




Three dreams
or three nations?
150 years of South
Asian Photography
The Study
page 10-11



The melancholy
of Mocha
The Review
page 36-37



'If it is beautiful,
it will endure on
every level'
The Portrait
page 48




IIAS
International Institute
for Asian Studies

theNewsletter

Encouraging knowledge and enhancing the study of Asia


Urbanisation 55 in East Asia 55



The Focus pages 17-32
Economically and politically,
Asia's increasing importance has
led some to see the 21st century
as the Asian century. One of
the major factors fuelling Asia's
remarkable growth is urbanisation.
Gregory Bracken is the guest
editor of The Focus, which zeroes
in on Urbanisation in East Asia.

Contents

3	FROM THE DIRECTOR			
	THE STUDY			
4	Engaging North Korea after the Cheonan sinking Timothy S. Rich	14-15	Moving portraits and interactive voices from the British Raj Annamaria Motrescu	THE NETWORK
5	Working girls in Dhaka, between public and private space Anna Ensing	16	Provincial globalisation: the impact of reverse transnational flows in India's regional towns Anant Maringanti, Carol Upadhy & Mario Rutten	41 IIAS News
6-7	The effeminacy of male beauty in Korea Roald Maliangkay			42 Opinion – East Asian art history reconsidered Anna Grasskamp Response to review of <i>The Russian Protocols of Zion in Japan</i> Jacob Kovalio
8	Cigarette counterfeiting in the People's Republic of China Georgios A. Antonopoulos, Anqi Shen & Klaus von Lampe			43 ICAS
9	Negotiating with the Taliban: an Indian perspective Sanjeeb Mohanty	17-32	'PULL-OUT' THE FOCUS Urbanisation in East Asia	44 Announcements
10-11	Three dreams or three nations? Rahaab Allana			45 IIAS Research
12-13	Maulana Bhashani and the transition to secular politics in East Bengal Peter Custers			46 IIAS Fellows
				47 Colophon
				THE PORTRAIT
				48 'If it is beautiful, it will endure on every level' The Asian Art Society in the Netherlands Rosalien van der Poel



The Focus Urbanisation in East Asia

© 2010 Google. © Imagery 2010 TerraMetrics. (Satellite image of Kuala Lumpur refers specifically to item on p19)

Pages 17-18
As guest editor **Gregory Bracken** points out, Asia is one of the fastest growing regions in the world. Economically and politically the region's increasing importance has led some to see the 21st century as the Asian century. We are certainly likely to see an increasing shift...

Page 19
Despite architecture and the built environment confronting all of us in our daily lives, writes **Leslie Sklair**, they have received little attention in discussions of globalisation, capitalism or postcolonialism. Certain types of architecture can be hegemonic in a class sense...

Pages 20-21
Historically, China has been culturally multivalent, with a heterogeneous range of cultures operating within the larger paradigm of the country as a whole. **Jacob Dreyer** explores this tension which is best realised in the Chinese coastal metropolis, Shanghai and the inland 'northern capital,' Beijing...

Pages 22-23
The high-speed city building of reform-era China will soon yield an agglomeration of many large, non-agricultural settlements. **Bogdan Stamon** predicts that China's massive, geographically clustered urban core will repeat itself via a common set of distinguishable spatial manifestations...

Pages 24-25
A wave of migration from China's countryside to its cities has left a floating mass of dislocated people with little emotional connectivity to the places that receive them. As **Ana Moya Pellitero** demonstrates, a space of illegality and irregularity has consequently arisen in the periphery of China's urban areas...

Pages 26-27
History provides a window for understanding the postcolonial condition, and the region known as Asia cannot be separated from its colonial past. **Estela Duque** shows that what distinguishes the Philippines from other Asian nations is that it was colonised twice: by Spain from the 16th century...

Pages 28-29
Nostalgia has consistently been a motivation for the study of contemporary Chinese urban life, says **Non Arkaraprasertkul**. Scholars have produced an abundance of work on urbanism from a pro-historic preservation perspective and, for example, have long claimed that the *lilong* house...

Pages 30-32
'Looked down upon from the highest point in the city, Shanghai's *longtang* – her vast neighborhoods inside enclosed alleys – are a magnificent sight.' **Lena Scheen** refers to the award-winning novel *Song of Everlasting Sorrow*...

IIAS in the new era

THIS FIRST DIRECTOR'S NOTE gives me the opportunity to introduce the Newsletter's readers to some of the new initiatives IIAS plans to undertake in the coming years. An important point is that all IIAS members share the sense that the Institute's original mission – of 'initiating and facilitating innovative research in the study of Asia and creating new academic networks; supporting initiatives that address new themes and transcend national, regional and disciplinary boundaries; operating in collaboration with cultural and political institutions that focus on Asia; seeking strategic partners to set up new research partners, investing in talented researchers in the humanities, arts, social and environmental sciences; enabling young researchers in developing new projects' – is as relevant as before, and that moving forward, this should continue to inspire our actions. As in the past, IIAS wishes to operate as a clearing house linking together people and communities sharing an interest in/on Asia, exposing scholars to the wider world and facilitating relations between scholarship and society at large.

Since the years of the institute's creation, however, IIAS's global environment has changed tremendously. While it must keep its balance between local and global reaches, with the Netherlands and Europe as its base and Asia its focus, the Institute's view is one of Asia as a global and dynamic actor, with links, ramifications and expertise shared across continents, from North America to Africa, the Middle East, and other world regions. In practical terms, IIAS must recognize this increased Asian prominence while taking into account the disparities that exist within the Asian region itself, and the vibrancy of transnational, intra- and inter-regional trends (in which European, African, American and Asian interests are more interwoven and interdependent than ever).

This global trend is taking place amidst a perceived crisis in the traditional Humanities and Social Sciences at universities in the West, with the Humanities often devalued and Areas Studies questioned amidst a market-orientated environment privileging 'useful' and quantifiable knowledge that can be turned into consumable 'products' – in a context where the distinction between universities and informal learning is becoming blurred with TV, Internet, etc. aimed at a more multiform global public. At home, IIAS faces a trend towards decentralization between and within universities, and centralization of funding agencies, with increased competition for reduced funds.

IIAS's answer to this new environment is to enhance its Asian relevance by increasing its visibility and focus. We want to do so by furthering IIAS's institutional identity through the originality of its programmes and activities. Its position as an independent, flexible, small institution, built on global networks, mutually-beneficial collaborative partnerships and well-targeted quality services, can earn IIAS the support of its various members, partners and stakeholders, its prime beneficiaries. Concretely, we aim to do so through well targeted, mobilizing, programmatic thematic clusters in phase with contemporary Asian currents; through strengthened activities and services, with more internal coherence and tighter adherence to the general strategy; and through reinforced networks with strategically selected partners and initiatives in Asia, Europe/Netherlands and elsewhere.

Because the present Newsletter's Focus section deals with one of IIAS's three programmatic initiatives (Asian cities), I propose to briefly introduce them. All are built around the notion of social agency. Future activities, including fellowships, will be organized along these topical lines. The aim is not to exclude anyone or any topic, but to cultivate synergies and coherence between people and projects and to generate more interaction with Asian societies.

Cluster 1: Asian Cities

Over 60 percent of the Asian population live in cities. Urbanisation brings about tremendous changes in the social, cultural and political economy of Asian societies, increasing the development of new economic and social interactions, globally connecting individuals and societies while contributing to forging new social consciousnesses. Contrary to still pervasive Western assumptions, until recently translated in development-related international programmes, this central role of the 'urban' in many regions of Asia is far from new. Cities and urban cultures have long been a feature of Asian history, with related issues of flows and fluxes – of ideas, peoples and goods, of cosmopolitanism, metissage and connectivity at its core, framing the existence of vibrant 'civil societies' and micro-cultures of contestation.

IIAS wishes to explore this longstanding Asian urban 'tradition', by linking the various elements of city cultures and societies, from the ancient period to modern times (colonial and post-colonial), into a broad multi-disciplinary corpus that can actively contribute to the development of Asian cities today. Through its fellowships, IIAS aims to engage social scientists and scholars in the humanities – its traditional 'clients' – together with activists, policy-makers and city practitioners. The objective is to map out the contours of a new, integrated 'Asian city knowledge' rooted in the life and development of the cities themselves.

Cluster 2: Heritage and Social Agency in Asia

The general discourse on 'heritage' is a contested one. Whether articulated in the 'Western' or 'Asian' contexts, from civil societies or from states, they cover different – and sometimes contradictory – definitions. Initially a Europe-originated concept associated with architecture, it evolved to mean a diversity of cultures and values, with the assertions of material and immaterial heritages (rather than the artificial dichotomy of 'tangible' and 'intangible'), and the importance of defining one's own identity or identities vis-à-vis those of others. It also carries with it the subversive notion of local 'ownership', and therefore, social agency. In Asia, the notion of heritage is often associated with the construction of post-independence nation-state models and the definition of national 'traditions' and 'authenticity', with the idea of a pre/post colonial historical continuity. In similar fashion, the notion of 'heritage' and 'memory' became central to a number of post-imperial European states and intellectual circles.

This thematic cluster aims at addressing the variety of definitions associated with heritage and their implication for social agency, including those currently questioned of 'national heritage' or 'shared heritage'. The wish is to focus on perceived 'endangered' local cultural heritages: languages, religious practices, crafts and art forms, as well as material vernacular heritage – issues increasingly prevalent in Asia's fast transforming landscapes with the affirmation of multiple voices and identities. The cluster also aims at directly engaging Asian and European scholars, artists, intellectuals and other 'social educators' in a constructive 'civil society to civil society' dialogue.


Cluster 3: Global Asia

IIAS wishes to push the academic understanding of various processes of globalization through three specific objectives: by challenging the euro-centricity of much of its literature and the rehabilitation of the central role of Asia and, by extension, other regions artificially sidelined by this literature – stressing notions of fluidity and interconnectivity that transcend existing delineated global regions; by countering the current tendency privileging contemporary processes of globalization over historical cases; by going beyond the 'selfish' knowledge-gathering process traditionally imbedded in Western academia, by engaging in several collaborative educational capacity-building initiatives with the aim of 'multi-locating' – and thus enriching – the field of Asian studies.

Tackling these orientations should help develop a realistic comparative understanding of globalization processes, and with them, the role of Asia in both time and space, thus avoiding the risks of 'exceptionalism' and 'exclusiveness' that abound. Likewise, and without such exceptionalism, we wish to assert the constructive role European intellectual institutions can play in this global redistribution process. The aim is to provide insight into some of the cultural-historical processes associated with knowledge production and circulation as they affect patterns of globalization. Here too, the objective is to encourage interaction between disciplines, cultural and social practices, in the form of renewed trans-regional synergies at both academic and practical levels.

Again: welcome to IIAS!

Philippe Peycam
Director of IIAS
p.m.f.peycam@iias.nl



Follow IIAS on Twitter!

Get all the latest news on IIAS events, research fellows and projects. Sign up today and follow @AsianStudies

<http://twitter.com/AsianStudies>



IIAS

International Institute
for Asian Studies

Engaging North Korea after the Cheonan sinking



With the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War this summer, we are once again reminded of unresolved Cold War tensions. The March 26 sinking of a Republic of Korea (ROK)¹ military ship, the Cheonan, with 46 of the crew found dead or still missing, has provided additional fuel for inter-Korean conflict while the current Lee Myun-bak administration has deliberately chosen a more conservative approach than its predecessors towards Pyongyang. While evidence strongly suggests, and global opinion largely concurs, that a North Korean torpedo caused the Cheonan sinking, little substantial evidence has arisen regarding whatever rationales may have been behind such a move.

Timothy S. Rich

EXPERTS HAVE SUGGESTED that a struggle for who will be Kim Jong-il's successor may be the root cause of recent aggressive actions, with a growing consensus suggesting Kim's virtually unknown youngest son Kim Jong-Un is being groomed for the role. However, virtually no first-hand knowledge of North Korean decision making is available, with the last major defector, (Hwang Jang-yop) defecting 13 years ago. Insight to North Korean intentions has been gleaned from the constant barrage of propaganda, with conjecture trumping empirics. Despite the potential for regional instability caused by actions within North Korea, few innovations have been made to understand the political mindset of the Hermit Kingdom.

The aftermath of the Cheonan, both in increased North Korean rhetoric and actions, as well as US-ROK military exercises, highlights the precariousness of peace on the peninsula. The current shift has done little to encourage Pyongyang back to the negotiating table or reduce the North's own security fears. Instead of continuing a policy largely built upon sticks, I suggest a more nuanced approach which may benefit all powers within the region.

Cheonan Chronology

Shortly after 9pm on March 26th the South Korean ship Cheonan split in two and sunk off the Western coast of the Korean peninsula near Baengnyeong-do and the Northern Limit Line (NLL). Almost immediately the South Korean government claimed that the North was responsible. An investigation report released on May 20th by the Joint Civil-Military Investigation Group (JIG) indicated that a CHT-02D North Korean torpedo caused a non-contact explosion approximately three metres from the Cheonan's gas turbine room. The same day, North Korea's National Defense Committee denied involvement. Shortly thereafter, a critical minority both within South Korea (such as the NGO People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy/ PSPD) and abroad questioned the findings, claiming a lack of transparency in the investigation and that inconsistencies and scientific testing do not match Seoul's claims.² Similarly and consistent with traditionally diverging North Korean policies, liberal and conservative parties debated the cause of the sinking and China's potential role in restraining future actions.³ In July, the United Nations condemned the Cheonan sinking, however fell short of assigning blame. Meanwhile, the North Korean government never claimed any involvement.

Insight to North Korean intentions has been gleaned from the constant barrage of propaganda, with conjecture trumping empirics. Despite the potential for regional instability caused by actions within North Korea, few innovations have been made to understand the political mindset of the Hermit Kingdom.

While the Cheonan has received much attention internationally, inter-Korean military skirmishes are not uncommon. In December 1998, the ROK intercepted a North Korean vessel attempting to land near Yeosu. In June 1999, six North Korean ships repeatedly crossed the maritime boundary near Yeonpyeong over six days, culminating in an exchange of fire leaving both sides with casualties. In June 2009, a South Korean fishing boat was captured after crossing the maritime boundary. A 20 minute naval battle occurred in June 2002, leaving a damaged DPRK vessel and a sunken ROK vessel. In November of the same year, a North Korean naval vessel crossed into ROK waters and was later fired on by ROK navy. Last year a navy skirmish off the coast of Daechong Island left a North Korean ship severely damaged and 10 crewmen dead while the South Korean vessel and crew remained unharmed. Furthermore, during the apex of recent inter-Korean conflict, a southern fishing boat was captured by North Korea this August.

Assuming that North Korea was at fault for the sinking—which is the Western consensus with approximately three quarters of South Koreans concurring—there are several possible rationales. First, the Cheonan sinking could be connected to the crisis of succession, with next generation leadership (e.g. Kim Jong Il's youngest son, Kim Yong-Un) or a faction within the government attempting to secure their position by being aggressive against the South. The combination of the strength of the military (believed to be the fifth largest in the world) and the ideological foundation of the party has prevented state collapse so far and most analysts expect the next generation of leadership to maintain a bellicose stance towards both South Korea and the US. The potential accession by a member of the National Defense Commission (NDC) may encourage small but highly publicised shows of strength. Similarly, the support of the military would be especially necessary if Kim Jong Il's son takes the helm, as he has no direct military experience nor a long period of tutelage for accession in the way that Kim Jong Il had from his father, Kim Il Sung. With the first Chosun Workers' Party (KWP) delegates' conference in 44 years scheduled for September, would-be successors have a further incentive to shore up support by maintaining an aggressive stance towards the ROK. The sinking could also be viewed as revenge for the Daechong naval encounter with the ROK in November 2009. In addition, a rogue military officer may have acted without higher orders, forcing North Korea to respond. Finally, the

counterintuitive intent may be to persuade the ROK to restart aid and investment programmes largely reduced under the Lee Myung-bak administration.

Changing directions?

Some may view the Cheonan as a watershed event, limiting the possibilities of rapprochement. Even liberal parties within South Korea have toned down calls for a return to the engagement under the 'Sunshine Policy'. The Cheonan incident has also encouraged military reform within South Korea to better combat low intensity asymmetric challenges. However, none of this resolves the underlying problems of North Korean insecurity nor persuading North Korea's traditional backers—mainly China but to a lesser extent Russia—from altering their stances.

The United States has consistently clung to employing economic sanctions towards North Korea to coerce more desirable behaviour. Not only has this largely failed in other situations (e.g. Cuba and Iran) but in the North Korean case it may potentially increase North Korea's reliance on China. Chinese officials have been reluctant to support North Korean belligerence, yet at the same time have encouraged economic reforms and cooperation that could prevent regime collapse. By the 1990s, China provided North Korea most of its rule and consumer goods and nearly half of its food supply.⁴ With growing joint development agreements and meetings with military officials between Beijing and Pyongyang, American sanctions may have actually strengthened North Korea's position by moving China from a reluctant supporter towards more than superficial relations. Chinese goals appear fairly straightforward: maintaining some sense of stability within the North Korean regime.⁵ The potential not only for military conflict but a collapsed North Korean state leading to a massive influx of refugees into China, as well as the potential of a US-backed ROK approaching the Chinese border is of great concern to China and thus actions which prop up the government remain in their national interest. One should not be surprised, then, that China has refused to assign blame to the Cheonan sinking to North Korea for fear up disrupting a government already on edge.

Whereas the US has consistently linked denuclearisation to the elimination of sanctions and the establishment of diplomatic relations, this fails to address that each party within the Six Party talks, other than a vague desire of regional security, have very differing goals. Instead, the US should encourage joint Korean economic programmes which potentially restrict North Korean actions while limiting growing Chinese influence. While one should never reward bad behaviour, the political costs of establishing formal liaisons, and thus encouraging future talks for formal recognition, outweighs the potential costs of increased conflict. Furthermore, instead of continuing the traditional path of sanctions, the US should continue the so far more successful policy spearheaded by the Treasury Department of targeting North Korean shell companies abroad by tying host country assistance to future economic cooperation. So far such leverage has encouraged several governments, including Vietnam, to voluntarily target suspect companies so as to not damage growing relations with American firms. By encouraging economic stability in North Korea while also restricting their illicit activities abroad, the US can reaffirm their commitment to South Korea and potentially encourage progress on stalled talks.

Timothy S. Rich
Indiana University, USA
tsrich@indiana.edu

Notes

1. For this paper, the terms South Korea, Republic of Korea, and Seoul will be used interchangeably as will North Korea, DPRK, and Pyongyang for North Korea.
2. Such sceptics constitute roughly a quarter of Koreans at most, according to estimates by several specialists contacted by the author. 'US Professors Raise Doubts About Report on S. Korean Ship Sinking'. Chosun Ilbo (English version). July 11, 2010. http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/07/10/2010071000245.html.
3. Min, Namgung. 2010. 'South Korean Politics Split on Kim Visit.' Daily NK website. May 4. www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?catald=nk00600&num=6328.
4. Eberstadt, Nicholas. 1998. 'Statistical Blackouts in North Korea: Trade Figures Uncovered'. Beyond Transition 9(2). World Bank Group. www.worldbank.org/html/prdr/trans/marapr98/pgs21-23.htm.
5. Glaser, Bonnie, Scott Snyder, and John Park. 2008. Keeping an Eye on an Unruly Neighbor: Chinese Views on Economic Reform and Stability in North Korea. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Working girls in Dhaka, between public and private space

The participation of girls in the global labour market is lower than that of boys. As a consequence, there is a lack of qualitative data. Anna Ensing studied working girls in Dhaka, Bangladesh. She documented their activities and the related hazards and studied the way working girls themselves perceive their position in society. The research results make clear that working girls live with three disadvantages: they are poor, female and young. These three factors reinforce each other and determine the girls' position in society.

Anna Ensing



ACCORDING TO ESTIMATIONS from the International Labour Organization (ILO), female children are less frequently employed in economic activity but they are also less likely to be attending school and more likely to do household chores (ILO 2006; Buvinic et al. 2007). Most debates on child labour, however, have left the specific problems of the girl child unanswered. With the exception of prostitution and child domestics, research has tended to focus on male child labour.

In 2009, the Irewo Foundation conducted an anthropological study on working girls in Dhaka, Bangladesh, to gain insights about their participation in the labour market and the consequences of this work.¹ The focus of the study was on three main groups: girls working in home-based industries; girls working in the public domain; and girls working in the formal industries.

The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2003) stated that, at the time of their survey, almost two million girls were working (10% of the girl population), either in combination with school or not. The great majority of the working girls in Bangladesh live in rural areas (81%) and are involved in agricultural work (60%). It should be kept in mind though, that girls often work in unpaid jobs at home and that their presence in the labour market is often invisible (Blanchet 1996:77); statistics don't always depict a complete picture (Lieten 2009:64-66). We therefore conducted an anthropological study in which girls' views and opinions were brought to the forefront. In two specific geographic areas of Dhaka – Kafrul and Mohakali – we studied the working girls in different settings.

Home-based industries

Home-based jobs are considered a good choice because they take place in the safety of the home, the working hours are flexible and not excessive and there are relatively few health hazards. The most common home-based industries in Dhaka are karchupi (bead and sequins work) and embroidery, which represent, respectively, 14% and 1% of girls in the informal sector (ILO/IPEC 2002: 29-30).

Girls working in home-based industries in Dhaka work within a family undertaking and are not directly paid by a contractor. The work is often considered to be part of the household chores and thus is habitually condoned as a useful activity for girls. The Bangladeshi law allows children to work in these 'family

and small-scale holdings producing for local consumption and not regularly employing hired workers'.

Home-based jobs need not in themselves be considered hazardous labour, but they are often combined with household chores, usually the responsibility of women and girls. The real workload depends on the combination of work in home-based industries and household chores, which can in some cases be excessive and thus harmful for girls.

One of the main reasons why girls work is the difficult economic circumstances. A 'shock' or misfortune, such as the loss of the family's income earner, can be a direct cause for a child to start working. In cases of poverty, girls are more likely to be employed at home, while boys work outside.

Girls are mostly found working in the home because of cultural gender roles, which define the home as the proper place for women (Kabeer 1985). Especially unmarried pubescent girls tend to be involved in activities that restrict them to the private sphere (see also Naved et al. 2007). The girls agree that home is the best place for them, and that 'a safe job is a job at home'. In addition to safety, status and respect also play a role: an unmarried girl's presence in the public domain could threaten her and her family's honour. Society considers a 'good character' absolutely crucial for girls, which is best demonstrated by socially acceptable behaviour (Joseph 1997).

Working in the public domain

Some girls, however, were nevertheless found working outside the home. We distinguished three main activities: scavenging, services at markets and chipping bricks, although most girls do a bit of everything. Working in the public domain can be explained by extreme poverty, which negates most social norms. Daughters will only be sent to work outside the home when parents have no alternatives. Thus, girls working outside their homes come from extremely poor families or they live without their (direct) family.

Working hours vary and are flexible for most street jobs but conditions are harsh and all jobs on the street are poorly paid. Brick chipping and waste collection are harmful to health and most other activities are exhausting. The girls complained of the dirt; people are disgusted by them and this damages their self-esteem. Adolescent girls are particularly concerned about their physical appearance, mainly because they know they should be getting married soon.

Girls working in the public domain face aggression and violence every day. Girls are not just harassed by passers-by or employers, but also by the police. The girls who live without family wish for 'good adults' to protect them, although working with friends can be helpful too. When adolescent girls are unable to maintain their distance or privacy from male strangers, as is the case with girls working in the public domain, they are likely to be confronted with sexual and mental harassment (see also S.F.Rashid & S.Michaud 2000). Because of their sexual vulnerability very few girls above 14 work in public spaces. If the girls are touched by a man who is not their husband they become 'spoiled'; they and their family may lose their honour. Girls can prevent harassment on the streets by working alongside a male relative, or by marrying early.

Working in formal industries

The growth of the Ready Made Garments (RMG) industries in Bangladesh in the 1980s and 1990s attracted large numbers of women and girls. However, after threats of a boycott many thousands of the very young girls were fired (see Bissell 2004). Today, girls start working in the factories as assistants at 14 years old and progress into higher functions, such as operators. Girls generally approve of garment work because of the relatively good pay and safety measures.

However, the working conditions of women in particular are mostly in contravention of labour laws (see for example Nielsen 2005; AMRF Bangladesh & CCC The Netherlands 2009; Hearson 2009), and the working conditions of underage girls are often even worse. Girls between 14 and 18 are legally allowed to work in factories, but only for a maximum of five hours per day and not between seven pm and seven am. In practice, however, they work the same amount of hours as adult women. Because it is fulltime, a garments job cannot be combined with education. In addition, the factory environment is not favourable for the girls' health (headaches, backaches, etc.) and we also documented cases of verbal abuse, physical punishments and sexual harassment. Many of the girls are scared of their supervisors because of their abuse of power. Thus, despite the relative safety and freedom from domestic constraints, factory work is harmful for the health, morals and development of adolescent girls.

The girls' view: three burdens

Poverty is considered to be the main problem for working girls and the foremost reason for having to work. The girls argue

that rich girls, contrary to poor working girls, can go to a good school, they can eat all they desire, they don't have to work at home, they don't need to leave their relatives in the countryside and they don't have to live in a slum. Furthermore, rich girls are not exposed to verbal abuse; they are more protected and respected by their environment.

In addition to being poor, working girls suffer because they are female. Males are favoured in Bangladeshi culture because daughters will be married and leave the home, while sons continue to bring benefits (income and a wife) to the family (White 1992). Girls have less freedom than boys and are more controlled by their families; they have to be more responsible and they are permitted less fun. Although working boys also suffer maltreatment, working girls endure more sexual harassment and disrespect.

The third threat to these girls is their young age. They feel that adult and married women live better lives than young girls; once married, they will not be bothered anymore, they will be respected by employers and other people and they can go outside without problems. Being older and being married implies safety and less vulnerability.

The three burdens reinforce each other: poverty forces girls into situations that conflict with gender roles and age norms but also denies them protection from society's judgement and abuse.

Working girls in Dhaka, especially from 12 years onwards, take great responsibility for their own lives. Within the constraints, they have agency. They want to solve their problems and bear their sorrows alone. However, there are also many decisions that the working girls cannot make for themselves. Girls start to work when their families need the support; they continue to work because they cannot solve and end the poverty of their families. Similarly, most girls choose to keep quiet when harassed out in public because raising their voice is a form of agency incongruent with the cultural norms for girls' behaviour, and this would provoke worse reactions. Society's structural constraints clearly limit the girls' agency in these cases.

Anna Ensing

Formerly IREWOC, now TIE-Netherlands
annaensing@yahoo.com

Notes

1. See www.irewoc.nl for more studies on Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal. The research project was financed by Plan Netherlands.

References

- AMRF Bangladesh & CCC The Netherlands. 2009. *Study on Living Wage in the Export-oriented Garment Sector in Bangladesh*. Alternative Movement for Resources and Freedom & Clean Clothes Campaign.
- Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. 2003. *National Child Labour Survey 2002-2003*. Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.
- Bissell, S. 2004. 'Incentives to Education and Child Labour Elimination: A Case Study in Bangladesh', in G. K. Lieten et al. (eds.), *Small Hands in South Asia: Child Labour in Perspective*, 269-289. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors.
- Blanchet, T. 1996. *Lost Innocence, Stolen Childhoods*. Dhaka: The University Press Limited.
- Buvinic, M et al. 2007. 'Gender Shapes Adolescence', *Development Outreach. World Bank Institute*, 9(2):12-15.
- Hearson, M. 2009. *Giant retailers, purchasing practices, and working conditions in the garment industry*. Amsterdam: Clean Clothes Campaign.
- ILO. 2006. *Global Child Labour Trends 2000-2004*. Geneva: ILO-IPECSIMPOC.
- ILO/IPEC. 2002. *Profile of the Urban Informal Economy. Baseline survey*. BGD/00/P01/NET. Dhaka ILO/IPEC.
- Joseph, A. 1997. 'The World According to Adolescents', in S. Pal (ed.), *Giving Voice to the Unheard* 7-12. New Delhi: National Foundation for India.
- Kabeer, N. 1985. 'Do women gain from high fertility?' in H. Afshar (ed.), *Women, work and ideology in the Third World*, 83-106. London: Tavistock Publications.
- Lieten, G.K. 2009. *Child Labour and Child Rights*. Dhaka: University Press Limited.
- Naved, R.T et al. 2007. 'Mobility of Unmarried Adolescent Girls in Rural Bangladesh', *Economic & Political Weekly*, november 3.
- Nielsen, M.E. 2005. 'The politics of corporate responsibility and child labour in the Bangladeshi Garment Industry', *International Affairs*, 81(3):559-580.
- Rashid, S.F. and S.Michaud. 2000. 'Female Adolescents and Their Sexuality: Notions of Honour, Shame, Purity and Pollution during the Floods', *Disasters*, 23(4):54-70.
- White, S.C. 1992. *Arguing with the crocodile*. Dhaka: University Press Unlimited.

6 The Study

The effeminacy of male beauty in Korea

Whether on TV or on the cinema screen, on billboards or in a shop window in a South Korean downtown shopping district, over the past few years a new trend in the styling of Korean male models and mannequins has emerged: despite their often chiselled physiques, the men use foundation and lip gloss, pluck their eyebrows, wear longish, wavy hairstyles, combine white garments with brightly coloured accessories, and generally present themselves both verbally and non-verbally in a soft and gracious, arguably vain fashion that, until recently, would have been neither common nor socially accepted.

Roald Maliangkay



ANY WRITER'S (or, for that matter, reader's) judgement of what constitutes 'effeminacy' will, of course, be shaped by his or her culturally established views on gender roles. And, as is true for beauty, while one's notions of masculinity and femininity may be culturally proscribed, ultimately any judgement as to what is beautiful or what is effeminate will be made on the basis of not only one's surrounding culture or cultures but, subjectively, on the basis of complex internal factors, both conscious and unconscious. This writer claims no exception to this rule. Still, in Korea, where beautiful male pop icons are now commonly referred to as *kkonminam* (*kkot* = flower; *minam* = handsome man), Korean male beauty has, by any standard of judgement, taken on a distinctly effeminate quality.

Ambiguity surrounding notions of effeminacy hardly represents the only tricky issue here. Another involves the difficulty inherent in demarcating anything as the sole province of Korean popular culture. Because of the Internet and the ease of travel and communication, it has become increasingly difficult to define many aspects of popular culture as belonging to or originating in a single culture. Especially in the areas of design and styling, ideas are today shaped and redefined in ways that are increasingly homogenised and transnational. For the agencies of many Korean stars the lack of distinctiveness has become a deliberate factor in marketing their products overseas. Several popular boy and girl bands have one or more Chinese or Japanese members whose nationality cannot be easily identified based on their appearance alone. But they allow the inclusion of Chinese or Japanese lyrics, and they may guarantee an even larger foreign fan base, as well as more overseas support for actions against copyright infringement.

As a result of the homogenisation, a nation's popular culture, as a unique, freestanding entity, has become almost impossible to circumscribe. Even so, it remains inevitable that nationalism will bring itself to bear in some way on almost any cultural phenomenon, resulting in the promotion of products and ideas that reflect and suggest a country's historical pedigree. Thus, any cultural realm invariably acquires a national flavour. Korea's new standard of male beauty may be one such thing. (And, although few Koreans in their forties or older could be expected to proudly defend the phenomenon of *kkonminam* as something born in Korea, it's not hard to imagine that, with its growing status abroad, they might well become inclined to take ownership of it.)

A wave of Japanese culture?

The widespread effeminisation of male beauty can be traced to the rising of the so-called 'Korean Wave' (*hallyu*) in the late 1990s, when Korean pop acts first began to break through into broader East Asian markets. The blend of good looks and slick presentation, a repertoire made up of a mix of hip-hop and R&B, and a lack of profanity and sex, as befitting Confucian morals, have often been named as primary reasons for the widespread appeal of *hallyu*'s Korean pop artists. By the time



it hit Southeast Asia, and movies and TV dramas had been added to its repertoire, journalists in China and Taiwan began to argue that the Wave could significantly boost South Korea's 'soft power'—a notion immediately embraced by Korean policymakers.

Meanwhile, although a fair number of the actors appearing in the movies and TV dramas sold abroad were middle-aged, the Wave continued to be driven by young stars. Their often surgically 'improved' faces came to be used in ads for fashion and cosmetics-related products across Asia, with the biggest male stars also appearing on memorabilia of all kinds, including socks, jewellery and mugs. Few of these products were endorsed by the stars' production agencies, but it is likely that their lawyers were too preoccupied with the growing problem of illegal downloads and counterfeiting to pay much attention, for example, to the unauthorised appearance of their star's image on a key chain.

Four of the Wave's biggest stars to date, singer/actor Rain, actor Lee Byunghun, singer/actor Lee Jun Ki and actor Bae Yong-joon, are widely considered *kkonminam* icons. Rain often wears his hair tied up with a hair band and has, on occasion, worn very effeminate clothing and accessories, and Lee Byunghun, with his perfect white smile, recently pleased many of his fans when he wore eyeliner in the blockbuster film *The Good, The Bad, The Weird*. He does not appear very effeminate, but because of his good looks and sharp dress sense he is nevertheless considered an exemplar of the trend in Korea.

It is, however, Lee Jun Ki and Bae Yong-joon who together epitomise the effeminisation of Korean male popular entertainment. Lee, who rose to fame in 2005, in the role of a feminine folk entertainer in the hit movie *Wang-üi namja* ('The King and the Clown'), has done much modelling in which his effeminacy is accentuated. Bae Yong-joon's popularity soared in July 2004, when the drama *Kyōul yōn'ga* ('Winter Sonata') began to be aired on Japan's terrestrial channel NHK. Many middle-aged women fell in love with Bae's character, allegedly because of his good looks, passion, sincerity and good manners. Some fans of the show took up studying Korean or joined clubs where they could share and exchange photographs of their idol and many went to Korea to visit sites where key scenes of the drama had


been shot. The Japanese devotion to the foreign star raised some concern inside Japan, however, and at one point some Japanese citizens launched an ultimately unsuccessful anti-Wave movement.¹ In Korea, Bae also enjoyed a great following among mostly somewhat older women who appeared to appreciate Bae for the same reasons as their Japanese counterparts. But not all Korean women were infatuated with the upcoming *kkonminam* icons and their dramas. A fair number, put off by the honest, respectful and openhearted ways of the characters, turned to Japanese dramas in which, in their eyes, romantic relationships are portrayed more realistically.

The emergence of *kkonminam* is frequently linked to the enormous rise in popularity in Korea of the *yaoi* genre of comics, following the lifting of the ban on Japanese popular culture in 1998. In the original Japanese *yaoi* comics, men are commonly depicted with somewhat elf-like features. They often engage in homosexual relationships, and are idealised as soft, sensitive and selfless. Moto Hagio's *They Were Eleven* (1975) provides an early example. In the comic's sci-fi storyline, ten cadets are left on an abandoned spaceship for 53 days to test their readiness. Two of the characters hail from a species whose gender remains undetermined until adulthood, when it is decided not by biology but by external social forces. One of the characters, Frol, who is undeniably feminine in appearance, is participating in a test that will entitle her to become male, a privilege otherwise granted only to a family's oldest child. In one intimate scene, Frol's male friend Tada tries to persuade Frol to become his wife instead: 'You can come to my planet. We're monogamous. Marry ME [...] you'll be beautiful'.²

Mari Kotani associates the alteration of male bodies in *yaoi* fiction with 'the desire of women to appropriate the idealised masculine images constructed by male-centered ideologies for themselves'.³ Thus, while the men take a traditional masculine form, for example, dressing in male clothing, the characters' beauty is feminine. Toshihiko Sagawa, a former publisher of *June* (1978-), a magazine for a female readership featuring romantic stories between males, notes that 'the characters are really an imagined ideal that combine assumed or desired attitudes of both males and females. Thus the heroes can be beautiful and gentle, like females, but without the jealousy and other negative qualities that women sometimes associate with themselves'. Sagawa points out that because men are considered to experience fewer constraints both socially and sexually, many of the readers idealise the friendship and bonding between men as one ultimately based on love.⁴

Writing on his fascinating website 'The Grand Narrative', James Turnbull argues that the prominence of Japanese scholars in East Asian cultural studies has led researchers studying the Korean phenomenon to place too much emphasis on the influence of *yaoi* fiction. He believes to do so in relationship to *kkonminam* is anachronistic, preferring to attribute changes in the appearance of the idealised Korean man to the shift in married women's attitudes toward the traditional gender divide

Above:
Singer/actor Rain.
Cutout: A give-away pack of tissues from a restaurant in Seoul specialising in 'woman's style hot sun chicken' (presumably referring to a kind of roasted chicken that contains very little fat) shows a *kkonminam* carrying a bunch of flowers (October 2009).



On websites, one can find millions of comments from Korean fans about their idols' appearance, including frequent complaints about *kkonminam* stars dressing too effeminately or acting too girly.

that occurred rather suddenly in the mid 1990s, when modern literature and film began to question the roles assigned to men and women in traditional Confucian society. To many, issues of gender equality had for too long had to take a back seat to the wider aims of democratisation.⁵

Although one could argue that Japanese comics and animation were widely available in South Korea before the ban on Japanese popular culture was lifted, it is in fact difficult to find signs of the *kkonminam* trend prior to 1998. Turnbull posits that, in addition to growing female disillusionment with the traditional roles of Korean men in the private and public spheres, the desire for a different ideal male figure also arose out of anger many women felt over being the first to be laid off after the so-called 'IMF crisis' hit in July of 1997. Indeed, although the role of a woman working in public had never been perceived very positively in Korean traditional culture, the crisis laid bare one of the rapidly developing democracy's major lacunas. Decades of significant gender inequality in the workplace thus combined with sexist attitudes to fuel women's burning resentments over their longstanding secondary status. While the softer male image was therefore partly born out of criticism, it also had the potential to make the opposite sex look more powerful.

Although Turnbull's perceptions of the influence of Korean women on the effeminisation of the Korean male icon carry some persuasive weight in explaining the disparity between the rather macho-like Korean concept of male beauty leading up to the mid 1990s and what we have seen since then, there are still other possible factors to consider. One concerns the enormous popularity of Korean pop entertainment among teenage girls.

Machos are so passé

In Korea, popular music can be divided into two general categories: that marketed primarily to middle school, high school, and university students and that directed to adult consumers. Although artists performing for each of these markets may share a predominant use of heavy make-up and accessories, the two categories are very different in

terms of both the music itself and the manner in which it is performed. Where music for adults often entails single performers singing in a dramatic, traditional style with relatively little movement, music for students is quite the opposite. Apart from its energetic performance style and prolific use of electronic media, the youth formula generally entails a mix of romantic R&B-type ballads and rap. Audiences appear to be predominantly made up of girls who spend a lot of time and money on popular entertainment, have some idea of developments in popular culture in other areas of East Asia, and are likely to favour artists who they perceive would not treat them as sexual objects of attraction but as equals.

Today's students, after all, are less likely to find much appeal in the macho type that for decades dominated in popular entertainment. Those tough men usually had no chance of going to university and/or of leading normal, quiet lives. Instead, they were forced to show their grit as soldiers, gangsters, or policemen, often sorting out differences through violent means, while appearing fragile only in their inability to express their feelings in words. Although they were able to protect and financially support their love interests, they could not care less about the myriad social pressures exerted on women. While the brutish tough guy image may not jive with a male population that over the past few decades has attended college in high numbers when compared to other nations, since the 1960s that image had reflected accurately traits inherent in a legacy of two long-lasting military administrations and their cultural policies and a mandatory military service of up to three years. Especially considering that national service is still in place, albeit in reduced form, psychological remnants of Korea's military years continue to affect how many men express their feelings and deal with issues of conflict or stress.

Although relatively few sports stars have acquired *kkonminam* icon status, soccer star Ahn Jung-Hwan has undoubtedly helped propel the trend. After scoring an historic goal against Italy that sent Korea through to the World Cup quarterfinals, Ahn—one of an unprecedented number of young university students to represent Korea at a World Cup—ran toward the audience kissing his wedding ring. The idea that at his moment of becoming a national hero Ahn would so openly express his love for his wife was uncommon. Although the act was not particularly noteworthy in itself, Ahn, with his very fair skin and longish, wavy hair was already, before the match, regarded as the pretty boy of the team. The goal and the team's celebration were replayed over and over again in Korea, where it earned Ahn the nickname 'Lord of the Ring'.

We may not know if Ahn wore his hair long because he was asked to by his wife, or because he knew that women in general would like it, or if he was simply following the advice of a male or female hairdresser. Nevertheless, his and others' behaviour does raise the possibility that the trend was started, or at least is supported, by men. Although good looks may now have become a marker of social success, as former president's Roh

Moo-hyun's eyelid surgery in 2005 possibly attests, longstanding pressures on men to be successful in society and provide for their families did not ease much after the economic crisis.

