

theNewsletter

Encouraging knowledge and enhancing the study of Asia

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Asia/EU

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The painted photograph marks a crucial chapter in the history of photography. Enjoy privileged views from the Alkazi Collection.

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From the Director

This issue of the Newsletter features a thematic which we expect will be a continuous and growing concern for all, that of energy security. The demand for energy will grow, especially in Asia, and to secure its production and delivery, a stable political and economic situation is crucial. Dr Mehdi Amineh, IIAS fellow and head of the IIAS Energy Programme Asia is the guest editor of this issue.

The new look Newsletter continues to provide readers with a wide range of articles, always informative and often surprising. Number 51 is no exception, with articles on bride-kidnapping in Western Mongolia (pp.4-5); the conflict on the Thai/Cambodian border (p.10) and we're very privileged to have a selection of painted photographs to share with you from the Alkazi Collection in this issue (pp.16-17).

August sees the 6th International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS), organised in Daejeon, Korea. It is the largest gathering of Asia scholars in the world and once again attracts participants from all over the world. I warmly commend it to you and hope those attending the convention, as well as those of you unable to be in Korea, will appreciate the special ICAS supplement in the centre pages of this newsletter.

This is to be my last preface as Director of IIAS. As of 1 October 2009, after three good and fruitful years, I have decided to stop with my work for IIAS and spend more time on research. The institute is healthy and bustling with activity. It has been a privilege and a pleasure to work for the institute and I wish my successor well.

Max Sparreboom,
Director

Important notice

From 2010 the Newsletter will be available in a digital version. On the A4 address label which accompanies your copy of the Newsletter you will find a request to indicate in which format you wish to receive the newsletter in the future – paper or digital. Please give this your attention. Those subscribers who do not react by the end of this year will be removed from the mailing list.

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How would you like to receive your Newsletter?

In a bid to print less and distribute less, we've decided that from 2010 the Newsletter will be available in a digital and a paper format. While the paper version will still be available, we hope that many of you will decide to go digital! Please go to www.iias.nl and follow the links to let us know in which format you want to receive the Newsletter: digital or paper. Or return this form by post **ticking the appropriate checkbox below**. We will send this message once again with Newsletter #52, but if we don't hear from you by the end of 2009, we will assume you no longer wish to receive the Newsletter. If you choose to receive the digital version, from 2010 onwards you will automatically receive an email notification when the new Newsletter is ready. We look forward to hearing from you.

Anna Yodanis, Editor

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
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'Forty houses should forbid the girls...'



Non-consensual bride kidnapping is practiced in western Mongolia amongst the Kazakh diaspora. In neighbouring Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the practice is thought to be increasing. In Mongolia there are no data indicating the prevalence of the practice, but according to local women it is a common occurrence. Although bride kidnapping is illegal, incidents are not generally reported to the police, and kidnappers are almost never charged. Anna Portisch considers one young woman's kidnapping, and reflects on social control mechanisms within the community and how they are negotiated.

— Anna Portisch —



ON A COLD WINTER MORNING IN 2005, Maira and I stood talking in the central square in the provincial centre of Bayan-Ölgii. She was a music teacher at the school in the village where I was conducting fieldwork, and had come to Ölgii on school business. As we exchanged news, I became aware of someone shouting behind her. I ignored the man's voice thinking it was a drunk returning home. The shouting continued and as we both turned to face the man Maira froze. I asked her a question but she stared past me at the square behind. Then I heard her name being shouted, 'Hey! Maira's come to town. Maira is here...' One of the drivers of Ölgii's dilapidated fleet of Lada-taxis was hanging out the car door in a heavy sheepskin coat shouting at us in a mocking voice. Maira asked me to walk with her to her aunt's house. Shaking and looking nervously over her shoulder, she explained that the man had been amongst those who had kidnapped her the previous year.

The previous winter, Maira had accompanied her music students to an annual school competition in the neighbouring town of Tsengel. Some of her students had won medals and it had been a busy time. On the last day, the students were sent home in vans and the teachers and jury were arranging lifts. Most cars were full, and when Maira found that an old school friend happened to be in town she happily accepted a lift from him to the village where her parents lived. A few friends of his were in the car, and although her companions were a little subdued Maira was in high spirits.

The road that connects Tsengel with other villages is a network of dirt tracks that criss-crosses the mountainous landscape. Between villages, isolated houses sit at the foot of sheltering hills in cover from the spring winds. Relatively few cars drive the distance, at busy times perhaps five cars per day. In winter, transportation is less frequent. The temperature regularly drops to minus 30-35 C and the hillsides can be treacherously icy. As darkness fell they came down the mountainside towards her parents' village where the faint lights from a few windows could be seen.


Her friend did not turn off when they reached the track which leads to the village. Maira joked with him, asking him if he

was tired; had he not recognised the turning? He and his companions kept silent. She realised she had been tricked and pleaded with the men to take her home. She cried and tried to force them to stop the car. She tried to open the door, but was restrained by the men who sat on either side of her.

Once the kidnapped bride arrives at her potential parents-in-law's house where the wedding is planned to take place, she must face the elders of this family, whom, ordinarily, she should treat with respect. The eldest woman will try to put a scarf over her head. If she succeeds, this indicates the captured bride's acceptance of the marriage. Her initial resistance is likely to be interpreted as the 'correct role play' of a modest and well-behaved girl. If she continues to resist the 'proposal', the elders of the household are likely to physically and psychologically coerce her to stay, the women pointing out that they too were kidnapped; assuring her of the groom's good character; or reminding her that if she leaves her chances of marrying a man of her choice will be slim (cf. HRW 2006; Kleinbach & Salimjanova 2007; Lom 2005; Werner 2004).

Young Kazakh women state that if their parents were to support the marriage, it would be extremely difficult for them to reject the 'proposal'. The kidnapped bride's parents may consider it a pragmatic and 'better' option for her to marry the kidnapper, even though he may not be the love of her life, since rejecting the 'proposal' will put her at fault in several ways. Having spent the night at the aspiring groom's home, she will no longer be perceived as a virgin. By leaving she will bring shame on her family, and occupy an unacceptable position as 'spoiled' yet not married. Potentially, she will face hostility from those connected to the aspiring groom, and the approaches of men in the community that will follow from her 'spoiled' status. Young eligible men (and their mothers) are likely to be put off by her ruined reputation and what it indicates: that she is unlikely to become a respectful and obedient daughter-in-law.

Maira spent the 'wedding night' sitting quietly and biding her time. In the morning the groom's parents called her parents, as is the custom, to formally apologise for having kidnapped her. When Maira's parents came to settle the matter, Maira



Bride kidnapping amongst the Kazakh of western Mongolia

Having spent the night at the aspiring groom's home, she will no longer be perceived as a virgin. By leaving she will bring shame on her family, and occupy an unacceptable position as 'spoiled' yet not married.



Fig. 1 (left)
Road north of
Tsengel, Bayan-Ölgii
province. Courtesy
of the author.

Fig. 2 (left inset)
Wedding
celebration, Ölgii
province centre,
summer 2005.
(This bride was
not kidnapped).
Courtesy of the
author.

Fig. 3 (above)
A bride leaves
her natal home
accompanied by
her husband,
summer 2008.
(This bride was
not kidnapped).
Courtesy of the
author.

protested so strongly that her parents had no choice but to take her home. On returning home, her mother was so angry she beat her with the poker from the stove, leaving permanent scars. Her mother blamed Maira for accepting the lift; she should not have been so friendly with the young man at school, leading him on so that he wanted to marry her. In addition, Maira had put her own personal happiness above her respect for her parents, and above the good relations between her own clan and that of the aspiring groom.

A marriage of strangers

While many people in Bayan-Ölgii marry for love, it is equally understood that it is normal for young people not to know one another well upon marrying and to 'grow to love one another', or simply establish a good working relationship. Women often (voluntarily) marry men they have recently met, sometimes only days before the wedding. In terms of how well acquainted a bride is with her groom, a woman who has been kidnapped, does not necessarily face such a different situation from a woman marrying someone she barely knows.

This situation is partly understandable in light of the difficulties of 'dating' in a social environment defined by co-habitation and co-dependence, and respect of elders. Akiner describes social hierarchy in Central Asia more generally as organised around 'patriarchal control allied to maternal authority' (1997: 286). In Bayan-Ölgii young people are aware of the attitudes of their elders, anticipate their reactions, and often family and community concerns take precedence over individual inclinations or desires. As Akiner further points out, '[t]he positive aspect of community life was that it provided a highly effective, informal and very sensitive social security network. The negative aspect was that it was very difficult to escape from its all-embracing control.' (Ibid.: 278). In Bayan-Ölgii, a proverb states that 'Forty houses should forbid the girls, thirty houses should forbid the boys'. In other words, the family and wider community of relatives endeavours to monitor and direct young people to becoming moral agents through restriction.

Young people often live with their family until they marry. It would be improper to invite a young man home, or to visit his

home. Moreover, it is difficult for a young woman to go out in public with a man who is not her relative. Such behaviour is likely to generate scandalous gossip (*öse*). If a young woman is suspected of indecent behaviour, the monitoring of her is likely to sharpen. Similarly, it is considered unsafe to let a girl sleep on her own in a separate bedroom within the family home. She cannot be trusted to remain chaste or to protect herself against potential intruders. A girl should not walk around town or in the countryside on her own, since she might be seen to have 'opened herself' to advances from strangers. What is important is not that any indecency has actually been observed, but rather its potential. Similarly, the 'wedding night' does not necessarily result in the kidnapped bride losing her virginity, but the potential for this alone is sufficient to 'spoil' her status.

Gossip as social control

If a young woman wishes to leave her kidnappers, she must politely fend off her potential in-laws. She has to consider her parents wishes and her own willingness to disobey them. Moreover, she has to consider her own reduced options and 'ruined' standing in the community, which will be the subject of widely circulating gossip. In this context, scandalous gossip might be considered a social control mechanism, employed by community members to assess others' actions and publicly express such assessments, and, in turn, a means of directing young people's behaviour.

While scandalous gossip affects young women's options, it is also a tool on which they rely and to which they actively contribute. Because it is difficult to get to know men who are not relatives, young women rely on gossip to build a picture of whether someone would be a desirable suitor. Young women often comment that they hope to glean from the available gossip whether an eligible man has a tendency to drink (vodka) or is predisposed to violence. Should he have such tendencies, it would be advantageous if he were physically smaller than her, so that she might restrain him.

Moreover, gossip does not continually reproduce the same repertoire of interpretations. Through her actions, and aided by the community's propensity for scandalous gossip,

Maira set an example which other young women draw on in considering their own options. Perhaps her example acts as a deterrent, or perhaps because of its outcome it acts as a lead to follow. A few years after her kidnap, Maira married a young man of her choice. They live with his mother in the village where she continues to work as a teacher, and they have a small child. Maira still meets with abuse from her kidnapper's allies when she is in town. As if putting the event behind her, she never talks about her kidnapping. Through her choices, she paved a route to becoming a morally acceptable actor within the community, as a hardworking and obedient daughter-in-law, wife and mother, but a route perhaps more closely moulded to her own inclinations.


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All names have been changed in this essay.

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Asian performing arts in the academy



models for hybrid cultural production to non-Europeans. Much can also be said about the introduction of drama into colonial school curriculum and the rise of scripted drama in Myanmar and India, tourism and its impact on dance in Bali and islands of the Pacific. And so on.

