIATIVES LISTED ABOVE, new connections are being drawn. They are not only cutting through disciplinary and geographic parameters, but they are also crossing sectors of activity, going beyond traditional 'academia'. The new connections reflect the increasing blur of categories and the need to anchor Asian Studies in a new university paradigm, an institution whose primary responsibility, Achille Mbembe reminds us, is "to minister to the universal", to act accountable to numerous publics beyond its immediate constituencies, by means of knowledge increasingly framed outside the North/West.[1]

IIAS wants to continue to ride through such a multi-faceted and changing intellectual landscape, especially in the framework of its three thematic clusters. One of which is 'Asian Cities'. Cities are essential nodal centres where local and global forces converge; with their increasingly meaningful role and inter-connections across 'borders', they make us rethink the most basic conceptual notions such as governance, society or culture. The UKNA network is continuing to extend its exploratory span through its research/editorial themes: 'Idea of the City (in the Asian Context)', '(Asian) Cities for and by the People', and 'Future of (Asian) Cities'. Institutions from ever-more diverse horizons are joining the network, thereby creating a unique laboratory of theorisation and prospective actions on urban milieu in and beyond Asia.

We see similar developments in the debate over the role of ICAS: the engagement of the global network's International Council and Secretariat to assist in the establishment of regional webs on Asian Studies in Africa today, and Latin America tomorrow, suggests a dynamic appreciation of what the IIAS-hosted platform can do to facilitate the emergence of a multi-levelled and multi-centred field on Asia. It is to become a reflection of the region's new global presence in these other continents, beyond the more traditional foyers of Europe, Australia, North-East Asia and North America. Its efforts to truly represent Asia in its diversity are matched by an equal drive to engage less heard voices in society.

This aptitude of IIAS to think and act 'big' must, however, be balanced by the maturing of its role amid its closer community of scholars and civil society actors, here in Europe. Together with a few institutions from other European countries, IIAS is seeking to revive the once-vibrant European Alliance on Asian Studies, to forge a more convivial and more collaborative regional environment; one that departs from the seemingly never-ending predicament of always more competition and 'efficiency' among already debilitated centres of Asian Studies across the continent.

Here too, IIAS is at the forefront of "practices of cultural pedagogy and research [capable] of forging [...] types of institutional spaces where important questions can be asked, where networks and communities can be created and where, ultimately, progress on a number of socially significant issues can be made".[2] This is what continues to motivate the IIAS team and what gives it the inspiration and energy to pursue its public service mission.

Philippe Peycam, Director IIAS

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1 Mbembe, A. 2012. 'At the Centre of the Knot', *Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies,* Routledge, 38(1):8-14
2 Morris, M. & M. Hjort. 2012. *Creativity and Academic Activism, Instituting Cultural Studies,* Durham/Hong Kong: Duke and Hong Kong University Presses, p.2

Annika Schmeding wins the 2014 IIAS National Master's Thesis Prize in Asian Studies

DURING A FESTIVE CEREMONY on 18 December, Chairman of the IIAS Board, Professor Henk Schulte Nordholt, awarded the 2014 IIAS National Master's Thesis Prize to Annika Schmeding from Leiden University, for her thesis *Who's the real 'nomad' in Afghanistan? Socio-political status, legal rights and the differences between peripatetic and pastoral nomads.* For her excellent work, Anika won a full three-month IIAS fellowship to write a PhD project proposal or a research article.

In his congratulatory speech Professor Schulte Nordholt also gave much praise to the other three finalists. In fact, he explained, the selection committee had had a very hard time choosing between the final four short-listed theses, but finally made their choice based on the following considerations:

"Annika Schmeding's thesis on the nomads and semi-nomads of Afghanistan struck the selection committee, not only by its contents and the quality of the presentation, but particularly by the way in which the material had been collected. Fieldwork in war-torn Afghanistan, to put it mildly, cannot be easy; but Ms Schmeding has shown that a great deal of determination and courage can provide information that would otherwise remain hidden, for perhaps many years to come. She has furthermore drawn attention to ethnic groups in modern Afghanistan that to date have received little attention, namely the peripatetic groups, often called the *jogis* and *chori frosh,* which have long remained outside mainstream Afghan society, and in fact, continue to do so. She rightly opposes this group to the pastoral nomads and semi-nomads, often known by the name *kuchis,* which due to their ancestry and language do form an integral part of Afghan society."

More information
Each year, IIAS awards a prize for the best master's thesis in the broad field of Asian Studies in the humanities or social sciences, written at a Dutch university. The next deadline for submission is 1 October 2015. Both students and their supervisors can apply.

Information on the Prize and all shortlisted theses over the last years is available on the IIAS website. www.iias.nl/masters-thesis-prize

The politics of dancing in Japan

Dancing is illegal in Japan. That does not mean it doesn't happen, and indeed nightclubs regularly stay open into the early hours. However, since 2010 police have begun reanimating Japan's old *fueiho* cabaret law, dubiously used to crackdown on nightclubs. This has been a disaster for Japan's vibrant underground music scene, an affront to freedom of expression, and evidence of a growing authoritarianism by elites who rely on vague legal and institutional practices. With a push back from Japan's civil society in the form of the Let's Dance Campaign, and a simultaneous alignment between domestic and international elites worried about the upcoming 2020 Tokyo Olympics, things may be beginning to change. This article explores the structures of power underlying this issue and speculates on the degree to which recent developments may be cause for alarm or cheer.

Ryan Hartley

FUEIHO (pron: 'fu:' 'ei' 'hoo') is an acronym of the 1948 *Fūzoku Eigyō Torishimari Hō* [Businesses Affecting Public Morals Regulation Law]. The key word in that title is *fūzoku*, which in the context of the law refers to entertainment, but is specifically referring to the sex industry.[1] The law itself has been amended four times, with the last change coming in 2005, demonstrating a continued interest by lawmakers in refining the legislation (or rather campaigning on it), but has been largely dormant in the hands of the police. This changed in December 2010 when police used the law to justify raids on nightclubs in Osaka's *amerika-mura* district, or *ame-mura* for short (America Village), a popular expat locale and the central location for much of the city's nightlife. Two clubs were raided and the owners arrested for allowing people to dance. Later, all twenty of the area's clubs were raided and the owners arrested. This soon spread to Tokyo and some of the capital city's major clubs found themselves raided on multiple occasions, making normal business operations impossible. In the short period between 2010-2013, many either shut down or dramatically altered their operations, damaging and in some cases ending an underground music scene that attracts DJs and musicians from around the world, and which has made Tokyo and Osaka major capitals within the international music circuit.

The fueiho law
The Meiji period (1868-1912) was a time of incredibly rapid change for Japan and its people. The country was in the midst of its catch-up phase, after having been forcibly pulled out of its *sakoku* period whereby contact with the outside world was restricted to a few key trading posts. As foreign contacts developed, Japanese elites realized how far behind Western nations they were and they embarked on a radical program of social, economic, technological and political change. Among these developments was the dancehall, the first of which, *Rokumeikan,* was completed in November 1883. The purpose was political; creating a common space for the exchange of ideas and agendas, in addition to convincing foreign representatives of Japan's comparatively equal status. The dancehall was thus born as a political instrument, yet it quickly became popularized, emerging as a place of 'questionable moral virtue' where strangers could meet, hold hands, and even dance closely (public demonstrations of affection were a taboo at this time). Police felt that dancehalls initiated public assembly, and as a result they were sites where political unrest could potentially erupt. For parents, dancehalls threatened the organizational system for marriage – *miai,* or arranged marriage – as the venues gave their children opportunities to find their own partners. When a member of the nobility's son eloped with a town girl whom he had met at a dancehall, intra-elite pressure was exerted to close down the venues.[2]

During the Edo period (1603-1868), attitudes towards 'nightlife' or *mizu shobai* (water trade), had been significantly more mature, with authorities attempting to curb and control its excesses, rather than ban or moralize about it. The shift in attitude towards the dancehall/cabaret/nightclub as a public morality issue can be historically linked to the more puritanical Christian norms that Japan started to import during 19th century Meiji period. Eventually, dancehalls became, in the elite's mind, sites of a dangerous phenomenon: liberalism.

The Meiji period's conservative internationalism gave way to a fragile democracy during the brief Taisho period (1912-1926), that then fell to a fascist imperialism during the militarized Showa period (1926-1989). The impact on the dancehalls was greater restriction through the use of regulation, licensing, zoning or simple outright bans. Japan was not alone in this. In the US, prohibition was enacted between 1920 and 1933, feeding the early seeds of organized crime in America.

After Japan's WWII defeat, the dancehall morphed into the cabaret club, and started serving a new and hungry clientele: the American GI.[3] Cabaret clubs and the side attractions they generated came to be regarded as a public health threat and a challenge to elite desires to redevelop and reform the country within a certain normative framework. Occupation authorities in Japan, partly driven by a Christian reformist ethos, attempted to introduce not only 'superior' Western democratic institutions, but also specific social values. This was the context for the creation of the *fueiho* law. The law mandates that nightclubs that wish to allow dancing must apply for a license, and clubs with a floor space less than 66m² will not be issued one. Those with a license are required to stop all dancing at midnight (after the law was amended in 1984). This has led to some comical, and many not so comical situations.

Nightclubs and Japan
"Every weekend, we DJs are breaking the law." DJ Emma.[4]

Rising to prominence in the 1970s at venues such as Studio 54 (Manhattan, US) and The Warehouse (Chicago, US), and at The Hacienda (Manchester, UK) in the 1980s/90s, clubs and 'clubbing' are now an important channel of cultural and economic globalization. They are also large sources of revenue and cultural trendsetters. Japan was socially, and especially economically, well prepared to join this global trend. In the 1980s and 1990s, Japanese corporate entertainment budgets were proportionately higher than national spending on defense, with on average an enormous 20% of a company's budget being allocated to 'entertainment'. Leisure time was increasing, especially among the young, and attempts were made to enjoy this new and booming global clubbing culture. The cabaret club transformed again, into the nightclub. Clubs began to open in greater numbers and greater sizes, with mega clubs such as Gold, Yellow and Mission emerging, and catering not only to larger audiences, but also audiences wanting to engage with this 'cool' non-mainstream culture. By the 1990s Japanese DJs began to stray outside their national clubs and into the various international music scenes, with some at the time becoming that new musical character: the 'superstar DJ'.

The scene continued to develop in a legal grey zone, with police rarely interested in clubs unless something very serious occurred. By the end of the 1990s and into the new millennium, previous tensions in Europe between the developing underground 'rave' culture and the police had largely disappeared, as the music and the scene became normalized. Japanese club owners attempted to follow a similar path, legitimating and better monetizing the movement. By the turn of the century, super clubs such as Womb, AgeHa, and Air had opened their doors.

However, there were, and still are, domestic structural constraints on this developing culture, which are unique to Japan: the country's shrinking and aging population; a public

Above: Clubbing in Tokyo. Image reproduced under a Creative Commons license, courtesy of Ginji Fukasawa on Flickr.com.

perception even among Japanese youth that nightclubs are *abunai* (dangerous) or *kowai* (scary), not aided by media perceptions of nightclubs as dens of crime and embarrassing behavior; and busy cradle to grave study/work lives, all present constraints on the scene that differ from other countries. These are in addition to fluctuating pressure exerted by police over the decades. As a result, the thriving nightlife and underground music scene began to change in December 2010, when police began raiding nightclubs in the southern cities of Osaka and Fukuoka, legitimated by the *fueiho* law. Soon spreading north to Tokyo, the raids became more widespread, with key nightlife institutions being harassed to the point of closing their doors, creating a trickledown effect of fear upon the smaller clubs.

Nightclubs are more than just party venues. From post-Cold War divided Berlin to minority/gay freedom movements in New York, nightclubs represent key sites of social and political counter culture. They are also a sociological 'canary in the coalmine', as the attitudes taken by elites in power towards the 'other' of the nightclub dweller, reflectively demonstrates the space and limits of mainstream society at large. Furthermore, Japan`s political elite generates rafts of laws that lay dormant on statute books and unused by periphery state authorities. This has been the case with the *fueiho* law, whereby nightclubs have been tacitly condoned for decades. It becomes incumbent therefore to ask "why now?" It is posited here that there are three levels of explanations: the non-state (the yakuza), the state (the politics-big business nexus), and the international.

Non-state actors: the Yakuza
They exist in plain sight, are connected with Japanese banks, property and construction (the Japanese state's perceived golden goose of economic growth), and even the national sport sumo. They have headquarters (openly displayed with signs), business cards and even their own magazine.[5] Largely a southern phenomenon, centered around the Osaka-Kobe-Fukuoka triangle, there are many gangs of varying sizes, with three large syndicates representing most members – *Yamaguchi-gumi, Sumiyoshi-kai,* and *Inagawa-kai.* Traditionally the Japanese police have tolerated the yakuza as agents of street level stabilization, removing day-to-day petty crime functions from the police workload. In addition, the yakuza could be considered to be a form of social welfare and training for young misfits, school dropouts, and other potential social miscreants. In exchange, yakuza groups supposedly refrain from trading in firearms or drugs, and prevent internal feuds from spilling over into the public domain.

This balance seems to have been upset around 2009 when, as noted yakuza investigator Jake Adelstein points out, a perfect storm of events came together to break this implicit compact.[6] The crackdown on nightclubs could be explained by police attempts to put pressure on yakuza revenue streams. Revenue may come from protection rackets, or narcotics, although Japan's narcotics consumption is extremely low by international standards and so is not considered a significant enough explanation for the targeting of nightclubs. There is also the issue of an intra-group breakdown of structure, as differing yakuza factions began internecine fighting. Existing outside traditional hierarchies, a splinter group of Tokyo's

Sumiyoshi-kai, called the *Kanto Rengo-kai,* are less than discrete about celebrity activities in nightclubs they protect, which has resulted in lurid newspaper front pages, thereby breaching the implicit compact: do not embarrass the police or their authority.[7] Two cases that severely hardened the police's resolve were an assault on *Yamaguchi-gumi* members in a cabaret club in Roppongi in 2011, and the beating to death of the owner of Club Flower, again in Roppongi, in 2012. The crackdown on nightclubs thus becomes both a means of controlling this violent splinter group, in addition to allowing the police to reassert their position. However, perversely, it may be the *fueiho* law itself that is mitigating this problem. A veteran DJ from the Tokyo clubbing scene informed this author that it is standard practice for clubs to rely on the *Kanto Rengo-kai* due to the fact that after midnight, because of the *fueiho* regulations, it is not possible to call the police if there are problems.

The State: politicians, police and big business
Following a seemingly global trend, Japan is currently experiencing a shift to the political right. From 1999 until 2012 Ishihara Shintaro, a conservative nationalist, governed Tokyo. In Osaka, between 2008 and 2012 Hashimoto Toru, himself the son of a yakuza member, was elected by adopting Ishihara's populist conservatism. Eventually in 2012, both split with their already conservative parties to form the even more conservative 'Japan Restoration Party'. Both leaders have made a great deal out of 'cleaning up' their cities. Located in central Tokyo, Roppongi is a town of two halves. Its older half, 'Roppongi Crossing', was developed in proximity to a US army base during the US occupation of Japan, and is characterized by bars, nightclubs (including their associated industries) and a high presence of foreigners; the other half, and more recently developed half, centers on 'Roppongi Hills', a large upmarket shopping and business mall where high fashion, expensive restaurants and large corporations reside. While in office, Ishihara made no secret of his distaste for Roppongi Crossing, appearing in election campaigns with a broomstick to symbolize the cleanup of the area. Roman Cybriwsky argues that Tokyo authorities increasingly want to clear away the older infrastructure and unwelcome foreign influences, and reclaim prime central Tokyo real estate for the benefit of large construction companies like Mori Building Company, which built the Roppongi Hills complex.[8] Japan's *doken kokka* (construction state) must survive.

The police also have a political agenda. Modern police forces are increasingly target-based. However, in Japan there is a lack of any clearly defined laws concerning yakuza (it is not actually illegal to be a member). Therefore, to meet targets it is easier to aim at easy targets (the nightclub) rather than difficult targets (a *yakuza* gang) to push up the points. The *fueiho* law is ideal, because it is so vague as to allow the police to enter the premises on the slightest of pretexts, pick up anyone of suspicion, make drug busts without the need for probable cause, and exert a generalized influence over society.[9] The Japanese police will sometimes claim that the reason for a raid is a noise complaint from local residents, and indeed, this had been the pretext for the original crack down on *amerika mura* in Osaka. A range of recent local ordinances is further facilitating this approach.[10] However, clearly noise pollution cannot always be the real reason, as many nightclubs are either in soundproof basements, are far away from residential areas, or are in the middle of commercial districts that pump out more ambient street level noise than the nightclub could even with its doors open.

Personalities and ambition matter too. When then National Police Agency (NPA) chief, Ando Takaharu, spoke about the yakuza in 2009, he stated "we want them to disappear from public society". The context was that he was positioning himself as clear leader of the nation's differentiated police forces at the time. Echoes of this existed fifteen years previously in the last major nightclub crackdown, when Mutsumoto Yoshitaka was installed at Azabu Juban (a Tokyo district with many nightclubs) police station in the mid-1990s. Incentivized by a points based system for promotion, he took a hard line towards nightclubs and hostess bars, harassing many to the point of closure and fining/arresting their owners.[11]

The international: the US and the Olympics
International factors also play a role, especially with regards to Japan's ideational and politically important relationship with the US. In the post-9/11 landscape and concomitant US 'war on terror', the Obama administration began specifically targeting Japan's yakuza in 2011.[12] Concerned with the shifting signals from the US and always wanting to maintain the strength of the *nichi-bei* partnership (Japan-America), it appears as though the crackdown on nightclubs comes at an opportune moment that falls in line with changing international security expectations. The US also plays an important modelling role, especially to conservative Japanese lawmakers. New York enacted draconian cabaret laws in 1926, which forbade any more

[...] the Kanto Rengo-kai, are less than discrete about celebrity activities in nightclubs they protect, which has resulted in lurid newspaper front pages, thereby breaching the implicit compact: do not embarrass the police or their authority.

than three people from dancing together, a discriminatory attempt to prevent multi-racial mixing in Harlem and other downtown areas. As in Japan, these laws have been anachronistically kept on the statute book but rarely enforced. That is until Mayor Rudy Giuliani was elected in 1994, remaining in office until 2001. Mayor Giuliani embarked on what he called 'quality of life' initiatives, which involved tightening up police responses to what were perceived to be prevalent vices: the cocaine and heroin trades. Conservative Tokyo Mayor Ishihara's 'broom holding' seems resonantly similar to Mayor Giuliani's rhetoric in New York.

In addition to pressure from the US security regime and US national ideational shifts, is the pressure from the decision to campaign for and win the international chest-beating ego competition that is the Olympic Games. The world's gaze on Japan is making the country's elite very conscious of not appearing 'weird'; with allowing people to dance would certainly qualify as being odd. As lead lawyer from the *Let's Dance* campaign, Saito Takahiro, says: "I think politicians and authorities are feeling pressure as they don't want Japan to be seen as a boring place by foreign tourists."[13] Better to create a Potemkin village for as long as the world is focusing on Japan.

Recent developments: a liberal turn?
There has been resistance from Japanese civil society in the form of the *Let's Dance* campaign, a collection of Japan's biggest musicians, music journalists and DJs. In May 2013 a petition with 150,000 signatures was submitted to the Japanese government requesting that dancing and nightclubs be removed from the *fueiho* legislation. Success may have resulted, as on 13 May 2014 the government announced the intention to potentially loosen the *fueiho* law to exclude nightclubs. Attempts to reframe the law in June 2014 failed; however, there seems to have been a strong impetus to examine the issue (preparations for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics picking up speed), and on 24 August 2014, Abe Shinzo's socially conservative/economically neo-liberal government revised the *fueiho* law. Instead of the law being applied to dancing, it will now regulate venue light levels and opening hours. Maximum lighting levels of ten lux are permitted (about enough brightness to read a newspaper 30cm away), and a special license is required, indicating a 'special entertainment and food-serving business'.[14]

An offshoot of the *Let's Dance* campaign, the *Dance Lawyers,* is attempting to challenge each case in the courts. On 25 April 2014, Kanemitsu Masatoshi (owner of Osaka's Club Noon) won a landmark trial after being charged with breaking the *fueiho* law and 'corrupting sexual morals'. However, the summation of the presiding Judge Masato Saito is revealing of elite attitudes. Saito found Kanemitsu 'not guilty' in his individual case, but judged the basic *fueiho* law as still valuable, rejecting the defense's claim that the law infringes the Japanese constitution's guarantee of free of expression: "[There is] reasonable doubt that the club allowed customers to dance in an obscene manner that can disturb sexual morals. The regulation has an important aim of promoting the healthy fostering of young people." (Judge Masato Saito).[15]

Conclusion
Some may applaud democracy in action in this case, as both political and juridical forms of peaceful protest and legal argument have impacted a change in practice by the state. The *Let's Dance* campaign and the *Dance Lawyers* have certainly scored some significant victories. However, the rules are still vague. For example, lighting levels can be arbitrarily measured; the police are able to subjectively decide when and where to measure the lights, and hence when a venue is in breach of the rules. In addition, it is more than likely a combination of preparations for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics and the desire to further integrate into the US security apparatus that is driving change, especially with regards to the yakuza. In Japanese this is called *gaiatsu* or 'foreign pressure', and the Japanese state is rarely prompted to bring about significant change without it. Domestic protest has thus come at an opportune time; leaders and lawmakers are conscious of their, and the country's, status. However, once the international gaze has shifted to its next sparkling target, there is no telling when it will once again be 'business as usual'.

Vague laws give power to authorities, as they imbue the actor in charge with both investigatory and judicial powers, being able to exercise at will the prosecution of the law. What is needed is a clear, black and white law, which draws a line that lawmakers, police, and civil society, can see. This would place controls on state authorities by giving non-state actors an awareness of their rights. Japan still has a little way to go.

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2 Sugunuma, M. 3 November 2012. 'Dancing Ban in Japanese Nightclubs, Netizen Reactions', *Japan Crush,* www.tinyurl.com/japancrush (accessed 24 November 2014)
3   John Dower details how various cultures arose from this – a sexualized literature (*kasutori* literature), prostitutes or 'women of the night' (*panpan* girls) and a general need for escapism encapsulated in the 'three-S' policy of sex, sports and screen, washed down with copious amounts of black market *shochu* or methylated spirits called *bakudan* (bomb). Dower, J. 1999. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II,* New York: W.W. Norton Company/The New Press.
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6 A 2008 National Police Agency 'Special Report on the Yakuza' states that due to their inroads into the financial sector the yakuza represent a threat to the economy itself; fifty *Kodo-kai* (a wealthy sub-branch of the *Yamaguchi-gumi* clan) members parade themselves on stage at a Nagoya sumo stadium while live on NHK, in the summer of 2009; the *Yamaguchi-gumi* syndicate begins to record the names and details of police officers and their family members; finally resulting in National Police Agency chief Ando Takaharu's call to all police forces in Japan to devote their energies to tackling the *Kodo-kai* and other yakuza groups. Adelstein, J. 2011. 'The Yakuza: No Longer Welcome in Japan (2)', *Culturemag.de,* www.tinyurl.com/adelstein2 (accessed 24 November 2014)
7 Several high profile cases of celebrities in drugs and assault related cases in nightclubs around Nishi-Azabu and Daikan-yama in Tokyo, involving *Kanto Rengo-kai* members – long time number one sumo wrestler Asashoryu Akinori in February 2010 (sumo a sport riddled with yakuza and gambling connections) and 11th generation kabuki actor Ebizo Ichikawa in December 2010 – have drawn increased public attention to the 'club as danger' perception.
8 Cybriwsky, R. A. 2011. *Roppongi Crossing: The Demise of a Tokyo Nightclub District and the Re-Shaping of a Global City,* Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press.
9 Stefan Saxanoff, an expat club owner in Tokyo, claims that a policy evaluation tool launched in 2001 called 'Law to Evaluate the Administration of Policies' [*Gyosei kikan ga okonau seisaku no hyoka ni kansuru hōritsu*] is the problem. It requires bodies to report centrally on regulations they are responsible for, to assess whether they are still relevant and workable. In the case of *fueiho,* rather than admit that the regulation is old and irrelevant, it incentivizes the police to use the law more, in order to show that it is still worth having on the statute book. Quoted in Hadfield, J. 12 October 2012. 'Japan: no dancing please. Police are raiding clubs nationwide for the "crime" of dancing. What's going on?', *Timeout,* www.tinyurl.com/timeoutJapan (accessed 24 November 2014)
10 This is perhaps due to the currently fashionable *machi zukuri* (community building) philosophy, jurisprudentially enacted through the 'City Planning Act' (2000) and the 'Local Autonomy Act' (2003), combined with an increase in 'Local Ordinances for Safe Community Building' (crime prevention coalitions of citizens that began in Osaka in response to increased criminal activity). These are leading to an increasing degree of local activism against perceived local troublemakers. Residents are now more active in their neighborhoods and complaints to police are taken very seriously. Nightclubs also take this seriously, and position staff outside and along the street upon closing to shush people as they leave.
11 Grunebaum, D. 2000. 'Stop The Music!', *Metropolis: Tokyo Classified* issue 300, www.tinyurl.com/grunebaum (accessed 24 November 2014)
12 In 2011 US President Obama signed Executive order 13581 giving the US Department of Treasury the ability to impose sanctions on transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), allowing the freezing of their assets in the US. Japan's isolation strategy of the yakuza was effectively internalized. See: White House. 25 July 2011. *Executive Order13581-Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations,* www.tinyurl.com/blockprop (accessed 24 November 2014)
13 Quoted in Knight, S. 23 June 2014. 'License to boogie: Japan moves to ease dancing ban', *Reuters,* www.tinyurl.com/reutersboogie (accessed 24 November 2014)
14 Yagi, T. 25 October 2014. 'Want to dance? Cabinet approves revised law easing regulations on dance clubs', *Asahi Shimbun,* www.tinyurl.com/revisedlaw (accessed 24 November 2014)
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'Strange peoples'

Writing in 1670, Cornelis Speelman offered one of the earliest descriptions of the Sama Bajo of eastern Indonesia preserved in the archives of the Dutch East India Company (VOC). Though brief, Speelman's account was most influential. His assessment of who the Sama Bajo were, and what they were capable of, formed the basis for later representations of these people in Company documents. Perceptions of the Sama Bajo changed little over the next century, and they continued to be portrayed as simple sea nomads and slaves of the landed kingdoms of Sulawesi. This enduring view influenced the manner in which Sama Bajo peoples were reported on and dealt with by Company officials in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and it continues to be influential in more recent accounts of Sama Bajo history.

Lance Nolde

INFLUENTIAL AS IT IS, Speelman's monumental 646-page report to his superiors and successors, known as the *Notitie*, actually contains very little information on the Sama Bajo. In Speelman's time, and still today, the Sama Bajo were encountered across the length and breadth of eastern maritime Southeast Asia; from the southern Philippines to the Timor coast, and from eastern Kalimantan to the Bird's Head of West Papua. The Sama Bajo with whom Speelman was most familiar, those of eastern Indonesia, form one sub-group of the larger Samalan ethnolinguistic family, arguably the most widely dispersed peoples indigenous to Southeast Asia.[1] Known most popularly as 'sea peoples' or 'sea nomads', the Sama Bajo are a highly mobile people who live in boats or in littoral villages scattered throughout the region, and are unrivaled in their abilities as sailors, navigators, fishers, hunters, and collectors of various sea products. Despite their pervasiveness in Indonesian waters, however, very little about the Sama Bajo was known to Speelman and his contemporaries. For Speelman, Sama Bajo peoples were an interesting but peripheral feature of eastern Indonesia's political and commercial scene.

A guide for future governors

Speelman's cursory notes on the Sama Bajo were written in 1669 following the VOC's conquest of the South Sulawesi kingdom of Gowa, and the principal port and commercial center of that kingdom, known as Makassar. Prior to its defeat, Gowa was the most powerful kingdom in eastern Indonesia and its port-city Makassar (named after its chief inhabitants, the Makassarese) was the most important entrepot in the region. There, traders of all nations came to acquire Malukan spices, slaves, textiles, and products harvested from the forests and seas, which were then shipped to other parts of Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and the wider Indian Ocean world. The Makassar Wars (1666-1669), as they came to be known, were the culmination of VOC efforts to establish a monopoly on the spice trade out of Maluku. By removing Makassar from Gowa's authority, the Company mostly eliminated what had been the main source of spices outside its own control. Gowa's defeat also resulted in a permanent Dutch presence in South Sulawesi and the creation of a system of port-controls, maritime patrols,

and sailing passes designed to regulate and restrain the movement of people and goods between Makassar and other areas of the Indo-Malay archipelago.

Speelman's *Notitie* was written as a memorandum of transfer and instructions for those officials who would head the newly established Company-post in Makassar after the admiral's return to Batavia. A copy was deposited in Fort Rotterdam to serve for future governors as a reference and guide to the complicated world of South Sulawesi politics, culture, and commerce. Later VOC governors of Makassar consulted the *Notitie* when writing their own reports and when forming decisions regarding native affairs in Sulawesi. Seen as the earliest and most reputable source of information regarding the local situation, Speelman's take on South Sulawesi, including his portrayal of the Sama Bajo, was echoed in the writings of subsequent officials throughout the eighteenth century.

Enduring impression

"These people", Speelman wrote of the Sama Bajo, "before the war lived in fairly large numbers under the jurisdiction of Makassar, most living on the islands offshore … [and] they travel also to all the islands further out to sea … collecting

Above: Sama Bajo women returning home after harvesting firewood.

Below: Pile-homes in a Sama Bajo village off the east coast of Sulawesi at low tide.

tortoiseshell from there which they must deliver to the King of Makassar … [they] furthermore must always be prepared to go anywhere in their boats, whenever they are sent by the king to his advantage, as these people are slaves of the king." In addition, those settled in island villages, "many of them", he noted, "live in boats on the water, and forage everywhere around the islands." During the roughly three years he spent in South Sulawesi, Speelman came to see the Sama Bajo as simple fisher folk who served as slaves of the Makassarese kings. They provided their lords with sea products and seaborne transportation whenever called, but the Sama Bajo otherwise remained at the geographic and sociopolitical margins of Makassar.

Knowledge about the Sama Bajo among Dutch officials in Makassar increased only minimally in the following decades. Whenever the Sama Bajo do appear in Company documents they are invariably described as wandering fishermen, and reference is usually made to their perceived status as slaves of the Makassarese and Bugis kings. When commenting on the Sama Bajo in their reports, officials typically rehashed one aspect or another of Speelman's description, or simply referred the reader to Speelman. Thus, in Company documents written almost sixty years after the *Notitie* was completed,

The Sama Bajo in VOC perception and policy

the description of the Sama Bajo remained mostly unchanged, such as in a memorandum from 1727, where the Sama Bajo were said to "serve mostly in regard to navigation … and can be compared only to freebooters". "For their description, and regarding Gowa's authority over them," the author wrote, "your Honor shall refer to the memorandum of Lord Speelman in which these *Badjos* are mentioned foremost as wandering gatherers of goods from every place, formerly only in service for the Makassarese, but now also for the Bugis."

Even after nearly a century of interaction with these "strange peoples", the portrayal of the Sama Bajo in Company discourse remained largely the same with little or no augmentation. In a memorandum from 1760, for example, the governor describes the Sama Bajo as "a people who have no home", who "dwell in any place where they can obtain a livelihood by fishing", and who are "subjects of the Makassarese and used by them as slaves". Just as his predecessors, this governor ends his piece on the Sama Bajo by referring his readers to Speelman as the primary source of information. Highly similar descriptions of the Sama Bajo appear in the reports and missives of each successive governor of Makassar until the dissolution of the VOC in 1799, and even in the colonial records of the nineteenth century.

Linking Company perception and policy

More than simply a discursive phenomenon, there is reason to suggest that this enduring impression of the Sama Bajo also affected the manner in which the Company administration in Makassar reported on and dealt with Sama Bajo peoples in areas under their jurisdiction. As mentioned above, the daily reports and missives produced by each governor were not merely records but were active, ongoing participants in discussions about Company policies and practices. In the case of the Sama Bajo, the institutionalized perception of these wandering sea peoples may have informed Company practices in ways that proved detrimental to VOC trade monopolies and its attempt to control the waterways.

For nearly sixty years after the Makassar War, the Sama Bajo were the sole group of seafarers from South Sulawesi who, at least in practice, were not required to possess Company-issued sailing passes, and their vessels were not routinely inspected upon entering or departing from Dutch-controlled Makassar. Where the Dutch administration in Makassar put forth tremendous effort beginning in 1671 to circumscribe and supervise the movements of traders from other Sulawesian ethnic communities, the smaller, less suspicious Sama Bajo boats apparently were not subjected to such stringent controls. Perceived as a relatively benign fisherfolk, it became de facto Company policy in Makassar for the Sama Bajo to come and go much more freely than other groups.

This aberration in Company policy proved detrimental to its commercial and security interests. Contrary to the conventional perception held by Speelman and his successors, the Sama Bajo were a vital element of the Gowa kingdom and its political and commercial dominance in eastern Indonesia. Since before the fifteenth century Sama Bajo groups were strong allies of Gowa and the related kingdom of Talloq, serving as fishers, sailors, traders, and warriors, and their elite held esteemed positions within the Makassarese court. Sama Bajo fleets sailed throughout the Indo-Malay archipelago collecting valuable sea products, transporting precious spices and other commodities, and helping to expand Makassarese influence through trade and warfare.

Not surprisingly, the Sama Bajo continued to serve these same functions with vigor soon after Gowa's defeat and they therefore took on a renewed importance in the changed political and commercial climate of eastern Indonesia. It appears that some Sama Bajo took advantage of their special treatment to bring contraband goods into Makassar undetected, while others navigated the nearby rivers and creeks to bring their cargo to market clandestinely. Sama Bajo regularly sailed in and out of the waters surrounding Dutch Makassar carrying trade goods, letters, and even weapons and ammunition, using their small boats to move such 'contraband' without detection. In the more distant islands of eastern Indonesia as well, Sama Bajo boats carried on in their activities, transporting spices, sea products, wax, and slaves from various resource zones to key intermediary ports that remained outside Dutch control, as well as to the markets of South Sulawesi. Occasionally these Sama Bajo boats and crew encountered VOC patrol ships. In the waters of South Sulawesi they most often were allowed to sail on or enter the roadstead without inspection. On a few occasions, however, Sama Bajo boats – especially the larger, less stereotypically Sama Bajo vessels, and those in areas distant from Makassar – raised suspicions, and the encounter was more violent. In these instances Sama Bajo sailors either fled the patrol ship or attacked preemptively and engaged in battle. In the period between 1670 and 1726, several such clashes took place between Sama Bajo sailors and Company ships, a number of which resulted in the arrest of Sama Bajo crews. Reports and complaints from other Company outposts about Sama Bajo 'smuggling' activities, however, were far more frequent than such arrests.

Above: A Sama Bajo fisherman with a captive Fish-Eagle. Tukangbesi, Indonesia.

All photos by author.

A series of events in the 1720s called into question the practice of letting the Sama Bajo travel more freely than other groups. Reports of Sama Bajo smuggling, slave raiding, and involvement in the contraband trade in Malukan spices, increased in this period, and several violent clashes took place between Sama Bajo and Dutch patrols. This surge in undesirable events forced the Dutch to reevaluate their conventional treatment of Sama Bajo peoples in and around Makassar. Yet, within discussions regarding the need to control the 'excessively free' and 'unbounded' movements of Sama Bajo peoples, the established description of the Sama Bajo remained little changed. Even in the face of these disruptive activities the Sama Bajo were portrayed as simple, benighted subjects forced to take part in the machinations of their Makassarese and Bugis rulers. Accordingly, while Company practice and policy in Makassar regarding the Sama Bajo began to change, the way in which the Sama Bajo were perceived and depicted in administrative records did not. In the eyes of the Dutch administration, the Sama Bajo remained, as one official wrote in 1759, "slaves of Bone and Gowa … such as was noted in the statement of the Honorable Lord Speelman."

This dominant perception of the Sama Bajo also influenced the manner in which Sama Bajo people appeared, or did not appear, in Company records. As poor, wandering "vagabonds of the sea" [zeeschuimers] who lacked any sort of political or social organization, and who were little more than industrious slaves, Dutch officials apparently could not envisage Sama Bajo peoples holding any kind of status or authority in Sulawesi or elsewhere in eastern Indonesia. Thus, when a powerful Sama Bajo leader waged war against the Sultanate of Bima on numerous occasions in the eighteenth century, the Dutch administration in Makassar just assumed the leader was a Makassarese noble rather than the high-status Sama Bajo he was. Institutional wisdom suggested it was inconceivable that Sama Bajo could hold positions of such power, that they could lead Makassarese troops in war, or that they could govern coveted lands on behalf of Gowa's king. The strength of such long-held perceptions apparently blinded most Company officials to the complexity of the Sama Bajo and prevented them from understanding the importance of these communities for Makassar and for Indonesian commerce more generally.

So much more

This view of the Sama Bajo as having been marginal sea nomads and slaves of Makassarese and Bugis kings remains common in popular and scholarly literature. Elements of seventeenth and eighteenth-century Dutch representations of Sama Bajo culture and status are often still present in more recent scholarship and, as a result, much of what has been written reflects the Sama Bajo's current socioeconomic marginalization more so than their historical significance. Recent research in Sama Bajo, Makassarese, and other local oral and written traditions, in conjunction with a more thorough examination of the VOC archives, however, reveals an entirely different picture than these familiar, but inaccurate characterizations of the Sama Bajo.[2] More than nomadic fisher folk, the Sama Bajo in the early modern period were a powerful and proud people who fulfilled a variety of roles critical to the creation and maintenance of Indonesian sociopolitical and commercial networks. They were not only the primary collectors of valuable sea products so crucial to international trade, but they were also navigators and explorers, traders and merchants, seaborne raiders, nobles and figures of authority within landed polities, and even territorial powers in their own right.

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Encoding visual imagery of *Ki Suryŏn* exported to the West

This essay examines the iconography of an instructional DVD of GiCheon, a contemporary Korean mind-body discipline.[1] Cultural practices such as these, commonly referred to as qigong in China and *ki suryŏn* (氣修練 cultivating life energy) in Korea,[2] are often reconstructed in East-Asian modernity on the basis of ancient traditions. The DVD was produced to support GiCheon adepts and to advertise the practice to potential newcomers. As a practitioner myself, I am familiar with theories of self-cultivation in GiCheon; within this theoretical context I suggest interpreting the video as a 'decoding' of the call for self-development within a visual narrative located in the mountains, particularly through the images of water, wood and stone.

Victoria Ten

Banished, now rediscovered

In the West, practices of self-cultivation are reemerging, after having been banished to the fringes about four centuries ago. Michel Foucault categorized these and similar practices as *epimeleia heautou*, 'the care of the self'. He held that self-care (implying intellectual, moral and physical transformation) was a common ethical axis of Greek, Hellenistic and Roman philosophy. However, within the narratives of Western subjectivity Foucault also identified a 'Cartesian moment', climaxing in the 17th century with the relegation of self-care to the periphery of Western intellect, where it survived mainly in the occult realm.[3]

Self-care is rooted in archaic techniques of purification, concentration of the spirit/breath, interiority through abstinence from the external, and practices based on the endurance of pain and hardship. These techniques were shared by a number of civilizations and, having travelled through a number of avatars, are visible in the contemporary era in practices characterized as 'internal alchemy'. East-Asian and European civilizations share 'operational (external)' and 'spiritual (internal)' alchemical practices and principles. European alchemical knowledge arises from ancient Greek and Arabic alchemy, which, there is evidence to suggest, developed under East-Asian influences.[4] If the declared endeavor of external alchemy is the creation of an elixir that turns any metal into gold and gives eternal life, internal alchemy achieves perfection and immortality through transformative processes in the body and mind of the adept. In practice, external and internal alchemy often intersect and merge.

Alchemists strived to discover vital cosmologic and cosmogonic principles through which they hoped to effect transformation of matter as well as heal disease and prolong life. In contemporary times, internal alchemic practices have reemerged as traditions reinvented, rediscovered and exported from East Asia westwards. These practices have merged with the remnants of ancient Western occult arts. Self-cultivation as 'alternative medicine' has fought its way into academia; technologies of self-transformation have thus been rediscovered by Western science.

Iconography

GiCheon, 'a school of internal alchemy' (in the language of Don Baker, the only other scholar who mentions the existence of GiCheon in an English language academic work[5]), is one example of Korean *ki suryŏn*. As an expression of the vast mind-body culture in East-Asia, GiCheon favors verbal articulations even less than other similar practices. In fact, the motto of GiCheon is 말과 글에 집착하지 말고 몸으로만 수행해라 [Do not cling to words and letters just practice with your own body]. The wish to communicate GiCheon in a manuscript thus presents a problem. In accordance with this sentiment, the 'GiCheon Instructional DVD Volume One' was produced in June 2002, by GiCheon teacher and practitioner Lee Ki-tae. The target audience are English-speakers, even though there is only music and no one actually talks in this DVD. Nevertheless, the visual narrative is rich with imagery, 'speaking without words'. I argue that in producing this visual aid, Lee paid special attention to maintaining the dignity of the practice, not compromising its integrity, while 'selling' it to the general public. Below, I discuss the choice of images used in the video. Asking what meaning the images might have for the maker and the viewer, I suggest interpreting them as an explication of an alchemical transmutation of the self.

In 2014, an encounter with academic discourses on art and craft marked for me the beginning of the process of articulating my GiCheon experiences. Particularly important in this respect was reading Pamela Smith on the connection between crafts and alchemy[6] and Rebecca Brown on the deployment of visual symbolism in nationalist movements.[7] I do not elaborate here on the nationalistic aspect of GiCheon – despite it being strongly present in GiCheon narrative – yet there is much in common between Gandhi's use of a spinning wheel image for his anticolonial struggle, discussed by Brown, and the deployment of iconography in GiCheon internal alchemy and other mind-body practices. Instead, I focus on the simple semi-abstract images of mountain landscapes (including streams, lakes, trees), which anchor the conscious and unconscious perceptions of the viewer.[8] These images carry extensive meanings; GiCheon flyers, books and websites abound with such visuals, most often focusing on mountains and mountain streams.

The DVD opens with a scene of streaming water. The viewer faces the stream from the front, seeing it cascade between two rocky slopes, down into a little lake, formed and bordered by large stones. The viewer appears to be standing in the lake, with the water streaming at and through him/her. The slopes are covered with greenery, the tree branches stretch out over the water, the passage is flecked by dappled sunlight. The camera then zooms in on the gushing water; splashing and splattering over the rocks. This visual narrative focuses on the lively, dynamic, crude but graceful vigor of the water. We see the current circulating in a little basin, contouring the protruding boulders, which have clearly been rounded and weathered by the water.

Turning for a moment to the theory of GiCheon, we could decode the visual message of the opening scene as follows. In GiCheon, human beings are compared to a lake that is connected to other lakes by routes or channels. A certain amount of water ('*ki*-life energy', manifesting as blood and lymph, awareness, consciousness, sensibility and other kinds

Left and right: Series of stills from the GiCheon Instructional DVD Volume One.

of information) circulates within the lake, new water constantly comes in, and some water leaves. As the new 'water' – food, sensations, experiences, perceived words and actions of others, etc. – comes in, there is a constant need to 'purify' the water. There will always be 'bad water' left and some stagnation cannot be avoided. But the relative amount of 'bad and stagnant water' can be reduced, in an attempt to achieve 'better flow', which is the primary goal of GiCheon practice.

GiCheon stances are supposed to facilitate smooth passage of 'information' through the body and mind-heart; food and liquids are absorbed easily, sweat and excrements leave the body comfortably, thoughts and emotions are perceived and realized efficiently, words are said and actions performed with greater honesty and simplicity. In GiCheon this 'flow of information' is addressed as 'ki flow' and is metaphorically compared to the circulation of water, visually represented in the video.

The camera's focus moves from the small waterfall towards the stone basin. This is a separate section of the stream, with a clearly marked beginning and an end. We can interpret this as a human lifespan. Every thing has a beginning and an end, and every form will be 'unformed' in the course of time. The flow of life occurring within an individual as a microcosm, and in the universe as a macrocosm, is exemplified in the visual narrative as a mountain stream, a little 'world in itself' illustrating an alchemical transmutation.

The view shifts towards the smooth slopes of tree-covered mountains. The camera zooms in on multi-colored wooden pavilions built in a traditional Korean style, Buddhist pagodas and bells, and then a Buddhist monk striking a big drum in one of the pavilions. In a sense, this progression from a natural mountain panorama towards wooden buildings, metal structures, and the display of culturally engaged humans, is significant. This is the advancement from nature to culture, whereby nature is not discounted, but continues to coexist harmoniously with culture. This is typical for an East-Asian worldview, usually categorized as Daoist. In one scene the viewer is shown a red and green wooden roof of a pavilion, set against the backdrop of trees with red and green leaves; culture and nature are not contradictory, but supplementary, they echo and support each other. Images of water, mountains, trees, wooden and metal structures, and humans, presented with the sounds of 'Korean mediation music', connote the motifs of alchemical transformation and everlasting transmutation of life. Through these themes, a wide range of meanings is attributed to GiCheon. Besides an obvious connection to mountainous immortality and the invigorating, cleansing and penetrating quality of water, the visual narrative claims an 'ancient and traditional' status for GiCheon, placing it in the same line with Korean Buddhism and Korean architecture. The bells and drum-playing hint at GiCheon artistic and creative aspects, supporting the

... visual depiction on the screen becomes a technique, a medium for self-transformation ...

notions of awakening and self-actualization. GiCheon practice is a conscious and directed attempt at self-transformation.