To this day, however friendly and good-looking a man may be, he is still judged by the degree to which he provides for his family's well-being and what is printed on his business card. This may help explain why, in 2006, the suicide rate of Korean men was more than double that of women. I surmise that Korea's *kkonminam* provide a hint that men, experiencing disillusionment with their traditional personas (for reasons similar to women's disillusionment) are reacting, to a degree, by shunning conformity and embracing a style that makes them feel better about themselves. Yet if the trend continues, the pressure on men to conform to the new standard of beauty will increase and arguably add to their predicament.

Recent studies show that, in 2007, more than 40 per cent of Korean teenagers harboured a desire for plastic surgery and that even some young Korean males were choosing to go under the knife in the hope of improving their chances of finding a better job. The ever-increasing pressure on young women to conform to an ideal, surgically enhanced beauty may also lead some of them to turn away from the traditional male role model, towards a man who now understands, and may even to some extent share, the beauty burden. Still, today's young woman is very unlikely to be looking for a man who is as effeminate as she, or whose sexual orientation is in question.

On websites, one can find millions of comments from Korean fans about their idols' appearance, including frequent complaints about *kkonminam* stars dressing too effeminately or acting too girly. The star may have played the role of a gay protagonist in a movie or drama, but those stories rarely contest traditional gender roles. It was only ten years ago that a Korean celebrity came out in public for the first time. When VJ Hong S kch' n one day admitted that he was gay, he found himself laid off by his TV network. Not until after a massive public petition effort was in full swing was he offered another contract. Few men have publicly come out since. For some time, Hong's name could often be heard mentioned alongside the names of male-to-female transgender stars Harisu and Park Yuri, even though he's a guy, and even though he's gay, whereas these women are neither. The three were viewed collectively solely on the basis of what they are not: models of traditional Korean male identity.

Today's South Korea is a vibrant democracy, but its longstanding ideas about love, relationships and people's roles in society have not changed much and remain topics of debate. However many movies, dramas, and songs discuss the issue of homosexuality or gender equality, there remains a big difference between this art realm and reality. With time, however, and with the increasing influence of the Internet and its social networks, I expect that that difference will become somewhat opaque.

The *kkonminam* phenomenon was born out of a combination of many factors, many of which are still active today. Whatever led to its emergence, it has now come to reflect both a male and a female ideal. It is ironic that even though the phenomenon may have arisen at least partially out of working women's disillusionment with traditional male roles and that today's young girls prefer a softer, less sexist male figure, these can hardly be seen as triumphs for women. *Kkonminam* have been unable to ease the pressure on women to conform to a beauty ideal either. While couples may increasingly share the beauty burden, this modern-day shift has little to do with the underlying predicament of the many men and women who remain disillusioned with the social roles assigned to them. For those roles to change, much more is needed than a cosmetic make-over.

Roald Maliangkay
Australian National University
 Roald.Maliangkay@anu.edu.au

Notes

1. See Maliangkay, Roald. 'When the Korean Wave Ripples', *IAS Newsletter* 42 (Oct. 2006), p. 15.
2. Keiki Nishi, Moto Hagio and Shio Sato, *Four Shōjo Stories*. Translations by Matt Thorn. San Francisco: Viz Communications Inc., 1996, p. 166.
3. Bolton, Christopher, Istvan Csicsery-Ronay Jr. and Takayuki Tatsumi. 2007. *Robot ghosts and wired dreams: Japanese science fiction from origins to anime*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007, p. 49.
4. Schodt, Frederik L. 1996. *Dreamland Japan: writings on modern manga*. Berkeley, Stone Bridge Press, p. 122.
5. See Turnbull, James, "Korea's `Flower Men': Where's the Beef?", *The Grand Narrative*, 6/4/09 (weblog posting, <http://thegrandnarrative.com>).

Above:
 Actor Bae Yong-joon.
 Below:
 Underground Billboard
 at Ch'ŏnggye'ch'ŏn,
 Seoul (Oct. 2009).



Cigarette counterfeiting in the People's Republic of China

Until about 10 years ago, most cigarettes sold on black markets worldwide originated from legal sources. Major tobacco manufacturers were accused of wittingly or unwittingly supplying smugglers on a grand scale. Since then, under pressure from various governments, the tobacco industry has apparently become much more careful in choosing customers down the chain of distribution, leaving a void on the black market to be filled by counterfeit cigarettes. One country is frequently mentioned in this context: China.

Georgios A. Antonopoulos, Anqi Shen & Klaus von Lampe

CHINA IS GENERALLY BELIEVED to be the main source for counterfeit cigarettes worldwide. Most counterfeit cigarettes seized in the European Union and in the United States during the past few years have been traced back to China, although the most recent data shows a declining share.¹ Overall, according to recent estimates, between 93 and 400 billion counterfeit cigarettes are produced in China per year which would constitute about seven percent of the global (legal and illegal) cigarette market.² Governmental agencies, media and tobacco manufacturers portray cigarette counterfeiting – just as other illegal tobacco-related activities – as the business of serious ‘organised criminals’ and of threatening ‘criminal organisations’,³ and the authorities paint a pessimistic picture as far as measures against the cigarette counterfeiting business are concerned. China’s leading role in cigarette counterfeiting, however, cannot be understood without considering some broader social and economic facts about the importance of tobacco in this country:

- China has the largest smoking population in the world reaching approximately 300 million.
- Cigarettes (and other tobacco products) have a powerful cultural meaning in Chinese society. Tobacco is a commodity that is often associated with success and affluence, and has been used as a lubricant of social relationships and an ‘instrument’ of bribery.
- China is the biggest tobacco producer and exporter in the world.
- The tobacco industry contributes significantly to the Chinese economy and provides substantial revenues for the central government and local governments, although at a declining rate.
- Tobacco provides income for millions of Chinese people.
- Despite China’s shift to a market economy 30 years ago, the tobacco industry in the country is highly regulated by the central government, and specifically the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration (STMA). The regulation provides numerous impediments to individual entrepreneurs wishing to be involved in the legal business.

Features of the cigarette counterfeiting business

Counterfeit cigarette manufacturing and trading originated from the southern coastal provinces of mainland China, Fujian and Guangdong, which borders Hong Kong and Macao, and where most of the special economic zones of China are located.

The counterfeit cigarette production phase can be divided into three stages: (1) acquiring raw materials; (2) manufacturing counterfeit cigarettes; and (3) packing counterfeit cigarettes. It is worthwhile paying some additional attention to each phase:

1. Acquiring raw materials

In China, counterfeit cigarettes can be produced from tobacco of various levels of quality, second-hand tobacco or even waste. Generally, low quality tobacco, directly and regularly bought from tobacco farmers is used to make counterfeit cigarettes. Counterfeiters also obtain their tobacco from ‘irregular’ channels. In a case uncovered by the authorities in Liaoning province, counterfeiters used dumped materials and *lajijian* (‘rubbish tobacco’) to make cigarettes. In some cases counterfeit cigarettes are also made of non-tobacco waste such as sawdust, wood shavings and rotten vegetable leaves. In such cases, the

cigarette wrapping paper, filters and other material are collected from the waste sites. That said, it is not unusual for counterfeit cigarettes to be made of good quality tobacco.⁴

2. Manufacturing counterfeit cigarettes

The actual manufacturing of counterfeit cigarettes requires rolling machines. In the past, purchasing cigarette rolling machines was extremely expensive. In order to bring costs down, counterfeiters bought used rolling machines from state-owned cigarette factories. With the development and expansion of cigarette counterfeiting businesses, counterfeiters – like their legitimate counterparts – have started to invest in more advanced equipment. Prior to 2004 only 30 per cent of the cigarette machines seized were automatic; current figures for the counterfeit cigarette production line suggest that it is 90 per cent automated.

3. Packing of counterfeit cigarettes

There are different methods used for the packing of counterfeit cigarettes:

- *‘Pick ‘n’ mix’* – genuine cigarettes are mixed with counterfeit ones in each pack. This is a rare packing method.
- *Genuine packs* – counterfeit cigarettes are packed in used genuine packaging. This guarantees that health warnings are not misspelled, images are clear and other giveaways are not present.
- *Counterfeit packs* – counterfeit cigarettes are placed in packaging resembling that of genuine brand cigarettes.
- *Unique format of counterfeit packs* – In order to attract prospective customers’ attention, some unique packaging – which may not even exist for the genuine cigarettes – has been designed for counterfeit cigarettes of the most popular brands.

There is a large and diverse set of venues used for the production of counterfeit cigarettes. These include legitimate factories producing other commodities, warehouses, farms in rural and semi-rural areas, martial arts training schools, temples and private homes. A number of illicit production facilities have also been discovered in underground chambers and in mountain caves.

Distribution patterns

Medium to large quantities of counterfeit cigarettes are sold in shopping centres, department stores, hotel-owned luxury shops and various legitimate small businesses such as groceries and kiosks. Most of these premises are licenced cigarette retailers that sell counterfeit cigarettes as well. There is also a number of floating street-sellers, who trade counterfeit cigarettes outside night clubs, discos, restaurants and other night-time economy establishments, or along the street and in other public spaces. Counterfeit cigarettes are often sold in village marketplaces. These marketplaces meet the demand of villagers who have very little disposable income and cannot afford to buy quality, genuine cigarettes. Of great relevance here is the reluctance of legitimate cigarette sellers to trade in cheap legal cigarettes, due to the small profit margin and the subsequent reduction or even cessation of production of cheap (or ‘low class’) cigarettes by authorised cigarette factories. Finally, counterfeit cigarettes are sold outside mainland China by mainland Chinese peddlers in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan and through global illicit distribution channels on North American, European, Australian, Asian and African markets.⁵

Organisation of the cigarette counterfeiting business

The cigarette counterfeiting business requires a degree of sophistication and management of resources and labour. Consequently, counterfeiting networks tend to have a naturally defined horizontal ‘structure’. In fact, there appear to be independent, autonomous ‘entities’ involved in the production of counterfeit cigarettes and in the sale of the merchandise, as well as a constellation of actors who are subcontracted around these two particular stages of the counterfeit cigarette business. In many cases – and in contrast to other contexts – the structures involved in the production of counterfeit cigarettes are hierarchical, and this is most probably a result of the fact that the production of counterfeit cigarettes involves someone who owns the (unauthorised) factory or workshop and workers are employed by him. In essence, a counterfeit cigarette factory is almost identical to a legal cigarette factory.

A number of individuals act as intermediaries who assist in the introduction of the merchandise into the market or who identify persons that can be subcontracted by the counterfeit cigarette producers and offer specialised services (e.g. packers or transporters). It is also important to note that in many cases the production phase of the business is ‘demand-based’. Counterfeit cigarette production is based on orders and the people who order the counterfeit cigarettes should be viewed as the ‘initiators’, or the initial customers of the business rather than the ‘organisers’ of the process.

Corruption of Chinese public officials also plays a significant role in the cigarette counterfeiting business. We have identified three

forms of corruption, the most extreme form of which involves officials being actively engaged in the business. In such cases, public officials take advantage of their position, specialised knowledge and social networks to establish cigarette counterfeiting manufacturing sites. In addition, public officials may act as a ‘protective umbrella’ (*‘baohusan’*) for cigarette counterfeiters and intervene when cigarette counterfeiters are arrested. This ‘protective umbrella’ usually means that any suspension of the illegal business is limited and often the business can continue, virtually uninterrupted, irrespective of the number of detections. Finally, public officials may not be directly and actively engaged in cigarette counterfeiting or in providing a ‘protective umbrella’ to participants in the counterfeit cigarette business; however, some of them may ‘turn a blind eye’ to the activities of cigarette counterfeiters in exchange for financial rewards. In some cases a financial reward may not even be needed. This appears to be the case in relatively small, primarily rural and semi-rural settings in which there are pre-existing social relationships between counterfeiters and public officials.

Unlike other contexts, in China a higher prevalence of violence in the cigarette counterfeiting business has been observed. Within this context, gangs are hired by counterfeit cigarette manufacturers to attack informants who are rewarded by law enforcement authorities for providing relevant information. Violence and threats of violence are sometimes used towards law enforcement officials and tobacco authority officials by cigarette counterfeiters and, occasionally, even buyers protesting about the quality of cigarettes. However, the cigarette counterfeiting business and cigarette counterfeiters can also themselves be victims of violence or extortion.⁶

Conclusion

Unlike popular representations, cigarette counterfeiting in China, just as with illegal tobacco-related activities in other contexts, is characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity. There appear to be independent ‘entities’ involved in different parts of the business, as well as actors who are subcontracted to provide commodities and services for the process. There is a relatively high level of sophistication in the business in terms of the technology necessary for the production of counterfeit cigarettes; less so in relation to the links between actors or stages of the business. Relationships between actors in the business are very often based on a customer-supplier relationship. The role of corruption and violence in the cigarette counterfeiting business should not be underestimated. Corruption, although not present in all counterfeiting cases we encountered, seems to be at least a facilitating factor in a large part of the business. In addition, violence is more prevalent in the counterfeit cigarette market in China than in other contexts.

Georgios A. Antonopoulos
Teesside University, UK
g.antonopoulos@tees.ac.uk

Anqi Shen
Teesside University, UK
a.shen@tees.ac.uk

Klaus von Lampe
John Jay College of Criminal Justice,
City University of New York, USA
kvlampe@jjay.cuny.edu

References

1. European Commission. 2009. *Report on EU Customs Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Results at the European Border – 2008*, Brussels: European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/customs/customs_controls/counterfeit_piracy/statistics/2009_statistics_for_2008_full_report_en.pdf, accessed on 3 June 2010; OECD (2008) *The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy*, Paris: OECD.
2. Chen, T-P. 2009. ‘China’s Marlboro Country’, Slate, www.slate.com, accessed on 17 July 2009; Joossens, L., D. Merriman, H. Ross and M. Raw. 2009. *How Eliminating the Global Illicit Cigarette Trade Would Increase Tax Revenue and Save Lives*. France: International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease.
3. Chow, D.C.K. 2003. ‘Organized Crime, Local Protectionism, and the Trade in Counterfeit Goods in China’, *China Economic Review*, 14, 473-484.
4. Nanfang Ribao. 2009. ‘Wuxianqiao, Guangdong Cigarette Counterfeiting Making More Profits than Drug Trafficking’, *Nanfang Ribao*, 26 April, http://news.dayoo.com/guangzhou/200904/27/53872_5785011_4.htm, accessed on 1 June 2009.
5. Chen, T-P. 2009. op.cit.
6. Shen, A., G.A. Antonopoulos and K. von Lampe. 2010. ‘The Dragon Breathes Smoke’: Cigarette Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China, *British Journal of Criminology*, 50(2), 239-258.

In some cases counterfeit cigarettes are also made of non-tobacco waste such as sawdust, wood shavings and rotten vegetable leaves.

Negotiating with the Taliban: an Indian perspective

Perceiving Pakistan's growing centrality to diplomacy in Afghanistan, the West has planned its policy of identification and engagement with the moderate Taliban. But India believes that in war there is no substitute for victory. Therefore, it has reasons to be wary of the idea of a political reconciliation with the Taliban. Crafting peace in Afghanistan requires the US not to overplay Pakistan's sensitiveness towards Kabul, rather to be more attentive to Indian security concerns vis-à-vis Pakistan. Simply protecting its own interests in the region may not help the US in its mission.

Sanjeeb Mohanty

AS A PRICE FOR ITS SUPPORT in the global war on terrorism, Pakistan urged the US to engage with moderate elements of the Taliban. The Obama administration has made this reconciliation initiative an integral part of its Af-Pak strategy and is flirting with that hoary old chestnut of 'good' Taliban, 'bad' Taliban. Behind Pakistan's efforts to protect the so-called moderates has been an intention to preserve its dominant influence in Afghanistan and prevent the complete elimination of the Afghan Taliban, which it created as a strategic asset. In the present context, the Obama administration is more political and it is willing to concede that, from their perspective, the war in Afghanistan is unwinnable and therefore some level of negotiation and compromise is now unavoidable. In fact, the US and its allies have given a clear indication that they are willing to make a distinction between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and deal with the former, or at least some sections of it.

A lesser evil

Presently, the Taliban is a major threat to Afghanistan and a destabilising factor in the South Asian region. However, a dialogue with the Taliban or the incorporation of its moderate elements into the process of governance seems to be the only available alternative left for the US to bring peace in Afghanistan. By negotiating with the moderates, the US hopes to isolate those hardcore, ideologically driven, full-time fighters within the Taliban movement who contribute to the present unrest in Afghanistan.

The US does not see the Taliban as a threat to international security. The primary, perhaps the only, concern of the US has been to eliminate Al-Qaeda, which has a global, anti-US, jihadist agenda. The US strategy, therefore, focuses on what it perceives as the 'real' threat – Al-Qaeda – and considers the Taliban a lesser evil in comparison. According to the US, Al-Qaeda is a bigger threat because of its 'proven links with international terrorism while the Taliban is identified with Islamist ideology, not directly with terrorism'.¹ The Taliban, then, is treated as a different force with an obscurantist Islamist ideology. However, by tying the Taliban to a fundamentalist ideology rather than directly with terrorism, the US fails to see the thin line that divides fundamentalism and terrorism.

The US is searching for 'good' Taliban who can be weaned off violence in return for a share in power. However, the US feels that the uncompromising core of the Taliban, with their radical ideological leanings, must be met with force and defeated. These moderates that it seeks are mainly foot soldiers, who have taken up arms simply for money and lend support to the hardcore to stay safe; they are the less ideologically motivated sections within the enemy's fold.

Since the Taliban is extremely heterogeneous, the US expects to succeed in including local, non-ideologised leaders of the insurgency in the political reconciliation process that it hopes will isolate the leadership of the radical Taliban.² The Western strategy has been to turn short-term military momentum into long-term success in Afghanistan by isolating the hardcore section. But isolating the moderates will prove difficult, for the simple reason that the leadership of the Taliban in Afghanistan is not in the hands of the moderates and fear of offending their seniors will keep many moderates from negotiating.³

Indian worry

For a variety of reasons, India has cautioned against treating any faction of the Taliban as moderates and rejects the idea of negotiating with them. The Indian government takes the line that anyone subscribing to a fundamentalist ideology cannot be good and fundamentalists must not be and cannot be appeased. The Taliban are viewed as a regressive force with an anti-modernist ideology. It takes the view that they have made Islam more conflict-prone and have a tremendous capacity for extremism. India believes that a resurgent Taliban means brutal governance, a paralysed economy, denial of basic human rights and international isolation. There are also fears that cultivating moderates could embolden Pakistan to exploit its proximity to Taliban.

Second, it is almost impossible to make a distinction between 'good' and 'bad' Taliban and trying to do so is not only deceptive but could further complicate the situation in Afghanistan. It is certainly unlikely to stem the scourge of transnational terrorism. The US intention behind making such a distinction is a way of ensuring Pakistani cooperation, by accommodating its security concerns in Afghanistan. Even Pakistan's suspicion about India's presence in Afghanistan has led the US to underplay India's role in the country.

Furthermore, India is concerned that the search for moderate Taliban could see these elements fall under Pakistan's influence and control, in turn lending a helping hand in Afghanistan to fulfilling Pakistan's strategic ambitions in the region and in ensuring effective control over the country.⁴ This particular Indian worry stems from the fact that the Afghan insurgency has no broad popular base but is linked to clandestine support from Pakistan. Bringing so-called moderates back into the political process could enhance Pakistan's influence in Kabul because of its control over the Pashtun leadership, many of whom are members of the Taliban.

Pakistan's military planners view Afghanistan as a strategic space in the event of a war with India and to control this space they need the help of the Taliban. It is argued that 'once Pakistan acquires the strategic depth through these moderate elements of Taliban and is assured of peace on its western border; it may concentrate its entire energy and attention to the eastern border with India'.⁵ The Indian government fears that accommodations with the moderates would result in a re-emergence of fundamentalist forces in South Asia and the return of an extremist regime to Kabul.


India is wary of the Pakistani offer to mediate with the Taliban. This offer departs from Pakistan's previous reluctance to approach the Taliban. If Pakistani political and military leaders remain ambivalent about a clean break with all Taliban variants, it would be unwise on the part the US to accept any kind of mediation. What Pakistan can offer, however, is their influence over the Haqqani network, whose forces are battling with the American and NATO forces in Afghanistan. In return for trying to rein in the Haqqanis (Jallauddin and Siraj), Pakistan will be looking for a friendly Afghanistan and for ways to stem the growing Indian presence and influence there.

Rather than negotiating with the moderates, the international community should stress the need for a problem-solving approach while making efforts to promote development, capacity and enhancing internal security in Afghanistan. The hardcore Taliban can be isolated by winning the trust of the local Afghans. The international community must stay engaged until the Afghan government is capable of providing security, justice and development. Bolstering the Kabul government's capacity for better governance by transforming Afghanistan into a democracy would help stabilise the country.

There are concerns that a rehabilitation of the moderates reignite fears and insecurity in the minds of the Afghans. A sense of security is a vital prerequisite of good governance and providing good governance is essential to fighting an insurgency. An Afghan government too weak to provide governance and infrastructure will create a socio-political space for radicalism. The increased military presence in Afghanistan is a clear sign of the international community's commitment to establishing effective governance, to enhancing the spirit of the Afghan people to fight the jihadis and to secure Afghanistan's future as an independent country in its own right.

Deceptive distinction

The Obama administration is drawing a deceptive distinction between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, ignoring India's genuine concerns. Obama should be aware that both moderates and hardliners share a common ideology. There is also a nexus between the Taliban and the Pakistani ISI. India fears that a political deal with any of the elements of Taliban will only strengthen the Pakistani military and the global jihad network. Therefore, the United States must remain circumspect about the ulterior motives of the Pakistani military establishment.



Overplaying Pakistan's sensitiveness in the running of Afghanistan would enhance the nuisance capabilities of the ISI in complicating the military situation there. 'Pakistan's dilemma on Afghanistan, therefore, is to be found in the military leadership's convictions'.⁶

The US war in Afghanistan can only be successful if the Pakistani military's sanctuaries and sustenance infrastructure for the Afghan Taliban is dismantled. The surge, bribe and run policy adopted by the US is unlikely to buy peace in Afghanistan. Any military surge must be backed by political strategy which would ultimately defeat or render the Taliban irrelevant to the aspirations of the ordinary Afghan people. Quitting is not an option. Obama's goal, therefore, must be to break the back of the Taliban, significantly reducing their military capabilities. The US should rather search for a credible Afghan partner having support of the Afghan people, not of these moderate fundamentalists.

Conclusion

A wrong selection for negotiation may reverse the trend in spite of a new winning strategy. Many see the US desperation to reach an agreement with the moderates as a part of its exit plan prior to 2012. Cutting a deal with the Taliban sends a signal that the US is not winning the war in Afghanistan. The staying power of the US in Afghanistan depends on how it understands the global nature of the Taliban threat. India, on the frontline of the global fight against terrorism, will definitely bear the brunt of this myopic US attempt at a political reconciliation with Taliban, which is an integral part of the Af-Pak strategy. It would be prudent for the US to systematically include India in crafting this strategy. 'The West would be better served if it takes India's concerns into account'.⁷ However, if the US remains determined to bring a distinction between 'good' and 'bad' jihadis, it will neither reduce the threat of terrorism in the sub-continent, nor weaken the spirit of Taliban as a fighting force.

Sanjeeb Kumar Mohanty
Berhampur University, Orissa, India
mohanty_sanjeeb@yahoo.com


References

1. Challaney, Brahma. 'Pay Offs Won't Pay', *The Times of India*, Bhubaneswar, 2 January 2009, p.12.
2. Gerner, Martin. 'US Foreign Policy in Afghanistan: In Search of Moderate Taliban'.
3. Khan, Imran. 'Talking to the Taliban', *Al Jazeera English*, 10 March 2009 <http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2009/03/200939102529353355.html>. Accessed on 20 September 2009.
4. Shah, Aqil. 'What is the Problem with Pakistan? Washington and the Generals', *Foreign Affairs*, 31 March 2009. www.foreignaffairs.com/node/64845. Accessed on 19 June 2009.
5. Sharma, Pranay. 'The Lesser Evil?', *Outlook*, New Delhi, 6 April 2009, p.30.
6. Raghavan, V.R. 'Strategic Depth in Afghanistan', *The Hindu*, 7 November 2001. www.thehindu.com/2001/11/07/stories/05072523.htm. Accessed on 27 August 2009.
7. Pant, Harsh V. 'Terms of Involvement', *The Times of India*, Bhubaneswar, 4 March 2010, p.12.

Three dreams or three nations?

A recent exhibition¹ on South Asian photography entitled 'Where Three Dreams Cross: 150 Years of Photography in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh' highlights indigenous or native photographers as a marker of what India was before the two partitions. This is to suggest that there is a history of image-making that stands outside the ambit of European practitioners. The exhibition featured over 400 photographs, a survey of images encompassing early trends and photographers from the 19th century, the social realism of the mid-20th century, the movements of photography from the studio to the streets and, eventually, the playful and dynamic recourse with image-making in the present.

Rahaab Allana



CULTURAL PRACTITIONERS—whether writers, musicians, painters and even photographers—have endlessly tried to understand the varied ways in which we should and do look beyond borders; and whether those lines of separation monitor the inner workings and deeper cultures of engagement in our dealings with art, and even the curatorial practice engaged with expressing that art. Consequently, to ponder whether Indian photography is definable without Pakistan and Bangladesh, or whether South Asian photography is contained in these three nations alone, unfurls a series of assumptions and notions that counter the reasons for the separation of identity today, but simultaneously maintain how there are traceable differences that mark the development of photography in Asia.

The exhibition

Photography in Asia represents the coming of an age, digital, virtual and otherwise. The history of it is allied to a European history, one that sadly does not find its way into the exhibition. In trying to juxtapose the vintage elements of photography in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, do the images actually stand beside their contemporaries, struggling for space? The preface in the exhibition catalogue announces: 'This project traces the characteristics of contemporary photography through its historical precedents, revealing the roots.' This is a curatorial decision of working backwards, and therefore a significant amount of attention has been given to the self-determination of the curators in creating their personal links with the artworks. The catalogue itself marks this intent, with evocative pieces by the curators—Sunil Gupta, Radhika Singh, Hammad Nassar, Shahidul Alam, Urs Stahel and Iwona Blazwick—as well as Christopher Pinney, Geeta Kapur and Sabeena Gadiloke. The writing is somewhat disproportionately concentrated on photography in India.

Five distinct sections in the exhibition highlight distinct themes that draw the attention of the visitor towards classifications and subjects. These include, the portrait, family, body politic and performance and the street, each highlighting thematic passages. Over 70 photographers including Raghu Rai, Pushpamala N., Rashid Rana, Dayanita Singh, Raghubir Singh, Umrao Singh Sher-Gil, Gauri Gill, Sheba Chachi Rashid Talukder, Ayesha Vellani and Munem Wasif are presented in the show, with works drawn from important collections of historic photography, including the Alkazi Collection of Photography (Delhi), The Abhishek Poddar Collection (Bangalore), The Udaipur City Palace Museum Archive (Central India), Whitestar (Pakistan) and the Drik Archive (Dhaka). These are joined by many previously unseen images from private family archives, galleries, individuals and works by leading contemporary artists.

Exhibitions are part of a collective enterprise, a space where artists and their work often speak for themselves. Given that India has had a varied encounter with photography over the last 150 years, any engagement with it in the current scenario entails work that assumes to undo, abet and evolve from what was done in the past. The bearing of such an exhibition, therefore, highlights three distinct modes of operation and the fraught relationships between past and present: the imperial, nationalist and the post-colonial. These represent continuities, ruptures and contradictions that have given the modern aesthetic in South Asia nourishment in the last 100 years.

The effect of photography on contemporary exhibition practice, such as that under discussion here, highlights the framework, mainly of the post-colonial (and even post-modern) as the point of engagement with the public. However, in the attempt at shaping the discourses on representation in visual culture today, the discussion peters away, marginally addressing the scope of differences in the exhibition. This is perhaps also because the chief curator (and photographer), Sunil Gupta makes a conscious attempt to avoid what he terms as 'conceptual art' from entering the realm of the exhibition. Gupta (born 1953) earned an MA in Photography from the Royal College of Art, London in 1983. As photographer, curator and activist, he has worked extensively to represent Indian photography at the local level, as well as at international exhibitions. He broaches on a kind of intended play associated with the notion of heritage, the inherent contradictions that arise from the local to the global, often signaled in the mediations of the South Asian Diaspora, placed in a transnational landscape of cultural production. However, one can't help feeling that the exhibition suffers to some extent from trying to understand the notion 'who produces and for whom and why?' Though the curators seek to highlight modes of practice that may tie the three nations together by virtue of the contradictions they share, the viewer is left wanting more insight into the intentions and the reasons behind the photographs on display.

On the other hand, the exhibition purposefully avoids chronology. There is an emphasis on theme and the use of insinuation and reflection rather than a sense of temporal or even aesthetic progression, or in some cases iconic works featured from the history of the contemporary. Photography is realised as a form of cultural production in the present that lays claim to the past, and this is mediated and transformed by the act of display. Here contemporary practitioners from all countries, respond to cultural dilemmas in many and self-conscious ways and often remain caught in the discrepancies created by colonial history and the paradigms of it. Dayanita's commentary on

Images from left to right:

1. Photographer from Mumbai, Unknown Artist, Silver Gelatin Print, c. 1900, 16.4 x 11cm. The Alkazi Collection of Photography.
2. Syed Muhammad Adil, Protest Against lack of electricity and water in Karachi, 2008, Digital print, 50 x 61cm. White Star, Karachi
3. The cover of the exhibition catalogue.
4. Homai Vyarawala, Pandit Nehru Releasing a pigeon at the National Stadium in Delhi, 1950s. The Homai Archives/ The Alkazi Collection of Photography.
5. Aasim Akhtar, Kali Bari, Peshawar, 1997, Silver gelatin print, 35 x 27cm. Collection the artist.
6. Pushpamala N. Bombay Photo Studio, Navarasa Suite (Raudra), 2000-3, sepia toned silver gelatin print, 62 x 47cm. Shumita and Arni Bose Collection, NY.

Mona Ahmed, the personal life of the eunuch who lives beside a graveyard, Pushpamala N.'s engagements with the historical archive and the use of iconcity, the use of memory by Vivan Sundaram through a relay of works on his aunt and grandfather, Umrao Sher Gil; these are only some of the links created that provide insights into the history of the contemporary.

Hammad Nassar, curator of the collections from Pakistan, mentions in the catalogue, the infusions of fine art and a documentary kind of photography that emerges from Pakistan. Nasar is a London-based curator, gallerist, writer and co-founder of the arts organisation, Green Cardamom, with a range of interests outside photography. He comments on the magic realism of some of the ruh khitch (soul pulling) photographers who line the streets of Lahore with older cameras. Important examples here are Gogi Pehewan and Muhammad Amin. Iftikar Dadi and Shaughat Mehmood's interaction with photography is of interest in connection with the genre of manipulating and altering the surface of the image, as one sees in painted photographs. Bani Abidi's work, represented in video and photographic forms, together with Rashid Rana's investigation of photographic narrative structures creates an interesting juxtaposition with photographers in India, depicted through nuanced investigations of place and identity.

Here we take an interesting turn to Bangladesh, an important force in photography today, curated by Shahidul Alam, an important figure in the organisation and dissemination of photography in Bangladesh. Shahidul Alam studied and taught chemistry in London where he obtained a PhD from the University of London, starting out as a practitioner of photography in 1980. In 1989 he set up the Drik picture library and Pathshala: South Asian Institute of Photography. He is also a director of Chobi Mela, the festival of photography in Asia. In this exhibition, he brings forth the work of Golam Kasem Dady, an early photographer in Bangladesh in 1918. Later works by Rashid Talukdar who photographed perhaps the most important moments of the 1970s, juxtaposed with images of Muhammad Shafi or Jalaluddin Haider create a political trajectory that permits a deeper understanding of Bangladesh's violent past. Other younger and extremely dynamic photographers from Bangladesh on display are Shumon Ahmed, Abir Abdullah, Abdul Hamid Kotwal and Munem Wasif.

Frictions

Historical material in the exhibition is rarely seen as a starting point but rather, as a point of return. In taking this view, the vintage material seems somewhat appropriated to the production of material in the contemporary, rather than a point

150 years of photography in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh



of initiation. There seems to have been an act of scrambling the images, perhaps a rightful solution in this case. Material is drawn from disparate collections and the thematics identified are often from older productions or exhibitions. The method devised to deal with this problem is to let the images speak for themselves. This is an important curatorial stance, but needed to be sussed out in more tangible and descriptive ways, allowing the unread viewer to take stock of the movements and international conditioning in photography in Asia. The impressionistic overview veers through the tracts of self-representation, portraiture, documentation and artistic recreation, where artists from the three countries try to contend with their own realities and, in doing so, they yearn to be understood.

From a wholistic point of view, exhibitions such as these are an interesting route into Art History. Here the social economic and, at times, political forces that shape artistic production and distribution come together, exerting varying degrees of pressure on artists, critics, curators, collectors and dealers alike. Therefore, while encountering the exhibition, it becomes important to forge your own link with the works. How, then, does Muhammad Arif Ali—with his 2008 works of political rallies—compare with the sweeping panoramic images of Praful Patel in Mumbai in the 1950s? This leads us to compelling historical figures such as Homai Vyarawalla and Kulwant Roy, mirrored on a facing wall with architectural images by Lala Deen Dayal and by Bharat Sikka's gigantic views of contemporary Delhi.

Rooms of wonder yield the dynamic images of Vikas Roy, Ram Rahman and Abdul Kalam Azad, leading further onto Muhammad Ali Salim, and even views by upcoming photographer from India, Shahid Datawalla. Further connections may be drawn between Syed Muhammad Adil and Tanveer Shahzaad, while the historical images of Bozai go well with Homai Vyarawalla and Whitestar images from Pakistan. Therefore in exhibitions such as this, it is important to identify why the juxtaposition of the

old and the emerging, have led artists to confront the future of their own productions with varying degrees of emulation, rejection and creative departure.

Apart from talks by the three main curators, a compelling symposium was organised over two days in the Fotomuseum, Winterthur. The speakers included curators such as Pramod Kumar KG, who spoke on the life of portraiture in India, based on his extensive work in the Udaipur Archives. Akshaya Tankha and Suryanandini Narain revealed their experiences of ethnography and the archive and the representation of women in studio photography, respectively. Practitioners such as Dayanita Singh and Bani Abidi spoke of their personal inspirations and experiences that led to the generation of their work. Sabeena Gadihoke highlighted her interest in photography during and after the national movement in India, concentrating on press and magazine photography. One of the most intriguing talks was by independent practitioner and writer, Aweek Sen, on his personal journey through the images and themes that underlay the exhibition and the complexity between the meaning and resonance of images and words.

In all, the exhibition presented more than pure aesthetic delight, creating horizons of contestation between themes and images. In a world where the art market seems to be sky rocketing—and artists are becoming ever more demanding of galleries and curators are vying to represent them—photography in Asia still seems to demand much greater academic input and real substantive criticism that would allow it to represent more than regional identity. Such an interaction would necessarily explain and exploit a landscape that has a powerful modern visual paradigm in order to highlight a sense of cultural difference in the 21st Century, a sense of heterogeneity in what is 'seen' and experienced. This is the world of global capitalism, citizenship, neo-imperialism, minorities, exile, secularism: and these are the boundaries that need to be transgressed for a more humanist understanding of the contemporary world.

Rahaab Allana
Alkazi Collection of Photography, Delhi, India
rahaab@acparchives.com

Note

1. The exhibition 'Where three dreams cross: 150 Years of Photography in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh' was on display at the Whitechapel Gallery, East London, in January 2010 and at the Fotomuseum in Winterthur, Switzerland, from June until August 2010.

Maulana Bhashani and the transition to secular politics in East Bengal

In the 1950s, a mass movement demanding national self-determination for the Bengali people emerged in East Bengal, then part of Pakistan. This movement was led by the politician-preacher Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, who, prior to Partition, emerged as a leader of marginalised peasants in Assam. Bhashani championed the twin demands that shaped the politics of East Bengal – the demand for national self-determination and the demand that the state distance itself from Islam. Peter Custers argues that, in fact, Bhashani led the transition to secular politics in the decades that preceded the emergence of Bangladesh.

Peter Custers



ON MARCH 10, 1947, a day of non-cooperation was observed in the colonial province of Assam. That morning, the *Maulana* (Muslim theologian) Bhashani succeeded in evading the British intelligence services who had issued instructions to arrest him. He crossed the Brahmaputra river in a *nauka*, (a small boat), then travelled onwards by land in a bullock cart, eventually reaching the town hall of Tejpur. Here, thousands of peasants had gathered for a public meeting calling for the formation of a separate state of 'Pakistan', comprising Bengal and Assam. Though the day of action was sponsored by the Muslim League, claiming to represent exclusively Muslim interests, Bhashani's speech was free of the communal rhetoric to which other Muslim League leaders were prone. He insisted that unity between Hindus and Muslims be maintained; his movement was directed against 'British imperialism' – not against any religious community.¹

Though Bhashani originally hailed from Shirajganj in East Bengal, (now Bangladesh), he derives his appellation 'Bhashani' from *char* Bhashan, a low lying area of Assam. It was here, in the late 1920s, that Bhashani built his own hut, after having been forced by the British colonial authorities to seek refuge beyond the borders of Bengal. Before this shift, the fiery theologian had started distinguishing himself as an opponent of the feudal *zamindari* system which formed the backbone of Britain's rule over Bengal. 1920s Bengal saw the emergence of a movement for tenants' rights² protesting unjust impositions by absentee landlords. It was actively supported by rural intellectuals, including lawyers and Islamic preachers. *Maulana* Abdul Hamid Khan, later to be known as 'Bhashani', was a key organiser of this movement.

In Assam, the *Maulana* emerged as an effective and popular peasant leader, ready to champion the cause of the down-trodden. Perhaps paradoxically, he also emerged as a widely respected leader of the Muslim League and in 1944 he was elected the party's President.³ The mass appeal which Bhashani developed via his support for immigrant peasants is illustrated by a short account of a *Shammelan* (conference) held in Mangaldoi, in 1946. The event is vividly described by the journalist-writer Samsuddin, who had been invited to chair it.⁴ Arriving at the conference ground, Bhashani was greeted by a large crowd of peasants, raising their sticks above their heads. 'There must', Samsuddin writes, 'have been at least two lakh, (200,000) participants!' In a two-hour long speech to the conference, Bhashani criticised the British, but also singled out the police for atrocities committed against Bengali immigrants. Even his own Muslim League colleagues came in for criticism; Bhashani exhorted them to work harder for the cause.⁵

Just months before Mangaldoi, in April 1946, the Muslim League had won all but three seats in elections to Assam's Legislative Assembly. This resounding victory, according to the biographer Syed Abul Maksud, should 'almost entirely' be credited to Bhashani.⁶ Yet, Bhashani was no conventional Muslim League

politician. In 1944, at the very meeting where he was elected party President, Bhashani appealed to the League's General Secretary, Sadullah, not to act as a 'postbox' for the British authorities.⁷ He was later to recall that, at a certain point during his stay in Assam, he had actually allied with the Congress party so as to press the Muslim League into action!⁸ Bhashani consistently used his standing as a religious leader and politician to advance the cause of the peasantry and on the eve of Partition, we find Bhashani combining the espousal of migrant peasants' interests, with a principled opposition against communal hatred, and advocating the formation of a greater Bengal state.⁹

Bhashani as religious leader

Writings eulogising *Maulana* Bhashani tend to focus on his politics, and the fact that he played a central role in the political evolution of (East) Bengal.¹⁰ This is a rather myopic view, for Bhashani's politics cannot be understood without also taking into account the fact that he was a religious preacher with a huge following. Indeed, in Assam, *Maulana* Bhashani was widely regarded as a *pir*, a saint-like figure, commanding a large number of disciples who accepted his religious teachings, who were willing to support his politics, in particular his opposition to British colonialism.

Between 1907 and 1909, Bhashani attended the famous Islamic University of Deoband, where he received theological training. Deoband was widely regarded as a centre with progressive leanings. Several Sufi orders have influenced Deoband's teachings. Its theologians are reputed to have shared an 'anti-imperialist' orientation, and to have actively propagated the need to end Britain's domination over the subcontinent.¹¹

There are clues to which current within Islam Bhashani ultimately chose to embrace in his essay on the policy of '*Rabubiyat*', written in 1974, at the twilight of his political life.¹² This essay indicates that, from 1946 onwards, the *Rabubiyat* remained his guiding ideology. The *Rabubiyat* preaches the undivided equality of all people, whatever their caste, nationality or religion. What makes *Rabubiyat* distinct, is that it advocates the abolition of private ownership on the basis of faith. Bhashani states:

*'Man is only a custodian, whereas Allah holds ownership over all properties that exist. Thus, the state should abolish all private ownership, and should distribute things in equal proportions, on the basis of need.'*¹³

This statement reveals just how intertwined politics and religion were in Bhashani's vision and life. Indeed, for him the message of Islam was so much a vision on how society should be structured economically, that he used every occasion to impress on his followers the need to engage in struggles for socio-economic change. Bhashani *preached* that the peasants needed to get organised.