A global approach has a certain appeal in higher education – as it potentially allows students to make connections to Asian performance via the known and familiar. An exclusive emphasis in the curriculum on globalisation runs the risk, however, of reifying dominant stereotypes of the dynamic West and receptive/passive East. Furthermore, it over-values and exaggerates the prominence of cultural production looking to global markets, which is precisely the sort of Asian performance that gets reported in the press, tours internationally and under-values folk and ritual arts embedded in local communities, ecologies and spiritual economies. By overly emphasising global arts, we risk forgetting the particularity of localised expressive forms, and thereby thematise otherness as sameness.

Take the case of *Barikan*, a *wayang kulit* ritual drama. *Barikan* is a shadow play performed annually in a score of villages in the Cirebon area of West Java and addresses local malignant spirits (who become characters in the play) in order to ward off illness and other threats to communities. It is possible to discuss *Barikan* in light of global concerns – a 1994 performance by the puppeteer Basari that I have translated, for example, references AIDS (Basari 1998). There is historical evidence that early 20th century performances addressed global epidemics prevalent at that time as well, including cholera. But such a hermeneutic lens potentially deprives the event of what makes it interesting to local performers and audiences, which is the making present in the here-and-now of the normally intangible and abstract and removed. *Barikan* does not exist ‘because of’ AIDS or cholera, but it provides one mode for addressing fears and concerns about the unknown and an opportunity for puppeteers to reflect upon relations between the mundane and the supernatural in terms of a local cosmology. Chalking off *Barikan* to folk medicine diminishes its significance to speak across a variety of registers (symbolic and practical) and does not grant it the flexibility to address new, emergent issues that is required if it is to be maintained as a traditional art in a local context of production.

Grouping Asia’s performing arts together is what Gayatri Spivak calls a ‘strategic essentialism’. Europe’s performing arts have historically had more cohesion than their Asian counterparts. The reason why we might want to cluster such different forms as Japanese *nihon buyo* dance, Mongolian throat singing and Malaysian *bangsawan* theatre, Matthew Cohen argues, is not because these heterogeneous genres share essential characteristics commonly imputed to Asian arts such as spirituality, audience participation, stylisation and inter-mediality. Rather, that Asian performing arts taken as a whole can impact on Eurocentrist beliefs and practices.

Matthew Isaac Cohen

Fig. 1 (above)
The Law of Java, an 1822 English-language melodrama, performed by second year Royal Holloway drama students on the *noh* stage of the Handa Noh Theatre in 2006.

Fig. 2 (right)
Performance of *Cungkring Nyaleg* (Cungkring Runs for Office) by *wayang kulit* puppeteer Anom Purjadi in Cengkoak, Cirebon, 2009. Images courtesy of the author.

Globalisation and popular theatre

Carol Fisher Sorgenfrei, in an article about Asian theatre studies in American academia, writes that: ‘Asian theatre, whatever and wherever it is, remains the ultimate Other, unknowable, unlearnable, unfathomable. The languages are imagined to be indecipherable; [...] cultural values and historical context are totally alien; performers are trained from birth, so why bother to teach an impossible discipline?’ (Sorgenfrei 2006: 220).

In part to counteract this dominant stereotype, the trend has been to think about Asian performing arts in terms of global systems of production and consumption. We have seen studies that theorise relations between *kabuki* and Shakespeare and analyse modern systems of performer training that emerged in late colonial Asia. Much work still needs to be done on international touring circuits that brought opera, music hall and circus to cities and towns around the world. These circuits provided an economic prop for European culture, integrated novel acts and performers from around the world and offered

The other danger in stressing global frames of reference is that an emphasis on commonality and shared experience potentially drains the interest of students in non-Western arts. European students are commonly drawn to our courses and workshops on non-European performance because we offer alternatives from realist theatre and film. Asian performance in the student imagination means flashy costumes and bright makeup, stylised iconography, exacting psychophysical discipline, evocations of unseen worlds and spirits and performance structures promoting group process over individual psychology. Students seem, in general, not to like studying non-European theatres too similar to their own popular theatre.

Ritual theatre and social contexts

Ritualised Asian performance, in contrast to popular theatre, has an exotic cachet in academic culture. One of the icons of my department is the *noh* stage of the Handa Noh Studio Theatre, which was originally constructed for a visiting *noh* theatre troupe that played the 1991 Japan Festival, advertised as ‘the biggest festival devoted to the arts and history of a foreign country ever to be presented in the UK’. Undergraduate student admission forms often cite the existence of the *noh* theatre as one of the reasons why students desire to study drama at Royal Holloway. This interest, however, does not translate directly into student numbers in the *noh* theatre course and while the stage is regularly used for student performances, it is rare that independent student productions are based in a *noh* performance style. In other words, students like the idea of having proximity to *noh* theatre, but don’t feel compelled to enter into it. For most students of my department, the *noh* stage is more fetish object than enabler of performance.

If I then resist the tendency to globalise Asian theatre in academic contexts, and am even more wary of exoticising or fetishising Asia, what do I identify as viable modes for handling Asian theatre and other performing arts in the classroom?

One possibility is to take a cue from ethnomusicologist Mantle Hood’s concept of ‘bi-musicality.’ Hood advocated a deep cultural immersion in the practical study of the performing arts of the Other and the development of performance competency to the point where one can perform and even creatively think and teach in an art form that becomes one’s passion as well as one’s subject of scholarship. The primary goal is not to become a professional performer, but to develop the ‘chops’ to understand and critique performance from within. Bi-musicality in ethnomusicology has become so dominant that it is now the common expectation that ethnomusicologists will not only write about and teach about non-Western music, they will also run ethnic ensembles in universities and community settings.

Theatre studies in Britain operates according to a different logic. Most academic drama departments encourage the development of students as ‘thinking practitioners,’ who can take received structures and forms and analyse these critically to create their own performances. Unmediated repetition is strongly discouraged, subversion is celebrated. This approach works to a

degree when dealing with European performance but has real problems at every level in relation to Asian theatre. Students have genuine difficulty discerning the structure and constraints on forms of work they encounter, do not know the relevant critical matrices with which to evaluate work they see and generally lack the skills to formulate a performative response. The theatre studies model is thus prone to produce pastiche, (sometimes unintentional) parody and a lack of engagement with the specificities of technique, history and culture.

We see there are real structural problems in accommodating Asian theatre in theatre study’s dominant educational model of learning-through-practice. More important than learning about Asian theatre might be to experience styles of teaching and learning that characterise how Asian theatre is transmitted in situ. Educators since Plato have known that the true goal of the educator is not to ‘put knowledge into souls where none was before’ but rather to direct attention from the obvious and trivial to areas of genuine importance. Plato, in Book 7 of *The Republic*, allegorically uses shadow puppet theatre, a theatrical genre readily familiar to all Asianists, to explain this. The masses are chained and conditioned to watch flickering shadows projected by puppets passed before a flame, and it is the job of the educator to drag his students to look beyond the shadow images on screen and see not only the puppets that produce theatrical illusion but also the real objects (or forms) upon which they are based.

Educating students in Asian theatre means going beyond shared rapture in sumptuous displays of art, but experiencing the modes of production that go into the making of art, and the social reasons why these ways of working exist. One should, I suggest, engage with ways of instruction that correlate with how Asians learn to perform. Towards this end, for example, when I teach Indonesian theatre I sit with my students cross-legged on the floor for hours at a stretch. I encourage students to eat food and make comments when watching performance videos. I use foreign terminology and do not feel obliged to translate everything, but make students come up with their own explanations. I require them to practice skills at home, and encourage them to imitate things they see on video. I try as much as possible to bring in Indonesian practitioners, and encourage students to play in gamelan groups, for it is common for actors, dancers and puppeteers to be musicians as well.



Sometimes it is possible to accommodate the British academic model to Asia but sometimes it is patently not. I recall the case of a British puppeteer colleague who based his mode of instruction on Japanese master-disciple relations, favouring a young man who he saw had great potential as a puppet maker and performer and ignoring others. Student complaints lead to his dismissal from the teaching job – but the young man remains his faithful apprentice to the present.

Sorgenfrei writes that ‘despite the apparent interest in world theatre [among non-Asianists in academic theatre departments], what they really wanted was someone able to incorporate something non-Western or non-canonical into existing Eurocentric courses. They needed to look global but wanted to remain local!’ (Sorgenfrei 2006: 221).

Simply ‘looking global’ is not enough. I suggest that for Asian theatre to find a happy home in British academia we must strive to institute accommodations in academic culture to allow for Asian theatres to be taught and learned in a way that is true to both its social contexts and aesthetic forms. That is to say, I wish Asian theatre to be situated in an academy that is permeated by the spirit of what Japanese historian Akira Iriye calls cultural internationalism – allowing for both the expression of national sentiment and a dialogue across cultures for the sake of world peace. This is a utopian task that falls on Asian theatre academics to accomplish together.

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This paper was originally presented at the Palatine workshop, Asian and African Theatre in Higher Education, held at the University of Reading on 13 February 2008.

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The future of the Chinese and East Asian musical past



What do we know about the great traditional music of East Asia, past or present? Why are faithful renderings or reconstructions of such music so seldom heard on today's concert stages? What can be done to bring back to life or to preserve their sounds? International experts will discuss 'the future of the Chinese and East Asian musical past' in Brussels from 18 to 22 November.

Frank Kouwenhoven

SOME ONE HUNDRED MUSICOLOGISTS, music historians and musicians will gather in Brussels in November 2009 for a conference on traditional music in China and East Asia. Issues at stake are the development and preservation of musical instruments, the reconstruction of historical musical genres and methods of study, documentation and archiving. The meeting, organised by CHIME (the European Foundation for Chinese Music Research) and hosted by the Brussels Musical Instruments Museum (MIM), will cover a vast range of musical regions and historical periods. Key questions include: what is there still to discover about genres of music or musical instruments which have disappeared, or are on the brink of disappearing? How do traces of former musical genres survive in contemporary East Asian music? And how can the material heritage of traditional music – instruments, scores, recordings, people's memories – best be preserved and guarded?

Lost and found

Of course, a great deal of music from East Asia's past is irretrievably lost. But even if few scores and (obviously) no sound recordings are available, it is often possible to speculate meaningfully on how certain musical genres of past centuries sounded, or were structured. Sometimes, complete pieces can be successfully reconstructed. Many ancient zither scores and court ensemble pieces have been brought back to life. Even very ephemeral repertoires such as folk songs sometimes turn out to be open to some historical reconstruction. New discoveries in music archeology and music history and new research methods have made it possible to solve pieces of the historical puzzle. Scholars have established a closer rapport with an impressive variety of genres, from ancient ceremonial bells to lutes and zithers played in the 18th century, from Korean court music to Laotian temple drums, from Mongolian chant to Malaysian teahouse music. Some local traditions which survive today, such as Chinese 'silk and bamboo' (*sizhu*), or the mysterious southern Chinese balladry *nanguan*, can now be more meaningfully linked with other regional genres or with specific musical traditions of the past.

Unravelling the past is not just a matter of inspecting historical artefacts. Some musicologists also feel the need to establish better links with present-day musicians, music educators and cultural policy makers in Asia. A more active interest in older music traditions on the part of musicians and politicians could make a big difference in the prospects for learning more about traditional musical realms. In this respect, 'the future of the past' still leaves a lot to be desired: cultural preservation policies in countries like China, Japan and Korea are beset with problems and misconceptions, and professionally trained musicians in state educational institutions in East Asia often have scant knowledge about the history of their own instruments or of the music they play.

Reconstruction in China

For example, the vast majority of professional musicians in China show little interest in revivals of early music based on historical study or factual analysis. Even the performance practices of 50 or 60 years ago are already *terra incognita* for

most young urban musicians in this country. *Pipa* (lute) players today generally have no idea how very different their steel-stringed instrument would sound if played with silk strings, as was common only half a century ago. Historical recordings of this are available, but they are rarely consulted. Generally speaking, the gap between historical scholarship and practical performance is enormous: what is being presented on Chinese concert stages today as 'early' or 'ancient' music is largely newly composed repertoire, played on modern instruments, and most of it is a product of fantasy, without any recourse to historical data.