The practitioner in the video (demonstrating the specific postures and moves of the practice) stands near a tree, a stone pagoda, and water. Water, wood and stone, are symbolic representations: stones are bones; trunk, branches, leaves and roots are organs and soft tissues; water is blood and other bodily fluids. In nature, the elements transform, and so does the human body. Water, wood and stone frame the practitioner; he is like a precious jewel in a royal crown surrounded by lesser gems. And still, he bears the most intimate connection with them – they are of the same nature, they are him, his parts, companions and followers. And he is silent – just like them. They are also his teachers. The GiCheon adept has to be silent like trees, but unquestionably alive and present; his movements must be smooth and natural, like the flow of the water, but also defined and powerful, stable as a mountain, and if needed, hard like stone.

Conclusion

By analyzing the images used in the instructional video, this paper has examined the routes by which Eastern internal alchemy finds its way within Western societies. I explored how various visual images subsumed within overarching symbols of water, wood and stone, correlate with the 'self' placed at the center of the visual narrative, creating the dynamics of interactive knowledge and mutual transformation, thus continuing an alchemical tradition and the 'care of the self'.

This paper looked at the two layers of knowledge involved in the alchemical process of GiCheon. The first is the alchemical operation in the body and mind of the adept, which are related in GiCheon theory, and the second is its visual representation on the screen. But the two layers are connected: visual images direct and shape the alchemical process inside the 'self', thus encouraging the transformation of the self. This is how visual depiction on the screen becomes a technique, a medium for self-transformation, a 'technology self' in Foucauldian terms.

The instructional DVD portrays a practitioner performing static and dynamic stances. He is always in the center of the screen – a site of subjectivity, authenticity and personal power. The icons enveloping the performer include water, wood/trees and stone/rocks; these are not only symbolic manifestations of the physical body, but also of the 'cosmic' body, which is nature, surrounding, containing, supporting, and nourishing the physical body. As the practitioner's *ki* (氣) grows stronger, s/he reverses the process and starts, in turn, to nourish the cosmos – to carry, embody and transform it, thus effecting an alchemical transmutation on the levels of the microcosm and the macrocosm.

The visual/digital representation of GiCheon theory and practice on the screen, revealing dialectic connections

between microcosm and macrocosm, allows a glimpse into the reinvented Korean traditions of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries currently exported to the West. GiCheon finds its inspiration and its power in the wilderness and mountainous landscapes of Korea and the alchemic traditions of past and present – traditions which continue to shape the topographical, physical, spiritual and moral lives of the Korean peninsula. The GiCheon instructional DVD is one medium through which East-Asian internal alchemy claims its place in Western or modern society, helping to maintain the global circulation of knowledge and practice.

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Under the Umbrella

Umbrella sociology

Alistair Fraser

IN ENGLISH, THE NOUN UMBRELLA comes from the Latin *umbella,* meaning flat-topped flower, and from *umbra,* meaning shade: a flower that protects. In written Chinese, however, the character used for umbrella is not a noun, but a verb, 'to block' (遮, ze). While these roots share a common idea – of defence and safety – they also allude to divergent meanings. One is static and organic, the other mobile and proactive. Both represent something important about the protests.

While some – particularly international – reports have depicted the Umbrella Movement as being relatively homogenous and cohesive, the protests have in fact been extremely heterogenous. As the contributions to this issue demonstrate, participants have been focused on action rather than reaction; on individual acts of resistance rather than a unifying narrative. Indeed, Cantonese-speaking friends tell me that few people actually used the terms 'umbrella' or 'movement' in everyday discussions. Conversations are more grounded in action: 'Did you occupy Admiralty?' 'Did you sit-in?' This gap between representation and reality shows the value of sociology in making sense of unfolding social and political events.

In 1959, the sociologist C Wright Mills published a now-famous book called *The Sociological Imagination*. In it, Mills outlines a way of thinking that links the micro-level of everyday life with the macro-level of structural change, between what he calls 'private troubles' and 'public issues'. By shuttling back and forth between these levels, Mills thought it possible to relate large-scale political and economic shifts to personal decision-making. Cultivating this approach means not only an ability to analyse the emergent aspects of social life – of history 'in-the-making' – but also in grasping the significance of individual action in altering its path. In demonstrating the contingent nature of life, Mills thought that sociology could promote social activism.

Fifty-five years later, this way of thinking remains an indispensable tool in understanding current social change and, importantly, one not reserved solely for academics. In many ways the Umbrella Movement involved the rapid development of a kind of mass sociological imagination, in which a direct connection between individual choice and structural change became obvious for a sizable population. The private troubles of individuals, families and communities became fused with the public issue of political representation, and it became clear that action was possible.

As the student contributions to this issue show, the forms of involvement varied tremendously – from steadfast occupiers to online translators, quiet contributors to logistical coordinators – but were nonetheless unified under the banner of collective action. In this sense, the English roots of *umbella* and *umbra* feel particularly apt – these actions represent the flowering of an organic form of grassroots politics that is both powerful and protective. This unifying umbrella brought together people from varying backgrounds and political stripes, and created space for a range of minority groups to have a voice.

Indeed, what has often been missed is that this particular social movement has been a particularly *social* movement. Though most came to the protest sites for the politics, many stayed for the community. In a city so keenly focused on individual success, where living spaces are so incredibly cramped, the occupy sites were a revelation. Collectively, participants redefined the space – from a spaghetti-junction choked with taxis, buses and fumes to a spontaneous space of quiet defiance and interdependent conviction. The expansive spaces of the protests sites also proved to be fertile soil for the growth of creativity, as art and resistance came together in the form of sculpture, banners, and DIY post-its.

As some of the other contributions here illustrate, however, peering beneath this umbrella reveals a complex range of social divisions: the creation of community is both protective and exclusive. During the height of the protests, suddenly you were in or out, for or against, yellow or blue. In this sense, the Chinese verb for umbrella, 'to block', helps to clarify more than the English. The protests were mobile, active, defiant – in turn, tensions based on gender and social class became exposed, social boundaries were solidified, rumour and conspiracy flourished. What this shows is that, among other things, social movements must be understood not just at a broad level of abstraction, but at the level of the individual; they are social, human struggles above all.

And this, to me, speaks of why we need sociology. Making sense of major world events through their impact on daily life; shuttling between history, biography and culture; seeking out the cracks between representation and reality. This is the stuff of the sociological imagination. C Wright Mills would, I'm sure, have approved of the Umbrella Movement, as a powerful demonstration of both the 'task' and the 'promise' of sociology that he spoke of so passionately. More than asking what sociology can do for the Umbrella Movement, though, we might ask what the Umbrella Movement can do for sociology. We might, for instance, think of a form of 'umbrella sociology' that is both protective yet engaged, unifying yet mobile, civic yet creative. Now that's an umbrella I'd like to get under.

Understanding the Umbrella Movement from the perspective of governance in post-1997 Hong Kong

Kwok Wing-hei, Richard

SINCE THE HANDOVER OF SOVEREIGNTY IN 1997, social conflict and popular mobilization have been challenging the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government. This culminated in the Umbrella Movement: beneath the calls for universal suffrage lie people's grievances about the government's incapability in alleviating socioeconomic inequalities and the attendant problems. I will argue that such incompetence is rooted in the 'built-in' weaknesses of Hong Kong's political structure.

Problem on the surface: inequalities in the global city
Since the 1990s, Hong Kong has developed into what Saskia Sassen calls a global city that witnesses a polarizing occupational structure and widening income inequality, the manifestations of which are multi-faceted. For instance, housing becomes increasingly unaffordable for the average household; hence the ever-lengthening waiting list for public housing, and the 'popularity' of sub-divided units, i.e., partitioned rooms in flats often located in poorly maintained old residential buildings, as an option of accommodation. This is not helped by skyrocketing property prices, but the government's commitment to restructuring the housing market and land supply, which is vital for curbing speculative activities, is also conspicuously absent. The dismay of the public is visualized in the Umbrella Movement: protesters label their tents with the names of luxury residences, so as to mock the government's failure to provide people shelter.

Housing policy exemplifies the government's departure from a redistributive agenda. With the ascendency of the neoliberal doctrine in public policy-making since the late colonial era, emphasis has been placed on minimizing public expenditure, purportedly geared towards making public administration more efficient and raising the competitiveness of the local economy in the global market. This explains the gradual withdrawal of the role of the government from housing provision, and in relation to this urban planning, as in the case of the provision of education and medicine. The government thus becomes less and less accountable to the needs and interests of the public, as evidenced in increasing housing unaffordability.

Structural weakness of governance: a look at the legislature
Bucking the trend of neoliberalism is not easy in a globalizing economy and will not singularly help salvage the government's dwindling accountability to the public. Conservative budget practices, an executive-led government and elitist rule were hallmarks of Hong Kong's colonial rule and were considered essential to the maintenance of the city's capitalist way of life after the handover in 1997. Written into, and guaranteed in, the Basic Law is therefore the skewed power distribution in favour of pro-business, pro-Beijing functional interests in the political institutional set-up. According to the Basic Law, the Legislative Council (Legco) should be made up of an identical number of seats returned from the directly-elected geographic constituencies

Above:
A protester named his/her tent 'Umbrella Residence' in the Admiralty occupy area, mocking the way the government turns a blind eye to a property market increasingly skewed towards the building of expensive residences by private developers, at the expense of the housing needs of the masses. Image courtesy of Benson Tsang.

(GCs) and those returned from the functional constituencies (FCs). The seats of the latter, professedly representative of the interests of the functional elites and distributed across 28 sectors (e.g., industrial and professional sectors), are, according to voter registration statistics, elected by an electorate 15 times smaller than that of the GCs. Despite this, the FCs hold equal power to the GCs in passing and blocking bills or motions under the separate voting system, where a passed motion or amendment should be supported by a simple majority of each of the GCs and FCs. In other words, the legislature is designed in such a way that diminishes the power of the GCs, where most democrats and pro-grassroots representatives are elected into. Their proposed bills and motions (e.g., legislation on the right to collective bargaining) can easily be vetoed by the FCs, which comprise mostly business and pro-establishment figures. In this sense, the legislature virtually guarantees the power of the FCs to authorize policies in favour of the interests of establishment and the business community, i.e., those that incur minimum expenditure on public services (hence minimizing the pressure for increased taxation) and facilitate maximum private capital accumulation. Such power imbalance underlies the continued struggle of the public for, say, the universal retirement protection system (which entails long-term commitment to public expenditure), and the approval of the construction of the HK$70 billion Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link in 2010, despite mass discontent.

The Basic Law: the writing on the wall
One should be reminded that the Basic Law was drafted by a committee dominated by PRC government officials, who, alongside the appointed local representatives, reported to the National People's Congress (NPC). This means the NPC was guaranteed the control of the institutional design of governance in post-1997 Hong Kong. From the NPC's point of view, the much-versed 'prosperity and stability' of Hong Kong's financial capitalism is pivotal for Chinese capital flow and accumulation in the global market, and, by extension, for PRC's continued economic growth, upon which the legitimacy of the Communist regime is founded ever since PRC opened its economy to the world in 1978. This explains the skewed power distribution in favour of pro-business, pro-Beijing functional interests in the SAR's political institutional set-up. With this in mind, one can understand why popular demand for further democratization, which entails the dismantlement of the FCs, has been strongly opposed by the business community since the late colonial period. One can also understand why, despite 'One Country, Two Systems' as envisioned in the Basic law, Beijing has unabashedly intervened in local politics, for example, through the 'reinterpretation' of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (SCNPC) of the Basic Law and the subsequent veto against universal suffrage in 2007 (for the Chief Executive (CE)) and 2008 (for the Legco).

The bone of contention in the Umbrella Movement, the proposed election method of the CE in 2017, was decided by the aforementioned SCNPC on 31 August 2014. It is stipulated that a 1200-member, allegedly 'broadly representative' selection committee represented by members of 4 sectors (comprising local representatives of the NPC and the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (NCCPPCC), as well as local functional elites) will be formed. For candidates to be nominated, they have to secure the support of half of the committee members. This 'universal suffrage' is controversial, as the above means that the nominees will be 'pre-screened' by a committee mostly comprised of pro-Beijing and pro-business figures. The CE elected will therefore likely to be strongly in favour of Beijing's and business interests, and the current power imbalance in the SAR's governance, and its eroded accountability to the public, will be continued. The Umbrella Movement broke out in the midst of public concern about such injustice, in the absence of any sign of resistance by the SAR government against the 31 August decision.

Conclusion
The Umbrella Movement represents another milestone in Hong Kong's struggle for democratization. The underlying reasons are complicated and intricate. I have shown that income inequality, and the ensuing 'new poverty' in Leo Goodstadt's words, is not merely aggravated by globalization, or inevitable in capitalist societies, as the first and second CEs respectively would have us believe. It is a case of ineffective governance built into the political institutional structure of the SAR. The grassroots and the socially-underprivileged, with their strong presence in mass mobilization in recent years, are primed for political reform. The government, with its 'wait-and-see' attitude, is misguided in promulgating a view that 'livelihood issues' should be set apart from politics in the course of the Movement. Such a view can only encourage quick-fix solutions to social problems and social conflict, deters the making of transformative policy, and further erodes its accountability to the public. This, I believe, will bring about more political impasses and challenges from the civil society in the close future.

Youth participation in the Umbrella Movement: the role of new media

Compiled by Carmen Tong

OCCUPIERS AND ORDINARY PEOPLE ALIKE, Hongkongers found themselves glued to different new media since teargas swept the streets of Admiralty. News and updates diffused quickly beyond the territory through multilingual updates on Facebook. Working with almost 800 translators, I witnessed the eagerness of netizens' engagement in the Umbrella Movement.

Notwithstanding the reservations of its critics, new media plays a crucial role in the mobilization of social movements across the world. Indeed, for the younger generation in Hong Kong, new media is the platform through which they exchange information and perspectives, engage in dialogues, make their voices heard, coordinate resource mobilization, hence exercise their rights and empower themselves as citizens. New media is indispensable as a public sphere for them, as the following 4 narratives testify.

Wing-sum Leung
Like many, I was only an 'information receiver' at the beginning of the movement. Not until the birth of a particular Facebook page did I experience the genuine power of technology. Different Facebook pages appeared simultaneously when protesters began occupying the streets. First-hand and timely updates, as well as information about locations of resource stations and strategies of student organizations, etc., became available online. The overflow of news and rumours caught the attention of some students in journalism, who then set up a new page to offer information verification. This page soon attracted thousands of followers and made its impact by rectifying the inaccuracies spotted on other Facebook Pages. This was a ground-breaking idea for me.

Hoping to enhance communications between students, I came up with the idea of building a platform for students to share and discuss our thoughts on the movement and political reform in Hong Kong. Instead of sleeping on the streets, my friends and I began channelling our energy into talking and reading. We extracted key arguments from the literature and interviews with scholars, and presented them on our own page. We also conducted our own interviews with other university students. The aim was to generate dialogue about how long-term measures can be implemented for citizens to achieve genuine universal suffrage.

Our Facebook page has transformed my experience in the movement; from a mere observer on the streets to an active participant focusing on social deliberation and lobbying. I believe my experience is not unique. Social media helps democratize the movement and elevates citizens' participation both quantitatively and qualitatively, in a manner possibly no other medium can match.

Alan Yau
The ignition of the first teargas bomb was not only witnessed in Admiralty, but also broadcast live on the internet. As diffusive as the gas, discussions about the police's action permeated into virtually all social networking sites and chat groups, constantly notifying and reminding me about the surreal development in those days. There was no escape from the sense of urgency and emotion that drives the most inert person into action, in real or virtual reality.

Largely a 'keyboard fighter' behind the screen in the events, I joined one of my classmates, who witnessed teargas bombs unremorsefully tossed into a first-aid station, in forming a group dedicated to making first-aid packs for medical stations. With students and staff working together, resources were quickly gathered, and the first-aid packs were ready within 24 hours. Everybody found their niche in helping; social boundaries were no longer in effect in the light of a greater cause. People joined different groups when needed, and they parted ways when the group had served its best.

Instant, bottom-up coordination, as exemplified by the work of our group, is hardly a rarity. To maximize the use of resources between occupy locations, a centralized online spreadsheet was developed and circulated among netizens.[1] Users remained anonymous to each other, yet worked together to optimize resource distribution. Although the movement has ended for now, efforts and the handiworks of Hong Kong citizens will forever be stored as zeros and ones on the internet, reminiscent of our glory.

Min-zhuo Zhou
The hubbub of the Umbrella Movement has gradually died down. While I was not a protester at the frontline, I still feel involved for what I did in transmitting the happenings of the movement via social media to family and friends in mainland China. In mainland China, official media did not report the movement and social media was placed under surveillance. When you typed 'Umbrella Movement' in Baidu, China's most popular search engine, you would be reminded that, "according to laws and regulations 'none' results can be found". This means all information has been filtered. Despite the government's great efforts in blocking information, people in mainland China were not completely in the dark. Weibo, the Chinese Twitter, is the most fascinating platform – because of its most tactful users. You need to play with words, for example using allusion or puns, when conveying sensitive issues.

Amid rumours of a clearing-off before the Chinese National Day, I voiced on Weibo my disappointment with some mainland students' apathy and my concerns for those on the streets, in a euphemistic way without mentioning "Hong Kong" or "Umbrella Movement". This triggered my friends' curiosity, even though not everyone was sympathetic. Afterwards, I elaborated my concerns using 'Moments' in Wechat, the Whatsapp counterpart, thus bypassing censorship on Weibo. When I reposted pictures and articles from Facebook onto my 'Moments', they generated constructive responses, and I felt my efforts in bringing the truth and concern for Hong Kong to people in mainland China had not been in vain.

Hok-yee Siu
"I would like to do a documentary. Can I videotape your dream about your future and about Hong Kong? "

This was my opening question to all the interviewees in the documentary I made. During the Umbrella Movement, young people were constantly criticised, mainly by their elders, for being idealistic and selfish. Idealistic, because their demands for universal suffrage are unlikely to ever materialise, and are certainly doubtful within the parameters stipulated by Beijing. Selfish, because their actions (e.g., road blocks) inconvenienced many others, and in all likelihood caused their parents to worry. Many critics furthermore argued that the young will eventually, when they grow up, abandon their 'superficial post-materialist' values (unrealistic ideals, detached from material reality). I found such cynicism repulsive, but couldn't help wondering what if such prophecies come true? I started to record young people's ideas in their own voice for my documentary project. I discovered that, beneath the slogan "I want genuine election", different protesters harbour different agendas about working towards a better Hong Kong.

One protester would like to run a quality bakery with reasonable prices for ordinary people; some would like to become teachers who nurture civic-minded pupils; and others would like to be professional journalists who work for the public. It was most interesting to learn that some protesters had never listened to their partners' dreams! I was especially touched by two junior college boys who were preparing for their school test under the streetlights. They chose not to go to the study area which had proper chairs and desks, because they felt that the students taking public examinations were more in need. Despite their different backgrounds, these young people were all trying to strive for the public good.

People say Hong Kong is dying, but the aspirations of young people are sparks in a seemingly hopeless situation. I still believe as long as we work out our individual dreams, a better Hong Kong will come true. My documentary is to preserve the present, so that neither our wishes nor our longing for democracy can be eroded by time.

Reference
1 http://tinyurl.com/centralspreadsheet

Below:
From the provision of supplies to the treatment of injuries sustained by pepper spray, information was shared and exchanged online in the Umbrella Movement.

25	Question	solved	pepper spray treatment 胡椒噴霧處理		Use salt water to wash off, milk to soothe/rinse burning 用鹽水清洗，牛奶舒緩/沖洗	1:10的比例（「勞工」和「Johnson's Baby」等），相較水、生理鹽水、牛奶更為有效，特別是牛奶，陽光曝曬加上缺乏冷藏設施下，容易變壞。 http://j.mp/oc-pepper1 http://j.mp/oc-pepper2 http://i.imgur.com/fDiHeq9.png
34	Question	solved	有台灣朋友準備支援物資。香港是否真的需要外地支援？	木港物資仍然充足		可否幫忙預備耳塞,眼罩及N95口罩 http://3mshop.kingnet.com.tw/3m-products-innovation.html?pcid=51
35	Question		im IT student what areas can I help in building system?			
36	Question		What is the channel of walkie talkie? I am Rabbit. I brought 20 walk talkies yesterday and the day before but cant find the channel			
37	Questions	solved	confirm香港goggles & N95已絕out of stock? 有冇人可以 provide 個人防護設備 (PPE) ge supplier contact? 佢地應該有 護目鏡、防護(呼吸)裝備等	少量商鋪仍有供應		
38	Questions	solved	有沒有人可以整理 "(5)相關支援點"	已有人處理中		

Under the Umbrella *continued*

The Opinion

"This is my choice, the right choice!" Police solidarity and power: some observations of police usage of social media

Leona Li & Josephine Sham

IN A WAY, the new media mobilizes and democratizes political participation. What we know less is how the new media also mobilizes participation in a counter-movement that defends police use of force and violence against the protesters in the sites of occupation. Some people speculated that police officers were 'indoctrinated', of which we had limited source of information for further investigation. However, thanks to our connections with the police force, we observed how, during the Umbrella Movement, junior police officers closely connected with one another via police forums and Facebook became bound together into a cohesive unit exuding solidarity. In the process, they shared articles arguing for the use of force and other related actions against the protesters.

On 5 October 2014, many of Leona's police friends posted onto Facebook their photos in which they wore blue, captioned with statements such as, 'We wear blue, so what? This is my choice, the right choice!' Against the yellow colour adopted by the protesters, blue symbolizes opposition against the Movement, and, in turn, support for or defence of police use of force against the protesters. Nevertheless, aside from the unquestioned trust placed in police's 'professionalism', Leona rarely saw grounds for such assertions provided. Posts like this drew many 'like' responses from fellow officers, but many respondents were actually not working at the frontline and knew little of what was really happening.

What is more disturbing is that Leona received a Facebook private message from a police acquaintance expressing his torn feelings. He disagreed with some police practices against the protesters, yet sympathized with frontline colleagues working for long hours. Such feelings were never publicly disclosed on Facebook. This begs the question: how many have been struggling to have their voices heard, beneath the façade of police solidarity that obscures differences?

Police solidarity was shored up by a siege mentality against not only accusations of their excessive use of force, but also provocative anti-police criticisms. Frontline officers,

Primed for action – but to what extent could individual police officers act upon their will? Image courtesy of Kwok Wing-hei, Richard.

overworked and stressed, felt indignant. "We are human. Why can't we voice our anger?". Josephine became deeply troubled by the police's problematic use of the social media. For example, a piece of news on Facebook about the assault against Hong Kong journalist Erik Mak, who was trying to capture an instance of scuffles in the Mongkok protest area, was shared by a police friend of hers. It was described with the statement, "Cool, feeling happy today". Seeing the many 'likes' drawn to this post, Josephine, after prolonged discussion with this friend, eventually 'unfriended' the latter. Personal and political relationships have been brought into tension across the city, causing some to become concerned about an erosion of police ethics and officers' dissipating sense of responsibility and concern for social injustice.

By collectively changing their Facebook profile pictures into ones with blue ribbons, in the same way the protesters /movement sympathizers did with yellow ribbons in the

aftermath of the teargas bombing on 28 September 2014, the police officers made a political statement. How such infringement of the Police Force Ordinance, which mandates political neutrality of the police, actually won the consent of the officers' supervisors is disquieting. The same can be said of the police's claim for their entitlements to freedom of speech – as the protesters and their sympathizers did – at the expense of their professionalism. What seemed forgotten is that, unlike average citizens, the police is equipped with the power to exercise the highest level of violence as long as it is in the name of 'maintaining social order'. Forfeiting political neutrality encourages the abuse of power of the political authority, thus putting more citizens at risk of the routinized use of excessive force by the police.

*Quotes were translated from Chinese to English and were modified for the sake of anonymity.

Do they belong? Women's presence in the masculinized 'public', as in the protests in Mongkok, was constantly policed, which delimited their exercise of agency as a citizen. Image courtesy of Tiong Leung.

THE UMBRELLA MOVEMENT comes as an awakening to the unlimited possibilities of enacting political citizenship in Hong Kong. Nonetheless, few are aware of the gender politics and the activism of the LGBT community embedded in the movement. Women and the LGBT community are entitled to freedom of speech under the protection of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and the Basic Law, but are their voices heard and recognized in the movement?

Women in the movement
Clara was at the frontline in Mongkok when a mob first violently confronted and attacked the protesters on 3 October 2014. Amid the yelling, swearing and pushing, a sharp male voice cutting through the air was heard screaming, "Protect the girls!". The girls who were too busy guarding the frontline were all of a sudden surrounded by a chain of men. Notwithstanding the good-will of these men, it is clear that they were acting on the assumption that women are weak and need protection. Gender assumptions are also validated and reinforced by the media. A picture posted by the press, captioned "a girl frightened crying", showed Clara crying. Clara was shocked to see her tears of extreme anger twisted into a symbol of fragility. She is not alone; the press is especially interested in showing women treated violently, such as those being tossed onto the ground or sexually harassed or assaulted by the police or passersby, most of them anti-Umbrella Movement protesters. Throughout the movement, we seldom find images of women fighting against violence, or hear women interviewed about their frontline experiences.

The voices unheard: gender politics and LGBT activism in the Umbrella Movement

Liona Li, Candice Tang and Clara Tang

Gender-biased and selective media representation is ever-present, and this is not helped by the construction of sites of protests as dangerous, hence 'masculine'. With frequent eruptions of violent confrontations since 3 October, Mongkok has become a site 'for man': "One is not a real man unless he has guarded Mongkok". Clara was often approached by male protesters in Mongkok for friendly conversations, but also for asking why she was there as a girl. She was frequently urged to go home, or to Admiralty, the other site located in a district of government offices, hotels and business. It was occupied by many university students and frequented by office ladies, thus perceivably 'safer' for women.

Women's existence in the movement has been categorized as one of passivity, vulnerability and victimhood. Clara's experience, alongside the sexual and verbal abuses directed at female protesters by both police and public, testify to how women's freedom to exercise their bodies and strength in the movement is constantly policed. The gendering of sites of protests attests to the entrenched divide between the masculinity-coded 'public' sphere, i.e., economy and politics, and the 'private' sphere, i.e., family, housework and childcare, which seemingly continues to be where women 'belong'. How unpaid 'private' labour limits the inclusion of many other women in the realm of the 'public', remains hidden from the purview of the public and many protesters.

The presence of the LGBT community
Since the de-criminalization of (male) homosexuality in 1991, the local LGBT community has been struggling for recognition of their identities and relationships. They have fought for legislation against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (2005/12), and for transgender people's right to marry (2009/12), etc. Nevertheless, they are still excluded from certain social rights (e.g., couples' eligibility for joint tax return or to apply for public housing). This is because citizenship in Hong Kong, as in Western liberal democracies, continues to rest on a (masculine – see discussion in the previous section) conception of a heterosexual individual, whose participation in the 'public' domain is supposed to be supported by the reproductive labour carried out in the 'private' realm of marriage and family: the institutionalized expression of heterosexuality. Despite the calls for 'care' if not 'tolerance' for sexual minorities, these belie the disgust and hatred directed against their alleged 'threat' to the 'majority', best exemplified in right-wing discourses mobilized during the controversy surrounding the government's intention to initiate public consultation about legislation against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The LGBT community is not deterred from asserting their identity in the 'public', however. They are to be seen everywhere in the movement, be it at the frontline, in the first-aid or supplies stations, in the 'rainbow village'

in Admiralty, or in Hong Kong Shield, a group established for the monitoring of the use of violence by the police during the movement. Liona and Candice, members of the inter-university activist group Action Q, have witnessed how the Umbrella Movement helps change perceptions and raises public awareness of LGBT issues. For instance, the arrest of a transgender protester in the confrontations in Mongkok has led people to question whether members of the LGBT community are sufficiently protected by the law.

The linkage between the LGBT movement and the Umbrella Movement is not a mere coincidence. With their exchanges with numerous protesters coming from the LGBT community, Liona and Candice come to realize that the everyday experience of sexual minorities actually sows the seeds for their engagement in pro-democracy movements, something that has gone unnoticed even by the protesters themselves. For them, compulsory heterosexuality is as oppressive and unalterable as the 31 August 2014 decision by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (SCNPC) that rules out genuine universal suffrage (see article by Kwok). Collective struggles have always been the only way for the LGBT community to fight for their deserved rights; such spirit of resistance has been the driving force behind their participation in the Umbrella Movement.

One should also be reminded that sexual minorities are victims under the current undemocratic political system. Because of the presence of the functional constituencies (FCs) in the Legislative Council (Legco) (see article by Kwok), there have been hardly any achievements by the LGBT movement in pushing for the recognition of their rights as citizens. In 2012, legislator Cyd Ho proposed to urge the government to initiate public consultation regarding legislation against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Under the separate voting system, the proposal was vetoed; it secured the support of the majority of the directly-elected geographical constituencies (GCs) (21 votes), but 17 out of 27 of the votes of the FCs were against it. As of 2014, there remains no government plan to initiate the aforementioned consultation process.

We are in the same boat
Many Hongkongers may have clung to their institutionalized heterosexual and male privilege in making claims for citizenship. However, with blocked access to decision-making through suffrage and rights to run for office in elections, everyone in Hong Kong is a second-class citizen. Without doubt, many have made their yearnings heard internationally in the Umbrella Movement, but the voices of women and the LGBT community are neglected. There is a long way to go for Hong Kong's democratization, but without redressing the hypocrisy in excluding women and sexual minorities as viable political actors, the battle will only be made more treacherous.

Epilogue
Doing umbrella sociology

Beatrice Oi-yeung Lam

FROM THE JULY 1ST MASS RALLY in 2003 to the Umbrella Movement, social activism empowers Hongkongers as citizens. The new media is often credited for how it pluralizes discourses and mobilizes action. Nonetheless, virtual communities remain susceptible to tendencies to exclude rather than include. This mirrors the apprehension towards diversity in the larger political society, rife with demonizing personal attacks that serve no more than to name and shame.

In these pages, our colleagues and students from the Department of Sociology of The University of Hong Kong spoke of what happens under the Umbrella in the Movement, at the same time doing umbrella sociology: we share marginalized, if not unheard voices, so as to protect them from being swamped. From these voices we learn to understand our personal troubles, from not affording a decent shelter to being questioned about presenting one's sexual identity in the protest area, as public issues. On this premise we learn to listen, put ourselves in others' shoes, and examine our own values, assumptions, interests, and the larger social context in which we find ourselves. In this sense, (umbrella) sociology nurtures our capacity to engage in dialogue and to deliberate, respectfully and reflexively. It is in this way we enable ourselves to guide our communities to democratic decision-making and self-governance – just as what we witness in the flowering of the Umbrella Movement.

Sociology frightens because of how it often exposes the inconvenient truth, just as the Umbrella terrifies, for how it reflects upon and lays bare the cynicism that suffocates local politics. But get under the Umbrella, and we see possibilities of creating ourselves as actors who fight for human dignity, social conscience, and justice, in the process changing our politics and making history. Why should we be afraid of the challenges that the Umbrella brings to our city?

Below: Among others, the study space in the Admiralty occupy area is emblematic of democratic deliberation and organic self-governance from the bottom up. Image courtesy of Jimmy Wong.

Pride under the umbrella: LGBT activism has been fused with Hongkongers' collective struggle for democracy. Image courtesy of Action Q.

The medical spur to postcolonial Indonesian science: the Soekarno era

At the closing reception of the First Indonesian National Science Conference in 1958, President Soekarno connected the ideals of the Indonesian Revolution (1945) to science, for the very first time. Soekarno proffered that science has always been revolutionary in its outlook as it is based on a meticulous investigation of facts. He noted that thirteen years since the commencement of the Indonesian Revolution, the country had not yet adequately applied science towards the realisation of the revolutionary ideals of a just and prosperous society *(masjarakat jang adil dan makmoer),* but that he had confidence in the contributions that science could make. However, in order for science to attain the revolutionary ideals, Soekarno urged that the Indonesians transform basic science into applied science. This study investigates the pivotal role of Indonesian medicine in furthering the idiomatic Bandung Spirit, which advocated liberation of the world from colonial domination and superpower hegemony, economic and technological self-sufficiency of newly-independent nations, and solidarity with newly-independent nations of Africa and Asia.

Vivek Neelakantan

DURING THE SOEKARNO ERA (1945-1967), medical sciences, particularly paediatrics and nutrition, which physicians related to the nationalist objective of achieving self-sufficiency in economic affairs, shaped the course of Indonesian scientific thinking. Soekarno maintained that the development of science would ameliorate the country's entrenched problems such as food scarcity. If scientific knowledge was to be mobilised to address the nation's pressing problems, Indonesia needed to invest in technical expertise and turn the minds of the people and scientists alike towards both existing and emergent problems.

Science in the Soekarno era
Science in the Soekarno era Indonesia was, firstly, a comprehensive programme of socio-cultural change intended to transform the prevalent mindset of the Indonesians. Secondly, it was the instrument to achieve a just and equitable society. In Soekarno era Indonesia, science was mobilised, as in Nehruvian India, through centralised planning.[1] For Soekarno, science was an important component of nation-building, and was concept-ualised as a programme of delivery committed to redressing Indonesia's basic social problems such as food, clothing, and employment. Soekarno era science was at once both national and universal, whereby scientific thinking was not to be restricted solely to Indonesia's national orbit, but to also embrace humankind. While intending to inspire national pride among Indonesians and to nurture the country's developmental regime, science was also a negotiation tool in Indonesia's international relations with both the US and the USSR. Soekarno understood science in relation to both Indonesia's national needs and Cold War ambitions.

Within the existing historiography of Science and Technology Studies (STS) in post-World War II Indonesia, much attention has been given to the role played by technology in the formation of national identity and the institutional growth of science.[2] The contribution of medicine to postcolonial Indo-nesian science, although significant, receives scant attention in comparison to the careers of, for example, biologists.[3] The pivotal role played by medicine in furthering the Bandung Spirit in the Indonesian context – attaining technological and economic self-sufficiency by minimising dependency on either the USSR or the US, and strengthening the nation's solidarity with the newly-independent nations of Africa and Asia – remains overlooked in mainstream historiography. In actual fact, during the 1950s, nationalist physicians – especially M. Sardjito, Sarwono Prawirohardjo, and Soedjono Djoened Poesponegoro – emerged as influential thinkers in Indonesia's scientific establishment, due to their active involve-ment in the anti-colonial struggle since their training at the country's medical school at Batavia. Below I explore the specific ways in which Indonesian physicians presented medical prob-lems as national problems and aligned their practice, teaching, and research with Soekarno's interpretation of science.

M. Sardjito's nationalist interpretation of science
The Batavia Medical School, also known as *Dokter Djawa,* began to train native medical assistants as smallpox vaccinators *(mantri tjatjar)* in 1851. The training lasted for two years. In 1903, the school was renamed STOVIA (*School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen;* School for the Education of Native Physicians), with training lasting six years. *Boedi Oetomo,* a student-led nationalist organisation founded at STOVIA in 1908 to further native education, is regarded as the genesis of the Indonesian nationalist movement. Physicians were able to use metaphors from their medical training to critique the shortcomings of the colonial and postcolonial state, and many came to dominate the nationalist movement in the Dutch East Indies.[4] One specific physician, M. Sardjito, developed a nationalist interpretation of science as an outcome of his association with *Boedi Oetomo.* In 1950, he became the founding President of Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM).

On the first anniversary commemorating the proclamation of Indonesian Independence (17 August 1946), Sardjito delivered a lecture highlighting the role of physicians in the reconstruction of the Indonesian nation.[5] In his lecture, Sardjito argued that health was not only a state of physical, but also mental wellbeing. He noted that, during the colonial period, malnutrition had been widespread. As a result, Indonesians were not healthy enough to assume national responsibilities. He was the first Indonesian physician who had foreseen population health as a critical ingredient in national reconstruction after World War II.

Sardjito urged medical students to undertake socially relevant research and enhance Indonesia's respectability in the international research arena. He advocated for Indonesia's self-sufficiency in vaccine production, particularly against smallpox and cholera, to indicate to the world that the nascent nation was capable of standing on its own two feet *(berdiri di atas kaki sendiri)* where public health was concerned.

Sarwono Prawirohardjo: the institution builder
Sarwono Prawirohardjo was Indonesia's first obstetrician and gynaecologist. He was an alumnus of the *Geneeskundige Hogeschool* (GH) at Batavia (established in 1927 and the successor of STOVIA), which awarded medical degrees to Indies physicians along the same lines as the universities in the Netherlands. He inaugurated the *Balai Perguruan Tinggi,* or the Institute of Higher Education of the Indonesian Republic, in 1945; it was to be the precursor to UGM. In 1946, he became a member of the Central Indonesian National Committee, a purely advisory body that assisted President Soekarno in drafting the Indonesian Constitution. In 1950, he founded Indonesia's Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology at Universitas Indonesia's (UI) newly instated medical faculty in Jakarta. As the founder of the Indonesian Council of Sciences (*Madjelis Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia,* or MIPI) in 1956, his focus turned towards imbuing Indonesians with a scientific mindset.

Above: Soekarno's address at the closing reception of the First Indonesian Science Congress at Malang, dated 8 August 1958. 'Pidato Pada Konggres Ilmu Pengetahuan Nasional Indonesia ke I di Malang, Tanggal 8/8/1958,' Image Record 4425 (East Java Dept of Library and Archives, East Java Provincial Archives). The image is in the public domain.

Prawirohardjo argued that, unlike European nations, Indonesia and other newly independent nations of Asia had missed out on the scientific and industrial revolutions, and thus they resorted to using technology developed in the West as a catalyst to achieve economic growth. This led to a state of scientific and technological neo-colonialism in which Indonesia and other Asian countries were reduced to dependency on the West for the transfer of scientific knowhow. He urged Indonesia to realise its potential in science and technology through innovation.

In 1951, Prawirohardjo was chosen as the head of a nine-member committee appointed by the Ministry of Education to prepare the initiation of MIPI, which was formally established in April 1956. As a central body, MIPI would be dedicated to developing and coordinating scientific endeavours undertaken within Indonesia; it would establish Indonesia's reputation in science internationally; and it would operate as an autonomous body without undue interference from the government. Prawirohardjo envisioned that MIPI would complement research undertaken at Indonesian universities by making scientific research relevant to Indonesia's needs. Sardjito, Prawirohardjo, and Poorwo Soedarmo (also referred to as *Bapak Gizi* or the Father of Indonesian Nutrition) helped coordinate research undertaken in Indonesian universities in accordance with the objectives of MIPI.

Unfortunately, MIPI was yet another bureaucratic institution that failed, despite its lofty aims. The chief obstacle was financial. Research in Indonesia was restrained during the Soekarno era due to low salaries for academics and stringent foreign exchange regulations that hampered the purchase of text-books and laboratory equipment from overseas. Prawirohardjo declared that the main obstacle faced by Indonesian science during the 1950s was the lack of scientific manpower. Indonesia had only a limited number of senior scientists, who were on the verge of retirement, and the younger scientists just beginning their careers in science still lacked proper training. To bridge the gap between senior and junior scientists, Prawirohardjo recommended postgraduate mentoring for young Indonesian scientists abroad.

In addition to his involvement with MIPI, Prawirohardjo was an active supporter of Indonesia's family planning programme. He established *Perhimpunan Keluarga Berentjana* Indonesia (Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association) aided by the US-based Brush Foundation that promoted birth control measures as a means to limit family size. He tried to persuade President Soekarno that birth control was a preventative measure that could save mothers' lives. But, Soekarno seemed dismissive of Prawirohardjo's ideas. He did not want to antagonise Indonesian religious groups and as President of Indonesia he had reservations about accepting advice from international aid agencies.[6] Although Prawirohardjo's disagreements with Soekarno did not impede the functioning of MIPI, it did cost the former his political career. As a result, he was excluded from the newly created ministerial portfolio for research in 1962.

### Soedjono Djoened Poesponegoro: the research statesman
Poesponegoro was undoubtedly the most influential Indonesian scientist during the Soekarno era as his notions regarding science converged nicely with those of the President. As Soekarno's family paediatrician, he was able to align paediatrics with President Soekarno's conceptualisation of the Indonesian Revolution: as a period of investment in the human skills of the population. In other words, paediatrics was a good illustration of medical science in relation to nation-building. Due to his influential role as Soekarno's family paediatrician, together with his leadership skills, Poesponegoro was appointed as Minister of Research in 1962.

Poesponegoro's nationalist credentials were shaped by his experience at the *Geneeskundige Hogeschool* (GH), Batavia. After graduating from the GH in 1934, he undertook postgraduate training in paediatrics at Leiden University (in the Netherlands) and established himself as a paediatrician in Semarang between 1938 and 1945. Soon after the transfer of political sovereignty to the Indonesian Republic in 1949, like his colleague Prawirohardjo, Poesponegoro realised that with the deteriorating relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, and the exodus of Dutch scientists to the Netherlands, Indonesia would suffer from a leadership vacuum in scientific disciplines that would inhibit the training of the next generation of research professionals. As a part of his commitment to develop Indonesia's capacity in medical research, he joined the newly-constituted Faculty of Medicine at UI in 1950, as a lecturer of paediatric diseases.

Poesponegoro's notion of undergraduate training was in agreement with Soekarno's idea of *pembangoenan* [nation-building]. He saw *pembangoenan* as a dynamic process that involved socio-economic change that could have overall repercussions on the health and wellbeing of the community. He argued to the effect that if undergraduate students were to gain a nuanced understanding of the socio-economic determinants of disease in a community, and how to initiate preventive measures, it was imperative that they train in social and behavioural sciences, particularly sociology, psychology,

and anthropology. To this end, he encouraged the stimulation of scientific curiosity among students through the independent study and identification of dominant health issues affecting the community. Poesponegoro was influenced by Soekarno's proposition that every citizen of Indonesia had a stake in the latest developments in technology. He acknowledged the utility of the dictum 'science for society'.

In his inaugural lecture as Professor of Paediatrics at the UI on 7 February 1953, Poesponegoro presented paediatrics as a nation-building endeavour.[7] He expressed hope that with the advancement of paediatrics as an academic discipline in Indonesia's medical schools, members of *Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat* (Indonesian House of Representatives) would become more thoughtful of children's health. And with women's organisations volunteering to address children's health issues, the Ministry of Health would hopefully come to approach malnutrition, infant, and neonatal mortality from a holistic perspective; i.e., coordinating paediatrics with nutrition. Indonesia would become a strong and healthy nation *(negara kuat dan sehat)* if it could reduce infant and neonatal mortality.

As Minister for Research between 1962 and 1966, Poesponegoro was in charge of the Department of National Research (DURENAS), which sought to coordinate research undertaken in Indonesian universities with the activities of the research institutes (particularly the Nutrition Institute, the Department of Agriculture, and the National Institute of Biology) that were under the jurisdiction of MIPI. For example, the Department of Paediatrics at UI, under the leadership of Poesponegoro, initiated interdisciplinary research into nutrition in conjunction with the Nutrition Institute *(Lembaga Makanan Rakjat),* an autonomous research institute directed by Poorwo Soedarmo. The aim was to discover cost-effective substitutes for milk that would combat *kwashiorkor* (protein energy malnutrition) and *xeropthalmia* (vitamin A deficiency).

Poesponegoro astutely aligned the concerns of Indonesian paediatrics with the socio-economic questions raised by the final communique of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung convened in 1955. The Conference considered problems of common interest for countries of Asia and Africa and discussed the ways in which the people of those countries could achieve fuller political, economic, and cultural coopera- tion. The Conference gave birth to the Bandung Spirit, which advocated peaceful coexistence between nations, liberation of the world from colonial and superpower hegemony, and solidarity with those who were weak and exploited. In 1964, under Poesponegoro's initiative, Indonesia hosted the Second Afro-Asian Congress of Paediatrics (Jakarta). At the opening

**Above:
Arnoud H. Klokke,
whose 1956 PhD
thesis was entitled
'Yaws in the
Household of the
Tjawas (Central Java):
An Epidemiologic
Study from the
Treponematoses
Control Program in
Indonesia,' receiving
his PhD degree from
M. Sardjito (left),
President of the
UGM. Source: With
permission from
Arnoud H. Klokke's
Private Collection.**

**Inset: Sarwono
Prawirohardjo:
The Institutional
Foundations of
Indonesian Science
Source: LIPI Press.
The image is in the
public domain.**

ceremony, Soekarno asserted that the Indonesian Revolution had a vision to establish a new world order of free independent nations, a new brotherhood of humanity, and the cessation of all forms of exploitation. The cooperation between Asian and African nations was not only political, but extended to other fields, particularly health. Soekarno maintained the proposition, "health not only for adults, but also health for the children."[8] Delegates to the Second Afro-Asian Congress of Paediatrics unanimously resolved that a concerted effort towards eliminating the socio-economic causes of ill health among children would achieve greater social welfare and consolidate the gains of national independence. They maintained that childhood malnutrition was a medical, social, agricultural, and educational problem that could only be alleviated with self-help initiatives of African and Asian nations, without international assistance.

Poesponegoro demonstrated his statesmanship by successfully relating paediatrics to the socio-economic questions raised by the Asian-African Conference at Bandung. Because of Poesponegoro's excellent interpersonal skills, DURENAS was able to liaise between Indonesian universities on one hand, and research institutes under the jurisdiction of MIPI on the other. Unfortunately, DURENAS remained underfunded throughout the early 1960s, due to the diversion of financial resources to the warfront resulting from Indonesia's political confrontation with Malaysia, and because of the seventeen-fold depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah.