Images from left to right:
1. Sheikh Mujib at 'Probat Ferry' with Maulana Bhashani and others in 1953.
2. A Pakistani policeman barring Bhashani's way in front of Dhaka's Baitul Mokarram mosque in 1968.
3. The Maulana while speaking at a grand rally, held at Dhaka's Paltan Maidan in 1970.
4. Shaheed Minar Dhaka, 1956.
5. Leaflets for an independent Bangladesh.


Transition to secular politics

After Partition, Bhashani returned to East Bengal (East Pakistan). Here, he led a mass campaign in the 1950s in favour of regional autonomy and Bengali self-determination. This campaign was to play a key role in the *Maulana's* journey towards the secularisation of politics, for the momentum which the movement for autonomy gained decisively demonstrated that the hold of the Muslim League and of Pakistan's rulers over the minds of the population in East Bengal was weakening, and that secularisation was truly possible.

Bhashani had already protested in public against Pakistan's economic exploitation of East Bengal in the late 1940s.¹⁴ Furthermore, he had also ensured that the demand stating that self-rule (*swayatsashan*) be granted to the province was included in the programme of the the (Muslim) Awami League, a new party formed as breakaway of the Muslim League in 1949.¹⁵ In the campaign for the 1954 elections he turned the demand for autonomy into the public's 'heartfelt issue' (*praner dabi*), showing that electoral campaigning can contribute significantly towards a society's politicisation. After the party coalition he led had gained a convincing victory, he steadfastly continued building public opinion in support of self-determination, calling on students and other sections of the public to wear black badges on a province-wide day of resistance, and leading numerous rural demonstrations to vent the public's discontent.¹⁶

The 1957 Cultural Conference at Kagmari formed the culminating point of Bhashani's campaign in favour of regional autonomy, and is considered to be a milestone in Bangladesh's history. The (by then renamed) Awami League had assumed governmental power in 1956. It soon became evident, however, that its ministers were bent on abandoning the party's principles, in exchange for personal gain. It was under these circumstances that Bhashani, as the League's President, called for a two day Council session of the party in Kagmari, Tangail, to be followed by a three day Cultural Conference. Bhashani used Kagmari to re-affirm the party's 'anti-imperialist' stance.¹⁷ In his conference speech, Bhashani threatened – prophetically – that if East Bengal were not granted autonomy, the people would ultimately say '*Assalamu Alaikum*' (goodbye) to Pakistan.¹⁸

Even today there is a tendency amongst a section of Bangladeshi politicians, to obfuscate history and downgrade Bhashani's achievements. It is critically important to underline how Bhashani's campaign for regional autonomy, which reached its peak at the Kagmari Conference, both created the environment for the secularisation of politics, and formed the precursor to the 1971 war for the independence of Bangladesh. Yet what nasty opposition the aged preacher-politician had to face! In the wake of the Kagmari Conference, conservative *pirs* and *maulanas* publicly vilified Bhashani, arguing that he was



trying to disrupt Pakistan's territorial integrity.¹⁹ Bhashani's own party colleagues were equally uncooperative. Editorials in both West and East Pakistan openly denounced him for his uncompromising stance.²⁰ Yet, despite all this, the history of East Bengal's subsequent evolution attests that *Maulana* Bhashani was a political pioneer.

Bhashani's struggle for secularisation of East Bengal's politics started well before the Kagmari Conference took place. Thus, at a Council session of the Muslim Awami League in 1955, he proposed that the word 'Muslim' be dropped from the party's name. And in his welcoming speech to the Kagmari Conference, he pushed aside Jinnah's 'two nations' theory, insisting that, while it was a country with a Muslim majority, Pakistan was 'for Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, *adivasis* and other small nationalities alike'.²¹ Bhashani stated that the communal problem was the 'very biggest problem of the people of India and Pakistan'. He warned that if this problem was not resolved, the people of the two countries can never live in peace, and 'all efforts at development' will be utterly wasted.²¹

The details registered above regarding East Bengal's political evolution during the 1950s, reveal Bhashani's key role in steering the transformation of East Bengal's politics. Indeed, history attests that the 1950s saw a dramatic transition from the Muslim League with its communal grip over East Bengal's politics, towards the secularisation of the region's politics. *Maulana* Bhashani did not just contribute to, but played the very determining role in achieving this historical transition. Via his leadership in the formation of East Bengal's (Muslim) Awami League, via the consultations he held on abolishing the party's communal bias, and via his speeches on the problematic relations between the Subcontinent's main religions, Bhashani helped lay the foundations for the subsequent formation of Bangladesh as a secular state.

Bhashani's class politics:

Having highlighted Bhashani's intense efforts to strengthen religious tolerance in East Bengal in the 1950s, it is now necessary to return to discuss the *Maulana's* class politics. Here it should be stressed that, during the given historical period, Bhashani did not just stick to the policy he had pursued before, i.e. of championing peasant demands, but took it to a new stage. He invariably took a stance in favour of the demands put forward by various sections of the labouring population, such as industrial workers, fisher folk and peasants producing Bengal's 'golden' fibre, jute. Moreover, Bhashani did not just use his leverage as a public opinion builder to promote these causes, he also took a personal interest in the self-organisation of each labouring class or section. The enhancement of class struggle was central to the methodology and strategy he used to defend religious tolerance.

Soon after his return to East Bengal from Assam, in the late 1940s, Bhashani agreed to champion the cause of waged workers employed in modern enterprises. Newspapers reports published in 1949/1950 record the sorrowful plight of workers recruited to labour for the province's railways. Many lacked proper housing, and job security did not exist. Against this background, a union of railway workers was formed in 1949, and Bhashani was elected to be its President. In this capacity he is reported to have repeatedly spoken at gatherings of the union's leading members, and he also participated in negotiations which the union held with the railway authorities.²² Four years later, the *Maulana* was again called upon to be president of another trade union. This time it was the union of workers employed in Adamjee Jute Mills, the largest industrial complex in East Bengal at that time.

One personal initiative which the *Maulana* undertook was regarding the formation of East Bengal's union of fisher folk.²³ This initiative dates from 1958 and was launched immediately after Bhashani had parted ways with the Awami League, and had formed his own Leftist party, the NAP. (*National Awami Party*). NAP's programmatic documents expressed unequivocally Bhashani's combined orientation, on class struggle from below and on religious tolerance. The document also referred to the need for 'land reform'.²⁴ In 1958, he launched a month-long drive to help prepare for the holding of a conference of fisher folk. Over a hundred delegates are reported to have gathered for this event, termed 'singular' in the history of Bengal.²⁵ The *Shammelan* adopted a 12-point charter of demands, with strikingly concrete propositions, including: that import licenses for fishing gear be offered to professional fishermen, that floating hospitals be set up in fishing zones, and that anyone owning a net should be granted rights over water bodies.²⁶

Again, not long before he had started his drive in support of fisher folk, in January 1958, the *Maulana* had already taken the initiative towards the formation of a peasant association, the East Pakistan '*Krishok Samity*'.²⁷ Soon after, however, the process of organising in the rural areas was disrupted, when the military took over state power and imposed Martial Law. It was only in 1964 that organising could be re-intensified.

Clearly, the aged Bhashani in the Pakistan period made sustained efforts to promote the formation of union-type organisations, both in villages and towns of East Bengal. By the end of the 1960s, these efforts bore fruit and in a very explosive manner. Unfortunately, in this brief essay, there is no scope to give a detailed description of Bhashani's role in the 1968/69 uprising against military dictatorship. It should be noted, however, that he personally launched the uprising in East Bengal, via a general strike held in Dhaka on December 7, 1968, and that he personally helped shape other tactics employed by the rising's participants. In the aftermath of Ayub Khan's fall, Bhashani's leadership in the uprising drew much international attention.

In the late 1940s, just after Partition, the sphere of politics in the province had largely been communalised. By the late 1960s, through the intense and sustained efforts which the *Maulana* and other politicians opposed to intolerance had made, the impact of communal parties in East Bengal had dramatically declined. The change in public discourse was very visible in the uprising against Ayub Khan's dictatorship. The very success of this uprising indicates that the state could no longer exploit religion to manipulate the sentiments of East Bengal's population. Politics had largely been secularised.

Conclusion

Bhashani's efforts should be assessed within a broader, longer-term perspective on religious tolerance and the history of Bangladesh. Here two points may be re-visited: First, Bhashani did not try to position himself beyond the parameters of a single religion. Bhashani's way of identifying with Islam, it may be argued, limited his scope for incorporating syncretic elements derived from other faiths into his own world view. While he surely displayed an affinity with Bengal's syncretic tradition, his approach was different from, for instance, the poet-writer Nazrul Islam, who used an imagery derived from both Hinduism and Islam. Nevertheless, Bhashani's championing of religious tolerance from within the framework of Islam has its own, positive, importance for the contemporary debate on religious tolerance. For at a time when right-wing, Western politicians are trying to make their public believe that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the values of religious tolerance and the nature of Islam, the example of *Maulana* Bhashani reveals, with full force, that the opposite is the case.

Peter Custers
IIAS, Leiden University, the Netherlands
antimil@hotmail.com
www.petercusters.nl

Notes

1. The observance of March 10, 1947 as 'Assam Day', and *Maulana* Bhashani's appearance and speech at the gathering in Tejpur, are amongst others described by Bhashani's chief biographer Syed Abul Maksud, *Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani* (Bangla Academy, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 1994), p.57.
2. Information on the Peasant Conferences Bhashani held in the 1920s and 1930s can be found in Abu Noman Khan, 'Maulana Bhashani's Jibansrote' (in Mohsin Sastrapani, *Majlum Jananeta. Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani* (Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Parishad, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2002), p.264.
3. Syed Abul Maksud (1994), op.cit. p.46; Abu Noman Khan (2002), op.cit., p.265.
4. See Abul Kamal Samsuddin, 'Maulana Bhashani O Assamer Lain Protha' (in: Hasan Abdul Quayyum (ed.), *Mozlum Jananeta Maulana Bhashani* (Islamic Foundation, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 1988, p.15); also Syed Abul Maksud (1994), op.cit., p.49/50.
5. Abul Kalam Samsuddin (1988), op.cit. p.20; also Syed Abul Maksud (1994), op.cit., p.50.
6. Syed Abul Maksud (1994), op.cit. p.47.
7. Abu Noman Khan (2002), op.cit. p.265.
8. Syed Abul Maksud (1994), op.cit. p.8.
9. On the controversy that existed in the Muslim League of Bengal over formation either of one common state of Pakistan, consisting in a Western and an Eastern territory, or of two distinct state entities, meaning that a separate state of Bengal be formed – see notably Kamruddin Ahmed, *The Social History of East Pakistan* (Crescent Book Centre, Dacca, East Pakistan, 1967), p.82 and p.87/88; and Shila Sen, *Muslim Politics in Bengal. 1937-1947* (Impex India, New Delhi, India, 1976).
10. This is true in particular for writings by Leftwing intellectuals and activists on Bhashani – see e.g. the bulk of the writings included in the anthology edited by Mohsin Sastrapani, *Majlum Jananeta. Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani* (Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Parishad, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2002).
11. Syed Abul Maksud (1994), op.cit. p.11; on the founding theologians of Deoband and Sufi mysticism, see notably M.Azam Qasmi, 'Sufism and the Founders of Deoband: A Study of Their Understanding and Responses' (in Saiyid Zaheer Husain Jafri/Helmut Reifeld (2006), op.cit., p.338.
12. *Maulana Bhashani, "Rabubiyater Bhumika"* (April, 1974 – published in Syed Abul Maksud (1994), op.cit., p.398).
13. *Maulana Bhashani* in Syed Abul Maksud (1994), op.cit. p.701.
14. See for instance Bhashani's speech on the budget of the Pakistan government, held in 1949 – Saidur Rahman, *Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashanir Bhashan O Bibriti* (Jagroti Prakashani, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2000), p.17.
15. See for the inclusion of the demand for autonomy in the 12-point demand program of the Awami Muslim League – Syed Abul Maksud (1994), op.cit., p.718 (point 3).
16. Muhammad Samsul Haque, *Maulana Bhashanir Rajnoitik Jiban. Tatvalochona O Mulyayan*, Tangail, Bangladesh, 1987 (1987), p.24; Syed Abul Maksud (1994), op.cit., p.126/127; Abu Noman Khan (2002), op.cit., p.279.
17. See notably Shah Ahmed Reza, *Bhashanir Kagmari Shammelan O Shayatshashoner Sangram* (Ganoprakashani, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 1986).
18. On Bhashani's famous '*ukti*' threatening his '*Assalamu Ailakum*' to the existence of Pakistan, see e.g. Shah Ahmed Reza (1986), op.cit., p.51; Syed Abul Maksud (1994), op.cit., p.126; Muhammad Samsul Haque (1987), op.cit., p.30.
19. See Shah Ahmed Reza (1986), op.cit., p.71; for an overview of negative reactions to the Kagmari Conference, see e.g. Syed Abul Maksud (1994), op.cit., p.151.
20. Syed Abul Maksud (1994), op.cit., p.151; Muhammed Samsul Haque (1987), op.cit., p.31.
21. Syed Abul Maksud (1994), op.cit. p.149.
22. For details on Bhashani's involvement with the union of railway workers, see e.g. Amzad Hossain, 'Panchash Dashaker Sramik Andolen O Maulana Bhashani' (in: Mohsin Sastrapani (2002), op.cit. p.170-171.
23. See Syed Abul Maksud (1994), op.cit. p.225: 'Pradeshik Motshojibi Samity Pratishtha'.
24. *ibid*, p.208.
25. Maksud calls it the 'first political organisation of fisher folk in East Bengal' – see Syed Abul Maksud (1994), op.cit. p.226.
26. *ibid*; see also Abu Noman Khan (2002), op.cit. p.285.
27. Syed Abul Maksud (1994), op.cit. p.234, 'Porbu Pakistan Krishak Samity Gathan'.

This is a summary of an article published in the The Indian Economic and Social History Review (IESHR) April-June 2010 issue, Vol.XLVII no.2, p.231: Peter Custers, '*Maulana Bhashani and the Transition to Secular Politics in East Bengal*'.

Moving portraits and interactive voices from the British Raj

The study of South Asian colonial amateur films and of oral history archives provides a particular insight into imperial identities that is not necessarily evident from other sources. The Centre of South Asian Studies, University of Cambridge, has recently made available online 280 films and 300 interviews documenting lesser-known aspects of the British rule in South Asia (see www.admin.cam.ac.uk/news/dp/2010030401). The Centre's online archives represent a timely and singular contribution to the current scholarship concerned with renewed negotiations of Britain's imperial past and its relevance to today's multicultural society.

Annamaria Motrescu



THE UNCENSORED VISUAL AND AURAL RECORDS of colonial India held in The Centre of South Asian Studies' online archives include at the moment 500 hours of interviews given by British and Indian members of the former British Raj and 80 hours of colonial amateur films made by British people serving at various outposts across South and South-East Asia between 1911 and 1956. This is the first stage of an ongoing project run by the Centre with a view to gradually digitise and broadcast further 150 films and 100,000 photographs. The recent online launch of both film and oral collections is the result of an archival effort started over forty years ago by the Centre's then director, Mr. Ben Farmer. He was joined in 1967 by Mary Thatcher who became, and remained for almost two decades, the driving force behind the Centre. Ms. Thatcher showed an unrelenting commitment to the identification, preservation, cataloguing and research of papers, photographs, films and interviews illuminating the lives of many British and Indian people who lived through the last decades of colonial India. Today, the Centre holds written and visual documents of significant historic merit and the archival team, lead by Dr Kevin Greenbank, is gradually developing innovative educational programmes alongside the ongoing digitization of the collections.

The documentary relevance of the Centre's online archives subscribes to today's growing interest in imperial studies with a particular focus on countries such as India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong. These films and interviews operate at various interpretative levels and invite new analytical avenues and methodologies. For instance, they challenge stereotypical representations of British and Indian colonial identities while inviting renewed analysis of gender and racial dynamics. Also, through particular cases of imperial spectatorial gaze they show unwitting representations of both Indian and British 'subaltern' voices.

One of the key features of the Centre's online archives is the full-length broadcast of each collection. While most archives are making available online only excerpts from their film and interviews, the Centre is providing researchers with immediate and unedited access to its collections while gradually building cross-referential links within its digital

databases. Some of these cross-references are found on topics such as the building and operating of Indian railways, bridges and irrigation infrastructures,¹ tea plantations,² military operations,³ and the work of several British and Indian people alongside Mahatma Gandhi.⁴ In addition, the Centre's online archives are supported by invaluable background information found across in-house collections of photographs, South Asian newspapers, government microfilms, maps, and the donors' files.

To date, over 300 interviews (see www.s-asian.cam.ac.uk/audio.html) and 280 colonial amateur films (see www.s-asian.cam.ac.uk/films.html) are accessible on the Centre's website. The online oral archive highlights include, for instance, 120 interviews with former members of the Indian National Congress and of the Swaraj Party, as well as interviews with Roman Catholic and Anglican missionaries, former tea planters, railway engineers, members of the Indian Colonial Service and with British people who stayed on after the Indian Independence. While some of the colonial amateur films show details of mundane colonial life, others contain scenes of British rescue operations from Burma into India during World War II (the *Mackrell* collection); repairs to railways in Sind in 1934 (the *Berridge* collection); processions of Masonic lodges in Calcutta in 1927 (the *Studd* collection); scenes of Toda communities in the Nilgiri Hills in 1930 (the *Buchanan* collection); the marriage of the Maharaj Kumar of Patiala in 1932 (the *Wilson-Pemberton* collection); and relief operations in Punjab during the Partition of India in August 1947 (the *Williams* and *Burt* collections).

Imperial and postcolonial counter narratives

The documentary relevance of the Centre's online intertwined resources becomes evident across several collections providing either complementing or contrasting information on specific themes. One such theme is the representation of British and Indian women on film and how conventional means of portraying their ways of life are often contradicted by the women's oral testimonies. Thus, scenes showing an alleged carefree life, leisure activities and sports enjoyed by the memsahibs –wives of Indian Civil Servants,⁵ military or political officers –contrast

with some of their recollections of colonial times. For instance, in an interview from 1978, Mrs. Marjorie Hall describes her experience as the wife of a British military officer posted to Jacobabad in the early 1940s in terms of 'We were so busy surviving... [the British government] had no right to post families to places like that, it was criminal. You got up in the morning, you died in the afternoon, you were buried at night, [all] because you went bad so quickly.'⁶

A similar contrasting narrative is found when interpreting representations of Indian women across different visual and oral collections. Recurrent scenes of Indian women shown as *Ayahs* (child minders), tea pickers, poor villagers, or wives of Indian civil servants, would never convey the educational and political commitments of many Indian women. However, Indian women's political agency becomes evident in some of their interviews as is the case with Mrs. Savitri Madan's interview from 1970 (no. 147). A former teacher and village-industry specialist, she describes her work with women *satyagrahis* (nonviolent resistance activists) in inter-war Sialkot and Lahore, and her interest in Mahatma Gandhi's movement of Basic Education, particularly when she taught the children how to 'think in a way in which they could not only participate in their own development but [also] in the development of the[ir] country.'

Another example of counter narrative emerges when comparing scenes of the Indian Army with interviews describing the ideological dynamic among the ranks. Inter-war film scenes showing Indian Army parading, marching and undertaking military training find a new interpretative dimension when contextualised alongside oral records describing lesser-known social and political details. As a result, illustrative scenes of the 14th Battalion Rajputana Rifles from the *Barton* film collection, or of the 2nd/10th Gurkha Rifles from the *Taylor* film collection, are ideologically counteracted by various testimonies given by British and Indian military and political officers. For instance, Mr Nilubhai Limaye, a former member of the Samyukt Socialist Party, mentions the attitude of the Indian Army towards the Indian independence as 'very cold' and 'that most of them did not know that there was such a movement going on in the country'.⁷

By providing direct and uncensored access to original footage and interviews, the Centre of South Asian Studies facilitates and supports online scholarship reliant on critical practices engaged with the (re)production and representation of colonial memory, as well as with the re-assessment of how the past is continually reinscribed in the present.



There are also examples of interrelated visual and oral sources that supply the researcher with multilayered, complementing background information. One such case is offered by the Davy film collection and by Mr. C. H. Barry's interview from 1983 (no. 008), both documenting in great detail the inter-war life and activities of Indian students enrolled at the Aitchison College, Lahore. The two films from the Davy collection, made by an unidentified filmmaker in the 1930s, show the College at a time when the Principal was C. H. Barry. While the films show general views of the College's grounds and buildings, scenes of sports, horse shows, swimming, gymnastics and field hockey, Mr Barry's recollections reveal the critical situation he faced when appointed as the Principal of the College in May 1933. At that time, he was offered the job with the caveat that the College 'is bankrupt both in terms of numbers and finance. It is virtually bankrupt educationally. This is a last, desperate attempt to see whether it can be salvaged. We shan't blame you if it collapses because it's more than likely that it will.' The interwar film scenes and Mr Barry's interview illustrate an important, and ultimately successful, decade in the history of an educational institution launched primarily to serve the Punjab's princes and the sons of landed aristocracy and zemindars.

New contribution to digital humanities

By providing direct and uncensored access to original footage and interviews, the Centre of South Asian Studies facilitates and supports online scholarship reliant on critical practices engaged with the (re)production and representation of colonial memory, as well as with the re-assessment of how the past is continually reinscribed in the present. The Centre's online dissemination of its collections mediates new debates about patterns of inclusion/exclusion inherent to identity building and colonial, racial, gender, class, religious and political discourse. It also proposes alternative ways of discussing issues of displacement, British Diaspora and social acculturation. At the same time, amateur ethnographic records such as the Buchanan or Hopkinson film collections raise issues about the shifting relationship between official accounts and visual representations of colonial control. Across the Centre's online collections can be identified several representational patterns

Above:
Berridge collection.
Bombay-Madras
railway, ca.1930s.
Right:
Henson collection.
Jubbil, India, ca.1915.



corresponding to various forms of collective colonial knowledge and to trends in post-colonial acts of remembrance. Moreover, they intertwine narratives of coexistence and conflict within a continuous re-writing of historical contexts by challenging patterns of reproduction and contestation of imperial collective memory. This way, colonial and postcolonial identities are constantly negotiated from multidisciplinary perspectives with social and political perspectives drawing on visual, anthropological and psychoanalytical theories.

Overall, the Centre's online collections represent records of public and private colonial memory and offer outstanding insights into imperial ways of life. Their relevance to the imperial studies curriculum illuminates the entwined British and Indian collective memory and challenges stereotypical representations of the two colonial identities and cultures. The comparative analysis of these films and interviews reveals novel imperial gender and racial dynamics, while the identification of particular instances of colonial visual rhetoric and postcolonial memorialization proposes new methods of interpretation and acknowledgement of colonial societies. Thus, as first person narratives of specific times and events, the Centre's colonial amateur films and postcolonial interviews advocate for the renegotiation of Britain's imperial memory and past.

Lastly, the Centre's online collections offer a palimpsest of documentary resources that presents illuminating imperial as well as post-colonial ideological and cultural frameworks. The examples discussed here show how the Centre's cross-


referential online archival resources invite renewed research of means of production and re-imagining of imperial memory, and how these visual and aural digital collections advance interconnected methodologies of critical literacy in the field of digital humanities.

Annamaria Motrescu
University of Cambridge, UK
amm230@cam.ac.uk

Notes

1. See the Berridge and Stokes film collections, the W.S. Benton and E.P. Mainprice photographic collections, and Brig. R.E. Gardiner's interview (no 270).
2. See the Grant film collection and the F.G. Alderson-Smith's interview (no 007).
3. See the Barclay film collection and G. Sweeney papers.
4. See, for instance, Miss Anu Bandhopadhyaya's interview (no.105) about touring with Mahatma Gandhi across East Bengal following the outbreak of communal riots. See also, E.B.H. Baker papers.
5. See, in particular, the Kendall film collection.
6. See Interview no. 013.
7. See interview no. 148, 1970. Also, for records about the Indian National Army (INA) see S.A. Ayer's interview (no. 172) about the Azad Hind Cabinet of Subhas Chandra Bose, and Mr Cyril Tracey's interview (no. 036) in which he comments on the formation of the INA.

Provincial globalisation: the impact of reverse transnational flows in India's regional towns



An important five-year collaborative international research programme on 'Provincial Globalisation' is being directed by Prof. Mario Rutten of the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR), University of Amsterdam, and Prof. Carol Upadhyia of the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bangalore, supported by an Integrated Programme grant from WOTRO Science for Global Development (Netherlands). Dr. Anant Maringanti, the post-doctoral coordinator and a researcher on the programme explains the aims of the research.

Anant Maringanti, Carol Upadhyia and Mario Rutten

THIS IS ALL ABOUT 'GENETICS'! Harish Bhai, a prominent member of Dharmaj village community in central Gujarat proudly declares. The genetics that he is referring to is the fact that the village has a history of transnational migration that dates to the 19th century. People tracing their lineage back to this village live on three continents – Africa, Europe and North America. Although Harish Bhai himself rarely travels outside Gujarat, he plays a crucial role in mobilising remittances from members of this extended transnational village community, deploying these resources for village development works, maintaining family trees and records of donations and marriages, and encouraging people to come back to the village for special annual occasions that coincide with the Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas – India's official annual event when thousands of Overseas Indians congregate with government officials, business organisations and local cultural associations and NGOs to reinforce their ties with the motherland.

Although one may not come across such confident references to 'genetics' as the organising principle of transnational communities in other regions, such pride in linkages with relatives and community members overseas, in which family and kinship, business sense and philanthropic spirit, go hand-in-hand, is not unusual in India. How and why do people maintain such loyalties? What material and non-material resources flow back through the transnational networks that connect migrants with local communities? What are the implications of such connections and flows for development and for development policies in rapidly globalising India?

Such are the questions that drive the research programme on 'Provincial Globalisation'. The programme revolves around four central themes or propositions related to India's international migrants and their ties to India:

- 1) transnational migration is an important driver of globalisation and globalisation is experienced differently in medium and small-size urban centres in their peripheries, in contrast to metropolitan centres;
- 2) these differences may, in part, be related to the greater salience of caste and kinship networks in the provinces, which tend to get concealed by modernity in the metro cities;
- 3) such towns and their surrounding rural regions are not passive recipients of remittances and other migrant transfers, but rather are active nodes in forming and strategising around transnational flows and, hence, in the remaking of globalisation;
- 4) there is an urgent need to counter the sharp divide in much of the recent scholarship between research on remittances and migration and between studies on transnationalism and development studies.

The programme is built around five projects designed to examine transnational flows around three towns in three different Indian states – Anand in central Gujarat, Mangalore in coastal Karnataka and Guntur in coastal Andhra Pradesh. It will assess both quantitatively and qualitatively the social character and developmental consequences of 'reverse flows' of material resources such as household remittances, investments in land or businesses and charitable donations

to NGOs; 'social remittances' such as new ideas and know-how; and cultural and religious transactions such as donations to temples, mosques and churches, or support for spiritual organisations. Using a comparative and interdisciplinary approach, the programme will develop new methods for studying transnational processes.

Background

While there is a large literature on transnational networks and increasing interest in the impact of transnational flows on development in the home countries of migrants, conventional datasets generated in relation to nation-state boundaries do not do justice to the complexity of these processes. Thus, there is need to develop new types of data and methods of analysis in order to capture these processes. The Provincial Globalisation programme will uncover new and unconventional data sources on resource flows and map the key mechanisms and sites of resource transmission. It will also examine the influence of such transactions on political and economic processes, social development, and cultural/religious institutions and identities in the selected regions.

From the Indian policy perspective, there has been increasing interest in Overseas Indians who are seen as a resource base for national development. The motivations for migrants to share their resources with their communities of origin are often related to a cultural need to reinforce collective identity. The consequences of such transnational connections and flows, however, have neither been uniformly benign nor evenly spread across regions. For example, high volume investment in real estate by overseas Indians in their home regions has been known to have led to an escalation in land prices and increased polarisation of landholding. In this context, the research programme makes a case for a more comprehensive understanding of the consequences of such reverse flows, which will include an analysis of the social structuring of economic exchanges as well as their broader implications.

Programme structure

The programme consists of five independent but inter-linked research projects located in three states of India, to be carried out by three doctoral students – Sanderien Verstappen, Sanam Roohi and Sulagna Mustafi – and two post-doctoral researchers – Anant Maringanti (geography) and Puja Guha (economics). The PhD projects will be intensive micro-level studies of the selected regions, while the two post-doctoral projects will provide macro- and meso-level mappings of transnational linkages and flows at the regional, state and national levels.

Research sites and comparative analysis

The project sites, located in the states of Gujarat, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, have been selected to represent contrasting patterns of migration, transnational flows, and development outcomes. They also share common features – all are productive agricultural regions that are rapidly urbanising, where the dominant landowning/agricultural groups have diversified economically – processes that, in turn, are linked to out-migration. However, the time-scale, type, and destination of migration differ in each case. These include a range of actors

Above: Boat ride on the lake in the community park and fodder farm at Dharmaj built with contributions from NRIs. Photo by Anant Maringanti.

from domestic workers and other unskilled and semi-skilled labour going to the Middle East, to highly skilled and mobile professionals such as doctors and software engineers. While some receiving countries' policies do not permit permanent residency, in other cases the migrants actually become permanent residents or citizens. These diverse environments shape the character of reverse flows. Although different types of migration are found in all the regions, for the purposes of this research programme the focus in each case will be on particular groups of migrants who appear to be most significant in terms of driving transformations in their home regions.

This multi-disciplinary perspective, encompassing the disciplines of sociology, social anthropology, economics, and geography, is essential to capture the diverse ways in which transnational flows are embedded in social networks and permeated by cultural values or political aspirations. The overall programme has been designed to facilitate comparative and multi-scalar analysis by integrating the results of the individual research projects at different stages. The skills of the research team will be supplemented by consultations with development practitioners and a range of other stakeholders.

Significance

The research programme will produce significant academic as well as policy outputs. The programme will contribute to the literature on globalisation and transnationalism, as well as on migration and development, especially in the context of South Asia where such studies are inadequate, by moving down from the global and national levels to the region and locality. The research outputs will also contribute to national and international policy debates on migration, development, and the contributions of Overseas Indians to India's development. In India, the debate on migration and development has been focused mainly on the economic impact of remittances. In this context, one of the main goals of this research is to bring material, social and cultural dimensions of migration into the same framework in order to arrive at critical insights into contemporary globalisation processes.

Anant Maringanti
AISSR, Amsterdam University, the Netherlands

Carol Upadhyia
National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru, India

Mario Rutten
AISSR, Amsterdam University, the Netherlands

For more information contact
Prof. Carol Upadhyia
National Institute of Advanced Studies
Indian Institute of Science Campus, Bengaluru, India 560 012

Telephone: +91-80-22185000, Fax: +91-80-22185028
Email: provincial.globalisation@gmail.com
www.nias.res.in/researchgroups-sss-provincial-globalisation.php

Pull-out supplement

theFocus

Urbanisation in East Asia

Asia is one of the fastest growing regions in the world. Economically and politically the region's increasing importance has led some to see the 21st century as the Asian century. We are certainly likely to see an increasing shift from an Atlantic-centred world to a Pacific-centred one, with all the ramifications that that will bring. One of the major factors fuelling Asia's remarkable growth is urbanisation. The articles in this issue of *theFocus* are about the cities of Asia, and the scholars who have undertaken the research outlined here, most of it ongoing, come from a variety of different disciplines, including architecture, urbanism, sociology and the humanities. Their articles focus on East Asia and examine what cities such as Shanghai, Beijing, Manila and Kuala Lumpur are doing for (and to) their countries, as well as the wider region as a whole. They examine how these cities are positioning themselves in a rapidly globalising Asia and how some of them have made canny use of models imported from the West, yet have managed to retain their own identity. Indeed, by melding the different influences of East and West some of them have managed to create a new and dynamic urban environment.

Gregory Bracken

Urbanisation in East Asia: The geometries of stone

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 17 >

URBANISATION IS PLAYING A VITAL ROLE, particularly in China's recent and remarkable economic expansion. Alan Wheatley, in a recent article in the *International Herald Tribune* (3 August 2010), estimates the number of migrants in China to have reached 211 million in 2009. These people have been taking part in the largest mass migration in human history, sparked off by Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms in 1978. This 'second revolution' turned China into the world's workshop and enabled the country to move into the footlights on the world stage. A carefully controlled capitalist enterprise, which goes under the rubric of 'capitalism with Chinese characteristics', has enabled China to overtake Japan as the world's second-largest economy (which it did in August 2010). Some commentators even see the country as toppling the US from its number one spot in 20 years' time. America's economy is still three times that of China, but if China manages to sustain its 9% per annum growth this could well be a possibility.

This economic miracle also has its downside, which is particularly obvious in China's cities. The country has a population five times that of the US and its per capita income is on a par with countries like Algeria, El Salvador and Albania (i.e. approximately \$3,600 per annum, whereas the US is approximately \$46,000). Despite this, China has become the world's largest market for passenger vehicles, reflecting an interesting new stage in the country's economic development. The country no longer relies on the export of the cheap toys and clothes that first earned it the nickname 'workshop of the world', instead it has begun to turn to domestic demand in an effort to boost production and encourage Chinese people to buy the products that are made in the country. While this may seem a step in the right direction, it is having some unfortunate side-effects, such as the environmental impact of increases in steel and cement production, as well as an increase in the demand for power, which is still primarily fuelled by coal (China surpassed the US as the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases in 2006). However, China has recognised this problem and has taken steps to address it. Li Daokui (an economics professor at Beijing's Tsinghua University) was quoted last month in another article by Alan Wheatley as saying that investment in a low-carbon economy, as well as urbanisation and development of the interior, will be the main factors sustaining China's annual growth rate of 9% over the coming decade (*International Herald Tribune*, 17 August). He sees the country about to enjoy a 'golden period', one which will see not only a new focus on energy efficiency but also on the shift to growth in the domestic sector we saw mentioned earlier. Red China, it seems, would like to be seen as Green China.

The changes that this rapid economic development have caused have often been painful, even for those who have seemed to benefit the most – those with good jobs in the country's manufacturing sector. The Chinese government introduced a minimum wage in 2004, yet such moves, promising as they are, do not go far enough to alleviate the problems associated with the country's rapid economic growth, as witnessed by the wave of strikes that affected the country earlier this year. The government's apparent reluctance to repress these strikes is seen as a turning point in a country known for having little tolerance for labour militancy. This new-found tolerance is yet another sign of China's new economic maturity. Concern for workers' rights, and the gradual increases in wages that have resulted from it, are signs that China is leaving behind the old era of low-wage capitalism.

Yet what about those who have been left behind by this economic miracle? Or those who have been imperfectly able to partake in it? The 'floating population' of millions of migrants to China's cities, born out of the restrictive *hukou* registration system. These people simply disappear when the economy takes a downturn. They haven't disappeared, of course, all they have done is returned home, which does nothing to solve their problems; in fact, it exacerbates them, as there's nothing for them to go home to. One horrific example of the malaise associated with China's rapid pace of change was the spate of attacks on rural elementary school children in the run up to the Shanghai World Expo. Economic pressure and the stress of life in a such a rapidly changing society, not to mention the social stresses that have resulted from the One Child Policy, laudable as it is in principle, are having detrimental side-effects, with far too much pressure being placed on children to succeed, so they will be better able to take care of parents in their old age.

The debate over urbanisation and land reform that is beginning to engage the country is dealt with by [Ana Moya Pellitero's](#) article, which looks at the influence the economic reforms are having on the countryside, as well as the cities, particularly the dangers faced by the vast floating population which is ripe for exploitation. [Bogdan Stamoran](#) also examines China's rapid urbanisation from the point of view of how high-speed city building may soon yield to an agglomeration of numerous large, non-agricultural settlements, where individuals' plights are increasingly irrelevant in these new utopias. His article also examines China's massive infrastructure upgrades, which are enabling this growth but asks what effect it will have on Chinese family life? This is what all of the papers in theFocus are really about: the people who call these cities home. Some, like rural migrants, are mere sojourners in the city, but after a decade or two maybe they should start thinking of these places as home. That is, if they are allowed to.

Sojourners have been coming to Shanghai since its inception as a Treaty Port in 1842. Most of them lived in a housing typology that is unique to the city: the alleyway house. This is referred to by two authors: [Non Arkaraprasertkul's](#) analysis uses the more general term *lilong* in his examination of the nostalgia that has enveloped this accommodation, just as it is in real danger of disappearing; [Lena Scheen](#), in her examination of Wang Anyi's famous novel, *The Song of Everlasting Sorrow*, refers to them by using the Shanghainese term *longtang*. These alleyway houses feature almost as a character in the famous novel, which also acts as an encomium to a vanishing way of life. Lena Scheen also interviews the writer who reveals that she moved to the city as a young child and was always perceived as an outsider. The heroine of her novel is a woman who goes against the grain and suffers for it. 'I can't say Wang Qiyao is a representative of Shanghai', says Wang Anyi, 'then she is like Boston ivy on the wall of an old Shanghai building: a beautiful decoration of the city'.

A number of the articles take a broader view of urbanisation in East Asia. [Jacob Dreyer](#) examines how Beijing and Shanghai are vying with one another to be models for the rest of the country. These are two cities with very different characteristics, perhaps China could embrace the best of both worlds and benefit? Or will its cities follow one or the other model and increase the polarisation between them? [Leslie Sklair](#) takes us away from China by examining the architectural iconicity in the transition from the colonial to the globalising city. He takes a look at Malaysia's Multimedia Super Corridor, as well as the Petronas Towers and their role in helping Kuala Lumpur position itself as a global city. Finally, we come to a part of Asia that is somewhat underrepresented in discussions of globalisation and postcolonialism, that is the Philippines. [Estela Duque's](#) article examines the role of the US Army in the Philippines between 1898 and the 1920s, and the effects it has had on Manila and its environs.

I worked for many years as an architect in Asia. When I returned to Europe to begin training as an urbanist I found that I had to unlearn some of the tools that had previously served me so well. Perhaps the most important thing I learned was that even though cities might appear to be made up of buildings, as well as the streets and spaces between them, the most important thing about them is its people. Architects often concentrate exclusively on buildings (though the better ones do tend to take other factors into account), urbanists are better at seeing the spaces between buildings, not as empty space but as the connections that link the buildings to one another, which of course enables them to function. Spaces between buildings function very much like the spaces between the spokes of a wheel, the wheel's integrity depends as much on the spaces as on the materials the spokes are made of. None of this, neither the buildings nor the spaces, would be anything without the people who inhabit them. This simple fact is something that is reflected in the thoughtful and timely essays contained in this issue of *theFocus*, and is also something that any reader fortunate enough to visit the places mentioned in the papers should bear in mind. A stroll through these cities' street should be enough to convince anyone that what cities are all about is not the cold geometries of stone but the people who call them home.

Gregory Bracken
IIAS, University of Leiden and Delft School of Design, the Netherlands
gregory@cortlever.com

Architectural iconicity: Malaysia's Multimedia Super Corridor

Despite architecture and the built environment confronting all of us in our daily lives they have received little attention in discussions of globalisation, capitalism or postcolonialism. Certain types of architecture can be hegemonic in a class sense, serving specific class interests alongside their recognised aesthetic qualities. Until the middle of the 20th century this idea was discussed mainly in terms of monumentality and political power. However, in recent decades with the spread of consumerism around the world, notably in the postcolonial, newly industrialised countries (NICs) of East Asia, Leslie Sklair argues that iconic architecture is becoming increasingly important to understanding capitalist globalisation.

Leslie Sklair

IN A PREVIOUS ARTICLE¹ I attempted to explain the relationships between iconic architecture and capitalist globalisation, defining iconic in terms of fame and symbolic/aesthetic significance. Iconicity operates at the local/urban, the national and the global levels and many buildings can become iconic locally and/or nationally without achieving this status globally, though all global architectural icons are also well-known in their cities and countries of origin. My argument is that in the pre-global era –roughly before the 1950s and the onset of the electronic revolution in production, distribution and exchange, paving the way for what we now know as capitalist globalisation –architectural iconicity, usually in the form of monumental structures, was largely driven by state and/or religious authorities (often overlapping); while in the era of globalisation, iconicity is more often driven by the corporate sector, often in partnership with globalising politicians and bureaucrats (allies in an emerging transnational capitalist class). An examination of the iconic architecture that characterises most postcolonial and globalising cities suggests that the typical architectural form is not so much monumental as what can be characterised as consumerist –lightness of materials (glass and steel) replacing monumental massification (stone) –thus encouraging delight and the democratic propensity to spend rather than totalitarian awe.

Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC)

MSC comprises a series of high-tech, modernist (in some cases postmodern) buildings and projects designed to transform the image of Kuala Lumpur and Malaysia from an economically quite successful Asian country into a globalising powerhouse for the 21st century. The then Prime Minister Mahathir first expressed his global 'Vision 2020' in 1991, highlighting the fundamental importance of Information and Communication Technologies (now more commonly labelled the Digital Revolution) and the MSC is a direct consequence of this policy. Responding to extreme overcrowding in Kuala Lumpur, through a series of public-private partnerships, MSC comprises a 50 km long, 15 km wide corridor, from Kuala Lumpur, through Putrajaya, the new administrative and governmental complex, and Cyberjaya, its 'intelligent city' neighbour, culminating in the Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) –linked to KL city centre by an express rail link –one of the largest and most spectacular airports in Asia. The master plans for most of these sites were developed with foreign consultants (Bill Gates was on the MSC International Advisory Panel). While some of the more ambitious goals, particularly the development of Cyberjaya, were and continue to be adversely affected by the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the current global financial crisis, an impressive amount of building has been completed.

In Malaysia, as in all postcolonial countries, the global needs to be balanced by the state-approved symbols of real and/or imagined national cultures. Marc Boey puts the issue very well: this 'carefully articulated "hybrid" MSC landscape... embraces not only the economic magnetism of modern global-city architecture but also the repackaged symbolisms of tradition and culture that reifies the national integrity of the country'² –complete with strategic placement of new mosques. Creating a building, let alone an urban mega-project, that combines the elements of an acceptable national icon with the elements of a recognisable architectural global icon is not an easy task but this is exactly what the planners of MSC tried to do, notably with their flagship project, the Petronas Twin Towers (PTT). The construction of PTT in Kuala Lumpur (in this 'moderate' Islamic state) is a good, if convoluted, example of how such issues are typically addressed under conditions of capitalist globalisation. The architect, Cesar Pelli was born in Argentina in 1926 and moved to the US in 1964. Pelli attracted international attention with his enormous towers in the World Financial Center in New York (1981) and in Canary Wharf in London (1986), so it was no great surprise that he won the international competition for PTT in 1991. The project was the centrepiece of Mahathir's *Wawasan* (Vision) 2020, based on two 88-storey towers, 451.9 metres high, with a skybridge between the 41st and 42nd floors. PTT is owned and largely tenanted by

the consortium led by Petronas, the state petroleum company, as part of the Kuala Lumpur City Centre plan. The architect reported: 'It was never specified that the towers should become the tallest buildings in the world, just that they be beautiful',³ though the fact that the tallest building in the world would be located (for a short time, at least) in Kuala Lumpur was certainly appealing to the Malaysian client. Pelli & Associates won, apparently, not only because their 'proposal met the desire for a uniquely Malaysian design' (ibid.) but because meeting this desire also solved a problem in skyscraper design. In Pelli's own words: 'Linking the Petronas Towers to Kuala Lumpur and Malaysia required rethinking the character of the traditional skyscraper to unburden it of American or European connotations. ...[the] shape of the towers has its origin in Islamic tradition, in which geometric patterns assume greater symbolic importance than in Western culture' (ibid.: 68).

Where, then, does this 'uniquely Malaysian design' come from? At one level, as noted above, it comes from the Islamic geometry of the floor plan; at another, deeper level it comes from the break with modernist tradition embodied in the symmetrical arrangement of the towers and what this means for the space between them. Pelli explains: 'Through Frank Lloyd Wright, many architects have been influenced by Lao Tzu's teaching that the reality of a hollow object is in the void and not the walls that define it. This quality of the building is not derived from Malaysian tradition. But because it appears for the first time in Kuala Lumpur, it will be forever identified with its place' (ibid.: 70). Just as the Eiffel Tower, whose structure and form were not French in origin, became synonymous with Paris, PTT would become synonymous with Kuala Lumpur. This is clearly a rationale that is open to many types and layers of interpretation. Suffice it to say here that, at one level and for some professionals and ideologues, it painlessly reconciles national and global architectural symbolism and aesthetics in a postcolonial direction conciliatory to the interests of capitalist globalisation. Not only are the twin towers a significant tourist attraction (thus feeding into a global culture-ideology of consumerism) but the ground floor of PTT has become one of the most iconic shopping spaces in Asia –the Suria mall. As Pelli predicted and his clients hoped, the Petronas Towers complex has become a first class marketing symbol for Kuala Lumpur and Malaysia as a whole, despite its purported 'break with modernism'.

KLIA, like PTT, was also designed by a world famous iconic architect, Kisho Kurokawa –a leading light in the Metabolist challenge to International Modernism, with notable buildings in Tokyo, Berlin and Paris in his portfolio. Again, the global-local symbolism and aesthetics are in evidence: with the roof structure purporting to reflect the Malaysian *kampong* houses, internal supports mimicking palm tree plantations, and full-frontal attempts to merge the airport with the jungle. Like all major airports around the world, KLIA is not only a transportation hub but a series of shopping and leisure spaces. While PTT and KLIA are the only undeniably global architectural icons in the MSC project, there are several aspiring local and national iconic buildings in Putrajaya.⁴ The use of wood, Islamic symbols and 'tropical-ness'⁵ all conspire to bundle the local into the global. The shape of the International Conference Centre has been likened to the '*pending perak*' (royal belt buckle); the modernist cable structure of the Seri Wawasan Bridge has the look of the Arabian dhow (we can also reference Calatrava here); the Palace of Justice, has been said to incorporate Islamic cultural forms (notably the Taj Mahal), Moorish culture and even a touch of the Palladian villa, and government buildings use the traditional Islamic keyhole motif that could pass for a postmodernist gesture.

These apparently culturally specific references fit easily into the architectural cosmos of the postcolonial and globalising city. According to the author of a study of urban mega-projects in Asia (including MSC), by the late 1990s 13 of the 30 largest architect-developer firms working in Asia were domiciled in the US, Australia or the UK. 'This leads inevitably to a collection of architectural projects that are remarkably the same

in cities such as Tokyo, Shanghai, Singapore and Jakarta'.⁶ All these mega-projects will have partners on the ground; not just architects but engineers, real estate agents, bankers, lawyers, academics and support staff, out of which the elites and the new local affiliates of the transnational capitalist class will emerge as part of transnational urban growth coalitions. For example, the Multimedia University, whose origins lie in Malaysia's first private university created by the Malaysia Telecoms Company, is a key element in the aspiration to establish Cyberjaya as Malaysia's Silicon Valley –MMU is making a good start with its 'E-Scroll' a digitally signed graduation certificate, stored in a CR-ROM with a microchip-based Smart-Card ready to be downloaded into job application forms.

Contradictions

While MSC has stalled somewhat in recent years, the rhetoric and some spectacular architecture remain. Nevertheless, frequently hidden from the tourist gaze the iconic buildings of the MSC obscure the lives and living conditions of the poor.⁷ While it may be argued that the new high quality government buildings in Putrajaya are a legitimate public expense, local critics point out that Putrajaya Conference Centre is heavily under-utilised and that it could take hundreds of years to recoup its original cost. This appears to be true for many globalising cities and not just those in the developing world –it is a condition of existence of capitalist globalisation, what we can identify as the crisis of class polarisation. On the surface, this appears to turn the earlier critique of capitalism –private affluence and public squalor –on its head. Through the culture-ideology of consumerism, promising the fruits of capitalist globalisation to all (fortified by platitudes like 'the rising tide lifts all boats'), apparent public affluence is created through iconic architecture. This is achieved through an appropriation of modernist, often postmodernist, iconicity with regionalist characteristics which prevailing postcolonial modes of representation translate into a language that sits comfortably with the culture-ideology of consumerism of capitalist globalisation. Three main audiences are targeted by those who own and control such globalising cities. First and most directly, these spaces and buildings seek to attract the national and international tourist trade, an important component of which is business-tourism (trade shows, conferences, sports events, etc.); second, the local urban upper middle class, whose numbers have increased rapidly over the last few decades in most cities; and third, indirectly, the local working class who are encouraged to participate by looking at and taking occasional outings in their new, gleaming, city centres, public buildings and suburban shopping malls, promoted as sources of civic and national pride even in the poorest countries. In these ways under the conditions of capitalist globalisation former colonial cities are being transformed into postcolonial and globalising cities.

Leslie Sklair

London School of Economics, UK
l.sklair@lse.ac.uk

References

1. Sklair, L. 2006. Iconic architecture and capitalist globalization. *City* 10/1: 21-47.
2. Boey, M. 2002. '(Trans)national realities and imaginations: the business and politics of Malaysia's Multimedia Super Corridor', in Bunnell, T, L. Drummond and K.C. Ho. eds. *Critical reflections on cities in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Times Academic Press: 185-214.
3. Pelli, C. C. Thornton and L. Joseph. 1997 The World's Tallest Buildings. *Scientific American* 277/6: 64-72.
4. King, R. 2007. Re-writing the City: Putrajaya as Representation. *Journal of Urban Design* 12/1: 117-38.
5. See 2.
6. Marshall, R. 2003. *Emerging Urbanity: Global urban projects in the Asia Pacific Rim*. London: Spon Press.
7. Bunnell, T. 2004. *Malaysia, Modernity and the Multimedia Super Corridor: A critical geography of intelligent landscapes*. London: Routledge.

The metropolis and the capital: Shanghai and Beijing as paradigms of space

Historically, China has been culturally multivalent, with a heterogeneous range of cultures operating within the larger paradigm of the country as a whole. Today, this tension is best realised in the Chinese coastal metropolis, Shanghai, and the inland ‘northern capital,’ Beijing, two cities equally convinced of their centrality, with systems of spatial organisation that, in addition to being completely at odds with each other, ratify their own roles. In so doing, they offer two equally valid models for other Chinese cities (the so-called ‘second tier’ and ‘third tier’ cities) to follow.

Jacob Dreyer



Tiananmen Square. ‘The center of the capital represents the political power by which it has subjugated its territory. This center, sporadically alive with the comings and goings of its representatives, is often apparently vacant...’
Photo: Flickr Photostream.

‘SHANGHAI AND BEIJING SEEM to have similar urban symbolic resonance within China, as do Paris, London and New York in their national contexts,’¹ commented an urban planning scholar recently, missing the point that the centrality of Paris, London and New York is uncontested in their countries: all three are considered global cities, a role that isn’t truly accorded to any other cities within their respective countries.

Beijing and Shanghai are both consciously jockeying for this global city status within a China that, still in the midst of finding its own version of modernity, has not yet crystallised around a single urban space. If China can truly become a ‘middle kingdom,’ moving from the global periphery to the centre, a spatial and cultural practice that is equally compelling to those of Western countries will have to be formed, echoing the logic developed in one of these two competing metropolises. The hugely different dynamics of Beijing and Shanghai – arising from very different cultural, geographic, and political factors – mean that the city, which becomes the central, defining space of the new China will, in effect, have imposed its own spatial logic on the rest of the country; indeed, both cities seem to be attempting to do so. The spatial dynamics of the cities are not irrelevant to the nature of social relations within them; the architectural typologies express the configuration of the city as social space, the dominant types reflect a ‘deep structure,’ making visible the ideology which constructed them. ‘It is the building... in which the ideology of all ‘imagined communities’ ...is contained, materialized and symbolized,’ writes Anthony King,² and this seems especially resonant in China, where contemporary architecture has reached its apogee.


Beijing, the political capital, is often given precedence in national discourses, controlled as those are by a centralising state based in Beijing, which has both explicitly and implicitly used media, concentration of academic and cultural institutions and language standardisation that posit Beijing as the true ‘centre’ of China.³ For Hung Wu, the spiritual centre of Beijing is Tiananmen Square.⁴ The urban design of Beijing – concentric ring roads – would seem to suggest that in a cultural sense, all of Beijing is suburb to the Forbidden City, an impression that is equally apparent on subway maps. Wu Hung writes that immediately after the 1949 revolution, the planner Chen Gan ‘identified the city’s traditional zero point... all other architectural features were subordinate to this absolute centre, while reinforcing it.’⁵ In fact, not only Beijing but the entire country itself can be said, in the vision suggested by Beijing’s planners and officials, to be cantered around Tiananmen, ‘a freestanding front [which] can thus have a large architectural complex- city or country- as its ‘metaphorical body.’⁶

Beijing and Shanghai are both consciously jockeying for this global city status within a China that, still in the midst of finding its own version of modernity, has not yet crystallised around a single urban space.

A China in which all roads lead to state power is one, necessarily, which revolves around the Forbidden City (or its contemporary equivalent, the Zhongnanhai complex directly adjacent to it). The continuity with the previous imperial tradition is clear; one may say that the slight shift of absolute state power from the Forbidden City to Zhongnanhai, ‘signified only the changing of leaders, not a new concept of leadership,’⁷ nor a new concept of the distribution of power throughout space. Whatever the ambitions of the revolutionaries of 1989, total power would still reside in the centre of Beijing, a city incessantly described by textbooks, propaganda organs and even tourism bureaus to be a cosmic diagram, an astounding and bizarre claim.⁸

Clearly, this diagram is in the form of a gigantic altar surrounding a ‘gate of heavenly peace,’ (to literally translate Tiananmen), designed primarily for the use of emperors, now claimed by their contemporary successors. This metaphor of a gate between heaven and earth still dictates the logic of the capital today: policy on high is translated into immediate political reality in Beijing. Beijing envisions itself as culturally central to China, a vision which itself defines culture as hierarchical, residing in closely guarded legacies of the imperial past in the Palace Museum, Forbidden City, etc. This vision, demanding even the subversion of language for its realisation, has no room for local dialects or ethnic difference, even representing China’s 56 ethnic groups with Han Chinese.⁹ This narrative crystallises around the political space of the centre of Beijing and its realisation requires its imposition and universal acceptance. This centre, however, is strangely deserted, echoing Anne Querrien’s concept of the capital: ‘The centre of the capital represents the political power by which it has subjugated its territory. This centre, sporadically alive with the comings and goings of its representatives, is often apparently vacant... it is never the heart of metropolitan life.’¹⁰

Shanghai is another story altogether. It is a series of centres, having at least three zones in different areas understood by Shanghai residents as ‘downtown’.¹¹ To once more use Querrien’s terms, Shanghai ‘offers its own mode of space-time to those for whom the principles of a sovereign people and a nation state do not apply.’ Shanghai’s gaze, when not narcissistically directed at its own image, is directed at the world outside of China. Shanghainese have no doubt about the privileged status of their city; if it doesn’t really rival Beijing in political terms, that’s because politics is Beijing’s game and Shanghai isn’t playing. Though Shanghai, almost by definition, has no centre like Tiananmen,¹² the Oriental Pearl Tower is as indicative of Shanghai’s spatial practices as Tiananmen is to Beijing. As with Tiananmen, it is both



Beijing’s metro map, which in addition to subway stops, displays the symbolic heart of the city. Image courtesy beijingtraveltips.com.

symbol and centre of the city, a monument that has real social meaning as an organising principle. If the square materialises the logic of collective gathering made monumental, the tower gives life to an entirely different logic of social organisation. The tower, built for the broadcast of television signals, is clearly spectacular in its nature: as Jay Pridmore writes, 'the Oriental Pearl TV tower... was Shanghai's first attempt to create an instantly recognizable architectural signature. The building would serve not only for transmission, but as a centrepiece of Pudong.'¹³ It was seen as being central to the view of the Pudong New Area (an area that was largely unpopulated at the time of its construction) and the building was meant to be viewed from Puxi, the area on the opposite side of the river where the majority of residents live. In addition, the structure acts as a viewing tower itself. This triple function of spectacle – transmitting spectacle, enacting spectacle, and enabling spectacle – exemplifies the language of Shanghai's skyline. 'Much of the admiration for Shanghai is based on visual evidence. Just look at Shanghai's impressive and imposing skyline and the conclusion is obvious,'¹⁴ writes an economist. Shanghai's baroque frippery is not a coincidence but fundamental to the perception that it is the natural economic centre of China. Shanghainese writers have noted the commercial character of the city; Wang Anyi writes of the Shanghai opera of the 1920s that 'The singing resembled everyday conversation, and the subject was the bitterness of not having the necessities of life, such as rice and salt – a far cry from... Peking opera, consumed by lofty ideas such as loyalty and patriotism.'¹⁵

It is worth noting that the names of both cities denote their geographic positions. If Beijing defines itself as the capital of the north, Shanghai epitomises the culmination of a different folkway and tradition, that of the water cities of the Yangtze river plain; the city's name situates it on the upper reaches of the Huangpu river. Ranciere recently wrote of the chaotic populism of port life, 'a disease that comes from the port, from the predominance of maritime enterprise governed entirely by profit and survival. Empirical politics, that is to say democracy, is identified with the maritime sovereignty of the lust for possession.'¹⁶ This feeling is still present in the streets of the old quarters of Shanghai, for example in large swathes

For Beijingers, Shanghainese are superficial, arrogant, obsessed with fashion, and lacking in culture; for Shanghai residents, Beijing seems drab, overly policed, dirty, poorly planned and generally vulgar.

of the Huangpu and Hongkou districts; places that truly seem designed for communal living, daily rituals of buying and selling, chatting and living in a street whose role is situated between public and private. This is, of course, a democracy completely different from the one that elite students demonstrated in favour of in Tiananmen Square: 'The social ideal of the metropolis is a democracy in which citizens of various origins stand at an equal distance from each other... however, in its quest for a world market, the metropolis encourages a limitless economic expansionism which completely overrides this ideal.'¹⁷ Indeed, the social mobility that is so often cast as vulgarity in Beijing is Shanghai's most redeeming feature: as Wang Anyi wrote of a building on Shanghai's Bund, 'it was designed to look down over everything, impressing viewers with an air of tyrannical power. Fortunately, behind these magnificent buildings was an expanse of narrow streets and alleys that led to the longtang houses, whose spirit was democratic.' These same longtang are now being demolished for reasons of hygiene,¹⁸ recalling Louis Chevalier's remarks about the same process in Paris:¹⁹

As for the filthiness, [they] were adapted to the imagined unhealthiness... that is, their own uncleanness, which they were used to and even appreciated.²⁰

The hygiene problem of Shanghai is perhaps less the bacteria that might germinate than the ideas and men that may spring unplanned from the lively backstreets of the city; the secret to the city's famous economic vitality is the independent spirit that so disturbs Beijing's political vision. For this view does not privilege politics, nor the sacred spaces of Beijing, in the least; the rules of the market apply here, where all distinctions of culture and tradition are valued at best as commodities to be sold. While this has indisputably given the city the kitschy veneer of a Fabergé egg, it has also helped, inadvertently, to dismantle ancient structures of domination, simply by carelessly failing to take account of them.

A recent book about Beijing, recounting the choice of the ill-starred OMA design for the CCTV tower, tells us that 'the choice of such a spectacular and grandiose solution... was dictated by the explicit desire to compete with other metropolises, especially Beijing's Chinese rivals of Shanghai and Guangzhou.'²¹ The fate of this tower may have convinced Beijing's planners to leave the skyscrapers to the experts, as their own pompous claims to be the authentic source of Chinese culture literally exploded. As office workers set off fireworks in one of the buildings in the complex to celebrate Chinese New Year, the building caught fire; the CCTV tower that was to be the spectacular centrepiece rivalling Shanghai's TV tower currently sits unoccupied. However, Beijing has its own monumentality, which is just as grand if not grander than Shanghai's: the point being that two completely different power structures are being monumentalised. The two cities' spatial organisation reveals two entirely different urban cultures and, at this point, it would be presumptuous to claim that one or the other has proven dominant in the competition for global city status. It is clear, however, that whichever city becomes the central space of the Chinese imagination will bring with it its cultural, economic, and social model, as well as the monuments of that model.

For all these avowed differences, the two cities are, though locked in competition, in some respects mirror images of each other. Those who take the budget flight from Shanghai-Hongqiao to the old Beijing airport – stepping from the Shanghai metro into the taxi into the airplane into the taxi into the Beijing metro – may feel that they are somehow trapped inside the same labyrinthine form, one that contracts every year (as, for example, when the new high-speed train link is built, making the cities only five hours' apart by land). While subtle differences remain – the accent of subway announcements, the greater humidity in the air in Shanghai, calling streets 'jie' instead of 'lu' – and the cities' spatial programmes are defined by their opposition to each other, this is precisely what makes them partners or twins. The truth is that the daily lives of the two cities resembles each other in a way that no other Chinese city can claim; they are worlds apart, but still unified by whatever mystical quality the Chinese government judges to be 'first-tier' about them.²² Their differences are significant, though: Beijing representing a China subjugated to state power, to urban planning that often disregards traditional neighbourhoods and to an ethnic nationalism (one, moreover, that proclaims local identities and dialects to be subversive of the national project); Shanghai representing a China that is dominated by foreign investment, characterised by greater ethnic diversity and openness to social progressivism, but which is perhaps compromised by a past and present relation to foreigners that seems uncomfortably colonial to many. The competition causes mutually felt tension and citizens of the two cities (Chinese and expatriate), locked into competition, stereotype each other mercilessly. For Beijingers, Shanghainese are superficial, arrogant, obsessed with fashion, and lacking in culture; for Shanghai residents, Beijing seems

drab, overly policed, dirty, poorly planned and generally vulgar. The contrast between the two is crucial to China's future – will it look like Shanghai, with its endless crowded shopping malls, visible foreign population and economic dynamism? Or will it resemble more Beijing, with its homogenising, nationalist vision of a China where academics, artists and officials alike come to the capital? To ask where the de facto capital of China will be is to ask whether the future of China will be dominated by the state or by non-state economic actors. Just as Beijing's Olympics brought the formidable power of the state to bear, so Shanghai's Expo – built on a different economic structure of coalition between the city government, foreign investment and investment from state-owned enterprises – today reveals its own unique strengths. Both spectacles were primarily aimed at the domestic Chinese population, showing China its own cities, which have recently taken on new forms, as much as displaying itself to the outside world. The model that China is lurching towards is still uncertain and the clashes between the metropolis and the capital stage the internal divisions for the world.

Jacob Dreyer
London Consortium
jacobaugustsdreyer@gmail.com

References

1. Rowe, Peter G. 2005. *East Asia Modern: Shaping the Contemporary City*. London: Reaktion. 21-26.
2. King, Anthony D. 2004. *Spaces of Global Cultures: Architecture Urbanism Identity*. London: Routledge. King, co-author of the influential article 'On Beijing in the World: Postmodernism, Globalization, and the Making of Transnational Space in China, can scarcely be unaware of the implications of this statement in China; indeed, the book quoted addresses spatial issues in China directly.
3. Mandarin, based on Beijing dialect, implies that Beijing is standard and Shanghai, Guangzhou, Sichuan etc., more or less aberrations or 'local,' perhaps reflecting tensions in the placement of Chinese culture that go back to the Three Kingdoms period.
4. Wu, Hung. 2005. *Remaking Beijing: Tiananmen Square and the Creation of a Political Space*. London: Reaktion.
5. Ibid. p.8.
6. Ibid. p.53.
7. Ibid. p.72.
8. www.chinatour360.com/beijing/forbidden-city/ is one example; however, a google search for 'Beijing cosmic diagram' quickly turns up many results. In contrast, Shanghai cosmic diagram turns up nothing specific to the urban form.
9. 'The children supposedly representing the country's 56 ethnic groups were in fact all from the same one, the majority Han Chinese race,' www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/olympics/2561979/Beijing-Olympics-Ethnic-children-exposed-as-fakes-in-opening-ceremony.html.
10. Querrien, Anne. 1986. *Zone 1/2*. New York: Urzone, NY, 219-222.
11. People's Square, Lujiazui, Xujiahui, not to mention the French Concession, Jing'an Temple, Zhongshan Park, etc.
12. The metropolis is a membrane that allows communication between two or more milieus, while the capital serves as a nucleus around which these milieus are rigorously organised.
13. Pridmore, Jay. 2008. *Shanghai: The Architecture of China's Great Urban Center*. New York: Abrams. p.1.
14. Huang, Yasheng. 2008. *Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 177.
15. Wang, Anyi. 2010. *The Song of Everlasting Sorrow: A Novel of Shanghai*. Weatherhead Books on Asia - New York, Chichester: Columbia University Press. p.182.
16. Ranciere, Jacques, trans. Liz Heron. 2007. *The Shores of Politics*. New York, London: Verso Books. p.1.
17. Querrien, Anne. 1986. *Zone 1/2*. New York: Urzone, NY, 219-222.
18. Arkaraprasertkul, Non. 2010. 'Debating Interdisciplinarily, Debating Shanghai Urban Housing'. Oxford University. (This is a conference paper). The 2010 CPN (China Postgraduate Network) conference held at Oxford University. www.chinacentre.ox.ac.uk/news/items/china_postgraduate_network_uk_2010_annual_conference.
19. See also, Harvey, David. 2003. *Paris, Capital of Modernity*. New York: Routledge. pp. xi, 372.
20. Chevalier, Louis. trans. David P. Jordan. 1994. *The Assassination of Paris*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 212.
21. Greco, Claudio and Carlo Santoro. 2008. *Beijing: The New City*. Milan, New York: Skira (distributed in North America by Rizzoli International Publications) p.104.
22. Though Guangzhou is also considered a first-tier city, this must surely be interpreted as a tantrum on the part of the Chinese state; the dominant urban imaginary of the Pearl River Delta is clearly Hong Kong, and just as clearly, the Chinese state would like to minimise that fact.



Above: Shanghai Skyline. 'The spectacle is not a collection of images, but a social relation among people, mediated by images.' Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle*, thesis 4. <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/debord/society.htm>, accessed May 15, 2010. Image by Franziska Mothes, used with permission.

Below: Shanghai's identity as cosmopolitan is central to the identity it represents to itself and others, an identity which is immediately commodified. Photograph of Jinfeng Wine advertisement, taken in Shanghai Metro's South Railway Station by Ryan Carter. Used with permission.



The state of cities in China

The high-speed city building of reform-era China will soon yield an agglomeration of many large, non-agricultural settlements. China's massive, geographically clustered urban core will repeat itself via a common set of distinguishable spatial manifestations. The stories of individuals' plights and everyday life were irrelevant to the planning of this spatial spread. Instead, a totalising utopian vision, with the city itself as a subject, dominates the propagandistic narrative of urbanisation. Will the upgrade of infrastructure, some of which includes unprecedentedly fast high-speed rail, redeem conceptual planning biases by interconnecting the splatter-patterned urban spots across the country?

Bogdan Stamoran



THE MASSIVE, NEWLY BUILT ENVIRONMENT of China has appeared mostly at a low cost and at spectacularly high speed. The real loser in most of this urbanisation is farmland. It has been besieged by vertical cities, seemingly dropped from the sky.

Yongfu Li, Anron Dang and Hongyin Cao have analysed the spatial spread in the Yangtze River Delta over the past 30 years and shown that administrative status adjustments – the central-government-approved bureaucratic transformation from village into town – for locations becoming cities accelerated urban spread. Due to the dual-track legal system for urban and rural land, land was first transferred at a low rural value from the farmers working it and then commercialised at drastically higher values as urban land for construction. The result was an uncontrolled urban spread (Li, Dang and Cao: 993).

By 2020, a gigantic meta-city is poised to dominate the country, aggregated along its eastern coastal periphery, between the Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong metropolitan areas and their respective estuaries. Clockwise from the top of the map, the northeast and the Bohai coastal region in the north, the Yangtze River Delta further south, the Pearl River Delta in the southeast, as well as the industrial cluster around Xi'an and Chongqing in the west, will serve as outlines of the conurbation.

Piper Rae Gaubatz explains that the key underlying societal changes allowing for the new spatial fabric of post-Mao China are the specialisation and gradual commodification of land use (Gaubatz: 28). The changes to both specialisation and commodification of land use have delivered new textures and forms that have resulted in questionable sustainability for such a large, urbanised mass, which has been almost exclusively planned on a block-by-block basis (with large blocks as the basic units). Commutes between residence and work, or business district, educational district and administrative district, are carbon-intensive and often based on private car use. Before the specialisation of land use for residential, commercial and industrial use, Chinese citizens often resided close to or in their place of their work, eliminating the need for commuting. Furthermore, the loss of agricultural land in the areas surrounding the cities, becoming earmarked for industrial and/or urban development, lengthens the process of food procurement for the city dweller.

Better inter-connection, better life?

Of key importance, then, is China's emphasis on the building of a massive, high-volume and high-speed transport network.

The urban nodes within this evolving network are becoming integrated through a high-speed, large volume transport network of air, rail, expressway and water links. Different modes of transport are interlinked via multi-modular transport hubs.

Infrastructure is centrally coordinated and implemented: the national highway network plan, as well as high-speed rail development targets of the Ministries of Transport and Railways, respectively establish arteries for the relatively controlled but fast movement of people and goods. Additionally, the project resonates with political power through its sheer size and scale. The layout of the national expressway system sets out seven routes radiating from the capital, Beijing. These are enmeshed with nine longitudinal north-south corridors and 17 east-west horizontal routes. The total length of the system will exceed 100,000 km (62,000 miles) (see map).

According to the Chinese Ministry of Railways, currently China runs 86,000 km (54,000 miles) of rail, the second most extensive network in the world. 6,552 km of these are high-speed tracks, the longest amount in the world. Within two years, 42 dedicated high-speed rail tracks will be finished, bringing the total number of newly built high-speed rail tracks to 13,000 km. China's rail network will surpass 110,000 km. Of the new high-speed tracks, 5,000 km support transport speeds of 250 km/h and 8,000 km of them allow for transport at as much as 350 km/h. Arranged within a grid of four north-south and another four east-west corridors, the rail-transport network will include ring infrastructure for the Bohai Gulf and the Pearl and Yangtze River Deltas. High-speed rail is integrated with an emphasis on inter-modal terminals: high-speed rail terminals are placed adjacent to airports and expressways.

Movement is of paramount importance for the prosperity of the cities' and the country's – if not the whole planet's – sustainable future. The new fibres of transportation will need not only to connect but eventually integrate the urban spread of the last 30 years into a dense but functioning machine for living. China's productivity will be upgraded by the increased speed of movement of goods and people.

Taxonomies of urban landscape and building tactics in China Urban forms across China are not a monolithic whole. There is, however, a repertoire apparent in their manifestations. Recognisable city and city-fabric types are spreading across China, establishing an urban-rural sprawl. Kuang Xiaoming, editor of *Urban China* (城市中国), produced a compilation

Above:
Knocking down old structures on the way to *tabula rasa*. Photo by Scott Ballantyne


of inextricably interrelated physical patterns of city fabric across China. These are economic development zones, new city areas (城市新区), central business districts, central city areas, 'Old City' areas, university cities, mixed commercial areas, technology parks, residential areas and logistics areas. He concludes with a ten point list, which by its physical and methodological prevalence could define 'Chinese-style city-making' and which can be an analytical framework for understanding the streetscape in China:

- A (polarised) pattern of the two cities: new city – old city.
- An administrative centre that employs a limited range of designs and alignment for institutions.
- A city ring road (usually an elevated expressway).
- A wide city axis (often as part of the administrative centre).
- A central park (often adjacent to the administrative centre).
- Garden residential communities (gated).
- Elevated highways (and the interchanges they spawn).
- Waterfront developments.
- Symbolism (象征主义) and
- Fengshui doctrine (Kuang 12-14).

These recognisable instances of urban landscape in China hint to the prevalence of a *tabula rasa* development approach.

The new cities are shaped by building codes that uniformly orient the large alignments of blocks of Corbusian-style residential towers. These are set well away from large roads, grouped in (gated) residential compounds. Scores of cities in China have developed agglomerations of curtain-wall office tower clusters: the central business district (CBD). These are examples of Manhattanism, the culture of congestion identified by Rem Koolhaas in *Delirious New York* that has become the dominant form of the contemporary iconic, vernacular commercial district.

Wide, alienating boulevards (axes) in China are a combination of symbolic traditions, the need for strategic troop movement, as reasoned by Europe in the 19th century, and automobile-centric urban planning. The urban nightscape of extensive neon and LED displays necessarily infuse the modern city in China with a sprinkling of a fairy-like aura. Waterfront developments across the country often employ *fengshui* but distil it into commercial leverage in real-estate advertisement and, by extension, deal making. The city ring roads – usually elevated expressways – and their numerous vast interchanges shooting twirls of multiple ribbons command vast areas of urban space. They have pulverised the areas they run through but tend to be



tolerated because the high-volume expressway network is of great importance to the new cities in China.

Jiang Jun analyses in *Urban China* how cities are being rapidly built in China by describing 11 interrelated techniques: enclosing (land), reclaiming (land), linking (land), deconstructing (available forms), renovating, faking (using 'exotic' European styles), copying (multiplying designs across a plot), decorating, landscaping, collaging and mixing. The techniques involve the preparation of a real-estate site, as well as the laying out and composition of the new structures. Due to the availability of low-cost labour and large physical scales, high speeds can be achieved by an extremely short planning and design stage and the wide employment of readily available standard and modular designs.

Towards some conclusions

The ethos driving the spatial change is often relying on an abstract 'concept-city' contained within a mantra of progress. The consequences are radical transformations for the everyday practices of life. As part of the large-scale urbanisation movement, China's path provides an opportunity to reassess the practices of planning, building, and community development themselves.

Neville Mars' analysis on contemporary city-building is that two types of urban planning can be distinguished: one is founded on a belief in expertise and the power of ideas. The other distrusts grandiosity and abstraction, correct forms and only trusts individual solutions, based on the belief that man's genius is his adaptability. Their rift exposes the model as the crux of this divide. Type one favours institutionalised, large-scale responses; while type-two planning focuses on surveying, research and organic emergence (Mars: 220).

China is a hybrid of the results typically associated with these two types of planning, albeit overwhelmingly a type one with a very small input of type-two, its built urban spaces have the look and scale of abstract, visionary planning. In the urban landscape some organic emergence and informality prevails, but as research by Luofeng Qin on Shanghai's structural transformation shows, little to no community collaborative elements are fed into the planning process and its execution (Qin: 239). Only in exceptional cases is structural change not top-down. If it is not the central government that dictates and carries out the transformations, it is the local government. State capitalist market principles alone underpin residential and commercial development.

Above:
View of Jing An district, Shanghai.
Photo by Scott Ballantyne

There are, hence, clear implications in the new urban environment of China for design, architecture theory and planning: spatial planning interventions should be based on multidisciplinary input, community focused, and preferably lightweight. Furthermore, flexible frameworks should replace long-term planning. Yong He Chang, currently Dean of the Architecture Department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, deplores the emphasis on symbolism versus experience in urban form in China and declares that such a 'city of objects' is 'the realisation of the anti-city texture city ideal'.

The narrated universal subject of the propaganda of urbanisation is the concept of the 'city' itself and not the sustainable upgrade of myriad individuals' daily art of life. The concept of the city, according to Michel de Certeau, is both a hero and machinery of modernity. We have seen that urbanites are simply objects of urbanisation rather than subjects in charge of transformation. Perhaps city dwellers, now or in the future, should gain the power and wisdom to constitute themselves as subjects in charge of sustainable urbanisation and not just objects affected by it.

This utopian notion of the urban reverses progress at the expense of casual time and makes space the subject of technology alone. The speculative, large-scale urbanisation of China is a corollary of the country's swift and sustained economic growth. The result is an internationally connected industrial exporter and socialist market consumer. The coming years will show whether planned density can evolve into something more than a quick and socially polarising industrialisation recipe.

Bogdan Stamoran
Leiden Institute for Area Studies, The Netherlands
stamoran@gmail.com

Bibliography

Benjamin, Walter. 1999. *The Arcades Project*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
de Certeau, Michel. 1988. *The Practice of Everyday Life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Chang, Yung Ho 2004. 'City of Objects, also known as City of Desires'. Yuan Lun Jiang and Jian Shi, eds. *Brimming Metropolis*. Guilin: Guangxi shifang daxue chubanshe.

Chuihua [et al] 2001: Judy Chung, Jeffrey Inaba, Rem Koolhaas, Sze Tsung Leong (eds.), *Great Leap Forward, Harvard Design School Project on the City 1*. Koln: Taschen.
Gaubatz, Piper R. 1995. 'Urban Transformation in post-Mao China: impacts of the reform era on China's urban form'. Davis, Deborah, Richard Kraus Barry Naughton and Elizabeth Perry, eds. *Urban Spaces in Contemporary China: The Potential for Autonomy and Community in Post-Mao China*. Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.
Jiang Jun 2005: Jun Jiang 姜捷 速成之城 [Speed City] in 城市中国 [Urban China], China Periodicals Publishing Centre, September 15, No. 4, p 112.
Koolhaas Rem. 1994. *Delirious New York: A Retroactive Manifesto for Manhattan*. New York: Monacelli Press.
Kuang, Xiaoming 2005 '中国式造城 [Chinese style city-making]', 城市中国 [Urban China], China Periodicals Publishing Centre, September 15, Issue No. 4.
Li, Yongfu Dang Anrong and Cao, Hongyin. 2009 'Examining the Spatial Spread of the Chinese Metropolitan Region from the Administrative Adjustment Point of View'. *Proceedings of IFOU Delft* pp. 992.
Mars, Neville. 2008: Neville Mars and Hornsby, Adrian, *The Chinese Dream: A Society Under Construction*. Rotterdam: 010 Publishers.
O.M.A. Rem Koolhaas and Bruce Mau. 1995. *S, M, L, XL*. New York: Monacelli Press.
Ouroussoff, Nicolai. 2009. 'The Lessons of Las Vegas Still Hold Surprises' *The New York Times*, December 22 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/23/arts/design/23yale._r=1&ref=nicolai_ouroussoff accessed August 19th 2010.
Ouroussoff, Nicolai. 2008. 'The New, New City' *The New York Times Magazine*, June 8th http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/08/magazine/08shenzhen-t.html?ref=nicolai_ouroussoff accessed August 19th.
Ministry of Transport of the People's Republic of China. 2005. 'Plan of the Chinese National Expressway Network' <http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/PI-c/755501.htm> accessed June 6th 2010.
Ministry of Railways of the People's Republic of China . 2009. '2009 Railway Statistical Report' <http://www.china-mor.gov.cn/zwgg/gongbao2009.html> accessed June 6th 2010.
Wright, Arthur F. 1965. 'Symbolism and Function: Reflections on Changan and Other Great Cities'. *The Journal of Asian Studies* 24-4.
Qin, Luofeng 2003. *Wohnquartiere in Shanghai. Analyse, Kritik und Sanierung typischer Wohnformen und Baugruppen aus dem 20. Jahrhundert*. Stuttgart: Grauer.

National economic reform and rural migration to China's cities



Deng Xiaoping's policies were instrumental in de-collectivising the Chinese countryside.

A wave of migration from China's countryside to its cities has left a floating mass of dislocated people with little emotional connectivity to the places that receive them. Consequently, *a space of illegality and irregularity* has arisen in the periphery of China's urban areas. As this suburbia grows so does segregation, inequality, poverty and crime. State authorities, powerless to prevent rural to urban movement, opt for a 'demolition-redevelopment' model that forces migrants to locate elsewhere, quelling the growth of peri-urban slums. At the same time, a lack of space and opportunity and an unclear policy of urban integration result in a constant flow back to the countryside.

Ana Moya Pellitero

Photo: Creative Commons

DENG XIAOPING'S NATIONAL ECONOMIC REFORM of 1978 de-collectivised the countryside. The rural land that once belonged to the commune was now divided into individual plots and leased to farmers for a period of 15 to 25 years. In theory, these freehold single-family farms allowed peasants to invest money and labour in their own land, paying back part of their gains to the government in taxes. In practice, this household responsibility system failed because farms were too dispersed and a lack of capital and large-scale farming made investment impossible (Wilson 1996: 170). Furthermore, while the government gave farmers the responsibility for rural management and the maintenance of infrastructure, they lacked support from the kind of powerful organisations that had existed during the commune period.

Before the national economic reform, the people's communes were responsible of their own agricultural and industrial gains and production. Communes also took charge of maintaining, repairing or renewing irrigation systems, dams and ditches, as well as carrying the costs of schools and healthcare. Development and gains were based on a structure of collective labour and common good. Rural communes also benefited from campaigns such as the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), when urban residents were temporarily sent to rural areas to help in programmes of rapid agricultural development, providing much needed trained and expert staff. Following the de-collectivisation of the countryside there are fewer powerful social organisations to maintain rural infrastructure, and in particular to maintain the irrigation and ditches needed for crop growth. Under the agricultural reforms of 1978, services formerly provided free of charge, or subsidised by the government, had to be paid for by farmers (Wilson 1996: 177). A farmer was expected to pay for local highways, school costs, social insurance, welfare, and for development projects such as building schools, hospitals, police stations, etc. In rural communes, these expenses used to be taken from the collective income, now they are charged to each individual, with the risk of abuse by local officials. Farmers find themselves exposed to bankruptcy when the selling of their crops cannot cover these local fees.