The instrumental ensemble suites from the Chinese Tang court that have survived (mainly) via Japanese Togaku manuscripts include great music, but are rarely performed in China. Musicians and instrument makers have also made little effort to reconstruct historical instruments. Copies have been cast of such prestigious objects as the Zheng Houyi bronze bells from the Warring States Period (2500 years ago) – and these are played in an a-historical fashion in tourist shows at the Hubei Provincial Museum in Wuhan and elsewhere – but historical lutes, fiddles, drums and other instruments are mostly consigned to museum display cabinets. True enough, one early pioneer, Zheng Jinwen, made more than 160 replicas of old Chinese instruments as early as the 1930s, but his collection was destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, and his work is all but forgotten in China. The reconstructions of Tang music by Laurence Picken (Cambridge) and by Western and Chinese fellow musicologists now mainly gather dust on Chinese library shelves. A number of reconstructed instruments especially made for a concert of Picken's Tang music in Shanghai in 1991 were returned to the instruments factory in Suzhou after the concert, and were never re-used in public.

Living traditions

To stay with China for a bit longer: solo repertoires for plucked lutes and zithers like *pipa* and *qin* include numerous hidden and unexplored treasures, but they are rarely given the chance for authentic reproduction on concert stages. Playing on steel strings (as most performers in China currently do) and with amplification destroys the historical sense of the music, and most of the roughly six hundred *qin* pieces which survive (documented in some 3000 scores) are never heard in performance. Audiences in China must live under the impression that the entire *qin* repertoire consists of some 20 'famous' pieces. Fair enough, a handful of *qin* players in China (notably in Hong Kong and Taipei) and one Westerner (John Thompson) try to re-dress this, and investigate the impressive corpus of *qin* manuscripts on a basis of historical criteria.

Splendid recordings of traditional ensemble music from the 1950s (such as that from the Zhihua temple musicians), as well as the continuing living music practices of numerous rural *shengguan* bands, temple orchestras, story singers and local opera groups in China provide us with exciting

clues about past practice, but such clues are rarely taken up by urban musicians. Professional performers from the state conservatories in China show little interest in doing musical fieldwork in their own society, although the country possesses one of the biggest and most magnificent musical backyards in the world. Folk music could be a major inspiration and source of knowledge for early music enthusiasts (as European folk music has become for early music experts in the West).

The painstaking and impressive historical scholarship of scholars like Yang Yinliu, Cao Anhe and their followers, such as Ye Dong and Chen Yingshi provides the basis for early music research in China today, but unfortunately their work is being ignored in concert halls. Real acknowledgement of the achievements of these scholars has been slow to arrive, and early Chinese music today remains the domain of a relatively small group of theorists. One aim of the conference in Brussels is to raise new debate on this situation, by inviting to the meeting not only music historians but also some 40 practicing musicians from China.

Discoveries

The musico-archeological record for East Asia is rich, but also very scattered, and it usually provides only tantalising glimpses of specific genres played in former ceremonial court contexts. A great deal of folk and rural (and even court) musical culture remains almost 'invisible', because it has left practically no traces. Surviving scores are open to many different interpretations, especially where rhythms, tunings and temperament are concerned. Nevertheless, progress is being made in a number of areas. Western scholars have long been hesitant to subscribe to Chinese scholars' views about the ancient roots of the southern balladry genre *nanguan*, since no sources documented that genre earlier than the 16th century, but new research proves the Chinese scholars right. Musicologists are now mapping this genre more accurately, also charting its relationships with regional opera genres. Another example: The bells of Marquis Yi were the first documented instance in world history of a chromatically tuned musical instrument (some 1700 years before the rise of the Western keyboard). Robert Bagley of Princeton University and others have argued that the chromatic tuning of the bells was never intended for playing chromatic tunes, but mainly for producing five-tone melodies in different keys (meaning that the bells were suited for playing together with other instruments with variable tunings). Bagley suggests that the tuning of the bells was not reached on the basis of refined calculations and precise casting methods, but empirically, by trying out combinations of different sizes of bells until a suitable chromatical series emerged.

Cultural intangible heritage

Until now, many results of historical research have little or no bearing on performance practice. This could change if scholars, instrument makers and musicians in East Asia join forces in exploring the musical past. There are some cautious steps in this direction, also in setting up joint research projects concerning living traditional music.

Only a few decades ago, appeals for the preservation of rural and local folk music were rare in most parts of East Asia. In recent years, cultural intangible heritage organisations and a number of (private or state-guided) preservation and documentation programmes have been established. 'Rescue' projects in China, Japan and Korea have been undertaken, with mixed results: as long as local instruments are repaired, scores copied, or repertoires recorded and documented, such projects probably serve their objectives. In Yunnan Province in China, ancient *dongba* rituals were successfully reintroduced in Naxi ethnic minority areas. Youngsters in Yunnan are taught about the merits of protecting and supporting rural traditional music culture. However, such developments are counter-balanced by the less positive side-effects of some other forms of cultural promotion. The Centre for the Preservation of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Peking (founded with support from the Chinese Government and UNESCO) awarded grants to a number of rural folk musicians, which caused great envy, sometimes even serious rows among their fellow villagers. In other instances, local folk musicians were practically turned into professional stage artists, and village musical ceremonies transformed into commercial tourist shows. What is 'rescued', in such instances, is perhaps the economical basis of some musicians, but probably not their rituals or their music. The many intricacies of cultural protection laws and preservation programmes in countries like China and Japan will be discussed in the Brussels meeting.

For more details on the programme and the (many) concerts in the CHIME conference, see <http://home.wxs.nl/chime>.

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
Fig. 1 (above) and Fig. 2 (below) Daoist musicians in Yulin, Shaanxi, northwest China. Daoist music in China has generally survived the onslaughts of modern times remarkably well. Photographs courtesy of the CHIME archive.

In Yunnan Province in China, ancient *dongba* rituals were successfully reintroduced in Naxi ethnic minority areas.



The hungry tide

Bengali Hindu refugees in the Subcontinent



Partition is a recurring theme in Indian Writing in English. Much of the literature focuses on the experiences of Partition on the Punjab border. Amitav Ghosh stands out in his choice to write about the aftermath of Partition on the Bengal border, and his novels demonstrate a continuing engagement with the motif of migration and refugee resettlement in West Bengal. Rituparna Roy takes Ghosh's 2004 novel *The Hungry Tide* and examines how it traces the trajectory of Bengali Hindu refugees in the subcontinent.

Rituparna Roy

The history of the Indian novel in English reflects the fact that Partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 has been the single most important determining factor of India's destiny. From Khushwant Singh's *Train to Pakistan* in 1956¹ to Shauna Singh Baldwin's *What the Body Remembers* in 1999,² it seems a new perspective on the event emerges in each succeeding decade.

Marked by the twin features of massacre and migration, Partition, however, did not mean the same thing for Punjab and Bengal. As outlined below, there are three significant differences which have had a direct bearing on the refugee movement in these two states:

Firstly, the Punjab Partition was a one-time event that was marked by a two-way exodus, while the Partition of Bengal turned out to be a continuing process, with migration happening predominantly in one direction – i.e. from East to West Bengal. In other words, there was a more or less equal exchange of population on the western border in 1947 which was not the case in West Bengal.

Secondly, compared to the nature of border and boundary in the West where political, strategic and military considerations converted the entire Punjab region into two rigid divisions, the dividing line in the East remained porous and flexible, facilitating the refugee movement.

The third and most important difference between the Punjab and Bengal Partition was the attitude of the centre to the crisis on the two borders at the time it happened. The crisis in Punjab was seen as a national emergency, to be tackled almost on a war footing; and as the communal violence in the West came close to being genocide, the government felt a moral responsibility to put into immediate effect rehabilitation measures for the refugees. This sense of urgency was totally lacking on the Eastern border. The violence there was not of the same magnitude as the violence in the West. Hindu minorities in East Bengal were not considered to be in grave danger, and the flight of refugees westwards was regarded mostly as the product of imaginary fears and baseless rumours. In fact, well

after it had begun, Nehru continued to believe that the exodus in the East could be halted, even reversed, provided government in Dacca could be persuaded to deploy 'psychological measures' to restore confidence among the Hindu minorities.³

This difference in attitude and perception of the Central government regarding the nature of the crisis facing the two borders translated itself strikingly into the expenditure on refugees in the West and the East.⁴ A difference that would have permanent, debilitating, economic consequences for the state of West Bengal,⁵ and the way it dealt with its refugees.

Amitav Ghosh highlights precisely this aspect in his second novel, *The Shadow Lines* (1988).⁶ He provides vivid glimpses of what life was like for refugees on both sides of the border, even at the end of the Nehruvian era. And if we are to go by the testimony of the narrative of this novel, the Bengali Muslim refugees who sought shelter in Bangladesh seemed to have fared much better than the refugees in West Bengal, who were damned to a life of destitution and starvation in the nation they had escaped into.

But the problem of Bengali Hindu refugees was not confined geographically to one state alone. While a substantial percentage of the refugees who had crossed the Eastern border lived in West Bengal – mostly in Kolkata and its suburbs – many were also sent to other states.

The government of West Bengal was of the opinion that the refugees (who by the 1960s constituted a third of the population of the state) were a burden to be shared jointly among the federal government and those of the neighbouring states. It was in this context that the Dandakaranya project in central India was conceived as a long-term solution to the problem of rehabilitation of Bengali refugees.

Its genesis lay in the Rehabilitation Ministers' Conference of 1956 where it was decided that government relief would be given only to those refugees who agreed to resettle outside West Bengal. Subsequently, the Dandakaranya Development




Fig. 1 (above)
Photograph
by Margaret
Bourke-White.

Fig. 2 (left)
Amitav Ghosh.

Authority (DDA) was established in 1958. DDA was responsible for developing an area of 78,000 square miles, known as Dandakaranya, in the Koraput and Kalahandi districts of Orissa, and the Bastar district of Madhya Pradesh.

In *The Hungry Tide* (2004),⁷ Amitav Ghosh chronicles the saga of just such a group of refugees who were sent by the West Bengal Government to Dandakaranya in Madhya Pradesh in 1961, but who left the place and returned to West Bengal in 1978, only to be massacred and evicted again.

Recovering lost histories

Ghosh's writing has never had a strict demarcation between 'fiction' and 'non-fiction'. He has always combined several roles – that of novelist, journalist, scholar and historian, and one of his fundamental preoccupations as a writer has been to recover lost histories. *The Hungry Tide* attests to this, with the novel intertwining accounts of the Morichjhapi Massacre of 1979 in the Sunderbans and the history of riverine dolphins (*Orcaella brevirostris*) which are an integral part of the island's history and ecology. The discussion in this article will be confined to the massacre in the Sunderbans.

Ghosh dramatises the last phase of the refugees struggle in the Sunderbans. But life had been difficult long before – ever since their forced migration to India. They had moved to West Bengal after partition, hoping for a better life there. That hope proved utopic as they were later, in the 60s, pushed further inland from their deltaic origins into central India. Dandakaranya was conceived as a long-lasting solution to their problem. But ironically enough, it increasingly turned out to be 'a land of banishment rather than the haven of hope it had been made out to be by rehabilitation administrators.'⁸

The refugees felt alienated and between 1965 and 1978 more than 12,000 families deserted the settlement. In mid-1978, there was a new wave of desertions under the leadership of an organisation called the *Udavastu Unnayansheel Samiti*. The press at the time talked of a 'migration in reverse gear.' The West Bengal government managed to send a lot of these refugees back, but about 25,000 managed to return to West Bengal and build a settlement on the island of Marichjhanpi.