Conclusion

The salient features of Soekarno era science can be summed up in three points. First, Indonesian physicians used science to critique colonialism, enhance Indonesia's respectability among the international scientific community, and marry intellectual endeavour with practical concerns of post-war national reconstruction. Second, Soekarno sought to contest the Western monopoly on scientific knowledge and he envisioned the development of Indonesia's local scientific capabilities. While extolling the transnational nature of modern science, the President also understood science in relation to furthering Indonesia's national interests during the Cold War. Third, given President Soekarno's syncretism in assimilating the ideas of others, one of the difficulties when conceptualising a notion

of Soekarno era science is to establish what the President's own contribution to scientific thinking actually was.

In the previous paragraphs, I have highlighted how the demands of national reconstruction resulted in a bias towards applied sciences, particularly medicine as opposed to pure sciences such as mathematics or physics, during the Soekarno era. The practice of Indonesian science was infused with a mentality of mobilisation during the 1950s and the 1960s, in such a way that the pursuit of knowledge would not only address national concerns, but also broader socio-economic questions such as those raised by the Asian African Conference at Bandung, and nurture the country's developmental regime.

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A bullet train or a paved road?

The first Chinese high-speed rail (HSR) connection opened in 2007, but by the end of 2013 the country had over 12,000 km of high-speed tracks (the biggest network in the world and about half of all HSR tracks in operation worldwide). Service levels among China's high-speed trains[1] are high; passengers play games on their phones and consume luxury foodstuffs sold on board, as they near their destination at 300 km/h. The perfectly air-conditioned, mostly quiet HSR environment stands in stark contrast to the bustling carriages of regular Chinese trains, in which passengers chat over card games and share life stories, eating instant noodles and sunflower seeds (not for sale on HSR). Influencing traveling cultures is only one of many ways in which the construction of the world's most advanced high-speed railroad (HSR) network is changing China, a country in which access to travel is closely tied to socio-economic development. So far, scholarly attention has been limited, but whether it is the economic impact of HSR on remote regions, emerging forms of tourism, or the nostalgia surrounding the disappearing slow trains, the approach of the HSR era in China brings with it many topics worthy of further research.

Tabitha Speelman

LOOKING INTO THE LOCAL CONTEXTS OF HSR REFORM seems especially significant, as the top-down initiative does not allow much room for such enquiries itself. Based on a 2004 central government blueprint, and part of a larger state agenda to shrink China into an increasingly uniform and accessible area, HSR is said to realize a well-off society in all of China, presenting the plan's execution and this happy outcome as both desirable and inevitable. So what does this top-down strategy look like from below? In the summer of 2012 I spent two months along a number of HSR routes in the Chinese provinces of Jiangsu and Guizhou exploring this question. In this contribution I share some of my ethnographic research into the social impact of HSR in these two provinces, showcasing the variety of development speeds in contemporary China.[2] I conclude that, while HSR is the 'shiny name card' of Chinese modernity, which you want to be seen using (fig.1), and although it perhaps illustrates the strengths and speed of reform under authoritarian rule, it also demonstrates some of the weaknesses of such a hasty, centralized undertaking, most notably the neglect of the diversity of needs and opinions on the ground.

China's HSR development
In 1995, government spending on transportation (0.6% of GDP) was one of the lowest in the world. However, HSR development took off at an incredible speed after the Middle and Long-term Railway Development was ratified on 1 July 2004. In 2008, a four trillion RMB stimulus package, which the central government designed to combat the financial crisis, triggered an even

bigger 'Liu Leap Forward' *(Liu Yuejin),* named after strategy mastermind and former railway minister Liu Zhijun. The plan was to build a network in which all provincial capitals (except for Lhasa and Urumqi at twelve hours) would be within eight hours travel of Beijing (fig.2). China's total railway length, for both passengers and freight, will be increased from 70,000 to 120,000 km by 2020, of which at least 16,000 km should be the much more expensive passenger-only HSR rail, a longer stretch of HSR than in any other country.

According to the 2008 blueprint, HSR would limit the negative impact of the global financial crisis and even out unequal regional development. It was presented as an economic game-changer, freeing up existing tracks for more freight capacity and driving regional integration by enabling fast and convenient passenger connections. The optimism surrounding the HSR strategy reached a peak in 2010. In media coverage from that year, a 'HSR-themed' language emerged, including terms such as a 'HSR network,' 'HSR era,' 'HSR territory,' 'HSR strategy,' and 'HSR empire'. But the project has also had its share of controversy, including the 2011 deadly train crash near Wenzhou that incited a nationwide debate on the speed and safety of China's current development. After the crash, authorities attempted to bury one of the crashed train carriages before confirming that all victims had indeed been rescued from the wreckage. In addition, there was the scandal of rampant corruption within the now dissolved Ministry of Railways, leading to the suspended death sentences of minister Liu Zhijun and deputy chief engineer Zhang Shuguang.

Fig 1: Passengers getting their picture taken with a bullet train.

Fig 2 (inset): The 'eight-hour strategy' (http://tinyurl.com/chinapictorial)

Even though the turmoil slowed down its execution, it did not significantly alter the ambitious development plan. With the backing of the new leadership under president Xi Jinping and premier Li Keqiang, investment picked up again in 2013, and soon domestic and international media once more hailed Chinese high-speed rail as a 'success story'.

In its efforts to boost its soft power and present an attractive, non-threatening image to the world, the leadership has invested much in 'rail diplomacy' *(tielu waijiao).*[3] Over 50 countries have expressed interest in Chinese HSR and deals or political agreements have been signed with at least 8 countries (although in some countries, including Thailand and Myanmar, Chinese rail has been rejected by the local population, delaying action). HSR development in recent years tends to be seen as a successful example of some of the more, and less, subtle mechanisms of China's adaptive authoritarianism, that ultimately allows it to 'get stuff done'. Within a few years, the HSR project developed from a symbol for everything that was wrong with China's regime – from disregard for human life to the squandering of public funds – into an example of the stable, modern and safe image the new leadership would like to exude.

Welcoming HSR
In Jiangsu, just five years ago, a trip between Shanghai and Nanjing would take at least five hours; now, with most of the 200 daily connections taking less than an hour, residents are the envy of public transportation passengers around the world.

Local accounts of high-speed rail reform in China

In Congjiang (Guizhou), however, no railway connection yet exists, taking it at least 20 hours to get to Guangzhou. After the planned connection is in place, the trip will take no more than a couple of hours. Many residents have never even seen a train, but residents now find that their backyard is the construction site of both a high-speed rail connection and a national expressway.

The contrasts between the regions are exemplary for the interrelatedness between socio-economic development, geographical conditions, and transportation reform. Jiangsu's GDP per capita ranks second in the country, while Guizhou is China's poorest province. Although their differences far predate 1978, the development gap between Jiangsu and Guizhou grew much bigger during the reform period, and as a 2012 central government document on stimulating Guizhou's development noted, the gap is currently still growing. The HSR blueprint, however, aims to transform both regions, and the challenges this creates are at times remarkably similar.

Jiangsu

In Jiangsu, the rapid replacement of slower and cheaper rail connections by HSR, has in fact disadvantaged parts of the population. While regular train tickets are heavily subsidized, HSR ticket prices have been set according to commercial standards and are about triple the price. Students – who previously benefited from train ticket discounts – and migrant workers, especially, are affected by the cancellation of cheaper services. As a Nanjing graduate student put it: "I can now hardly afford the really necessary travel I have to do to see my parents and attend weddings, let alone fulfil the dreams I had when I was young about seeing more of the country during my spare time as a student. Now I just go to the library and read American novels, by ways of my long-distance travels."

In a relatively affluent province like Jiangsu, HSR does, however, clearly have a market. A growing middle class who travel for work and leisure, and many of whom used to travel by air, is discovering HSR. While the popularity of HSR among these travellers has had a serious negative impact on China's domestic air travel, it has also been a source of optimism among transportation economics analysts assessing HSR's long-term potential. And indeed, 74% of my Jiangsu interviewees confirmed that HSR access makes them travel more, and that it makes them want to travel to more places in China.

But while respondents would generally praise HSR's speed and convenience, many also complain about the speed of recent developments that 'just happen to us' and are hard to keep up with. Inconveniences faced by Jiangsu travellers included the remote locations of newly-built HSR stations and the lack of integration of different modes of transportation. Due to the high costs of expanding inner-city stations, new HSR stations are often built outside the city centre, ideally in between the old city and emerging suburbs or technological parks. However, with lots of space and light, these stations stand in sharp contrast to the darker, more crowded conventional stations (fig.3).

In such a rapidly changing environment, negotiating the route which best suits one's needs and purchasing power remains very important. Forming a subtle form of resistance to the way regular rail and HSR are set op as mutually exclusive, many passengers do in fact use both systems and are willing to go out of their way to take the few slow connections that are still on the timetable. Migrant workers find HSR too expensive, but will use it when they have 'urgent business'

Within a few years, the HSR project developed from a symbol for everything that was wrong with China's regime [...] into an example of the stable, modern and safe image the new leadership would like to exude.

Fig.3:
Above – Regular rail station in Zhenjiang, Jiangsu (author's picture); Left – HSR station in Zhenjiang (author's picture)

(jishi), a term that tends to get used for sudden sickness or other mostly negative sudden occurrences. College students and white-collar workers I talked to in both 2012 and 2014 only use HSR when the boss pays, and – if they can get tickets – prefer slow trains for personal trips.

Guizhou

In Guizhou, conversations about HSR remain in the realm of expectation and speculation, as the HSR connection is still under construction. In the geographically isolated region, infrastructure development is considered a game changer, and successfully completed projects tend to be major accomplishments (zhengji) for local officials. In 2012, Congjiang was filled with a 'finally it is our turn' sense of excitement about the coming train connection, without residents having a clear idea of how HSR differs from regular rail. For once, the mountainous corner of the minority zone would not be 'left behind', with residents clearly displaying what Zhang Li, describing massive urban restructuring in Kunming, calls "a double sense of lateness", a need to catch up with both the rest of the country and the rest of the world.[4] As a migrant worker who had just returned from Guangzhou explained, for most Congjiang residents, rail is something entirely new, a curiosity. As he put it: "I think everyone will take it, at least once. Young people especially really need this kind of excitement (cijigan)". Other residents, too, mentioned that they looked forward to watching the trains come by.

Up until today, traveling decisions in Guizhou are based as much on availability as on cost. Migrant workers who work in China's coastal areas – Congjiang's most experienced group of travellers – noted the estimated 300-400 RMB ticket price would be prohibitive to about 90% of the Congjiang population: locals living on an annual income of 2000-3000 RMB. However, since current long-distance bus prices are also high, the migrant workers themselves would consider using HSR to get to work in Guangzhou. White-collar workers in Shenzhen and Beijing also noted that a HSR connection would make it much easier to return to their Guizhou familial home during their short holidays.

Ironically, while HSR has not yet had the chance to increase mobility opportunities, it has already for some years reduced them, as the main local road out of Congjiang has deteriorated into an accumulation of dust and rocks due to the simultaneous construction of the HSR and a highway. While, in 2012, no one was pleased with the situation, there was a strong sense that the temporary discomforts are inevitable for future progress. After all, as I frequently heard, "All beginning is hard", and "things are already so much better than they used to be". As a Congjiang government accountant put it: "Everyone knows that what they promise and what actually happens are two very different things. ... But it is always better for something to happen than to be left out again".

At the same time, there were worries about the rail connection's long-term impact. Would the new passenger line (a preferred freight connection was cancelled in light of the national HSR strategy) really benefit the local economy? Or would it only be of use to the Shenzhen and Guangzhou companies that were starting to enter the region? As the line is scheduled to open in December 2014, these questions can now soon be revisited.

Normalized worries

In the summer of 2012, concerns about ticket price, station accessibility, and passenger safety – the 2011 Wenzhou train crash still fresh on people's minds – stood out in the answers of my respondents. I also frequently came across newly built unused stations and empty trains. In 2014, HSR has clearly made progress with regard to integrating itself into the transportation system. Ridership has increased, with 70% of seats filled in 2013, and is increasingly diverse.[5] However, many of the same concerns persist, including a negative impact on the deepening rich-poor gap and a perceived lack of efforts to make citizens stakeholders in the project.

Whether it is poor compensation for land and homes lost to HSR construction or corruption that trickles all the way down, the vast majority of respondents criticized the overall project. Many brought up the consequences of corruption for construction safety, noting that they would prefer to sacrifice some speed in exchange for safety guarantees. Their concerns were confirmed by a local employee at the No. 18 HSR construction company in Guizhou. She told me, "the hands that grab a little at every level so that we have no money left to buy quality materials to build tracks". However, faced as they are with a vast range of safety concerns (from food safety to collapsing bridges), these worries do not stop Chinese passengers from using HSR trains. On the contrary, for urban populations in more developed parts of the country, such as Jiangsu, HSR is currently in the process of rapid normalization. With only 1-4 years of history in most places, the way people assess the relationship between time, price and distance is changing already. As Chen Yulin, a transportation

studies scholar at Southwestern Transportation University, put it: "I am finding that people are getting used to paying more for faster train services. After all, the former train ticket prices were exceptionally low. ... The value people place on saving time is shifting. I see this in my own life as well." Rising salaries, especially those of migrant workers – up 14.3% in 2013 – are also making HSR increasingly affordable. There is also talk of HSR eventually offering student discounts. In 2014, I found that the integration of HSR with other transportation modes had improved due to expanding urban subway systems; however, while this process is prioritized in larger cities, smaller cities do not see the same level of integration.

This unequal development runs throughout the strategy's implementation. While the relationship between spatial change and social development has mostly been researched in the field of urban development, my fieldwork shows that transportation reform initiatives, such as HSR, can also serve as an example of the increasing "spatialization of class" taking place all over today's China.[6] In doing so, it reinforces existing inequalities that often follow rural-urban divides. Recent studies in the field of transportation science confirm this. A 2014 study of accessibility indicators in 337 Chinese cities found that HSR most benefits cities with more than 3 million residents located 50 km or less from HSR stations. The authors conclude that a more developed HSR network will eventually result in increased balance, but "regional disparities ... will still be greater than before the construction of the HSR".[7]

Taking the train in China today makes this extremely visible: either you belong at an old-style station, with its broken plastic chairs, variety of snacks and signs with Hu Jintao's 'Eight Honours and Eight Shames', or you have made it onto the Harmony Express, for which you wait on grey metal seats whilst looking at advertisements for suburban 'paradise-style' apartments. This separation of social groups in different physical realms of travel seems to be an intentional, or at least inevitable, part of HSR's branding.

Conclusion

Local experiences of China's HSR development display a variety of opinions on the (perceived) need for HSR, both before and after the opening of HSR lines. They stand in contrast to the "centralizing aesthetic" the top-down strategy that tends to result in an all-encompassing plan that disregards detail and internal diversity.[8] A closer look reveals that, while HSR might be becoming increasingly normal for those who can afford it, the rapid replacement of slow trains with bullet trains is also reinforcing and even deepening social inequalities. In this and many other ways, HSR development in China, seemingly primarily an issue of spatial restructuring, extends into cultural, social, and ideological territory, deserving of critical attention beyond the more technical fields of transportation studies and engineering.

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1 Although 'train' (huoche), is an overarching term for everything that rides on tracks, in China regular rail and high-speed rail tend to be experienced as two different modes of transportation. I therefore distinguish between 'HSR (track/rail)' (gaotie) and 'regular rail' for all other types of trains. HSR, usually referring to any commercial train service with an average speed of 200km/h or higher (UIC 2012). For more information on different types of trains, see Seat 61: www.seat61.com/China.htm

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The Temple of Heaven: cosmological symbolism

If you've been to China, and Beijing in particular, possibly you also went to visit the Temple of Heaven. I can only assume you were amazed at its layout, with numerous squares and circles cleverly combined, vibrant colors, dense and open spaces, exquisite paintings, wonderful architectural components, and so on. However, what you likely saw was just the beauty of the place, but perhaps not its intrinsic significance. Understanding the cosmological symbolism of the Temple of Heaven, will help you see its true value and splendor.

Chen Chunhong

Above: The Temple of Heaven, Beijing, China. Image reproduced under a Creative Commons license, courtesy of 月明 端木 on Flickr.com

THE TEMPLE OF HEAVEN, or Tian Tan, is one of the largest altar complexes in China and a paradigm of Chinese mystical and cosmological symbolism. It was once a place for emperors to make sacrifices, to pay respect to their ancestors, and to pray to Heaven at winter solstice each year. As the son of Heaven and the ruler of the people, the emperor would intercede with the gods in the name of his people and pray for a good harvest. The Temple of Heaven was built between 1406 and 1420, during the reign of Emperor Yongle, who was also responsible for the construction of the Forbidden City. The temple was enlarged and renamed 'Tian Tan' during the reign of Emperor Jiajing in the 16th century. It was renovated in the 18th century under Emperor Qianlong. It is a spatial representation of Chinese cosmology and astronomy, on which the political power and legitimacy of the imperial dynasties were based for more than two millennia.

Magical layout of cosmology

The overall planning of the Temple of Heaven met with basic ancient Chinese architectural ideas. A double ring of walls enclose the compound of temple structures. The 'north circular' and 'south square' meet with the Chinese traditional understanding of the cosmos as a 'hemispherical dome', situated over a 'flat earth'. Similarly, the north wall was constructed higher than the south wall, signifying that Heaven is higher than Earth. As the temple was where the emperor would pray to the heavens, the temple's design needed to reflect this relationship. In accordance with the theory of Hemispherical Dome, the north wall of the temple was designed to be circular, a symbol of Heaven's shape; the south wall was to be square, representing the Earth's appearance. The main temple buildings line up from north to south along the central axis of the compound. All the temple structures have a square or circular design, again representing the shapes of Heaven and Earth. The Circular Mound Altar (圜丘坛) stands in the southern part of the compound, and was designed as a place of Heaven worship; it comprises a triple circular altar, surrounded by a square enclosure. The Hall of Prayer (祈年殿), with its three-tiered conical roof, is found at the northern end of the grounds, and was designed as a place to pray for a good harvest.

Heavenly number nine

According to traditional Chinese design theories, the Circular Mound Altar needed to establish a cosmic connection with Heaven; using the 'heavenly number nine' was an effective tool

for this as Heaven is believed to have nine levels. The Circular Mound Altar is constructed of three circular stone platforms, each with its own white marble balustrade, and as a whole enclosed by first an inner circular wall, and then an outer square wall. Both walls have four gates; one at each cardinal point – north, east, south, west. Each platform is reached by walking up nine steps. The diameter of the entire altar is 45 Zhang (丈, ten feet); in other words, nine multiplied by five. Those two numbers are often used together to represent the emperor. In the center of the uppermost platform lies the Tianxingshi (Heaven's Heart Stone). Around this, flagstones pave the platform in nine concentric circles, with each circle comprising a multiple-of-nine number of flagstones: the first ring has 9 stones, the outer ring has 81.

Combined with the traditional calendar

Another remarkable feature at the Temple of Heaven is the link between architectural design and the traditional Chinese calendar. Most notably in the Hall of Prayer. The Hall of Prayer reflects the Chinese calendar with the number of its com-ponents. The total number of pillars in the Hall are 28: the four highest and largest columns stand at the center of the Hall, around that are 12 pillars, and again around those are another 12. The innermost columns represent the four seasons, the 12 middle columns the months of the year, and the 12 outer columns the 12 hours of a day. The 24 outer and middle columns represent the solar term, whilst the total number of columns signify the 'Twenty–Eight Lunar Mansions' (28星宿), the Chinese heavenly stars, comparable to the zodiacal constellations recognized in western astrology.

Number eight and orientation symbols

The number eight is a Chinese symbol for universal unity, for rebirth or blessing. It also represents the eight cardinal and intercardinal directions: north, northeast, east, southeast, south, southwest, west, and northwest. The number eight is also present in the Chinese 'Eight Symbols' (八卦符号), which represent the fundamental principles of reality.

The Imperial Vault of Heaven (皇穹宇), located to the south of the Hall of Prayer, has a conical roof and stands on a single layered marble base. The Vault houses eight peripheral columns and eight internal columns, both sets reflecting the points on a compass. Inside, the floor paving is again a concentric pattern, this time nine rings with each a multiple of eight fan-shaped stones. Thus the first circle has 8 stones,

the second circle 16, and so forth, out to the ninth circle with 72 stones. The total number of stones is 360, signifying both the degrees in a circle and the days in a year according to the ancient calendar. In the center of the vault stands a shrine for the God of Heaven; on four other platforms in the vault you find memorial tablets for eight former emperors.

Cosmological meanings of colors

The various colors found on and in the structures of the Temple of Heaven are so well coordinated, are so harmonized and stunning, that you may be led to suspect that they were placed there by the gods. The colors indeed have a cosmological significance. The gates, walls and pillars of the temple are red, which indicate Chinese royalty. Red columns could only ever be used for imperial buildings; they were forbidden in ordinary houses, and homeowners risked being sentenced to death. All the roofs are covered with dark-blue glazed tiles, which are a strong reflection of blue skies and Heaven.

The Hall of Prayer's three-tiered roof used to be different colors; blue, yellow and green tiles were used to represent Heaven, the Emperor and the Earth. During the Qing Dynasty, the colors were unified into the single color cyan, making the symbolism more explicit: to highlight vibrant plants and good weather. Another building in the temple compound, known as Zhai Palace (斋宫), was built to house the emperor during ceremonies. As the emperor's palace, its roof should be covered with yellow glazed tiles, but in fact they are blue. It was the emperor's choice, as he wanted to reflect his pious respect of Heaven.

Conclusion

Many Chinese buildings, old and new, are related in various ways to cosmology, as it is seen as an effective way to establish a connection with Heaven. An old Chinese saying goes, "An object is a Tai Chi world (一物一太极)", meaning that anything can be interpreted by using cosmological theories. Architecture is certainly one of the most significant ways in which this 'small universe' is expressed, connecting Earth with Heaven. So next time you visit China, and perhaps even the Temple of Heaven, take note of all the cosmological significance, and you will see how it enhances all the beauty.

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
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
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
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
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
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Translating twelfth century China

With James M. Hargett's lucid translation of the text and meticulous annotations of the *Treatises of the Supervisor and Guardian of the Cinnamon Sea (Guihai yuheng zhi,* hereafter *Treatises)* by Fan Chengda (1126–1193), a renowned official and scholar of the Song, this work has doubtlessly become more accessible to a much broader readership. Together with his translations of Fan's other three works, *Diary of Grasping the Carriage Reins (Lanpei lu), Diary of Mounting a Simurgh (Canluan lu),* and *Diary of a Boat Trip to Wu (Wuchuan lu),* Professor Hargett, a leading scholar in the fledgling field of Chinese travel literature, has accomplished his aim to provide English readers with translations of all four major prose works of Fan.

Hang Lin

CONSISTING OF 13 SECTIONS, each devoted to a particular category of objects, the book offers a wealth of geographical, historical, cultural, and ethnographical data about southwestern China – mainly Guangxi – in the twelfth century, ranging from landscape, minerals, flora and fauna to the history of various non-Han peoples and their cultures. In this review, rather than

Below: Cormorant Fisherman on the Li River in Xingping Fishing Village, Guilin, Guangxi, China. Image reproduced under a Creative Commons license, courtesy of Vern Fong on Flickr.com.

recounting the content of individual sections, I would like to touch upon some issues that emerge from the work itself.

The original text by Fan, appended in full to the translation, is not voluminous at all. As a typical example of the *youji* (travel records) literature, the *Treatises* is written, as Hargett expounds, in a straightforward "reportorial-descriptive" language (p.xlvi). But a closer look at Fan's methodological approach and the work's content reveals that it is not a conventional *youji* but at once a gazetteer, an encyclopedia, and an ethnography. It comprises both passages outlining the landmarks, vegetation, and people of particular localities, and reportorial accounts on those areas' customs and products. For Hargett, the *Treatises* is not only "a personal memoir of Fan's happy and restful days in Guilin [in Guangxi]", but also "a serious and detailed scholarly study" (p.xxxvi). Like many of his contemporaries, Fan was not only a curious traveller but also a keen observer. Containing large amount of personal observations and detailed information from informants, many of them "not generally found in local gazetteers" (p.4), the *Treatises* reflects Fan's strenuous effort to report information and to relate these facts to potential readers who probably knew little or nothing about these matters. In this sense, this work, like many other *youji,* is extremely valuable as a source work (p.xxxvi).

The particular value of Fan's accounts contained in the *Treatises* is enhanced by his relatively neutral attitude towards the area of Guangxi and the various non-Han peoples living there. For a long time in Chinese history, officials were sent to the remote and mountainous region of Guangxi for demotion or political exile. The reason why Fan headed for Guangxi

was of no exception. However, Fan did not harbor much fear or distress but was surprisingly enthusiastic about his assignment. Guilin was certainly far from the Song political center in Lin'an (today's Hangzhou), but when he arrived in Guilin in 1173 he "found peace of mind there" (p.3), and even after his tenure, he still "remain[ed] deeply attached to Guilin, so much that [he has] compiled and edited this [collection] of minutia and trivia" (p.4). Furthermore, Fan did not find himself in "a strange, alien land" (p.xxix) populated by non-Han "barbarians" who had not been assimilated into the orbit of Han-Chinese civilization, although Fan collectively termed them as *man* (literally: barbarians). In fact, he "refrained from 'looking down on the [local] people'", most of them probably non-Han, and "they in turn forgave my ignorance and trusted in my sincerity" (p.3). As the issue of political legitimacy became thorny again under the political and military pressure of the non-Han peoples from the north, in particular after the Jurchen seized the Song capital at Kaifeng and took over whole North China in 1127, there was a trend among Song literati to emphasize their cultural superiority over their non-Han neighbors to counteract their political and military inferiority and to strengthen legitimacy of their dynasty. Quite often too, those non-Han Chinese were described as "uncivilized barbarians". But in the *Treatises*, Fan has clearly presented another pattern.

In fact, Fan's observations and attitudes reflect how the Song endeavored to "maximize its control" in the southwestern border regions of the empire by "minimizing military conflict" with the large population of non-Han tribes-peoples residing there (p.xx). As the Song was already facing enormous pressure from the north, it endeavored to adopt a rather friendly diplomacy toward the tribesmen in the southwest. The Song followed the practice of "loose rein", also known as "bridle and halter" *(jimi),* to organize submissive tribal peoples (or peoples at least willing to submit themselves to the Chinese sovereign) into the Chinese administrative hierarchy. Although many of the non-Chinese people on the Song's southwestern borders were considered partially "sinicized", but more often than not local chieftains still had near-absolute control over land distribution and tax collection within their jurisdictions. But as long as this "loose rein" could bring peace for the Song, it was ready to accept the fact that the tribesmen's subordination existed only in name.

As is unavoidable in any translation of medieval Chinese text, some may have other suggestions for the translation or interpretation of individual words or sentences. For instance, on page 163, Fan's original sentence, which Hargett translates as "they receive corn allowances and office appointments but only at the rank of senior or junior envoy", would much better fit the context if it were translated as "many settlement chieftains […] purchased official ranks [from the Song], but [they got] only military ranks ranging from 9b to 8a". Nonetheless, such minor quibbles should by no means diminish the remarkable achievement James M. Hargett has made in his conscientious translation and painstaking study of Fan Chengda's *Treatises of the Supervisor and Guardian of the Cinnamon Sea.* Containing rich data about the natural world, material culture, and ethnography in China's southwestern frontier in the twelfth century, this book is bound to attract both experts and students of Chinese history, culture, and ethnography.

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Reading the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Since its establishment in 2001, the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) remains a conundrum for many commentators. On the one hand, the organisation brings together a seemingly unlikely group of members – China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. On the other hand, the SCO attracts an equally disparate group of observer countries (Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan), dialogue partners (Belarus, Sri Lanka, and Turkey), and guests (Turkmenistan, the Association for Southeast Asian Nations, and the Commonwealth of Independent States).

Emilian Kavalski

THUS, WHAT CONFOUNDS MANY is that regardless of the dissimilarity between its participants, the SCO not only survives, but also has become the most prominent institutional framework in Eurasia – an area notorious for its aversion to any form of meaningful regional initiatives.

At the same time, what makes the SCO even more puzzling is that it is an international organization developed, promoted, and maintained by China. Beijing's rapid movement during the 1990s, from the difficult task of delineating and disarming its shared borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, to promoting a multilateral organization and establishing growing economic and security ties with the Central Asian countries, attest to more than just conventional power politics. Instead, the creation of the 'Shanghai Five' – the precursor to the SCO – in the mid-1990s, promoted a climate that not only began to alleviate Central Asian (as well as Russian) suspicion about China's intentions, but also laid the groundwork for a regional political community. As the volume edited by Michael Fredholm indicates, China's engagement of Central Asian states in various collaborative initiatives during the 1990s, and the subsequent institutionalization of SCO, make conspicuous Beijing's socializing propensity. In this

Hindu kingdoms, to the Mughals

Sandhya Sharma's pioneering volume investigates Mughal Indian society and politics, as well as family dynamics, kinship, and caste, through *Riti Kal* literature. The author focuses on a form of *Riti Kal* known as *Braja basha* poetry, which was predominant in Western and North-Central India from the sixteenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Interestingly, although this poetry was traditionally written by male poet-saints, those originating from Northern India are mostly penned from a female point of view.

Rachel Parikh

AS A RESULT, *Riti Kal* as a genre advocated the conventional roles of women in family and society, and did so with sympathy and understanding. In addition, the majority of *Braja basha* poetry is mystical in nature, focusing on the spiritual union between a devotee and God. One of the most popular themes was the legend of *Krishna* (an avatar of the Hindu god *Vishnu*) and his chief consort *Radha*. Through a chronological and historical framework, Sharma traces the development of the female role and the evolution of the *Krishna-Radha* narrative against contemporaneous socio-political and religious environments respectively. As a result, she has found through her extensive research that the literature is a reflection of the changes in North India, from being home to medieval Hindu kingdoms, to being controlled by the Mughals. The author's use of this traditional form of Hindu literature offers an innovative and fresh perspective of understanding the influence of the Mughal Empire on North Indian life and culture.

The Introduction, which also acts as the first chapter, provides a sound foundation of understanding the genre of *Riti Kal* literature. It is made very clear, from Sharma's concise overview, that *Riti Kal* is greatly diverse and complex, qualities that have prevented it from being used as a source for understanding Mughal impact on North India. In addition, this section of the book acquaints the reader with the wide variety of primary source material on the subject, and how it can be utilized as historical documentation. Chapter Two, *Kinship, Caste, and Gender,* investigates the relationship between the individual and society. Sharma addresses how the dynamics of the family emanates in larger kin groups and plays a role in the formation of caste. She is particularly interested in patriarchal joint families, how they affected societal development, and how they were affected by the changes brought on by the Mughals. In her discussion of familial ideologies and their position within society, she takes the opportunity to discuss the individual, and how conformist and nonconformist attitudes are indicators of continuity and change. At this point in the chapter, she shifts her attention to gender relations. What makes this discussion more insightful and especially profound is that Sharma looks at the issues of gender from a historical perspective and not

according to our present day views. She also brings up an interesting point in her study; that the idealization of women in *Riti Kal* literature actually resulted in the oppression and objectification of women in society. Her examination concludes with a look at how different poets viewed women and gender relations through sociological, political, and familial frameworks, and how that affected their writings.

Chapter Three, *Krishna and Radha,* recounts the attributes, incidents, and myths attached to the legends of the two figures over time. Sharma re-evaluates the emotional and devotional portrayal of *Krishna and Radha* that were first set forth by nineteenth century scholars and historians. She looks at different traditions of the duo, as well as their divine and human forms, through a comparison between Indian religious traditions and colonial perceptions. The author brilliantly continues her assessment of gender relations by looking at the treatment of *Krishna and Radha* in devotional poetry and how their roles changed and developed over time. As a result, she demonstrates that *Radha* takes precedence in power over the god *Krishna*, which an interesting juxtaposition to the contemporary views of women and religious practices.

Three works are acutely examined in Chapter Four, *Narratives from the Past: Shakuntala, Prabodh Chandrodaya Natak,* and *Sujan Vilas.* Sharma uses these texts to support her argument that either *Riti Kal* poets, their patrons, or their audience (or perhaps all of the above), were making attempts to revive their literary and traditional past. Her comparison of these eighteenth century texts with their ancient counterparts allows for her to successfully demonstrate the impact of socio-political changes, brought on by the Mughals and later by colonialism, on pre-modern India.

Chapter Five, *Rulers, Regions, and Wars: Histories in Verse,* is an analysis of political narratives of the pre-modern period. By looking at political works contemporaneous to the poetry that Sharma has dedicated this book to, she allows the reader to gain a greater understanding of how much influence the changing environment had on *Riti Kal* literature. In addition, this section allows for a more comprehensive view of the relationship between the Mughal court at the different regions of Northern India. Through this chapter, Sharma successfully shows how the poetry reveals shifting patterns of alliances and rivalries between different geographical regions and the Mughal Empire, particularly between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Sharma's conclusion is an overview of the book. Her brief summary reiterates the necessity of her examination, and how important this traditional type of Indian literature is to understanding the dynamics between the Mughal Empire and the indigenous society, politics, and culture of the subcontinent. Sharma has paved the way for future research and scholarship in using literature as a platform for understanding the dynamic environment of pre-modern India. Her fresh and new perspective only helps achieve a greater understanding of the extent of the Mughals' influence on traditional practices, and also proves that this type of material should not be treated so flippantly. This book, filled with wonderful color plates, is a necessity to scholars, students, and those interested in learning more about pre-modern India.

Rachel Parikh, The Metropolitan Museum of Art. (rachel.parikh@metmuseum.org)

Above: Shah Jahangir. Attributed to Abu al-Hasan (1589-1630) (Bonhams), Public domain. Wikimedia Commons.

respect, the seventeen chapters included in Fredholm's collection provide what is probably one of the most detailed accounts to date of the SCO as an organisation for the regional security governance of Central Asia.

Contextualizing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
The meticulous study of the SCO provided by the volume edited by Fredholm ensures that the contributions make available a comprehensive overview of the institutional history and practices of the organisation. Usually, commentators take as their point of reference the 2005 rejection of the US application for a SCO observer status, and therefore label the organisation as an 'Asian NATO', an 'OPEC with nuclear bombs', or a 'club for dictators'. In contrast to such disparaging assessments, the accounts provided in Fredholm's volume depict the SCO as a mechanism for complex interaction on a wide range of economic, energy, security, and socio-cultural issues. This point of departure assist in unveiling the contextual dynamics and processes that both spur and sustain the SCO mechanism.

The book offers a detailed account of the organisational structure of the SCO. The vivid account depicts not only the aims and intentions of the organisation, but also illustrates the interplay between its permanent and non-permanent institutional arrangements. The picture that emerges is of an elaborate interaction between frameworks for informal discussion and regularised institutional processes. Thus, by demonstrating the complexity and diversity of institutions, initiatives, and interactions, the volume edited by Fredholm

makes conspicuous that the SCO is much more than a geo-political tool for either Moscow or Beijing. In fact, the book makes clear that the reading of the SCO as a type of anti-Western Sino-Russian alliance misunderstands both the content and character of the bilateral relationship between Beijing and Moscow, as well as the broader dynamics of Central Asian international affairs.

In fact, it is very often the perceptions of the Central Asian republics that tend to get excluded (and occluded) in the analysis of the SCO. Fredholm's collection distinguishes itself by devoting an entire section on the motivations and rationale of the individual member states of the organisation. Such a parallel assessment has definitely been missing in the literature and offers a much-needed insight into the involvement and input of the Central Asian republics in the agenda of the SCO. What is particularly worthwhile about the contributions to the volume edited by Fredholm is its indication that despite the conspicuous divergences between the motivations of the SCO member states, the organisation nevertheless manages not only to identify areas of common interest, but also to build consensus and to construct agreement around shared aims and initiatives. The volume is quite explicit that this observation should not be read as an indication for the emergence of a regional integration similar to either that of the European Union (EU) or that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the contrary, the contributors to Fredholm's collection are quite clear that the SCO is a state-centric, top-down project driven by the regimes of the member states and is quite distinct from the regionalizing frameworks

… the SCO not only survives, but also has become the most prominent institutional framework in Eurasia – an area notorious for its aversion to any form of meaningful regional initiatives.

embedded in both the EU and NATO. However, and crucially, the SCO indicates the emergence of cooperation in a region and between countries where such patterns of interactions are both rare and unusual.

Conclusion
Promoted as an organization for Central Asian cooperation that seeks to maintain regional stability and advance economic relations, the SCO not only reiterates Beijing's increasing clout in international life, but also boosts its credentials by emphasizing the peaceful foreign policy intentions and commitment to regional security. Its ability to foster discussions and agreements between its members is already an important achievement. And this is at least one reason why the SCO is significant and should be taken seriously. In this respect, the accounts provided in the volume edited by Fredholm challenges many of the dominant interpretations of the SCO. At the same time, the contributions offer a veritable picture of SCO's dynamics. The book's contextual assessment of the organisation's design and practices offers useful counterpoint to the prevailing narratives that will be welcomed both by those following Central Asian affairs and by those interested in the patterns of new regionalism, especially in Asia. At the same time, it is expected that the volume edited by Fredholm would benefit both students and scholars of post-Soviet politics, Security Studies, and international relations.

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
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
theFocus

Central
and Inner Asia:
New Challenges
for Independent
Research

Guest editors

Irina Morozova, University of Regensburg, Germany
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Central and Inner Asia

On 5-6 August 2014, a group of sixteen scholars from America, Central /Inner Asia and Europe, came together in the Mongolian capital of Ulaanbaatar to discuss the growing challenges posed to independent knowledge production and knowledge transfer in and on Central/Inner Asia. The seminar was organised in the context of a large-scale three-year (2014-2016) programme on the subject of 'Rethinking Asian Studies in a Global Context', managed by the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) (Leiden, the Netherlands) and funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation in New York. Within the framework of this overarching programme, the Ulaanbaatar seminar was designed to strengthen the dialogue between American/European and Central/Inner Asian scholars in a rapidly changing world, in which new challenges are being faced by the emergence of new states, new alliances, new world views and national narratives, new modes of information collection and transfer, but also by diminishing interest in Central/Inner Asian studies in America and a reduction in available funds for research worldwide.

Irina Morozova, Alexander Cooley and Willem Vogelsang

THE SEMINAR, organised by IIAS together with Ulaanbaatar University and the newly established International Unit for Central and Inner Asian Studies, focused on four related issues, namely:
a) the evolution of the study of Central/Inner Asian history and society in the past and in recent years, highlighting the problems being faced in a rapidly changing world (abstracts published in this Focus by Jigjid Boldbaatar, Nikolai Kradin, and Irina Morozova);
b) information collection and information accessibility for scholars worldwide in the field of Central/Inner Asian studies (abstracts published in this Focus by Timur Dadabaev, Ablet Kamalov, Morris Rossabi);
c) the contextual and technical problems in publishing research findings by Asian scholars for a global audience (abstract by Andrew Wachtel published in this Focus);
d) the future of institutional academic research in and on Central and Inner Asia in view of recent global events and new political structures and ideological constraints (abstracts published in this Focus by Alexander Cooley, Nargis Kassenova).

Challenges for Central/Inner Asia research and researchers
The two-day seminar in Ulaanbaatar, impeccably hosted by Academician Boldbaatar and his team from Ulaanbaatar University, led to a large number of observations that were astutely summarized by Alexander Cooley of Columbia University at the end of the second day. One of the main points, not unexpected yet unfortunately still of paramount importance in the study of Central and Inner Asia, is the fragmentation of academic research. If there has been any change in this situation, it has been for the worse.

A number of factors that play a major role in this development came up during the discussions time and again. These include the tension between ethno-nationalistic historiography on the one hand, and on the other a more objective, and international academic approach to the study of the history and modern developments in the region; the Soviet legacies and the differences in academic traditions; the problems of access to archival materials; the collection and interpretation of orally transmitted information; the new assumptions after the period of perestroika; the geo-politicisation of Central and Inner Asia area research and its use for intelligence and security-related purposes; the existing hierarchies of knowledge production on Central/Inner Asia; and the problems for Asian scholars in gaining access to international debates, to online sources and databases, and in having their research findings published in international peer-reviewed journals and book series.

On top of these problems, the decline for the last 25 years, in post-Soviet and post-socialist countries, in educational standards and in previously developed academic traditions, paralleled the destruction of social institutions. Secondly, Central and Inner Asian scholars find themselves in an academic environment that lacks funding for independent research. Funds available for research in Central and Inner Asian countries are limited. There is also, in many countries, a fear of attracting foreign (Western) funds and expertise. This specific problem is exacerbated by the dwindling interest in the US and Europe for Central and Inner Asia in general, which translates itself in fewer funds being available for research. In a vicious circle, promising students in Central and Inner Asia are thus discouraged from pursuing independent research, in the end negatively affecting the number and quality of future researchers.

What also became clear during the discussions was the lack of cooperation and dialogue between Asian scholars them-selves. They only seem to meet at roundtables and conferences organised from the outside, by mainly Western organisations. This situation strengthens the relative isolation of Asian scholars, who often have to compete with more nationalistically minded scholars that are far better supported by politicians and the ruling establishment of their respective countries. The newly founded International Unit for Central and Inner Asian Studies (IUCIAS), with its regional centre established in an Asian country (Mongolia), would in this respect be a step in the right direction. It has the specific aim of regularly bringing together Asian scholars in an international context. In 2014, immediately following the seminar being discussed here, it organised together with IIAS and Ulaanbaatar University, an international three-day conference on Central and Inner Asian studies.

Discussed at length during the seminar, on the basis of papers with sometimes very different topics, was the often rather 'colonial' relationship between Western researchers on the one hand, and local Asian scholars on the other. In many cases, because of their deficient academic training, lack of funding, and perhaps a lack of prestige in their own country, local scholars find themselves in the position of assistants to Western researchers, who not only have the funds, but also the academic background and training, and language skills, to 'dictate' the research programme and to publish their find-ings in international peer-reviewed journals, thereby delegating the role of Asian scholars to that of informants. The reverse problem is the appropriation by some Central and Inner Asian scholars of the 'anti-colonial' rhetoric in order to hide their own shortcomings and the lack of results in collective projects. Soviet or Russian trained scholars often find themselves in a better position, since their academic training is in general far

New challenges for independent research

better than that offered to the younger generations in the Central and Inner Asian states, but they, when working in these states, are often regarded with some suspicion, not only because of their background, but also because they, and American and European scholars in general, tend to go against the ethno-nationalistic approaches that have been adapted by many of the governments in Central and Inner Asia. What is clear therefore, is that the tension between American and European research on the region and that by Asian scholars is not a clear-cut East-West division, but also a disunion that is felt in Central and Inner Asia itself. Another tension that has affected the overall development of Central/Inner Asian studies is the division between 'Western' on the one hand, and post-Soviet/post-socialist scholars on the other, on their interpretations of the Cold War and its aftermath. Legacies of some of the Cold War ideologies seem to persist.

The way forward
What to do? The difficult situation in which more inter-nationally minded Asian scholars have to work, with lack of funding, training, and prestige, are regarded as paramount obstacles to the development of Central and Inner Asian studies. Editors and editorial teams from the field's journals are certainly aware of the problem and are increasingly requesting support to work with scholars from the region so that they better understand these publication and review norms. Donors and foundations could support the editorial and translation process, so that regional scholars are not at a disadvantage simply because they are not aware of Western publication norms. Another interesting initiative, next to that of other academic institutions in Central and Inner Asia, is undertaken by the American University of Central Asia. It will establish degree study programmes in regional studies within the region that attract Western and regional students, and are staffed by scholars and instructors from different institutional back-grounds. Potentially, this could make the region a magnet for Western students and a site of genuine learning and exchange, and not just a resource for them during the course of their Western graduate studies.

Another recommendation is to establish a new professional organization to assist in the support and networking of Asian scholars in particular. The establishment of IUCIAS is seen as a step in the right direction, because it will help in bringing Asian scholars together to exchange their research results and, in general, to exchange experiences and find mutual support. Non-Asian scholars and institutions can also play a role, in mak-ing sure that their research on Central and Inner Asia is not only shared with their Asian colleagues, but that the Asian scholars

are also actively included in the research, and receive credit for their work and contribution on collaborative projects. Asian scholars should in this process be encouraged and assisted in preparing their own research findings in inter-national, peer-reviewed journals. In this way, Central and Inner Asian studies will become a truly global enterprise, with a large input by Asian scholars who receive due credit for their work, and may thus raise awareness among the ruling classes of their home countries, including their scholarly institutions, as to their value in international dialogue and the proper understanding of their country.

Outside assistance remains important. The dwindling interest among European and American countries towards Central and Inner Asia, which are rapidly becoming the playing field between the Russian Federation and China, is a sad, and in the end self-defeating policy. There is the geo-political issue, but also the knowledge and experience in Central and Inner Asian studies collected in Europe and America, and the wealth of archives and other research materials, constitute an enormous reservoir for further study, by both Asian and non-Asian scholars. With a decrease in European/American funds, with the loss of government-funded programmes like Title VI (also for American /European scholars conducting research in their own countries), and the concurrent dwindling number of Western scholars studying the region, many of these resources will become understudied or even inaccessible.