The demise of rural life

Today, farmers survive by engaging in sideline activities, working for industries and enterprises in rural towns and villages. These industries are based in corporate organisations (collective property of local governments) and run with the leadership and entrepreneurship of party members and local

investors. Many rural towns and villages in China have productive industries for basic consumer goods, such as textiles, paper, simple electronics, agricultural tools, bricks for house construction and extraction industries like coal. These industries compete fiercely in the marketplace, ignoring niceties. They are not subsidised by local governments and they do not even have access to bank loans, therefore they are heavily motivated by profit. Many of the textiles and electronics on sale in the US and the EU originate from these rural industries. Village enterprises sold US\$12 billion worth of goods overseas in 1990 (Lardy 1992: 692). In periods when there are no jobs in the factories, or it is harvest time, workers return to tending their crops. In spite of these opportunities to supplement their income, many rural citizens are not protected by welfare. Many services formerly provided by the state now have to be paid by farmers themselves, including roads, wells, schools and electricity. The poorest farmers and their sons are forced to seek jobs elsewhere in rural industries, rural towns and by heading to the cities. They become 'surplus migratory labour', leaving their farms in the hands of woman, children and the elderly, making rural development virtually impossible. This is compounded by the phenomenon of farmers abandoning their uncultivated tracts of land, rather than renting it out for others to farm, because they see the property as their only form of security (Chang & Kwok 1990: 149). The result is a gradual abandonment of agriculture as a way of life in favour of work in rural industries and cities.

Life in provincial towns

Despite the ideological communist aim to reduce the gap between the rural and urban environment, since 1958, the *hukou* (household registration record) has identified every member of the population as 'agricultural' or 'non-agricultural', using their residence—which is classified as 'urban' or 'rural'—as a mobility control. Migrant workers required many bureaucratic passes in order to travel and settle in other areas different of their household registration. The communist state severely restricted residential mobility, however, it instituted programmes to send urban residents to the countryside during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. With the economic and political reforms of 1978, restrictions on social mobility changed slightly. The governmental slogan in the 1980s was *li tu bu li xiang* (to leave the land but not to leave the rural areas). The peasant workers (*mingong*) lived in rural areas and commuted to rural towns for work, or migrated to cities as labour without getting an urban *hukou*.

China's 'floating population' is considered a 'dangerous class' (Friedmann, 2005: 63). As such, the urban population rarely mixes with rural migrants who live on the fringes or in factories and on construction sites. It is an 'invisible population' that gathers together in groups originating from the same native place.

This resulted in a 'decentralized urban growth' (Lee 1992: 89-118). Towns and cities became centres of economic activity but not bases of residential expansion. Instead, townships (*xiang*) sprang up and hosted rural *hukou*, where many farmers arriving from other rural villages could work and live. However, since 1984 and the first reform of the household registration system, many former *xiang* have evolved into towns and earned an urban status (*zhen*). By 2000, over 100 million rural residents were making their living in small towns (Stockman 2000: 59). In 2001, a second major registration reform occurred when those rural *hukou* residents possessing a stable job and an urban residence permit were allowed to move to small cities and designated towns of less than 200,000 inhabitants. Today we see, however, that many rural migrants are so poor and in desperate search of work that they arrive in cities illegally, where they have no rights to social housing or health care. These rural migrants, called *mangliu* (blind migrant), are considered a 'temporary' population. They are not officially registered in the cities and have become a 'floating population', living without a fix abode, constantly travelling from place to place. At the same time, many other migrants to be found in urban China are not 'permanent' but *cyclical* (returning home during harvest time or for other occasions) or *repeat* migrants (they return to their native place, only to leave again at a later date) (Friedmann 2005: 65).

Illegal migration to mega-cities

In the mid-1990s, migration affected approximately 80-100 million people (Stockman 2000: 65). Today, most newcomers to China's cities are temporary workers, construction labourers and housemaids. The numbers of temporary residents without formal urban household registration has increased. Cities like Beijing or Shanghai periodically eradicate migrant enclaves and repatriate the population because these areas are considered a threat to the public order (poor living conditions, social disorder and the deterioration of the urban environment). China's 'floating population' is considered a 'dangerous class' (Friedmann, 2005: 63). As such, the urban population rarely mixes with rural migrants who live on the fringes or in factories and on construction sites. It is an 'invisible population' that gathers together in groups originating from the same native place. The state cannot control the numbers of these illegal rural migrants, the majority of whom end up in the informal and illegal economies or doing dangerous, dirty and difficult jobs in family enterprises, manufacturing industries, or as nursemaids to middle-class households. All of them are paid below the minimum wage and exploited. Young women,

in particular, are at high risk of sexual exploitation and abuse. Migrants live in cramped dormitories or squeezed together in one room because their limited salaries don't stretch to paying for a single room in an urban village. Even in these conditions, migrants still expect to save some money to support their families in the countryside, one of the major reasons why they left home in first place.

Migrants have created a social space that falls outside official planning and implicates a transformation not only of the physical space in the cities but also of society in general (Zhang 2001: 202-3). They form alternative living spaces and build illegal structures, including temporary housing, stores, restaurants and street markets. At times of important international gatherings and events in China, the government mobilises clean-up campaigns and demolishes these illegal constructions. In the cities, illegal enclaves are called 'villages' (*cun*) and are preceded by the name of the province where the migrants come from. Beijing, for example, hosts Henancun, Anhucun and Zhejiangcun. These villages are conglomerations of illegal dwellings located in peri-urban zones (Friedmann 2005: 70). There are also peri-urban villages around big urban centres that attract the settlement of rural migrants who, because of their rural status, cannot obtain state-subsidised housing in the cities (*anju*). These peri-urban villages provide them with opportunities for accessible and affordable housing and to live legally with their rural *hukou*. Often, indigenous villagers in peri-urban areas build housing units in order to rent them out to migrants (Zhang 2005: 248). The current law gives farmers autonomy over their land and they are not obliged to follow building codes. Consequently, many of these housing constructions evade planning regulations. The result is chaotic shanty areas that aggravate problems of spatial segregation. The government's approach to urban development is its 'demolition-development' model. The local government allots indigenous villagers with a new registration household, upgrading them from rural to urban *hukou*. However, the migrant rural population living in these villages automatically acquire a status of illegality, forcing them to relocate and keeping them in a constant state of flux.

The establishment of the People's Republic and a planned social economy induced the political goal to reduce the gap between rural and urban China. However, the good will ended as numerous social mobility restrictions grew and resulted in an even greater physical barrier between both worlds. With the shift from a planned to a free market economy, the aim, again, was to reduce the economic gap between rural and urban areas, privatising business and allowing the construction of competitive industries in rural areas. Manufacturing facilities in cities and peri-urban areas attracted cheap rural labour that helped to make the economy competitive. The government was permissive, granting flexible household restrictions in order to allow for the arrival of millions of workers to urban areas. However, despite attempts to eliminate the duality, rural migrants have not been fully integrated into China's urban social structure. A lack of clear social policy in this respect makes it impossible to solve the problem of the constant movement of a 'floating population'. Without a permanent abode and better housing conditions, the risk that migrants become a permanent urban underclass has become a reality. The migratory enclaves that have developed help them to maintain their social relations and to preserve a group identity, however, these 'villages' also isolate them into ghettos.

Ana Moya Pellitero
Principal at StudioMEB, Faro-Barcelona, Spain
moya@studiomeb.com

References

Chang, Sen-dou and Wing-wang Kwok. 1990. 'The urbanization of rural China', in Wing-wang Kwok, R., William L. Parish et al. (eds.). *Chinese Urban Reform, What Model Now?* London: Sharpe Inc.

Friedmann, John. 2005. *China's Urban Transition*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Lardy, Nicholas. 1992. 'Chinese foreign trade', in *The China Quarterly*, n.131.

Lee, Yok-shui. 1992. 'Rural transformation and decentralized urban growth in China', in Guldin, G.E. (ed.). *Urbanizing China*. New York: Greenwood Press.

Stockman, Norman Stockman. 2000. *Understanding Chinese Society*. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.

Wilson, Dick. 1996. *China, the Big Tiger*. London: Little Brown.

Zhang, Li. 2005. 'Migrant Enclaves and impacts of redevelopment policy in Chinese cities' in Ma, Laurence and Fulong Wu (eds.). *Restructuring the Chinese City, Changing Society, Economy and Space*. London: Routledge.

Zhang, Li. 2001. *Strangers in the City: Reconfigurations of Space, Power, and Social Networks Within China's Floating Population*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Suburbia in the city of Guilin, Quangxi, China, (2001).
(c) A.Moya Pellitero.



Villagers selling in an informal street market, Guilin, Quangxi, China, (2001).
(c) A.Moya Pellitero



Countryside in Xian, Shaanxi, China (2001).
(c) A.Moya Pellitero



Migrant 'village' (cun) in Fangzhuang, Beijing, China (2001).
(c) A.Moya Pellitero



Constituting governance: the US Army in the Philippines, 1898-1920s



Americans posing with Locals in Manila, 1908.
Photo collection: Paulo Ordoeza, Flickr.

This essay looks at the transformation of Manila and its periphery over two decades, beginning with the American occupation in 1898. The US Army's success in pacifying the provinces is frequently associated with its 'reconcentration' of the rural population, which cut off the insurgency's economic and material support. What is not recognised is that this was a spatial intervention and that it is equally important to examine how the state was constituted in order to understand how its technical or infrastructure programme worked. When the United States staged a theatre of war in the Philippines, the city was the initial site of operations. The official end of the Philippine-American War in 1903 transformed indigenous resistance into a guerrilla war with important implications for state superstructure and infrastructure. This study argues that the US military, represented by the Philippines Division, contributed to the early establishment of highly centralised state-initiated urban and regional reforms, including the initial conceptualisation of regional autonomy and the later integration of Mindanao.

Sources of authority

It is important to establish the depth of the Philippines Division's involvement in post war rebuilding efforts. The First Philippine Commission, appointed by US President William McKinley on January 20, 1899, came on an investigative mission. The Second Philippine Commission (September 1900-August 1902) had legislative and executive powers to begin organising a system for governing the archipelago. It was only in July 1902 that an insular government was established, headed by William Howard Taft as first Governor-General. That year, in General Order no. 152 (July 7), US President Roosevelt relieved the Commanding General of the Philippines Division as Military Governor and placed him in a subordinate position to the Governor-General. These instructions contained an assumption of peace, referring to the end of the Philippine insurrection and a new task of creating local governments, except in those areas held by 'Moro tribes'.

According to Resil Mojares, the Philippine Division allowed the Spanish influenced municipal and provincial structure of local government to continue functioning. Between August 1899 and March 1900 the Philippine Division issued the earliest regulations for municipal organisation.³ It was only in September 1900 that the first civil legislation was passed, which provided two million Mexican dollars for road and bridge building and a repair programme for the entire archipelago – another task that fell to military responsibility.

Two civil laws were enacted in 1901 reorganising municipal and provincial governments in pacified areas – Act no. 82 (January 31) and Act no. 83 (February 6) – but they could not be enforced everywhere. Act no. 100 (March 9) enabled the Military Governor to appoint an administrative body in places plagued by insurgent activities. Furthermore, military control of a province was restored if insurgent activity resumed, as was the case in the provinces of Cebu, Batangas and Bohol. The US military also continued to participate in civil affairs after the official end of the Philippine-American War in 1903, something that has not been well acknowledged. An examination of the legislation passed between 1901 and 1913 shows precisely what civil duties the military performed, including being detailed to various civil positions as bureau chiefs to clerks, and holding positions from chief engineers to draftsmen and from provincial governors to provincial police officers.⁴

From January 1901, General Order no. 141 series 1900 made possible the release of a majority of the clerks in the Adjutant General's Office so that they may accept civil positions; all except two were enlisted men. A few months later, the Military Governor was authorised by Act no. 100 (March 9) to organise the administrative body where the Provincial Government Act could not be enforced. Act no. 107 (March 28) gave the Military Governor the option of assigning military officers 'quasi-civil functions' in these provincial posts. In 1903, Act no. 787 (June 1) authorised the organisation of a government in the Moro Province, contained provisions enabling US Army officers to be appointed as Provincial Governor, Secretary, and Engineer. Shortly thereafter US Army officers were allowed to act as attorneys representing United States' interests in Philippine courts, by Act no. 856 (August 27). According to Frank H. Golay, by this time 20 US Volunteers had been accused of offences such as embezzlement of public funds.⁵ Despite this, the appointment of military officers to insular government positions continued, filling an important gap in the colonial service.

In 1905, Act no. 1391 (September 8) allowed US Army officers to be detailed to civil districts as Governor and Secretary; and by Act no. 1416 (December 1) to the constabulary force (civil police) in positions ranging from director, military district chiefs to all ranks of officer (field, line, executive, supply and quartermaster, medical and ordinance). The following year, legislation enabled US Army officers to execute non-combatant roles: as justices of peace enforcing liquor traffic prohibitions. Act no. 1502 (June 26), made them 'peace officers', with powers to arrest and deliver to authorities those perceived as violators of sanitary

History provides a window for understanding the postcolonial condition, and the region known as Asia cannot be separated from its colonial past. What distinguishes the Philippines from other Asian nations is that it was colonised twice: by Spain from the 16th century, then in the early 20th century by the United States, creating a second overlay of change in urban space. Estela Duque's investigation into the history of Manila as early 20th century primate city and the impact of the military on civic space shows how the study of cities inevitably involves its peripheries, because human movement was indispensable for colonialism.

Estela Duque

There are many places from Cotabato and Davao south to and including Sarangain (sic) where illicit trade, including the capture or purchase of women and children, is easily carried on. These places cannot be occupied by troops, but may easily be controlled if a sufficient number of sea-going steam tugs are supplied to the principal posts. The highways of these islands are by water, and by water only, and it will be impossible to escape the expense of providing abundant water transportation if effective rule is to be maintained. Brigadier General W. A. Kobbé, Zamboanga, May 10, 1901.¹

THE ABOVE REPORT BY KOBEE, commanding officer of the Department of Mindanao and Jolo, reflects the discomfort the American military felt regarding perceived differences with the Muslim inhabitants of this region of the colonial Philippines. Here, talk of illicit trade or slavery, which was soon to become part of the North American abolition discourse,² is entwined with Kobbé's perception of space: highways, through which persons are spirited away, are literally and metaphorically fluid and unstable. When the department was reorganised two years later, the geographic reference to Mindanao and the island of Jolo in the Sulu archipelago were dropped and it was renamed Moro Province, highlighting the hardening of racialised conceptions within official discourse.

and municipal health ordinances by Act no. 1505 (June 29). These 'peace officers' were later given more encompassing powers by Act no. 1797 (October 12, 1907), and duties now included guarding civil prisoners assigned to labour gangs working on the civil government's infrastructure projects; ensuring the observance of sanitary and municipal health regulations; and making arrests in relation to the disruption of public peace. Furthermore, in order to facilitate their detail to the Constabulary (civil police), Act no. 1698 (August 26, 1907) exempted army officers from civil service examination requirements.

The US military's roles in pacified and non-pacified areas changed after the end of the Philippine-American War in 1903. The US military played a greater administrative role in non-pacified areas, especially Visayas, Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. Five military officers served as governors of Moro Province, reporting directly to the US military commander of the Philippines and not to the Governor-General. In 1913, with the prospect of the appointment of the first civilian provincial governor of Moro Province, army officers were nevertheless asked to fill other administrative posts. Act no. 2299 (November 25) made the appointment of army officers to provincial and district office positions possible; Act no. 2408 (July 23, 1914) widened the scope of appointments to the province's administrative council. In just over 15 years, US Volunteers and US Army officers had been detailed in a variety of positions such as draftsmen, site supervisors, chief engineers and even chief of the Forestry Bureau.⁶

Tracing the pacification trail

Given these roles of the US military, it is useful to compare what was occurring in the United States at the same time. Historians have pointed out that city planning in the US was initially driven by aesthetic concerns, only later shifting to more technical goals emphasising economy and efficiency achieved through more systematic 'land use' and transportation systems.⁷ These new concerns came to be known as the City Scientific approach to city planning and came to dominate only in the 1920s. Richard E. Foglesong, who prefers the term 'City Practical', argues that the key to understanding planning in the United States is the role of the state and the social classes that backed this movement.⁸

In contrast, centralised management of post war Manila in the early 20th century Philippines began with the Philippines Division's attempts. It is here that the Foucauldian notion of governmentality is useful: the emphasis is not on an institution's political influence but its ability to dictate the 'conduct' of its urban and rural subjects. In this sense, it is the interaction of military and insular authorities that provides a key for theorising the role of the colonial state in the non-western setting. This also locates the tensions in the state's disciplinary regimes. Initial 'stabilising operations' defined as 'routine humanitarian, governmental, economic, social, judicial, penal and security tasks' were undertaken by various offices of the Philippines Division; in the provinces they were carried out by the Department of Northern Luzon, Department of Southern Luzon, Department of Visayas, and Department of Mindanao and Jolo.⁹ The US military's contribution to civil affairs began with the work undertaken by the Manila-based offices of the Quartermaster General, Quartermaster Depot, Army Transport Service and Commissary. Then, after 1903, the US military's efforts shifted to the southern Philippines where it contributed not only to infrastructure building but, more importantly, the military position informed an evolving regional policy towards Mindanao and Sulu.

Manila's emergence as the Philippines' primate city, which began under Spanish administration, continued throughout the 20th century but the US military's contributions to this process has not yet been examined. This is because the appearance of a distinct spatial typology – the US military defence complex – in later decades conceals the link between the military and urban change. However it is possible to trace how the military reinforced the primacy of Manila in two ways: first, by detailing how the Office of the Quartermaster General was responsible in the first few years for both military and civil construction and real estate contracts; and second, how various sections of this office established Manila as the storage and distribution centre for the entire Division of the Philippines.

First, the Chief Quartermaster handled military and civil government leases on buildings and land including barracks, warehouses, corrals, schools, observatories, markets, quarantine stations and hospital buildings.¹⁰ Carpenters and other workers were directly employed to build 31 warehouses of 223 square metres; two new medical supply depots; officers quarters at Santa Mesa (outside Manila); Santa Mesa Hospital water closets; new barracks and repairs to old buildings at Corregidor Island; a new military prison at Olongapo, Zambales province; and a water supply system at Mariveles quarantine station, Bataan province.¹¹ This office supervised work by private contractors equivalent to 120,000 Mexican dollars at Engineer Cuartel, Intendencia, Estado Mayor, Ayuntamiento, Santa Mesa Hospital, Exposition

Grounds barracks, the Quartermaster Depot corral and the Governor-General's residence. It also handled the contracts for cleaning dry earth closets and cesspools at barracks, prisons, civil police stations, hospitals and civil government buildings.

Second, by May 1901, the Office of Land Transportation already had space for 182 mules and 64 horses for both military and civil government use in Manila. The Quartermaster Depot enclosure sheltered teams drawing the ambulances, metal sanitary carts, water carts and 'dead wagons' for medical purposes; dump carts for coal and wood distribution; excavators and sprinklers; farm, escort (heavy farm work), light spring, Dougherty (passenger), California stake wagons, as well as lumber, hay and other utility trucks. It handled all forage, coal, wood, and oil requirements of the civil and military transport system.¹² The Army Transport Service office was responsible for all chartered and government vessels in service throughout the archipelago: nine steamers, eight steam lighters, 55 launches and tugs, 24 lorchas and lighters, 131 cascos, and 72 row-boats.¹³ These pioneering efforts in Manila are indicative of the kind of logistics and centralised planning efforts to provide troops with sufficient food, water, shelter, clothing, medical supplies, equipage, weapons, forage and fuel that the US War Department would later undertake, with greater regional military involvement, in Japan, Korea and Vietnam. For example the Chief of the Commissary office responsible for feeding the troops, attempted to procure 15 tons of fresh meat, constituting 70 percent of the daily requirements of 34,000 troops. Frozen beef was shipped in from Australia and the transport chain included iceboxes in coastal steamers and refrigerator cars pulled inland by pack mules for 20 miles or carabaos for 60 miles until it reached an army post. Fresh vegetables came from the United States, Japan, China, India and Australia.¹⁴

The problems of theft and pilfering encountered by of the Quartermaster Depot in 1900 were symptomatic of the enormous task of connecting all posts to the capital. The duties of the Quartermaster Depot included 'receiving, issuing and manufacturing supplies for the entire Archipelago' and one of the complaints was of US Army property being stolen, unintentionally damaged, or mislaid. Among the reasons given by the Assistant Quartermaster for this were the lack of storage space at the Manila depot, and the difficulty of making an accurate inventory because of non-uniform packaging and box weight, and a lack of an accounting system for US Army property in transit. This problem was great because 'nearly all islands in the Archipelago had been occupied by troops and posts established at places never heard of, a great number of which had to be reached by sea'. It was impossible to pinpoint precisely at what point and whose responsibility it was when the thefts and pilfering occurred.¹⁵

Conclusions

Paul Rabinow describes urbanism as the union of 'historical' and 'natural' elements of the city in the management of society and how reforms were undertaken both in terms of the superstructure and the infrastructure. The former represented the state's 'technical programme'; the latter, the state's 'social response' implemented by agencies responsible for education, culture, religion, commerce, sanitation, etc.¹⁶

American military administrators in Mindanao and Sulu archipelago used religious, historical, cultural, and social differences to argue for a policy of administrative autonomy from the Luzon-based insular government. The Filipino heirs of the insular government later used the argument to make the case for a policy of integration, this time aligning sympathies with Christian Filipinos as 'kin'. Roads, telephones and the telegraph were central to the region's pacification: road networks in Davao, Lanao; and a telegraph line connecting the military headquarters in Zamboanga to most of Cotabato.¹⁷ This is significant because in Mindanao and Sulu, Rabinow's notion of urbanism finds a more diffuse regional application.

This interpretation contrasts with the history of city planning in the United States that began in the 1900s as privately initiated urban reforms by civic and professional groups and the 'city scientific' approach that became dominant only in later decades. This study contends that the civic spaces established by the insular government were concurrently underpinned and undermined by war, in contrast to urban change in United States, which was tied primarily to market forces (*laissez-faire*). This means that civil government and the infrastructure associated with it were established only by eliminating the insurgent threat. However, because the anti-colonial movement continued to change (conventional war, guerrilla war, Pulahan, Hukbalahap rebellion, etc) in response to the current political and social climate, civil space to this day continually faces the threat of being overrun by the war's new incarnation.

This analysis of the US military role in Philippine affairs uses the notion of Foucauldian governmentality. The US military's participation in civil affairs constituted a distinction between

colonial and imperial cities that was played out in two ways. First, it provided the management, professional skills and security requirements for the insular government's road- and bridge-building programme. In addition, it strengthened Manila's link to Mindanao and the rest of archipelago by land and water and organised a storage and distribution network to meet its pacification campaign. Second, the authors of military strategy in the Philippines were part of an evolving technocracy, where the influence of government specialists would find fuller expression in appointments by subsequent colonial and nationalist administrators. The rate at which both military operations and appointments proceeded ran contrary to the US War Department's claims of peace. This is emphasised because the military would reprise this central role again seven decades later, in nation building efforts during Martial Law under the Marcos administration.¹⁸ Such military practices continue in some form in post-colonial cities and in the Philippines today it comes in the guise of the Joint Special Operations Task Force at Edwin Andrews Air Base and Camp Navarro in Zamboanga City, Mindanao.

The productive and the destructive aspects of war are dichotomies that should be carefully unpacked in order to understand the effect of conflict on colonial and postcolonial spaces, both urban and its non-urban correlates. War's productivity is tied to the creation of new subjects, spaces, and connections. The Philippine-American War's colonial subjects included governor-generals and military commanders, soldiers and thieves, prisoners and *camneros* (road builders). They built and toiled at the nondescript spaces that fell in the shadow of the insular government's proposed civic space: quarries and construction sites, ports and harbour developments, barracks and warehouses, roads and bridges, launches and ferries.

Estela Duque
University of Melbourne
meduque@t-online.de

Notes

1901. Appendix P. Report of Commanding General Department of Mindanao and Jolo. [Report title] Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur, US Army, Commanding Division of the Philippines. Military Governor of the Philippine Islands. Vol. I: 4.
- Salman, Michael. 2001. *The Embarrassment of Slavery: Controversies over Bondage and Nationalism in the American Colonial Philippines*. In cooperation with University of California Press. Quezon City: Ateneo University Press.
- Mojares, Resil B. c1999. *The War against the Americans, Resistance and Collaboration in Cebu 1899-1906*. Quezon City: Ateneo University Press: 118-9.
- Bankoff, Greg. 2005. Wants, Wages and Workers: Laboring in the American Philippines, 1899-1908. *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 74, No. 1: 59-86.
- Golay, Frank H. 1998. *Face of Empire: United States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946*. Quezon City: Ateneo University Press: 95, 492 n14-15.
- Bankoff, Greg. 2009. 'Breaking New Ground? Gifford Pinchot and the Birth of "Empire Forestry" in the Philippines, 1900-1905'. *Environment and History* Vol. 15, No. 3: 369-393; 2005. "'These Brothers of Ours': Pobleto's Obreros and the Road to Baguio 1903-1905'. *Journal of Social History*. Vol. 38, No. 4: 1047-1072.
- Akimoto, Fukuo. 2009. 'The Birth of "Land Use Planning" in American Urban Planning'. *Planning Perspectives*. Vol. 24, No. 4: 457-483.
- For the history of city scientific: Foglesong, Richard E. c1986. *Planning the Capitalist City: the Colonial Era to the 1920s*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. See also Wilson, William H. c1989. *The City Beautiful Movement, Creating the North American Landscape*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press: 285-290.
- Yates, Lawrence A. 2006. *The U.S. Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press: 1-2, 9.
- Appendix L. Report of Provost Marshal General. [Report title] Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur: 6-7.
- Appendix D. Report of Chief Quartermaster, Exhibit A. Office of Assistant to the Chief Quartermaster, *ibid*: 9-11.
- Appendix D, Exhibit C. Office Land Transportation, *ibid*: 29-33, 34-7, 42.
- Appendix D, Exhibit D. Office Army Transport Service, *ibid*: 47, 49, 51-2.
- Appendix E. Report of Chief of Commissary, *ibid*: 3-5.
- Appendix D, Exhibit B. Office of the Quartermaster Depot, *ibid*: 13-17.
- Rabinow, Paul. 1995. *French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment*. Originally published by MIT Press c1989. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 4-5, 12.
- See the following by Patricio N. Abinales: (1) 2000. *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State*. Co-published with University of Hawai'i Press. Quezon City: Ateneo University Press: 17-18, 30-31; 1998. *Images of State Power*. University of the Philippines Press: 15-17.
- Caoili, Manuel A. 1999. *The Origins of Metropolitan Manila, a Political and Social Analysis*. University of the Philippines Press: 133-135, 142-143, 203 n104-109.

Leaping beyond nostalgia: Shanghai's urban life ethnography

Nostalgia has consistently been a motivation for the study of contemporary Chinese urban life. Scholars have produced an abundance of work on urbanism from a pro-historic preservation perspective and, for example, have long claimed that the *lilong* house ('li' means neighbourhoods, 'long' means lanes) is an efficient form of housing for the residents of Shanghai. Non Arkaraprasertkul argues, however, that these studies fall short in terms of future city planning, as they omit the personal experiences and viewpoints of urban residents regarding the efficiency of such dwellings.

Non Arkaraprasertkul

SOON AFTER SHANGHAI BECAME A TREATY PORT in the 1840s, British developers built *lilong* houses to provide basic accommodation for Chinese labourers. A typical *lilong* neighbourhood is a walled community composed of a main lane running all or half-way across each housing block, connected by perpendicular branch lanes.

Lilong: a critical history

The idea behind the *lilong* is to pack as many housing units, as economically as possible, into any single cluster. For instance, the original design of the *lilong* included lanes which function not only as the main and only access to individual residential units but also back-of-the-house service paths. This has the added benefit of minimising construction costs, since the two different functions pertinent to mobility in the community are combined. Before long, however, residents had transformed this thoroughfare into an everyday 'community corridor,' utilising these lanes as space for almost everything from hanging out to chat and for community meetings, to cooking, washing clothes and selling stuff to gambling and so on.¹

This is a good illustration of how adaptations within *lilong* neighbourhoods respond to the multiple social functions of the community, allowing its physical elements to serve several purposes simultaneously. The success of the first series of *lilong* led to demands for the next. In fact, within a century of the first construction, more than 200,000 *lilong* dwelling units – of approximately 60 to 150 square metres per unit – had been built and the *lilong* had become the dominating characteristic of the urban fabric of Shanghai (see fig. 1 and 2).

Benefitting both servant Chinese and served Westerners, *lilong* houses became the epitome of communal and modern Chinese housing culture and were in high demand until a series of wars and local uprisings disrupted foreign industries, which was in essence the backbone of Shanghai's economy, and which were followed by the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Foreign commercial investment and employment disappeared due to the wartime turbulence and the radical changes brought about by Mao Zedong's socialistic central fiscal planning policy that followed it. During the hardship of this ongoing period of economic decline, residents were continually adapting the physical form of the *lilong* to accommodate changing social and political circumstances. The residents adopted unique methods in order to flexibly utilise the formal space – in ways the original builders did not plan – to meet their daily needs. The result was a change in the social structure both of the single unit and of the neighbourhood. Each unit was sub-divided to house more families and allow for more commercial activity.

Since the 1970s, *lilong* houses have become increasingly popular among Shanghai's burgeoning middle and upper classes. Despite the *lilongs'* serious infrastructural problems, due to the increasing population and adequate provision of maintenance in these ageing houses, many people see them as a viable alternative to expensive high-rise apartments. As this interest in the *lilong* houses increases, it is becoming increasingly necessary to understand how the flexibility of these urban spaces works. It begs the question, is it the residents who are flexible or the *lilong*, or perhaps both? (see fig. 3).

Today, Shanghai is undergoing unprecedented urban development, which can be attributed to the process of social reform (*shehuigaige*) and skyrocketing land values, both of which tend to encourage high-rise building. During the first decade of Deng Xiaoping's social reform (1978-88), the Communist Party used political power to interfere with the economy, pressing the country towards capitalism. This resulted in the large-scale destruction of a number of *lilong* neighbourhoods, making way for monumental open spaces and high-rise development. These top-down transformations – documented extensively in academic literature – fail urbanistically if the operation is carried out without recognition of local people's needs. Furthermore, in the late 1990s Shanghai's local government fully adopted property-led redevelopment schemes in order to maximise revenue from under-utilised land. These schemes included

demolishing existing older, low-density neighbourhoods in favour of high-rise developments that could instantly provide much more leasable – i.e. profitable – space. No consideration was given to social issues such as family displacement, gentrification, or social stratification, let alone more complex issues such as cultural identity and historical value. This dramatic reduction of social space for interaction within the community results in the diminishing of social capital. Furthermore, in terms of the wider social perspective concerning 'filial obligations', recent ethnographical research, shows that this change of housing infrastructure could be a threat to the support and security of the elderly vis-à-vis social segregation.² (see fig. 4).

It is thought that the younger generation of Chinese, especially those working in the service sector, find the smaller spaces of an apartment more preferable for day-to-day living. The advantages of a high-rise apartment unit with a studio-type room include low maintenance, modern infrastructure (heating system, air-conditioning, hot water, etc.), cheap rent, good ventilation, and natural lighting – something that the *lilong* simply cannot provide.

The 'missing middle ground'

Needless to say, research from both sociological and historical perspectives that advocates the preservation of *lilong*, indicates that high-rise development could be responsible for diminishing the social bonds and the relationships of the people in these communities. There have been a number of studies of the *lilong* made, in a variety of disciplines. Those from the field of architecture are perhaps the most concrete in terms of implementation; yet they still rely on the extreme *tabula rasa* approach – i.e. how to rebuild a 'new' *lilong* neighbourhood – rather than the trying to establish a middle ground that tries to incorporate both preservation and urban development.


As a result of the One Child Policy (*dushengzuzhengce*), there have been changes in the preferences for housing among multi-generational Shanghaiese residents and immigrants for which *lilong* may or may not be the answer. The study of the relationship between the physical infrastructure of *lilong* and the social formation of neighbourhoods is important to the process of urban housing policy planning and could provide a counter-balance to high-rise development. Within the context of China's unprecedented social reform, the knowledge and ideas gained from cultural and social anthropology are essential.

In an earlier paper, 'Towards Modern Urban Housing: Redefining Shanghai's *Lilong*', this author presented a comprehensive study of the history and architecture of *lilong* and offered a new way of looking at the design of new housing in contemporary Shanghai. The idea was put forward that the low- to medium-rise and high-density (LMHRD) housing is the most suitable for the city, but with a caveat that the author was 'aware that this research might not completely fill the noticeable void in contemporary thinking on architecture and urban housing in Shanghai.'³

This paper is not an extension of this previous work on the *lilong*, quite the opposite in fact, this paper aims at disrupting and renegotiating the common perception – an axiom if you will – about the study of urban housing and design. It adamantly rejects the value of scholarship (including some of the author's own work) as it ignores some of the most important aspects of design – that is, the understanding of the community-in-action from an anthropological perspective. Needless to say, as the introduction of this paper discusses, there are differences in several academic attitudes and perspectives towards *lilong*, which are important to the thorough understanding of housing design.

Today, Shanghai is undergoing unprecedented urban development, which can be attributed to the process of social reform (*shehuigaige*) and skyrocketing land values, both of which tend to encourage high-rise building.

1. Diagram showing the basic structure of *lilong* neighbourhood: A walled community composed of a main lane running all or half way across each block, with branch lanes connecting perpendicularly to the main lane. The diagram was drawn for the purpose of giving an instant picture of the structure of the neighborhood but not of giving accuracy: The lanes are much smaller in reality. Source: Wenjun Ge.



2. An aerial photograph of Shanghai (overlooking Puxi) in the 1930s showing the dominating pattern of *lilong* houses. Only along the waterfront (the Bund; by the Huangpu River at the top of the picture) were other types of buildings located; most of them were foreigners' houses and their business headquarters. Source: Virtual Shanghai Project, Christian Henriot (IAO - Lyon 2 University).

Addressing the missing middle ground

To reiterate, given the scholarship of historians (particularly that from the 1980s to the present time) who have long claimed that the *lilong* has been an ‘efficient’ form of housing for Shanghai residents, this paper seeks to ask a deeper question, from a community perspective, about whether or not *lilong* should be considered as part of the future planning of Shanghai? The research on urban housing should be based on the study of the relationship between space and people, rather than just being led by a nostalgia for the *lilong*. This approach is necessary to define how space is utilised, justified, and re-justified by the resident users, the people who stand in the middle ground between the physical form of their micro-communities and the ever-changing culture of China’s largest city. Does Shanghai accept the *lilong* as its dominant dwelling culture? Or have financial factors resulted in these houses and neighbourhoods becoming as important as they have done?

The suggested primary research methodology is a ‘lighter’ version of ethnography as presented by Jan Wampler and this author in the work *Community-Oriented Urban Housing Design for Beijing: Strategies for LMRHD and Urban Design* (2008). In this paper, some basic study methods were suggested, such as participant observation and semi-structured interviews, which architects and urban designers can employ in order to understand the dynamic of communities. From this study of the community, the strategy paper proposed a series of experimental designs that represented ideas of ‘community-oriented housing’. That is to say, mixed-use, mixed-tenure, and mixed-housing type developments, as well as humanised and walkable neighbourhoods, and high-density, integrated open space, and environmental morphology. The study revealed that the process of familiarisation is crucial to architecture. In other words, ‘the site visit’ is a pathway to the preliminarily understanding of the quality of space alongside the requirements of any programme. Without this first process of deep familiarisation with the locality of the site, architects will fail to derive a design that works and, as Jan Wampler points out, ‘[i]n fact, many architects contributed to the problem by designing buildings [and their space] that do not fit with the culture or the landscape and do not make places’.⁴

However, it would be uneconomical for an architect, commissioned to study and design a housing project, to spend a week or a month ‘hanging out’ like an anthropologist in the community to try and understand how things work in order to produce a good design. Instead, the lighter version of ethnography for housing research requires architects to pay attention to what they observe and to ensure they be keen to ask questions about the rationality behind certain activities that take place in the community, rather than to just look at the characteristics and physical condition of the existing architecture. That is, it is possible –and feasible –to conduct an ethnographic study of an urban community in order to derive the true understanding of the community for design.⁵ (see fig. 4).

Such fieldwork aims at assessing the nature of *lilong* neighbourhoods via: a) the organisation of public space in such communities; b) the casual formation of semi-private space; c) the social networks (community networks including clubs, exercise groups, religious groups, chess clubs, etc.), which constitute spatial arrangement; and d) the personal experience of inhabitants actively creating and/or maintaining both.

What I have learned specifically from my study of lilong is the ‘condition of resistance’ in the environment of a community that has an important role to play in the design of social space.

The principle methodology would be participant observation. While this could be construed as a ‘passive method’, ethnographers can never really be passive in reality. In fact, people are going to expect contributions back from the field ethnographer and that is always a *negotiated process*. Regarding the participatory research, this research clearly distinguishes such methods from Participatory Action Research (PAR) which requires full involvement of people in every aspect of research towards a goal (in best cases, of their choosing) for progress or development.⁶ Another viable method is Participatory Appraisal (PA), which employs techniques such as ‘Photovoice’ –giving selected groups a disposable camera and have them photograph their neighbourhoods to record the communities’ strengths and concerns. The aim of the method is twofold: firstly, to get the participants to engage in a group process of critical reflection on the community and secondly, to develop an opportunity to look into the deeper content of the community that cannot be seen using the outsider’s perspective. In fact, the PA method (developed by Robert Chambers) is widely used in international development studies, with the aim of incorporating the knowledge and opinions of people in the planning and management of development projects.⁷

Conclusion

The study of contemporary urban housing in large and emerging Chinese cities should be a fundamental attempt to understand residents’ lives and their inevitable processes of adaptation to the social and cultural realms controlled by a set of formal and informal rules and regulations that is different from other places in the world. The latest developmental stage of community-oriented urban housing design sparks important debate on the relationship between people and the built environment in the recent study of spatiality. This is a place where the limiting knowledge to physical space alone is redundant and where ethnography and anthropological work can fill in the gaps. What I have learned specifically from my study of *lilong* is the ‘condition of resistance’ in the environment of a community that has an important role to play in the design of social space. With the understanding of such conditions, architecture and urban design could break new ground for design with –more than just psychological –anthropological realism.

Whereas previous studies from various angles prescribe two extreme paths toward the development of Shanghai urbanism in order to cope with political change and economic reform, it is hoped that the suggestions contained in this paper could help to establish a long overdue ‘missing middle ground’. Deeper study of the actuality of the community is urged. The goal is by no means to suggest policy or to advocate the preservation of *lilong* but, rather, to contribute towards a useful argument on the benefit of a balance between history and the contemporary condition of the city. Indeed, the aim of this paper has been to contribute vital substance to academic discourse on such housing typologies through an *ethnographic view* of dynamic communal life and the socio-spatial impacts of property led development in Shanghai’s *lilong* neighbourhoods.

Non Arkaraprasertkul
Harvard University & Harvard-Yenching Institute,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
narkarap@fas.harvard.edu

References

1. See D. Louise Morris, *Community or Commodity? : A Study of Lilong Housing in Shanghai* (Vancouver: Centre for Human Settlements, School of Community and Regional Planning, University of British Columbia, 1994), 8-12; Chunlan Zhao, ‘From Shikumen to New-Style: A re-reading of Lilong Housing in Modern Shanghai’ *The Journal of Architecture* 9, no.1 (2004): 57.
2. Elisabeth J. Croll, ‘The Intergenerational Contract in the Changing Asian Family,’ *Oxford Development Studies* 34, no.4 (2006): 475.
3. Non Arkaraprasertkul, ‘Towards Modern Urban Housing: Redefining Shanghai’s lilong,’ *Journal of Urbanism: International Research on Placemaking and Urban Sustainability* 2, no.1 (2009).
4. Jan Wampler and Non Arkaraprasertkul, ‘Community-Oriented Urban Housing Design for Beijing: Strategies for Lmrhd and Urban Design,’ in *The Seventh China Urban Housing Conference* (Chongqing, China: Center of Housing Innovations, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008).
5. Non Arkaraprasertkul, ‘Resilient Lilong: An Ethnography of Shanghai’s Urban Housing,’ *Working Papers Series: Harvard-Yenching Institute* (2009), <http://hyi.scribo.harvard.edu/category/working-paper-series/>.
6. Nabeel Hamdi, *Action Planning for Cities : A Guide to Community Practice*, ed. Reinhard Goethert (Chichester: Chichester : John Wiley, 1997).
7. Robert Chambers, *Participatory Workshops : A Sourcebook of 21 Sets of Ideas and Activities* (London ; Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications, 2002).