The West Bengal government was averse to the idea of old refugees returning back to the state and deeply unhappy with this development. It wanted a solution, once and for all, to the vexed refugee problem that the state had been facing for more than three decades. It declared the Morichjhapi settlement an illegal encroachment by 'deserters' on forest land in an area earmarked for the protection of endangered tigers. The refugees were given an ultimatum to evacuate the island by 31st March, 1979; when that proved futile, the government started an 'economic blockade' that severely affected the refugees; and the state police finally cracked down in mid-May 1979. Official estimates claimed that only 36 refugees were killed in this action, the actual number, however, ran into several hundreds.

In the *Hungry Tide*, the Morichjhapi Massacre is traced through a witness, Nirmal, and his diary to his nephew (Kanai). In Chapter 19 of the novel, we come to know the facts of the incident from Nirmal's widow. Nilima runs a hospital and a trust in Lushibari and is known as 'Mashima' (or aunt) to all. She tells her nephew Kanai of the events leading up to the massacre and of her husband's involvement in it.

'...In this place where there had been no inhabitants before there were now thousands, almost overnight. Within a matter of weeks they had cleared the mangroves, built badhs and put up huts. It happened so quickly that in the beginning no one even knew who these people were. But in time it came to be learnt that they were refugees, originally from Bangladesh. Some had come to India after Partition, while others had trickled over later. In Bangladesh they had been among the poorest of rural people, oppressed and exploited both by Muslim communalists and by Hindus of the upper castes' (p.118).

Ghosh eloquently summarises the events at Morichjhapi in 1979 through Nilima's narrative. His fictional representation of the event keeps very close to what actually happened, and he has successfully shown the various ways in which Morichjhapi was markedly different from other refugee settlements. The refugees there were trebly displaced people – they had moved from East Pakistan to West Bengal, from West Bengal to Madhya Pradesh and then again from Madhya Pradesh to the Sunderbans. Yet in Morichjhapi they had found a place where they were no longer at the mercy of the local people or even the government, initially. They found vast tracts of free land in the Sunderbans and created a world of their own. However, the refugees coming to the tide country was premised on a false assumption – they chose this place because they thought that the new Left Government in West Bengal would sympathise with their cause.

'Who are these people, I wondered, who love animals so much that they are willing to kill us for them?'

Actually, the government falling short of the expectations of the refugees – not being able to meet their needs or not being sympathetic to their problems – was not a new story in West Bengal. But what happened in 1979, the way they were forcibly evicted from the island, was a gross betrayal by the Left.

As Prafulla Chakrabarti demonstrates in his classic, *The Marginal Men: The Refugees and the Left Political Syndrome in West Bengal* (1990),⁹ there was a symbiotic relationship between the refugee movement and Left Politics in West Bengal in the early years of Independence. In fact, the political ascendancy of the left in West Bengal owes a great deal to the refugees and their struggles for rehabilitation in the 1950s.

Chakrabarti argues that the Communists provided the refugees with leadership in their struggle for rehabilitation, and in return, the refugees became the striking arm of the Communists, providing them with the mass support which enabled them to entrench themselves in the city of Calcutta, and later, catapulted them to power. But in 1979, in a most ironic and tragic turn of events, the Left Front Government in West Bengal was turning against the very cause which it had championed for over two decades and which had been key in bringing it to power.



The refugees at Morichjhapi showed initiative and organisation in their attempt to build a new life. To borrow a phrase from Nilanjana Chatterjee's well-known essay on East Bengali refugees, theirs was 'a lesson in survival.'¹⁰

And they put to rest, once and for all, the false stereotyping that had gained currency in official discourse against the so-called 'non-enterprising, lazy, parochial' East Bengali refugees (contrasted with their solid, hard-working, self-respecting West Punjabi counterparts).

The *Hungry Tide's* protagonist Nirmal writes of the refugee initiatives in his diary:

'Salt pans had been created, tubewells had been planted, water had been dammed for the rearing of fish, a bakery had started up, boat-builders had set up workshops, a pottery had been founded as well as an ironsmith's shop; there were people making boats while others were fashioning nets and crablines; little marketplaces, where all kinds of goods were being sold, had sprung up. All this in the space of a few months! It was an astonishing spectacle – as though an entire civilization had sprouted suddenly in the mud' (p.192).

But even while the Morichjhapi refugees gave shape to their dream, their feet were firmly planted on the ground. They tried, as far as possible, to be self-reliant, but at the same time they were conscious of the need to garner social and political support for their work. To this end the refugees held a feast, and invited dignitaries to the island to see their enterprises first hand. On the face of it, it proved to be a great success. It is interesting that the group actively sought the support of the establishment. But they were cheated. In the novel, Ghosh shows that the big shots who came from Calcutta, despite their lofty speeches, actually already knew that these settlers would eventually be evicted.

But the settlers at Morichjhapi, trebly displaced as they were, proved to be a defiant lot. Till their last breath, they fought the injustice of the government. And in the very last phase of their struggle, when they were being forcibly evicted by a 1500-strong police-force (who were specifically deployed for the purpose), their battle-cry became:

'Amra kara? Bastuhara. Morichjhapi chharbona'
'Who are we? We are the dispossessed. We'll not leave Morichjhapi, do what you may.'

Hearing this, Nirmal remarks in the novel:

'Standing on the deck of the bhotbhoti, I was struck by the beauty of this. Where else could you belong, except in the place you refused to leave' (p.254).

The refugees' case was also unique in another respect – in that it was intimately linked up with an environmental issue. For the

rehabilitation debate, in their case, basically boiled down to the question: what is more important – conserving forests for animals or allowing humans to live?¹¹

In *The Hungry Tide*, Ghosh uses the testimony of a Morichjhapi settler and victim, Kusum – as told to Nirmal during the final phase of the islander's clash with the police – to articulate the peculiar predicament of the Morichjhapi refugees:

The worst part was... to sit here, helpless, with hunger gnawing at our bellies and listen to the policemen say...

'This island has to be saved for its trees, it has to be saved for its animals... it is a part of a reserve forest, it belongs to a project to save tigers...'

Who are these people, I wondered, who love animals so much that they are willing to kill us for them? (pp.262-63)

While I have sought to demonstrate the distinctness of the Morichjhapi settlers and their experience from that of the other refugees who sought shelter in West Bengal, their trajectory covers all the important phases of refugee influx into West Bengal (until 1979) and the accompanied problems of rehabilitation. In fact, with their experience, they trace the curve of West Bengal politics (*vis-a-vis* refugee rehabilitation) from 1947-79.

In his earlier novels, Ghosh dealt with some of the major phases of refugee influx into West Bengal and their immediate and long-term consequences for the state. In a way, all of them come together in *The Hungry Tide*. For, the history of the Morichjhapi incident can be traced back to all of these phases: starting with the original refugees from Bangladesh (1947), who were resettled first in West Bengal (1947-late '50s), then moved to Dandakaranya (in 1961), from where they escaped and came to the Sunderbans (1978) only to become the victims of state-sponsored violence a year later (1979).

The un-preparedness and inadequacy of the state government to deal with the deluge from the east, their subsequent plans to rehabilitate the refugees from East Pakistan elsewhere in the country, the monumental failure of that plan in Dandakaranya, the final effort of the refugees to rehabilitate themselves in the Sunderbans, and the unexpected reprisal from the new Left Front Government – all of this can be traced through their experiences.

The Morichjhapi massacre is but one aspect of a wonderfully rich and complex text. But it is very significant in that it reflects the wider experiences of Bengali Hindu refugees in the subcontinent. And through it, following on from what he started in *The Shadow Lines* (though in a much more direct way), Ghosh draws our attention to the aftermath of partition on the Bengal border.

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Notes

1. Singh, Khushwant. 1956. (1988) *Train to Pakistan*. New Delhi: Ravi Dayal.
2. Baldwin, Shauna Singh. 1999. *What the Body Remembers*. Canada: Vintage.
3. See 'Introduction' to Bagchi, Jasodhara & Subhoranjan Dasgupta (eds.) 2003. *The Trauma and the Triumph: Gender and Partition in Eastern India*. Kolkata: Stree.
4. There is a detailed discussion of this much-neglected aspect of the administrative consequences of the Partition of 1947 in Joya Chatterjee's 'Right or Charity? The Debate over Relief and Rehabilitation in West Bengal, 1947-50' in *The Partitions of Memory: The Afterlife of the Division of India*, edited by Suvir Kaul. (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2001).
5. Chatterjee explores this theme in great detail in her book, *The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India, 1947-1967*. 2007. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Ghosh, Amitav. 1988. *The Shadow Lines*. New Delhi: Ravi Dayal.
7. Ghosh, Amitav. 2004. *The Hungry Tide*. New Delhi: Ravi Dayal.
8. Kudaisya, Gyanesh. 2000. 'Divided landscapes, fragmented identities: East Bengal refugees and their rehabilitation in India, 1947-79', in Kudaisya, Gyanesh & Tai Yong Tan (eds.), *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia* (Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia), 156. London & New York: Routledge.
9. Chakraborty, Prafulla. 1990. *The Marginal Men: The Refugees and the Left Political Syndrome in West Bengal*. Kalyani: Lumière Books.
10. Chatterjee, Nilanjana. 1992. *Midnight's Unwanted Children: East Bengali Refugees and the Politics of Rehabilitation*. Brown University.
11. For a discussion of this aspect of the novel, see Mondal, Anshuman. 2007. *Amitav Ghosh*, 176-178. Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press.




Fig. 3 (above right)
The Sunderbans.

American wars, French borders

Thailand's acrimonious adjacency to Cambodia (Part 1)

The end-games to two tremendous historical conflicts in Cambodia have lately gained the sporadic notice of the international press: the small-scale war on the Thai-Khmer border, and the legal proceedings against a number of former Communist leaders. In the reporting, some historical facts have been repeated out of context, with distortive results. In the first of two articles Eisel Mazard argues that the intersecting causes of these two conflicts are to be found in American support for Cambodian Communism without which neither the history nor the present can be understood.

Eisel Mazard

Royalists under Communist patronage

The timeline of American support for the forces that became infamous under the unofficial name of the 'Khmer Rouge' is one of the least known matters of fact in Asia's history. I was spurred to research the matter more thoroughly due to the lack of any firm date stated in the new introduction to Vickery, 1999 – a text that I found too vague in alluding to the advent of this US policy decision (p. vii, cf. 308).

The precise answer is not a secret, and never has been. Many of the prevalent misconceptions seem to have no source other than Shawcross, 1979, a book that attempts to foist moral responsibility for the Khmer Rouge onto China (op. cit., 387).

On the contrary, the origin of one of history's strangest alliances is to be found in another, perhaps even stranger: China supported King Sihanouk consistently from the mid-1950s forward, to the exclusion of any support or sympathy for the Khmer Rouge. The latter remained without Chinese patronage until they joined forces with Sihanouk, following the *coup d'état* of 1970.

Sihanouk's relationship with Beijing did not formally originate in the misalliances of the Geneva agreements of 1954, but seems to have emerged soon thereafter. The strong personal friendship between Sihanouk and both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai dates from 1955-6 (Basu, 1987, p. 17).

The mutual respect these leaders held for one another would endure for decades. As early as 1956, Sihanouk's interest in drawing 'neutral' (Royalist) Cambodia ever closer to China was explicitly stated in terms of an alliance against Vietnamese encroachment upon the smaller country.