The IIAS/Mellon seminar in Ulaanbaatar provided a some-what pessimistic picture of Central and Inner Asian studies. However, critically, the seminar moved beyond platitudes and general assumptions to pinpoint the specific problems, so that steps can be taken to remedy the situation. Among the participants of the seminar (and ensuing international conference), there was an overall sentiment of rising up to the challenges posed. The next IIAS/Mellon seminar, which will take place in Regensburg, Germany, in the summer of 2015, will again bring together Asian and non-Asian scholars, while IUCIAS will continue its endeavours, together with IIAS and the institutional assistance by Ulaanbaatar, to turn the international conference on Central and Inner Asia into a biennial event.

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To the studies of Soviet *vostokovedenie:* the precarious Marxist debates

In the fields of humanities and social sciences (particularly in Asian studies), individuals and collectives of Soviet scholars developed their research topics within the lines of international scholarship. However, their works were rarely known or recognised internationally. In the aftermath of the Cold War, in the 1990s, the dissolution of the former social institutions went hand in hand with the decline of many previously renowned academic traditions in the former Soviet Republics and especially Russia.

Irina Morozova

THE RUSSIAN ASIAN STUDIES or, to emphasise the imperial origins of their formation, *Oriental studies,* had borrowed significantly from and developed in close linkage with the German tradition of *Orientwissenschaft.* Diverse colonial encounters of Europeans in Asia produced various systems of knowledge about the Orient. The debate on the differences of socio-cultural constructivism behind Orientwissenschaft and Orientalisms established in other European maritime empires, particularly Great Britain, is relevant for the Russian Oriental studies as well. The Russian term, *vostokovedenie,* means 'knowledge about the East [*Vostok*]' with an accent on possessing knowledge.

In the 1920s and during the first part of the 1930s, no radical rupture of tradition had occurred in Soviet Russia yet, and many imperial Russian Orientalists were still leading the research departments. However, the formation of a new society also called for completely new and modern debates. This article dwells upon the merger of imperial Russian vostokovedenie with Marxism, which produced a very specific knowledge system, with its politicised concepts and research apparatus. Another aim of the article is to endeavour to explain why scientific Marxism, as a method to study history and society, appeared to be practically completely abandoned by the former Soviet Union and socialist states of Eastern Europe; and to find not solely political, but social grounds for this transformation.[1]

The concept of the Asiatic Mode of Production in Soviet vostokovedenie

Marx's analysis of Asian societies became the foundation of the development of theory in Soviet vostokovedenie – an approach poorly researched by contemporary Western scholars[2] and almost forgotten by the majority of the former Soviet Orientalists, the *vostokovedy.* One of the central questions of Marx's analysis was the concept of the 'Asiatic Mode of Production' (AMP) – a special mode of production that distinguished Asia from the West. The Western world, according to Marx, undergoes a number of successive formations (primitive society – slavery – feudalism – capitalism – socialism), while in Asia property is not differentiated from power, which impedes the development of certain formations.[3] In fact, Marx never thoroughly developed the AMP concept himself, but in the 1920s, *imperial* Russia and *new* Soviet vostokovedy fostered the development of the AMP debate. The reason for the debates' popularity was the Russian Bolsheviks' plans for the spread of communist revolutions in the Vostok (by means of the Third Communist International).

The debate first broke out between the followers of the AMP concept and those scholars who wanted to find a place for Vostok within the formations scheme. The debate roared in the 1920s and the early 1930s; it then died down, only to be partly revived in the 1950-60s, when it had to reflect the discussions on socialist development in the decolonised Vostok. In the mid-1970s, the Soviet vostokovedy endeavoured to reconceptualise the communist grand narrative and change their visions of the Vostok's history and development. The AMP debate was once again brought to light in a peculiar modified form during the later stages of the Cold War.

The key discourses held about Vostok, its history and culture, differed noticeably between the Soviet vostokovedy, working on the 'foreign East' (*zarubezhnyi* Vostok), and those conducting research on the Soviet 'domestic East' (*otechestvennyi* Vostok). The hierarchy found in the Soviet vostokovedenie research institutes had long been formed on the basis of the obviously political distinction that framed, above all, the social hierarchies in the USSR: the studies of the 'foreign East' were considered more prestigious (and thus situated in the capital), while the 'domestic East' scholars in Central Asia were linked to the studies of their localities [*kraevedenie*][4] and the histories of their national republics. Institutions on the theory and methodology of social sciences were situated in the cities of the European part of the country. Nevertheless, the Soviet vostokovedy of the 'domestic East' started to acquire a wider social and political role inside the USSR in the mid-1970s; after the Soviet Union's disintegration they moved to the forefront of nation-building processes in the newly independent Central Asian states.[5]

The followers of the formations approach were mostly representatives of conservative intelligentsia and *nomenklatura,* and those who wanted to believe that any society, at any stage of development, could be guided towards socialism. Those who tried to work on the AMP were suspected of revolting against the Soviet mainstream. The AMP debate, however, acquired a new social meaning at the time of *perestroika.* Scholars who wished to legitimise perestroika and market economy reform, supported the AMP concept. And again vostokovedy played the key role, as many (particularly in ethnography) tried to prove the impossibility of transition towards socialism by many Vostok societies (and what was not openly pronounced at the end of the 1980s, but implied – in the Soviet Union itself).

In the same way as endorsements by certain influential Russian vostokovedy in the early 1930s (e.g., renowned Egyptologist and Assyriologist V.V. Struve) had helped the formations approach to prevail, in the 1980s a respected sinologist, L.S. Vasiliev, among others, brought the AMP to the frontline again. His interpretation of the AMP was a bizarre mixture of Marxist dialectics, Orientalism and Cold War ideological biases on socialism, which he learned in the process of non-critical reading of the Western literature available in the Soviet Union. The Western 'rightfulness' over the Soviet 'lies' was reaffirmed in Vasiliev's eyes as he witnessed the devastating economic and social crisis in the USSR at the end of the 1980s. Vasiliev, as Marx did,[6] interpreted the integrity of power and property in the AMP as the 'Eastern despotic mode of production' – 'the civilisation-cultural fundament' of Vostok. From this, already in opposition against Marx and to a greater degree against the Soviet mainstreams, Vasiliev made another step: he connected the 'Eastern despotism' with the repressive state structures, 'typical' for the Soviet society. So far 'communist and other left experiments of the twentieth century' with the USSR at the vanguard, were seen as a manifestation of AMP. Communism, as Vasiliev wrote, was 'genetically' tied to 'Eastern despotism' and had to give way to the liberal values of the market economy.[7] In the early 1990s, his two-volume textbook, *The History of Vostok,* was key reading at the main faculties for Oriental studies at the universities in Moscow. In the second volume, devoted to contemporary Vostok, Vasiliev changed all the previous dogmas and reverted to new ones, condemning the socialist way of development as morally backward and ultimately wrong, and praising any course towards liberalisation, free market reforms and democratisation of the countries of Vostok. Those interpretations became the legitimising ideology for the group of young liberal economists who launched reforms in Russia in the 1990s.

Socialist revolutions in the *underdeveloped* Vostok of the 1970-80s, and the traumatic aftermath of socialism

The disclosure of Soviet historiographical biases became such a dramatic process for many vostokovedy at the beginning of the 1990s, that some of them, especially those who used to write on socio-economic developments in the Middle East, rejected their own literary legacy to the point that they abandoned their studies and switched to studying former Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus – the 'new' *zarubezhnyi* Vostok – which as they sensed, would become vitally important for the new Russia's government.[8] This narrowing of geographical scope of research by Russian vostokovedy echoed Russia's political and economic withdrawal from the foreign East. To understand the level of shock involved for these vostokovedy, who were suddenly excluded from the social fields inside the country, one has to remember their 'golden decade' (specialists of the Middle East in particular) when in the mid-1970s the 'threat of Wahhabism' was constructed.

In the mid-1970s, and into the Gorbachev era, new socialist revolutions had been taking place in Vostok, also among communities at the 'tribal stage' of development (according to the formational dialectics of the Soviet policy-makers). However, even at this low stage of development (*under-developed*), the societies had to be mobilised for the national-liberation struggle and revolution, for which the concept of 'non-capitalist development' (once applied in Mongolia in

the 1920-30s) was revived. Afghanistan came into focus; the study of the history and culture of the Afghan tribes, and primarily their languages, became important specialisations at the departments for vostokovedenie at the leading universities and research institutes in the Soviet Union in the 1980s; and the Department of Fraternal Nations at the Academy of Sciences of Afghanistan, supported by Moscow, ran the projects on national minorities' languages.

Another key discussion of Soviet vostokovedenie, dismissed in the 1990s, was on the state institutions among the peoples of Vostok (particularly the *underdeveloped* nomads), according to which the state [*gosudarstvo*] was seen as another inevitable stage of societal development and a precondition for social evolution. The politicised vision of a nation-state as a necessary step in the evolution towards a communist state had been an ideological ground for mapping the Soviet Central Asian Republics in 1924. More than this, since the 1940s, the ethnocentric idea of the nation-state impregnated the national academia and formed the mainstreams in the Republics. Although the *independent* historiographies of modern Central Asian states tend to throw a veil over many social developments at the time of socialism, the nation-building policies of the states largely derive from the Soviet concept of 'statehood' and search for the 'state features' in ancient and medieval polities of Central and Inner Asia.

The legacies of socialism are strong in Central Asia and many concepts and symbols persistently resurface in the ongoing rivalry for the Soviet legacy (that has become more visible against the background of the recent war in Ukraine). The young generation adheres to the affirmative nationalist symbols (remaining unaware of their actual evolution) and reproduces new localised identities (particularly 'us' versus 'them') that potentially divide rather than consolidate the population.

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7 Vasiliev, L.S. 1994. *Istoriya Vostoka* [The History of the Orient], Moscow: "Vysshaya shkola", Vol. I, II. Importantly, the publication of such textbooks was a matter of approval by the Moscow 'Orientalists gang' – the directors of the leading universities and the branches of the Academy of Science and recommendation by the State Committee on High Education of the Russian Federation.

8 Other 'Middle Eastern experts' changing their research profile for Central Asia included L.A. Friedman. In 1963 he published the most famous work, *Kapitalisticheskoe razvitie Egipta.* 1882-1939. [Capitalist development of Egypt] (Moscow: MGU). In the 1990s he became more known for his works on Central Asia: for instance, *Ocherki ekonomicheskogo i sotsial'nogo razvitiya stran Tsentral'noi Azii posle raspada SSSR* [Remarks on economic and social development of Central Asia after the USSR's disintegration] (Moskva: "Gumanitarii", 2001).

Debates on nomadic feudalism in Soviet thought

The discussion in Soviet anthropology and historiography of the social and political organization of nomadic societies has passed through several stages. In the 1920s and early 1930s, many approaches were explored: some researchers spoke in favour of the primitive tribal nature of nomadic societies, while others persisted in stressing their statehood character. Since the mid-1930s, with the establishment of the Stalinist regime and the beginning of mass repressions and genocide against the Soviet people, the theory of nomadic feudalism came to prevail.

Nikolay Kradin

HOWEVER, WITHIN THAT FRAMEWORK there were still dissenting views. If, according to the official point of view, the basis of nomadic feudalism was the ownership of land, in the opinion of others nomadic society was based on the ownership of cattle. These disagreements led to several heated discussions, and the most vehement disagreements came to the fore between 1953 and 1955. After the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956, small steps were taken towards the democratic transformation of the country, and the ideological pressure of communist despotism was somewhat lifted from the social sciences. Consequently, many researchers started to explore new approaches and to present non-traditional solutions to scientific problems.

In the 1970s and 1980s, many theories were further developed. One of the most consistent critics of the nomadic feudalism theory, Professor Genadiy Markov (Moscow University), showed that the social organization of Mongols, Kazakhs and Turkmen was, in principle, similar to that of the earlier nomads and had little in common with feudalism. He distinguished the community-nomadic and military-nomadic conditions of nomadism, the military-democratic social organization of nomadic societies, and the unstable and ephemeral political formations, such as nomadic empires. At the same time, alternative directions in the study of nomads were taken. These assumed the presence of a class system and the formation of states. Along this line, some researchers persisted in the possibility of a slave-holding stage of evolution of the nomads,[1] although others convincingly demonstrated the impossibility of the evolution of slavery relations among nomads.[2]

There were also other points of view. The Georgian scholar Melikishvili considered that the nomads constituted a specific form of an early state. 'Nomadic', 'oriental' and 'highland' feudalisms are, in his opinion, different variants of the evolution of early state societies. A member of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Kshibekov, argued that the nomads should be considered within the framework of the Marxist model of the *Gemeinwesen* of Asiatic type, but without developed despotism.

Nomadic feudalism
One can identify several independent theories among the advocates of the presence of feudalism among the nomads. First, there is the orthodox understanding of nomadic feudalism, based on traditional historical materialism. The basis of feudalism, in this context, is private ownership of land. The ancient nomads are considered as tribal or early slave-holding formations, while the medieval and (pre-)modern nomads formed feudal societies. Second, there is the so-called *saun* theory. Its advocates assume that cattle was the main factor of production in nomadic pastoral societies, rather than land. Hence, rich cattle owners giving livestock to poor nomads for pasture *(saun)* was the ground of feudal relationships.

The third approach is going back to the specific concept of nomadic feudalism that was advocated by the Member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Boris Ya. Vladimirtsov, a well-known specialist on the Mongols. His supporters hold the Marxist point of view that ownership relations are an expression of real economic relations. For this reason, ownership of land and ownership of cattle cannot be regarded as the basis of the feudal mode of production. In their opinion, the essence of nomadic feudalism lies in power relations and it is necessary to analyse the vertical social relations between nomadic aristocracy and ordinary nomads.

Fourth, there is a theory presented by the Moscow archaeologist, Svetlana Pletneva and her followers, who distinguish an evolution of nomadic societies from military democratic to semi-settled 'nomadic towns' with a stable feudal state. The main channel of establishing feudal relations, in the opinion of Pletneva, was the settlement of impoverished pastoralists in winter camps. The fifth theory is presented by a large group of researchers, who speak in favour of the existence of undeveloped patriarchal forms of feudalism, but without particular evidence relative to its internal nature.[3]

Nomadic societies as early states
An intermediate position in the above discussion is occupied by those who discuss nomadic societies as examples of early states. They say that it is necessary to consider nomads as part of a much wider macro-system that they shared with settled agriculturists. In this context, their development and internal organization were affected by successful or unsuccessful conquests and attempts to levy tribute. Therefore, the nomads may independently have reached the early-class stage, while their further development was determined by their relations with neighbouring farmer communities. In the main, this approach in Soviet literature was developed by the well-known nomadologist, Anatoly Khazanov, now professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He proposed to call this theory the ecological approach.[4]

A distinctive hypothesis for state formation among the nomads was proposed by the Siberian archaeologist, Anatoly Martynov. He supposed that nomads in their evolution escaped the "barbarism" stage and created an original "steppe civilization". In order to illustrate this thesis he used a diagram with a division of history into savagery-barbarism-civilization, as described in *Ancient Society* by Lewis H. Morgan and in *Ursprung* by Friedrich Engels.

Nomadism and Marxism
Nomadism, in general, confronts Marxism with the same fundamental problems as the Asiatic Mode of Production. Neither nomads nor the East (the Orient) fit into the common Marxist-hypothesized evolution of humanity, from the primitive stage to Communism. The problem arises from the impossibility of interpreting the superficially motionless and cyclically evolving nomads within the framework of progressivist (and I would add, Eurocentrist) theories of human history, which also include Marxism. Another serious problem is the difficulty of representing the socio-political organization of nomads in terms of the Marxist conceptual system. How can we explain from the Marxist point of view such a paradoxical fact that, among the nomads, private property in means of production (i.e., livestock) has appeared practically in parallel with the formation of nomadism as an economic-cultural type, long before the advance of private property among the agriculturists, whereas, as their socio-economic level is concerned, the nomads were less developed than sedentary people? How accurate is it to assign the nomadic pastoralists to the primitive stage, when there was private ownership of livestock and persons were allowed to accumulate property in large quantities? Conversely, how can one consider nomads to be primitive, even if they had no state bureaucratic apparatus?

Finally, how should nomadism be interpreted within the framework of one of the basic methodological principles of historical materialism: the law of correspondence between basis and superstructure? According to Marxist theory, changes in the basis lead inevitably to the respective transformation in the superstructure (in the form of revolutions). The economic basis of nomadism-pastoralism has actually remained unchanged over the course of many centuries. Ancient, medieval and even more recent nomads have had a similar herd composition, strictly determined by the ecological conditions of habitat, primitive and easily transportable tin ware and analogous household technology. However, pastoral 'superstructure' did not demonstrate the permanency of the basis. The nomads sometimes created tribal alliances, but also formed the gigantic nomadic empires under the dominion of mighty leaders and then again disbanded into separate khanates, tribes and even smaller groups.

Civilization theory and nationalism
In the years of perestroika and after the collapse of the USSR, many researchers from the countries of the former socialist block turned their back on Marxism. They turned instead to the civilization theory, because it appeared to many of them to offer a fresh look at history.[5] Some scholars promulgated it as the universal paradigm that should replace Marxism. Others believed that civilization theory should substitute the obsolete approach of different modes of production. However, it should be noted that post-Soviet scholars do not share a common understanding of the civilization theory. One can identify several different interpretations. For example, in Kazakhstan and in Kyrgyzstan local scholars write about the Kazakh and Kyrgyz civilizations, where it became stylish to write about national statehood. If, in Soviet times, it was prestigious to show that people had 'nomadic feudalism', then after the collapse of the USSR, and Marxism being out of fashion, theories were proposed that referred to the construction of one's own nation and state.

In many multi-national republics of Russia, papers have been published in which the existence of specific civilizations is substantiated. So, the Bashkir, Buryat, Kalmyk, Tatar, Yakut, and other civilizations emerged. Each of the ethnic groups, having achieved its statehood (as an independent post-Soviet state or republic within the Russian Federation), aspires to construct its past and to prove the ancient origins of its nation. Essentially, the civilizational analysis appears as a form of nationalism. It is, so it appears, a common ideology of weaker and economically less powerful countries, which wish to escape from the colonialism of the Big Brother. In this case, the pretences of national elites, to cultural uniqueness and an ancient civilization older than that of the Russians, present an attempt to construct their own ideology of nationalism. The idea of ancient nation construction is thus another, parallel form of political legitimization for the local ruling establishment. For example, it is common practice in Yakutia to relate the past to the medieval Kyrgyz and even the Xiongnu Empire. The ethnic elites use these political myths for legitimization and pretences to rule. They underline a long experience in state-building and a genetic memory of the state.

Thus, in conclusion, in the Soviet period 'nomadic feudalism' was a form of national identity for various minorities. For the scholars of the metropolis, nomadic feudalism was a form of Orientalism. In the last quarter of the 20th century, many scholars in post-socialist countries believed that the introduction of the civilizational analysis would allow them to differentiate themselves from their foreign colleagues in matters of theoretical developments. But these illusions must be abandoned. In practice, the civilizational analysis has become a form of nationalism only.

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Above: Cattle crossing the Dushanbe-Kyrgyz Border Road. Image reproduced under a Creative Commons license, courtesy of the Asian Development Bank on Flickr.com

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The state and trends of Mongolian historical studies

Dogmatism, lack of historical thinking and utilization of duplicating methods were three characteristics of Mongolian historical schooling for a long period. However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s new approaches were introduced, and attention was focused on the dissociating of issues from politics and ideologies, and on looking at the problems objectively. The main factor that influenced this shift was a rejection of the Marxist approach and free access to archival materials.

J. Boldbaatar

Монголын Үндэсний Түүхийн Музей
The National Museum of Mongolian History

PREVIOUSLY, the periodization of Mongolian history followed the formation theory, and led from prehistorical primitive societies, through enslavement, feudal relations, to capitalism and ending up with the socialist ideology. However, after the 1990s, the periodization acknowledged by the majority of Mongolian historians was changed drastically; below follows the new scheme with an overview of the pertinent academic works published since 1990.

Ancient and early medieval period
This period covers the time of human settlement in Mongolia up to the 12th century AD. The Mongolian scholar, G. Sukhbaatar, writing in 1992, expanded current knowledge of the Mongolian Niryn state (330-555 AD). He argues that during the subsequent Turkic period (6th-10th centuries), Mongolian statehood did not disappear, but that the Mongolian Tatar Khanate continued to flourish in eastern Mongolia, while the Turks held sway over the western parts and beyond.

Medieval and post medieval period
This period includes a range of historical events, from the 13th up to the 20th centuries. This is a period of some 700 years. This period can be described as that of the rise and subsequent fall of Mongolian statehood. The period can be divided in three parts: imperial period; period of dissolution; and the Qing period.

The Mongol Empire (13th-14th centuries) –
the imperial period
'The Mongol Empire' comprised some 230 different nations and states, and as such it was unique in the history of the world. A number of important works were recently published by Mongolian scholars, including *The Great Mongol Ulus, 1206-1260* (1994; by Academician Ch. Dalai; revised version 2006). Another work is called *Some Distinctive Features of the Great Mongol State, its history and ideology* (2000; by Academician Sh. Bira). In this study Bira introduces three periods of imperial history, namely the initial stage of the Mongol statehood (1206-1227); the imperial period or state development stage (1229-1259, time of Ögedei, Güyük and Möngke khans); and the period of imperial growth, or the Mongol Yuan period (1260-1368). In his book, Bira stresses the ancient Mongol belief that their khans were mandated by heaven, and thus they performed a worship of heaven or *Tengri*. Sh. Bira claims that the basis for the ideology of the Great Mongol State was *tengerism*.

The formation of the Mongol Empire has led to a series of academic studies. Some scholars believe that Mongol society during the imperial period was in a pre-state formation, without any state structure, and it was merely a union of tribes under the charismatic leadership of Chinggis Khan. These scholars also claim that there was no legislative document, such as the alleged *Great Yasa*. Others argue that the state established by Chinggis Khan could be defined as an 'early state'. Others again state that the Mongol Empire was a 'sort of early state', which was at its 'inchoate', 'typical', or in its 'transitional' stage. N. Kradin and T. Scrinnykova, in their joint book, entitled

Epoch of Chinggis Khan (2006), consequently believe that the predominant character of the Mongol Empire can be classified as an *early state*. Yet other scholars hold the opinion that the *Ike Monggol Ulus* included a population, a territory, statehood and state power, and could thus be classed as a state.

Other important studies by Mongolian scholars include *The Mongol Yuan State* (2006; by scholars at the Academy of Sciences); *The History of Mongolia, 1260-1388* (1992; by Ch. Dalai); *The Mongol State of the Golden Horde* (2006; by S. Tsolmon); *The Mongol State of the Chagadaids* (2006; by Ts. Enkhchimeg); and *The Mongol Ilkhanate* (2006; by D. Ankhbayar). These books were among the first attempts by Mongolian scholars to introduce the Mongol states as a separate subject matter. The monograph *The Mongols and the Armenians, 1220-1335* (2011; by D. Bayarsaikhan) represents a constructive work of the Mongol incursions into the Caucasus, Asia Minor and the Middle East. The work was written in English and published by Brill, Leiden.

Apart from the above studies, the study of Chinggis Khan has been continued. It is worth noting *Chinggis Khan's Ruling Principle (Tsadig)* (1991; by Sh. Natsagdorj), and a collective work, *The Great Chinggis Khan* (2012; edited by J. Boldbaatar).

Political dissolution (end 14th century to beginning 17th century)
This period was formerly known as the 'period of feudal dispersion'. The reason to abandon this term was its connection to the term 'feudalism', and that it was no longer thought appropriate to describe Mongolian society of that time in such a way. Therefore, having put aside the discussion of whether the medieval Mongolian society was feudal or not, scholars decided to rename the 14th-17th centuries as the time of 'political dissolution'. In general, when the (Mongolian) Yuan emperor Togoontumur was pushed out of Beijing in 1368, the pillars of the Mongol empire were shaken; the autocracy of Khan was undermined, and the individual *noyans* and nobles, using their economic powers, strove for political independence. A PhD dissertation, entitled *Revisiting the Dissolution Period in the History of Mongolia*, was recently written by D. Enkhtsetseg. Unfortunately this is the only academic publication to date that addresses this topic.

The Qing period (17th-20th century)
The Manchus from China took southern Mongolia in 1636, Khalkha Mongolia in 1691, and Oirat Mongolia in 1755. In this process Mongolia lost its independence to the Chinese Qing emperor, marking the gloomiest period in Mongolian history. Considering Mongolia as a 'colony' of the Qing Empire, however, would not be correct. There were three different stages: a client stage (17th to beginning 19th century); the semi-colony stage (mid-19th to end 19th century); and a transition stage towards total Chinese control (end 19th to beginning 20th century).

The study of the Qing period in Mongolia is connected to these different stages and other issues such as trade. Recent Mongolian scholarship includes the publication

Above: National Museum of Mongolian History, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. Image reproduced under a Creative Commons license, courtesy of Felix Andrews on wikimedia.org

The Qing Policy towards the Mongols (2009; by O. Oyunjargal), and a PhD dissertation, *The 'jasaq' in Khalkha and Manchu Relations in the 17th Century* (by E. Jigmeddorj). It is also worth noting contributions made to the development of Mongolian-Qing studies by the Japanese scholar, Hiroki Oka, by the Inner Mongolian scholar Chimeddorj, and by their students.

Modern Mongolian history (beginning 20th century to present)
This period can be divided into the following stages:
- National liberation revolution
- Attempts to achieve democratic development (1924-1928)
- Leftist deviation or the imposition of Soviet socialism onto Mongolia by Komintern (1928-1932)
- New reform policies and their results (1932-1940)
- Pre-socialist activities (1940-1954)
- A shift to build socialism (1954-1966)
- Building socialism and its consequences (1966-1989)
- A transition to democratic development and market economy (since 1990)

The modern period of Mongolian history is the most well-studied. Many issues of this difficult period were recently studied from new perspectives. The study of 20th century Mongolia has gone through drastic revisions, due to the changes in historical paradigms. Important scholarly works have been written by L. Jamsran, J. Urangua, N. Khishigt, Ch. Dashdavaa, Ts. Batbayar, P. Bold, and others.

The transitional period toward democratic developments and the introduction of the market economy surely have caught the attention of historians, sociologists and anthropologists. The events that occurred in 1990 have been analysed, not within the frame of a Marxist understanding of 'revolution', but as a peaceful democratic 'reform' that was directed to change the quality of social life. This period also became the topic of scholarship abroad. Important publications include *History and Politics in Mongolia* (2004; by T. Kaplonski), *Modern Mongolia, From Khans to Commissars to Capitalists* (2005; by M. Rossabi) and a range of Japanese articles on the subject. From the works of Mongolian scholars we can add *Mongolian Political and Legislation History* (by J. Boldbaatar and D. Lundeejantsan).

Bright outlook
Since the early 1990s, more than sixty academic publications have been dedicated to the biographical study of famous individuals in Mongolian history. Apart from these, it should be added that historical philosophy and archival studies are flourishing. A new edition of thirty volumes with Mongolian primary sources was published as the result of the collaboration of many scholars. All what was said above is real evidence that Mongolian historiography is re-emerging. However, one should be aware that it is easy to slip backward toward subjective opinions and politicization.

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Information collection & accessibility in Mongolia, Inner Mongolia & Xinjiang

The study of twentieth and early twenty-first century Mongolia on the one hand, and Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang on the other hand, necessitates the use of a multitude of oral and written sources in a variety of different languages; thus the first major obstacle for a scholar and an educated audience is the extraordinary diversity of the essential languages. No single person can master such a wide array of languages and scripts. A collaborative effort, which is not always optimal for scholars, would be one way of overcoming this difficulty. More likely, however, scholars will choose individual topics based upon their knowledge of specific languages. A specialist who studies these various works would then be capable of devising an accurate appraisal.

Morris Rossabi

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN the source materials available for Mongolia, and Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, are readily observable in the possibility and accessibility of data from interviews. In one project, which continues to be translated into English, Professors Yuki Konagaya of the National Museum of Ethnology in Japan, and I. Lkhagvasuren of the National University of Mongolia, set forth initially to conduct "interviews with some [Mongolian] representatives of the socialist political elite, who devoted themselves to bringing the socialist modernization plans to life."[1] English translations of a set of interviews by Lkhagvademchig Jaadamba, of Buddhists in Mongolia, have also appeared.[2] Lkhagvademchig Jaadamba chose to interview Buddhists who were not part of the elite, in order to depict the course of Buddhist history in the socialist and post-socialist periods. Special attention must also be paid to the University of Cambridge's Mongolian and Inner Asia Unit's 'The Oral History of Twentieth Century Mongolia', which has conducted more than six hundred interviews and has made them available online.[3]

Personal and oral accounts
Complementing oral history projects, individual Mongolians have written invaluable autobiographies, which offer insights into developments in the pre- and post-socialist eras. Several of these have been translated into English. Bazaryn Shirendev, the First President of the National University of Mongolia (founded in 1942) and of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences (established in 1962), wrote a detailed account of his academic career as well as a description of some of the twentieth-century's leading political figures. In his auto-biography, J. Sambuu, Ambassador to the Soviet Union and later President of Mongolia, provided a withering portrait of the oppressiveness of the pre-socialist era and then an analysis of his later career, emphasizing his role as Ambassador to the Soviet Union and North Korea. Ts. Namkhainyambuu, the most renowned herder in Mongolia's socialist period, offered a depiction of life in the pastoral economy and of the development of the *negdels* (or collectives) and of their dissolution in the post-socialist era. Other prominent Mongolians, such as B. Jargalsaikhan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to a number of countries, and J. Lkhagvasuren, the Minister of Defense through much of the socialist period, have also written autobiographies that await translation into English.

Oral and personal sources on Mongolia have been elicited through unsupervised and un-regulated field research. Both foreign and Mongolian anthropologists have had considerable access to sites throughout the country, resulting in an array of informative studies.[4] The government has not interfered in any way to limit anthropologists in the field or to shape their conclusions.

Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang offer sharp contrasts concerning oral sources. No independent unregulated interviews of a wide swath of inhabitants have been permitted, and the minorities in these so-called autonomous regions have not, for the most part, granted interviews. Foreign anthropologists had a window of opportunity to conduct field research in the last decades of the twentieth century and managed to produce books on aspects of life in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang.[5] However, after the publication of *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland,* a book edited by Frederick Starr,[6] such opportunities ended and, for a time, led to the Chinese government's refusal to offer visas to the book's contributors.

State archives and libraries
In some categories of written sources, the contrasts are less sharp. The National Statistical Office in Mongolia provides monthly indicators of economic performance as well as

Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang offer sharp contrasts concerning oral sources. No independent unregulated interviews of a wide swath of inhabitants have been permitted ...

measures of education, health, and society, which are then gathered together into an annual publication. Much of the information is also online. The Chinese Statistical Bureaus in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Group issue similar data on the economy, population, and social matrixes. Individual cities in these regions, such as Urumqi and Turfan, also have statistical bureaus that publish statistics on the economic and social conditions in their domains. All of these data is online and can readily be accessed. Thus, independent economists can also assess the credibility of these statistics.[7]

The early twentieth-century history of Mongolia, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia reveals the greatest differences in government and public transparency. Mongolia has opened up many archival sources concerning the socialist period from 1921 to 1990, and numerous public discussions by former government and Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) officials have been published. The opening up of Buryat and Russian Federation archives has complemented the Mongolian government's policy of transparency. Dr. Irina Morozova has used these archives to write a recent book on twentieth-century Mongolia and has also consulted the Russian State Military Archives.[8]

The availability of both the Mongolian and Russian Federation archives, the accessibility of primary documents such as collections of the speeches of the dominant government and MPRP leader Kh. Choibalsan and his successor Yu. Tsedenbal, as well as official correspondence concerning the Comintern's activities in Mongolia, will all contribute to research on and understanding of twentieth-century Mongolia. Japanese archives are also accessible, offering valuable glimpses of Japanese efforts in the 1930s to encroach upon Mongolia, culminating in the 1939 battle of Nomonhan (Khalkhyn Gol), with Generals G. Zhukov of Russia, and J. Lkhagvasuren of Mongolia, trouncing the enemy. A number of researchers have consulted these archives to provide insights into Japanese policy and actions from the late nineteenth century through World War II.[9]

Archives in Inner Mongolia also offer significant insights into Japanese activities in the pre-WWII period. However, as shown by the case of an American researcher trying to access these archives to conduct research for her doctoral dissertation on Japan's involvement in Inner Mongolia in the 1930s,[10] considerable obstacles are presented when seeking to consult the archival resources. A stifling bureaucracy impeded her at every turn, demanding almost overwhelming paperwork to grant permission to use the archives. The slightest error

in filling out the forms resulted in delays; the doors to the archives were frequently opened late; she was denied certain essential materials that appeared to have no current political significance; and costs for microfilms or copies were exorbitant.[11] Admittance to government archives of the post-1949 period is also difficult, if not impossible.

Archives in Xinjiang are even more restrictive. The tensions between its inhabitants and the Chinese government and the ensuing violence over the past sixty years have no doubt prompted concern about the Uyghurs and other minorities in this allegedly autonomous region, which has translated into lack of government transparency and extends to the period before 1949.[12] Foreign scholars have, on occasion, been allowed to conduct research in Beijing on pre-1949 Xinjiang, but have generally been excluded from local and regional archives. Specialists on Xinjiang have often been limited to analyses of speeches of government leaders, to the official newspaper *Renmin Ribao,* and to local journals.

The contrasts between State Libraries in Mongolia, and those in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, are not as striking. The State Library in Mongolia is accessible but, bereft of sufficient State funding, does not operate efficiently. It has also suffered damage from insect infestation and flooding. I have seen quite a number of water-logged texts, which are almost unreadable.

Hopeful
It may be useful to end with one positive note concerning information collection and accessibility in Xinjiang. In 1996, I traveled with curators from the Metropolitan Museum of Art and the Cleveland Museum of Art in preparation of their joint exhibition 'When Silk Was Gold' that was mounted in 1997.[13] We were permitted access to the exhibits and to the storage areas in the Xinjiang Museum in Urumchi and to the Turfan Museum. In addition, a number of curators have been shown objects and have been allowed loans of objects from the relatively new Inner Mongolian Museum in Hohhot. However, in all of these cases, the foreigners had considerable *guanxi* (or connections), which worked in their favor. One can only hope that the Chinese national and local governments in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia will also start allowing access. Art is not as volatile as history and politics.

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Below: Museum of Inner Mongolia, Hohhot. Image reproduced under a Creative Commons license, courtesy of Shaojin Alianto Tio on Flickr.com.

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Recollecting Central Asia's Soviet past

This paper presents in brief a project that aims to collect, record and interpret personal experiences and memories of the Soviet past in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Interviews were held with elderly citizens in order to contribute to the understanding of the relationship between the official historiography of the Soviet era and people's private lives and beliefs. The aim of our study is to contribute to academic knowledge with regards to how people remember their Soviet past. In addition, this study may also shed new light on the transformations of present-day Central Asia, from the perspective of personal memories. The way in which people in Central Asia reconcile with their Soviet past is to a great extent through a three-fold process of recollecting their everyday experiences, reflecting on their past from the perspective of their post-Soviet present, and re-imagining their own history.

Timur Dadabaev

'Retrieving' the memory

The interviewees were chosen from an older generation, beyond retirement age, who had not been covered by any previous studies. Those selected had spent their most active years in a Soviet cultural and social environment. Their recollections were recorded on audiotapes (in the case of Uzbekistan) and video-recordings (in the cases of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan), transcribed and translated, and are currently in the process of being archived.

Methodologically, a critical discourse analysis was used for the processing of the interviews. The video/audio recordings of the interviews were transcribed. These texts /interviews were then treated as elements mediating social events that occurred during the Soviet times. In the process of the interviews, the topics that the respondents touched upon mostly related to the analysis of various actors, such as the Communist Party, the Soviet government, religious institutions, local communities and respondents, and their social roles. This study thus joins other research that analyses Soviet-era social actors, using techniques 'to include or exclude them in presenting events; assign them an active or passive role; personalise or impersonalise them; name or only classify them; refer to them specifically or generically.'

Our study in Central Asian oral history has resulted in a number of conclusions based on people's recollections of Soviet times. The first conclusion is related to the patterns of history construction and the role of the public in this process. The public view of history in post-Soviet Central Asia, and particularly Uzbekistan, often falls between Soviet historiographies, advocating advances in the Soviet past, and post-Soviet historical discourses, rejecting the Soviet past. Public perceptions of history are primarily shaped by and related to the everyday needs, experiences, identification and mentality of people, in contrast to the ideologies and political doctrines of the time. They often reflect not only the perceptions of people regarding their past, but also their perceptions regarding their present and imagined future.

Second, recollections of traumatic experiences associated with the Soviet past are often placed within this dichotomy of depicting Soviet experiences. However, in terms of public experiences, the recollections of the public with respect to traumatic experiences, similar to the ones described in recollections of Stalinist repression, often reflect the positions of the narrators and their (in)ability to adapt to the conditions in which they were placed during those years. Different social, ethnic, educational, religious and/or ideological backgrounds greatly influence the selectivity of these recollections and explain why certain individuals recollect their Soviet experiences with a sense of rejection, while others relate to it with the sense of nostalgia.

Third, in a related manner, although nostalgia in post-Soviet countries is frequently explained solely by the economic hardships and social pressures of the post-Soviet period, such explanations do not accurately cover this phenomenon. Economic and social explanations for the nostalgia of respondents are obvious. However, such explanations are not the only ones, and there are a number of other nostalgia-inducing factors that are rarely discussed in the literature on this subject. From the narratives of senior citizens included in our project, one can conclude that many nostalgic views of the past reflect the respondents' attitudes, both to their adaptability to the Soviet realities and also to various aspects of their present lives.

Fourth, in terms of specific issues such as ethnicity, oral-history research may contribute to the debate about how people in Central Asia recall Soviet ethnic policies and their vision of how these policies have shaped the identities of their peers and contemporaries. Such narratives demonstrate that people do not explain Soviet ethnic policies simply through the 'modernisation' or 'victimisation' dichotomy, but locate their experiences in between these discourses. Their recollections again highlight the pragmatic flexibility of the public's adaptive strategies to Soviet ethnic policies.

Fifth, the hybridity produced as a result of Soviet experiences can be traced not only to ethnic self-identification, but also to the attitude of the public towards Soviet and post-Soviet religiosity. An analysis of the manner in which people have come to terms with their past and their recollections of anti-religious campaigns helps us to understand how life under the Soviet government not only resulted in changes in lifestyles, but also redrew the boundaries of 'proper/modernised' religious life and of what are now considered to be the religious remnants of the past.

Challenges, limitations and biases

There are a few conceptual and logistical issues to be considered in connection with interviews of the type discussed in the preceding sections. First, the mentality of ordinary people has influenced the outcome of the interviews. The interviewers observed that respondents were often reluctant to speak about negative aspects of Soviet times in certain countries, for which there are several explanations. One of the most important explanations is the issue of censorship, which can largely be regarded as a legacy of the Soviet past. In particular, the censorship of questionnaires and answer choices remains one of the greatest obstacles to the wider development of survey research in Central Asia. Even today, the same attitude towards surveys seems to prevail in a majority of cases in post-Soviet Central Asia, which often leads to a situation in which respondents are under either imagined or real pressure to provide socially desirable answers to impress interviewers or please authorities.

In addition to potential political and other related pressures, respondents may be of the opinion that talking about one's problems and expressing criticism outside of their own group is shameful and should be avoided as much as possible. Therefore, in many cases, interviewees may be inclined to speak more about the positive sides of issues than the negatives sides.

Second, determining the language in which an interview should be conducted may be a challenge given the multi-ethnic nature of the environment in which our survey was carried out. Uzbek/Kyrgyz/Kazakh (depending on the country) was used by those belonging to the titular ethnic group, who preferred to answer in their own language. For the Russian and Russian-speaking groups (such as Koreans), Russian language questionnaires were used. In certain instances, questionnaires in alternative languages were drafted. Fortunately, the diversity of languages used for the questionnaires did not present a technical problem, beyond for the logistical concerns related to translation. A much larger problem was the obvious correlation between the language of the questionnaire and the pattern of asking questions and answering those questions. In the Uzbek /Kyrgyz/Kazakh languages, the interviewer was required to go through the long procedure of first explaining at length the background of the issue and then asking the question. If not, the answers given would be inadequate, too short or shallow. In the Russian language, however, preceding the question with a long discussion of the background of the issues and their details irritated the respondents, who desired clear, short questions without a patronisingly long introductory interpretation and explanation of the problem. In the same manner, the answers in local languages were softer, long and extensively descriptive, with few short and clear-cut answers. Those responding in local languages preferred to give 'middle-ground' answers, which can largely be attributed to the mentality of the people. Even when respondents answered in a straight and critical manner, they still preferred to do so after extensive explanation and after 'setting the stage'. In contrast, the Russian language responses were more direct, more critical or clearer in their message, omitting background information and offering very little explanation. In addition, certain respondents spoke about their lives and experiences in their local language, and then switched to Russian when they wanted to be more direct or blunt about certain events or happenings.

Third, in certain cases respondents clearly attempted to provide interviewers with the information that they believed the interviewers wanted to hear, which influenced the outcomes of the project, since the information did not always reflect the real lifetime experiences of people, but rather interpretations of history acquired from other sources.

The fourth problem is related to the issue of sampling. Because the population of the region is very diverse in terms of ethnicity, religion, and lifestyle, compiling a representative sample of everyday Soviet-era experiences appears to be one of the greatest challenges.

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Below: Crying Mother Monument, Tashkent. Honouring the 400,000 Uzbek soldiers who died in World War II. Image reproduced under a Creative Commons license, courtesy of Allan Grey on Flickr.com.

Evidence & history in archival documents: civil war in Semirech'ye

In an era of a global cyberspace, many concepts of social sciences acquire new dimensions, which is also true for the concept of the archive. Yet, irrespective of these new dimensions, the core question in the process of generating new knowledge still concerns the relationship between evidence and history, between data and what really happened.

Ablet Kamalov

ARCHIVES BECAME A VERY IMPORTANT SOURCE for the revision of the past in post-Soviet Central Asian countries, within the framework of the construction of new national narratives. In this process historians take an active part, introducing unknown or previously concealed documents from archives and re-interpreting the 'old' ones. Historians working with materials of the state archives are quite familiar with both advantages and limitations of archival work and successfully use methods of source analysis. One of the challenges of archival work concerns specific 'archival narratives', a 'set' story of the past, to which the existing archival documents are subjugated. The construction of archival narratives is difficult to reveal, because of an absence of alternative stories as well as the specific rhetoric of the narration, excluding a possibility of alternative interpretations. One of these archival stories of the early Soviet period is the tragic event of the massacre of the Taranchi Uyghurs in the Semirech'ye region (modern Southeast Kazakhstan and North Kyrgyzstan) in 1918.

The essence of the historical event in question is a mass shooting, in the summer of 1918, of the Uyghurs living in the villages located between the city of Verny (present Almaty) and the border with China in the east, by the Bolshevik Red Army. According to various estimations, the number of villagers killed amounted to some 20000 to 25000, almost 40-50% of the entire Uyghur population of the Semirech'ye. The tragic event of the 'Atu' (Shooting) was not excluded from collective memory of the local Uyghurs constructed in the Soviet time, but in Soviet historiography it was attributed to counter-revolutionary elements. While Soviet historiography failed to explain the fact that the massacre was carried out by the Red Army regiment led by Communist Commissar Murayev, who arrived with his soldiers in Verny from Tashkent, the crime against the civil population was described as a counter-revolutionary action of Menshevik leaders who falsely represented themselves as Bolsheviks.

The 'Atu' was mentioned for the first time in Soviet historiography by Malik Kabirov in his book *Essays on the History of Soviet Kazakhstan's Uyghurs* (1975), but was limited to just one sentence: "Direct impulse to the exodus [of the

Above:
State Archive of the Russian Federation. Courtesy of the Cultural Heritage of Russia website; http://culture.ru/en/atlas/object/789.

Uyghurs] to China was the illegal repression of the Uyghur population by alien elements who had penetrated the ranks of the Red army detachment of Murayev, who arrived in Semirech'ye from Tashkent to render assistance in solidifying Soviet power". Although archival documents contain more details on the mass massacre, they hardly add any essential information to formulate alternative interpretations of the events.

Nevertheless, since the massacre followed the anti-Bolshevik uprising of the Russian Cossacks in the city of Verny, which was successfully suppressed by the Bolsheviks, there are some hints in the archival documents that allow considering the massacre as a reaction of the Red Army to the Uyghurs' support of the anti-Bolshevik uprising of the Cossacks. However, the dominating narration in archival documents does not leave room for the representation of the Uyghurs as a serious anti-Bolshevik force in the region; according to the archives, only a small group of the wealthy Uyghurs [bays] and Muslim clerics [mullas] joined the anti-Bolshevik movement in Semirech'ye. The general description in the archival documents of the massacre in 1918, based on a class struggle approach, depicts the majority of the Uyghur population as full supporters of the Bolshevik power in the region and only a small number of wealthy people as reactionary elements who finally had to flee to neighbouring China after the defeat of the Cossack uprising in Verny. Hence, the Bolsheviks could not have carried out the shooting of their allies – the Taranchi Uyghurs, therefore it was organised by reactionary elements who were hiding under the guise of Communists.