Bibliography

- Arkaraprasertkul, Non. ‘Resilient Lilong: An Ethnography of Shanghai’s Urban Housing.’ *Working Papers Series: Harvard-Yenching Institute* (2009), <http://hyi.scribo.harvard.edu/category/working-paper-series/>.
- . ‘Towards Modern Urban Housing: Redefining Shanghai’s lilong.’ *Journal of Urbanism: International Research on Placemaking and Urban Sustainability* 2, no.1 (2009): 11-29.
- Chambers, Robert. *Participatory Workshops : A Sourcebook of 21 Sets of Ideas and Activities*. London ; Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications, 2002.
- Croll, Elisabeth J. ‘The Intergenerational Contract in the Changing Asian Family.’ *Oxford Development Studies* 34, no.4 (2006): 473 - 91.
- Hamdi, Nabeel. *Action Planning for Cities : A Guide to Community Practice*. Edited by Reinhard Goethert. Chichester: John Wiley, 1997.
- Morris, D. Louise. *Community or Commodity? : A Study of Lilong Housing in Shanghai*. Vancouver: Centre for Human Settlements, School of Community and Regional Planning, University of British Columbia, 1994.
- Wampler, Jan, and Non Arkaraprasertkul. ‘Community-Oriented Urban Housing Design for Beijing: Strategies for Lmrhd and Urban Design.’ In *The Seventh China Urban Housing Conference*. Chongqing, China: Center of Housing Innovations, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008.
- Zhao, Chunlan. ‘From Shikumen to New-Style: A re-reading of Lilong Housing in Modern Shanghai’ *The Journal of Architecture* 9, no.1 (2004): 49-76.



3. Aerial photographs of Shanghai in the 1930s (left) and 2008 (right) comparing the pattern of urban fabric. A large number of *lilong* houses, which were the dominating fabric of the city in the 1930s, have been razed since the early 1980s resulting in a mixed-fabric of high-rise buildings and *lilong* house as shown in the photograph on the right. Sources: Virtual Shanghai Project, Christian Henriot (IAO - Lyon 2 University); Google Earth Image.

Summary of attitudes towards *lilong* from different academic angles, which serve as a theoretical (cursory) study of this paper

PERSPECTIVES	PRO-LILONG	ANTI-LILONG
Historical	Historically important; dating back to the 19th century	Labourers’ housing; history replaced by Chinese nationalism
Development Studies & Planning	Diversified environment; Counter-balancing high-rise development, which alone is not conducive to urban life	Inefficient use of space; dilapidating condition; obsolete infrastructure
Sociology & Cultural	Shielding family displacement, gentrification, diversity, social segregation	Slum condition; crime; drugs; changing structure of Chinese family in urban areas needs the efficiency and the low-maintenance aspect of high-rises
Architectural & Physical	Flexibility of urban space as example of livable community; Efficient typology of traditional housing settlement	Bad ventilation; inadequate infrastructure; environmental and health hazard
Tourism Studies	Selling point of ‘real’ Shanghai	Bad image of for the city’s tourism



4. A typical *lilong* branch lane where all types of activities ranging from drying clothes to community gathering are normally taking place. Photo: Author.

Writing the *longtang* way of life



‘Looked down upon from the highest point in the city, Shanghai’s *longtang* – her vast neighborhoods inside enclosed alleys – are a magnificent sight.’ Thus opens the award-winning novel *Song of Everlasting Sorrow* by the influential writer Wang Anyi. In this novel, Shanghai’s alleyway houses are brought to life by meticulous descriptions that seem to anthropomorphise the city. A unique housing typology, the experience of its residents and Shanghai history, all made one through the literary imagination.

Lena Scheen

EVERY SHANGHAISE WILL PROUDLY TELL YOU that if you haven’t been to the Bund, you haven’t been to Shanghai. It is indeed a unique site: imposing buildings from the treaty-port period (1841-1943) facing the futuristic skyline of ultramodern Pudong across the Huangpu River. The local significance of the Bund reveals the citizens’ paradoxical rejoicing in Shanghai’s new global image and, simultaneously, their growing sense of nostalgia for the city’s past. In particular the first half of the 20th century has become a favourite subject in ‘high’ as well as popular culture; a time when the cosmopolitan metropolis was world-famous as a financial and cultural centre, known by such colourful nicknames as ‘Pearl of the Orient’, ‘Whore of Asia’, ‘Paris of the East’, or ‘Paradise for Adventurers’.

The collective infatuation with colonial Shanghai – referred to as ‘Shanghai nostalgia’ in Chinese cultural discourse – sprang up in the mid-1990s when the city witnessed an explosion of destruction and renewal. Searching for a Shanghai identity in the midst of brutal transformation, Shanghai writers resorted, en masse, to this distinctive period in Chinese history. After being presented as the epitome of evil in the Maoist period, colonial Shanghai now reconquered its original representation of Western-style urban modernity. The typical Shanghai *longtang* – built in the colonial period and characterised by a unique mixture of Chinese and Western architecture –

The collective infatuation with colonial Shanghai – referred to as ‘Shanghai nostalgia’ in Chinese cultural discourse – sprang up in the mid-1990s when the city witnessed an explosion of destruction and renewal.

has become one of the main symbols, featuring recurrently in contemporary Shanghai fiction, of which *Song of Everlasting Sorrow* is one of the most representative examples.

Song of Everlasting Sorrow

Wang Anyi’s novel borrows its title from a narrative poem by Bai Juyi (CE 772-846) about the tragic love story between Tang emperor Xuanzong and his most beautiful concubine Yang Guifei. Being madly in love, the emperor neglects his state affairs until he has to flee because of an armed rebellion. His royal guards blame Yang Guifei and force the emperor to have her executed. The poem closes with Xuanzong’s lamenting words: ‘While even heaven and earth will one day come to an end, this everlasting sorrow shall endure.’

The novel *Song of Everlasting Sorrow* also ends in the murder of a tragic beauty, the ageing Qiyao whose life reflects Shanghai’s turbulent history. As though she is just one of the diverse elements that constitute a *longtang* neighbourhood, Wang Anyi only introduces Qiyao after four chapters of detailed description of the *longtang* setting. She embodies the ‘girlish *longtang* spirit’:

Behind every doorway in the Shanghai longtang a Wang Qiyao is studying, embroidering, whispering secrets to her sisters, or throwing a teary-eyed tantrum at her parents.

Through Wang Anyi’s words, the protagonist of the novel seems to become the *longtang* itself, or, in the words of the Chinese journal *Writer*: ‘the city’s alleys, the city’s atmosphere, the city’s thought and spirit.’

While the timeframe of the three parts of *Song of Everlasting Sorrow* corresponds to the political periods of pre-Mao, Mao, and post-Mao China, it is not a historical novel in the strict sense. History and politics play their part behind the scenes, leaving their traces in Wang Qiyao’s life story. But what is most striking about the novel is how historical events are mirrored in the changing physical appearance of the *longtang*, that originated in the glorious days of cosmopolitan Shanghai:

First to appear are the dormer windows protruding from a rooftop tingzjian [the garret above the kitchen in longtang, this often rented out to struggling young writers and lent its name to a popular literary genre as a result] of those traditional longtang buildings, showing themselves off with a certain self-conscious delicacy; the wooden shutters are carefully delineated, the handmade rooftop tiles are arranged with precision, even the potted roses on the windowsills have been cared for painstakingly.

CONTINUED PAGE 32 >

'My relations with Shanghai are tense'

An interview with Wang Anyi

When Wang Anyi was only one year old, she moved to Shanghai with her mother, the novelist Ru Zhijuan. Today, Wang Anyi herself is, arguably, the most influential writer of Shanghai and her stories consistently use the city as a backdrop. Yet in a recent public interview, Wang Anyi confessed that she 'doesn't feel Shanghainese', though she added, 'but, neither can I say that I'm not Shanghainese, because if I'm not, then where am I from?'

Ms Wang sits on the stage, wearing an ankle-length skirt and a long shawl draped around her shoulders. Her lively eyes scan the audience with curiosity. Sitting up straight, hair pinned back, feet placed firmly on the ground, hands clenched into fists on her knees, she exudes the air both of a distinguished writer and of a down-to-earth peasant woman; an intriguing paradox that she shares with several other mainland Chinese intellectuals.

It is not difficult to picture Ms Wang 40 years ago, when most 'urban youths' were sent to the countryside for 're-education by the peasants'; a young girl with rosy cheeks and braided hair, most likely wearing unisex cotton-padded clothes while singing revolutionary songs to the rising sun and chairman Mao. In particular, her early works deal with these experiences during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), after which she started writing stories that belonged to the so-called 'roots-seeking literature': rural fiction that explored traditional Chinese customs and values still present in the countryside. However, since the 1990s her work has turned increasingly towards the main subject of this interview: the city of Shanghai. Explaining this shift in her work, Wang says:

Although my work from before the 1990s does not limit itself to the countryside, the city did indeed play a vague role; it was always in the background of the plot. At that time, my work focused on the characters, their emotions, and how they grow in the story. Shanghai is the place where I live and I think people are usually not so conscious of their own living environment. So that's probably also the reason that when I wrote stories set in Shanghai, I didn't really reflect on the place where the characters were living. Since the 1990s, though my work still focused on both rural and urban experiences, the city became more concrete, and sometimes even the main character of a story. For example, in my short story 'The Street', the street itself is actually the only character and forms the whole plot; I describe the houses, the cars, the people, but the people remain nameless. Although I am very critical of this story—I think it is rather boring—I still consider it an important turning point in my writing: from now on Shanghai became an important subject in my work.

After each question, Wang Anyi vigorously keeps on talking until the interviewer interrupts her for the next. She is open, quick-witted, and sharp, at times appearing to think out loud and she never loses her sense of humour. Holding the audience spellbound, Ms Wang recounts her childhood search for belonging in a society that disparagingly labelled her as 'new Shanghainese':

When my mother and I arrived in Shanghai, we moved into an apartment with a local Shanghai family living above us. They criticised our family for many things: our home was too sparsely furnished, we lived too simply and we couldn't speak Shanghainese. They were constantly lecturing us and passing judgment. So when I befriended the daughter of this family, my mother was furious and kept nagging about how this family would turn me into an ordinary person. My mother moved in both literary and military circles, so her values were in conflict with those of the local Shanghainese. What I'm trying to explain is that there is a difference between the 'local' and the 'new' Shanghainese. Although there is something quite funny about it: even though my mother had a strong aversion to the locals' criticisms, she actually admired them as well. I think my mother and I were both intrigued by our neighbours' lifestyle. They would visit places that were particularly popular with local Shanghainese, like the Chenghuang Temple and the Great World Entertainment Centre. Our way of life was completely different and going to the cinema was the only fun thing I did with my mother. So from a very young age I have always felt I don't fit in with the local Shanghai lifestyle.

Wang Anyi's childhood experiences not only marked her life but also planted the seeds of her ambivalent relationship with Shanghai:

Although I'm living in this city, we don't blend like milk and water. Sometimes I feel like I'm a spectator watching the city from a distance. Maybe it's precisely because of this feeling that I can have an objective view of Shanghai. Although this objectivity is relative, of course, since it's overruled by my own experiences: I have been living here since I was one year old,

my friends and classmates were all Shanghainese, and our family has moved around town. I guess I have a very tense relation with this city: I feel distant and close to it at the same time. I don't like the city, but I have no choice but to like it. My relationship with Shanghai is probably best expressed by the Chinese idiom 'the bones are broken, but the muscles still hold them together'.

The most important obstacle between Wang Anyi and the city appears to be the local language. Several times, Ms Wang brings up the consequences of her ongoing struggle to master Shanghainese (a northern Wu dialect that is less than 50 per cent intelligible for speakers of Mandarin, the national standard language):

Since I couldn't speak Shanghainese as a child, I was always very nervous when I had to say something in public and afraid people wouldn't have the patience to listen to me. So in the end, I would usually just give up the right to speak and, in order to compensate for that, mainly talk to myself. For me, writing is just like talking to myself: the process of writing begins when I feel like I'm talking too much to myself, then I just have to write it down until it becomes a novel.

The story reveals how Wang Anyi continuously relates her position as a 'new Shanghainese' to her writing profession, reminding us of the best-selling author Chen Danyan (often grouped with Wang Anyi and Cheng Naishan for their 'nostalgic novels' on Shanghai), who also moved to the city as a young child and frequently emphasises how her 'outsider's perspective,' as she puts it in an interview, 'helped her to detect many subtle things ignored and taken for granted by local Shanghainese'. It is precisely this distance that turns them into good observers, as Ms Wang modestly explains:

I haven't experienced much, so most of my stories come from my imagination. Actually, you can call me a little boring or a coward with regard to life, but I do have passions and I like to watch other people's lives. I'm not a reader but a spectator, observing the lives of others and even the most trivial things. When young people aspiring to become a writer ask for advice, I always tell them that the main talent of a writer is to observe.

A talent that Wang Anyi attributes particularly to women: not only because they 'have a great capacity for strong emotions' as 'emotional beings', but also, again, because of their 'outsider's position':

Male authors mainly write about major events in society. Even when they write about personal feelings, it is always related to those issues. Works by female authors have their own characteristics: we prefer to write about daily life. Why do people like Zhang Ailing [Eileen Chang] so much? I think it's because she writes about the common people. This is why I personally prefer to read works by female authors. Even in the most boring stories you can still take pleasure in their great ability for description; they portray details that only women notice. Maybe it's even because society has been male-dominated for such a long time, and we women have been kept outside, that we have had the opportunity for self-searching.

As soon as the gender issue comes up, Ms Wang's eyes light up and her voice becomes excited. While passionately

championing women's writing, Wang Anyi is also very critical. Straightening her back, she ventures:

If we talk about women's rights today, I believe we have accomplished a lot. However, I do feel that when we look at it from the perspective of the emotions, we are still quite primitive: it's like we women are not fully evolved, as if we're still dragging a tail, a tail of emotions. When a woman is the protagonist of a story, she is mostly completely independent, she has everything, she can do anything, and yet she is still yearning for love, searching for true love. So actually, not much has changed in this perspective. We are still living in the age of Jane Austen, we're still not so developed and still predominantly looking for a good marriage.

The evening ends with a question from the audience about Wang Anyi's most influential novel, *Song of Everlasting Sorrow*, a story that follows the adventures of a Shanghai woman from when she participated in a Miss Shanghai contest in the 1940s until her tragic death in the 1980s. The English translation carries the subtitle 'A Novel of Shanghai', revealing that it is actually the history of Shanghai that is being portrayed through the life story of the protagonist, a woman of course:

I don't dare to say that the protagonist Wang Qiyao represents the city, because if I would say that, readers might point out qualities that are missing. But I did try to keep many characteristics of the protagonist resonant with the city. For example, Wang Qiyao is from a common background, born in a common family, which is just like Shanghai. In China, Shanghai is a relatively mature society consisting of an urban middle class that barely inherited anything from the past, but had to start from scratch, on its own and without being too ambitious. So the city and its people take it one step at a time. What I like about Wang Qiyao, and what is also true for the city, is that although she is very pretty and tender, she is a strong woman at heart. She doesn't care about her duties according to the social norms, but pursues things despised by contemporary values, which is why she is always defeated. But of course, Shanghai is a much stronger woman and it is developing into a megacity. So, if I can't say Wang Qiyao is a representative of Shanghai, then she is like Boston ivy on the wall of an old Shanghai building: a beautiful decoration of the city.

Lena Scheen

Note

Wang Anyi (b.1954) is the author of numerous volumes of essays, short stories, and novels, which are gaining her increasing recognition around the world, ranging from China's highest literary honour, the Mao Dun Prize (for *Song of Everlasting Sorrow*), to the Los Angeles Times Book of the Year Award (for which *Baotown* was a finalist). Currently Ms Wang is the Chairperson of the Shanghai Writers' Association, and a professor of Chinese literature at Fudan University.

This interview took place during 'Shanghai Week', a festival organised by the city of Rotterdam in honour of the 30th anniversary of the Shanghai-Rotterdam sister city relationship and the Shanghai World Expo 2010. If you are interested in the full interview, please contact the author. With thanks to Nan Su (Dutch Sino Business Promotions) for her kind help with the translation.



From left to right: Nan Su, Wang Anyi, Lena Scheen, Jana Beranova (Rotterdam poet). The picture above the podium shows the Shanghai lane houses. Photo: Eric Chen.



CONTINUED FROM PAGE 30 >

This is the décor against which Wang Qiyao's story begins in 1946, when she is 16 years old, reaching third place in a Miss Shanghai contest. Leading a glamorous life as a model and mistress of Kuomintang officer Li, Qiyao is able to escape her humble background. Her charmed life ends with Li getting killed in a plane crash and Qiyao being left with only a small box of his gold bars.

The second part of the novel, set in the Mao period (1949-1976), finds Qiyao making ends meet as the neighbourhood nurse. *Longtang* life runs its normal course, seemingly untouched by the political upheaval surrounding it: neighbours and friends meet in Qiyao's home, eating, drinking, chatting, gossiping, playing mahjong, and having afternoon tea. Since this kind of 'decadent bourgeois' life was basically impossible during the Mao period, one could almost forget this part of the novel is no longer set in colonial Shanghai. In this way, the *longtang* can be seen as a place of refuge and a space of apolitical resistance.

All this abruptly ends in 1966, when Qiyao's then lover commits suicide by throwing himself out of a window. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) is largely omitted, which is rather striking for a work that deals with 40 years of Shanghai history—Shanghai is the city where the Cultural Revolution was instigated and experienced its peak. People were restricted in their private lives and many residents were sent to the countryside. It is again through the depiction of the *longtang* that one can painfully sense the atmosphere of overall devastation:

Longtang alleys of all shapes and sizes ran all over the city, and it was during the summer of 1966 that the red- and black-tiled rooftops riddled with protruding dormer windows and concrete terraces were all pried open suddenly, their secrets, conciliatory or compromising, damp and moldy, reeking of rat piss, were in the process of rotting away [...]

In the final part of *Song of Everlasting Sorrow* Shanghai embraces the market economy model. Wang Qiyao has more difficulties in adapting than her illegitimate daughter. As a former Miss Shanghai, Qiyao becomes a symbol of the colonial period and attracts a young boy who idolises her because of this. However, he soon realises that his beloved old city and Qiyao are both fading irrevocably away.

The novel ends with Wang Qiyao's violent death: she is murdered for the one possession that she nostalgically used to keep the past alive—Li's gold bars, symbols of old Shanghai.

The Shanghai longtang have grown gray; there are cracks in the streets and along the walls, the alley lamps have been smashed by mischievous children, the gutters are clogged, and foul water trickles down the streets. Even the leaves of the sweet-scented oleanders are coated with grime.

By depicting the daily lives and 'trivial' experiences of ordinary people in the cramped spaces of *longtang* neighborhoods, Wang Anyi reveals the untold stories of the city, or what Zhang Xudong calls 'the natural history'—unofficial histories, intimate life-worlds, and memories—of the city beneath 'a mechanical, homogeneous history.' The *longtang* seem to embody the soul or essence of Shanghai culture that has survived in spite of a brutal history, but is now about to vanish:

Amid the forest of new skyscrapers, these old longtang neighborhoods are like a fleet of sunken ships, their battled hulls exposed as the sea dries up.

What the narrator mourns, seeing the decay of Shanghai's *longtang*, is not so much its unique architecture but the Shanghai lifestyle that the typology of these houses made possible. In an interview, Wang Anyi illustrated this poignantly with the following personal story:


One day I was heading for an appointment, but couldn't find the place. I suddenly noticed that I had unconsciously entered a typical Shanghai longtang neighbourhood. As I walked on, a deeply familiar feeling overwhelmed me. It was a particular smell, but also a particular sound, a particular temperature... Tears came to my eyes, because these sensations embodied a life that I recognised: my childhood in the longtang neighbourhood, my longtang life when I was a child.

To conclude in Wang Anyi's own words, 'You could say a *longtang* is a certain type of architecture, but what it actually is, is a way of life.'

Lena Scheen
Leiden University, The Netherlands
lena.scheen@gmail.com

References

Zhang Xudong, 'Shanghai Nostalgia: Postrevolutionary Allegories in Wang Anyi's Literary Production in the 1990s'. In: *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique* 8:2, Autumn 2000, p. 349-387.



'One day I was heading for an appointment, but couldn't find the place. I suddenly noticed that I had unconsciously entered a typical Shanghai *longtang* neighbourhood. As I walked on, a deeply familiar feeling overwhelmed me. It was a particular smell, but also a particular sound, a particular temperature... Tears came to my eyes, because these sensations embodied a life that I recognised: my childhood in the *longtang* neighbourhood, my *longtang* life when I was a child.'

New for review

GENERAL

Homay King, 2010
Lost in Translation: Orientalism, Cinema, and the Enigmatic Signifier
 Duke University Press,
 232 pp., hardback
 ISBN 978 0 8223 4743 9

Terence Wesley-Smith & Jon Goss, 2010
Remaking Area Studies: Teaching and Learning across Asia and the Pacific
 University of Hawaii Press,
 272 pp., paperback
 ISBN 978 0 8248 3321 3

CHINA & HONG KONG

Hsiu-Chuang Deppman, 2010
Adapted for the Screen: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Fiction and Film
 University of Hawaii Press,
 256 pp., paperback
 ISBN 978 0 8248 3454 8


Ho-fung Hung, 2009
China and the Transformation of Global Capitalism
 Johns Hopkins University Press,
 222 pp., paperback
 ISBN 978 0 8018 9308 7

Kerry Brown, 2009
Friends and Enemies: The Past, Present and Future of the Communist Party of China
 Anthem Press, 224 pp, paperback
 ISBN 978 1 84331 781 4

Zhang Li, 2010
In Search of Paradise: Middle-class Living in a Chinese Metropolis
 Cornell University Press,
 272 pp., paperback
 ISBN 978 0 8014 7562 7


Rebecca Karl, 2010
Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World: A Concise History
 Duke University Press,
 208 pp., paperback
 ISBN 978 0 8223 4795 8

Dai Yingcong, 2009
Sichuan Frontier and Tibet, The: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing
 University of Washington Press,
 368 pp., paperback
 ISBN 978 0 295 98952 5



JAPAN

Mark Driscoll, 2010
Absolute Erotic, Absolute Grotesque: The Living, Dead, and Undead in Japan's Imperialism, 1895-1945
 Duke University Press,
 352 pp., hardback
 ISBN 978 0 8223 4740 8



T. R. Sareen, 2010
Conspiracy of Silence: Japanese Prisoners of War in India 1942-1946
 Life Span Publishers,
 382 pp., hardback
 ISBN 978 81 83690287

Ken Tadashi Oshima, 2009
International Architecture in Interwar Japan: Constructing Kokusai Kenshiku
 University of Washington Press,
 320 pp., hardback
 ISBN 978 0 295 98944 0

William Wayne Farris, 2009
Japan to 1600: A Social and Economic History
 University of Hawaii Press,
 264 pp., hardback
 ISBN 978 0 8248 3325 1

Frances McCall Rosenbluth & Michael F. Thies, 2010
Japan Transformed: Political Change and Economic Restructuring
 Princeton University Press,
 280 pp., hardback
 ISBN 978 0 691 13591 5


Kawano Satsuki, 2010
Nature's Embrace: Japan's Aging Urbanites and New Death Rites
 University of Hawaii Press,
 240 pp., hardback
 ISBN 978 0 8248 3372 5

Cynthia J. Bogel, 2010
With a Single Glance: Buddhist Icons and Early Mikkyo Vision
 University of Washington Press,
 496 pp., hardback
 ISBN 978 0 295 98920 4

SOUTH ASIA

Vanita Seth, 2010
Europe's Indians: Producing Racial Difference, 1500-1900
 Duke University Press,
 312 pp., paperback
 ISBN 978 0 8223 4764 4

Mukulika Banerjee, 2009
Muslim Portraits: Everyday Lives in India
 Indiana University Press,
 192 pp., hardback
 ISBN 978 0 253 35341 2



SOUTHEAST ASIA


Christina Schwenkel
The American War in Contemporary Vietnam: Transnational Remembrance and Representation
 Indiana University Press, 280 pp., paperback
 ISBN 978 0 253 22076 9

Jan Ovesen & Ing-Britt Trankell, 2010
Cambodians and Their Doctors: A Medical Anthropology of Colonial and Post-Colonial Cambodia
 NIAS Press, 336 pp., paperback
 ISBN 978 87 7694 058 4

Tony Day & Maya Ht Liem, 2010
Cultures at War: The Cold War and Cultural Expression in Southeast Asia
 Cornell Southeast Asia Program,
 301 pp., paperback
 ISBN 978 0 877 27751 4

Anne L. Foster, 2010
Projections of Power: The United States and Europe in Colonial Southeast Asia, 1919-1941
 Duke University Press,
 264 pp., paperback
 ISBN 978 0 8223 4800 9

Mark Frost, Ravinder Balasingamchow & Yu-Mei, 2010
Singapore: A Biography
 Editions Didier Millet, 456 pp., hardback
 ISBN 978 988 802 817 7



Robert Pringle, 2010
Understanding Islam in Indonesia
 University of Hawaii Press, 220 pp., paperback
 ISBN 978-0-8248-3415-9

Budy P. Resosudarmo & Frank Jotzo, 2009
Working with Nature Against Poverty: Development, Resources and the Environment in Eastern Indonesia
 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
 paperback ISBN 978 981 230 959 4

SEE MORE TITLES AND REQUEST BOOKS FOR REVIEW ON WWW.NEWASIABOOKS.ORG.

newasiabooks.org
 the indispensable tool
 for identifying, evaluating
 and purchasing new
 publications. Up-to-date
 listings of all recent and
 new academic books on
 Asia. Review, comment
 on and debate new
 publications in your field.

www.NEWASIABOOKS.org

social sciences international relations

globalisation

the arts

media

anthropology

cinema security

philosophy politics

education

China history

law

poetry

Agriculture design

memory sustainability

philosophy

politics

globalisation

Nepal

Bangladesh

democracy

family

economics

photography

performance

sociology

anthropology

poverty

government

Indonesia

trade

Malaysia

terrorism

ethnicity

ethnography


business

conflict



Bookmarked

Dangdut Stories: A Social and Musical History of Indonesia's Most Popular Music




By **Andrew N. Weintraub**
Oxford University Press, 2010
ISBN 978 0 19 539567 9
272 pages, paperback

A UNIQUE AND POTENT FORCE in contemporary Indonesian society and culture, dangdut is Indonesia's most popular music. Dangdut, named for its characteristic drum sounds 'dang' and 'dut', was denigrated as a debased form of popular culture in the early 1970s, commercialized in the 1980s, re-signified as a form of national and global pop in the 1990s and localized within ethnic communities in the 2000s.

Dangdut Stories is a social and musical history of the genre, within a range of broader narratives about class, gender, ethnicity and nation in post-independence Indonesia (1945 to the present). Using a new interdisciplinary approach that synthesizes ethnomusicology, anthropology of media and cultural studies, author Andrew Weintraub connects the aesthetic properties and the uses and effects of dangdut music to social and material conditions in modern Indonesia. *Dangdut Stories* contains a wealth of new and original musicological source material, in the form of interviews with dangdut stars, information from obscure journalistic resources and thoughtful analysis of dangdut standards, combined with a keen reappraisal of the existing literature.

Contents: Note on the Web Site; Introduction; Mythologizing Melayu: Discourse, Practice and the Stakes of Authenticity; A Doll from India, Mr Mahmud, and the Elvis of Indonesia; Music and *Rakyat*: Constructing 'the People' in Dangdut; 'Suffering' and 'Surrender': Dangdut and the Spectacle of Excess; Dangdut Nation: 'We Bring the Happiness of Dangdut'; 'Dance Drills, Faith Spills': Islam, Body Politics, and Dangdut in Post-Suharto Indonesia; Conclusion: Why Dangdut?; Glossary; References; Index.

Qing Governors and Their Provinces: The Evolution of Territorial Administration in China, 1644-1796




By **R. Kent Guy**
University of Washington Press, 2010
ISBN 978 0 295 99019 4
512 pages, paperback

DURING THE QING DYNASTY (1644-1911), the province emerged as an important element in the management of the expanding Chinese empire, with governors – those in charge of these increasingly influential administrative units – playing key roles. R. Kent Guy's comprehensive study of this shift concentrates on the governorship system during the reigns of the Shunzhi, Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong emperors, who ruled China from 1644-1736.

In the preceding Ming dynasty (1368-1644), the responsibilities of provincial officials were ill-defined and often shifting; Qing governors, in contrast, were influential members of a formal administrative hierarchy and enjoyed the support of the central government. Both masters of the routine processes of administration and troubleshooters for the central government, Qing governors played crucial roles in the economic and political management of a larger and more complex empire than the Chinese had ever known. These increasingly powerful officials extended the court's influence into even the most distant territories of the Qing Empire. *Qing Governors and Their Provinces* uses the records of governors' appointments and the laws and practices that shaped them to reconstruct the development of the office of provincial governor and to examine the histories of governors' appointments in each province. Interwoven throughout are colourful details drawn from the governors' biographies.

Contents: List of Tables; Acknowledgements; Introduction. PART 1: The Burdens of History: Pre-Qing Territorial Government; The Qing Creation of the Province; The Conundrum of Competence; The Power of the Unexpected; The Imperatives of Continuity. PART 2: The Legacy of Military Occupation: The North and the Northwest; Negotiated Orders: The Lower Yangzi Valley and the Southeastern Coast; Regions into Provinces: The Middle Yangzi and the Lingnan; Communications and Provincial Government in Southwest China. Conclusions; Appendix; Abbreviations; Notes; Chinese Glossary; Bibliography; Index.

Through the Eyes of the King: The Travels of King Chulalongkorn to Malaya



By **P. Lim Pui Huen**
ISEAS Publishing, 2009
ISBN 978 981 230 773 6
178 pages, hardback

THIS BOOK TAKES THE READER to old Malaya as seen through the eyes of King Chulalongkorn of Siam. The King was probably the most traveled monarch of his time. He went to Java three times, India and Burma once, and Europe twice. In all these journeys, he had to pass through Singapore, and when he went westwards, he had to pass through Penang.

The King traveled to Malaya more than ten times – mainly to Singapore but also to Johor, Penang, Malacca, Taiping and Kulim. The narrative is told through historical photos and notes on the places he visited and pen sketches of the people he met.

Since King Chulalongkorn's travels cover nearly the whole period of his reign, they reflect the different stages of his life and reign. We see him first as a young man eager to see the world and preparing himself to rule. Then we see him in middle age, in poor health and taking a respite from the cares of state. Lastly, we see him as a statesman withstanding severe pressure from aggressive British officials.

The context of each journey is discussed in the light of Siam's relations with Britain and the northern Malay states that were still under Siamese suzerainty. Malaya was both holiday destination and confrontational space.

Contents: Foreword; Message; Introduction; 1871: A Study Tour; 1871: A Second Study Tour; 1890: Prince Chakri; 1896: 'Dress Rehearsal' for Europe; 1897: En Route to Europe; 1901: Storm Clouds; 1902: More Storm Clouds; 1907: To Europe Again; King Chulalongkorn's Visits to Malaya; References Cited; Photo Credits; Acknowledgements; Index; About the Author.

Add your intellectual weight to The Study. Sharpen The Focus. Voice your opinion in The Review. Launch your event via The Network. Declare your passions through The Portrait.


THE NEWSLETTER is the leading publication in Asian Studies with a wide network and a truly international audience.

We're always on the look out for input from new contributors.

Tell us about the world you live in! Share your research, share your passions, write an essay or a book review.

To find out how to get your article published contact: iiasnews@iias.nl

Cultural forms are like snow, crystal clear when hardened, opaque when soft



The study of popular music in East Asia has gradually developed into a field, largely due to the efforts of the Inter-Asia Popular Music Studies Group (IAPMS). Formally established in 2007, IAPMS is especially keen on involving scholars that are based in Asian communities. Amsterdam-based Jeroen de Kloet is one of several founding members of the group and his new book, *China with a Cut: Globalization, Urban Youth and Popular Music* directly relates to attempts by IAPMS to decolonise the field of study.

Jeroen Groenewegen

De Kloet, Jeroen. 2010.

China with a Cut: Globalisation, Urban Youth and Popular Music. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 255 pages. ISBN 978 90 8964 162 5 (paperback).

CHINA WITH A CUT accuses 'students, friends [and] journalists' of reiterating 'the hegemonic gaze (and arrogance) of 'the West'' by demanding Chinese rock music to be authentic, that is exotic and subversive (p. 25). To identify and distance himself from this romantic inclination, De Kloet introduces the term 'rock mythology', which he defines as 'a set of narratives which produce rock as a distinct music world that is, first and foremost, authentic, but also subcultural, masculine, rebellious and (counter) political (p. 26).'

Implicitly, the rock mythology criticises the outstanding scholarly works of Andrew Jones, Andreas Steen, Geremie R. Barmé and Nimrod Baranovitch, among others, for presenting Chinese rock as the voice of the oppressed people against the Communist state. This contra positioning becomes explicit in De Kloet's rebuttal of the perceived sell-out and decline of Chinese rock in the course of the 1990s (pp. 16, 18-19, 167). However, rather than examine its influence on Western (mis)representations, the majority of *China with a Cut* deals with how the rock mythology binds producers, musicians, and audiences together in the People's Republic of China (p. 26).

De Kloet first formulated this argument in his PhD thesis *Red Sonic Trajectories: Popular Music and Youth in Urban China* (2001). Although based on this thesis, *China with a Cut* is much better argued. It also contains a wealth of new information and at times new theoretical approaches. Its chapters are organised according to positions in the field of rock production. The first three chapters deal with musicians and bands that increasingly challenge the rock mythology. Chapter four discusses audiences and chapter five the industry and government regulation.

Borrowing Arjun Appadurai's notion of hard cultural forms, De Kloet argues that 'rock changes those who are socialised into it more readily than it is itself changed' (p. 28, quoting Appadurai 1996:90). In the first chapter, De Kloet substantiates this claim by discussing (1) how various 'hard scenes' position themselves within rock culture, (2) how they make claims to authenticity through styles and, finally, (3) how they negotiate a sense of place and locality. The discussion continues in the second chapter, 'Hyphenated Scenes,' framed by the

Above: A sweaty rock concert in the August heat. Photos by Photo-bluer via Flickr.

same three topics but these 'articulat[ions] of specific social identities in and through music' increasingly reveal the inadequacy and restrictiveness of the rock mythology (p. 41). Thus, comparing scenes enables De Kloet to argue that rock is more multifarious than often assumed, for instance in the way it engages with Chineseness.

'The stronger a sound rocks, the harder it becomes and the more involved it gets in the negotiation of place' (p.101, cf. 194). Underground deliberately misuses traditional instruments. Heavy metal borrows from chivalric Chinese folklore. Hardcore punk, 'the ideal embodiment of the rock mythology,' reuses Communist symbols and sounds but is simultaneously obsessed with the West and Japan (p. 61-62, p. 67). Hip-hop 'keeps it real' by rapping in local dialects interspersed with English words. By contrast, while folk-rock performs migratory experiences, the other hyphenated scenes pop-rock, pop-punk and especially fashionable bands rather stress their connections with a hip, cosmopolitan sound than with China.

The initial pages of *China with a Cut* make it clear that the 'popular music' of the subtitle means rock music and the first three chapters drive this point home. The hard and hyphenated scenes, as well as the majority of subaltern sounds of the third chapter are part of the PRC band scene. Furthermore, the female and south Chinese artists of the latter reiterate the rock mythology rather than challenge it, as De Kloet points out. Jeroen de Kloet deserves praise for identifying and criticising the rock mythology, as well as for foregrounding the sounds it silences. However, it proves difficult for him to transcend rock and its fixations.

'Seductive Sounds', the final section of 'Subaltern Sounds,' discusses pop music. However, instead of discussing a mainstream pop star, De Kloet discusses Anthony Wong (Huang Yaoming), a Hong Kong-based alternative or indie pop singer and producer. In De Kloet's narrative, Wong becomes the subaltern voice of Beijing rock, rather than that of the highly influential Hong Kong pop music industry that Wong is, arguably, more engaged in. This is remarkable given De Kloet's publications on the Cantopop star Leon Lai (Li Ming) (2008) and his forthcoming article *The Chinese wind in Hong Kong's music videos* (forthcoming).

These articles also sit uneasily with De Kloet's argument that 'neither in imagery nor in sound is there an articulated attempt to localise *Gangtai* pop (p. 130),' as does the footnote at the

end of this sentence that acknowledges the overt Chineseness of Jay Chou's (Zhou Jielun) music, the reigning king of Chinese pop. 'Shanghai rock bands, gay jazz singers, and controversial female writers hope to be less local than Beijing, so as to revive the cosmopolitanism of the old Shanghai,' which is at least as local as Beijing hardcore punk (p. 129). In other words, De Kloet's argument that the hard cultural forms of Northern China make more effort to localise their sound is unconvincing.

De Kloet amends his rock-centred framework by arguing that pop is not a soft but an opaque cultural form. Following Bakhtin and De Certeau, he argues that whereas rock is hegemonic, pop enables different, often conflicting readings and social identities and thus 'unfolds the *heteroglossia* of everyday life' (p. 131). While thought provoking, this celebration of pop ignores how mainstream pop is highly normative and conservative and organised around singular, unified pop stars rather than ambiguities and multiplicities. In these pages *China with a Cut* runs the danger of turning the hierarchy of Andrew Jones' *Like a Knife: Ideology and Genre in Contemporary Chinese Popular Music* (1992) around, presenting pop as a liberation of hegemonic rock, whereas its power lies in critiquing such hierarchies (paraphrasing p. 199).

The scenes presented in the first three chapters, which 'proliferate around specific genres' are entirely absent in chapter four, which argues that 'genre plays an important role in technologies of the self,' but mainly discusses the pop-rock divide (pp. 41, 140). This suggests that the scenes are useful to differentiate and describe what, in the end, is a single multifaceted and entangled PRC rock scene. Indeed, De Kloet suggests that musicians in China have a greater flexibility to switch and blend genres and styles than in the West (p. 123).

That said, 'Musical Taste and Technologies of the Self' is refreshing because it explores the uses of music as a symbolic toolbox in the processes of self-identity and reflexivity (paraphrasing pp. 140-141). Surveys and the analysis of fan mail provide insight into how audiences use music to articulate identities and to manage moods and emotions. *China with a Cut* covers three generations of urban youth: the hoodlums (*liumang*) of the early 1990s, the saw-cut (*dakou*) generation of the late 1990s and those born in the 1980s (*balinghou*), rising to prominence in the early 2000s. Most of the data provided in chapter four was collected in 1997, but De Kloet argues that also younger Chinese face exceptional pressure from the family, the education system, politics and global capitalism, and hence similarly need music to vent and escape.


'Global capitalism and the Chinese nation-state can work very well together, producing [...] a hybrid mix of cosmopolitanism and neo-nationalism, a mix which serves as the lubricant for the shared accumulation of capital' (p. 175), argues De Kloet in chapter five. Nevertheless, in the face of the perceived commercialisation and internationalisation of the Chinese media, local companies are dominant in the music industry. Large transnational record companies have limited operations in the PRC, mainly because of piracy and the need to cooperate with state-owned publishers. Taiwanese and Hong Kong companies such as Red Star and Magic Stone signed Beijing bands in the mid 1990s because of their perceived authenticity but have gradually retreated, partly because of cultural differences. In this uneven landscape, foreign companies paradoxically stress Chineseness, whereas Beijing-based companies such as Modern Sky and Scream Records stress cosmopolitanism, argues De Kloet, turning the argument of the first three chapters on its head: 'The local travels well globally, the global travels well locally (p. 180, cf. 191).'

To De Kloet, the idea of the velvet prison, in which artists internalise restrictions, is appealing but of limited use because musicians, producers and audiences often find loopholes and workarounds to get records published. These include playing dumb, providing other lyrics, deliberate delaying and working with publishers with the right connections or in parts of China that are less strict. De Kloet's argument for a less top-down hegemonic and more playful and negotiable view of state-control hits home.

China with a Cut is a crucial work in the emerging field of the study of Chinese popular music. In the 1990s politics and rock were all-important. In 2003, Nimrod Baranovitch' *China's New Voices* describes ethnicity, gender and politics in PRC popular music of the 1980s and 1990s. De Kloet is the first to describe these themes in the music of the new millennium, adding much-needed perspectives from audiences and the industry. Furthermore, De Kloet opens important vantage points for researching transnational flows of both mainstream and alternative pop music.

Jeroen Groenewegen
Leiden University
J.W.P.Groenewegen@hum.leidenuniv.nl

The melancholy of Mocha



At first glance, this book seems to deal with an unlikely topic. Using architecture as a prime source, it deals with the history of a city, Mocha, which today lies in ruins. Even in 1909 there were only about 20 stone or brick buildings left in this once thriving port city. The reproductions of old photographs of various buildings are often captioned, in melancholy fashion, 'now destroyed'.

Michael Pearson

Um, Nancy, 2009.

The Merchant Houses of Mocha: Trade & Architecture in an Indian Ocean Port.
Seattle and London: University of Washington Press.
270 pages. ISBN 978 0 295 98911 (paperback).

MOCHA HAD A RELATIVELY BRIEF PERIOD of prominence in the trade of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. It rose under the Ottomans, from 1538. In 1635 it was taken by the Qasimi imams, a ruling group of the Zaydi shi'i faith based at various cities in the interior. Professor Um's book covers the period 1650 to 1750, after which the town declined and, finally, was totally eclipsed by the rise of Aden from 1839.