China's apprehension of an independent and Soviet-aligned Vietnam (some 20 years before this was to eventuate) can only be understood in the context of the over-arching Sino-Soviet hostility that dominated foreign policy in that era. Mao's own son had recently died in Korea because the Soviets did not provide expected aerial support in combat (to deter American bombing); the possibility of a pan-Communist alliance had died with him. The Korean War demonstrated that Soviet priorities were in Eastern Europe, looking West.

By contrast, the priority that Mao placed on his support for Sihanouk was demonstrated in 1966 when China refused to receive Cambodian refugees (including members of parliament) fleeing the latest wave of brutal repression against leftists. Given the recent memory of the 1963 massacre of some 90%



Photography by Willem Paling.

of Cambodian People's Party members, this refusal must have been keenly felt (Basu, 1987, p. 11).

The Cambodian Communists did learn from the experience: the only way they would gain Chinese support was to subordinate themselves to Royalist leadership, and this is precisely what they did in 1970. At that late date the PRC first began to support the Khmer Rouge, but only as a subsidiary part of the 'government in exile' allied against the dictatorship of Lon Nol, led by Sihanouk, and based in Beijing.

Communism under American patronage

Lon Nol's ejection of Sihanouk is often casually reported to have been a CIA plot; this begins to seem less likely when we consider that the Soviets actively tried to court Lon Nol's favour following his takeover and that the US was already negotiating with China to 'betray' him in 1971. In a career marred by lies, it is possible that Nixon was stating the truth when he protested that 'Lon Nol's coup came as a complete surprise to us. We neither encouraged it nor knew about it in advance' (Nixon, 1985, 117). In any case, neither the US nor China were pleased with the results.

1971 seems to be the first year when an explicit anti-Vietnamese policy is attested by extant Khmer Rouge materials (Bizot, 2004, 113; Vickery, 1999, 215). Despite underlying ethnic tensions, such a policy would not make much sense before they had gained Chinese patronage, which came with an anti-Vietnamese agenda as its necessary proviso.

In the same year, Henry Kissinger arrived in China to negotiate an alliance largely defined by the two countries' common hostility toward the North Vietnamese. This entailed the immediate withdrawal of US troops from Taiwan and the eventual inclusion of the PRC in the UN.

The stipulation that the Americans would support the Khmer Rouge was sealed in mid-June of 1973 (finalising the negotiations initiated in 1971), two years before 'the fall of Phnom Penh' to Communist troops in '75, and six years before the Vietnamese invasion to drive them out. The latter is often falsely stated as the justification for American support for Cambodian Communism (e.g., Kiernan, 1996, 384-5). Nixon himself was evidently proud of this pact, leaving the historical record without any ambiguity:

"Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai also wanted to prevent a North Vietnamese victory in Indochina. China wanted closer relations with the United States to counter increasing hostility from the Soviet Union. Therefore, it was directly contrary to Peking's interests for Moscow's clients in Hanoi... to achieve hegemony in Indochina... We had the elements necessary to strike a deal. We had significant influence over Lon Nol. China could pull the strings of the Cambodian Communists. Sihanouk... the nominal head of the opposition forces, would listen to Zhou's council. We soon put together a plan ...Sihanouk and Khmer Rouge forces would settle the war in exchange for an end to our bombing".

Source: (Nixon, 1985, 176-7)

The one aspect of Nixon's summary that seems disingenuous is the suggestion that his offer to end the bombing was somehow crucial to securing the subordination of the Khmer Rouge to Sihanouk's 'nominal' leadership. During these negotiations, Nixon was already in violation of the Congressional Order of Jan. 2nd, 1973 to end all military operations in Indochina (excepting withdrawal) inspiring another, more explicit bill (passed the same June) to stop all funds for bombing of any kind, effective August 15th.

Peace means war by other means

Although he hardly tells his own story in such terms, Nixon had been negotiating from a position of weakness. Congress had even refused to fund his proposed 'enforcement' of the Paris peace accords (with \$1.45 billion in overt military aid, plus something like 1973's total of \$2.27 billion of supposed non-military aid to South Vietnam) and he was left with no choice but to withdraw in defeat, or else continue the war by other means (Nixon, 165-6; 186; 188).

In effect, both would transpire. The alliance with China allowed America's war to continue through other channels, though almost all of the decision-makers who sealed the pact died or fell from power soon thereafter. Nixon resigned in '74, while both Mao and Zhou died in '76. The preparations for the proxy war they agreed upon continued without them, but the importance of these personal relationships remained evident in all that ensued.

The last attempt at averting a Sino-Vietnamese war over the control of Cambodia was negotiated by Zhou Enlai's widow;

on her return from Phnom Penh in 1978, Beijing declared Cambodia the victim of Vietnamese aggression. (Basu, 53-4) This remained their justification for supporting Pol Pot's troops on the ground through to the 1990s. (Zhu, 1990, 426-442) Sihanouk continued living like a king under Beijing's patronage despite the categorical change in political circumstances, likely because of the halo he retained from his personal relations with Mao (certainly not on the basis of his ability to command or control the Khmer Rouge).

China had portentously occupied the Paracel Islands in January, 1974. In preparation for the war to come, large-scale purges of (perceived) pro-Vietnamese elements within the Khmer Rouge were well underway in 1975. There were armed confrontations on both the Sino-Vietnamese border and the Khmer-Viet border in 1978, prior to the declaration of the 'Salvation Front' (KUFNS) to liberate Cambodia from Pol Pot's rule in December of the same year.

China's large-scale invasion of Vietnam might originally have been planned in support of a Cambodian resistance that had, astoundingly, already collapsed a month before. Nobody could have expected the Vietnamese victory to follow as rapidly as it did, but the widespread starvation and atrocities that have since made the Khmer Rouge infamous also eroded domestic support for their side and decimated their capacity to sustain a war. Basu observes that the invasion that did eventuate (February 17th, 1979) served to protest against (or deter) Heng Samrin's signing of the Friendship Treaty (on February 18th) that clearly aligned Cambodia's new government with Vietnam (Basu, 77).

As Vietnam's victory was already *fait accompli*, it must have been something of an embarrassment that the conference to assemble all of China and America's allies (79 nations in total) to declare their unanimous support for Pol Pot could not be organised until July, 1981 (Zhu, 1990, 426-442).

By this time, what the UN was alleging to be Cambodia's 'legitimate government' was a scattered guerilla army with a tenuous connection to the deposed king speechifying in Beijing, but already legendary for their brutality and sheer numbers of civilian casualties.



The diplomatic difficulty of directly referring to Pol Pot as America's ally was evaded with the creation of a new acronym in 1982: 'CGDK' would thenceforth serve as the polite code-word for bankrolling and arming the Khmer Rouge.

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Part two of this article will be published in *the Newsletter*, #52. November 2009.

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Dances with an Indian 'tribe'



A fondness for dancing and beer is an attribute often referred to whenever 'tribes' of India are culturally distinguished from the general Indian population, rooted in vague ethnographic traits dating back to colonial times. Markus Schleiter endeavours to counter these essentialisations with a narrative ethnographic account of a dance night with the Birhor 'Tribe'.

Markus Schleiter

I BEGIN WITH A CAVEAT: The example of the Birhor dance night is meant to focus on transgressions of cultural ideas, but it still requires an awake and intrigued readership, as dancing and drinking remain a firm part of the proceedings! It starts with Lugu Murmu, an inhabitant of the settlement, confirming generalisations about Birhor culture: "From the beginning we Birhor dance every week at our dancing place."

The joy can be seen in Lugu's face as he talks to Shyam and me about the evening to come. Shyam is a friend of mine and lives two hours from here. Lugu continues his description: "We Birhor work hard and go to the forest. That's why we drink and dance every week from Tuesday onwards. Today we will dance all night! Come on, let's go and have rice-beer"

"From the beginning we Birhor dance every week at our dancing place."

We are ambling through the settlement, passing small houses, all of equal size. Most of the houses are in a tumble-down condition, covered by a rusty corrugated sheet roof. The Indian government built them 13 years ago. Almost all of the 70 inhabitants are sitting around outside of their houses, which are piled up on two sandy roads. A girl is calling me in a loud voice: "Shall we dance?" I answer, as it was taught to me: "We will dance!" A few metres ahead, a creaky voice emanates from within a group of old women: "Do learn our language, we will not be able to understand you otherwise. Who else will listen to you, apart from us?"

Today was market-day in Jashipur, a small town in the Indian state of Orissa, situated on National Highway 6 from Kolkata to Mumbai. Many of the Birhor walked 10 kilometres to the market place in order to sell their products. The settlement itself is sited in the midst of rice-fields, verdant following the rainy season. Lugu is around 25 years of age. He is married and father to a daughter and a son. He lives from the 'traditional' occupation of the Birhor, which is crafting ropes from a bark. In the coming two days he will not work. Today his wife has sold all his ropes, and bought rice and vegetables for the week.

Dance night

Gradually it becomes dark, only the moon illuminates the village. Crickets are chirping around us in the night. It is one of those rare moments when academics can forget about postmodernity and enjoy the 'life in the woods-feeling'. Many people are sitting in front of their houses and are singing or talking to each other loudly. More and more people are gathering at the dance square, where the two routes of this settlement intermingle. Some visitors from the neighbouring villages have joined the occasion.

Photography courtesy of the author.

The young men of the Santal, in particular, enjoy the Birhor's dance nights. Furthermore, the young women of another Birhor settlement, 30 kilometres away, have been invited this time. Gobora, a good friend of mine here, is leaving us: "I am suffering from headaches. I will go to bed early, so I will be fine tomorrow." I have never seen him dancing. At this moment five girls, standing up together, start to sing a song in a high pitch: "Too much mud, too much water on the way, Young woman, I will come with you, Ask your mother, ask your father, Young woman, I will come with you".

Some of the young men assemble in a group and repeat the verse of the song they just heard. After that the girls begin a new verse, which is again repeated by the boys. Lugu explains to me: "This is a Birhor song. Will you dance now?" Adivasi, this is his name, picks up his hand drum and gives the beat. Slowly he paces up and down the dance square. All the dancers join their hands behind their backs and move in a long bent row. Lugu joins me in-between two young girls – for the most part men and women alternate in the row – and I fail in my attempts to try to imitate the rhythms and steps. Nevertheless, everybody seems to be happy that the guest is dancing with them. The song ends a few minutes later. Lugu turns to me: "Now, we will sing a new song. That's again a Birhor song."

Anthropological enquiries

The next morning, Shyam and I decide to write down the Birhor songs we heard. "Gobora, do you know the lyrics of Birhor songs?" "I don't know them, you could ask Lugu or Ranjen." Armed with a pencil and a notebook, we search for them. "Ranjen, we want to write down song lyrics. Could you help us." "Just now I have to get a drink. Give me a few rupees for a rice-beer. Only then will I be able to sing."