A revision of the massacre of the Uyghurs, which started in the *perestroika* period in Uyghur publications, finally accepted it as a Bolshevik act of terror, but without recognition of the role of the Uyghurs in the anti-Bolshevik movement in the Semirech'ye region during the Civil war period in 1918-1920. Although there is still no clear evidence of active involvement of the Taranchi Uyghurs in the anti-Bolshevik movement in Semirech'ye, which could be used as a pretext for the massacre by the Bolsheviks, a recently found document in the State Archive of the Russian Federation, namely a 'Charter to

the Taranchi people' by Admiral Kolchak, allows us to assume that the real involvement of the Taranchi Uyghurs in the anti-Bolshevik movement in Semirech'ye has been misrepresented by the Soviet archival documents. This charter [gramota] to the Taranchi people was written on behalf of a recognised leader of the White movement, Admiral Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak, who had been proclaimed as the supreme ruler of Russia on 18 November 1918 in Omsk (Siberia) and who headed the White movement until his arrest on 15 January 1920. According to S. Iskhakov, who published this charter in a collection of archival documents on the Civil war, the charter was printed as a leaflet and can be dated to 16 July 1919. The charter presented an official address of Admiral Kolchak to the Taranchi people, praising their contribution to the resistance against the Bolsheviks. He praised the Taranchis as "small in number, but strong in spirit", for not having "gone on the false path of destruction of the Russian state" and "remained faithful to the Fatherland and its laws, and sealed that with the blood of many thousands of the best sons and their possessions in the struggle against the Bolsheviks". Kolchak recognised the loyalty of the Taranchi people to the Russian Fatherland in fighting Bolsheviks and promised to honour their needs.

One should be critical about Kolchak's rhetoric in the charter, for he might have had a clear political aim, namely encouraging various groups of people in the resistance against the Bolsheviks and attracting them to the White movement; the charter might therefore overestimate the real involvement of the Taranchis in the civil war in Semirech'ye. Nevertheless, the "Charter to the Taranchi people" deconstructs the existing archival narrative of the massacre of the Taranchis and allows for an alternative vision on the role of the Taranchi Uyghurs. We can assume that archival documents in the early Soviet period have gone through a special selection: alongside the use of a 'Bolshevik language' in depicting events, they represent only those facts matching the Bolshevik ideology.

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Publishing challenges for local Central Asian scholars

Scholars of Central and Inner Asia who come from the region face two major hurdles in publishing their findings for an international audience. The first has to do with the constitution of their field of study and is related to problems faced by all scholars (local or foreign) who deal with fields that have, on the one hand high qualification requirements, and on the other appear marginal to most outsiders. The second has to do particularly with the training these scholars generally receive, the kinds of institutions they work in, and the need foreign scholars in this field have for local knowledge.

Andrew Wachtel

High qualification requirements

If we focus on the first, we see quickly that Central or Inner Asian Studies do not differ too much from Balkan Studies (which I happen to know quite well) or African Studies. What characterizes these fields? In order to be competent, the scholar needs to know much that few people know, and that knowledge takes a long time to acquire. First and foremost, I have in mind languages. Of course, it is possible to do work on Central or Inner Asia with only English and Russian, but what one can do is exceptionally limited. In reality, to do serious work, one should have English, Russian, a Turkic language, a Persian language and perhaps Chinese. Even for locals, the amount of time needed simply to amass the basic linguistic requirements (the ante price, we could call it) is large.

Because it takes so long to achieve what is needed for basic competence, however, and because life is short, the people who achieve it often do not have time to achieve other competencies that are absolutely necessary for dealing with international publishing. First and foremost, the time they spend learning languages and getting field experience is time they do not spend learning the basic disciplinary and interdisciplinary discourses that are the coin of the realm for their foreign colleagues, who have the good fortune to study less obscure fields where the entry requirements are lower or are possessed by more people (by the way, it should be noted that the situation of local and non-local specialists on Central and Inner Asia does not differ in this regard).

Marginal to most outsiders

At the same time, the field has no *a priori* interest to anyone outside it. This again is a problem faced by both local and foreign scholars. If you study the US or China or any other big place, scholars who do not work on your topic have at least a glancing interest in it (or at the very least they are embarrassed to admit that they don't care about it). If you study Central and Inner Asia, you do not have the luxury of automatic interest.

Below: American University of Central Asia, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Image reproduced under a Creative Commons license, courtesy of Matthias Buehler on Flickr.com.

You need to do one of two things to get it. Either you need to have a topic that is *sui generis* (and therefore that your colleagues in other fields might care about) or you have to show how your field of study requires a rethinking of (or at least a modification of) the basic paradigms of scholarly discourse, which are almost always developed by scholars focusing on 'mainstream' regions.

The former case is rare and only happens by chance. Thus, Islamic studies, which was once just as obscure as Central or Inner Asian studies, has over the past 25 years become a topic about which one can publish in all sorts of international journals, because world events have thrust it into the forefront of interest. However, the things one can say about the topic are limited by what scholars in more mainstream fields want to hear. Thus, it is easy to publish on Islamic fundamentalism, but much harder to publish on everyday Islam.

Central and Inner Asian studies, however, have few, if any areas that are of automatic interest to anyone outside the region (perhaps energy policy?). As a result, it is not easy to publish by focusing on *sui generis* issues, because these issues are so unique as to be utterly uninteresting to colleagues outside the field. Therefore it is hard to get a hearing in the kinds of disciplinary journals in which good colleagues from other fields get to publish.

Instead, what is left is to take the road of showing how material from Central Asia allows (or forces) scholars who work on other regions to reconsider what they think we know about their own fields. But here we again run into the problem noted above. Because local scholars have spent many years building up local knowledge, but have not had the necessary level of exposure to the broad questions of their fields, they often do not know how to use the material they have acquired in a comparative way. To be sure, this problem is also faced by their foreign colleagues, but those colleagues have the advantage of native fluency in a major foreign language and at least an undergraduate education in a relatively broad field of studies outside the Central Asian context.

The result of this situation is a strange kind of scholarly colonialism. The smartest outsiders use local scholars as 'native informants', who can provide information that can be used by foreign colleagues. In the best-case scenario, these local scholars are credited as co-editors on the papers of foreign scholars, while in the worst they merely become paid research assistants receiving minimal credit for their work. Either way, it is hard for the local person to become a full-fledged scholar in his/her own right.

Institutional setting

To break out of this trap is exceptionally difficult for local scholars. In most cases, they have done their undergraduate work at substandard local universities (for even the best of those universities, and I would count the American University of Central Asia (Bishkek) among them, are not so great by world standards). When they go abroad to do graduate work, they bring with them good knowledge of one or two local languages and a working fluency in English and Russian. Trying to catch up with colleagues who have gone to better universities is not easy, but perhaps they more or less manage to do so. When they return home, however, they find themselves outside of the type of institutional setting that allows them to develop further. They often do not have good access to foreign publications, they do not have English language editors who can help them place their articles, they work in not very good universities and in not very good conditions, they may be paid enough to live reasonably well in their home countries, but not enough to be actively involved in international research, and they are in a limited amount of demand as 'local informants'.

Small wonder then that they have trouble publishing independently and making a breakthrough on the inter-national scene when they work in obscure institutions on topics that few people care about, and carry a heavy baggage of knowledge but not much awareness of why it could be interesting to anyone else.

There is, unfortunately, no magic wand to solve the problems outlined above, many of which, as I have noted, are not limited to scholars of Central and Inner Asia but are pretty typical across a wide range of 'obscure' academic fields. The Academic Fellowship Program that used to be organized by the Open Society Foundations was one attempt to overcome the problems, but based on the experience of my own institution, I cannot say that it was all that successful (at least in this regard – it was quite successful in other ways). In the long run, perhaps the best way is to make sure that local university graduates interested in studying their own region are told, as early as possible, what obstacles they will face and that they need to focus on making their work legible and relevant for non-specialists.

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Scenarios for future Central Asian studies

The future of Central Asian studies will depend on the future of the region itself (here I focus on five former Soviet Asian republics – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). The shape or condition of regional studies depends on funding, which is driven by the interest held for this region by external countries and regions, based on the impact it already has on others or its perceived future prospects. The external levels of interest shape research trends and themes; a change in interests can result in the reformatting of the field of Central Asian studies. The reformatting of the field can also be caused by the ongoing changes on the ground: shifts in identity, languages spoken, economic and social linkages with other regions. Political alliances, in my view, play a secondary role.

Nargis Kassenova

FULL-FLEDGED REGIONAL STUDIES are only possible when local researchers can effectively interact with the international scholarly community. Thus, the development of local scholarly communities will depend on the level of openness of Central Asian states. The higher the level of their economic and political development, the more appreciation for their knowledge.

I would like to propose three highly speculative scenarios of what can happen in the region over the next ten years, and how that would affect the field of Central Asian studies. The scenarios range from optimistic to pessimistic, and are not assigned any probability percentage. They are developed on the basic conditions and trends that we have been witnessing already, and they are very schematic and limited. Even in the range of the 'known unknowns' I do not consider all the possibilities, for example, an interruption in the rise of China.

Scenario 1: 'Eurasian bridge' (optimistic)
The dream of turning Central Asia into a bridge connecting rich European markets with bustling Asian ones finally comes true. This happens with the help of external actors. Most importantly, China has been able to alleviate some of the contradictions in its system and maintain economic growth and further invest in its Silk Road Economic Belt initiative. Russia-led post-Soviet integration efforts have not been successful due to a lack of sufficient resources and dynamism in the Russian economy and political mistakes resulting from imperial/great power illusions, and Moscow has no choice but to accommodate itself to the new situation of China having an upper hand. The West is present and appreciated in the region as the source of modernization, investments and technological transfers, and as the second pole of power preventing full Chinese dominance.

The main beneficiary of such a scenario in the region would be Kazakhstan, whose economy proves to be the most prepared to benefit from new opportunities. Uzbekistan, with a time lag, starts opening up within this scenario. These changes have a positive effect on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan retains its isolation, but finds it necessary to create better conditions for investors and to develop some transit potential as well. None of the Central Asian economies demonstrate miracles, but they show an adaptive capacity and manage to stay afloat. Labour migration remains a staple of smaller economies.

In political terms, the situation is more complex. Nation-building processes, including strengthening of national languages and identities, are juxtaposed with further fragmentation of societies in social and economic terms. Central Asian personalised authoritarian regimes have been unravelling without major upheavals, and the decentralisation of power is accompanied by growing political pluralism and youth activism. Since both internal and external forces are interested in

stability in the region, states do not fail or crack, yet they cannot escape or suppress the challenge of round-the-corner Arab-spring-style mass uprisings.

This scenario would be conducive to the development of full-fledged regional studies, due to the emergence of local resources for research and integration of the local knowledge infrastructure with international ones. Central Asian studies can become an attractive and fruitful area allowing for the crossbreeding of ideas and discourses put forward by European, American, Russian, Chinese, Indian, Japanese and other scholars. Local scholars can greatly benefit from these exchanges.

The relative vibrancy of the region would also stimulate a broader approach to the region in terms of themes and topics: from the macro-level of globalisation, political economy and regime change to the micro-level of individual and group identity. The role of a geographical bridge can help Central Asia retain its identity as a region, although Kazakhstan will continue to insist on its mixed Euro-Asian identity (similar to that of Turkey) and having as much in common with Russia and Eastern European states as with its Central Asian neighbours. The openness of the region will also challenge the now prevalent insulation of the field of Central Asian studies and force more research on linkages with other regions and cross-regional trends.

Scenario 2: 'Muddling through' (slowly eroding status quo)
This scenario implies that the Central Asian states and societies are unable to mobilise and generate change for the better. States remain dysfunctional to varying extents and societies remain fragmented and apathetic with marginalised pockets of dissent. The economies and institutions are extractive in nature. However, due to the lack of external and internal actors interested in destabilisation, the states manage to muddle through without major upheavals, although this order is fragile. If within the first scenario, destabilisation potential comes largely from the processes unleashed by modernisation and transformation, within this scenario it is mostly drawn from underdevelopment and stagnation. Central Asian countries join the ranks of chronically failing states.

In this case Central Asian studies will be good for comparativists with a particular interest in underdeveloped areas: former colonies, resource-cursed and dysfunctional for many possible reasons. Matters of social and cultural change, Islamic revival processes, and identity formation will continue to be central themes for social, political and anthropological research in the region. Security and development communities will also find this area attractive. Political scientists interested in the study of political regimes will find it challenging to do first-hand research, since Central Asian regimes, being fearful of dissent and foreign meddling, will become even more paranoid and protective.

Overall the field, within this scenario, might not be of major interest to the international academic and policy community, and will have its niche in various broader research programs (Eurasia, Asia, etc.). A partial Western withdrawal and loss of interest in the region will be no help either. At the same time, interest from China and other Asian countries for more research on the region will remain and to some extent will offset the decrease in funding and interest from the West.

Scenario 3: 'Conflict zone' (pessimistic)
The last scenario assumes that one or several Central Asian states implode under the pressure of accumulated problems and challenges, or due to a conflict between regional states over natural resources. External factors that can contribute to this scenario are spill overs of instability from Afghanistan and South Asia and/or highly hypothetical Russian interference along the lines of the Georgia and Ukraine crises.

The region will be more and more considered part of the 'South' and 'Greater Central Asia', which includes Afghanistan. The discourse on Central Asia would include this area into the 'arc of instability' and the region might be excluded from the European security architecture zone and treated as a problematic periphery that needs to be sealed off as much as possible.

This negative scenario implies that the field of Central Asian studies will be dominated by research on conflict, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and related matters. This will bring some interest and funding to Central Asian studies programmes. However, overall it is the most negative scenario for the field. It will be difficult for scholars to conduct research in the area due to a higher level of personal risk.

General trends
No matter how affairs unfold, and which scenario presents itself, it seems likely that we will see the following general trends in Central Asian studies:
1) There will be growing interest and funding from Asia. This shift will result in more research on Central Asia from the Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, Japanese, and Korean perspectives.
2) The young generation of local scholars who received training in the West and abroad will substitute the Soviet cadre. This will result in better communication and more fruitful collaborative research between local and foreign scholars.
3) More research will be conducted through the use of national /local languages. The role of Russian as the lingua franca of the region will slowly decrease and the role of English as the international language of communication and science will increase.

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Above: Presidential Palace, Astana, Kazakhstan. Image reproduced under a Creative Commons license, courtesy of Mariusz Kluzniak on Flickr.com.

The geopoliticization of Central Asian scholarship

On 16 June 2014 Alexander Sodiqov, a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto, was taken into custody by Tajik security services while conducting a field interview for a research project on local responses to conflict management. Sodiqov was reportedly accused of treason and espionage – crimes that carry a possible 20 years prison sentence. On 22 July, Sodiqov was released from prison and his case was taken up by an international coalition of scholars, human rights activists and press freedom watchdogs, who viewed his detention as a fundamental infringement on academic freedom in Central Asia. After sustained international pressure, Sodiqov was allowed to return to Toronto in September, with the case still legally open.

Alexander Cooley

Inset: Alex Sodiqov. Surrounding images show groups of supporters from various universities promoting the twitter tag #FreeAlexSodiqov. All images taken from the website http://freealexsodiqov.org

THIS MEMO ARGUES THAT SODIQOV'S CASE is the result of the decade-long shrinking of academic and journalistic freedom in Central Asia, a trend largely rooted in the region's securitization and Central Asian authorities' increasing concern with controlling the information space and narratives about political trends, in order to ensure their own survival and stability. In these efforts, crackdowns on information dissemination, journalism and, now, academic research have become justifiable responses to alleged foreign interference and 'external meddling' in internal affairs. The cumulative impact of this crackdown is likely to have chilling effects on future efforts by social scientists and regional specialists seeking to analyze, interpret and gather data in the region.

The current assault on academic freedom can be considered the result of three distinct events in Central Asia, each contributing to the geopoliticization of scholarship and shrinking of the information space.

9/11, GWOT and the securitization of Central Asian politics
The first significant markers were the 9/11 attacks and the US-led military response in Afghanistan that immediately ensued. For the United States, Central Asia went from being a relatively isolated and low-priority area, to occupying the frontline of operations in Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror (GWOT). During the fall of 2001, the United States negotiated logistical access arrangements with all of the Central Asian states, including formal basing agreements (with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan), fly-over and emergency landing agreements, and refueling agreements.[1] The United States also provided military assistance to the Central Asian governments and security services, much of it in the form of training, border assistance, and special forces outreach. The securitization of US relations with Tajikistan had a number of secondary effects directly relevant to Central Asian studies. First, it increased, for about a decade, the amount of resources and funding available to scholars and specialists trained in Central Asian regional studies and languages. Defense contracting and intelligence jobs, most of them now routed through private subcontractors, became alternative sources of employment for scholars and analysts trained in Central Asian studies.

Second, securitization and the ongoing GWOT disproportionately privileged and rewarded the study of political Islam and its potential for mobilization across the region. This funded serious and high quality research on these topics, but it also rewarded proposals and scholars who took a more alarmist view of the region and its potential for destabilization. Third, securitization also encouraged US scholars and analysts to tone down criticism of escalating political rights abuses in the region, in the interest of maintaining Western engagement. Finally, US engagement and security cooperation raised con-

cerns in Moscow and Beijing that the United States was interested not only in engaging with Central Asia for its Afghanistan operation, but was also seeking to project power and influence throughout the region. The US State Department's decision in 2006 to shift the Central Asian states away from the Eurasia Bureau and bundle them into a new South and Central Asian bureau, so as to emphasize links with Afghanistan, further fueled suspicions that Washington harbored geopolitical ambitions to sever the region from Moscow's political reach.

The color revolutions, regime insecurity and fears of foreign influences
The second marker of Central Asia's shrinking political space was the regional upheaval and backlash caused by the so-called 'color revolutions' of 2003-05. The collapse of governments in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) as a result of mass protests, especially the March 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, sent shockwaves throughout the region. The Uzbek government's crackdown in Andijan just two months later was, at least in part, motivated by the demonstration effects and fears of these political upheavals. Within 18 months of the Tulip Revolution, all Central Asian countries, with Uzbekistan the most aggressive, passed new restrictions on the media and operations of NGOs. Fears of 'foreign-funded' groups destabilizing the country under the pretense of promoting democracy, civil society or human rights became a recurring public meme. Tajikistan's restrictive new Law of Associations (2005) required all NGOs to re-register in a cumbersome process, effectively shrinking the sector by 70% within a year.[2]

The backlash led to the closing of a number of organizations that had actively been supporting academic research in the region, such as the Open Society Institute in Tashkent, and Freedom House. The backlash also emphasized the blurring between internal and external threats to regime security, with Russia and China backing the Central Asian governments' new restrictions, while Western governments were forced into an increasingly difficult balancing act of maintaining security cooperation with the Central Asian governments, while registering concern about the slide in the region's respect for civil liberties. In other words, internal policies towards political opponents, human right advocates and civil society also became geopoliticized.

Post Arab Spring, US disengagement and budget cuts
We are now in a third distinct phase, one we could term the 'Post-Arab Spring' era. Just as the color revolutions sent tremors throughout the region, so too did the Arab Spring and Middle Eastern upheavals of 2011-12. The toppling of long-standing rulers in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya sent signals

about the lack of Western political commitment to these governments, but also ushered in a new level of concern about the potentially subversive effects of social media and online mobilization, for example, Facebook and Twitter. Bloggers and online communities were targeted throughout the region, as new tools to regulate, monitor and censor the internet were adopted. Regulating the 'information space' had become as important as cracking down on formal political opposition.

At the same time, there is a growing focus on US future interests and engagement. US and NATO withdrawal from the region in 2014, for example, will decrease instrumental interest in adjacent Central Asia (despite renewed interest in Eurasia as a result of the Russia-Ukraine crisis). US policy makers have an acute bout of 'Central Asian fatigue'; US Congress has dramatically reduced levels of assistance for all of Central Asia and Eurasia. More relevant to the issue of the future of Central Asian studies, the budget sequestration has led to unprecedented cuts in the funding of Eurasian scholarship. All this at a time when both Russia and China are increasing their official cultural and educational engagement with Central Asia. Thus, the confluence of geopolitical interest in Central Asia and government support for Central Asian studies that characterized Western engagement with the region in the 2000s, appears to be gone.

Conclusion: blurring the lines, chilling the future
Ironically, then, Alexander Sodiqov finds himself at the unfortunate convergence of increasing paranoia and concern within Central Asian governments about the boundaries of political dissent, and growing Western indifference and disengagement from the region. Simply put, while regional security and intelligence services exaggerate the destabilizing role of so-called agents of foreign influence, and take concrete measures to further restrict the activities of foreign-based and funded organizations, the actual interest in the region is palpably waning. To be sure, some of this decrease is a corrective from the excessive security focus that was heavily supported and promoted in the 2000s. However, it is difficult to underestimate the long-term damage that will be inflicted on Central Asian studies in the United States from recent cuts in government funding. In this era of diminishing interest in regional studies and strong disciplinary boundaries, the lack of official support is likely to significantly curtail the growth of a new generation of scholars engaged with Central Asia across all disciplines.

At the same time, this new media and information age is proving difficult to regulate and categorize. Sodiqov himself has been a widely-read blogger and policy commentator, leading some to wonder whether his plight should be covered more as a 'media freedom' issue or that of a detained journalist, rather than as an academic. The case highlights, as Anne Nelson, former Director of the Committee to Protect Journalists, emphasized at Sodiqov's New York event (organized by Scholars at Risk), that scholars and scholarly networks lack the same types of legal protections, umbrella societies and best practices guidelines that loosely govern and monitor the international media. Whether academics should adopt similar types of 'best practices' is something that will now be debated, but with existing Institutional Review Boards at Western universities increasingly hesitant to sanction research in areas where researchers might encounter 'risks', the Tajik government's actions are likely to have an impact on International Review Boards' decisions across the country. One rather disturbing possibility might be that IRBs, in the future, might ask for clearing letters from host governments explicitly asking for authorization for the proposed research.

Alexander Sodiqov's case can be regarded as the culmination of a steady deterioration of academic freedoms and civil liberties across Central Asia, many of which have been intertwined with the geopolitical situation in the region and host governments' responses. In addition to the current challenging political environment faced by social scientists who ask uncomfortable questions and gather data that challenge official government narratives, Western research on contemporary regional political and social issues is also likely to be stifled by declining Western engagement with the region and reduced official support for Eurasian-based scholarship.

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References
1 See Cooley, A. 2012. *Great Games, Local Rules: the New Great Power Contest for Central Asia,* New York: Oxford University Press, chapter 3
2 ibid, appendix 2

Modernity experienced at an everyday level

Nira Wickramasinghe has published an important work that moves readers' attention towards an aspect of Sri Lanka's history that is often neglected in historical works on Sri Lanka, namely how modernity was experienced at an everyday level under colonialism.

Shyamika Jayasundara-Smits

Reviewed publication: Wickramasinghe, N. 2014.
Metallic Modern. Everyday Machines in Colonial Sri Lanka,
Oxford/New York: Berghahn Books, ISBN: 9781782382423

Metallic Modern is written in a pleasant and playful manner. Yet it is a dense and serious book that touches upon the very nature of history writing and reworks our notions of time and place, of what makes an event important and what needs to be recorded for posterity. The richness and originality of this publication should not come as a surprise for those who are familiar with the author's earlier works, all written in a style reminiscent of French social historians, where theory is never overbearing but insinuates itself in the narrative. Furthermore, in a period where Sri Lanka's history is often assumed to be one single national narrative this book is a timely intervention to help put *things* into perspective.

Metallic Modern departs from conventional writings on the colonial history of Sri Lanka. By digging into new archives, visual, business, personal such as the police entry of a tailor called Pieterz in 1912, the Singer Papers in Wisconsin (USA), colonial records in Britain and newspaper advertisements in Sri Lanka, Wickramasinghe has beautifully captured the intersections of many histories; social, cultural, political and economic, criss-crossed by considerations of gender and religion, and most valuably, material and ideological histories, all in a single, small book. The style of writing and the way the materials are organized and presented, the way themes and objects reappear in chapters inadvertently, constantly challenge readers (in a positive way) to draw lines and connections.

In this book, the author has very successfully painted a picture of how non-elite groups in Sri Lanka encountered modernity most directly through their use and adoption of machines (i.e., sewing machines, gramophones, trams, bicycles and industrial equipment) and grew into modern day global consumers. Further, this book is very much a reflection on the 'Sri Lanka modern' that was, as the author argues "created out of the mould of consumerism and commodification"[5]. The story that is being told through the use of machines is multiscalar: it moves seamlessly from the self, to the streets of the city where in 1915 rioters began to use trams and bicycles, the Buddhist world and the world at large under the throes of a first globalization.

Metallic Modern is composed of an introduction, 8 short chapters and a conclusion. The beautiful illustrations used in the book, some of which are original sketches obtained from private collections, tell us a unique story as we sift through the pages. In the introduction, the author provides a dense theoretical and methodological discussion to place her chosen approach in the wider field of history writing. She situates the book in a wide terrain and engages with scholarship on empire, the Indian Ocean and global history. By doing so, the author intentionally snaps readers out of their familiar mental boundaries of the 'island' Ceylon and its history. Chapter 1 tells the story of the invention of the Singer sewing machine and investigates how it fashioned a market imaginary in the British Crown colony of Ceylon. This chapter offers a different take from that of economists and economic historians, who tend to dominate the history of industrial capitalism and consumption, and shows how and

Above: 19th century sewing Machines, Armley Mills, Leeds, United Kingdom. Image reproduced under a Creative Commons license, courtesy David Dixon.

why ordinary colonized people consumed global products in the age of industrial capitalism. While lamenting about the lack of sufficient data to write a history of consumption in South Asia, the author deftly extracts anecdotes from the Singer archive in the USA to illuminate the story of colonized people as consumers. Chapter 3 of the book, entitled *Paths to Buddhist Modern: From Siam to America,* discusses how in colonial Sri Lanka, first a few men from Buddhist monastic communities and then larger and more diverse groups used ritual performances, language and travel to subvert the authority of the colonial state and in chapter 5, how Japan became the model of an Asian modern for people in colonial Sri Lanka.

Using the gramophone (chapter 4), and trams, cars and bicycles (chapter 6) the author compares and contrasts how in the crown colony of Ceylon, and in other colonized territories, modernity was practiced through machines. Chapter 7, entitled *Tailor's tale, machines in the home,* provides an interesting account as to how material modernity entered ordinary homes. Although not explicitly stated, one of the main strengths of this chapter is the insights it offers into the gendered nature of modernity experienced and established in the crown colony through the sewing machine and the 'job of the tailor'. Probing further into such questions along the gender-political-power intersections could have provided greater insights into history as 'his-story and her-story too'.

This book is academically rich, analytically sophisticated and full of insightful interpretations that make it a valuable source for scholars and students from multiple disciplines. It will also be a pleasant read for those who are simply curious about the dusty machines that sacredly and majestically occupy a small corner of their grandparents' homes, still covered with a cloth.

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Living in the urban periphery of Hà Nội

Hòa Mục, in the past a small village (203 inhabitants in 1923) in the urban periphery of the Vietnamese capital city Hà Nội, stands central in this book. Danielle Labbé, attached as urban planner to the University of Montreal describes and analyses with much detail the changes that took place in the village during almost a century.

Hans Schenk

Reviewed publication: Labbé, D. 2014.
Land Politics and Livelihoods on the Margins of Hanoi, 1920-2010,
Vancouver: UBC Press, ISBN: 9780774826679

IN FOUR CHAPTERS a chronology covering major periods in the history of Hòa Mục has been followed: early urban influences during the French regime (1920-40), the initial decades of the North Vietnamese socialist transformation (1940-65); the difficult period till the economic renovation of the Vietnamese economy (Đoˇˆi mới, 1965-80); and the current reform period from 1980 onwards. During each period a major theme is the interaction between the villagers and the spatially, administratively, economically and otherwise expanding forces originating in the nearby big city. Oral history is her major source of information. The voices of (elder) villagers sound throughout the book (naturally supplemented by the usual primary and secondary oral and written sources of bureaucrats, planners, etc.) and make her study a mixture of a social-geographical, historical, anthropological, political and planning monograph.

Villagers dealing with the state
During the French regime, villagers developed side occupations, especially weaving, by taking advantage of the close proximity of the urban markets. During this period, the village developed its peri-urban character, "blurring of the rural/agricultural and

urban/industrial distinctions and categories."(42). During the first decades of the socialist regime, this characteristic was very welcome: its workers could contribute to the industrial development without claiming urban welfare benefits such as housing. From the 1960s onwards, Labbé observes an "informal *in situ* village urbanization process" (69). On residential plots in the village – land that was not included in agricultural land socialization – private economic activities were performed, including housing, and contrary to formal politics. She concludes that these informal developments in Hòa Mục are not a sign of a weak state. She uses the concept of flexible planning that allows for diverging interests under the same political umbrella.

Logically then, the well known economic reforms (Đổi mới) of the mid 1980s are in Labbé's view not really a fundamental watershed in Vietnam's societal course, but rather a more gradual change. However, she distinguishes two phases of the reform period after 1980 as far as the process of peripheral urbanization processes are concerned. Initially, private informal economic and housing activities were normalized in a discretionary way by the local administration and later acknowledged by the state and included in the so-called 'State and People Work Together' approach. This resulted in a massive outburst of privately built two to four storey 'urban style' houses and neighbourhoods: the physical incorporation of peri-urban villages in the city.

Above: Urban Sprawl of Hanoi. Image reproduced under a Creative Commons license, courtesy of Gavin White on Flickr.com.

Villagers and the market
However, the mid 1990s, argues Labbé, form a real watershed in the time-line of the transformations that took place in Hòa Mục (and for that matter, in quite some similar villages adjacent to Hà Nội). The peri-urban space was reorganized by the inclusion of several rural districts within the urban administrative realm. The former village in a rural district thus became a ward in an urban district in 1997. At the same time the 'State and People Work Together' approach was abandoned and replaced by a new model of urbanization, that of the 'New Urban Areas'. These areas were to become the shop window of what Hà Nội's urban planners and politicians were to convey to the world: a modern city with a "global image of order" (108). An essential aspect of the creation of the 'New Urban Areas' was that agricultural land was expropriated and handed over to the state (for the construction of infrastructural projects) and state-owned and foreign real estate developers. This changed the life of the villagers completely. Land got a commercial value, could be marketed and turned into a gold mine for many villagers. Of course, the villagers complained about the financial compensation for the expropriated land, but also moral issues were voiced and described by Labbé, such as social justice, corruption and greed. She quotes an elderly villager: "In the past, Uncle Hồ [Hồ Chi Minh] took the land of the rich to share it with the poor. Nowadays, it's the opposite: the people's land is taken and shared between officials and developers without any measure to ensure that the inhabitants have a future after the land is gone" (154). There was, Labbé states, a "moral-territorial order", shared feelings about social justice in the village community, for which the villagers fought since independence and shared as well by both the villagers and political elites. The new logic of urban development has violated this order as private economic gains have replaced the well-being of a community.

Even though Labbé mentions protest movements in Hòa Mục and indeed the land grab may have corroded the regime, a sad conclusion suggests itself after reading her fascinating and detailed book: the villagers could cope with the 'state': a colonial administration and a socialist regime, use it and make the best of it. They were, however, less able to cope with the coalition of real estate business and state officials: the 'market'. Comparative research may be useful to see if, and to what extent, Hà Nội has become just another South- and Southeast Asia metropolis regarding its growth and expansion into its urban periphery.

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A photographic journey into modern Indian kingship

Photography in colonial India has received a fair share of academic attention; this coffee table book is no less important than scholarly interventions as it creatively narrates the story of princely India. The photographs cover a large number of states across every geographical and political variations and generation of modern Indian rulers. Neatly divided into sections, with short notes accompanying every photograph, the book displays vividly the changes as to how the royals negotiated modernity, imperial administrators, the public, technological advances, and the art of producing self-images among things relevant.

Souvik Naha

THE PHOTOGRAPHS REVEAL a dynamic history of kingship. For instance, a 1930 photograph of the Bikaner royal children – Karni Singh and Sushila Kumari – in informal clothes, stands in stark contrast with the visage of an unidentified young prince, who was photographed in 1890 in elaborate apparel and jewelry. This bears evidence of the erosion of artificial formality in royal photographs. A definitive change in how one approached inter-religion marriages is evident in the photograph of the two wives of Maharaja Rajindar Singh of Patiala, one of whom was Florence Gertrude Bryan (renamed Harnam Kaur), who married the prince in 1893, adopted Indian clothing and tried to fit into the complex palace hierarchies. Portraits of traditionally dressed and heavily ornamented princesses exhibit the burden of normative behavior that weighed on most royal women, particularly in the nineteenth century as is evident from the photograph of the princess of Baroda from 1880. On the other hand, photographs such as that of Maharani Chimnabai II of Baroda during a hunt, taken in 1909, show that it was not uncommon for aristocratic women to come out of the inner domains of household and participate in outdoor activities, often wearing traditional costumes.

Top left: Painted photograph of Maharao Khengarji Pragmalji III (b.1866, r.1876-1942) of Kutch, 1879.

Top right: Painted photograph of Maharaja Shivaji Bhonsle (1863-1883) of Kolhapur, c.1870.

Below: Painted photograph of Maharaja Kishen Singh (b. 1899, r.1900-1929) of Bharatpur, c.1900.

Images taken from the book, reproduced with permission from theibtaurisblog.com

Just as the princes dressed in ornamental traditional clothing, there was a tendency to pose in contemporary Western apparels. By the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, royals across India had started to wear riding breeches, knee-high leather boots, overcoats, jackets and caps, even in the warm months. The stunning photographs of several queens and princesses, particularly that of Rani Sita Devi of Kapurthala, show that royal women were more at ease with Western clothes and also that they were less tradition-bound when it came to adopting foreign clothes. Among the men, Maharaja Jitendra Narayan, Prince Nitendra, Maharaja Rajendra Narayan and Prince Hitendra stand out as the subjects who, unlike many other pretenders, carried the clothes effortlessly, due mainly to their British education. There were other ways of showing affinity for the West. A photograph of Maharaja Jagatjit Singh with a bicycle, a new mechanical marvel when the shot was taken around 1890, shows how the princes used even simple vehicles in order to associate themselves with the progresses of Western modernity. An even lesser vehicle, a perambulator, was the subject of another photograph from 1900, purportedly to commemorate a rite of passage for a royal child and its claim to use objects of wonder. Maharaja Jagatjit Singh should be mentioned again for the photograph in which he poses intimately with his wife, Rani Kanari, who is seen draped in a tightly corseted gown and long silk gloves, proof again of the prince's fascination for all things Western.

Visual Techniques

In addition to history, the book throws light on techniques of photography too. It shows how photography replaced the art of portrait painting at the royal court, creating a new category of artists that was so much in demand that many famous painters put aside paintbrushes and shifted to camera. Yet, when technology failed to satisfy royal demands of grandeur, professional hand-tinting of photographs became the means to accentuate color and highlight the details of dress and jewelry, often at the expense of the subject's face being blurred. Manipulating photographs by merging two negatives into one composite print or overpainting was widely practiced to introduce new subjects and effects. However, the book also admits the presence of cutting edge techniques such as selective use of ambient light diffused through strategically placed glass panels. The book is as much about history of camera technology as it is about social history of princely states.

Omissions

The book features very rare photographs such as that of the last Mughal Empress, Begum Zeenat Mahal, taken in 1857 when she and her husband Bahadur Shah Zafar were imprisoned at the Red Fort in Delhi. However, it underrepresents many aspects of princely India, such as some of the royals' patronage of cricket and polo. It is not clear whether this omission was an editorial decision or was there simply not any photograph that showed princes playing or in company of players, which is quite unlikely given the level of involvement of the Maharajas of Patiala, Bhopal, Porbandar or other states in Indian sports. Conversely, paucity of photographs on sport or music leads to a number of speculations on why these subjects were largely absent from royal archives – such as whether or why princes considered being photographed with hunted animals, family or contraptions as more important than with cricket or sitar players?

The photograph was an occasion when the ordinary could share the same frame with the royals. Still, these were also sites in which the grandeur of princely households glossed over mundane social realities like war, poverty and famine, thus reanimating in the present reader nostalgia for indigenous monarchy. Although the princes intended to make their bodies look affluent, dominant and progressive, most of them looked strikingly unattractive compared to their wives and even the average Indian men. The seriousness with which royals approached the act of being photographed and preserved the print for posterity is quite evident. It also leaves the reader wondering if at least some of them (except Raja Deen Dayal whose passion for photography was widely known) learnt the craft with as much interest. Despite the inconclusiveness of some aspects of royal household that the book raises, it remains an excellent compendium of photography in princely India.

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IIAS Outreach

CinemAsia Film Festival 2015, the 8th edition

Lorna Tee, by Gerhard Kassner

FESTIVAL DATES

1-6 Apr	CinemAsia Film Festival	Kriterion in Amsterdam
10-12 Apr	CinemAsia on Tour	Natlab in Eindhoven
18 Apr	CinemAsia on Tour	Filmhuis in The Hague
19 Apr	CinemAsia on Tour	Worm in Rotterdam

CINEMASIA is an annual film festival that dedicates itself to broadening the horizons of the Dutch audience and the Dutch film industry in regard to contemporary Asian cinema, by offering a diverse selection of both new popular Asian films in Asia as well as ground-breaking films with a strong artistic vision. Besides culture and entertainment, CinemAsia also provides a creative platform that promotes the visibility of Asians in the media.

During the festival the audience can watch films that have been selected for the Competition, for the Official Selection and for the Country in Focus. The films selected for the Competition showcase strong filmmaking visions and voices, shift cinematic boundaries and/or present subjects with ground-breaking effects, from both new and established talent. Three titles that will be screened at the festival are:

Red Amnesia (China 2014) by Wang Xiaoshuai. This film was in Competition in Venice in 2014. *(Above left)*
End of Winter (South-Korea 2014) by Kim Dae-hwan, which won the Busan New Currents Award in 2014. *(Above centre)*
Tigers (India 2014) by Danis Tanovic, starring Emraan Hashmi. Tigers premiered in Toronto 2014. *(Above right)*

The Official Selection showcases exciting new films that are critically acclaimed or massively popular with audiences, covering a spectrum of countries and filmmakers to enable a presentation of the fuller picture of contemporary Asian cinema. The Country in Focus is a new section in the official program and explores the future of the country's film journey in screenings and discussions. This year we'd like to focus on Korean New Wave Female Power Producers. Since the 1990s, Korean films reformed themselves due to a variety of factors including the emergence of a new generation of directors, producers and investors. From the New Wave period, Korean films have been winning on so many levels including critical success, commercial success at home and internationally, and also currently being the most progressive and prominent of the Asian filmmaking nations.

For its side programs, CinemAsia invites diverse guests to join discussions, Q&A's and debates around the film screenings. The IIAS network will also be involved in CinemAsia's side programming. More information will follow on the IIAS and CinemAsia websites.

CinemAsia also has its own CinemAsia FilmLAB in which upcoming talent is encouraged to produce a short film about the Asian diaspora, while being coached by a professional mentor. This program helps to create, exhibit and archive local Asian Dutch history and to showcase Asians on the screen and in the media, as well as nurturing young talent to gain professional experience. After an intensive production process their films will be world premiered during the festival in April.

For program and further information go to www.cinemasia.nl

IN OCTOBER 2014, Lorna Tee became the new festival director of CinemAsia. She is a film producer from Hong Kong, who produces films from the new generation of Asian filmmakers. She has a large network in the Asian film industry and is actively involved as a consultant for international film festivals like Berlinale, Busan International Film Festival and the International Film Festival Rotterdam.

Lorna Tee: "The richness and complexities of Asian cinema still have a long way to be seen and experienced in The Netherlands. The growth in Asia, both economically and politically, in current times, places Asia as a territory that is not just a key trading partner, but also enables it to build strong and effective socio-political ties in the long run, through better understanding and cooperation, through the medium of cinema. Hence, the film festival's vision for the coming edition will focus on quality of films that will find resonance with not just the Dutch-Asian audiences, but will also bring forth a better representation of Asian cinema, culture and contemporary issues, that will give more Dutch audiences the opportunity to get a better glimpse and exploration of Asia. The programme seeks to cover as much ground on the vast continent of Asia and gradually reduce the distance between them and us by creating dialogues, discussion and debates through the power of film."

IIAS National Master's Thesis Prize 2015

Photo © Alila Blizzejewska

IIAS offers an annual award for the best national master's thesis in the field of Asian Studies, in the Netherlands

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– A maximum three month stipend to work at IIAS, in order to write a PhD project proposal or a research article

CRITERIA
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– The thesis must have been written at a Dutch university
– Only master's theses which have been graded with an 8 or higher are eligible
– The thesis must have been evaluated in the period 1 October 2014 – 30 September 2015
– Both students and their supervisors can apply

SUBMISSION
Please submit four hard copies of the master's thesis and a cover letter including the grade awarded and your contact details

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News from Southeast Asia

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This section offers thematic essays from ISEAS Fellows
and researchers. This issue features essays from
the Thailand Studies Programme with a focus on the
dynamic Thai political landscape. For more information
on the Thailand Studies Programme please visit:
http://www.iseas.edu.sg/thai.cfm

SOJOURN is an interdisciplinary journal devoted to
the study of social and cultural issues in Southeast Asia.
It publishes empirical and theoretical research articles
with a view to promoting and disseminating scholarship
in and on the region. Areas of special concern include
ethnicity, religion, tourism, urbanization, migration,
popular culture, social and cultural change, and
development. Fields most often represented in the
journal are anthropology, sociology and history.

**Publication Frequency: three times a year
(March, July and November)**

What is to come in Thailand?

Michael J. Montesano

MUCH HAS CHANGED since the 22 May coup last year.
However, in truth, Thailand has been experiencing several
longer-term transitions which have been changing the com-
plexion of the country. In all likelihood from now on, Thailand
will be a polity of citizens and not subjects. For cultural, social,
and economic reasons, a vast segment of the Thai population
that long conceded domination of the country's politics to
officers of the Thai state or to their putative social betters is
no longer willing to do so. I would like to offer a few thoughts
on four major transitions taking place in the country.

First, the north, northeast and, to some degree, rural
central Thailand—and not just political strongmen representing
provinces in those regions—will play a larger role in national
affairs than heretofore. Their role will in some ways resemble
that long played by the upper south through its parliamentary
representatives in the Democrat Party. This regional dimension
of political change in Thailand also has a pronounced ethnic
dimension: the 'Lao' people of northern and northeastern
Thailand will play political roles more closely commensurate
with their numbers. It had long been assumed, wrongly it is
now clear, that the early and middle years of King Phumiphon's
long reign had made this ethnic dimension of Thai politics
practically irrelevant.

Second, northern and northeastern Thailand will continue
to be marked by growing and, frankly, unprecedented

prosperity. Already, between 2007 and 2011, economic
growth in northeast Thailand outstripped that in Bangkok
by 40 percent to 17 percent. To be sure, some of that growth
was due to so-called 'Thaksinomics', to policies branded
'populist'. But some of it was also due to policies whose
origins long predate Thaksin Chinnawat's first premiership
(2001-2005), to remittances from Bangkok and overseas,
and to what may prove a self-sustaining intensification of
economic activity in those regions. Inevitable investment in
infrastructure and better links to China and Vietnam will only
increase the prosperity of northern and northeastern Thailand.
That prosperity is, to be sure, tied to China's growth and to
ASEAN's integration. While the people of those regions will for
some time remain, on average, poorer and less well educated
than the people of Bangkok, their political orientation will
be informed by aspiration rather than destitution, by feelings
of stakeholdership rather than grievance.

Third, from WWII through to the 1970s, Thailand imposed
heavy taxes on agriculture to the advantage of the urban sector.
From the mid-1970s onward, successive Thai governments
have reversed that flow of resources, in a policy shift typical of
economies in which agriculture and the rural sector represent
a declining share of total economic activity. Most famous,
or infamous, among such policies as adopted by former
PM Yinglak Chinnawat was the calamitously designed

**Above:
The military junta
in Bangkok 2014.
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under a Creative
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'rice pledge' scheme, which cost in excess of US$20 billion
and led to Thailand's losing of its position as the world's leading
rice exporter. This policy was almost certainly unsustainable.
Nevertheless, such inter-sectoral transfer payments will remain
a central fixture of Thailand's political economy in the future.

Finally, the monarchy and its role in Thai life are central to
Thailand's current crisis. They will be central to developments
in 2015 and beyond. American diplomatic cables released by
Wikileaks revealed how concerned senior figures in Thailand's
network monarchy were about the coming succession.
One needs, however, to understand these concerns in two
particular contexts.

One of these contexts is historical. When King Phumiphon
returned from Switzerland in late 1951 to live in Thailand
for good, senior courtiers and others carefully managed his
transition into the role of full-time king. The revival of monarchy
as a central institution in Thailand and the leading role in Thai
politics that King Phumiphon played for many years reflected
the success of this sort of management. Members of today's
network monarchy and, it seems, of the National Council for
Peace and Order (NCPO) junta that took power in May 2014
understand that management of the monarchy during the tran-
sition to a new reign will be crucial to the monarchy's survival.
Today, the junta's praetorianism and a monarchy in transition
show every indication of working together quite smoothly.

The second context for concern relates more directly
to the future than to the past. The effort in the late 1940s
and early 1950s to restore the prestige and influence of the
Thai monarchy after the setbacks that it suffered in the wake
of the end of royal absolutism in 1932 represented as much
as anything else a feat of imagination. Similarly, the future
of the Thai monarchy after the end of King Phumiphon's
reign will depend on the successful re-imagining of its
relevance and the consequent refashioning of its role for
a new era. The insecurity that has marked much fretting over
the succession represents not least a failure of imagination
among figures influential in the later years of the current reign.
As, it seems, the NCPO junta eases some of those figures aside,
there is little evidence of a determination to adapt the monarchy
to the demands and realities of the times. But who is to say
how long the junta will last or whether the cast of characters
who will end up managing the next reign during its early years
will suffer from a comparable lack of imagination concerning
the place of monarchy in contemporary Thailand?