Mocha could have been analysed as an 'Islamic City', or as an 'Indian Ocean port city'. Indeed, Um is fully aware of the literatures on both topics, but she sees Mocha as rather different. The classic Islamic city was usually not a port. Mocha of course is a port and her study could have followed on from the two collections edited by Frank Broeze on Indian Ocean port cities. The difference is that much of the literature on port cities describes the rise of colonial port cities, while Mocha was indigenous, indeed was 'owned' by a distant interior state. Thus, it is analogous to an extent with the great port cities of Gujarat, especially Surat, which owed allegiance to the Mughal state located in the north Indian heartland.

Many urban histories restrict themselves to the bounded city, but Um stresses connections both to the hinterland and the foreland, the former being the Yemeni highlands where the rulers were, and from where some trade goods were derived; the latter being the vast littoral of the Indian Ocean. As she writes in her conclusion, 'For Mocha one must emphasize the relevance of connected sites in a land-based network encompassing an agricultural hinterland, inland market centers, and distant highland capitals. One must consider the city's maritime port counterparts and its surrounding extramural quarters. All these elements contributed to Mocha's social, commercial, and political

structure, its architectural and urban shape, and its historical significance. The city's connections were constitutive of its identity and built shape, rather than external to them'. (p.187)

While Um uses what Arabic sources are available, most of her written information came from the records of the Dutch East India Company. She could have used them to write an economic study, along the lines of Ashin Das Gupta's classic work on Surat. However, Um is innovative in that she uses these written sources, but crucially combines them with what can be discovered of the architecture of the city to depict the layout, the spaces, of this urban area which owed its existence to trade. As she writes, 'I demonstrate that the culture of trade profoundly shaped the underlying structure of the port city, defining the principal orientation of its urban shape, the functional modes of its built elements, and the social hierarchies that dominated community life'. (p.11)

Interesting deviation

Following a cogent introduction, which nicely sets out the main themes, the first chapter sketches Mocha's trade networks, both to the interior and around the Indian Ocean, and also summarises its political history. Chapter 2 is something of a deviation from the main theme, albeit an interesting one, for it deals with coffee. Um shows that the notion that the city's trade was dominated by coffee is false, for it traded in many products, and other cities traded in coffee too. In any case, no coffee was grown in Mocha; it came from the highlands.

From now on we get what is the real contribution, that is historical analysis enriched by the use of architecture. Chapter 3 uses the now familiar concept of littoral society to show that Mocha's reach extended far inland, to the ostensibly 'remote' Zaydi shi'i Qasimi rulers. Flows went both ways, for there was a considerable degree of integration despite the inland capitals and Mocha being at least ten days' journey apart. Um shows that Mocha's revenues were crucial for the state, although regrettably she doesn't have precise statistical data to prove this. However, by focussing on architectural matters, such as



the lavish buildings –both houses and mosques –erected in the inland by the governors of Mocha, she demonstrates the richness of the port city and how its maritime profits were taken and used inland. Other governors patronised religious matters, such as lavish versions of the Qur'an. A few did what perhaps one would expect, that is public works in the city from where their wealth came, but this was less important than their 'inland' patronage.

Chapter 4 uses very sparse sources to describe Mocha's merchants, both wholesalers and retail. Um stresses the extensive interchange, not only of goods but also of personnel, with Mocha's twin city, Surat. As one example, a merchant prince of Surat, Muhammad Ali, undertook massive religious patronage in Mocha, as well as in Surat, in the 1720s. There is also good detail on more 'local' merchants, who even so maintained ties with the interior court, and often also with Surat. Qasimi imams also traded to Surat, via their *nakhudas* (ship captains).

Chapter 5 deals with the urban form and orientation of Mocha. Here is a valiant attempt to recreate a plan of the city from very diverse sources. Um shows that Mocha's layout differed from other European and Arab cities where the market is central to the economic function of the city; in Mocha these functions were much more dispersed. There were really two foci: the maritime one on the seashore, and the inland one leading to the interior. As she says, 'The two sets of spatial and built elements facilitated a transition between the realms of the Indian Ocean maritime network and the Zaydi highlands of the Qasimi imamate, mediated by the landmarks of a lowland Sunni village'. (p.123)

The next chapter follows on to show that in Mocha the urban *khan* did not necessarily function as a residence for merchants as well as a place of trade. Indeed, there was no urban *khan* at all in Mocha, that is no public structures where trade took place. Rather it took place in the houses of merchants, including the Europeans, and this is a modification of standard analyses of the Islamic trading city. There is excellent detail on the layout of a merchant's house, with family areas set off

A trading dhow on the Indian Ocean.
Photo by Charles Roffey.

above the less restricted area where exchange took place and goods were stored. The merchant house also functioned to show the wealth and status of the owner. Not that this house-based focus for exchange was unique to Mocha. While it was not found in the standard 'Islamic' city, it was in other port cities around the shores of the Indian Ocean.

The final substantive chapter describes the banyans, Hindu and Jain merchants originating in Gujarat. These men were sojourners, and did not bring their women with them. Most of Um's data describes their work with the European traders, while we know less about their economic interactions with the dominant Muslim communities in the city. There is much that is familiar here. They played a crucial economic role in exchange, as brokers, yet were often ill treated and used as milch cows. Nevertheless, just as in Gujarat if they were oppressed beyond endurance they could withdraw, thus crippling trade in the city, until redress was promised and they were coaxed back. Despite being Hindu, they were treated like Jews and Christians, as *dhimmis* (non-Muslims), and indeed they were much more economically central than was the Jewish community. This was shown by the way some of the wealthier banyans lived within the city walls, while Jews and other banyans and less important ethnic groups were relegated to suburbs outside the walls.

The Conclusion offers a brief account of Mocha's decline, and recapitulates the main themes. It ends with a very apposite plea for archaeology work, which would be invaluable.

This book deserves to be widely read, and praised. Um demonstrates familiarity with a host of secondary work in urban history, and where necessary challenges and modifies them. Her use of architecture as a key source is extremely innovative. In terms of Indian Ocean studies, we now have a few foundational studies, for example by Bose, the late Ken McPherson, Chaudhuri and Pearson, which sketch broad themes. We need many more micro-studies which can modify received wisdoms. Um's book is an exemplary case study of what we need, and stands alongside Margariti's recent comparable study of Aden in its use of difficult sources, and its successful analysis. Finally, I must praise

the dedication, for Um very touchingly writes of her husband that 'This book would mean nothing to me if he were not there to share in the joy of its completion', p. xii.

Michael Pearson
University of Technology, Sydney
mnpearson@ozemail.com.au

Bibliography

- Bose, Sugata, *A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.
- Broeze, Frank, ed., *Brides of the Sea: Port Cities of Asia from the 16th-20th Centuries*, Sydney, New South Wales University Press and Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1989.
- Broeze, Frank, ed., *Gateways of Asia: Port Cities of Asia from the 13th to the 20th Centuries*, London, Kegan Paul International, 1997.
- Chaudhuri, K.N., *Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean. An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Das Gupta, Ashin, and M.N. Pearson, eds., *India and the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800*, Calcutta, Oxford University Press, 1987, 2nd ed Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Das Gupta, Ashin, *Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat c. 1700-1750*. Reprint of 1979 edition; New Delhi, Manohar, 1994.
- Margariti, Roxani Eleni, *Aden and the Indian Ocean Trade: 150 Years in the Life of a Medieval Arabian Port*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007.
- Maritime India*, New Delhi, OUP, 2004, which contains *Rival empires of trade in the Orient, 1600-1800* by Holden Furber, *Maritime India in the seventeenth century* by Sinappah Arasaratnam and *The Indian Ocean: a history of people and the sea* by Kenneth McPherson, and in Introduction by Sanjay Subrahmanyam.
- Pearson, Michael, 'Littoral Society: the concept and the problems,' *Journal of World History*, 17, 4, Dec. 2006, pp. 353-73.
- Pearson, Michael, *The Indian Ocean*, London, 2003, and paperback edition November 2007.

Who is this 'Indonesian Muslim'?

Indonesia changes rapidly. Politically, religiously, and socially the country is in a situation of constant flux. Newspapers and other news media give an astonishing picture of a country in some respects in rapid development to progress but in other aspects retreating into backward ignorance.

Dick van der Meij



Luthfi Assyaukanie. 2009.

Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia.
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2009, xviii + 362
ISBN 978 981 230 889 4 (hardback),
ISBN 978 981 230 890 0 (PDF).

Bernard Platzdasch. 2009.

Islamism in Indonesia. Politics in the Emerging Democracy.
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2009, xxxviii + 412 pages.
ISBN 978 981 4279 08 6 (paperback),
ISBN 978 981 4279 09 3 (hardback),
ISBN 978 981 4279 10 9 (PDF).

TRUE POWER RELATIONS have not changed much since the introduction of democracy, and 30 years of Soeharto rule and influence cannot be erased in a matter of years. A lot more time is needed to change the mindset of intellectually repressed Indonesians before we will see the emergence of an informed and capable intellectual discourse. Following all these developments is a superhuman endeavour and probably best attempted only after a long period of experience and exposure to Indonesian life and realities.

It would be incorrect to think that only present-day Indonesia is in a situation of flux. It has always been so. The historical lines leading up to the current situation are the subject of many books, including the two discussed here. Assyaukanie's fascinating book discusses Islam and the secular state and all the ins and outs connected to this complicated issue. The history of the ill-fitting relationship between Islam and secularism – indeed, the very possibility of such a relationship – is traced and explained and Indonesia's stance is further described using the three models of the Islamic Democratic State, the Religious Democratic State, and the Liberal Democratic State. The continuity and discontinuity of the models are elaborated as well.

Platzdasch on his part goes into great depth in explaining the multifarious roots and currents of Islamism in Indonesia and devotes much space to the history and fate of the Masyumi Party, its proponents and their follow-ups in modern times.

It is no surprise that books on modern developments in Indonesia abound. Many among them center on the economy, law, international relations and monetary affairs, while a great number also address expected facets of Indonesian Islam, ranging from *shari'ah* implementation to radicalism, fundamentalism, terrorism, Islam and the secular state or, conversely, the Islamic state in Indonesia. Books on ordinary Indonesian Muslim life are hardly ever attempted and everyday life and religiosity are usually considered of insufficient importance or interest. In short, the subject is apparently not 'sexy'. This is a major failing. In order to understand Islam and Muslims in this huge country, we are in desperate need of insights into 'ordinary Islam' and the life of 'ordinary Muslims', if only because no Muslim is born a fundamentalist, radical,

or terrorist; we all start life as innocent infants. What happens among these 'ordinary Muslims' may reveal the realities of what Muslim life in this country entails.

The books discussed here do not escape the often-committed error of lumping all Muslims, or large portions of them, together and then discussing them as a singular entity without questioning the validity of this approach. In my view, there is no such thing as 'the Indonesian Muslim' and it is certainly unrealistic to claim that this 'Indonesian Muslim' is capable of doing whatever it is he or she is claimed to do. Indeed, Indonesian Muslims may find themselves just as surprised at what is claimed about them as I am when I read these books. Moreover, usually the Muslims being discussed in support of the author's arguments live, think, work, and act in Jakarta, and this Jakarta-centric viewpoint also seriously undermines our understanding. The underlying assumption, that what Jakarta does and wants has an immediate impact on the lives of Muslims living elsewhere in the country, has not been sufficiently demonstrated and interestingly, rather than being questioned, is often seen as something so self-evident that it needs no substantiation. I have the strong impression that many Muslims living outside of Jakarta, or outside Java for that matter, cannot relate to, let alone be interested in or act upon, what Jakarta wants, especially since the introduction of regional autonomy which caused Jakarta to recede into the far recesses of people's minds. They certainly do not act upon Jakarta's desires. They have other things to do, making ends meet being first and foremost among them.

Assyaukanie says in his introduction that 'Existing studies on Islam in Indonesia are dominated by an anthropological approach...'. I have my doubts whether this is so since sound expositions on method and approach are conspicuously absent from many of these works, which seem to start up with precious little attention to method or approach. It is therefore not an easy task to form an accurate picture of what is really going on in any scholarly defensible way.

The first thing the books teach us is that Indonesian Islam is fragmented to an unbelievable degree. This is why forming an accurate picture of Islam in the country is so extremely difficult. What may be found and demonstrated in one area is contested by the opposite in another region. Interestingly, this has not led scholars to simply accept this fact and to try to deal with it, but rather to insist on finding common denominators. Of course these exist, but are often so blatantly obvious that they become meaningless at best, and obfuscating at worst. Looking at the ins and outs of Muslim politics, political parties and currents does explain important aspects of Indonesian Islam, but only within those spheres and conclusions. Such notions cannot and should not be extended to people's daily lives. As for many people all over the world, politics and daily life seem to take place on two different planets.

Rather than exposing history and its key persons for the umpteenth time, we need to discover what the underlying causes are of the multifarious ways that many Muslims in Indonesia seem to randomly hate many aspects of the West – like secularism – while accepting most other things

Sunday mentoring
under a shady tree in
Bandung, West Java.
Photo by Ikhlasil
Amal.

unquestioningly, and where the overwhelming distrust Indonesian Muslims have of each other and of non-Muslims really stems from. Seeking out the underlying ideas of power and power distribution in Indonesia and the valid ways to demonstrate, or at times rather not to demonstrate, power and authority is a requirement for understanding why Indonesian Muslim individuals in power act the way they do. Examination of the notions that underlie valid reasoning is useful if we are to explain the often alarming superficiality of argumentation.

The ordinary Indonesian Muslim is also in another way – perhaps unintentionally – dismissed. In his introduction Assyaukanie writes 'I argue that there is no better measurement to judge the religio-political attitude of Indonesian Muslims than the general elections ...'. Is he unaware that most people never even found out how to vote, and that they have no inkling whatsoever about party programmes? Does he not know that access to accurate information on politics is very limited in most places outside Java and outside the major cities elsewhere, and that people are prone to blackmail and other forms of pressures to vote for a specific party? Is not the underlying assumption that people vote consciously highly overstated everywhere in the world, and particularly so in the fledgling democracy that contemporary Indonesia still is?

Of importance are also the chapters on the implementation of the *shari'ah* in various districts in the country and the discourse, or sometimes lack thereof, surrounding this implementation. Especially with the current unclear relationships between the Central Government and the Regional Governments, a proper insight into the workings of *shari'ah* implementation is crucial.

Does my criticism above mean that the books are uninteresting? Of course not. They are welcome additions to the literature we have on the subjects they describe. They often throw new light on matters and provide more and otherwise hidden detail. One of the important things these books point out is Indonesian political and religious pragmatism (in my view often amounting to downright opportunism). Indonesian people know exactly what they want and need, and they will go to great lengths to get it. If religiously inspired politics prove useless in this regard, they have no qualms in dismissing them on the spot. This is an important element of Indonesian religious and political reality. This should also have been studied in the case of 'ordinary Muslims', who likewise have no use for excessive regulations and hollow political rhetoric. The failure of Muslim political parties in Indonesia to attract voters may simply occur because their programs and actions are too far removed from the voters who come to distrust them and thus vote for other parties. To sum up, perhaps we should be happy that most ordinary Indonesian Muslims keep cool heads and are not easily seduced by the ideas and actions of Muslim political parties, the Front Pembela Islam and the plethora of other institutions, *ulamas*, and Muslim organizations. They seem to know quite well where their priorities lie!

Dick van der Meij
Center for the Study of Religion and Culture, UIN Syarif
Hidayatullah, Jakarta
dickvdm2005@yahoo.com

Race and multiculturalism in Malaysia and Singapore

Multiculturalism and ethnicity have become rather fashionable as research topics in Asian Studies. Several monographs and conference volumes have been published in recent years, especially concerning the situation in Malaysia and Singapore.¹ This well-edited book by Goh et al. is a welcome addition to the existing literature in this field. The various contributions add further information to a topic which is highly sensitive and of great importance for the modern nation-states Malaysia and Singapore.

Holger Warnk

Lanterns in Chinatown, Singapore.
Photo by Anna Roberts.

Daniel P. S. Goh, Matilda Gabrielpillai, Philip Holden and Gaik Cheng Khoo (eds). 2009. *Race and multiculturalism in Malaysia and Singapore* London: Routledge, xiii + 240 pp. ISBN 978 0 415 48225 7 (hardback)

MALAYSIA AS WELL AS SINGAPORE are multi-ethnic nation-states. In both states ethnicity, commonly referred to as 'race', is of crucial social and political importance. The topics of race were introduced by the British colonial administration which carried out census among its subjects which were categorised into diverse races. In consequence, they began to develop and imagine their own, partly new identities under these labels. This colonial legacy was well-cultivated in the post-colonial nation-states of Malaysia and Singapore and made a deep impact on national politics and the daily life of its peoples. Racial stereotypes are present in both states and are of great relevance for the communities, even when they often form perfect examples for 'invented traditions'. Take for example the term 'Indian race' in both states: while regarded as a uniform group, what lies behind the term is a great heterogeneity of ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural aspects. In Singapore 'Indians' are regarded as Hindus and 'Malays' as Muslims, so in consequence Indian Muslims face many difficulties in attempting to receive money from state funds for Muslims (Tschacher 2010). What constitutes a 'Malay race' in Malaysia is laid down in the constitution (article 160). This crude definition includes elements from language, genetics, religion – the Malay race is Muslim! – ethnicity and other fields. Furthermore, the 'Malays' in Malaysia are regarded as the original inhabitants of the country and thus are guaranteed special rights which has led to a policy of positive chauvinism towards their group. Thus it is not surprising that the theme 'race and multiculturalism' in Malaysia is not a theme discussed by members of the Malay group, but mostly by authors of 'Chinese', 'Indian' and other backgrounds. This is also the case in this volume.

The book under review here is divided into eleven chapters, plus a lengthy introduction and a short conclusion. As space is limited, not all articles can be referred to here equally. Daniel Goh and Philip Holden mention in their introduction the roots of multiculturalism and ethnonationalism which they rightly find in colonial notions of races and culture. When both Malaysia and Singapore openly make use of the category 'race' in the state apparatus, the post-colonial situations in consequence create rather fixed, often close boundaries. The authors rightly state that these situations open up, which has created 'possibilities in the politics of recognition, but has closed off many others' (p. 3). When official categories of Chinese, Malay, Indian and others become institutionalized, what happens to those who do not belong to either of these identities? Goh and Holden proceed to give a very readable

discussion of recent literature on multiculturalism. The overall good impression would have even been better if the authors had made attempted a definition of 'race' in the Malaysian and Singaporean context, something that is painfully missing.

In the first chapter Philip Holden gives the historical background of the passion for 'race' by analysing English-literature in Singapore. Tracing the roots back to colonial times by analysing the literary works in the *Straits Chinese Magazine*, Holden successfully shows how racial stereotypes were already set by the Chinese themselves as the magazine was edited by Song Ong Siang and Lim Boon Keng, two highly influential members of the Straits Chinese community in Singapore between the 1890s and 1940s. Holden then moves on to Singaporean authors of the 1940s and 1950s who became influenced by anti-colonial nationalism and finally reaches post-independence Singaporean authors. He rightly states that this literature can cause 'readers to reflect on their own racial subjectification' (p. 34), but the reading of texts from the past also has a particular value for deconstructing the state's primordial attitudes towards races and the legitimization of state multiculturalism in Singapore.

The essay of Gaik Cheng Khoo draws attention to the modern Malay movies of the late director Yasmin Ahmad and the constructions of Malay-ness in her films. An independent filmmaker, Yasmin Ahmad was only able to finish six movies during her lifetime. Many of her themes cover inter-racial and inter-religious topics and have been vividly discussed and sometimes also strongly attacked by movie critics close to the Malaysian government, by Islamic authorities as well as by Malaysian intellectuals. Some were even censored, although her movies have received considerable attention at international movie festivals outside Malaysia. Gaik Cheng Khoo meticulously analyses how Yasmin Ahmad's movies challenge Malaysian state-defined Malay subjectivity and gender stereotypes.

Kenneth Paul Tan's essay also deals with movies and discusses racial stereotypes in contemporary Singaporean films. For Tan, most Singaporean commercial films demonstrate how neoliberal multiculturalism in Singapore uses stereotypical notions of race and still is 'paranoid about racial otherness' (p. 139). This is also confirmed by Daniel Goh's excellent essay on Singapore 'Chineseness'. Goh convincingly argues that being Chinese in Singapore is privileged because the discourse is state-defined. He discusses the elements of Singaporean Chineseness and how these become stereotypes and are used by state authorities. But not only governments become active in the construction of racial thinking and multiculturalism, as the article by Kelly Fu Su Yin and Liew Kai Khiun shows. Here the authors show that the Malay hard rock scene in Singapore has hardened stereotypical racial representations of a rebellious and indolent Malay youth (p. 170).

Racial stereotypes of Malays and Chinese are not the only ones discussed in this book. Vijay Devadas shows how HINDRAF, an association of several Malaysian Indian NGOs which was declared illegal on 15 October 2008, plays an important part in constructing Malaysian Indian identity. Charanpal S. Bal analyses 'Punjabi-ness' in a multiracial Singapore and its reconstructions in modern times, while Matilda Gabrielpillai demonstrates the importance of modern novels in the discourse of both Indian and Chinese identity in Singapore. The volume is completed by essays by Helen Ting on the representations of 'Malay-ness' and the legitimization of Malay supremacy in Malaysian schoolbooks, by Michelle Antoinette on Malaysian identity which is inherent in the works of Malaysian artist Wong Hoy Cheong, and by Angelia Poon on Singaporean politics on race, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism.

In conclusion it can be said that this book is a fine sample of critical scholarship in cultural studies. The approaches of the authors vary and include studies on literature, art, film and also sociology. They give a good overall picture of ongoing discussions and debates in both Malaysia and Singapore and deserve to be read by a wide audience.

Holger Warnk
J.W.Goethe-Universität, Germany
h.warnk@em.uni-frankfurt.de

References

1. See e.g. Hefner (2001), Kahn (2006), Kymlicka & He (2005), Lim (2008), Lian (2006), Daniels (2005) and Zawawi (2008), to mention only a few.

Bibliography

Daniels, Timothy P. (2005): *Building cultural nationalism in Malaysia: identity, representation, and citizenship*. London. Hefner, Robert W. (ed.) (2001): *The politics of multiculturalism: pluralism and citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
Kahn, Joel S. (2006): *Other Malays: nationalism and cosmopolitanism in the modern Malay world*. Singapore: NUS Press.
Kymlicka, Will and Baogang He (eds.) (2005): *Multiculturalism in Asia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lian Kwen Fee (ed.) (2006): *Race, ethnicity, and the state in Malaysia and Singapore*. Leiden: Brill.
Lim, David C.L. (ed.) (2008): *Overcoming passion for race in Malaysia cultural studies*. Leiden: Brill.
Tschacher, Torsten (2010): *Indische Muslime und die Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura. Islam and state in Southeast Asia* (eds. Fritz Schulze and Holger Warnk), 83-102. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
Zawawi Ibrahim (ed.) (2008): *Representation, identity and multiculturalism in Sarawak*. Kajang: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia.

An extremely difficult position

When Rachmaninov's late Romantic third symphony was premiered in London in 1936, the *Daily Telegraph* critic Richard Capell maintained that, while the composer still gave parties on the grand old scale, no gorgeous guests turned up. Though remote from the subject of Pieter Drooglever's book, the remark came to mind when I received it. Here was a book on a scale that has become rare, made possible only by adding financial subsidy to authorial devotion. But – as Capell failed to recognize in respect of the symphony, now part of the repertoire – some gorgeous guests do turn up.

Nicholas Tarling



Pieter Drooglever, 2009. Translated by Theresa Stanton, Maria van Yperon and Margolijn de Jager.

An Act of Free Choice: Decolonization and the Right to Self-Determination in West Papua.
Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009. xviii + 854 pages.
ISBN 978 185168715 2.

IN PARTICULAR THEY COME from the Dutch archives. Dr Drooglever's book, started in 2000 and first published in Dutch in 2005, went hand in hand with his work on the documentation of Netherlands-Indonesia relations between 1950 and 1963. He has used other sources as well, and undertaken a number of interviews. But the book is particularly strong on the making of Dutch policy. This Drooglever begins with the very earliest contacts and carries up to the making of the 1962 agreement and the so-called act of free choice in 1969 that gives the book its title. The focus, however, is on the period after Indonesia secured its independence in 1949. Some of the story is familiar, but nowhere else can one find a fuller or more credible account. It seems on the whole to support the largely accepted conclusion that domestic politics was a dominant factor in what the Dutch did, not only, as Arend Lijphart pointed out, in respect of the initial decision not to transfer West New Guinea along with the rest of Netherlands India when they accepted Indonesia's independence in 1949, but also during most of the subsequent decades when Willem Drees sought to hold his coalition with the Catholic Party together. Self-determination became an avowed objective, and it was with the greatest difficulty that the de Quay government shifted towards 'internationalisation' and then more or less unavoidably towards acceptance of the Bunker plan in 1962.

Less is said about other powers. We do not learn much about the making of Indonesian policy, though we are given accounts of what the Indonesians did in public, at home, at the UN, in New Guinea, and what they said to diplomats and statesmen in other countries. The archives are, of course, not open to view, and like others Drooglever has to rely on what is in the public domain. Whether those archives would yield material that would make it easier to adopt a more positive view of Indonesian policy and practice we cannot know. Did the Indonesians, for example, feel genuinely concerned about the weakness of their frontier to the southeast of the archipelago, as, after all, their Dutch predecessors had? In general, it seems that the Papuans were again the playthings of domestic politics.

Giving a full account of the policies of other powers whose archives are open might have extended the book to Mahlerian lengths. But it is important to recognize that US policy

was decisive. The Americans at the outset took what they considered a neutral view in the dispute that developed between the Dutch and the Indonesians. Arguably, it was that indeed that allowed the dispute to continue. When their stance changed, the parties had to settle. But the motives for the change do not seem very persuasive, at least in our post-Cold War times. It certainly failed to win the Sukarno regime over to a more moderate approach to the region, as Kennedy's perhaps rather naïve advisers hoped, for the regime soon pursued its confrontation of Malaysia. There again the US was unwilling to check it, despite pressure from the British. It was only with the overthrow of the regime and the decimation of the PKI that the US cause was won. Even then, the US was far from willing to interpose in the cause of the Timorese when Suharto's regime behaved much as Sukarno's had.

More may also be said about the Australians, whose policy can, however, be plotted from a number of unpublished theses, such as P. Phelp's 'Australia, International Diplomacy and the West New Guinea Dispute, 1949-62' (Ph.D. thesis, Sydney University, 1996). Initially, they encouraged the Dutch to stay, while trying to prompt the US to support them. Yet when the Indonesians armed themselves – initially to put down the provincial rebellions but clearly with implications for the Dutch in New Guinea – the Australians made it quite clear that they would accept any agreement the Indonesians peacefully negotiated with the Dutch. In a rare slip, Drooglever gives two different dates for Subandrio's persuasive visit to Canberra: it was in 1959, as on p. 377, not in 1960, as on p. 342. (Other false notes: the Pacific war opens in 1942 (p. 55); Nichols becomes Nicholson (p. 333); and Harriman's first name is misspelled (p. 405). Australia indeed wanted good relations with its large neighbour. But it did not – and does not – always find it easy to settle on consistent terms to secure them.

One issue was indeed the future of East New Guinea, TPNG as it then was. There the Australians wished to proceed rather more slowly with political advance than the Dutch in the West. They limited the collaboration between the two regimes, and presented an obstacle to the notion of a Melanesian federation. That notion appears on a number of occasions in the present book. It was in fact discussed more than once by the British, who were also considering how to dispose of their dependencies in the Western Pacific in a responsible manner.

The British do not feature in this book. The Dutch version was being published, it seems, at about the same time I was finalizing my work *Britain and the West New Guinea Dispute* (Mellen, 2008). That fills in something of the gap. The British played quite an active diplomatic role, their policies affected by their desire to keep on good terms with the Dutch, their

allies in Europe; with the Indonesians, neighbours of theirs in Southeast Asia in whose country they had substantial investments; with the Australians, leading members of the Commonwealth; and with the Americans, the ultimate source of their security. In the early 1950s they pursued a policy of 'cold storage', though never quite as rigidly as the Dutch or the Australians. In the late 1950s they began to fear that the growing crisis would lead to open conflict in Southeast Asia, which would undermine their own increasingly fragile position. But they no longer made the significant decisions, though arguably their suggestions contributed to the Bunker plan.

John Saltford's book *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969* (RoutledgeCurzon, 2002) gives an account of the UN role. Drooglever's chapters do nothing to make it seem more creditable. His superiors seemed to have terminated any disposition Ortiz Sanz had to challenge the proceedings of the Indonesians, civilian and military, outrageous as they surely were. As a British official put it, the Javanese were 'born imperialists', and their conduct after 1969 was of a piece with their conduct before.

The Papuans, coverage of whom is another strong point of the book, emerge with some credit, unlike, one has to say, most, if not all, the other parties. Would they have been better off if the transfer had taken place in 1950?, Drooglever asks in his concluding paragraphs. He answers, 'they undoubtedly found themselves in an extremely difficult position in 1963, but Papuan society was better able to defend itself than it would have been without the extended Dutch rule' (p. 764). Other arguments could be made, and we could also speculate about the course of Indonesian politics in that event. Might-have-beens, however, are less important than constructive endeavours, though they must take account of what the author calls 'historical responsibility'. Of some of those endeavours Esther Heidbüchel gives an account in her *The West Papua Conflict in Indonesia: Actors, Issues and Approaches* (Wettenberg, 2007), reviewed in this Newsletter in 2008.

Portuguese Timor's experience since the Second World War both echoes and contrasts with that of West New Guinea. A decisive difference lay in the role of the UN. But decisive, too, was the fact that it had never been part of Netherlands India 'from Sabang to Merauke'. Post-colonial frontiers have largely followed colonial precedents. Perhaps the alternatives were worse. But the Papuans deserve a better deal, as this book, gently but powerfully, makes clear.

Nicholas Tarling
The University of Auckland, New Zealand
n.tarling@auckland.ac.nz

News

Volkswagen Foundation grant for IIAS fellow

DR IRINA MOROZOVA, an IIAS affiliated fellow since 2003, was granted a Volkswagen Foundation subsidy for a three year project entitled 'The History of Perestroika in Central Asia', starting in the fall of 2010. The project entails a cooperation with Dr. Gulnara Aitpaeva (Aigine Research Center, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan), Prof. Jigjidiin Boldbaatar (Sociology Department, National University of Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar), and Dr. Tolganai Umbetalieva (Central Asian Foundation for Developing Democracy, Almaty, Kazakhstan).

The project will add to the recent studies of social change in periods of structural crisis. In all post-socialist/post-Soviet countries, a shift from a socialist state economy and communist party rule to the market-orientated model and neo-liberal ideology has been a painful process, which has led to economic decline, stagnation, social marginalisation and polarisation among different population groups. The different development trajectories of post-Soviet Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and post-socialist Mongolia can be explained by a comparative analysis of the socio-political dynamics and reform during perestroika, the status of different elites in relation to Moscow, and particularities in cultural and religious institutions and identities before the disintegration of the USSR.

The project, with Dr Morozova as the principal investigator, is hosted by the Berlin Institute of Asian and African Studies at the Humboldt University, where Dr Morozova has taken up her position.

IIAS Postdoctoral Fellowships 2011

APPLICATIONS ARE INVITED for Postdoctoral Fellowships at the International Institute for Asian Studies for commencement after September 2011.

The positions are intended for outstanding active researchers from around the world, to work on an important piece of research in the social sciences and humanities. Interdisciplinary interests are encouraged. A majority of the positions will be allocated to the more specific areas introduced in the Director's note: Asian Cultural Heritage, Asian Urban Knowledge, and Global Asia. However, some will be reserved for outstanding projects in any area outside of those listed.

Deadlines: 1 April 2011 and 1 October 2011

For more information and application form, see www.ias.nl

The Cultural Heritages of Asia and Europe: Global Challenges and Local Initiatives



ON 2-3 SEPTEMBER 2010, IIAS and the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) organized a roundtable discussion in preparation for the 4th ASEM Culture Ministers' Meeting (8-11 September 2010, Poznan, Poland).

During the two days, hosted in the VOC room of the Oost-Indisch Huis of the University of Amsterdam, Sabina Santarossa (ASEF) and Philippe Peycam (IIAS) convened the roundtable, bringing together academic and civil society experts from Asia and Europe who openly discussed the multifaceted aspects of cultural heritage and the various challenges experienced.

The objective was to recommend concrete, contextualised strategies towards development and social empowerment through cultural heritage.

Specific objectives of the roundtable included:

- To discuss key issues related to heritage, of relevance to civil society and possible co-operation between Asia and Europe in this specific field;
- To enable sharing of experiences related to sustainable policies and practices related to heritage management and awareness;
- Drawing from the agenda of the political meeting, to reflect on the work of civil society actors in heritage and reaffirm the value of their contribution in this field;
- To reflect recommendations on heritage issues to policy makers at the Fourth ASEM Culture Ministers' Meeting; and,
- To seek closer interaction between educational/scholarly institutions and grass-root initiatives in cultural heritage activities.

For the recommendations to the Ministers and the final report of this roundtable meeting, see www.ias.nl

NUMBER 15 NOW AVAILABLE

Moussons

Recherche en sciences humaines sur l'Asie du Sud-Est

Social Science Research on Southeast Asia

Numéro spécial / *Special Issue*

LA SANTE: MIROIR DES SOCIÉTÉS D'ASIE DU SUD-EST
HEALTH: REFLECTING SOUTHEAST ASIAN SOCIETIES

Sous la direction de / *Edited by*
Laurence HUSSON

Un ensemble de / *A set of*

10 articles

Laurence HUSSON, Claire CHAUVET, Céline CODEREY, Natacha COLLOMB,
Laurence MONNAIS, Céline DUMAS & Anne-Laure FAURAND-TOURNAIRE, Claudia MERLI,
Pascale HANCART PETTET, Marie-Ève BLANC, Anne Yvonne GUILLOU & Evelyne MICOLLIER


3 notes

Frédéric BOURDIER & Ève BUREAU, Laurence HUSSON, Didier BERTRAND

COMPTES RENDUS / BOOK REVIEWS

PUBLISHING, SALES & SUBSCRIPTIONS
Publications de l'Université de Provence
29, avenue Robert-Schuman
13100 Aix-en-Provence, France
Ph: 33-(0)442953191
Fx: 33-(0)442953180
E-mail: pup@up.univ-aix.fr
www.univ-provence.fr/wpup

MOUSSONS c/o IRSEA
MAISON ASIE PACIFIQUE
Université de Provence
3, place Victor-Hugo
13003 Marseilles, France
Ph: 33-(0)413550723
Fx: 33-(0)491106115
E-mail: moussons@univ-provence.fr



Edited by Hyung-Gu Lynn

Pacific Affairs

Independently published since 1928

An International Review of Asia and the Pacific

There are few names among academic journals focused on Asia as rich in history and as evocative as Pacific Affairs. We explore contemporary issues that face a complex and interdependent Asia. Our international editorial board ensures articles are edited to the highest standard. Pacific Affairs' book reviews are a must for any busy scholar or librarian to keep abreast of the latest literature in the field. Please see our website for further details.

www.pacificaffairs.ubc.ca

Opinion

East Asian art history reconsidered

A report on the conference *Living Legacies: The History of East Asian Art Reconsidered*, held in Heidelberg on July 10–12, 2010

Anna Grasskamp

THE CONFERENCE *LIVING LEGACIES* took place in the heat of Heidelberg's summer, attracting more than 180 participants. Its subtitle *The History of East Asian Art Reconsidered* promised an informative and self-reflexive presentation of the discipline. The conference program covered material from Bronze Age bronzes to contemporary Korean mosaics, an international range of subjects and speakers showcasing how inter-disciplinary and international East Asian Art History presents itself as a discipline. Held in honor of Lothar Ledderose, the conference title *Living Legacies* referred to East Asian Art History's subjects, and could be associated as well with the lasting legacy of Lothar Ledderose's work at Heidelberg. Not only did his publications and research projects form frequent points of reference during the conference, but also the presence of many of his former students, now themselves in museum and academic key positions, testified to the exceptional position that Heidelberg's institute of *Ostasiatische Kunstgeschichte* gained under Ledderose's directorship, intellectually as well as educationally.

Yet, the institutional position of the comparatively small discipline remains a point of debate, as the conference's closing discussion revealed in turning remarkably fast from an evaluation of the intellectual status quo towards the often problematic institutional circumstances that the study and display of Non-Western art face. Thus, the circle was completed to the first conference panel which was originally dedicated to Picture Theories, but turned into a platform for debates on disciplinary, intellectual and institutional frameworks instead.

Hans Belting, Hochschule für Gestaltung, Karlsruhe, discussed the case of Chinese contemporary art within the framework of Global Art, which he defines as a post-1989 and post-internet, multicultural as well as cosmopolitan phenomenon. Selected artworks supported his argument of Chinese artists as particularly self-reflective agents, conscious of art's histories as well as art's historiographies. Arguing that art history had a global perspective earlier than one might assume, Rafael Rosenberg, Universität Wien, threw light on the inclusion and exclusion of non-European monuments and artifacts within the 17th, 18th and 19th century German historiography of art and architecture. Horst Bredekamp, Humboldt-Universität Berlin, took the 2009 show *Anders zur Welt kommen* (A Different Approach to the World) as his point of departure to discuss the politics of inter-cultural object display in the spirit of Leibniz's knowledge theaters and early modern *Kunst- und Wunderkammern* (art and rarity cabinets).

The two following panels were dedicated to the study of Buddhist Culture, its visual, textual and ritual traditions. Angela Howard, Rutgers University, shared recent results from field work on meditation caves and murals in Xinjiang to reconsider conclusions previously drawn from Buddhist iconography. Robert Harrist, Columbia University, covered the whole range of stone inscriptions from casual graffiti à la "I was here" to sacred Buddhist inscriptions, from monumental displays of imperial calligraphy to Mao Zedong's writings. The lecture by Funayama Toru, Kyōto University, stressed the importance of inscription-based research in comparing a sutra's printed editions to early engravings in stone. The plea for collation of the often corrupted textual sources with visual and material testimonies was further strengthened by Luo Zhao, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, who opened new perspectives on the origin of Buddhist art related to Water-Land Ritual. Zhang Zong, also Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, based his research on an equally wide range of textual, visual and three-dimensional sources to balance aspects of chronological transition and ritual continuity, and to trace back the image of the hooded Ksitigarbha. Stephen Teiser, Princeton University, used a method developed out of art historical research in his text-based lecture and applied Lothar Ledderose's modular approach of *Ten Thousand Things* (2000) to standardized components within Buddhist writings.

Remarkably few papers focused on the study of visual culture. The presentation by Eugene Wang, Harvard University,

contributed to our understanding of shifts from multi-colored to monochrome painting in relation to Yuan politics, iconographic symbolism and concepts of 'elegance'. Yoshiaki Shimizu, Princeton University, approached the work of Edo artist Itō Jakuchū from a biographic angle, examining the influences that the great fire of Kyōto had on his oeuvre. The talk by Marsha Haufler, University of Kansas, presented mosaics on open-air screens and external walls in 20th century North Korea and touched upon technological as well as political shifts within the imageries of personality cult.

Most papers drew their arguments from three-dimensional Asian art and material culture. Yukio Lippit, Harvard University, contextualized changes in the materiality of Japan's wooden sculpture and explored the meaning of wood as a concept appropriate for icon production. In *Panel IV: New Perspectives in early Chinese Archaeology*, Lothar von Falkenhausen, University of California Los Angeles, took the 2006 article on bronze casting technologies by session chair Lukas Nickel as point of departure for further deconstructions of Max Loehr's classification system of bronze objects. Focusing on the analysis of incised and inlaid decorations, Alain Thote, École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris, evaluated the possible relationships between 5th century BCE vessels found in the Lower Yangzi area and those seen in present-day Shanxi. The talk given by Dame Jessica Rawson, Oxford University, questioned previous notions of replicas found in Zhou tombs as *mingqi* (objects made for use during burial ceremonies). Introduced by observations on the roles of miniature objects in early modern Europe, the paper situated its particular Zhou case study among replica findings in other Chinese tombs.

The concluding panel on Material Cultures was opened by a study on the place of alcohol consumption in Chinese culinary culture by Thomas Höllmann, Universität München, and closed by Craig Clunas' approach towards Ming tombs as gendered spaces. Taking jewelry and inscribed metal objects as points of departure to throw light on possible (female) networks of object exchange, Craig Clunas, Oxford University, seemed to immediately incorporate Rawson's revision of the term *mingqi*. Using material culture as his point of departure, he revised Ming studies in revealing previously overlooked aspects of female agency.

Various presentations featured an inter-cultural perspective as side line or subsidiary approach, from an anthropological angle (Dame Jessica Rawson connecting European and Chinese replica) as well as from a comparative viewpoint (Marsha Haufler contrasted North Korean imagery with Chinese propaganda posters, Yoshio Funayama approached the Kyōto fire through sources on the Great Fire of London in 1666, and Jens Halfwassen, Universität Heidelberg, presented a comparison of Western and Eastern philosophical concepts of the negativity of the absolute). An equally inter-cultural perspective—anthropologically motivated or comparatively intended—became a recurrent pattern within responses from the audience, a repeated opening line being 'Yes, but in the Western/Eastern tradition this is...'