So we negotiate the fee of ten rupees and Ranjen goes to fetch two bottles of rice-beer. A small boy approaches us. I ask him for his name. "My name is Officer." Astonished, I turn to Lugu and Shyam. "It's really his name. He was born at the moment when the officer in charge of the settlements' development was here." From afar we hear engine noises. Three well-dressed men are arriving on two motorbikes. The eldest could be 50 years old, the other two are around 25. The former introduces himself to me as an anthropologist from the state capital Bhubaneswar. He has come here to survey a governmental literacy programme. I feel relieved that he arrived at the moment I began, with my pencil and notebook in my hand – which is befitting for a serious anthropologist – to write down Birhor culture. My only fear is that Ranjen will return with the rice-beer. Drinking alcohol is held in utter contempt at Indian universities. However, there is no need to worry. Ranjen comes back without the beer. The anthropologist from Bhubaneswar is now placing himself in front of some inhabitants of the settlements. He holds a small, colourful booklet in his hand. It is a new writing course for rural Orissa. The man talks in a loud voice for some time, while looking straight towards the mountains. His arms are moving in a determined way. The few people sitting around do not give the impression that they are directing any attention to the talk; nobody feels the



urge to interrupt him. He concludes by asking if anybody has seen the booklet before. It should be available throughout Orissa. Nobody knows about it. When the anthropologists have left, an hour later, I tell Ranjen that I was worried about the beer bottles. He grins to me: "Don't worry, I heard the motorbikes. I kept the beer further back." Quickly he retrieves the bottles and the work can start. We ask Ranjen and Lugu to tell us the lyrics of Birhor songs. "I do not know any Birhor songs." "But Lugu, yesterday you sang a lot of such Birhor songs, you told us." "No, those were songs of the Santal. I said that only because we Birhor danced to them yesterday. The Birhor have always moved from place to place, so, we have always learned the songs of the other tribes." "Ranjen", now confused, I continued to ask, "this means you do not sing your own songs?" "No, I don't know any Birhor songs, either. There are a lot of visitors here. We sometimes learn their songs."

There are no Birhor songs, I ponder. Nobody knows a Birhor song. But, why worry? In regard to cultural theory it is even more inspiring to write on a tribe without a tradition of its own songs. Perfect. I ask Shyam if he knows the Santal songs we heard yesterday.

"There is no doubt that the language of the songs is Santali, but we don't sing our songs like that. Santal songs are poetic, but here they repeat only a few lines. They sing very inaccurately."

It took one and a half years before somebody would sing 'traditional' Birhor songs to me. These songs included words of the Ho and Birhor languages.

"These are our old songs, we have always sung them", explains an old woman to me. "From where do you know them?" "From where do you know your songs? Our parents and grand parents sang them for us."



How do you write about an Indian 'tribe'?

In ethnographic writing on the Birhor 'tribe' from 1888 their dances are mentioned as part of their tradition. However, in contrast to my account, most ethnographers – for example, through describing culture persistently in the third person – created the impression that their culture is unchanging. As such, the Birhor were depicted as relics of a 'timeless' premodernity and, as a consequence, are regarded as unable to cope with the present. State officials blame the failure of development measurements, as well as the Birhors' poverty, on their cultural inability. Instead, my account shows culture as transgressable and in process and, moreover, breaks with representations of members of a 'tribe' being subordinated to officials. Admittedly, however, while one could think about abandoning the category 'tribe' as a whole, I continue to depict the Birhor as a distinguishable group. In doing so, I might even be accused of bringing 'tribal' representations into vogue and to a postmodern audience. Given also that 'tribal' difference is an affirmative category – one which Birhor people partially benefit from – the above celebrations of fragmented and (un)cultural songs are suggested as a state-of-the-art attempt to transfer 'tribal' ideas into the nearby future.

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Notes

I am grateful to Fritz Thyssen Stiftung for generously funding my ongoing research.


In memory of Lugu Murmu (35), who was admitted to Jashipur Hospital with suspected malaria and tuberculosis on 24th October 2008 and died there in the early hours of the following morning.



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Celebrating life and longings Bollywood dancing in Amsterdam



One of the most vigorous and exciting arenas for linguistic change and innovation is within immigrant communities, and the 160,000-strong Surinamese-Hindustani community in the Netherlands is positioned within a multilingual Europe, a continent still coming to terms with the racial tensions inherent in a multilingual population with cultural pluralism. Dipika Mukherjee has studied the women of this community and shares her findings with regard to language maintenance and loss and also the obstacles they face as they try to define their identity and their place in the Indian diaspora.

Dipika Mukherjee

IT IS PAST SEVEN IN THE EVENING in a community centre in Amsterdam. Cars are jammed into the tiny parking lot; some are double-parked. Inside, a female singer is belting out loud raunchy lyrics through a CD:

*Na gilaf, na lihaf, thandi hawa bhi khilaf sasurreel...
No blanket, no quilt, the freezing wind is a bitch!...*

*Bidi Jalaile Jigar Se Piya, Jigar Maa Badi Aag Hain...
Light your cigarette with my heart, beloved, I'm on fire...*

The song, titled *Bidi Jalaile*, is from the Bollywood movie *Omkara* (2006). This rustic, suggestive song featured as an 'item-number' in Bollywood parlance, which means that the dance was very sexy. The 14 women in the room are writhing to the beat; most are mouthing the lyrics. The movie was filmed in a dialect of Hindi similar to the language that the Surinamese-Hindustanis speak.

I am observing these women, as well as participating in the class as the singularly most untalented member. How the language identities evolve for women in the Surinamese-Hindustani community, and how their roles play out in the larger Dutch society has been the focus of my sociolinguistic research, but my primary question for this study is: Is the participation in a Bollywood dance class (and the consequent exposure to Hindi) indicative of a re-alignment with their Indian roots?

Background

In recent years, sociolinguistic studies have focused on the study of language as a political and economic entity. The findings have been highly nuanced when immigrant groups are the focus of the study. Researchers have investigated language choice as an expression of anti-racism (Rampton 1995), as covert subversion of the dominant language (Mukherjee 2003; Gal 1994) or as resistance to a dominant social code (Mukherjee & David, 2007; Mukherjee 2006; Miller 2004).

The Surinamese-Hindustani community in the Netherlands is among the Indian Diaspora of 'twice-migrants'. Most are descended from indentured labour recruited to work in Suriname.

The first ship, the *Lalla Rookh*, arrived in Paramaribo on 5th June, 1873, after a three month voyage from Calcutta, carrying 452 labourers, mostly recruited from the Uttar Pradesh area and Bihar. Prior to the independence of Suriname from the Netherlands in 1975, and driven by the threat of the same kind of ethnic violence that characterised the independence of other Caribbean nations, many of the Surinamese-Hindustanis migrated to the Netherlands. In June 2008, the community celebrated 135 years of their immigration history with cultural shows and scholarly speeches in The Hague, much of it celebrating the fact that the children of labourers were now a model minority in their new homeland.

Interest in Bollywood in the Netherlands is well documented (Choenni, 2006; Verstappen & Rutten, 2007). Bollywood movies (*Silsila*, *Hum Tum* among others) have been shot in the Netherlands, a tulip was named after the reigning queen of Bollywood Aishwarya Rai, and the International Indian Film Academy (IIFA) awards in 2005 were held in the Netherlands. There are at least 12 different Bollywood dance institutes scattered all over the country and there is even a new Bollywood Casting Agency based in Eindhoven for people with Bollywood dreams.

There is also a growing interest by mainstream Dutch audiences; the dance instructor mentioned a growing demand for the shows he choreographed for the Holland Casino and the classes at the Kunst Akademie, attended by non-Indian students. He explained:

"Bollywood is about international music. The new songs totally use international music. I think that you need a wide background and you need to learn a lot for this... Sometimes there is flamenco dance, flamenco music, salsa, merengue, even belly dancing..."

I closely observed 22 women enrolled in a single Bollywood dance class held at Daalwijkdreef (in Amsterdam) over a period of 16 months (January 2007 to April 2008). The women did not all consistently participate; some dropped out (especially after the summer break) while others joined midway. The class met every Wednesday for an hour (6-7 in the evening) and the women ranged in age from late 20's to late 40's.

The women enrolled in this class had friends or relatives who took lessons in Bollywood dancing. Few came alone. This dance class seemed to foster a sense of community rather than any sense of personal benefit, and there were no 'divas' in this class, unlike the teenager's class which met an hour earlier and was teasingly titled the *Little Angels*.

Religion did not come up until I interviewed the participants individually, and then I discovered that this class had Muslim, Hindu and Christian women from the Surinamese-Hindustani community.

Hindi vs other Indian languages/dialects

At least four languages are spoken in the daily lives of the members of the Surinamese-Hindustani community in the Netherlands: Sarnami Hindi, Dutch, Standard Hindi and Sranan Tongo. Sarnami Hindi is the main language of communication within the Hindustani community and within Hindustani families (Avoird, 2001).

However, Dutch was clearly the language of communication in this class. During a recording made during a class, there was some singing along in Hindi, as well as the instructor's encouraging *Kya Baat Hai!* (Good job!), but the language of instruction was Dutch. Codemixing, although present, was rare. Here is one recorded example (the Hindi words are in italics, the Dutch in bold):

Instructor: *Anitaji aap thora...snel trein*
(Anita (polite form) you're a bit like...a fast train)
S: **Snel trein?**
(Fast train?)
Instructor: *Ha, aap stop trein banaye zara usko*
(Yes, please make it a slow train)
S: *Thik hai!*
(All right!)

All the participants either expressed a strong desire to improve Hindi or to continue speaking their 'own language'. Although there was a basic understanding of standard Hindi among all participants in the Bollywood Dance class, the fluency varied.

Above: Posters and websites advertising night clubs with Indian music themed nights. Photographs from Madan's Mega Bollywood Dance Show 2008, Hoofddorp. All photographs courtesy of the author.



in the old plays archived in Sarnami House; low class people (prostitutes etc), speak Sarnami, comic parts are also in Sarnami, but the main characters speak in Hindi. It was also interesting to note that night clubs with Indian themed nights were advertised as 'Hindi Nation' and 'Hindi Freakz'.

Longing and belonging: images of home

In this age of global deracination, a sense of belonging can be completely unrelated to any essentialist notion of geophysical space. The women in this community spoke of a sense of feeling Hindustani, but it had no connection with India as a nation. During the interviews with the participants, home was never India; India was associated with poverty, and being 'crowdy': *My husband, his wish is to go to India, uhm, when we were married he suggest to go with honeymoon, and uhm, I don't know why, but India is not attractive to me. Not yet. Not yet.*

Home is sometimes not the Netherlands either; place of birth as well as age at migration is a strong predictor of attitude. The younger the person was at the age of migration, the stronger the ties with the Netherlands. However, the women in my study came to the Netherlands as teenagers or adults and frequently self-identified as 'Hindustani' over the other possible categories 'Dutch' or 'Indian'.

For some, Suriname is as wonderful as the ideal 'home' shown in the Bollywood movies:

Its really nice...you can see in the movies, in Indian movies, someone is going to get married all the food and that...before, in Suriname, it was like all that, the flowers...all the family, they do it, all together.

Suriname was presented as a community idyll in many of the stories I heard. One spoke of a mother-in-law's recovery from a deadly disease once she returned to Suriname and another told me her story of the community celebrating the Muslim tradition of *Qurbani* as one family, no matter how large. There was both regret and loss in these stories.

Life and death

The Surinamese-Hindustani women in the Netherlands are also conflicted by their own sense of who they are and what they can become, especially when faced with the contradictory forces of living within the very liberal cities of this country. There are many areas in which the women's aspirations and self-image do not mesh with that expected by the Surinamese-Hindustani community. This has made the community prone to a very high suicide rate, with women between the ages of 15-24 being at the highest risk. The local government in The Hague has initiated a project in an attempt to address the problems of these women who grow up in two cultures.

The problem is not minor. The statistics for attempted suicides per year, per 1000 girls in The Hague is given below. (source: Epidemiologisch Bulletin 1998, jrg 33, nr4, and 2005, jrg 40, nr 4.)

Suicides in The Hague, per annum, per 1000 girls								
Period/Age	Dutch		Surinamese		Turkish		Moroccan	
	15-19	20-24	15-19	20-24	15-19	20-24	15-19	20-24
1987-1993	2	2.5	7.2	6.7	5.2	3.7	4.1	1.4
2002-2003	2	2.5	4.7	4.5	5.1	7.2	2.3	2

The conflicts that the women face start with societal norms on how females are valued and the emphasis placed on chastity and marriage.