**Michael J. Montesano, Visiting Senior Fellow
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co-coordinator of its Thailand Studies Programme**

Populist policies and the rural-urban divide

Puangthong Pawakapan

ON 22 JULY 2014, two months after a military coup d'etat, the Thai military promulgated an interim constitution signed by King Bhumibol Adulyadej. With sweeping powers in the hands of General Prayuth Chan-Ocha, the leader of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), the interim constitution's preamble promises to eradicate corruption and bring 'reform' and subsequently 'genuine democracy' to Thai society. The NCPO promised its mostly urban middle-class supporters that it would put an end to corrupt politics in all forms. However, with a narrow focus on the corruption of politicians, the question remains whether the interim charter is able to bring genuine democracy, stability, and 'happiness' to a deeply polarized society.

Section 44 of the interim constitution, for example, provides PM Prayuth with extensive powers. They include the authority to issue orders and undertake whatever the NCPO deems necessary regardless of the legislative, executive or judicial orders, "for the benefit of reform in any field and to strengthen public unity and harmony, or for the prevention, disruption or suppression of any act which undermines public peace and order or national security, the Monarchy, national economics or administration of State affairs, whether that act emerges inside or outside the kingdom". The constitution guarantees that PM Prayuth's orders are "legal, constitutional and conclusive", thus rendering check-and-balance mechanisms unnecessary.

The NCPO's far-reaching power has, invariably, led to allegations of human rights violations. By the end of July 2014, the NCPO had summoned 565 individuals and arrested 233. These include human rights defenders, academics, activists, journalists, students, writers and protesters. Meanwhile the NCPO banned public gatherings, enforced stringent censorship on individuals, groups, and the mass media, issued repressive orders, revoked the passports of those who refused to report to the junta and who have fled abroad instead. Those who face charges will be tried in the military

court. The interim constitution also declares the NCPO's use of power to be within the law and, at the same time, renders the activities of coup opponents illegal.

The interim constitution also signals resistance to politicians and electoral politics. It barred individuals who have been members of political parties under three years prior to the date of appointment from becoming cabinet members of the coup-installed government (Section 20); members of National Legislative Assembly (Section 8); and members of the Constitution Drafting Committee (Section 33). Meanwhile, it channels political power to NCPO members, military personnel and government officials. In this context, Thailand may be argued to have returned to a 'bureaucratic polity', where the military, bureaucrats and business interests gain control over elected representatives. This negativity towards politicians and electoral politics is also broadly found among the urban middle class. Distrust of politicians has grown steadily since the early 1980s when participatory politics and electoral government began to entrench itself in the political system.

One of the key reasons for the distrust of participatory politics and electoral government is the belief that rural and poor voters, who form Thaksin's mass support, will sell their votes in exchange for short-term personal benefit or petty cash. The urban educated middle-class often blame rural voters' lack of good education and 'proper' understanding of democracy for the failure of Thai democracy. Many intellectuals and civic groups argue that holding elections does not necessarily mean adherence to democratic principles, and thus seek

to undermine the legitimacy of electoral politics and the principle of one-man-one-vote.

However, recent research has shown that vote-buying is no longer a decisive factor in determining election outcome. Instead the poor and rural voters are increasingly motivated by community development projects but this has been interpreted by others as being bribed by unsustainable populist policies. In addition, the urban middle-class believe that populist policies will cause long-term damage to the Thai economy. Ironically, they fail to see how multi-million baht projects catering to the interest of urbanites and industrialists have been contributing to uneven development and constitute exploitation of taxpayers. For many of these urbanites, a desirable political system does not necessary have to be the same as a western-style democracy with respect to freedom, liberties and equality of every citizen, but it must be clean from corrupt politicians and, hence, be ruled by moral people.

As a result, antipathy for corrupt politicians, and a bias against electoral politics and rural development policies will be registered in the new constitution that the military-appointed Constitution Drafting Committee is drafting. Many Thai conservatives believe that the most efficient way towards a happy and peaceful society is to programme people with similar beliefs, and to view diverse opinions, demands and values as subversive and harmful to society. The junta is certainly creating happiness for some in Thailand, but not all.

Puangthong Pawakapan, Visiting Senior Fellow at Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Below: 'RedShirt' protestor. Image reproduced under a Creative Commons license, courtesy of Anthony Bouch on Flickr.com

A new polity in the making?

Porphant Ouyyanont

THAKSIN SHINAWATRA'S overwhelming victory in the election of 2005 marked the start of a period of socio-political division in Thai society. The former Prime Minster's way of exercising power and his emphasis on efficiency and business management were seen by many as a direct challenge to Thai traditions, and also as a threat to the monarchy. Certainly under Thaksin there was less emphasis on the King's advocacy of a 'sufficiency economy' but, instead, more on maximizing growth and becoming competitive. Thaksin thus attempted to create a strong and populist state with power centralized around his office.

In effect Thaksin was challenging the bureaucratic polity and network monarchy. Elite bureaucrats and the military, which played a key role in the Thai political landscape, were gradually marginalised under Thaksin. Viewed in this light, the present National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) government may be seen as counter-force to years of Thaksinisation. However, in countering the influence of Thaksin, the NCPO government is moving into uncharted territory. It is exercising traditional authoritarianism in an age of corporatism and social media. What are the characteristics of the NCPO government?

First and foremost is the extent to which the military dominates the NCPO government and its agencies. The coup of 22 May was led by the Commander in Chief of the army, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, who was named interim Prime Minister on 21 August 2014. In Prayuth's cabinet, announced on 30 August, 11 out of 32 cabinet ministers, taking up 34 positions, were military figures. These were key positions in the ministries of Justice, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Labour, Social Development, Commerce, and Natural Resources.

Secondly, the message of stability before democracy has been continually emphasised by the NCPO government, as can be seen in PM Prayuth's weekly televised speeches. This is achieved by strong rule until such time as democratic processes like elections can be reintroduced. The denigration of Thaksin's political system is explicit. As PM Prayuth noted in one of his televised speeches: "Many people still try to destabilize the situation by using the words 'democracy' and 'election'. These people do not see that an incomplete democracy is not safe and it does not create confidence in the global community

Above: Prayut Chan-o-cha, the current Prime Minister of Thailand. Image reproduced under a Creative Commons license, courtesy of Phaethon on Flickr.com

... the distribution of revenues is unjust, while corruption, wrongful activities, encroachment of natural resources and environment are encouraged, and the public will be told that these things are good, righteous, and beneficial to them".

Thirdly, order and populism can go hand-in-hand. The NCPO government has taken action against gang-led motorcycle taxi rackets, taxi scams at airports, and vendors on the beaches. These crackdowns have been met with public approval. Less popular are crackdowns on gambling, even at village level. Such crackdowns, of course, provide the occasion for military patrols and for presenting the military in a positive light across the country. Other populist measures seem aimed at gaining public favour can be rather bizarre. The government forced television companies to screen World Cup football matches on free-to-air channels as well as offering 20,000 free tickets for a football match against Colombia. Such measures, under a general policy to bring back 'happiness' to the Thai people, also include free army concerts and haircuts. To many these were indicative of a condescending attitude towards the general public.

Fourthly, the control of state-owned enterprises by the junta has been vital. There are 56 such enterprises and they include some of the largest commercial enterprises in the country such as the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) and Thai Airways. Their combined assets amount to around US$360 billion. It was widely believed that Thaksin used his influence to give appointments in many of these enterprises to his political supporters. This was contrary to the long tradition of control which the traditional royalist elite had over state enterprises as well as their strong links to the military. As such, the new government's removal of powerful business leaders in the state sector who were appointed under pro-Thaksin governments has been a key means of reducing pro-Thaksin influence in the corporate sector. Among such changes have been the

Thailand Forum: 'Society In Transition'

ISEAS, Singapore, 27 and 28 July 2015

ISEAS will be holding the Thailand Forum on 27-28 July this year. The overarching theme of the Forum will be 'society in transition' and its focus will be on developments in politics, society, culture and the economy. These developments will be assessed for their medium and long-term implications.

Papers treating recent political developments will address those developments from an explicitly long-term perspective. Scholars will be invited to think about transitional processes in these areas and the different stakeholders involved, to describe the tension between the old and the new, and to consider the ways in which such transitions will unfold in the near future.

The aim of the Forum is to take stock of Thailand's current problems and prospects and to alert stakeholders and interested parties to issues and areas likely to merit attention in the years ahead. This Forum will be of interest to students and academics, policymakers and business people.

Papers will be divided into three broad sessions: Politics; Economics; Culture and Society. They will cover issues from the military coup, the military, monarchy, decentralisation, economic restructuring, the middle class, the media, and civil society.

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resignations of the PTT Chairman, the Chairman of the Krung Thai Bank, and the heads of the Government Lottery Office and the Airports of Thailand.

Finally, the clampdown on dissent has been extraordinary. Martial law has enabled the government to ban, throughout the country, any protest gathering of more than five people. The authorities exercise control and censorship, or the threat of censorship, over newspapers and television channels, while some newspapers, radio stations, and television channels have been closed down. Initially the authorities tried to block Facebook and also called for meetings with representatives from Facebook and Twitter. These were unsuccessful but the junta let it be known that those posting anti-coup comments on social media will be tracked.

Some websites, such as Human Rights Watch, are blocked. A well-publicized instance of the junta's sensitivity to dissent was the recent last-minute cancellation of an event organized by Amnesty International and other groups at the Foreign Correspondents Club in Bangkok in September 2014. The junta has also summoned a large number of people, most of them former politicians and activists, for questioning and warnings. The current number is estimated at well over 600, and some of them have been detained for up to a week.

In conclusion, the politics created by the present government marks a very fundamental departure from Thaksin's politics. However, in doing so, the NCPO government is also hastening the end of the traditional bureaucratic polity, the demise of the Thaksin electorally based, prime-minister-led polity, and perhaps the reduction in the influence of the network monarch.

Porphant Ouyyanont, Visiting Senior Fellow at Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

ICAS Book Prize 2015

The ICAS Book Prize (IBP) was established by the International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS) in 2004. It aims to create an international focus for publications on Asia while increasing their worldwide visibility. The biennial IBP is awarded to outstanding works, and dissertations, in the field of Asian studies.

Paul van der Velde, ICAS Secretary

IBP 2015 ceremony
Jury prizes are awarded to the best books and dissertations in both the humanities and social sciences. In 2007 the Colleagues' Choice Award was established following numerous requests to also give the academic community the opportunity to vote for their favourite. Votes can be cast online through the IBP Polling Booth from 16 March 2015-16 June 2015 (www.icas.asia).

The IBP award ceremony will take place on 6 July 2015, during ICAS 9 in Adelaide, Australia. So, of course, don't forget to register for ICAS 9 (www.icas9.com) Registration is open!

Towards a multilingual ICAS Book Prize
In the past we received complaints about how it was not possible to submit books written in languages other than English. We are considering changing this rule as of the seventh edition of the IBP, which will take place in 2017. This would mean taking a large step towards becoming a truly global competition that is not limited to the academic *lingua franca* English, but one in which all major languages with sufficient academic capacity can partake. To start with, we anticipate setting up reading committees for the following languages: Chinese, Japanese, French and German. We hope to realize this goal and present the outcome of this multi-lingual competition at ICAS 10 in 2017.

Shift from humanities to social sciences
In all 204 (2013: 252 / 2011: 174 / 2009: 89) books were submitted by 58 (2013: 60 / 2011: 40) publishers worldwide for this sixth edition of the ICAS Book Prize. All the key publishers in the field of Asian studies submitted books. These include: Brill Publishers, C. Hurst & Co, Columbia University Press, Cornell University Press, Duke University Press, Harvard University Press, I.B. Tauris, ISEAS Press, NIAS Press, NUS Press, Oxford University Press, Palgrave Macmillan, Routledge, Sage Publications, The University of Chicago Press, UBC Press, University of Hawai'i Press and the University of Washington Press. They all entered between 6 and 12 publications. Smaller publishers in the field, such as Cambridge University Press, Indiana University Press, Rowman & Littlefield and Stanford University Press, submitted 3 to 5 books. The remaining 30 publishers submitted 1 or 2 books.

Of the 204 submitted books, 115 were entered in the category social sciences and 89 in the category humanities. During the first edition of the IBP (2005) 65% of the books fell into the humanities category and 35% into the category

social sciences; this sixth edition of the IBP (2015) has near enough reversed the numbers, with 60% of the titles now categorized as social sciences and 40% as humanities. This marks not only a shift in publishing on Asia, but also in the field of Asian studies: a move from traditional humanities research to the more contemporary social sciences.

Background of authors
Over the past editions there has also been a gradual shift in the geographical background of the authors. 10% of the authors were of Asian descent during the first IBP, and this number has over the years risen gradually. They now make up 40% of the almost 300 authors, editors and contributors who were involved in the publications submitted for IBP 2015. Thus one may conclude that Asian studies are more and more becoming an affair of Asian scholars. This change has so far not translated itself into the realm of publishing because Asian studies books are still predominantly published by Western publishers. There has been a slight increase in the share of Asian publishers in the past ten years, but this has been marginal, certainly taking into account the fact that many of them are Asian branches of Western publishers.

Trending Topics
It will come as no surprise that almost 50% of the submitted books are about East Asia, and in turn half of those concern China. The number of books on South Asia doubled in comparison to the 2013 edition, India being the most studied country. The number of studies on Southeast Asia was clearly larger in the previous edition. In this region it was Indonesia that was most studied, with in its wake Singapore; significantly though, for the first time, several publications were submitted about all other ASEAN countries, e.g., Cambodia with 6 books. It is clear that Central Asia is understudied; as yet, no books from this region have ever been submitted for the ICAS Book Prize.

Popular themes, approached from different disciplinary or comparative angles, are: art and culture, diasporas and migration, East-West Relations, gender and identity, history and historiography, international relations and politics, economy, language and literature, religion and philosophy, and society. Economy, religion and philosophy were

newcomers in these most studied fields. As upcoming fields of interest we see biography, education, health and medicine, law, media and technology, urban culture and heritage, and war and violence. Themes previously popular such as (post) colonialism, democratization, labour, nationalism and state formation, science and knowledge, either disappeared or are underrepresented in this edition. 16 edited volumes were submitted, which is a 50% increase from the previous IBP. This is partly due to the putting in place of a reading committee accolade for 'best edited volume' at the IBP in 2013; it is one of the 6 accolades awarded in each category, to which we will most likely add an accolade for 'best art (history) book'.

Dissertations
In all 48 (2013: 99 / 2011: 43) dissertations were submitted by scholars who recently obtained their PhDs. Of the submitted dissertations 25 are humanities oriented, while the other 23 fall squarely in the broad rubric social sciences. The humanities dissertations include exciting contributions that examine issues relating to countries and historical times as diverse as eighteenth-century Persia, post-Suharto Indonesia and Mughal-India. As for the dissertations submitted under the category of social sciences, innovative and intriguing topics include gender and identity among Indonesian women, Ladakhi Buddhist youth in India and (flood) risk-handling styles in Jakarta. Although fewer dissertations were submitted compared to the previous edition the quality across the board seems to be considerably higher. As such the jury consisting of Lena Scheen (humanities) and Bobby Benedicto (social sciences) are faced with the difficult task of finding those two dissertations that stand out in terms of quality and originality, as such setting an example for the rest to follow.

New sponsorship
In October 2014, Leiden University unveiled plans for a new Asian Library at Leiden University Libraries, scheduled to open its doors in 2017. On 23 January 2015, IIAS signed a cooperation agreement with the Leiden University Libraries, stipulating that The Asian Library will sponsor the next three editions of the ICAS Book Prize (IBP 2015, 2017, 2019). In return, ICAS will donate to The Asian Library the books collected during the previous and upcoming editions of the IBP (read more about The Asian Library on page 51).

For more information about ICAS and the ICAS Book Prize, please visit: www.icas.asia

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Pictured above: A selection of the books submitted to the IBP 2015. Not all titles had been received at the time of taking the photo.

Reports

Hungry ghosts meet Ming bling: re-framing 50 years in the life of an empire

Anna Grasskamp

THREE YOUNG WOMEN ON LEASHES are sold for a pile of paper money, while in the background a wife is abandoned by her husband. This powerful image belongs to a set of 139 paintings made circa 1459 for the Baoning monastery in Youyu County, Shanxi, and used for the ritual appeasement of 'hungry ghosts', a euphemism for the restless souls of decedents involved in violent or immoral deeds. Another picture in the same series exhibits acrobats, athletes and performers, displaying their tattooed, spectacularly trained or otherwise extraordinarily shaped, modified or dressed up bodies for show. Through the inclusion of these impressive paintings the British Museum's exhibition *Ming: 50 Years that Changed China* finds a strong and memorable way of representing figures outside the glamorous and well-documented spaces of elite power.

Going beyond the outstanding collectibles of imperial provenance that (touristic) museum visitors usually find themselves confronted with in Beijing's or Taipei's museums, as well as many European institutions (some of which stage loot from the Summer Palace), the exhibition places these remarkable and subversive figures side by side with more common bodies of (material) evidence from the years 1400 to 1450. It would be misleading to state that these other pieces embody 'the Ming' in more familiar ways as the entire exhibition forms a challenge and perhaps a deconstruction of what museum visitors would stereotypically define as Ming – first and foremost the clichéd Ming Vase, whose emergence as a metaphorical image in the modern European mind has been subject of recent scholarship.[1]

Instead of the stereotypical blue-and-white vase, a gaudily colored cloisonné jar garnishes the exhibition poster and catalogue (Fig. 1). While the exhibition does present blue-and-white porcelain vessels it stages them as transcultural objects paired with non-Chinese artifacts that inspired Jingdezhen shapes and decoration systems. A non-specialist museum visitor who entered the show with a preprogrammed desire for china will leave it with impressions of manifold materials, forms and figures, adjusting blue-and-white preoccupations in favor of a more nuanced and polychrome image of the early Ming's social and material diversity.

In contrast to the enamel jar chosen to appeal to the museum audience, a gold plaque is the key visual to the conference *Ming: Courts and Contacts 1400-1450,* held in conjunction with the exhibition, 9-11 October 2014 (Fig. 2). The piece of intricate jewelry, a testimony of high-level goldsmith work, presents the Chinese dragon alongside gems imported from South Asia, a panorama of fragments from foreign soil. While the majority of the jewels form a rectangular and alien frame to the organically shaped central icon, some gems also figure as cloud balls within reach of the dragons' five-fingered claws. Similar to artifacts found in tombs of Ming princes, this transcultural object forms part of the material culture of a social group of elite members that only recently has received ample scholarly attention, most prominently by one of the show's curators, Oxford University's Chair of Art History, Craig Clunas.[2] As part of a research project conceptualized by Clunas and Jessica Harrison-Hall, the British Museum's curator and keeper of Chinese ceramics and Vietnamese art and antiquities, the show is the result of cooperation between university and museum.

The conference, *Ming: Courts and Contacts 1400-1450,* brought together curators and university-based researchers, as well as historians of painting, architecture and ship-building, porcelainists and musicologists, specialists of scientific and religious systems, scholars affiliated with museums in Beijing and Taipei, experts of past Chinese, Korean, Japanese and Persian empires. While transcultural and interdisciplinary in scope the choice of conference presenters was limited to scholars affiliated with institutions in the Anglo-American and Chinese regions of the world (with the exception of a single Korea-based scholar). This provokes questions on the connectedness of the global Ming academic community and the visibility and accessibility of research published in languages other than the world's two most widely spoken ones.

Focusing on the language of material and visual evidence the conference contribution of the exhibition's project curator, Luk Yu-Ping, re-interpreted empresses' headgear in an attempt to reconstruct symbolic meanings and aesthetic systems in addition to those documented in predominantly male-authored written records. In the same way as the painting described at the beginning of this review serves to evoke the presence of (oppressed) female voices in the exhibition, the hairpins and other components of female material culture that the show presents, are important artful testimonies of a past that we otherwise predominantly access through primary sources written by and for male (elite) authors.

While the publication of the conference papers is scheduled for 2015, the exhibition catalogue can be found in the museum shop, where it is framed by a variety of 'Chinese souvenirs' (some of them slightly disturbing in their almost aggressive use of the modified dragon motif, repetitively copied and pasted to the surfaces of a variety of contemporary utensils). Naturally, choices related to the museum shop lie outside the curators' ambit. One can also imagine that reductions of the emperors' personae along the lines of "Xuande – The Aesthete" might not have been at the core of the exhibition makers' mission. Nevertheless, such 'branding' of historical figures might have helped the average visitor in dealing with the potentially confusing unfamiliarity of Chinese names, encouraging the fabrication of an inner image of what a Chinese emperor was like (supported by reproductions of famous emperor portraits). As some have pointed out, the exhibition shows traces of institutional and political constraints,[3] in contrast to the catalogue that provides a more comprehensive 'paper version' of the actual show, adding significant pieces, elaborating on underlying frameworks and immaterial targets.

One of the declared goals of the exhibition lay in the public re-framing of fifty years in the life of a dynasty as 'connected' rather than isolated.[4] In this regard, the display adds to various recent exhibits that highlighted the transcultural aspects of the Qing Empire (in particular in relation to the emperors Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong and their engagement with European Jesuits). While the connectivity of the world has become commonplace, inviting scholars to ponder on 'early modern globalization', the 'Maritime Silk Road' or the 'East Asian Mediterranean', such envisioning has previously not reached a broader non-scholarly audience with the same intellectual strength and material variety that the British Museum show presents.

Regardless of whether one is with Clunas concerning his long-standing argument on early modernity in China that shaped the framework of the show and has been criticized by some,[5] *Ming: 50 Years that Changed China* significantly changes a broad museum audience's perception of Ming material, visual and political culture. In an exhibition space where a hungry ghost meets a piece of the 'Porcelain Pagoda', and an elegant headdress competes with the splendor of a sword, blue-and-white images of 'the Ming' dissolve into a colorful bundle of interwoven strings of questions concerning (the display of) regimes – foreign and local, male and female, high and low, private and public, material and immaterial.

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New discoveries on Southeast Asia's maritime and diplomatic history 1600-1800

Hendrik E. Niemeijer

AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE of the Southeast Asia Regional Branch of the International Council on Archives (SARBICA), 27 September 2013, the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia launched a new website which gives online access to one of its most valuable collections: the archives of Batavia Castle, the former headquarters of the Dutch East India Company (VOC). Since then, with a daily speed of 1,000 pages, a massive amount of information has become available on the website www.sejarah-nusantara.anri.go.id. A select group of international historians have long surmised that the Batavia Castle archives would offer surprises, but nobody expected so much new data on the region's maritime and diplomatic history. Old collections offer new research perspectives.

The challenge to put thousands of pages of archives online is more than just a logistical one. It is also a matter of implementing new technology and knowledge. High-tech scanners for 'preservation imaging' and durable data storage facilities improve by the year and become ever more affordable. The Digital Archives at ANRI (DASA) project in Jakarta is an innovative project in Indonesia. A specialized Dutch foundation, The Corts Foundation (TCF), funds the project, and arranges for technical assistance. TCF is also responsible for the development of databases, software and web applications.

Intellectual challenge

From a professional historian's perspective, the more complex challenge is intellectual and linguistic. How to make these old and linguistically challenging 17th and 18th-century sources relevant not only for Southeast Asian historians and students but also for the wider public? The archives of the VOC have a reputation as a key resource for historians wishing to tell the story of the Dutch East India Company and the activities of its far-flung personnel scattered in a wide arc between Deshima in Japan to Isfahan in Persia where they serviced the two-way trade between Asia and Europe. Dutch historiography continues to explore this storyline, focussing for instance on the lives of individual sailors like in Roelof van Gelder's excellent biography of the German George Naporra (1731-1793), or the recent publication by G.J. Schutte of the private letters of the high Company official Willem Fockens, Governor of Java's Northeast Coast (1763-1768).

Recent political interest in Intra-Asian trading networks in the VOC era, however, stress the need for Asian historians to participate in the ongoing debate on maritime history and identity. Chinese political projections of a 'Maritime Silk Road' and most recently the ambition of Indonesia's new President Joko Widoko ('Jokowi') to revitalize Indonesia's 'Great Maritime Past' underscore the need for historians to explain history and to counter misconceptions. Whoever visits the newly built Sam Poo Kong Temple complex in Semarang with its unabashed glorification of Chinese Admiral Cheng Ho (1371-1433) realizes just how important it is to construct an accurate history of the past on the basis of archival evidence.

Since 2003, the VOC archives have been included in UNESCO's Memory of the World International Register. This means that the nearly two kilometres of old documents in Jakarta have been officially recognized as 'cultural heritage'. The question now is how to make this massive collection available for contemporary researchers? In every epoch people ask different questions about the past, and many of these questions are related to ethnic, cultural and national identity.

Paper remnants of global, regional and local trading networks

The archives of the VOC in Jakarta may best be seen as the most voluminous paper record of the Europe -Asia and Intra-Asiatic maritime trade networks of the 17th and 18th centuries. The Daily Journals of Batavia Castle between 1624 and 1806 are an excellent example of the richness of this archival resource. This 80.000 page chronicle was created in Batavia Castle, the headquarters of the VOC administration in Asia. The Daily Journals registered all incoming and departing ships to and from Batavia. This is important new data. An earlier publication using parts of the Daily Journals published by the Institute for Dutch History in The Hague lists all ships sailing to and from Europe: a total of 4.700 ships went to Asia and 3.400 came back, a database of 8194 voyages (see resources. huygens.knaw.nl/das/voyages), the largest so far.

Besides this published data on ship voyages, the Daily Journals offer much new information on a range of other topics. They also contain a systematic registration implemented by the Batavia Castle administration of all European ships participating in the Intra-Asian maritime trading networks. This data helps us to understand European participation in the Asian trade: cargoes, flow of goods; frequency of voyages to certain ports; key trading entrepôts; export production and changes in local economies. The Daily Journals are the only available serial source to research the history of these intra-Asian ship movements.

The Daily Journals also registered the departure and arrival of junks from China. Other archival series in Jakarta, preserve a goodly number of early eighteenth-century cargo lists from Chinese junks. These lists substantially amplify the data collected and published by Paul van Dyke. Furthermore, the Daily Journals serve as a register of vessels in the petty trade in and out of Sunda Kelapa, Batavia's old harbour. Thousands of small and medium vessels, from the *prahu* to the *gonting* and *pencalang*, which arrived from the ports of Java's Northeast coast, Madura, Bali, Banjarmasin and those around the Straits of Melaka and Sunda Shelf, were registered, including short descriptions of their cargoes and crews. Some of the data for the year 1775 has been analysed by G.J. Knaap; and similar data on Makassar was likewise studied by G.J. Knaap and H. Sutherland. When other Daily Journals (for instance the Daily Journals of Ternate in Maluku) are also included, it is possible to reconstruct large sections of the maritime trade in the Indonesian archipelago, a real boon for maritime historians.

Multiple centres of diplomacy

Although some of the Daily Journals (published in 31 volumes – most of the years between 1624 and 1682) are a well known source, few historians are aware that Old Dutch translations of diplomatic letters from sultans, kings and local regents, like the powerful sultan of Banten to the minor regent of Sonbai (West Timor) were systematically inserted into these journals. Sadly the elaborately calligraphed originals have been lost. Batavia Castle received letters from Southeast Asian rulers on a weekly basis. Malay was often the language used in such letters, known in the Malay world as the *Surat Emas* or Golden Letters because of their appearance. Unfortunately the original letters were not preserved in Batavia Castle or were subsequently destroyed. When one realizes the ease and frequency with which regional rulers wrote letters to Batavia, one may only speculate that each of the centres of power kept their own archives containing diplomatic correspondence, including letters exchanged between regional rulers. The Daily Journals bear witness to the fact that Batavia was only one player in the region's correspondence networks. Diplomatic envoys, the sending of gifts and exchange of letters via a well-developed post delivery service (involving horsemen, runners and ships' captains) was a daily reality; and to this correspondence Europeans added their own document flow.

Above: Pencil drawing by Jan Brandes, depicting the reception of an embassy from Kandy to the Dutch fort in Colombo (1785). Brandes inserted labels to identify the Kandyan officials and the rank and identity of many of the VOC officers. These additions have been essential in allowing scholars to interpret this image and others with similar content.

Inset: Website logo.

Unfortunately, from the original documents earlier kept in palaces [*kratons*] and fortified settlements [*banteng*] almost nothing has survived. What is left are rather small library collections of original Malay, Minangkabau, Javanese or Buginese manuscripts, many of them not much older than the eighteenth century. These have been professionally catalogued by outstanding historians and curators, such as Pieter Voorhoeve, Merle C. Ricklefs, Edwin P. Wieringa, Ben Arps and Annabel Teh Gallop.

After an initial analysis of the Daily Journals of Batavia Castle it became clear that the number of letters that were inserted in this series surpass all other known collections of commensurate size in Asia. The first stage, involving a database of 4,423 letters covering the years 1683-1743 was published on the Sejarah Nusantara website in December 2014. This database was constructed by two students from Leiden University's Department of History, Simon Kemper and Maarten Manse. All names of the letter senders, including 690 names of regional rulers – some of them hitherto unknown – have been processed ruler by ruler. The second stage of the project in 2015 will result in the completion of the database, including all letters inserted in the Daily Journals from the earlier 1624-1682 period and the second half of the eighteenth century. This last part will offer quite a few surprises. During the administrative reforms of Governor-General W.G. van Imhoff (in office 1743-1750) it was decided to discontinue the insertion of translated letters into the Daily Journals. An entirely separate collection of incoming and outgoing letters from/to Asian rulers during the 1750-1812 resulted from this decision. Some 28 volumes of these letters (a few hundred of them in the original Asian languages) are currently being inserted into the database by ANRI archivists and language experts. By 2015 these documents will have been digitalized and published on the Sejarah Nusantara website.

Visualization and interpretation

The data in these letters between Batavia Castle and rulers in various locations are processed with a special software application on the website Sejarah Nusantara. The geographic visualization depicts Batavia Castle at the centre of a nexus of diplomatic and political relationships. The lack of Asian archival documents and data from other ports and political centres makes it impossible to depict any other maritime or political power centre in the same way. The lack of local Asian archives will make it difficult to interpret the diplomatic and political relations between other ports and centres and Batavia Castle. Powerful political centres with strong interests such as Banten, Ayuttaya or Kartasura had their own political and trading networks. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to see their relationship with Batavia in the wider historical context. It is also too often quickly concluded by historians that a contract between Batavia and a local ruler immediately led to a 'submission' of a ruler. In fact, the implementation of political and trading contracts required continuous further negotiations. Military defeats – like Gowa (Makassar, 1667) and Ternate (1683) – meant full control passed to the VOC; the rulers became vassals, but at the same time, the constant correspondence between Batavia Castle and such defeated rulers shows how much was still subject to negotiation, adaptation and mutual consent. The diplomatic letters show various forms of cooperation and mutual interest. All together the thousands of exchanges constitute an enormous challenge for historians desirous of reinterpreting Southeast Asia's history in its local, regional and global context.

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Responses to the manifesto 'Heritage beyond the boundaries'

The manifesto 'Heritage beyond the boundaries', published in the previous issue of the Newsletter (#69, Autumn 2014, pp.22-23), was compiled by a team of MA students and PhD candidates enrolled in the Leiden University program *Critical Heritage Studies of Asia and Europe*. As a teacher, I supported this initiative, together with Ian Dull, an independent researcher working on the heritage of Southeast Asia.

Adele Esposito

FROM A PEDAGOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, I recognize two main positive contributions made by the manifesto: first, it has fostered the students' capacity to make a statement to the field of heritage studies, based on their individual research; second, the students enthusiastically engaged in this extra-curriculum activity. The limits between a formal class and a passionate debate were blurred, late-afternoons were spent with exchanges about the articles, critiques flocked, responses were given. The manifesto encouraged interactions with an academic field, 'heritage studies', which is a source of heated debates.

The responses to the manifesto published in this issue of the Newsletter, show how current and thriving these debates are. The students and I have been happy to receive the harsh criticisms that will help to deepen the knowledge of heritage, but also the theoretical and philosophical foundations of 'critical heritage' as a field of study. We have also been glad to read those contributions that have provided new perspectives on the values and the forms of heritage in the contexts of Asia. Finally, we have been keen to publish those contributions that adopt a position contrary to one article, or to the manifesto as a whole. These will help the students to question the validity of their arguments, and imagine the response they would give if the community of authors were physically present in a conference room. We can only wish that this will in

reality happen one day, in order to develop fruitful and hot debates about the politics of heritage.

Below is a selection of the responses sent to us. We would like to thank everyone who sent us their thoughts on this issue, and regret we could not publish everyone's contribution.

Adele Esposito, Research Fellow at CNRS/AUSSER; lecturer at LIAS/Leiden University and coordinator of the MA Program 'Critical Heritage Studies of Asia and Europe', IIAS/Faculty of Humanities, Leiden University.

Hong Kong street markets as living heritage

Maurizio Marinelli

IN MY WORK on urban redevelopment and gentrification in Hong Kong, I focus on the history of street markets and street hawking. Street markets and hawking are an organically constitutive part of Hong Kong's history, culture, and socio-economic development. Since the inception of the colony, when the name 'Hong Kong' (香港 Fragrant Harbour) became a synecdoche to refer to the whole collection of fishing villages, trading on riverbanks and around harbours, street markets have always played an integral role in shaping the landscape for population growth and urban development. Not only do they serve as localized and more cost effective alternatives to supermarkets for fresh produce, but they also provide their local customers with the chance to interact directly with the producers, the distributors, and ultimately, with each other. In this sense, markets are spaces of social inclusion, laboratories for collective experiences of public space and 'living heritage', and in addition to that, they have progressively become the testing grounds for bottom-up practices of democratization thanks to the community's battle to preserve this 'living heritage' against the profit-driven logic of *domicide* and *memoricide* (Porteous, Smith, 2001).

Since the 1970s, but even more so starting from 1989, the Government decided to take an active role in disciplining public space in Hong Kong. Street hawking was the first step up the Hong Kong economic ladder, especially for the new-comers from Mainland China. This led to a huge increase in the number of hawkers, from around 13,000 to more than 70,000 in the 1950s-60s. Therefore, in the 1970s the

Government decided to stop issuing hawkers' licenses, and then progressively turned the street markets into indoor public markets (1980s), in the name of progress and modernity, and, of course, for the sake of public health. The outcome has been the development of 'modern', more 'civilized' and 'hygienic' urban spaces, with the collateral damage of the annihilation of 'living heritage'.

In my work, I define living heritage as the complex of informal social activities and cultural practices, which characterize everyday life and co-existence in a specific locale. Therefore, my definition is very different from the UNESCO's attempt to subsume living heritage as part of the intangible cultural heritage (IHC), which refers to the immaterial heritage of different cultures. Going beyond the UNESCO's Cartesian definition's dichotomy, I argue that the citizens have a role in shaping and practicing heritage: therefore, living heritage is material, since it includes embodied social relationships and cultural practices which become meaningful thanks to their co-existence in the street market. I argue that the street market (as opposed to shopping malls or luxury goods stores) is a perfect example of the living heritage, which is constructed and based on a collective civic identity: maintaining the street market vibrant and alive is the sine qua non to continue to bring disparate social, ethnic, and generational groups together, engendering a sense of social aggregate of the residents as a community.

Maurizio Marinelli, Senior Lecturer in East Asian History, History Department, University of Sussex

Above:
Hong Kong Market.
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on Flickr.com.

Cultural and natural heritage

Eric Jones

HERITAGE PARTLY CONSISTS of communal institutions used to allocate, conserve and harvest natural resources. Where humans have operated for millennia it is unhelpful to think of nature as independent of this traditional management. Yet these institutions are under threat. As Madhav Gadgil says, "the conservation of the rapidly diminishing pool of experience, a kind of cultural diversity, is as pressing as the conservation of biological diversity."

An appropriate theoretical framework envisages Asia's heritage as a continuum with Europe's experience; despite differences in timing both are shaped by economic growth. A model may be proposed like the familiar one where different waves of consumer goods are bought as successive thresholds of household income are crossed. Development likewise erases communal mechanisms for allocating resources. The model is mechanistic but is a first approximation; as usual in social science, deviations from its predictions are the greater interest.

Communal institutions for allocating resources are nearly extinct in Western Europe, ironically sometimes being ousted in favour of 'pure' nature conservation, despite the way specific ecosystems depend on historical practices. Two generations of development in East Asia, and population growth throughout Asia, have brought comparable effects. Environmental pressure has been externalised in part by importing forest products and seeking customary luxuries, like ivory, in other continents, not to mention in distant seas. But Asia itself has felt the effects, notably the commercialisation of exploitation where resources were formerly husbanded by local communities. Husbanded is the word: local people engaged in sustainable harvesting and it is their heritage of cautious management which is now, as Gadgil observes, under as much threat as wildlife itself.

An example is the exploitation of cave swiftlets in Borneo to make birds' nest soup. Small-scale management apparently existed in equilibrium for one thousand years, producing no 'tragedy of the commons'. However, Suharto's government replaced the system by annual auctions. Although this was logical, the resultant take was excessive. After Suharto's fall, reformers were frustrated by continued (human) population and income growth, which raised demand and hampered the restoration of previous means of allocating harvesting rights.

Not all growth-induced changes are negative since they provide money for national parks. In addition, not every seemingly archaic practice really is old: shorebird hunting in Thailand's coastal villages has emerged because nowadays fresh meat is affordable. Yet, generally speaking, the heritage of traditional management is being undermined by the forces of commercialisation.

Eric Jones, Professor; author of
'Revealed Biodiversity: an economic history of the human impact' (Singapore, 2014)

Stakeholders' motivations

Fang Xu

'A MANIFESTO - BEYOND THE BOUNDARIES' is a timely contribution to the topic of heritage for many Asian cities that are undergoing a radical transition in the process of urbanisation. Particularly, the critiques of institutional heritage practices highlight the problems of the current approach. Actually, in Asian countries such as China, the concept of heritage related to urban environment has been constantly shaped with ongoing change of content and interests. However, the institutional heritage practice remains a main avenue and is hardly challenged. As a designer and researcher involved in several large-scale urban renewal projects, I have witnessed this dynamic process in the past decade.

In China, the heritage-related exercise is far more than a technical issue, it is a systematic task that involves local government bodies, cultural relics protectors, developers, designers, and end-users or residents. As stakeholders, they play different roles based on their multiple interests, sometimes contradictory to each other. Government bodies seem more interested in the approach than is politically correct; developers only favour the potential commercial value that a heritage project can generated; cultural relics protectors merely focus on the conservation of heritage's physical features; designers try to turn the output of design into a personal mark and artistic statement; and residents are more concerned about potential impacts resulted from unpredictable changes.

Due to the dominant role of the government in the society and its top-down management system, government bodies are the most powerful stakeholders, while the voices of residents, although the largest group, are too weak to be heard. When doing research on heritage-related topics, the difficulty is not only dealing with all the challenges from stakeholders, but also constructing an exchange platform on which all stakeholders can equally share their different views.

My research is usually based on a specific practical project, and starts with studying the stakeholders. Examining the stakeholders' motivations underlying their different interests becomes a fundamental step to better understanding them. Meanwhile, the most vital part is to create a bottom-up approach, this grassroots-heritage practice offers many new possibilities for the exercise and adds an additional perspective and measurement to the institutional heritage approach. Hence, the integrated solution can emerge that can appropriately respond to the interests of all.

Fang Xu, Associate professor; coordinator of Environments/Spatial Design, UNSW Art & Design, The University of New South Wales

A condemnation of the condemnation of memory

David Tizzard

THE CONDEMNATION OF MEMORY – *damnatio memoriae* – is supported in the manifesto and implied that it may be a method in which a culture can begin to shape and control its own heritage. A proviso is given that it must be destroyed consciously rather than be the victim of an authoritarian deletion and the example specifically referenced is that of the Government General Building in the area of Kwanghwamun around Seoul. I worry, however, that this willing destruction and acceptance of it in order to control heritage brings about some rather serious problems: first, it denies a truth; second, it puts the subjective opinion ahead of the objective.

In terms of denying a truth, it surely cannot be supported that buildings, people, or ideas can be willingly erased from a history. Our vision and understanding is never infallible and, furthermore, it is only in hindsight and with the gift of perspective that we can often understand the true value of things. How many things would we have lost – or even have we lost – throughout the course of history if we were to simply begin collectively erasing things because of 'uncomfortable reflections on history and national traumas'. Korea, as an area which I research, is ripe for this and rather inconsistent in its approach. This inconsistency is the second point.

The subjective opinion being valued over the objective means that whilst one culture might certainly agree with the erasing of an object in order to promote its own heritage, this might be at odds with the views and values of another. Korea has continually lambasted Japan for not 'erasing' the memory of the Yasukuni Shrine and any visits to it made by Japanese politicians will make the news in the Korean media. They seemingly want, first, Japan to deny a historical fact and existence for the sake of their own peace. And yet, one of the biggest newspaper headlines in Korea is that of the 'comfort women' for which the country continually demands compensation from the Japanese: this issue has been decided will not be erased because it is of national 'benefit'.

Two devastating topics – war and prostitution – and yet I only include them to say that heritage does not exist in a singular vacuum but rather in a relationship with other heritages. Allowing distortions and subjective interpretations of history in favour of truth is, I believe, a dangerous path to follow.

David Tizzard,
Professor at Seoul Women's University

Above:
Yasukuni Shrine.
Image reproduced under a Creative Commons license courtesy of CLF on Flickr.com.

Critique without criticism?

Felix Girke

AS A SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGIST studying heritage practices in contemporary Myanmar, I have entered 'heritage studies' sideways, and am occasionally perplexed, less by the desire to apply one's insights to the betterment of the field, and more by the confidence that such interventions might in fact work. My puzzlement is professional ballast – the confidence that academics could improve the field they study suggests a modernist optimism many anthropologists have lost.

But I fully agree with the non-judgmental diagnosis that heritage itself is out of bounds. We are faced with a proliferation of applications of the term in Southeast Asia, Myanmar being a case in point. There, the term itself blots out even 'culture' at times, such is its current appeal. But I am not persuaded by the rationalist gestus of unmasking that emerges from the manifesto, namely, the seeming preference to deconstruct the "politics of significance" and to "undercut the invention of tradition inherent in it" at the national level, while respecting the subaltern's heritage efforts. This emancipatory drive is surely worthy, but do only the governmental heritage regimes and the national bias of global institutions prevent a true polyphony of heritages? Is there not also chauvinism from below? Maybe the key to this predicament is found in the little clause that heritage "*as an institutional practice*, is highly political and hierarchical" (my emphasis). Is it not always? Must not the yardstick remain the same?

Here, I want to invoke Christoph Brumann's recent call for "heritage agnosticism" as preferable to uncritical 'belief' and dismissive 'atheism', as the royal road towards

Above: Pyu Ancient Cities (Myanmar): Myanmar's first site inscribed to World Heritage List. Image reproduced courtesy of the Department of Archaeology, National Museum and Library Myanmar.

a better heritage studies (http://tinyurl.com/brumann2014). The manifesto seems ambivalent in that regard, since to acknowledge the political nature of heritage (that it is put "to work") is to disavow the prime conceit of heritage – that it has intrinsic value.

A final point: While the shelf life of global idioms is usually limited, we have not crested that wave yet. Heritage remains a fantastic 'boundary object', as claims of heritage find worldwide recognition and yet remain endlessly malleable in emplaced rhetoric. Its use for local, national and global interventions is hardly exhausted. Again: Myanmar only now had its first UNESCO sites listed. Heritage fatigue is still a long way off, and considering the many interests that are entangled with heritage today, my prediction is that we will see hypertrophy before we see renunciation.

Felix Girke, Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Regionalstudien (ZIRS), Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg

A new consciousness has emerged

Sheyla Zandonai

MY CURRENT RESEARCH examines the discourses and uses that have been tied to social, cultural, and political struggles to protect material heritage in Macau, China. I am interested in studying people's understandings and experiences of place in the advent of a global economy of gambling and mass tourism, and growing influxes of outsider populations, tourists and immigrant workers alike, who have no affective attachments to Macau. Once a vibrant port city, Macau's urban fabric attests to a diverse history of interethnic encounters, and the lack thereof, in which different periods of urbanization and architectural styles coexist. Following China's postcolonial program, part of Macau's Portuguese and Chinese material legacies has been recognized as World Heritage in 2005. While UNESCO's classification has been criticised for its top-down approach, and thus, not exactly representative of Macau's social history, I argue that it has, nevertheless, entailed a debate on heritage that did not exist until then. A new consciousness has emerged, *in spite of*. Different initiatives for heritage protection, from young and elder generations, are surfacing in tandem with UNESCO's ideas, but also evolving beyond it. Whereas incongruent interests, public and private, are at struggle, a multivocal claim for the right to heritage has been building up.

Now, beyond a call for 'heritage agnosticism' towards UNESCO's role in defining what heritage is (http://tinyurl.com/brumann2014), a reflection on what is being done on the ground once *Heritage* has entered the lives of people (from Macau), is also worth entailing. What heritage represents and to what extent it has been used to voice other concerns? I believe that in the case of Macau, it has given different *cultures* – local, Chinese, grassroots – a discursive and rhetorical tool that is being channelled into tangible agendas. It has been practiced as an instrument to voice resistance, to perform belonging and, ultimately, citizenship in a space, highly contested, in which the overwhelming impact of a political economy of gambling has been challenged by those directly affected by it.