The concluding debate chaired by Lothar Ledderose brought up further questions on the discipline's future between concepts of Global Art and an understanding of China/Japan/Korea in their own terms. Inevitably struggling with Gadamer's hermeneutic circle, inter- and trans-cultural approaches, the conference showcased the modern ways in which East Asian Art History defines and presents itself—though one might just as well use the term 'postmodern', since not only did papers and presenters embody and negotiate 'the global', but all of this was moreover made globally accessible as live broadcasts within the hypercultural space of the internet.

Anna Grasskamp
Universiteit Leiden
a.k.grasskamp@hum.leidenuniv.nl

Response to review of *The Russian Protocols of Zion in Japan*

Jacob Kovalio



I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY to briefly respond to Professor Ben-Ami Shillony's review of my book *The Russian Protocols of Zion in Japan: Yudayaka/Jewish Peril Propaganda and Debates in the 1920s* [New York: Peter Lang, 2009] in the Spring 2010 issue of the Newsletter.

My remarks concern two sections of the review:

1. "[Kovalio] uses the self-made acronym CSA (Conspiracy and Scapegoating Anti-Semitism). Such unfamiliar terms make the reading less fluent. The transliteration of some Japanese words does not follow the standard system. Thus, the suffix 'shita' is spelled throughout the book as 'shta.'"
2. "Kovalio seems to overstate his case, when he claims that the demonized image of the Jews in the last 150 years was created by the 'conspiratorial minds' of Sergey Nilus, Pope Pius IX, Karl Marx, Henry Ford, Adolf Hitler, Shiōden Nobutaka, Itagaki Yūzō, Anis Mansour, Mahathir bin-Mohamad, Edward Said, Noam Chomsky, Uno Masami and others (p. 68). Lumping together all these names into one anti-Semitic block may sound as fantastic as the accusations of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*."

Professor Shillony's 'relegation' of CSA to a semantic eccentricity is disappointing, because the term I devised is the book's core analytical instrument (pp. 2-13). CSA contains modern anti-Semitism's two main components and as such constitutes an all-encompassing 'means to achieve ulterior goals: religious, social, political, economic, global, national or personal' (p. 7).

Furthermore, in the broadest epistemological sense, the book, through a purposely highly focused text (p. x) with copious end-notes, introduces the reader to CSA as a common denominator of *all forms of anti-liberalism*: from nationalist, religious, Marxist (communist/Soviet) and Fascist, through non-Jewish, Jewish and Israeli anti-/post-"Zionism" (which is political anti-Semitism in all but name, since it aims to de-legitimize and eventually eradicate the Jewish State) and down to today's very influential Islamist-Leftist 'alliance'.

This can be illustrated simply by spelling out the manner in which some of the prominent individuals mentioned above are practitioners of CSA:

Through Sergey Nilus, the *Okhrana* (Russian imperial secret police) conspired to concoct the *Protocols* to scapegoat Russia's problems in the late 19th century on a 'Jewish/Zionist conspiracy' to rule the world. Meanwhile Pope Pius IX scapegoated the democratic trends of the 19th century, to which the Vatican was opposed, on the 'Jewish-dominated' Free Mason order. In *Zur Judenfrage* (On the Jewish Question) and other writings, Karl Marx exaggerated the role of Jews, who accounted for just one percent of the population (most of whom were not capitalists), in German capitalism, providing a lasting cornerstone of communist/Leftist anti-Semitism, to which Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin added their anti-'Zionism'. Indeed, for the German Marxist and terrorist leader Ulrike Meinhoff—as also for her Japanese communist counterpart Shigenobu Fusako—*anti-Semitism meant anti-capitalism*. For his part, Henry Ford scapegoated the failure of his naïve pacifism and the Bolshevik takeover of Russia on Jewish machinations, and financed a worldwide campaign to popularize the *Protocols* which he considered to be authentic.

As to Professor Shillony's objection to the non-traditional transliteration I have used for some Japanese terms: as explained (p. ix), giving the reader access to authentic Japanese pronunciation enhances the intellectual experience and overall familiarity with the subject.

Jacob Kovalio
japanpacific@rogers.com

This response has been shortened by the editor for reasons of space.

ICAS

A wave to surf on: ICAS Book Prize 2011

A wave of books has washed ashore on the desk of the secretary of the ICAS Book Prize 2011 (IBP). In all 171 (2009: 89) books were submitted by more than 40 publishers worldwide: 75 in the Humanities and 96 in the Social Sciences categories. A trend which became visible in the last edition has now become manifest.

Paul van der Velde

WHEREAS FOR THE FIRST EDITION of the IBP 65 percent of the books fell in the category humanities and 35 in the category social sciences, now with this fourth edition it is the other way around. This marks a clear shift in field of research: from traditional to contemporary Asia studies.

More Asian authors

There is an even more important shift to be discerned which relates to the geographical background of the authors. Whereas only 10 percent of the authors were of Asian descent at the first edition in 2005, now about 50 percent of the authors are Asian. Asian studies are more and more done by Asians but their books are still predominantly published by western publishers. Only 10 percent were published by Asian publishers but a slight increase in the share of Asian publishers is noticeable.

It came as no surprise that many of the books are about East Asia, 64, but surprisingly Southeast Asia is the subject of 42 books while South Asia counts 27 publications. Seven books are about Asia in general and the same number can be placed in the category global. Noticeable is that hardly any books on Central Asia were submitted.

Popular themes handled from different disciplinary or comparative angles are: art and culture, (post-)colonial, gender and identity, history, international relations and politics, literature, media, Islam (a newcomer), literature, nationalism and state formation, religion, and society. Of these between 10 to 20 books were submitted. Themes with 5 to 10 books are diasporas and migration, democratisation, economy, health and medicine, and urban culture.

Just as last year only five edited volumes were submitted but it should be pointed out that ground breaking edited volumes certainly stand a chance of winning one of the ICAS book prizes. At IBP 2009 one of the edited volumes made it to the short list in the humanities.

Number of PhDs tripled

Last year we formed a separate Reading Committee for the Best PhDs in the humanities and social sciences consisting of the prize winners of the 2009 edition of the IBP. Its mission was to triple the number of PhDs submitted. It accomplished the desired goal because 36 PhDs were submitted for this fourth edition of the IBP. We realize that this number is but a slight percentage of the total number of PhDs in the field of Asian studies on a two-yearly basis. So we will continue our efforts to get in more PhDs for the 2013 edition.

The long lists of the IBP 2011 will be announced on the ICAS website at the end of 2010 and short lists will be announced well before the meeting in Honolulu.

For more information see www.icassecretariat.org.

HONOLULU, HAWAII 2011

A special joint meeting of the
Association for Asian Studies and the
International Convention of Asia Scholars
in celebration of

70 Years of Asian Studies



Photos: David Cornwell, Hawaii Tourism Association (HTA)/Tor Johnson, Hawaii Tourism Japan (HTJ)

Mark your calendar!
March 31–April 3, 2011



Association for Asian Studies



**International Convention
of Asia Scholars**

For more information and to register go to www.asian-studies.org

AAS-ICAS Meeting '70 Years of Asian Studies'

The joint AAS-ICAS meeting '70 Years of Asian Studies' in Honolulu (30 March–3 April 2011) expects to draw an attendance of at least 5000 participants, exhibitors, and visitors. As organizers we are grateful for the overwhelming interest shown by applicants from all over the world.

The review process is now taking place and applicants will be informed about the outcome of this process **in the beginning of October 2010**. The meeting will certainly be a memorable event, so don't miss it.

For the latest news about the joint meeting see www.aasianist.org and www.icassecretariat.org.

On behalf of the ICAS Team,
Dr Paul van der Velde
Chief Executive Officer ICAS

Announcements

ARThinkSouthAsia Fellowship



THE ARTHINKSOUTHASIA FELLOWSHIP is designed to help develop skills, knowledge, networks and experience of potential leaders in the cultural sector of South Asia which includes museums, the visual and performing arts, and digital media. We believe that by supporting exceptional individuals to make a step-change in their skills and career potential, we can bring substantial benefit to the cultural field as a whole.

Fifteen Fellows will be selected from across South Asia. The Fellowship includes

- A two week residential course in March 2011
- A secondment/internship in Germany over the year 2011-12
- A concluding seminar in March 2012

The two week residential course is designed to include a balance of theory and professional training and will consist of five to six modules which include the latest thinking in cultural management in areas such as strategic planning, project management, strategic finance and fundraising, marketing, communication and internet technologies amongst others. These modules will be led by a mix of Indian and international professional trainers and academics and will be supplemented by expert guest lectures. Participation in the residential programme is mandatory.

Each participant will be offered a funded four week secondment/internship best suited to his/her needs, interests and objectives in a cultural organization in South Asia or Germany. All participants will attend a closing seminar at the end of the Fellowship year to present and share updates on their projects and experiences from the secondments with new Fellows of 2011-12.

We welcome applications from practitioners working across a wide range of creative and artistic activities, as also from those who are working outside it but who demonstrate a knowledge, understanding and passion for the arts. Artists and persons with unconventional careers and experiences are also invited to apply.

As the residential course has a greater focus on practical learning, each participant is required to apply with a concrete project which he/she is planning or is involved in. This project should be described in as much detail as possible to allow for an understanding of the scope and skills required for the successful formulation of various management strategies.

For further details about how to apply and who is eligible visit www.arthinksouthasia.org
info@arthinksouthasia.org
 T: +91 98109 69222

ARThinkSouthAsia
Goethe-Institut
Max Mueller Bhavan
3 Kasturba Gandhi Marg
New Delhi-110001, India



Governance and Citizenship in Asia: Paradigms and Practices

18-19 March 2011, Hong Kong

THIS INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE is organized by The Centre for Governance and Citizenship of The Hong Kong Institute of Education, with the support of the Asia Pacific Governance Institute; the Journal of Asian Public Policy; Public Organization Review; and Public Administration and Development. The organizers invite researchers and practitioners from all parts of the world, especially Asia, to participate.

Central question: How is citizenship related to governance? Citizenship and participation have emerged as central issues in recent public management debates. They follow, and are a part of, the larger debate on 'Good Governance'. However, little systematic effort has been made to define the concepts and delineate the links between the two domains of Governance and Citizenship. It is simply assumed that the concepts, and the values and arrangements they embody, are axiomatic and universal. It is time the two concepts be subjected to closer scrutiny and the relationships between them specified. Some of the questions that need to be addressed in order to make the concepts useful for heuristic and practical purposes include:

- What does citizenship mean in a globalized world?
- Is the concept of citizenship universal? Or does it vary across societies? Do the concepts developed in Western contexts apply to societies with communitarian outlook? If yes, then what are the specific features of citizenship in such societies?
- How is the notion of citizenship related to other essential tenets of Good Governance?
- What is the link between democracy and citizenship, and between democracy and governance?
- Specifically, is citizenship possible without democracy? Can participation in the policy process substitute for democracy? What are the expectations for public participation and engagement in non-Western societies?

Asia-specific themes

In the Asian context, governance and citizenship may well be construed differently because of different cultural, administrative and socio-political philosophical traditions. It is important to ground the studies of Asian governance and citizenship in regional institutions, civic virtues and values, as much as in global trends and advocacies. Will the Asian experiences be

different from Western counterparts in terms of their nature, scope, direction and pace of development, implying a distinct conception of governance and citizenship?

This conference will explore specific themes in governance and citizenship, with special reference to Asia:

- Asian Governance: Global Concerns and Domestic Realities
- Traditions and Modernity: Asian Traditions and Values
- Citizenship and Identity: Economic, Political, Social and Cultural Conditions
- Nationality, Cosmopolitanism and Transnationality: Exclusion and Inclusion

Abstracts of 250-300 words are invited from interested paper presenters, to be sent to the Conference Secretary (Ms Lo Oi-yu at email address: cgc@ied.edu.hk) not later than 15 September 2010. Acceptance of abstract will be confirmed by 15 October 2010. Full manuscripts for accepted papers must be submitted by 15 February 2011. Selected papers may be considered for special issue publication in the supporting journals.

Website: www.ied.edu.hk/cgc/.
 Enquires can be directed to Ms Lo Oi-yu, cgc@ied.edu.hk, or Ms Peggy Tang, pyhtang@ied.edu.hk.

The Centre for Governance and Citizenship
The Hong Kong Institute of Education
10 Lo Ping Road
Tai Po, New Territories
Hong Kong, China.

Rural China and its Global Connections 10th European Conference on Agriculture and Rural Development in China (ECARDC X)

April 8-10, 2011, Aarhus University, Denmark

WHEN THE FIRST ECARDC conference was held in 1989, China's opening to the outside world was already contributing significantly to globalization. However, it was still possible to think of Chinese village life as relatively isolated from global currents, but such a view is no longer tenable.

The 10th ECARDC will explore links between the global and the local in rural China. China is often described as one of globalization's great winners that has successfully attracted FDI, generated amazing economic growth, and created global metropolises such as Shanghai and Shenzhen. But how are the rural areas managing the challenges of globalization? Many observers predicted that China's entry into the WTO in 2001 would generate a deep crisis for Chinese farming. While the consequences seem to have been less severe than many feared, it is useful to take stock after the first decade of WTO and to explore how global market forces affect China's farmers, food security and agricultural practices.

Conference topics include:

1. Consequences of China's integration in global markets for the organization of agriculture and the development of agrobusinesses.
2. Who are the globalization winners and who are the losers in rural China?
3. The role of the central and local state, farmers' organizations, and foreign and Chinese organization and companies in the globalization of rural China.
4. Connections between rural China and specific countries or regions of the world.
5. China as a player on the global market for agricultural products. What will be the consequences of Chinese agricultural outsourcing to other developing and emerging economies?
6. How does China's agricultural development affect the world's agricultural markets and prices?
7. Comparative studies exploring the 'Chinese characteristics' of the way in which farmers are integrated in global commodity chains.
8. The evolving status of Chinese farmers—from peasants to citizens.
9. Rural governance reforms and their global connections.
10. Rural NGOs and their global connections.
11. Before 1949 many Chinese farmers were already producing for the world market, and a historical perspective could also be helpful to our understanding of China's interaction with global markets today.
12. How has the exposure to global culture affected perceptions and expressions of the 'local' and the 'rural'?

Panel and/or paper proposals

It is possible to present an individual paper, or to propose a panel with several participants. Participants who wish to present a paper and/or organize a panel must submit an abstract (max. 300 words) by **1 January 2011**. However, participants who require a visa to Denmark (e.g. *Chinese citizens*) should register by **1 November, 2010**. This will make it possible to send out invitations in time for visa applications to be made.

Please see the conference website

www.ruralchina.au.dk/en/ecardc for details.



IIAS Research

Programmes

IIAS CENTRE FOR REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE

The IIAS Centre for Regulation and Governance in Asia, is engaged in innovative and comparative research on theories and practices and focusing on emerging markets of Asia. The Centre serves as a focal point of collaborative research between European and Asian scholars. Its multidisciplinary research undertakings combine approaches from political economy, law, public administration, criminology, and sociology in the comparative analysis of regulatory issues in Asia and in developing theories of governance pertinent to Asian realities. Currently the Centre facilitates projects on State Licensing, Market Closure, and Rent Seeking; Regulation of Intra-governmental Conflict; Social Costs, Externalities and Innovation; Regulatory Governance under Institutional Void; and Governance in Areas of Contested Territoriality and Sovereignty. **Coordinator: Tak-Wing Ngo** t.w.ngo@hum.leidenuniv.nl

SCIENCE AND HISTORY IN ASIA

The complex links between science and history in Asian civilisations can be studied on at least two levels. First, one can focus on the ways in which the actors have perceived those links; how, on the one hand, they have used disciplines that we now categorise as sciences, such as astronomy, for a better understanding of their own past; and, on the other hand, how they have constructed the historicity of these disciplines, giving them cultural legitimacy. Secondly, one can reflect on historiographical issues related to the sciences. How can the sciences be incorporated into historical narratives of Asian civilisations? This question is crucial, given the dominant 19th and 20th century view that science is a European invention, and that it has somehow failed to develop endogenously in Asia, where 'traditional science' is usually taken as opposed to 'Western' or 'modern science'. This project will address various approaches to the issue by organising five international work-shops in Cambridge, Leiden and Paris. **Sponsored by: NWO Humanities, Needham Research Institute, Recherches Epistémologiques et Historiques sur les Sciences Exactes et les Insitutions Scientifiques (REHSEIS) and IIAS.** **Coordinators: Christopher Cullen (Needham Research Institute)** c.cullen@nri.org.uk and **Harm Beukers (Scaliger Institute, Leiden University)** h.beukers@hum.leidenuniv.nl

GENDER, MIGRATION AND FAMILY IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Developed from an earlier research project on 'Cross-border Marriages', this project is a comparative study on intra-regional flows of migration in East and Southeast Asia with a focus on gender and family. It aims at studying the linkage between immigration regimes, transnational families and migrants' experiences. The first component of the project looks at the development of the immigration regimes of the newly industrialised countries in East and Southeast Asia. The second component looks at the experiences of female migrants in the context of the first component. To investigate these issues, this project will bring together scholars who have already been working on related topics. A three-year research project is developed with an empirical focus on Taiwan and South Korea as the receiving countries, and Vietnam and the PRC as the sending countries. **Coordinators: Melody LU (IIAS)** m.lu@iias.nl

PLANTS, PEOPLE AND WORK

This research programme consists of various projects that study the social history of cash crops in Asia (18th to 20th centuries). Over the past 500 years Europeans have turned into avid consumers of colonial products. Production systems in the Americas, Africa and Asia adapted to serve the new markets that opened up in the wake of



the 'European encounter'. The effects of these transformations for the long-term development of these societies are fiercely contested. This research programme contributes to the discussion on the histories of globalisation by comparing three important systems of agrarian production over the last 200 years. The individual projects focus on tobacco, sugar, and indigo in India and Indonesia. **Institutes involved: University of Amsterdam, International Institute of Social History (IISH, Amsterdam) and IIAS.** **Coordinators: Willem van Schendel** h.w.vanschendel@uva.nl and **Marcel van der Linden** mvl@iisg.nl

SENSHI SOSHO

This project, funded and coordinated by the Philippus Corts Foundation, aims to translate a maximum of 6 official Japanese publications of the series known as 'Senshi Sosho' into the English language. From 1966 until 1980, the Ministry of Defense in Tokyo published a series of 102 numbered volumes on the war in Asia and in the Pacific. Around 1985 a few additional unnumbered volumes were published. This project focuses specifically on the 6 volumes of these two series which are relevant to the study of the Japanese attack on and the subsequent occupation of the former Dutch East-Indies in the period of 1941 until 1945. **Coordinator: Jan Bongenaar** iias@iias.nl

ASIA DESIGN

This programme consists of individual projects related to graphic design and architectural design in Asian megacities. **Institutes involved: IIAS, Modern East Asia Research Centre (MEARC), Delft School of Design (DSD).** **Sponsored by: IIAS and Asiascape.**

Asia Design: Translating (Japanese) contemporary art Takako Kondo focuses on (re)presentation of 'Japanese contemporary art' in art critical and theoretical discourses from the late 1980s in the realms of English and Japanese languages, including artists' own critical writings. Her research is a subject of (cultural) translation rather than art historical study and she intends to explore the possibility of multiple and subversive reading of 'Japanese contemporary art' in order to establish various models for transculturality in contemporary art. **Coordinator: Takako Kondo** t.kondo@hum.leidenuniv.nl

Asia Design: The post colonial global city This research examines the postcolonial cities of South, East and South-East Asia, and how some of them have made the successful segue from nodes in formerly colonial networks to global cities in their own right. This is intended to be an inter-disciplinary approach bringing together architects and urbanists, geographers, sociologists and political scientists, as well as historians, linguists and anyone else involved in the field of Asian studies. The research concentrates on cities that have successfully made the transition from colonial to postcolonial nodes in the global network (e.g. Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai). A key factor in the research is architectural typology. Architecture is examined to see how it can create identity and ethos and how in the postcolonial era these building typologies have been superseded by the office building, the skyscraper and the shopping centre, all of which are rapidly altering the older urban fabric of the city. **Coordinator: Greg Bracken** gregory@cortlever.com

ENERGY PROGRAMME ASIA –EPA

Established in September 2007, this programme addresses the domestic and geopolitical aspects of energy security for China and the European Union. The geopolitical aspects involve analysing the effects of competition for access to oil and gas resources and the security of energy supply among the main global consumer countries of the EU and China. The domestic aspects involve analysing domestic energy demand and supply, energy efficiency policies, and the deployment of renewable energy resources. Within this programme scholars from the Netherlands and China will visit each other's institutes and will jointly publish their research outcomes. **Institutes involved: Institute of West Asian and African Studies (IWAAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).** **Sponsored by: KNAW China Exchange Programme and IIAS** **Coordinator: Mehdi Parvizi Amineh** m.p.amineh@uva.nl

Networks

AGEING IN ASIA AND EUROPE

During the 21st century it is projected that there will be more than one billion people aged 60 and over, with this figure climbing to nearly two billion by 2050, three-quarters of whom will live in the developing world. The bulk of the ageing population will reside in Asia. Ageing in Asia is attributable to the marked decline in fertility shown over the last 40 years and the steady increase in life-expectancy. In Western Europe, ageing populations developed at a slower pace and could initially be incorporated into welfare policy provisions. Currently governments are seeking ways to trim and reduce government financed social welfare and health-care, including

pensions systems, unleashing substantial public debate and insecurity. Many Asian governments are facing comparable challenges and dilemmas, involving both the state and the family, but are confronted with a much shorter time-span. This research programme, in short, sheds light on how both Asian and European nations are reviewing the social contract with their citizens. **Research network involved: Réseau de Recherche Internationale sur l'Age, la Citoyenneté et l'Intégration Socio-économique (REIACTIS) Sponsored by: IIAS.** **Coordinator: Carla Risseeuw** c.risseeuw@iias.nl



ABIA SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN ART AND ARCHAEOLOGY INDEX

The Annual Bibliography of Indina Archaeology is an annotated biblio-graphic database for publications covering South and Southeast Asian art and archaeology. The project was launched by IIAS in 1997 and is currently coordinated by the Post-graduate Institute of Archaeology of the University of Kelaniya, Colombo, Sri Lanka. The database is freely accessible at www.abia.net. Extracts from the database are also available as biblio-graphies, published in a series by Brill. The project receives scientific support from UNESCO. **Coordinators: Ellen Raven and Gerda Theuns-de Boer** e.m.raven@iias.nl www.abia.net

19-26 June 2011
Leiden, The Netherlands

Academic directors:
Prof. Michael Herzfeld (Harvard University)
Prof. Nira Wickramasinghe (Leiden University)

The Summer Programme consists of a four-day masterclass and a two-day conference with presentations by PhD students
Open to MA and PhD students

Heritage
Conserved
and Contested:
Asian and European
Perspectives
Summer Programme
in Asian Studies

For more information and the application form, see www.summerprogramme.asia

IIAS Fellows

CENTRAL ASIA

DR IRINA MOROZOVA
Moscow State University,
Russian Federation. Stationed
at the Branch Office Amsterdam
& Leiden. Sponsored by the
Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung.
*The History of Perestroika in
Central Asia (social transformation
in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Mongolia 1982-1991).*
1 Sep –31 Dec 2010

EAST ASIA

DR MEHDI P. AMINEH
Stationed at the Branch Office
Amsterdam & Leiden. Coordinator
of Energy Programme Asia (EPA).
Sponsored by KNAW/CASS.
*Domestic and Geopolitical Energy
Security for China and the EU.*
1 Sep 2007 –1 Sep 2010

DR GREGORY BRACKEN
Delft School of Design,
TU Delft, the Netherlands.
Sponsored by IIAS.
Urban Complexity in Asia.
1 Sep 2009 –1 Sep 2011

DR MO CHEN
Institute of West-Asian and African
Studies, Chinese Academy of Social
Science. Research fellow within
Energy Programme Asia (EPA).
Sponsored by CASS/KNAW
*Energy Cooperation between China
and Angola*
25 Oct –25 Nov 2010

PROF. DENNIS CHENG
Department of Chinese Literature,
National Taiwan University.
IIAS Professor, holder of the
European Chair of Chinese Studies;
Sponsored by IIAS, BICER and the
Ministry of Education Taiwan.
1 Sep 2010 –1 Sep 2011

PROF. CHRISTOPHER CULLEN
Needham Research Institute,
Cambridge, United Kingdom.
Sponsored by NWO/NRI/REHSEIS.
*History of Chinese Science and
Medicine.*
1 Sep 2008 –31 Dec 2010

PROF. TORU FUNAYAMA
Institute for Research in Human-
ities (Jinbun kagaku kenkyusho),
Kyoto University, Japan. Numata
visiting professor in Buddhist
studies.
*Scholastic tradition and practice in
Indian and Chinese Buddhism*
10 Sep –18 Dec 2010

DR CATHERINE JAMI
REHSEIS, Paris, France. Science
and History in Asia. Sponsored
by NWO/NRI/REHSEIS.
*Circulation of scientific Knowledge
between Europe and China,
17th and 18th Centuries.*
1 Sep 2008 –31 Dec 2010

DR MASAE KATO
Leiden University, the Netherlands.
*A comparative Study on
Socio-genetic Marginalisation:
Japan in 'Asia' in relation to the
'West' as a Reference Group.*
1 May 2008 –1 Apr 2011

MS TAKAKO KONDO
Department of Japan Studies,
Leiden University, the Netherlands.
Sponsored by Asiascape and IIAS.
*Translating (Japanese)
Contemporary Art.*
1 Sep 2009 –31 Aug 2012

DR. FRANCESCA DAL LAGO
Leiden Institute for Area Studies.
*The Drawing of Modernity:
European Academic Education and
the Making of Chinese Modern Art
(1911-1937).*
1 Sep –31 Dec 2010

DR LI-FANG LIANG
IIAS. *Transnationalizing Carework:
The Everyday Practices of Live-in
Migrant Care Workers and Their Care*
7 Oct 2010 –3 Jan 2011

PROF. TAK-WING NGO
IIAS Extraordinary Chair at the
Faculty of History and Arts,
Erasmus University, Rotterdam.
History of Asia.
1 May 2008 –1 May 2012

PROF. CARLA RISSEEUW
Leiden University, the
Netherlands.
Ageing in Asia and Europe.
1 Jan 2008 –1 Sep 2010

DR MARGARET
SLEEBOOM-FAULKNER
University of Sussex, Brighton, UK.
*Human Genetics and its
political, social, cultural and ethical
Implications.*
17 Sep 2001 –1 Sep 2010

DR HONGBO SUN
The Institute of Latin America
Studies of The Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences. Research fellow
within Energy Programme Asia
(EPA). Sponsored by CASS/KNAW
*Cooperation Models between
China and Latin America in Energy
Development Energy*
25 Oct –15 Nov 2010

DR DOROTA SZAWARSKA
IIAS.
*Kinship and intergenerational
exchange of support in the context
of limited repatriation. The case
of Sakhalin Korean repatriates*
1 Sep –30 Nov 2010

PROF. GUANG YUANG
Stationed at the Branch Office
Amsterdam. Institute of West-
Asian and African Studies,
Chinese Academy of Social
Science. Programme Director of
the Energy Programme Asia (EPA).
Sponsored by CASS/KNAW
*Domestic and Geopolitical
Challenges to Energy Security for,
China and the European Union*
25 Oct –25 Nov 2010

PROF. GUOQING YU
The Institute of Latin America
Studies of The Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences. Research
fellow within Energy Programme
Asia (EPA).
Sponsored by CASS/KNAW
China's Energy Policy towards Iran
25 Oct –25 Nov 2010

SOUTH ASIA

RENE BARENDSE
Stationed at the Branch Office.
Amsterdam IIAS
*Portugal's Asian empire in the
1630's*
1 Aug 2010 –1 Aug 2011

DR GHULAM NADRI
Georgia State University.
Sponsored by NWO
*Political Economy of Eighteenth-
century Gujarat; History of Indigo
in Colonial India*
23 Aug –15 Nov 2010

DR SARAJU RATH
Sponsored by NWO.
*Scanning, Preservation, and
Transliteration of Selected
Manuscripts of the Taittiriya
Tradition.*
1 Jan 2010 –1 Apr 2011

DR ELLEN RAVEN
Kern University of Indology,
Leiden University, the Netherlands.
Researcher within the South and
Southeast Asia Art and Archaeology
Index (ABIA) Sponsored by the
J. Gonda Foundation.
*Art, Material Culture and
Archaeology of South and
Southeast Asia.*
1 Oct 1996 –31 Dec 2011

DR RITUPARNA ROY
Stationed at the Branch
Office Amsterdam, IIAS.
*The Aftermath of Partition on the
Bengal Border: A Comparative
Study of English & Bangla Partition
novels.*
1 Sep 2009 –31 Dec 2010

MS GERDA THEUNS-DE BOER
Leiden University, the Netherlands.
Researcher within the South and
Southeast Asia Art and Archaeology
Index (ABIA) Sponsored by the
J. Gonda Foundation.
*South and Southeast Asian Art
and Archaeology Index*
1 Nov 2002 –1 Jun 2011

SOUTHEAST ASIA

MR ANDREA ACRI
IIAS, Leiden University.
Sponsored by the J. Gonda
Foundation
*The Shaiva Religion in the
pre-Islamic Indonesian Archipelago*
1 Sep 2010 –1 Mar 2011

MS YETTY HANING
Centre for Studies & Advocacy
of Human Rights of Nusa Cendana
University, Indonesia
Timor Sea Border Issues
1 Sep 2008 –1 Sep 2010

PROF. GERARD PERSOON
IIAS Extraordinary Chair,
Institute of Cultural Anthropology,
Leiden University.
*Environment and Development:
indigenous peoples in Southeast
Asia.*
1 Jul 2009 –1 Jul 2014


PROF. HADIJAH BT RAHMAT
Asian Languages and Cultures,
NIE/NTU.
*European Relations to Abdullah
Bin Abdul Kadir Munsyi and its
Influence on Malay-Indonesian
Literary Development.*
1 Sep –1 Dec 2010

DR EKA SRIMULYANI
The State Institute for
Islamic Studies, IAIN Ar-Raniry
Darussalam Banda Aceh
Indonesia
*'Public' religious roles of
Muslim women; 'Teungku Inong'
(women 'ulama') and 'Majelis
Taklim' (religious learning circle)
in Acehese Communities*
1 Sep –30 Nov 2010

DR IMRAN BIN TAJUDEEN
National University of
Singapore (NUS), Singapore.
*Mosques as colonial heritage
in the former Netherlands
East Indies.*
1 Jul 2010 –1 Jul 2011

Association for Asian Studies

The professional association for scholars,
teachers, and students interested in Asia.



NEW MEMBERS WELCOME

Formed in 1941, the Association for Asian Studies (AAS) is a scholarly, non-political, and non-profit professional association open to all persons interested in Asia. With over 7,000 members worldwide, representing all regions and countries of Asia, and all academic disciplines, the AAS is the largest organization of its kind.

BENEFITS OF MEMBERSHIP

Networking opportunities with over 7,000 scholars across all disciplines

Member Only access on the AAS website, featuring:

- fully-searchable AAS Member Directory
- access to employment listings
- student section
- the *Journal of Asian Studies* Online.

Reduced registration for the AAS Annual Meeting

Asian Studies Newsletter (4 issues)

Journal of Asian Studies (4 issues, and online access)

Discounts on all other AAS publications, including *Education About Asia*

Eligibility for grant programs

www.asian-studies.org



Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs

- Essential reading for everyone interested in the latest research on and serious analysis of relevant current issues in politics, society and the economy in Southeast Asia.
- Presents new theoretical approaches and empirical findings in an engaging and informative style.
- Our contributors' expertise, a rigorous peer-review process and our international editorial board guarantee high-quality content.

Further information at www.giga-journal-family.org

Subscription: 4 issues annually

**GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien
Institute of Asian Studies**

Rothenbaumchaussee 32 ▪ 20148 Hamburg ▪ Germany

Phone: +49 40 428874-0 ▪ Fax: +49 40 4107945

E-mail: ias@giga-hamburg.de

Homepage: www.giga-hamburg.de/ias

GIGA
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Institute of Asian Studies

Ask for your personal sample copy.

Colophon

Staff

Michiel Baas (Coordinator, Amsterdam)
 Tetske van Dun (Programme Manager, ASiA)
 Martina van den Haak (Seminars & Publications)
 Manuel Haneveld (IT Manager)
 Ria van der Holst (Administrator)
 Sandra van der Horst (Fellowship Programme)
 Heleen van der Minne (Project coordinator, Amsterdam)
 Manon Osseweijer (Deputy Director)
 Paul van der Velde (ICAS & Publications)
 Amparo de Vogel (Secretary)
 Thomas Voorter (WWW)
 Anna Yeadell (Managing Editor)

Board

Henk Schulte Nordholt –Chairman (KITLV, Leiden)
 Maghliel van Crevel (Leiden University)
 Isa Baud (University of Amsterdam)
 Peter Ho (Groningen University)
 Mario Rutten (University of Amsterdam)
 Oscar Salemink (Free University, Amsterdam)
 Ivo Smits (Leiden University)
 Patricia Spyer (Leiden University)

Academic Committee

Adriaan Bedner –Chairman (Leiden University)
 Marieke Bloembergen (KITLV/University of Amsterdam)
 Koen de Ceuster (Leiden University)
 Aya Ezawa (Leiden University)
 Jeroen de Kloet (University of Amsterdam)
 Jos Mooij (ISS)

IIAS Extraordinary Chair

Gerard Persoon 'Environment (and development) Southeast Asia' Extraordinary Chair at the Faculty of Social Science, Leiden University 1 July 2009–1 July 2014

Tak-Wing Ngo 'History of Asia' Extraordinary Chair at the Faculty of History and Arts, Erasmus University of Rotterdam 1 May 2008–1 May 2012

IIAS Main Office Leiden

PO Box 9500
 2300 RA Leiden
 The Netherlands

Visitors:

Rapenburg 59, Leiden
 T +31-71-5272227
 F +31-71-5274162
 iias@iias.nl

IIAS Branch Office Amsterdam

Spinhuis
 Oudezijds Achterburgwal 185
 1012 DK Amsterdam
 The Netherlands

T +31-20-525-3657

F +31-20-525-3010

iias@fmg.uva.nl


IIAS Newsletter #55 Autumn/Winter 2010 ISSN 0929-8738

Managing Editor: Anna Yeadell (on leave)
 Temporary Editor: Marie Lenstrup (from 15 October 2010)
 Guest Editor: Gregory Bracken
 Design: Artmiks, Amsterdam
 Printing: Wegener Grafische Groep, Apeldoorn


Advertisements and submissions

Please submit material for issue # 56 by 1 January 2011.
 Enquiries and submissions should be e-mailed to iiasnews@iias.nl

Responsibility for copyrights and for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with authors. Their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views of the institute or its supporters.
www.iias.nl



International Institute for Asian Studies



Borrowed
 this copy from
 a colleague?

The Newsletter is the leading publication in Asian Studies. Subscribe online and receive your own free digital or print copy 4 times a year.

Sign up today at <http://www.iias.nl/newsletter-subscription-form>

'If it is beautiful, it will endure on every level'

The Asian Art Society in the Netherlands was founded in 1918 with the intention of generating greater interest in Asian art, bringing interested parties in contact with each other, and advancing scholarship in this field.

Rosalien van der Poel

THE SOCIETY STRIVES to achieve its goals by preserving and expanding its collection, organising exhibitions, specimen meetings and excursions, issuing publications, including the Dutch-language journal *Aziatische Kunst* and a Newsletter, and collaborating with like-minded societies in the Netherlands and abroad. The Society has 550 members, and set up the chair in *Material History of the Cultural Interactions Between Asia and Europe* at Leiden University.

From museum to pavilion

A dedicated museum of Asian art was essential to achieving the Society's goals: a place in the Netherlands where Asian artworks could be permanently displayed. This was realised in 1932 when the Museum of Asian Art was inaugurated in the Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam. The museum was relocated to the Rijksmuseum in 1952, where the collection has been housed ever since. The collection will once again be exhibited in all its glory in a specially designed Asian Pavilion when the Rijksmuseum reopens in 2013.

The collection

Since its founding, the Society has brought together a multifaceted collection of Asian artworks. This internationally renowned collection now comprises 1730 objects, and continues to expand through the Society's ongoing acquisition policy as well as through the gifts and bequests it receives. The Society's collection includes a number of highlights, high-quality representatives of the most important Asian art forms. Because of the wide scope of the collecting area and the enormous time span covered by the objects, it is almost impossible to use the objects in the collection to show the historical development of the various art forms, or to demonstrate how forms of artistic expression influenced each other time and time again. Despite this, interest in exhibiting the objects has never been a problem – as a chairman of the Board once wrote, 'If it is beautiful, it will endure on every level'.

The collection is strong in several areas: ancient Chinese art (sculptures, bronzes, paintings and ceramics), Japanese paintings, prints and sculptures, as well as temple objects and other artworks from Indonesia. The collection also includes objects from India, Thailand, Laos, Sri Lanka, Korea and other Asian countries.

Rosalien van der Poel
Asian Art Society in the Netherlands
info@vvak.nl / www.vvak.nl

Join the Asian Art Society in the Netherlands today

- Contribute to the preservation of the Rijksmuseum's collection of Asian art and to the study of Asian art in the Netherlands.
- Support the acquisition of museological Asian art objects to supplement existing sub-collections in the Rijksmuseum;

Benefits of membership

- Receive the quarterly Dutch-language journal *Aziatische Kunst* and the *Newsletter*, which include information about presentations, excursions and exhibitions in the Netherlands and abroad;
- Attend lectures, meeting and excursions relating to the field of Asian art;
- Free entrance (with one guest) to the Rijksmuseum Amsterdam.
- Request a sample copy of *Aziatische Kunst* at www.vvak.nl.

Become a member by donating a minimum of 60 euro per year at www.vvak.nl. For more information, contact Rosalien van der Poel, info@vvak.nl.



MAIN IMAGE:

Lohan, wood with traces of a polychrome decoration, height 109 cm, China, 13th–14th century, acquired in 2005, inv. no. AK-MAK-1727

SPOTLIGHT: AJITA, ONE OF A GROUP OF LOHAN*

The Society's collection of Chinese sculptures includes this imposing statue of a seated *lohan*. It was originally placed on a plinth, and the elegant folds and curves of the monk's robes hung over the edge of the front of the flat surface at a right angle. The penetrating gaze and the full lips amplify the intensity of the monk's expression. A *lohan* has extraordinary qualities, being a monk who dedicated his life to acquiring the highest wisdom and who withdrew from worldly life and lived as hermit to achieve this.

A *lohan* possesses transcendent and supernatural powers. The sculptor of this statue succeeded in beautifully conveying the *lohan's* great inherent power with his intense gaze and dignified posture. Within the greater group of 500 *lohan*, there is a group of sixteen 'great' *lohan* that are especially revered. This group is described in a *sutra* uttered by a dying *lohan* on Sri Lanka (Ceylon) in the third or fourth century. The text *Da aluohan Nandimiduoluo suo shuo fazhuji* (*Record of the Abiding Law as Spoken by the Great Lohan Nandimitra*) describes sixteen of Buddha's disciples and relates that as Buddha approached his death he entrusted these sixteen *lohan* with the task of protecting the Buddhist laws until the arrival of the future Buddha, Maitreya. The veneration of groups of *lohan* blossomed during the early Song period (960–1279), when the groups of sixteen or eighteen *lohan* statues were also selected. It seems that the *lohan* in the Society's collection is the fifteenth *lohan*, Ajita. He is described in an early twelfth-century text as having 'his head inclined, listening to the reading of a *sutra*, with a blissful, pure expression, as if he is in a state of consciousness called *samadhi* (a higher state of meditative concentration).' The *lohan* in the Society's collection is an outstanding example of thirteenth and fourteenth century Chinese Buddhist sculpture and is the only one of its kind in the Netherlands.

*With thanks to Menno Fitski, curator of East-Asian art, Rijksmuseum Amsterdam. The complete description of this object was published in *Aziatische Kunst*, volume 35, no. 3, 2005.

TOP

Left: *Divine Beauty*, sandstone, height 94 cm, India, 11th century, acquired in 1934, inv. no. AK-MAK-185-00
Middle: *Dancing Shiva*, bronze, height 153 cm, India, 12th century, acquired in 1935, inv. no. AK-MAK-187-00
Right: *Guanyin* (Avalokiteshvara), wood with polychrome decoration, height 117 cm, China, 12th century, acquired in 1939, inv. no. AK-MAK 84-00

INSET BELOW

Left: Flowerpot, decorated with yellow, green and aubergine coloured *email sur bisquit*, height 17.2 cm, diameter 22 cm, China, 17th century, acquired in 1968, inv. no. AK-MAK-572
Right: Detail from a *Plaque*, ivory, 5 x 12 cm, Sri Lanka (Ceylon), 17th–18th century, acquired in 2009, inv. no. AK-MAK-1730