There were similar findings in a Singaporean study on Indian women and suicide (Mehta 1990). In Mehta's study, she looked at a low income group: patients in government hospitals who were predominantly Hindu, and she concluded that the age range between 15-39 was the most stressful period in the lives of the immigrant women, be they first, second or third generation.

The conflicts that the women face start with societal norms on how females are valued and the emphasis placed on chastity and marriage. The following extract is from an unmarried independent career woman, yet she emphasises her mother's chastity and sacrifice in glowing terms: *She had a shop, my father had a shop, like in Suriname you call it a market. Clothes. And she never got married, and she never had a boyfriend and she was young. And that's why, we have something like that's my mother. We need to have respect for her, she did... she gave up her life, just for her 6 daughters so that's why.*

The status of men versus women can significantly differ in this society (Niekerk 1999). There was evidence of this from my data: *Hindustanis there is racism... even in our community, if you are dark oh no, they don't want you for their son, they want a chand ka tukra (a piece of the moon).*

There is also the taboo of exogamous marriage and many constraints on women's movements. The pressures on women

can be more oppressive than on their brothers, leading to despair. The women I interviewed all agreed that there was a problem with suicides in the community:

Once, I was very sad, I was very very sad. I know how these people are, I know that and also my Phua, (aunt) who's working with [suicidal women... she also. And if every single speaker the situation they are in... It's a, the important thing is that the women, they start to learn that they are worth it... I did everything to be out of the situation and to realise what I have... and for what I am and the quality I have and not because I'm married or who's sister, daughter, but who I am.

Some conclusions

It is abundantly clear from this study that despite the hype of Bollywood that is currently prevalent in the Netherlands, there is no desire among the participants I studied to reclaim India as a country. They do not feel the need to re-align with India as a geopolitical entity, but the notion of 'Hindustani-ness' is very dear to them. This notion of Hindustani-ness includes language maintenance, both for transmission to their children and for communication with the elderly of the community. Although the sense of identity is not tied to any specific geographical place, the women studied have a strong sense of self that is distinctive from being only Indian or only Dutch. Although Suriname is perceived as 'home', they realise that there is no going back. There is a strong sense of fellowship within the Surinamese-Hindustani community and respect for its norms.

Although adherence to such a collective group can devalue individual women – leading to depression and despair – these women are the survivors. There is something to be learnt from a sorority such as this, with its sense of sisterhood and solidarity that crosses religious and cultural barriers. Bollywood may merely be the most accessible means for language retention of a familiar tongue; what is most important is that this group is constantly creating its own ways of speaking and thereby redefining their place in the Indian diaspora.

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Interestingly, there was some confusion about the nomenclature of the language used; participants were unwilling to label it as Hindi, Bhojpuri, Sarnami or anything else; most chose to call the language 'our Hindi'.

The desire to speak Hindi or an ethnic language was in order to communicate with the elders in the community, to transmit the language to the children, or to participate in *Baithakgana* (a community question-answer song tradition) and other community cultural events. The easy availability of Indian (Hindi) channels on TV had made it easier for these women to keep in touch with Hindi shows, but music programmes like *Saregamapa* (a Hindi song competition, like the 'American Idol' shows) seemed to be more popular than soap operas.


Women as language bearers is a well established tradition in sociolinguistic research. Researchers have established that men and women differ in their communicative style (Gal, 1994) and that women tend to use language in ways that adhere more rigidly to the standard language for their region while men often lead linguistic change away from –and often in resistance to –the 'standard' language (Mukherjee 2006). Recent studies have also focused on young women's, emergence as leaders of linguistic change (Miller, 2004).

In this community, the women were insistent about the need to teach their children their own language: *Also my Hindi for my children...I'm proud to be a Hindustani and I want them also proud to be a Hindustani, also in Netherlands, I want them to live here and also invite peoples, don't forget their own culture and their own traditions. When I'm walking in Holland, I'm on the street, I'm looking at an old Indian woman, uhm, ask me something, I'm so proud I can talk to her in also in Hindi.*

Hindi was widely regarded as having a status much higher than Sarnami in this community. Standard Hindi is used during religious ceremonies and is regarded more highly than Sarnami Hindi by Hindustanis (Avoird 2001: 29). Researchers in the field decried that Sarnami magazines were decreasing in popularity, as is the written literature. Most interestingly, a community leader explained that Sarnami's relative low status can be seen

A trip to Amnye Machen

The diary of Joseph F. Rock



Emilia Sulek

Few Westerners have been to Golok. Many have contributed to its bad reputation. Nomads of what today is Golok Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in China's Qinghai Province, were, over decades of Western attempts to explore Tibet, portrayed as bandits and outlaws. Reading travelogues of Western travellers, who describe the dangers of meeting with Golok brigands, it becomes clear that few have ever really encountered any Golok or their territories. One man who did was Joseph F. Rock (1884-1962), a botanist working for Harvard's Arnold Arboretum. Emilia Sulek delves into Rock's diaries.

'What a secluded and lonely existence in this most isolated and inaccessible spot.'

JOSEPH F. ROCK IS A SCHOLAR remembered, principally, for his studies on the writing and belief systems of the Naxi people of China's Yunnan Province. Travelling through the eastern reaches of the Tibetan Plateau, it is hard to find a place that Rock did not visit or did not plan to include in his itineraries one day. A few years ahead of the journey described in Rock's diary, George Pereira, a British Military Attaché to Beijing, set off on a trip to Lhasa. He is famous as one of the first Westerners to see the peaks of the Amnye Machen mountain range in Golok, and he estimated that they are over 7000m high (GJ 1923: 125). Having read this account of the unknown mountains, in 1926 Rock decided to go and measure them himself, and collect botanic specimens for his Arboretum. In 2003 a diary from this trip along with selected letters Rock sent to America were published by Hartmut Walravens in his book, *Joseph Franz Rock. Expedition zum Amnye Machen in Südwest-China im Jahre 1926.* (Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden).

Fig. 1 (above)
The once unoccupied Amnye valley is now home to the Snowland Nomad Girls' school. Photograph courtesy of author.

This book is important for several reasons. First, it gives information about places that Rock visited in Tibet, including the monasteries of Labrang, Tsangar and Ragya and the great expanses of grassy highlands stretching from Labrang to Golok. Some of these descriptions are so detailed that one could use them instead of a map. Take, for example, his description of the road from Ragya at the Machu or Yellow River to the lands of the Yonzhi tribe:

'To our right cliffs of red conglomerate such as are found back of Ragya. These cliffs culminate into a tall, rocky, red bluff a little distance ahead. This promontory crowned by a few juniper trees is called Ge-tho and is the mountain god of the Ja-za clan. At its base, on the left of the trail, is an Obo, a conglomeration of sticks and rocks where the clan burns its incense to the mountain god of Ge-tho' (p.108).¹

Fig. 2 (below)
Obo (collection of sticks and rocks where the clan burns its incense to the gods) at the foot of Amnye Keto mountain which Rock writes of in his diary. Photograph courtesy of the author.

The view of the obo (or *laptse* as Tibetans call it) and the mountain, popularly called Amnye Keto, is unchanged. Only the valley is not as empty as it was during Rock's expedition. Today it houses the Snowland Nomad Girls' School. Given that the road from Ragya to Dawu was destroyed in 2008 due to the construction of an expressway, this alternative route described by Rock could save modern travellers much time and effort.

Rock's expedition to Golok was not the most propitious, to say the least. Botanical findings disappointed him. He was unable to approach Amnye Machen due to the area being criss-crossed by a network of intertribal feuds, and finding a guide willing to cross the conflicted territories was impossible:

'It is exceedingly difficult to move about here as each tribe is at feud

with the other, and one does not dare go into the territory of the other' (pp.102-103).

Even though Rock did not dwell long among the nomads of Golok, he is a valuable source of information on them. Many of the names he mentions in the diary are appearing for the first and only time in Western literature. Also significant is that Rock recognises that the area is home to a number of tribes that don't fall under the 'Golok' label for linguistic, historical and complex cultural reasons. These groups see themselves as distinct, only sharing the place they live with the Goloks. This was the case with the Yonzhi tribe, attacked by the Ma clan's armies in the decades following Rock's arrival. In one of the battles Yonzhi Aba, the tribe's chief, was killed. 'They acknowledge no authority, pay no taxes and are absolutely a law unto themselves' (p.110), Rock says. The Ma's incursions were indeed about the Yonzhis refusal to pay taxes. Rock's people passed through the valley where the tribe's chief was encamped. A foreign traveller who searched for plants in the highlands is remembered by today's Yonzhi chief. A man in his eighties, he was born around the time when Rock was trying to get to Amnye Machen.

A reader that knows Rock's most famous book, *The Amnye Machen Range and Adjacent Regions. A Monographic Study* (1956), might argue that the information in Rock's diary repeats itself on the pages of his Amnye Machen magnum opus. Why then should one bother to read these passages again? The diary formed the basis for Rock's future writing – the Amnye Machen book, and popular articles for *National Geographic Magazine* (c.f. Rock 1930). Rock felt an urge to share his knowledge with the public, but the diary he wrote largely for himself. Rock's diary is better written than the Amnye Machen book. It is interesting to see how he evaluated his fieldnotes, censored himself and transformed his informal discourse with himself into a more formal one with the readers.

During his days in Tibet, Rock encountered all the problems that a scholar on a field trip can face. Many travellers to Tibet lacked good interpreters. Rock seemed to have worked with a good one, a missionary from Labrang, William E. Simpson. However, Rock complained:

'I have learned this lesson that missionary business cannot be carried out in conjunction with a scientific expedition. (...) While he [Simpson] is kind and good hearted and willing in many ways, firmness is absolutely lacking in him; its place is taken by too much brotherly love and sweet words while these ruffians here look upon such conduct as becoming to a silly woman and not to a man' (p.106).

Rock's diary reveals that he was often unnerved by his caravan men's laid-back attitude, and it is clear he had financial problems – his letters in the second part of Walravens' book show how Rock's situation was similar to that of today's scholars' dependent on grants and university funds. Finally, Rock's explorations were affected by China's state of political

flux. Rock did not hide his dislike for the rising Communists. In one letter he informs:

'I'm sorry to report that even little Choni situated on the edge of nowhere has been ordered by Lanchou to hoist the Red flag. (...) and so we are truly under a Red regime, but the prince has little love for the Reds as I have' (p.219).

In another letter he promises:

'I can definitely say that if I ever get out alive, China will see me no more, or rather never again' (p.176).

In fact, Rock stayed much longer. He shared the fears that many a fieldworker has on the way home:

'I dread the idea of the lonely life in an American city. I am afraid I shall be much more lonely in America than here in this lovely wilderness' (p.219).

Rock's diaries show more the more human face of a person that, for many, might have seemed slightly 'inhuman' given his famous preference for European food served on fine china with a linen table-cloth and napkins. Something he only gave up under the most dire circumstances. He played arias of Enrico Caruso to the nomads he met on his way. 'They screamed with laughter at the most pathetic passages', Rock commented (p.36). He could be an archetype for Werner Herzog's *Fitzcarraldo* who dreamt of building an opera house in the city of Iquitos, Peru. Just like the protagonist in Herzog's film, Rock dressed smartly, and liked to wear a shirt, a neck-tie and jacket to meet the local chieftains. In a photo showing him with the prince of Choni he looks as fresh and pressed as if it was taken in a photo atelier on some chic American or European boulevard. However, Rock wasn't always as composed and self-contented as it might have seemed. A story related by William Simpson explains the reasons why their expedition to Amnye Machen was cut short. One day Rock was annoyed by the smoke from some nomads' juniper offerings. He lost his temper and kicked the fire apart. The nomads were enraged, and only Simpson's intervention saved Rock's life, so the story goes.² Eventually Rock was forced to say farewell to his dream of approaching the mountain. His only compensation was believing that the land he travelled through had not been trod by other Westerners. Indeed, in his writings he constantly claims to be the first in this *terra incognita* of Golok.