Sheyla Zandonai, Laboratoire Architecture Anthropologie (LAA), France; Department of Anthropology, Trent University, Canada

Responses to the manifesto 'Heritage beyond the boundaries' *continued*

Embracing conflict, unleashing voices

MCM Santamaria

Above: Kulintang at Asian Festival. Image reproduced under a Creative Commons license courtesy of Mr.TinDC on Flickr.com.

AS A STUDENT OF ETHNO-CHOREOLOGY, I will limit my comments to dance research and practice in the Philippines. Indeed, heritage as practice is 'political and hierarchical'. For instance, all Philippine national artists in dance have done much of their work or have been based in the National Capital Region: Francisca Reyes Aquino (University of the Philippines Folk Song and Dance Troupe); Leonor Orosa Goquingco (Filipinescas Dance Company); Lucrecia Urtula (Bayanihan Dance Company); Ramon Obusan (Ramon Obusan Dance Company); and Alice Reyes (Ballet Philippines).

Dance research has introduced me to great artists whose lives and works are largely known only in the periphery: Albani (Jolo-based dance master credited to have re-invented the popular *Dalling-Dalling* song-dance tradition); Ennura Deminggu (famed dancer of the Tariray bamboo-clapper dance of Sitangkai Island) and Mahail Hajan (Bongao-based dance master whose career spans more than 30 years of staging regional dances). Their marginalization is a function of lack of access to cultural capital and power. In a country with more than 70 major ethno-linguistic groups, how can 'imperial Manila' hold a monopoly of talent?

Recently, I have been engaged in a rather heated debate with another Manila-based scholar. This scholar is famous for her work on the Tausug *pangalay* dance tradition, which she claims to be the same (much to the disagreement of local informants) as the Sama-Bajau *igal* dance tradition.

Her work in 'preserving' *pangalay*, which she claims to be the "temple of dance in Sanskrit", has been the subject of at least three documentary films. Her writings reveal a discourse on heritage preservation that revolves around notions of 'authenticity' and 'distinction'. Is it correct to attribute the preservation of a dance tradition to a single individual? Are the efforts of the people in the field not worth noting?

Finally, I would like to draw attention to a contemporary Sama-Bajau dance form called *igal pakiring*. Instead of being accompanied by a traditional knobbed gong *kulintangan* ensemble, this new form is accompanied by a singer and an electronic organ. Several Manila-based writers have dismissed this vibrant new form as "crass" or "an unacceptable morph of tradition". Are the people of the field not allowed to change their own traditions? Whose aesthetics ought to be privileged?

The issues I raise reveal the highly conflicted nature of heritage production. Perhaps, conflict should be embraced. This may allow the unleashing of multiple voices that can balance that of the privileged center.

MCM Santamaria, Professor of Asian and Philippine Studies, Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman.

Critical Heritage Studies and the importance of studying histories of heritage formation

Marieke Bloembergen and Martijn Eickhoff

THE CONCEPT OF 'COLONIAL DETERMINISM', coined by Susan Legêne, precisely labels one of the questions that initially guided us in our project on archaeological sites and heritage formation in colonial and post-colonial Indonesia: what made the archaeology of colonial times *colonial*? (http://ghhpw.com/sbs.php) Investigating how Hindu-Buddhist, Islamic, Chinese, pre-historic and colonial sites located in Indonesia transformed into heritage, we focused on site-related knowledge production, studying colonial sources in combination with local Malay and Javanese texts. Our findings made us realize that these sites are not primarily colonial, even when colonial relations shaped them profoundly.

The monument regulations on Java of 1840 and 1842, for example, were the result of knowledge exchange between the colonial government and various Javanese parties, village heads as well as royal elites. For these – mostly Muslim – Javanese, the 'Hindu-Buddhist antiquities' were part of a historical and religious-mythical landscape. Their conviction that it was better not to (re)move site-based objects, was taken seriously by the colonial authorities. The regulation of 1840 officially forbade the export of antiquities and it obliged local authorities to inventorize the antiquities in their region. The following regulation of 1842 arranged that the Batavian Society could acquire archaeological objects for its museum, but with one restriction: the transactions should not interfere with 'indigenous' appropriations of these objects. Although many statues were still taken away, the colonial regulations do imply that Javanese subjects contributed to the development of (colonial) state-related heritage awareness in Java.

'Heritage beyond the boundaries: a manifesto' is a clear example of colonial determinism. The tone is set by the statement that notions of heritage worldwide are shaped by European cultural backgrounds, being disseminated by colonial powers and then organisations such as UNESCO. We consider this a dogmatic stance. It disregards how throughout colonial times, and worldwide, encounters and exchanges were pivotal for developing concepts of heritage. As our Javanese example shows, there were certainly colonial hierarchies at work. But recognizing them should not lead to the creation of false and essentialist dichotomies between the West and the Rest. It is more important to trace the complex interactions that affected heritage formation. Studying the histories of these interactions might help to develop a balanced understanding of the contemporary critical heritage discourse that, with its focus on communities and stakeholders, ironically enough, is often in the first place connected to top-down power structures in the post-colonial societies themselves.

Marieke Bloembergen, Cultural historian and senior researcher at KITLV (Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies), Leiden, Netherlands.

Martijn Eickhoff, Cultural historian, senior researcher at NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies and assistant professor at Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands.

'Tradition' or 'traditionalism' as a Chinese way to understand heritage

Zheng Yan Min (Cathy)

It is widely acknowledged that there is no equivalent translation from one language to another in various circumstances, especially when two languages come from different systems, such as ideographic Chinese and phonetic English. In terms of heritage studies, the officially accepted translation of 'heritage' as 'yí chǎn (遗产)' does not properly reflect the Chinese attitude towards the past, since 'chǎn (产)' in Chinese means 'property or kinds of physical forms that can be constructed or produced', which neglects the spiritual side of people's efforts in preserving heritage. In order to solve such a dilemma in translation, I propose a pedagogical initiative to understand 'Chinese heritage' as 'Chinese tradition' or 'Chinese traditionalism'.

There are two reasons for doing so: firstly, the back-translation of 'tradition' or 'traditionalism' as two Chinese characters 'chuán (传)' and 'tǒng (统)' can help understand Chinese attitudes towards the past, which imposes a significant methodological implication for undertaking anthropological research in Chinese societies, since 'chuán (传)' means 'transmission, transferring, communication or spreading' and 'tǒng (统)' means 'governing, taking hold in restraint, exercising authoritative influence over and always being presented as an integral form'. In other words, Chinese heritages cannot only be observed from physical remains, but also from ordinary people's daily lives, since a great part of Chinese heritages have been internalised generation by generation. Chinese anthropological research epitomises the historiographic tradition (generation) in anthropological research.

Secondly, the separate consideration of one Chinese word into two or more Chinese characters also follows Chinese academic tradition in interpreting texts; as we know, the enrichments and refreshments of Chinese academic thoughts come from those interpretations of those ancient Chinese academic articles in different historical periods of time. By way of technology in modern times, texts of various languages become more and more penetrating in people's everyday life. Such interpretation can facilitate mutual appreciations by adjusting various perspectives of understanding, and for doing so, it is possible to open up a new territory in formulating institutional heritage-preservation initiatives by using the 'language-mentality' formation paradigm in its most original (etymological) form; such as English is an inductive language and Chinese is a deductive language.

Zheng Yan Min, PhD candidate at the University of Macau, researching non-resident workers' daily commute between Macau and Zhuhai.

Toward an anthropology of heritage practices

Taku Iida

I TOTALLY AGREE with the manifesto issued in 'the Newsletter #69', which problematizes Asian heritage after due consideration of local, national, and international actors' different views. Keeping its significance in mind, however, I would like to place more stress on local people's values and actions, which are our main concerns in the ongoing project "Anthropology of Heritage: Communities and Materiality in Global Systems" of the National Museum of Ethnology, Japan.

Our pursuit started with the 2011 East Japan Great Earthquake. In the beginning of the recovery process, national agencies were occupied with rescuing material heritage. Intangible heritage, contrarily, was beyond their scope. Therefore, it was surprising for non-sufferers to know that some sufferers began to organize dance ceremonies, originally religious and annual, as their own action for recovery. The sufferers gathered to have exercise from temporary housings, made trips wherever their audience is found, and even filed applications to get grants. Their intangible heritage was not only a symbol of local history but also one of few handy resources to recover their everyday life.

Sure, the people decontextualized, showed up, and sometimes commercialized their cultural resources; and also allied with national and international agencies. Heritage here is therefore a product yielded by plural actors with different views and memories. However, we should not overlook that some kinds of heritage are left in local people's hands. They can create, inherit, repair, repeat, copy, diffuse, appropriate, conceal, and neglect their own heritage. In addition to these instrumental practices, people also make social ones; cooperate, compete, compromise, and break with one another. Such instrumental and social processes, rarely documented in the conventional heritage studies, remain to be described and analyzed ethnographically. Empirical research of heritage practices is expected to clarify modes of cultural transmission and super-generational communication in a globalized world, and thus to contribute to general theories in sociocultural anthropology.

The wind is favorable. UNESCO began to pay attention to the people in 1994 when the Global Strategy started. In 1997, Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention recognized the involvement of 'stakeholders' as an element of effective management. In 2003, UNESCO's General Assembly adopted the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, where intangible heritage is supposed to provide 'communities and groups' with a sense of identity and continuity. Anthropological knowledge on local heritage practices is thus demanded by both local and international societies.

Taku Iida, National Museum of Ethnology, Japan.

On critical heritage studies

Mark Hobart

As a step towards rethinking cultural heritage, this manifesto is welcome, not least in stressing rival institutional interests and how local participants become marginalized. However the manifesto draws upon a surprisingly conservative epistemology, which replicates the hegemony it questions and so undermines its own aims. This may not be immediately obvious because the manifesto deploys the trendy language of critical theory (critique, authenticity) and post-structuralism (discourse, deconstruction), but ends up as vacuous because it ignores what both are about. Further, it does not explore, as would Cultural Studies' scholars, culture as a site (or moments) of struggle. Nor does it ask 'who gets to represent what as culture to whom under what circumstances?'. Instead conflict is treated at face value, such as between rival stakeholders' interests. If the authors fail to engage with the implications of the arguments that they side step, the manifesto risks becoming an exercise in theoretical evasion.

The problems are evident in the fashionable use of the adjective 'critical' without apparent recognition of its genealogy. So the authors uncritically adopt the language of contemporary consumer capitalism in writing about culture as 'stakeholders' 'assets' and 'plural views and dynamic struggles for power' in a 'politics of significance' (Herzfeld). Drawing on a well-established sense of critical theory, we could then inquire into the conditions of class and power under which culture comes variously to be represented, hypostatized or produced through the 'culture industries' of which heritage is one. Rephrased in Cultural Studies' terms, how do class, race (not just 'post-colonialism') gender, religion and generation impact on who gets to articulate heritage, how and when?

There is also a stronger post-Kantian sense of 'critical' (e.g., Deleuze, *Kant's critical philosophy*). This would require us to address not just who represents the object of study as what, but also to criticize our own categories of thought and styles of reasoning as themselves historically and culturally conditioned. Would it not be wise for the critique of so singularly European a concept as heritage to include a critique of the Eurocentrism which is constitutive of the whole argument? So perhaps the authors of the manifesto should reflect on what they mean by 'critical'? So doing might help to provide a theoretical framework worthy of the manifesto.

Mark Hobart, Emeritus professor of Critical Media and Cultural Studies, SOAS, University of London.

Cultural villages as a source for science, education, fun, and identity building

Gisela Trommsdorff, Hans-Joachim Kornadt, Roswith Roth and Dietrich Albert

THE MANIFESTO addresses important questions and topics regarding the concept of 'heritage', its realizations and side effects. We agree on most of the propositions from a common sense point of view. However, we have to question its scientific basis. Such a manifesto should be based on systematic research, on meta-analysis, and initiate research. Regarding the methodology a clear distinction has to be made between (a) observed facts and data, (b) their interpretation, and (c) the derived consequences, e.g., recommendations. In case of 'heritage', scientific evaluation methods should be used.

From our point of view targeting the concept of 'heritage' might be too narrow. Instead, the broader concept of 'culture' should be addressed in its many facets: e.g., scientific conceptualizations of culture, how and why which cultural artifacts should be preserved? Beyond heritages, a long tradition in preserving cultural assets exists, e.g., in Asia and Europe, like private collections, museums, libraries, archives, restoring of buildings, area rehabilitation. Heritages are only one type in the context of other measures for preserving culture. Because connecting the different types of preservation is very demanding it should be supported by using modern Information Technology (IT). Also, the reasons for preserving cultural artifacts are manifold. Four of them have been addressed in the title of this commentary.

The facets of preservation are part of the goal of 'meaning-making', e.g., clarifying scientific hypothesis about cultural development and evolution, better understanding the current cultural, religious, political differences, and conflicts, and for comprehending oral history respectively. An isolated view on certain cultural assets cannot elicit 'meaning'; the context in its different aspects has to be taken into account. Further, culture is a dynamic system undergoing changes while at the same time promoting some continuity.

Excellent examples of presenting cultural assets in their context can be seen in *cultural villages*, e.g., in Korea and Malaysia. They are excellent with respect to the above mentioned aspects, and they provide meaning-making. Cultural villages can give an insight into the indigenous cultural values possibly still relevant in the respective cultures while socio-cultural changes abound.

Accordingly, analyzing, comparing, evaluating and possibly generalizing the concept of cultural villages in different Asian and European countries should help to reduce ethnocentrism, and underline the need for scientifically based cultural heritages. This could be the basis for better understanding of indigenous cultures and for global recommendations aiming to save, document and present their great options for human mankind.

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Traditional Indian Medicine (TIM) is not just Ayurveda

Maarten Bode

The manifesto in the Focus section 'Theorizing Heritage' (the Newsletter #69) gives me the opportunity to discuss the political nature of narrowing the many forms of contemporary Traditional Indian Medicine (TIM) to Ayurveda as India's national medicine. Indian nationalist politics affect the recognition, ownership, and management of the wide spectrum of traditional medicines in contemporary India. What is needed is a dialogue between two important stakeholders: the Indian state and local communities. Empirical data and theoretical perspectives of medical anthropologists and medical historians of the last two decades can constructively contribute to such a discussion. Their research shows that on the national level we see debatable, either unintentional or intentional, attempts at reification and ossification of the many forms of TIM practiced in India today. The suggestion is that Ayurveda as India's national medicine is a discrete medical system and that it provides the codified substrate for the many local forms of herbal based TIM practiced in India today.

There are approximately 500,000 state sanctioned practitioners of Indian medicine, who have at least a college degree in one of the systems of Indian medicine that fall under the Department of AYUSH (Ayurveda, Yoga, Unani, Siddha and Homeopathy). Approximately 450.000 of them have a bachelors or master degree in Ayurveda. However, it is estimated that 80% to 90% of these graduates practice western biomedicine. The large majority of practitioners of TIM can be found in India's heterogeneous folk sector. Here, around two million, often semi-legal, health care providers offer herbal based treatments for common and chronic diseases. Apart from these generalists we see specialists treating ailments such as jaundice, paralysis, skin disorders, eye problems, broken bones, poisonous bites, and psychosocial problems. Local midwives who look after the health of mother and child

are probably the largest group among them. These folk practitioners are an integral part of one of India's many local cultures. Their treatments are not standardized. On the contrary, they respond to local social-cultural and ecological realities. This probably increases their effectiveness.

It is common practice among Indian (health) authorities to conflate all forms of TIM with classical Ayurveda as it is represented by scholarly works of the first millennium. A case in point is the speech Prime Minister Narendra Modi held on the occasion of the Sixth World Ayurvedic Congress, held in New Delhi on 6-9 November 2014. Narendra Modi explicitly linked Indian folk medicine to Ayurveda and by denoting Ayurveda as *Panchamveda* [The fifth Veda], the prime minister tied TIM to India's Hindu past and to Brahmanism. In contemporary India this representation is both common and contested. Such 'politics of significance' beg to be deconstructed. The claim that all forms of Indian medicine fall under 'Ayurveda' and the notion that Ayurveda represents an unbroken tradition from the Veda's onwards, must be contested on two grounds. Firstly, Ayurveda is highly diverse. Processes of biomedicalisation and scientisation have made the Ayurveda promoted by the central Indian government very different from canonical Ayurveda. Secondly, local forms of TIM have their own logic, treatment procedures, and *materia medica*. To fixate Ayurveda and consider the term to be a synonym for the many local forms of TIM is a political act. It also denies the huge social asymmetries between the politicians and bureaucrats of the central government and local traditional healers and their patients.

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Above: Morning Yoga. Image reproduced under a Creative Commons license courtesy of Alona Praslov on Flickr.com.

Protecting heritage as a whole

Chen Chunhong

HERITAGE IS AN IMPORTANT MEDIUM for the transmission of human civilization and human history. The people of any nation and country are willing to explore the significant events of the past. There is no doubt that rich historical information has travelled to the present from ancient times by means of the effective medium, heritage. For this reason we must protect heritages well; and not just the tangible material heritage, but also the intangible cultural heritage. In historic districts or traditional villages the two should be protected together.

Good heritage protection does not mean to enclose and isolate heritage far away from people's touch and use; on the contrary, possibilities of being used should be assessed in advance, and encourage people to appreciate their historical values.

Heritage should be protected as a whole: the buildings, surroundings and also those who co-exist with it, such as the people who make use of it. The most effective examples may be traditional villages: simultaneously protecting the village's architectural heritage, the people who live in villages, the traditional styles of living, the cultural content, etc.

Protection of heritage should be timely and appropriate, and not decided by rushed policies and regulations. Heritage evaluation systems should be developed alongside the different cultures involved. National heritage protection methods should not follow a unified theoretical framework. For example, we can't assess the protection methods of the wood material heritage built in Asia by using the rules for stone heritage. Wood heritage is not eternal, it is inappropriate to evaluate it using eternal theory.

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IIAS Reports

Female Islamic authority in comparative perspective: exemplars, institutions, practices

International workshop, Leiden, 8-9 January 2015

David Kloos and Mirjam Künkler

Funded by the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV), the Asian Modernities and Traditions Research Program (AMT), the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), the Leiden University Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (LUCIS), and the Leiden University Fund (LUF).

THE SIGNIFICANT ROLE OF WOMEN participating in, and shaping, Islamic scholarly traditions through the centuries is still hardly reflected in either Western scholarly or public perceptions. Nearly all classic accounts of religious authority in Islam proceed from the assumption that this authority is male.[1] The possibility that women might exercise various aspects of religious authority is usually not discussed. Yet, when we dissect religious authority into its various manifestations (leading prayer, preaching, providing religious counselling, issuing fatwas, transmitting hadith, judging in court, shaping the Islamic scholarly tradition), nuances emerge that call the exclusively male character of religious authority in Islam into question.

Above: *Otuns* (spiritual leaders) gathering for *hudoi*, a thanksgiving ritual, at a *mazar* (shrine) near Khujand, Tajikistan.

All photos by Anna Cieślewska.

In recent years, case studies of women exercising any of these roles have been published by scholars working in different fields, including history, sociology, anthropology, politics, and law. Publications have focused on such topics as female teachers, scholars, preachers and judges, women's mosque and study groups, ritual leadership, the role of the state in shaping female religious authority, and Islamic feminism.[2] Particular attention has been paid to the role of the state and higher educational institutions in training women as female religious authorities. These analyses tend to highlight top-down processes of recognition and certification, that is, how universities and training programs, grand muftis and bureaucrats in state ministries of religion develop curricula to train women in various roles of Islamic authority and certify those who have successfully graduated from these programs. In the workshop convened at KITLV in early January 2015, we sought to apply an alternative lens and instead focused on bottom-up initiatives of establishing female Islamic authority.[3] Thus, papers explored how female Islamic authorities are embedded in local contexts, shedding light on community-based processes of certification.

Providing a reference point for the workshop as a whole, Mirjam Künkler gave an overview of recent state- and society-driven initiatives for the promotion of female Islamic authority. Recent years have seen a surge in programs aimed at training and certifying women as legal scholars, preachers and counsellors. In most cases, however, this authority is fundamentally limited, in the sense that it depends on, or is placed below male authority, or because it is confined to 'women's issues'. Interestingly, the latter limitation runs counter to all major schools of law (madhāhib) that allow women to provide advise (iftā) on any issue, not only issues of particular relevance to women. In light of the limits of top-down programs in training women as religious authority, Künkler called for a research agenda that turns the attention towards the way women are perceived as religious authorities by local communities.

The other papers complemented this analysis by exploring how female Islamic leaders and authorities have been gathering a following by building up a community. Rahima, a women's rights organization in Jakarta, and the focus of a paper presented by Nor Ismah, is responsible for one of the first female ulamā (religious scholars) training programs in Indonesia. To increase its reach among the grassroots, this organization has worked together with traditional Islamic boarding schools, most of which are located in rural areas. A framework that is often invoked in the relevant literature is one that distinguishes between female agency, male support, and state initiative in the promotion of female religious authority.[4] Ismah's paper confirmed the usefulness of this framework when it emphasized how the support of male religious leaders has been an important contribution to the success of Rahima's programs. Amporn Marddent, in turn, discussed the views and activities of a group of (female) Malay Muslim scholars in the southern provinces of Thailand. In contrast to the female ulamā mentioned by Nor Ismah, these scholars have a background in the tarbiyah movement – an (originally campus-based) revivalist current focused on religious instruction and modelled after the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. They also focus more explicitly on women's issues. What unites both case studies, however, is a conviction to empower women through religious knowledge and to develop forms of authority that are grounded in strong ties between female Islamic leaders and local communities.

Faried Saenong, in his inquiry into the vast (and for a large part female) universe of informal Islamic study groups in Jakarta, elucidated how female religious teachers have come to serve as crucial links between (seemingly) divergent spaces, including the upper hierarchies of traditional Islamic scholarship, electoral politics, and the mundane realities of the domestic sphere. Saenong usefully demonstrated how one particular social institution may encompass a spectrum of modes of certification, including genealogical authority, the granting of an ijāzah (permission to transmit religious knowledge)

Transcending the Bay of Bengal

Michael Laffan

Report of the workshop 'Belonging Across the Bay of Bengal: Migrations, Networks, Circulations', convened at Princeton University, 31 October 2014

The workshop 'Belonging Across the Bay of Bengal', held under the rubric of the Asian Spatialities forum of the IIAS/Mellon-sponsored program 'Rethinking Asian Studies', followed an earlier meeting at Princeton in 2011 that had used a discussion of traditional texts and modern textbooks to bridge the gap between specialists of South and Southeast Asia. Now, armed with a sense of what the three historical moments were to be for our project – the long 19th century,

the economic crisis of the 1930s, and the difficult period of emancipation after WWII – we were better able to come to grips with our subject in what was an incredibly fruitful discussion.

After an opening paper from David Ludden (New York University) on the Bay of Bengal as historical space, a further eleven offerings explored vectors of connection and imagination crisscrossing that arena; thinking about relationships

Satellite image of the Bay of Bengal. Image reproduced under a creative commons license courtesy of NASA Goddard Space Flight Center at Flickr.com.

between actors throughout and even beyond it. The primary themes that emerged concerned freedom of migration and mobility, and the place of India in historical imagination. Indeed it became apparent that there are now some strikingly polarized northern and southern narratives that distinguish contemporary sojourners from ancestral gifters of world religion.

As Ludden noted, much of the grand historical interaction in the eastern Indian Ocean has been across its southern latitudes. One need only think of the 11th century Cholas or the 15th century Ming incursions prior to the penetration of European power that saw the very naming and claiming of that space through Bengal. Anne Blackburn then demonstrated how Buddhists around that Bay have long regarded themselves as a 'Southern' (rather than Theravadan) community, offering a longue durée history of monks in motion and rituals of ordination being deployed by states in contact with both sides of the Bay. Even so, a primary shift is signaled in the 19th century with the rise of non-regal sites of exchange and interaction; especially in Lanka, where the discourse of global Buddhism transformed into the language of 'reform'.

Such transitions are to be found in the history of Islam too, and there is a burgeoning literature on that subject that takes some of its cues from the encounter with a Christian and colonizing West. In this sense Anne Hansen's paper on Khmer conceptions of religion was salutary, given that 'Indianised' Cambodia was never really the site of a Christian encounter. Rather some of its elite monks engaged with Orientalist thinking about the history of Buddhism, causing them to reimagine India as a historical rather than mythological place whose bequeathing of a world religion would play into their own nationalist thinking of Khmer superiority.

One of the reasons for Cambodia's lack of engagement with a Christian challenge reflects its modern isolation from the web of coastal capitals that served the European empire by the late 19th century. And it was to these capitals that many sojourners and settlers came from the near west, though not always

by *ulamā*, and diplomas obtained from state institutes of higher Islamic learning. David Kloos, in his paper on female *ulamā* in the Indonesian province of Aceh further strengthened the image of female religious leaders navigating a multitude of social and political contexts, while underlining the importance of female agency as a determinant of their success (or failure) in achieving their goals.

A conspicuous new dynamic concerns the rising middle class and its impact on the creation of and experimentation with new forms of female Islamic authority. In Singapore, religious courses inspired by American self-help rhetoric and Sufi theology, directed especially at (relatively wealthy) female Malay Muslim audiences, constitute a significant growth market. Nurhaizatul Jamil analysed the complex relationship between modern technology (particularly social media), Muslim minority anxieties, and the specific constraints placed by the Singaporean state on pedagogical spaces and the innovative roles played by young female religious teacher-cum-entrepreneurs. A very different – and rather paradoxical – effect of the upward mobility of (middle class) Muslim women was observed by Claire-Marie Hefner in her research on a cadre school of Muhammadiyah,

the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia. While Muhammadiyah has invested in the training of female preachers and leaders for several decades, Hefner pointed out a major drawback to the success of the movement, as students increasingly seem to aspire (more prestigious) secular careers.

From these papers it may appear that the emergence of female Islamic authority is exclusively or primarily tied to initiatives of religious, political and economic reform. In reality, the situation is more complex. In Tajikistan, Anna Cieślewska showed how traditional female leaders (*otun*) continue to provide important religious services to local communities, even though reform-minded state and religious institutions have been hostile to their religious interpretations and activities. Daniel Birchok, in his paper on (deceased) female saints in Seunagan, Indonesia, drew attention to the importance of ascribed (rather than achieved) authority. Belonging to a local lineage of *sayyids* (descendants of the Prophet), these women continue to bestow blessings on those Muslims who visit their gravesites and perform prayers and Sufi rituals. Both papers show that there are important continuities at work in the ways in which local communities recognize and incorporate forms of female Islamic authority in their everyday lives.

In general, the workshop demonstrated the strength of ethnographic approaches, as these brought to the fore how female Islamic leaders negotiate the spheres of organized religion, the state, local and (trans)national communities, and the family. In contrast to much of the recent literature, the papers in this workshop explored how local initiatives reinforce, clash with, or otherwise relate to the ways in which (state and religious) institutions enable and constrain various forms of female Islamic authority. As such, they open up space for new questions, analytical frameworks and comparisons that will further develop the study of Islamic authority in general, and female Islamic authority in particular.

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Mirjam Künkler, assistent professor in the Department of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University; senior research fellow at KITLV, winter 2014/2015 (kuenkler@princeton.edu)

Above: *Otuns* (spiritual leaders) participating in the ritual of *bibi mushkul-kushod* ('women solving problems') at the Kalandarkhona shrine, Khujand, Tajikistan.

Left: *Otuns* (spiritual leaders) reading the Quran during the one-year commemoration of a death.

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1   See, for example, Gudrun Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke (eds.) 2006. *Speaking for Islam: Religious Authorities in Muslim Societies,* Brill Academic Publishing; Nikki R. Keddie (ed.) 1972. *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis. Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East since 1500,* Berkeley [with the exception of the chapter by Fernea & Fernea]; Dabashi, H. 1989. *Authority in Islam. From the Rise of Muhammad to the Establishment of the Umayyads,* New Brunswick/London; Humphreys, S. 1991. 'A Cultural Elite. The Role and Status of the Ulama in Islamic Society', *Islamic History. A Framework for Inquiry,* [rev. ed.] Princeton, pp.187-208; Zaman, M.Q. 2002. *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam. Custodians of Change,* Princeton; Hallaq, W.B. 2001. *Authority, Continuity, and Change in Islamic Law,* Cambridge/New York.
2   For example, Masooda Bano and Hilary Kalmbach (eds.) 2012. *Women, leadership and mosques: Changes in contemporary Islamic authority,* Leiden: Brill; See also Juliane Hammer and Riem Spielhaus (eds.) 2013. 'Muslim women and the challenge of authority', *The Muslim World* 103(3):287-431.
3   Our workshop followed four other events with related interest, bringing together different constituencies: a conference of graduate students and junior scholars held at the University of Oxford in 2011, on female religious leadership more generally (including leaders of religious movements, thus not only theological and jurisprudential authorities); a conference comparing advocacy for female religious authority in Islam and Catholicism held at the University of Roehampton, London, in September 2012, bringing together scholars and activists; a graduate student conference on female religious leadership in Islam held at UCSB in March 2013; and a workshop on female religious authority in Shi'ism held at Princeton University in March 2014.
4   See Kalmbach, 'Introduction: Islamic Authority and the Study of Female Religious Leaders', in Bano and Kalmbach (eds.) 2012. *Women, leadership and mosques: Changes in contemporary Islamic authority,* Leiden: Brill, pp.1-27.

willingly. As Teren Sevea showed, a stage by stage examination of genealogies of Muslim saints in Singapore, Batavia and Perak shows how men remembered today as pious Arabs were in some cases Tamil or even Gujarati convicts (known locally as 'Klings') banished to the colonial periphery where they served mixed constituencies of Malays, Indians and even Chinese. Equally engaging in the narratives of their service and sanctity are the tales of their subverting the political order and even being the true authorities of, and guarantors of safety in, the colonial matrix.

Then again, as Pritipuspa Mishra (University of Southampton) argues, we should also remember the some such 'Kling' travelers wanted to replace local memories of bonded labor with the ancestral pride of having been bringers of civilization to such far-flung (and seemingly abstract) places as Bali. Was Kalinga not the name of the great kingdom of Orissa whose conquest had caused the great Ashoka to convert to Buddhism in the 3rd century BCE? Certainly many Oriya literati cast themselves in the 1930s as historical masters of the sea, for it should not be forgotten that India's nationalists were not yet settled on the colonial idea of Mother India as a network of village societies.

Contextualized against the backdrop of Sunil Amrith's (University of London) mapping of the vicissitudes of Tamil migrants in the 1920s and 1930s (when movement became foreclosed and ideas of diaspora were firmly planted) a strikingly similar narrative emerges in Nira Wickramasinghe's (Leiden University) paper on citizenship in colonial Lanka. For it was at this time that British authorities set the parameters for the ways in which Lankan nationalists would conceive of a place for acceptable Indians, not in the electoral process, but rather in an idealized and decidedly northern past that had brought 'true' religion to the resplendent isle where it could later be reformed and perfected.

Nor were such ideas and ideals to be confined to Lanka. Spurred by the attentions of the Theosophical movement, Lanka's renaissance man, Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-1933), would play a key role in shaping global appreciations of

Buddhism as a 'world religion' whose classical traces were to be found as far away as distant Java. And if Java lacked a Dharmapala, Marieke Bloembergen (KITLV) showed how its monuments, crowned by the Borobudur, could be made to bear witness to a greater Indian past in the minds of Orientalists, their elite informants, or yet rising nationalists.

Naturally there was a lingering tension about just what constituted local genius versus 'foreign' grace, a tension made all the starker in very late colonial contexts like neighboring Malaysia, which was the site of the contributions of David Henley (Leiden University) and Bhavani Raman (Princeton University). Examining the exclusionary discourse of Mahathir Mohamad, Henley was able to point to the enduring legacy of eugenic notions that seem entirely contradictory at first blush. How was it that the Malays were to be celebrated as true sons of the soil to be kept separate from 'industrious' Chinese and pliant Indians even as theories regarding origins and endurance were framed in terms of ancient moments of cultural invasion and admixture? In a way, the answer is to be found in Britain's own myths of origin, invasion and counter-invasion, though as Henley noted, the history of eugenic thinking in Malaysia is yet to be told fully.

Similarly deserving of recounting is the momentous first International Tamil Studies Conference of 1966. This was held not in Southern India, but rather in Malaysia and imprinted by thinkers and activists moving across the Bay both under and then beyond the auspices of British Imperialism. Indeed a key player in Raman's story, the Catholic priest Xavier Thaninayagam (1913-1980), is someone whose trajectory embodies the intertwined strands of southern Asian history linking notions of globalizing religion, historical imagination of culture and prowess, and yet a desire for recognition that need not necessarily be framed as nationalism or yet cultural imperialism.

Much of Raman's paper and the ensuing discussions brought us back to very slippery notions of belonging and the claiming of social rights, though we were also forced to remember that

there were many moments of excitement and hope in the 1960s that were not all predicated on nationalism and in which countries like India, Ceylon and Malaysia were viewed as future partners.

Of course, the story that did unfold thereafter was not one of harmonious collaboration, but rather of exclusivist claiming of places for imagined nations. In this sense, Clare Anderson's (University of Leicester) revisiting of the Andaman Islands highlighted many of the tensions found around the Bay of Bengal by pointing to their seeming absence at the former convict colony where boundaries of caste and even faith have been effaced or surmounted. That said, one might point to the writings of key prisoners like Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883-1966), who popularized exclusivist notions of Hindutva even as he wrote in Urdu, and Anderson has much to say too of the Muslim graves being studiously rediscovered and reinterpreted on the islands today. This very facet of remem-oration was also central to Laffan's (Princeton University) concerns in questioning the creation and recasting of the 'Malay' community of Cape Town whose saints have become the poles of attraction for local 'Indian' Muslims and Indonesian presidents alike.

In short the intertwined papers on mobility, the place of India, and the overlapping domains of Buddhism and Islam gave us pause for thought about a region not so much to be made the discrete object of scholarly colonization, but rather of a space whose interwoven histories offer an excellent critique of current Area Studies divides and real teaching potential if published in the future. Beyond this, too, we feel that we have made a real inroad into Indian Ocean history without romanticizing the space as a Muslim lake prior to colonialism. With such enthusiasm in mind, we are now approaching academic presses and considering ways to bring the papers into yet closer alignment and awaiting further findings from our subsequent workshop in Leiden this coming Summer.

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IIAS Reports *continued*

Re-examining the 'Subaltern'
Workshop in Mumbai, 10-11 December 2014

Paul Rabé

Above: Scene from the public program. Photo Paul Rabé.

ON 10-11 DECEMBER 2014, the Studio-X space of the Columbia University Global Center in the Fort area of Mumbai was the setting for a workshop entitled *Urban Democracy: Informality, Precarity and Modes of Survival.* This was the second in a series of discussions in the Idea of the City in Asian Contexts series, the urban studies oriented forum of the Rethinking Asian Studies in a Global Context programme, coordinated by IIAS with support from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation (www.rethinking.asia). The first workshop in the series, *Public City, Private City,* was held in New York in August 2014 and explored the politics of planning.

As in New York, the Mumbai workshop brought together a diverse group of around 25 scholars, activists, writers, architects, urban planners, journalists and PhD candidates – this time from around India, other parts of Asia, the U.S. and Europe. The objective in Mumbai was to critically re-examine theories and policies relating to the subaltern city, i.e., the practices of survival, persistence and illegitimized existence found in the so-called 'slums' and 'ghettos' of colonial and late capitalist modernity, in order to find new ways of looking at these phenomena.

The co-conveners, Anupama Rao (Associate Professor in the Department of History at Barnard College, Columbia University) and Paul Rabé (Coordinator of the Urban Knowledge Network Asia at IIAS), were interested in how historical legacies of planning, spatial segregation and informality in Asian cities and beyond have enabled practices of urban life that challenge the aesthetics of modernism and the logic of private property. 'Slums' and 'ghettos' have been a refuge for disposable populations, including internally displaced persons, refugees, illegal immigrants – as well as the poor. But they are also sites of improvised and tenuous forms of sociality and social cooperation, political actions and claims – arguably forms of informal 'democracy' – which either go unrecognized or become stigmatized as violence, crime, or unproductive and fruitless 'mob' behavior. Encroachment, illegality, and the resort to informal livelihoods are sites of subaltern survival, and define struggles for recognition in the face of spatial exclusion and civic disenfranchisement.

Discussions in the Studio-X space centered on four session topics relating to various aspects of the subaltern city:

1. 'Between the formal and the informal', touching on regulations, policy and planning, land grabs and urban dispossession.
2. 'Conceiving and intervening in the slum', covering approaches to the 'slum' by governments, donor agencies, civil society and market players; notions of power and identity; and collective action versus individual market opportunism.
3. 'Segregation and ghettoization', examining how categories of social difference such as migrants, caste, religion and gender are used to produce social and spatial separation.
4. 'Housing and right to the city struggles', touching on cultural and activist interventions on behalf of precarious and un-housed populations, emerging sites of 'infrapolitics,' and experiments in utilizing public-private partnerships for spatial justice.

The workshop ended with a reception and a public programme moderated by Jared Stark (Associate Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Eckerd College) and featuring artistic interventions by literary theorist Emily Sun from National Tsing Hua University (Taiwan), Mumbai-based documentary filmmaker Anand Patwardhan and writer and cultural critic Jerry Pinto.

The third and last of the urban workshops to be convened by Paul Rabé and Anupama Rao in the context of the *Rethinking Asian Studies* programme will take place in Shanghai in October 2015 on the theme of the 'Future of Urban Studies'. The co-conveners will close the workshop series with a presentation of the discussion themes from all three workshops.

Paul Rabé, IIAS, coordinator of the Urban Knowledge Network Asia (UKNA) (paulrabe@gmail.com)

University of Amsterdam hosts the 4th edition of the Sri Lanka Roundtable

Joeri Scholtens (UvA) & Maarten Bavinck (UvA)

ON 11-12 DECEMBER 2014, the Amsterdam Institute of Social Science Research (AISSR) hosted the fourth edition of the 'Sri Lanka Roundtable', gathering scholars from all corners of Europe and abroad. Following the tradition set by Utrecht University (2009), Zurich University (2011) and London School of Economics (2013), it brought together a wide range of social science scholarship on the history, social and economic organisation, and the culture of the country formerly known as Ceylon. The next Sri Lanka Roundtable is planned at the University of Edinburgh, early 2016.

With 55 participants from Europe, Sri Lanka and the US, the roundtable proved an excellent opportunity to provide an overview of social science research on contemporary Sri Lanka, as presented by a mix of graduate students and senior researchers. With the civil war coming to an end five years ago, much attention was devoted to understanding and defining the nature of 'post-war' Sri Lanka and the troubled post-war reconstruction process. Other themes included the rise of Buddhist extremism, caste and kinship, fisheries livelihoods, the executive presidency and the position of civil society in contemporary Sri Lanka.

The opportunity was also used to launch two new fascinating books on Sri Lanka. The first book, Checkpoint, Temple, Church and Mosque, A Collaborative Ethnography of War and Peace, is co-authored by Jonathan Goodhand, Jonathan Spencer, Shahul Hasbullah, Bart Klem, Benedikt Korf and Kalinga Tudor Silva. The book consists of rich ethnographies in eastern Sri Lanka during the last phase of the war and provokes new debate about the role of religious organisations and leaders in situations of extreme conflict. The second book, Of Tamils and Tigers: a journey through Sri Lanka's war years, part II, is based on the diaries of the Dutch Missionary Ben Bavinck (1924-2012), who spent a major part of his life in the war zone. A historical record of our times, Ben Bavinck's diaries "record with humor and compassion the defiance and spirit in many of the ordinary people who stood up to the Tigers and the State." The book was edited by Maithreyi Rajeshkumar of the Rajini Thiranagama Foundation. Part I, which covered the years 1989 to 1994, was published in 2011. Part II deals with the period 1994 to 2004.

The Sri Lanka roundtable was hosted by the Governance and Inclusive Development (GID) programme group at the University of Amsterdam. The University of Zurich, the CERES research school, the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) and the REINCORPFISH research project provided additional support.

A multi-disciplinary approach to analyzing climate change in Yangon

Report of training course given in Yangon, 3-14 November 2014

Paul Rabé

FROM 3-14 NOVEMBER 2014, a team with members from IIAS, the UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education (Delft, the Netherlands), and the Yangon City Development Committee (YCDC), jointly organized a tailor-made training course in Yangon to better understand the consequences of climate change (particularly flooding) for planning and the built environment in Yangon, Myanmar. The course was supported by a grant from the Netherlands Organisation for International Cooperation in Higher Education (NUFFIC).

The training course was designed for planning officials from YCDC, the municipal government of Yangon. Half of the 26 course participants were from YCDC itself; the other half were from the YCDC's development partners, including the Department for Human Settlements and Housing, the Department of Public Works, the Yangon Heritage Trust, and the Yangon Technical University. The international lecturers included Paul Rabé, Coordinator at IIAS of the *Urban Knowledge Network Asia* (UKNA), Cornelis Dijkgraaf from *Assistance in Management* in the Netherlands, Kittima Leeruttanawisut from *Assistance in Management* in Thailand, Professor Chris Zevenbergen of the *Flood Resilience Group* at UNESCO-IHE, and Budhi Setiawan of BAPPENAS in Indonesia. On the YCDC side, the course was coordinated by Dr Toe Aung, Director of the Urban Planning Division.

Above: Course participants pose for a group photo in Dala Township. Photograph: Paul Rabé

The centrepiece of the course was a 'quick scan' exercise, which helped participants to identify, rate, and protect critical infrastructure assets that may be at risk from flooding. These include both economic infrastructure, for example roads, power stations and markets, as well as social infrastructure, including schools, hospitals and heritage buildings – such as pagodas and historic shop houses.

The course provided an opportunity for some hands-on learning. The participants divided up into three groups, each of which focused on a different township in Yangon with distinct flooding challenges. In each township the course participants canvassed the area and met residents and other stakeholders in their efforts to compile information as a basis for their final output in the course: a flood risk analysis plan for the township. The three townships were as follows:

1. Latha Township is a small but highly densely populated inner city historical district, situated beside the Yangon River and thus at risk of flooding when the river exceeds its banks. Critical infrastructure here includes highways, part of the port, a major city hospital, historical buildings, houses, shrines and businesses in the Chinatown area.
2. Mingala Taung Nyunt Township is an inner city suburban residential area with a rapidly growing population. Flooding in this area is common because of the township's low-lying location between Kandawgyi Lake and the Yangon and Bago Rivers. Criticial infrastructure in this case includes roads, canals, markets, many religious shrines, and large housing estates.
3. Dala Township is a large but low-density area south of the Yangon River that is not yet connected to the city by bridge. As a result, the township maintains a largely agricultural economy. Flooding in this township is pervasive due its low-lying location beside the river. Villagers have largely learned to live with regular flooding, yet new development is vulnerable to flooding. In this township the critical infrastructure includes canals, roads, power stations, villages and large expanses of agricultural land.

The three groups of participants presented their flood risk analyses and plans at a major ceremony at Yangon City Hall on 14 November 2014. The ceremony was presided over by the Mayor of the Yangon City Development Committee, H.E. U Hla Myint, and was attended by representatives of various municipal departments, national environmental agencies, and academic institutions. One of the remarkable legacies of the tailor-made course is that it demonstrated the importance of a multi-disciplinary perspective in analyzing the causes and impacts of flooding and climate change, including the natural sciences, engineering, the social sciences, as well as the humanities. Thus, the history and ways of life of riverside communities in the three townships featured as prominently in the final flood risk plans of the participants as the analysis of tidal patterns of the Yangon River and the feasibility of engineering solutions and awareness-raising programs for the townships.

Announcements

Leiden University unveils plans for The Asian Library

Sandra Dehue

IN OCTOBER 2014, Leiden University unveiled plans for a new Asian Library scheduled to open its doors in 2017. On 23 January 2015, IIAS signed a cooperation agreement with the Leiden University Libraries, stipulating that The Asian Library will sponsor the next three editions of the ICAS Book Prize (IBP). In return, ICAS will donate to The Asian Library the books collected during the previous five and the upcoming edition of the IBP (see pages 40-41).

The Asian Library will not only house various existing and world-renowned Asian collections, it will also be a focal point for study, research and encounters between people with a profound interest in Asia, and its position in the world. Advanced plans exist to make its collections widely available through intensive digitisation programmes and the inclusion of born-digital information.

Leiden, in the Netherlands, is a major international knowledge hub on Asia. Dutch relations with Asia go back more than 400 years, and Leiden University has from its origin in 1574, concentrated on the cultures and societies of 'the Orient'. This is reflected in the many unique and important collections that found their way to the university libraries and other institutes, such as the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV). The Asian Library will bring together these and other collections, adding up to a staggering 30.5 kilometres in length. While plans are to house any low-use non-Asian materials from the collections in a book depository in the vicinity, the heart of the project is The Asian Library, which will be built *on top* of the existing University Library. This top extension will create a space for researchers, students and visitors to meet, study and do research, offering state-of-the-art library facilities, including collaborative facilities for scholars and students and a media centre.

The Asian Library will bring together the following collections:
1 Leiden University Libraries' notable Southeast Asian Collections;
2 The internationally acclaimed collections of the Sinological Institute Library, one of the leading libraries for Chinese Studies in the Western world (now part of Leiden's East Asian Library);
3 The rich collection of the Centre for Japanese and Korean Studies (now part of Leiden's East Asian Library);
4 The Kern Institute Library, the national centre of expertise for South Asia and the Himalayan region, more specifically India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Tibet, Nepal, and Bhutan. The collection is among the largest in Europe;
5 The colonial collection of the former Library of the Royal Tropical Institute (KIT);
6 The collection of the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV).

The Asian collection will be immediately available on-site through digital access, an open-stack collection and through fast delivery of the Asian collections stored on-site. But the plans don't stop here. Among the further ambitions and plans for The Asian Library is the establishment of an international fellowship programme, the creation of an *Indonesian Digital Library,* and named curatorship for digital collections.

The Indonesian Digital Library will bring together the extensive digital collections on Indonesia of Leiden University Libraries, the Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) and the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV). It will also intensify the digitisation of other Indonesian materials. This Indonesian Digital Library is to be made available to a worldwide audience and will allow for scholarly research using the latest e-science and digital humanities techniques. It will also collect and incorporate born-digital materials.

To expand the already present in-depth subject expertise into new exciting areas that are rapidly becoming of the utmost importance, The University Library is seeking funds to establish an endowed and named curatorship for the digitised and born-digital Asian collections. The curatorship of these collections will ensure their availability to the general public worldwide, their usability for advanced digital humanities techniques such as image recognition, text and data mining and their long-term durability.

For more information visit: www.asianlibraryleiden.nl

Visual: Yucon Amsterdam
Design: Katja Hogenboom Studio with FELSCH architecten

IIAS Annual Lecture 2015

Life and Death in Asia and Africa – Amartya Kumar Sen Laureate of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, 1998

Tuesday, 10 March, 15.30 hrs. De Rode Hoed, Keizersgracht 102, Amsterdam

IIAS
International Institute for Asian Studies

THE ANNUAL LECTURE 2015 of the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS; Leiden) will be delivered by the renowned Indian economist and philosopher, Professor Amartya Sen. His lecture will focus on the morbidity and mortality rates that remain exceptionally high, both in Africa and parts of Asia. The explanation lies partly in the absence of epidemiological interventions, but also in the defective way public healthcare is organised. There are, however, exceptions from which other countries can learn. Thailand, China, Rwanda, Bangladesh and the Indian state of Kerala provide lessons of different kinds of relevance. Life and death depend not only on human predicaments beyond our control, but also on policy wisdom.

Professor Amartya Kumar Sen was the 1998 winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, for his work in welfare economics. Professor Sen has made contributions to welfare economics, social choice theory, economic and social justice, theories of famines, measurement and evaluation of well-being and freedom, and moral, political and legal philosophy. Professor Sen is the Thomas W. Lamont University Professor and Professor of Economics and Philosophy at Harvard University. Until 2004 he was Master of Trinity College, Cambridge. Amartya Sen's awards, other than the Nobel Prize, include Bharat Ratna (India), Commandeur de la Légion d'Honneur (France), the National Humanities Medal (USA),

Ordem do Merito Cientifico (Brazil), Honorary Companion of Honour (UK), Aztec Eagle (Mexico), the George Marshall Award (USA), the Eisenhower Medal (USA), and the Edinburgh Medal (UK).

This lecture, which discusses developments in both Africa and Asia, coincides with new initiatives taken by the International Institute for Asian Studies in the field of African-Asian interactions, including the organization (in collaboration with the African Association for Asian Studies), of a large international conference on the subject of 'Asian Studies in Africa: Challenges and Prospects of a New Axis of Intellectual Interactions', which will take place from 24-26 September 2015 in Accra, Ghana.

Programme
15.30: Welcome by Dr Philippe Peycam, Director International Institute for Asian Studies
15.45: Lecture by Prof. Amartya Sen, 'Life and Death in Asia and Africa'
16.45: Questions and Answers
17.15-18.30: Drinks reception

Registration
The number of places is limited, and registration beforehand is required. Please register via the web form provided at the following url:

www.iias.nl/event/life-and-death-asia-and-africa

Amartya Kumar

3 Calls for Papers

Burma/Myanmar in transition: connectivity, changes and challenges

Conference, Chiang Mai, 24-25 July 2015
Deadline for proposals: 15 April 2015

The 1st International Conference on Burma/Myanmar Studies will be co-hosted by the Center for ASEAN Studies (CAS), Chiang Mai University, the Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development (RCSD): Myanmar Center, the Faculty of Humanities at Chiang Mai University and the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) in Leiden, the Netherlands. The conference will provide a forum for scholars, journalists, NGO workers and observers from Burma/Myanmar, Thailand and other countries across the globe to share the latest updates on Burma/Myanmar Studies.

The aims of the conference are: to deepen our understanding of the social and political transformations occurring in Burma /Myanmar, and their impacts on the environment as well as on the economic and social lives of local/ethnic communities; to examine Burma/Myanmar's nexus and connectivity within the regional and global context, as well as the internal interplay taking place among state actors, society and culture; to provide a platform for the exchange of academic ideas and dialogue among Burma/Myanmar scholars from around the world; to allow young and mid-level scholars/researchers to participate in an international academic forum.

For the full call for papers, visit: http://rcsd.soc.cmu.ac.th

Language, power and identity in Asia: creating & crossing language boundaries

Conference, National Museum of Antiquities, Leiden, 14-16 March 2016
Deadline for proposals: 15 May 2015

The International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) is hosting, in collaboration with LeidenGlobal and the Language Museum (Leiden), an international conference to explore the interrelations between language, power and identity in Asia. Participants are invited to submit a paper to address aspects of this topic, with a particular emphasis on Asia, but papers that illustrate the subject from other parts of the world are also welcome.

This conference explores how linguistic differences, practices, texts and performances are of critical importance to political, social and intellectual power structures among communities in the past and in the present, especially through processes of identity formation. How do (and how did) languages shape borders – social, ethnic, religious, or 'national'? Likewise, how do languages and linguistic communities move across these limits? In what ways do processes of hybridisation and multilingualism affect the formation of transnational or translocal identities, and how have they done so in the past? How have policies of language standardisation impacted on the political and intellectual spheres? What is the power of orality and performance vis-à-vis a variety of textual productions, through manuscript culture, epigraphical practices, print media, and the Internet?
For the full call for papers, visit: www.iias.nl/language

Sharpening the edges: instating state & power in Indian Ocean history. An agenda for critical research & teaching.

Workshop, 17 August 2015, Leiden, the Netherlands
Deadline for papers: 15 March 2015

A workshop funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and enabled by the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS). This workshop will bring together a group of fifteen scholars, some invited and others selected through this call for papers, to discuss the state of research and teaching in the burgeoning field of Indian Ocean history. For historical reasons linked to former colonial empires and continued relations between them and their erstwhile colonies, interest in the Indian Ocean is more visible in the fields of teaching and research in institutions in Europe and Asia rather than in the USA. In keeping with the overall Mellon programme, *Rethinking Asian Studies in a Global Context,* the workshop aims to triangulate a dialogue between Euro-American and South and Southeast Asian scholars. We especially welcome PhD students, postdocs and early career professors to apply with papers that reflect upon the spatial shifts visible in imperial and area studies with the purpose of developing approaches in teaching and research on the Indian Ocean.
For the full call for papers, visit: www.rethinking.asia

Gwen Bennett

The Alumnus

Gwen Bennett is an assistant professor in the departments of East Asian Studies and Anthropology at McGill University, Canada, where she was hired to start a program in East Asian historical archaeology. She has studied, worked, and done research in China for many years, and is currently Principal Investigator of the 'Khitan-Liao Archaeologial Survey and History Project' (KLASH) in southeastern Inner Mongolia, which looks at the rise of the Liao Empire by integrating new data from archaeological fieldwork with historical data; and the 'Chengdu Plains Archaeological Survey Project' (CPAS) in Sichuan, which has finished fieldwork and is now in the writing up stage. She is also the Co-Principal Investigator and Director of Fieldwork for the 'Understanding Cities in the Premodern History of Northeast Asia (c. 200-1200) Project', being done in tandem with KLASH and which uses geophysical methods to examine the three walled Liao period settlements in the project area.

I GOT OFF THE PLANE AT AMSTERDAM one Sunday morning in early September 2012 to take up my fellowship at IIAS and found when I arrived in Leiden that, serendipitously, I had arrived in the city on Open Monuments Day. Once a year on this day, the Netherlands' historic buildings are open to visitors, and all of its museums are free. I had to wait until Monday to meet everyone at IIAS, but even before then, in just one short day, I fell in love with Leiden. I wandered the city's maze of streets and went into all the historic buildings that I could; and I was enjoying the day so much that I didn't even notice my jet lag until I dragged myself back to my B&B and hurled myself into bed, exhausted but entranced with the city where I was to spend the next seven months.

On the next day, I went to IIAS on the Rapenburg to get the keys to my lodgings, and found I was to live in a newly converted historic hospital building that also housed several other IIAS fellows. My room overlooked Middelstegracht, a lazy residential street that must have once been a narrow canal but was now filled in. The room itself was high ceilinged with a wall of tall arched windows overlooking a courtyard and fitted out with brightly colored Ikea furniture, and, what the IIAS fellows living in this building soon came to call 'the cube': an ingenious plastic modular unit that provided modern facilities for each room in an old building that lacked them.

My days in Leiden were often spent reading at home in the mornings while I waited for the rain to pass, coming in to IIAS to eat lunch with the other fellows, and then working for the afternoon at the desk I had on the third floor facing the Rapenburg. On my tea breaks, I enjoyed exploring the Institute's historic building as much as I did those on Open Monuments Day. Many adaptations have been made to modernize it, but the building still had many interesting features to discover, such as when a trip to the attic revealed the resemblance between the roof's wooden beams with those of a ship's hull. Since the Netherlands had been a country of shipbuilders, this construction had a certain logic.

Exploring Leiden's history by roaming its streets provided me with numerous enjoyable respites from the book project that was my motivation for being there. I am examining how the past is interpreted and presented in Chinese museums, and I came to this subject because I am an archaeologist who works in China. In my work, the objects that I find are almost always broken. This is not unexpected; the material remains of the past societies who lived in the region that has now become China are hidden beneath the ground's surface, sometimes for many millennia before they come to light by a farmer's plow, or economic development, or even through the annual freeze-thaw cycle that eventually heaves them up to the surface. Once there, they can lie in a farmer's field for many more years before an archaeologist might discover them. Many of the remains that archaeological survey, the type of archaeology that I do, provides for study are the broken remnants of pottery and porcelain vessels. To understand how they once might have appeared, I spend a lot of time in museums looking at examples of complete vessels, fitting together in my mind's eye the jigsaw puzzle of fragments that I've collected into the

cooking, storage and drinking vessels that they once were. Because I have been doing archaeological survey in China since 1995, I have spent a lot of time in museums. Sometime during all those visits, I realized that I was doing more than seeking archaeological exemplars; I was also analyzing the museums themselves and the messages about the past that they were conveying to their visitors.

Inner Mongolia, the autonomous region (equivalent to a province) where I work; and Liaoning, the neighboring province where I lived for several years in the 1980s, are home to a particular Neolithic culture that is being presented in the region's museums as having direct historical continuity, from the Neolithic past 5-6,000 years ago to the Chinese present. This society built large mounded stone tombs for their leaders that can be filled with extraordinary jade carvings, and the remains of structures have been found that contain human shaped pottery statuary. The fascinating claims surrounding these remains are intimately tied to how these two regions present themselves in the context of the present-day Peoples Republic of China, and form the basis for my writing, which incorporates ideas from theoretical work on museums, memory, identity formation, and nationalism. The Leiden University Library was an excellent resource for books on these ideas, and the opportunity to present my work at IIAS' monthly noontime talks was also very valuable because of the audience's insightful questions and suggestions.

As I look back now, my time at IIAS was intellectually stimulating beyond my expectations. Much of this was due to a rich and diverse cohort of scholars at IIAS and the University who were working on fascinating projects themselves, and who were equally willing to explore ideas and learn from each other as I was. We often talked about each other's research at the Institute, but probably spent as much time doing it at the many dinners we shared with each other. Cooking became an international affair with shopping trips in Leiden and beyond to find the spices and foodstuffs to make Chinese, Indian, Japanese, Korean, Italian, and Austrian dishes to be served to friends, all paired with wine to make the thoughts flow, of course! These close interactions with colleagues over desks at the institute or over dinners gave me fresh perspectives on my own work and the chance to learn about areas of the world and areas of study I had not yet had exposure to. I came to Leiden to study China, but ended up learning just as much about India and Indology from my friends and their projects.

I came to IIAS under its Asian Heritage research cluster, and the many activities that the Institute and University held around this theme meant that there was always something to attend. Some of the most interesting events were the roundtable discussions held by the Leiden Initiative on North Korea, organized by Prof. Remco Breuker. Experts from many venues and perspectives, which refreshingly included several non-academic professionals with deep experience in Korea, took this opportunity to strategize on how to make North Korea more visible both in and outside of the academy. I was also able to attend a five day intensive course for graduate students on Korea organized by Prof. Breuker and Dr. Koen

De Ceuster of Leiden University. This workshop had as its theme, *Margins and marginalization in the production of Korean histories*, with the goal of examining the margins of Korean history from different theoretical, methodological, geographical, political, or social perspectives. As the only archaeologist, and the only presenter to work outside the present day boundaries of the Korean states, I talked about the Liaoning Provincial Museum's use of material culture to present the PRC's perspective on events and entities in this border region, including the early Han Dynasty commanderies and the Koguryo and the Balhae Kingdoms. This workshop also included a visit to the University's Bibliotheca Thysiana, where we were introduced to its architecture and collections, and had the rare opportunity to very closely examine several of the rare books in its collection. Meetings with Dr. Ilona Bausch, the University's archaeologist of Japan, were also always very thought-provoking, and we always enjoyed 'talking shop' together.

One of the most enjoyable events I attended was the 1st annual UKNA roundtable on urban heritage policies held in November at TU in Delft. Many fascinating presentations by Dutch and Chinese experts were made that critically compared and contrasted planning approaches to heritage in the Netherlands and Western Europe with experiences in Asian cities. The highlight of the workshop was the walking tour around Delft with these experts during which they told us about the buildings and projects that we were seeing, and the history or considerations behind them. What I learned about Dutch history and architecture during this short two hour walk helped me to better appreciate the urban forms and architecture that I saw on all my other day trips to other cities in the Netherlands.

I left IIAS at the beginning of March 2013 as the tulip fields were starting to color the landscape. I am back in Montreal at McGill University, but I keep in touch with the friends I made at the Institute and in Leiden, and I visit when I can. It was with great anticipation that I returned to take part in IIAS's November 2013 'Patterns of Early Asian Urbanism' conference where I spoke about urbanism on the steppe and medieval period Liao urban centers, and where I was able to meet friends from the Institute and University again. I was also able to visit with the IIAS staff that attended the AAS meetings in Philadelphia in 2014, and even got to man the booth to hand out their cloth bags and information!

This past September, as I attended the 2014 Association of European Archaeology meetings in Istanbul, I was able to re-experience the Netherlands' Open Monuments Day – while passing the Dutch Embassy on Istiklal Street I saw the 'Open Monuments' banner flying over its gate and knowing what it meant, I lined up for a guided visit and had one hour back on Netherlands territory as we explored the nooks and crags of this historic building. One hour in the Netherlands is not long enough for anyone, and I am fondly looking forward to my next visit!

Gwen Bennett, Assistant professor in the departments of East Asian Studies and Anthropology at McGill University, Canada. (gwen.bennett@mcgill.ca)

IIAS research and projects

IIAS research and other initiatives are carried out within a number of thematic clusters in phase with contemporary Asian currents – all built around the notion of social agency. The aim of this approach is to cultivate synergies and coherence between people and projects. IIAS also welcomes research for the open cluster, so as not to exclude potentially significant and interesting topics. Visit www.iias.nl for more information.

Global Asia

THE GLOBAL ASIA CLUSTER addresses contemporary issues related to trans-national interactions within the Asian region as well as Asia's projection into the world, through the movement of goods, people, ideas, knowledge, ideologies and so forth. Past and present trends are addressed. The cluster aims to expand the understanding of the processes of globalisation by considering the various ways Asian and other world regions are interconnected within a long-term historical framework. Acknowledging the central role of Asia as an agent of global transformations, it challenges western perspectives that underlie much of the current literature on the subject and explores new forms of non-hegemonic intellectual interactions in the form of 'south-south-north' and 'east-west' dialogue models. In principle, any research dealing with Asian global interactions is of interest.

Asian Borderlands Research Network (www.asianborderlands.net)
The Asian Borderlands Research Network focuses particularly on the border regions between South Asia, Central/East and Southeast Asia. The concerns of the ABRN are varied, ranging from migratory movements, transformations in cultural, linguistic and religious practices, to ethnic mobilization and conflict, marginalisation, and environmental concerns. The ABRN organises a conference in one of these border regions every two years in co-operation with a local partner.
Coordinator: Eric de Maaker (maaker@fsw.leidenuniv.nl)

Energy Programme Asia (EPA)
The EPA-research programme is designed to study the effects of global geopolitics of energy security on the one hand, and policy to increase energy efficiency and estimating the prospects for the exploitation of renewable energy resources on the other. EPA's current and second joint comparative research programme with the Institute of West Asian and African Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences is entitled *The Transnationalization of China's Oil Industry: company strategies, embedded projects, and relations with institutions and stakeholders in resource-rich countries (2013-2017)*. Involving various Chinese and Dutch research institutes, this programme will analyse China's increasing involvement with governments, local institutions and local stakeholders in the energy sectors of a number of resource-rich countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, notably Sudan, Ghana, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Venezuela, and Brazil. It seeks to determine patterns of interaction between national institutions and Chinese companies, their relationships to foreign investment projects, and the extent to which they are embedded in the local economies. This programme is sponsored by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Social Sciences (KNAW), the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and IIAS.
**Coordinators: M. Amineh, Programme Director EPA-IIAS
(m.p.amineh@uva.nl or m.p.amineh@iias.nl),
Y. Guang, Progamme Director EPA-IWAAS/CASS
www.iias.nl/research/energy-programme-asia-epa**

IIAS Centre for Regulation and Governance
The IIAS Centre for Regulation and Governance in Asia, is engaged in innovative and comparative research on theories and practices – focusing on emerging markets of Asia. Its multi-disciplinary research undertakings combine approaches from political economy, law, public administration, criminology, and sociology in the comparative analysis of regulatory issues in Asia and in developing theories of governance pertinent to Asian realities. Currently the research projects fall within the following interlocking areas: State licensing, market closure, and rent seeking; Regulation of intra-governmental conflicts; State restructuring and rescaling; and Regulatory governance under institutional voids.
Coordinator: Tak-Wing Ngo (t.w.ngo@hum.leidenuniv.nl)

Asian Studies in Africa
Since 2010, IIAS and other partners from Africa, Asia and the USA have been working on an initiative to promote the study of and teaching on Asia at African universities and, equally, to promote African studies in Asia. The initiative constitutes a first attempt to sustain a humanities-informed South-South knowledge platform with connections between other academic centers in Europe and North America, but also Latin-America and Oceania.
In 2012, a roundtable in Chisamba, Zambia, led to the establishment of the pan-African 'Association of Asian Studies in Africa' (A-ASIA). A-ASIA's development is headed by a steering committee of scholars, mainly from Africa and Asia. A-ASIA's inaugural conference will take place from 24-26 Sept 2015 in Accra, Ghana, under the title: 'Asian Studies in Africa: The Challenges and Prospects of a New Axis of Intellectual Interactions'. It will be the first conference held in Africa that will bring together a multidisciplinary ensemble of scholars and institutions from the continent and the rest of the world with a shared focus on Asia and Asia-Africa intellectual interactions.
More information: www.africas.asia

Asian Cities

WITH A SPECIAL EYE on contemporary developments, the Asian Cities cluster aims to explore the longstanding Asian urban "tradition", by exploring the origins of urbanism and urban culture in different parts of Asia and linking the various elements of city cultures and societies, from ancient to modern (colonial and post-colonial) times. Through an international knowledge-network of experts, cities and research institutes it seeks to encourage social scientists and scholars in the humanities to interact with contemporary actors including artists, activists, planners and architects, educators, and policy makers. By bringing together science and practice, IIAS aims to create a platform for scholars and urban practitioners focusing on Asian cities 'in context' and beyond traditional western norms of knowledge.

The Postcolonial Global City
This research programme examines the postcolonial cities of South, East and South-East Asia, and how some of them have made thesuccessful segue from nodes in formerly colonial networks to global cities in their own right. Intended as an interdisciplinary research endeavour, the Postcolonial Global City has brought together not just architects and urbanists, but also people from other disciplines, such as geographers, socio-logists and political scientists, as well as historians, linguists and anyone else involved in the field of Asian studies. A key factor in the research is architectural typology. Architecture is examined to see how it can create identity and ethos and how in the post-colonial era these building typologies have been superseded by the office building, the skyscraper and the shopping centre, all of which are rapidly altering the older urban fabric of the city. The research programme organises a seminar every spring.
Coordinator: Greg Bracken (gregory@cortlever.com)

Urban Knowledge Network Asia (UKNA)
Consisting of over 100 researchers with affiliations at 17 institutes in Europe, China, India and the United States, the Urban Knowledge Network Asia (UKNA) represents the largest global academic network on Asian cities. UKNA's objective is to nurture contextualised and policy-relevant knowledge on Asian cities, seeking to influence policy by contributing insights that put people at the centre of urban governance and development strategies. To this aim, the programme hosts a variety of research projects through the exchange of researchers of the participating institutions, focusing on the three research themes: 1. Ideas of the city; 2. Cities by and for the people; and 3. Future of the cities.
UKNA is funded by a grant awarded by the EU and runs from April 2012 until April 2016. IIAS is the coordinating institute in the network and administrator of the programme.
**For a full list of UKNA Partners please refer to the UKNA website (www.ukna.asia)
Coordinators: Paul Rabé (p.e.rabe@iias.nl)
and Gien San Tan (g.s.tan@iias.nl)**

Asian Heritages

THE ASIAN HERITAGES CLUSTER critically addresses cultural heritage practices in Asia. It explores the notion of heritage as it has evolved from a European-originated concept associated with architecture and monumental archaeology to incorporate a broader diversity of cultural forms and values. This includes the contested distinctions of 'tangible' and 'intangible' heritages, and the importance of cultural heritage in defining one's own identity or identities vis-à-vis those of others. It addresses the variety of definitions associated with heritage and their implications for social agency. It aims to engage with the concepts of 'authenticity', 'national heritage' and 'shared heritage' and issues pertaining to the political economy of heritage. It will critically address the dangers of commodification of perceived endangered local cultures/heritages, languages, religious practices, crafts and art forms, as well as material vernacular heritage.

Graduate Programme in Critical Heritage Studies
Over the last few years, IIAS has been intensively engaged with the Leiden University Institute for Area Studies (LIAS) and targeted Asian partners in the development of a special master's and PhD track in the field of 'Critical Heritage Studies'. The uniqueness of this initiative is that the MA/PhD in Leiden will be combined with a parallel set of courses at a number of Asian universities, allowing for the students to obtain a double (MA and PhD) degree at the end of their training. Students can already opt for the focus on 'Critical Heritage Studies of Asia and Europe' within the Leiden MA in Asian Studies, but can also engage in a Double Degree, offered by Leiden University and one of the Asian partners (currently National Taiwan University in Taipei, Yonsei University in Seoul, and Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta).
The MA heritages focus is supervised by Dr Adèle Esposito (IIAS/LIAS). Prof. Michael Herzfeld (Harvard) is a guest teacher and the Senior Advisor to the Critical Heritage Studies Initiative of IIAS.

Indian Medical Heritage Research Network
The Indian Medical Heritage Research Network wants to stimulate social-cultural and social-historical research on Indian medical traditions such as Ayurveda, Unanitibb, Siddha, Yoga and Sowa Rigpa. Of special interest is the integration of Indian medicine in Indian public health and its role as second resort for middle class Indians and Europeans. The network offers a virtual space on Facebook (www.facebook.com/IndianMedicalHeritage) for collating research findings and other information about India's medical heritage covering diverse perspectives, interests and backgrounds.
Coordinator: Maarten Bode (m.bode@uva.nl)

Rethinking Asian Studies in a Global Context

A research network supported by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation

With the objective of reshaping the field of Asian Studies, the three-year pilot programme (2014-2016) 'Rethinking Asian Studies in a Global Context' seeks to foster new humanities-focused research. In practice, this means adapting Asian Studies to an inter-connected global environment built on a network of academics and practitioners from Asia, the Americas, Europe and Africa. Educational opportunities are created by selecting cross-disciplinary methodological questions likely to shift scholarly paradigms as they pertain to Asia. In the process, the initiative seeks to shape academic communities around new themes of research, emphasising the inclusion of young and aspiring scholars from the four world-regions and beyond.
The initiative is coordinated by IIAS, in collaboration with numerous institutions in Asia, the United States, Europe and Africa, and is funded with a grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation in New York. The pilot programme includes a range of scholarly activities such as workshops, conferences and summer schools in five topical areas, or fora, that cut across regions and disciplines:

1. Artistic Interventions: Histories, Cartographies and Politics in Asia
2. Uses of Culture and Cultural Heritage
3. Asian Spatialities: the Indian Ocean World, Central Eurasia and Southeast Asian Borderlands
4. Idea of the City in Asian Contexts
5. Views of Asia from Africa

**Coordinator: Titia van der Maas (t.van.der.maas@iias.nl)
Website: www.rethinking.asia**

IIAS fellowship programme

Along with the research fellows, who are attached to one of the IIAS research programmes, the Institute yearly hosts a large number of visiting researchers (Affiliated Fellows) who come to Leiden to work on their own individual research project. In addition, IIAS also facilitates the teaching and research by various professorial fellows as part of agreements with Dutch universities, foreign ministries and funding organisations.

CURRENT FELLOWS

Roslina Abu Bakr
*Social interactions in
the Malay Manuscripts*
1 Nov 2014 – 1 Nov 2016

Hajime Akitomi
*The comparative study between the
Netherlands and Japan on employment,
labor and globalization*
1 Apr 2015 – 31 Mar 2016

Mehdi Amineh
Coordinator
'Energy Programme Asia (EPA)'
*Domestic and geopolitical challenges
to energy security for China and
the European Union*
1 Sep 2007 – 31 Mar 2017

Gregory Bracken
Coordinator
'The Postcolonial Global City'
*Colonial-era Shanghai as an
urban model for the 21st century*
1 Sep 2009 – 31 Aug 2015

Hannah Bulloch
*Intimate relationships and the politics
of personhood in the Philippines*
13 Apr – 12 May 2015

Chunhong CHEN
Urban heritage preservation in China
1 Aug 2014 – 31 Jan 2015

Yuehtsen (Juliette) Chung
Visiting Professor, Taiwanese Chair
of Chinese Studies
1 Sep 2014 – 30 Jun 2015

Valerie Gelezeau
*New geographies of urban cultures
in the Korean world – convergence
and divergence*
1 Mar – 31 Dec 2015

Jenna Grant
*Technology, clarity, and uncertainty:
an ethnography of biomedical imaging
in Phnom Penh*
20 Jan 2014 – 30 Sep 2015

Jie GUO
*Spectacular embodiments:
British and Chinese representations
of colonial encounters in the
Yunnan-Burma borderlands, 1880-1945*
1 May – 15 Aug 2015

Mariko Hirose
*A comparative study on social policies
between the Netherlands and Japan*
15 Oct 2014 – 31 Mar 2015

Yike HU
*Quantitative study of the urban
national park, boundary marketing,
design and management*
1 Feb – 30 Nov 2015

Nirajan Kafle
*Critical edition and annotated
translation of the Niśvāsamukha*
1 Sep 2014 – 1 Jan 2015

Pralay Kanungo
Visiting Professor,
India Studies Chair (ICCR)
Indian Politics
1 Sep 2013 – 31 Aug 2015

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*Nomadic imperial urbanization
and movement of people, empires,
and technologies in Mongolian
globalization: View from the Far East*
1 Mar – 31 May 2015

Yongwoo Lee
*Postwar mediascape and the
acoustic modernities in East Asia*
1 Nov 2014 – 31 Oct 2015

Chris Moffat
*Politics, history and the street
in contemporary Pakistan*
1 Aug 2015 – 31 May 2016

Tak-wing Ngo
Coordinator 'IIAS Centre
for Regulation and Governance'
IIAS Extraordinary Chair
at Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
*State-market relations and the political
economy of development*
1 May 2008 – 30 Apr 2017

Lance Nolde
*A history of the Sama Bajo
sea peoples of eastern Indonesia
during the early modern period*
1 Aug 2014 – 30 May 2015

Saraju Rath
*Indian manuscripts in the Netherlands:
from forgotten treasures to accessible
archives*
5 Jan 2004 – 31 Jan 2015

Dian Shah
*Constitutionalizing religion
and religious freedom: a comparative
study of Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Sri Lanka*
21 Sep 2015 – 20 Jul 2016

Tina Shrestha
*Transnational suffering
narratives: Documenting Nepali
migrant-communities
in Europe and Southeast Asia*
1 Mar – 31 Dec 2015

Bal Gopal Shrestha
Religiosity among the Nepalese Diaspora
1 Jan – 30 Jun 2015

Yi WANG
*Cataloguing the Van Gulik collection
in the library of Leiden University*
11 Oct 2014 – 11 Feb 2015

Juan WU
*A Study of Legends of King
Ajātaśatru/Kūṇika in Indian Buddhist
and Jaina Traditions*
1 Jan 2014 – 30 Jun 2015

Xiaomei ZHAO
*Spirit of urban heritage:
Place-making in the metropolis
in the globalized age*
26 Jan – 8 Mar 2015 and
20 Jul 2015 – 30 Sep 2015

IN THE SPOTLIGHT

Yongwoo Lee

**Postwar mediascapes
and acoustic modernities
in East Asia**

GLOBAL K-POP POPULARITY and the transnational *Hallyu* boom continue to spread beyond Asia, along the way inspiring critical questions regarding cultural nationalism, cultural imperialism and musical authenticity and hybridity. Using postcolonial aspirations of Koreans and the *Hallyu* campaign, my manuscript critically re-examines the genealogy of a "cultural modernity of sound" in colonial Korea (1910-45) as it intersects with the Japanese popular music industry and lingering colonial mentalities of Koreans after liberation until the 1950s. The narrative of Korean popular music echoes an implicit submission and colonial interiority, empowered by modern western technologies such as the gramophone, radio, and the phonograph record, while also appropriating various foreign popular music genres in relation to the spatial reorganization of the colonial metropolis and its surroundings.

This research primarily explores the ways in which the socio-cultural practices of consumption and production of Korean popular music became imbricated with the colonial structure of Korean cultural modernity. More precisely, I bring to light aural, quotidian experiences of Koreans who, through popular music narratives, gradually embraced their collective sentiments and mass perceptions regarding heuristic concepts of western and American modernity in a colonial context. Colonial Koreans' ambivalent position between two empires and the continuity of ontological colonial mentality casts valuable interrogations on: (1) the embedded structure of Japanese colonialism represented in Korean popular songs in relation to socio-historical genealogies of specific racist and gendered perceptions, production of imperial knowledge, and the concept of the nation-state, and (2) the impact of Americanization and the invention of modern subjectivity through consuming/performing popular songs as circulated via collective memory in colonial, postcolonial, and cosmopolitan discourses.

For the completion of my book manuscript in Leiden, I am pursuing an interdisciplinary research project on compressed modernity and the impact of Americanization in postwar Korea during the 1960s/70s under Park Chung-Hee's dictatorship. The book is entitled *Politics of Subservient Memories: Americanization, the Vietnam War, and Korean Popular Culture in the 1960s-1970s*. It is focused on symbolic relations in representations of America, American pop culture and its hybridized local adaptations in 1960s South Korea, with particular attention given to rhetorical tropes of the American cultural influx as a universalized corporeal modernity via U.S. military stationing, the collective ethos of dispatching Korean troops to Vietnam, and American signifiers of Korean homosocial brotherhood. Korean popular culture in the 1960s vividly represented the rhetoric of South Korea's political and economic "miracle" by sacrificing healthy sons and husbands in the Vietnam War, while also providing domestic female sex workers (*Yanggongju*) for U.S. troops and exploiting subaltern factory workers. This rhetorical military-sex-economy complex worked well as the gendered signifier of an imaginary nationhood of South Korean modernization in the 1960s/70s. It articulated the discourse of Korea's economic growth by way of sub-imperialistic rhetoric while also suggesting collective hysterias and dismantled sentiments against Communism on behalf of the discursive containment of the Cold War regime.

My joint fellowship at IIAS and ISEAS provides an intellectually stimulating work environment to exchange ideas with many brilliant scholars and postdoctoral fellows. Following my terms at IIAS, I will be an affiliated fellow at ISEAS, National University of Singapore, where I will continue work on my book project, as well as develop a new exhibition project entitled *Asian Divas: Acoustic Modernities in Asia*.

ASC-IIAS Fellowship Programme

A joint fellowship offered by the African Studies Centre and the International Institute for Asian Studies

THIS FELLOWSHIP is intended for researchers specialising in Asian-African interactions. It aims to attract researchers whose work is informed by current theoretical debates, in the social sciences and humanities, on global connectivities and who are able to critically engage with shifting paradigms in 'area studies' beyond the ways in which these have traditionally been conceived in the West. We are particularly interested in receiving fellowship proposals that go beyond a mere analysis of current issues associated with African-Asian comparative economic developments or Chinese investments in Africa – although none of these themes, if appraised critically and for their societal consequences, will of course be excluded. Our definition of Asia and Africa is broad and inclusive, Asia ranging from the Middle-East to the Pacific Coast, and Africa from North-Africa to the southern tip of the continent.

Application deadline: 15 March and 15 September each year. For more information and application form, go to: www.iias.nl/page/asc-iias-fellowship-programme

African Studies Centre

IIAS
International Institute
for Asian Studies

IIAS FELLOWSHIPS

Bal Gopal Shrestha

**Religiosity among the
Nepalese diaspora in the
UK and Belgium**

DURING MY IIAS FELLOWSHIP I aim to write a number of articles as well as a book concerning the varieties of religiosity among the Nepalese diasporas in the UK and Belgium. As a Research Fellow at the University of Oxford (UK) I have been carrying out relevant research since 2009, acquiring materials related to the religious practices of Nepalese communities in the UK and Belgium.

The Nepalese people have a long history of out-migration. After the Sugauli treaty was signed between Nepal and the British East India Company in 1816, we observe a gradual increase in Nepalese migration, especially to Darjeeling, Sikkim, Assam, Meghalaya, and even beyond, as far as Burma and Thailand. During the twenty-first century, in response to and in the aftermath of conflict, the cachet of migration is such that more Nepalese are leaving Nepal than ever before. The Centre for Nepal Studies (CNS) UK survey, finalized in 2010, established that in fact more than 72,173 Nepalese reside in Great Britain. Their number has since considerably increased. Not only many ex-Gurkhas and their families, but also growing numbers of students, nurses and other professionals have settled in, for example, London, Manchester, Reading, Swindon, and close to army bases (Ashford and Folkestone in Kent, Farnborough and Aldershot in Hampshire). The Nepalese diaspora community in Belgium is much smaller and has a different history; far fewer ex-Gurkhas and more asylum seekers. Their number is currently estimated at between 7,000 and 10,000 with concentrations in Antwerp, Brussels, Leuven, Ghent and Bruges.

A current study into two parallel diasporas in adjacent, but culturally as well as politically distinct settings, permits us to compare (a) the British, European and South Asian understandings of 'religion' and (b) the balance with regard to the types of religion in each location. Most are Hindus, some are Buddhists, others 'animists' or shamanists, and yet others are Christians. The research reveals how the Nepalese in diaspora define themselves religiously. It helps bring into clear focus the very question of what religion is, by showing how different definitions are presupposed, brought into play and perpetuated by different contexts and purposes. Migrant populations living in diaspora situations offer particularly interesting cases for the study concerning the ways in which religions are created and recreated by their followers. The results produced from the critical analysis of survey data, in-depth ethnography, examination of complex rituals and texts will be of wide interest.

Yuehtsen Juliette Chung

**Visiting Professor,
Taiwanese Chair of Chinese Studies**

MY WORKS HAVE AN ENDURING INTEREST in the issues of modern biopolitics and governance. With the focus on Chinese eugenics, my previous works investigate the relationship between science and society through a historical comparative study of eugenics moments as they developed in both Japan and China from the 1890s to the 1940s. They embody specific case studies of eugenics against a greater background of the global transmission of Western science and its local transformation. In the last three months at IIAS, I have published an article (Isis, 2014, 105: 793-802) and I argue that eugenics, race theory, and Social Darwinism unfolded as counter-imperial discourses, as they were deployed as self-improvement to resist external imperial impositions and within internal cultural and political disputes. In China, interracial and interethnic was celebrated for introducing better germplasm and wider cultural heritages. On the one hand, to locate a scientific turf for eugenics, Chinese eugenicists expanded the field of investigation from biology to sociology, from economics to ethnology. On the other hand, we see that eugenics has carried so much weight that it now justifies state ideologies promoting the monitoring of individual bodies for the sake of national health.

Currently, I am working on the Quarantine Service of the Chinese Maritime Customs from 1873 to 1949. The practice of quarantine was embedded in the interest of rendering populations governable through public health projects in the modern world, as commerce extended worldwide. Such practices were also bound up with the development of administrative governments that captured the imagination of a national 'geo-body' as they outwardly classified, communicated and enforced artificial territorial boundaries, and inwardly projected a series of expectations for modern citizenship of healthy individuals on their populations.

In addition to this project, during the next couple of months, I will be preparing the workshop 'Governance and Challenges in China's Peripheries and Ecology', sponsored by IIAS and convening on 27-28 May 2015. This workshop focuses on the issue of 'governance' and questions if China can achieve modernization without recolonization and exploitation, and whether China's economic growth can be equally redistributed and can reduce ethnic tension, on par with other nation-states that have been striving to achieve this balance since the post-war eras. This workshop includes papers that, historically and contemporarily, analyse territorization of peripheral regions in Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, south-western and maritime south-eastern China, and discuss topics of social equity, politics of resource allocations, constructions of people and nature, and contestations over ecological imperialism. I am so grateful for all the supports and help from the IIAS staff and the Leiden community, without whom this workshop would not be possible at all.

The International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) in Leiden, the Netherlands, invites outstanding researchers to apply for a fellowship to work on a relevant piece of research in the social sciences and humanities.

WE ARE PARTICULARLY interested in researchers focusing on one of the Institute's three thematic clusters. However, some positions will be reserved for outstanding projects in any area outside of those listed.

Asian Cities
The Asian Cities cluster explores modes of urban development, and deals with cities and urban cultures with related issues of flows and fluxes, ideas and goods, cosmopolitism and connectivity at their core, framing the existence of vibrant 'civil societies' and political micro-cultures. Through an international knowledge network, IIAS aims to create a platform for scholars and urban practitioners focusing on Asian cities 'in context' and beyond traditional western norms of knowledge.

Asian Heritages
This cluster focuses on the politics of culture and cultural heritages in Asia. It addresses a variety of definitions associated with cultural heritage and their implications for social agency. In general, the cluster engages with a broad range of concepts and issues related to culture and cultural heritage, and their importance in defining one's identity vis-à-vis those of others.

Global Asia
The Global Asia cluster examines examples of and issues related to multiple, transnational intra-Asian interactions as well as Asia's projection in the world. Historical experiences as well as more contemporary trends are addressed.

Research projects that can contribute to new, historically contextualised, multidisciplinary knowledge, with the capacity of translating this into social and policy relevant initiatives, will be privileged.

For information on the research clusters and application form visit our website:

www.iias.nl

IIAS
International Institute for Asian Studies

Envisioning journeys through Asia

By transforming personal journeys and distant places into familiar routes and iconic destinations, images depicting travel reveal and shape ideas about beauty, culture and foreign lands. Featuring more than 100 works created over five centuries, the objects exhibited in *The Traveler's Eye* are by travelers, artists, photographers and scholars who recorded actual journeys, as well as imagined voyages, to and across Asia. Curated by seven experts, the objects range from masterpieces of Asian art to quirky souvenirs – woodblock prints, ink paintings and art photography, to archaeological drawings, vintage postcards and diaries.

The Traveler's Eye: Scenes of Asia
22 Nov 2014 – 29 May 2015
The Smithsonian's Arthur M. Sackler Gallery

"WHETHER THEY WERE COLLECTED AS MEMENTOS, or whether they provided virtual experiences for those who remained at home, each has an extraordinary immediacy [...] Encountering these works invites our visitors [...] to think about how they might record and remember their own journeys," says organizing curator Debra Diamond. The first three galleries present how artists in Japan, China, and India envisioned particular journeys and destinations at key moments between the 1600s and the 1990s. The last gallery contrasts personal and mass-produced records of travel to and within Asia during the twentieth century. Radically diverse in style and intent, these glimpses invite us to consider the visual choices that established particular routes, places, and human activities as fascinating or important. Looking beneath the surfaces of these works illuminates the ways that seemingly straightforward images encode broader cultural perspectives.

The Traveler's Eye begins with a magnificent pair of Edo-period Japanese folding screens, lushly gilded and almost 11 feet wide, depicting *nambanjin* ("southern barbarians"; in this case Portuguese seafarers) in a Japanese harbor beneath swirling gold clouds. Created at a time when the Japanese were contending with an influx of European merchants and missionaries, and wanting no part in the ongoing colonization elsewhere in the world, the screens have traditionally been interpreted as scenes of cultural encounters with exotic foreigners. However, the images are rich in visual clues that suggest that the screens weren't created for Westerners after all, but were in fact commissioned by wealthy Japanese merchants as symbols of good fortune. (fig.1)

The second gallery features five rare Chinese scrolls and paintings, each portraying commercial travel on land and water in Ming and Qing Dynasty China. Neither artists nor patrons (members of the political and business elite) were interested in documenting the hardships or actual circumstances of any particular journey. Rather, these slice-of-life images of anonymous characters capture some of the noteworthy sights and scenes a traveler might encounter along the way. The images buzz with human activity, such as outdoor meals at mountain rest stops and boatmen grappling with narrow river passes, yet simultaneously convey the benevolent rule of an enlightened sovereign and the fundamental ideals of a harmonious society.

Among the highlights of the third gallery are Japanese woodblock prints that depict scenes along the famed Tōkaidō road. As travel on this route was highly restricted to individuals of great stature and wealth, such prints

Fig. 2

became an immediate sensation among the vast populace, many of whom could only imagine the journey. In this gallery you also find examples of the work by photographer Raghubir Singh (1942–1999). Singh maintained a lifelong interest in his country's vast and vibrant landscape as a means of capturing the changing complexity of modern India. He traveled frequently to observe the ebb and flow of daily life in bustling cities, along trunk roads, and across mountains and deserts. Sublime images of the mighty Ganges River contrast sharply with saturated, dense compositions framed by India's iconic Ambassador cars.

The exhibition concludes in the fourth gallery with records of journeys to and in Asia during the early 20th century. Western adventurers, archaeologists, and scholars were already traversing the globe to conduct research and explore foreign lands, but the advent of commercial travel brought on a flood of photographs, drawings, postcards, mementos, and other means of recording scientific and sentimental experiences abroad. Museum founder Charles Lang Freer's enthusiastically scribbled diary entries, photos and pedestal-mounted rock collection, tell of a man enamored with China's artistic glories. In 1910 he made his final journey to China; this time drawn into the country's interior to explore the Buddhist cave temple complex at Longmen Gorge in Henan province. Freer's destination was remote and largely abandoned, and so Chinese officials insisted that an armed guard accompany him. When he set out, his party had grown to more than twenty people, including porters, a cook, a photographer (Yütai), and six soldiers. (fig.2) Many of the more than one hundred large-format photographs (and relief rubbings) produced on this trip are the best in situ visual documents of sculptures that were looted over the following decades.

The exhibition's final installation features perhaps the most recognizable artifact of travel over the past 150 years: the picture postcard. During their golden age (1890s–1920s) postcards were requisite souvenirs. They were collected as mementos or mailed from abroad, accruing the additional prestige of a foreign stamp and postmark. Armchair travelers also acquired postcards, compiling them in specially made albums. They eventually became so ubiquitous that they created enduring and iconic representations of Asia for global audiences. Postcards could advance political agendas, whilst others romanticized a vanishing way of life for tourists' benefit, such as those showing rickshaws. With travelers and residents visiting the same photography shops, however, views intended for tourist markets also served to redefine local communities' perceptions of their own pasts and traditions, as well as their own modernity. (fig.3) Postcards remained popular throughout the twentieth century, but with the advent of mobile phones, they are becoming harder to find. Millions of posts on Instagram, Facebook, and other outlets, however, prove that the appeal of recording travels with a striking photograph and brief message has not diminished.

Fig. 1

Fig. 3

Chinese Girls in Jiurickshaw.

Fig. 1: Southern Barbarians in Japan Japan, Edo period, 17th century. Ink, color, and gold on paper Freer Gallery of Art, F1965.22-23.

Fig. 2: Longmen, Freer's Chinese assistants along the riverbank, November 12, 1910 Yütai (active early 20th century). Freer Gallery of Art and the Arthur M. Sackler Gallery Archives FSA A.1 12.5.GN.088.

Fig. 3: Chinese Girls in Jinrikisha China, Early 20th Century Picture postcard Freer Gallery of Art and the Arthur M. Sackler Gallery Archives, SA A2001.13 045.