Aside from being an invaluable anthropological source, the value of Rock's diary lies also in its capturing of the poverty of the human condition during such arduous explorations. It's clear from his writings that Rock found himself, at times, to be lost in the world he tried to research, another world, parallel to his own, but unknown.

'Today I feel as if I had enough of this life, I long for home and a fireside, a cozy corner, an armchair and good books; but alas I must sally forth into the unknown (...). Let the weather do its worst, snow, blot out this miserable bleak landscape, and let me sleep and forget the worries and hardships and the loneliness of life! [Still better would my sleep continue and merge into that unconscious sleep from which there is no awakening]' (p.27).

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Notes

1. Except when otherwise indicated the numbers refer to pages of Walravens' book.
2. The story according to Robert Carlson of Wheaton, IL. I owe my thanks to Ray Smith for providing me with it. Another version of the Rock-Simpson cooperation holds that Rock sent his interpreter back to Labrang after only five days of travelling together (Sutton 1974: 135).

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Social capital to alleviate poverty

Fisheries cooperatives in southern Sri Lanka

Social capital is a resource small-scale fishers can draw upon to cope with vulnerability. Fisheries cooperatives in the south of Sri Lanka have provided assistance to fishers to secure the required livelihood capitals and deal effectively with inadequately developed markets and other shocks. If fishers can secure the required livelihood capitals through cooperation, this will have a positive impact on poverty alleviation. However, the impact on resource health still remains uncertain.

Oscar Amarasinghe

FISHING IS A RISKY ACTIVITY. The risks stem from various sources. In respect of marine fishing, the open access nature of the resources involved is itself problematic. The high unpredictability of catches is another source of risk, as is the seasonality of fish. Fishers operate in a hazardous environment and confront the risk of death, injury and damage to craft and gear. Even the 'product' itself is problematic – the fish are highly perishable and must be sold or preserved immediately after harvesting. In order to secure the better prices usually afforded to fresh fish, fishermen must dispose of their landings quickly, even though this often means dependence on fish merchants and middlemen who possess much better market knowledge and usually enjoy strong market power. Aside from the above, which are intrinsic to fisheries, there are other shocks (civil disturbances, storms, changes in sea conditions) and trends (declining resource health, globalisation and changes in the rate of return, increasing cost of living) which add to the uncertainties in fisheries.

Risks affect livelihoods. The coping capacity of the individual will determine the impact of risk on his livelihood. This brings us to the concepts of vulnerability, coping and resilience. We consider vulnerability to be 'the probability of one's livelihood being affected by a certain risk or stress'. The higher this probability is, the higher the likelihood of falling into distress (negative impact on livelihoods). Therefore, people develop mechanisms to respond to and recover from such stresses – which we define as coping and resilience. If a person's access to livelihood capitals are limited, he will have less coping mechanisms available to him to respond and recover from shocks. This is the context in which small-scale marine fishers in Southern Sri Lanka operate.

Limited access to livelihood capitals

Vulnerable people combine an array of livelihood capitals – financial, human, social, physical and natural capital – to develop livelihood strategies, to cope and recover from shocks. Many fishing villages in southern Sri Lanka are isolated enclaves and fishers' access to good educational and training institutions is restricted. Procuring physical capital, in the form of mechanised crafts and gear, is also difficult, due to the capital bias of modern technology. Financial capital, such as credit and insurance, is probably the hardest of all livelihood capitals to come by in rural coastal communities engaged in small scale fisheries.

Fishers need credit in order to purchase fishing equipment, meet repair and replacement costs, for consumption and to meet social obligations. In respect of formal credit, fishers are at a serious disadvantage because their assets (their crafts and gear) are not acceptable to formal lenders because they entail collateral-specific risks (liable to damage and loss). Informal lenders are less discerning about types of collateral, yet fishers are reluctant to borrow from them due to the exorbitantly high interest rates, and the high probability of losing fishing or other assets kept as collateral. Alternative forms of lending have evolved, such as the craft owners lending money to crew, or fish merchants lending to fisher 'producers', both of which lead to long term 'bondage' to the lender.

Due to the highly fluctuating and unpredictable nature of fish catches and the hazardous nature of the marine environment, fishermen are likely to confront two types of shocks: idiosyncratic shocks and aggregate shocks. Both phenomena impact food entitlements of fishing households and both affect consumption of fishermen to a varying degree. A fisher's ability to cope with various shocks determines his vulnerability position. The higher the risks, the higher will be the demand for coping mechanisms. Due to the existence of high informational asymmetries between the insurers and insureds, the emergence of private agents offering insurance is unlikely in the fisheries. Instead, fishers have developed various individual and group mechanisms to cope with shocks and our concern here is with a particular type of group strategy fishers adopt to cope with vulnerability – 'cooperation'.



Fishers operate in a hazardous environment and confront the risk of death, injury and damage to craft and gear.

Cooperatives for coping

It is hard to find one acceptable definition for social capital. However, all social capital theorists stress that 'social networks have value'. They all accept that individuals reap greater rewards from interacting with each other and forming networks than from operating alone. These rewards are achieved through trust, norms (such as reciprocity) and values, all of which shape the behaviour of individuals in a community and elicit beneficial outcomes. Economists recognise the importance of social networks in facilitating social exchange and producing higher economic outcomes. Such networks reduce transaction costs, produce public goods through collective action and generate positive results, such as publicly shared knowledge.

Studies carried out in small-scale fishing communities in southern Sri Lanka showed that fisheries cooperation yielded an important form of social capital for fishers enabling them to cope with vulnerability. Cooperatives provide fishers with access to various livelihood capitals by expanding opportunities for network building and linking social capital.

Fishers access to natural capital was studied by collecting information on catch and effort data from three villages in the Hambantota District of southern Sri Lanka. The following data was collected: maximum sustainable yield; maximum economic yield and open access equilibrium. The results showed that high rates of resource exploitation (higher levels of effort) were evident in fishing villages with well functioning cooperatives. Cooperatives have been successful in providing their membership with equal and easy access to resources, via the provision of fishing equipment, channelling state assistance to the membership, etc. That said, the system has been predominantly welfare-centric and there has been little attention paid to resource sustainability.



All photographs courtesy of the author.

More than half of today's fishers in the south have obtained their craft and gear from the cooperatives, via an array of loan schemes. It's not just fishing equipment that cooperatives supply to members, however, but other types of physical capital too, such as small transport vehicles, and opportunities for other self-employment activities, all of which reveals their multi-purpose character. About half of the fishers in Hambantota (the study area) have obtained loans from the cooperatives to meet their diverse credit needs. The volume of such assistance showed a strong positive correlation with the level of efficiency of cooperatives (the 'institutional strength'). The cooperatives offer 'instant loans' - loans lent 'over the counter', immediately on request, to cope with catch shortfalls. This mechanism, devised by the cooperative, is to cope with short term risks of catch fluctuations; the aforementioned idiosyncratic shocks. In cases where cooperatives were found to be successful,

more than 80 percent of members had obtained long or medium term loans to purchase, expand, repair or replace their fishing gear or for other self employment activities which generate supplementary incomes to smooth inter-temporal fluctuations of fishing incomes).

Fishers, living in isolated coastal enclaves, such as those in many locations in the south, have limited access to human capital, such as education, knowledge and skills. Various services have been provided by fisheries cooperatives with the aim of providing its membership with access to human capital. A large array of training programmes to develop the skills of members in diverse self-employment activities, has been organised by, for example, the co-ops in Bata Atha and Godawaya, with assistance from various donor organisations. Moreover, with the help of government hospital staff several health camps (focusing heavily on drug prevention) have also been organised. A number of women have received assistance to start up plant nurseries, home gardens and fish drying by applying newly acquired scientific knowledge and using new equipment. Some co-ops, like the Bata Atha co-op, operate a student scholarship scheme, whereby outstanding students are awarded scholarships to pursue higher studies.

The co-ops have been able to provide such a wide range of services to its membership mainly by building links with the 'outside' - 'linking social capital'. This is distinct from social capital within small groups (or individual co-ops) which is characterised by bonding social capital. This is where trust emerges through the repeated interaction of individuals. Linking social capital appears to emerge through 'reputation'. For the donors and development agencies, a well functioning co-op which represents the interests of fishers, provides an efficient means of channelling assistance to fishing communities. It minimises transaction costs (such as search and monitoring costs), while ensuring that help reaches the most needy. This is demonstrated by the fact that in areas with well functioning cooperatives, post-tsunami assistance was handled efficiently.

Conclusions

Social capital is drawn from social groups or networks which foster cooperation among individuals, forming a resource which members of such organisations can draw upon to cope with vulnerability. Strong interpersonal relationships, cemented by trust, foster cooperation among members of cooperatives, have facilitated fishers in securing the required livelihood capitals and deal effectively with inadequately developed markets and other shocks.

If fishers can secure the required livelihood capitals through cooperation, this will have a positive impact on poverty alleviation. The impact on resource health still remains uncertain, however. While cooperatives have provided the membership with the required physical capital to engage in fishing, no measures have been taken to control access to or manage the resources. If cooperatives continue to provide fishers with access to natural capital by providing them with access to more physical capital, i.e. equipment, in the short-term fishers may find new employment opportunities. In the long-term, however, the resources are likely to degrade, due to biological overexploitation. Therefore the success of the social capital approach depends on successful intervention in terms of resource management; either by direct state intervention, or by co-ops assuming certain management responsibilities, or by forming partnerships (various co-management arrangements).

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The art of realism

Painted photographs from India

The emergence of the painted photograph marks a crucial chapter in the history of photography. By abetting the notion of 'modernism' in visual practice at the turn of the 19th century, these embellished images represent a crucial embodiment of cultural encounter, a new medium that successfully addressed existent traditions of illumination in painting, and slowly emerged as a self-sustaining convention, a meld of 'realistic' documentation and artistic manipulation. Rahaab Allana, Curator of the Alkazi Foundation for the Arts in New Delhi, India, reveals the world of coloured portraiture in India.

Rahaab Allana



Fig. 1




Fig. 2




Fig. 3



Fig. 4

EVER SINCE ITS INVENTION, the camera's faithfulness to 'truth' has assisted in the validation of identity, the seamless construction (and erosion) of categories, and the forensic mastery of a world steeped in ground realities. The photograph moved upward in the market as a popular medium in the early 20th century, as much as it stirred across cultural frontiers. The cult of looking at an image of oneself, therefore, led to the shifting role of expectation, a hermeneutic stance that saw visual representation as a mode of fantasy, and equally, a reinforcement of position and class. And so, while early expeditionary photographers, such as Samuel Bourne (1834-1912) and Felice Beato (c.1834-1907), were revealing the exciting pace of the journeying eye, portraiture enabled this artefact as a social statement, representing that median position between actuality and art. That is to say, where the image is fixed in time, its meaning is not.

The early life of the painted photograph addresses the ambiguity about 'artists' and 'photographers', wherein the photographer assumes the role of a portrait artist, while the artist, that of a draftsman. The traditional format of portraiture seen in folk art, enmeshed with the photographic framing of it, slowly presents a compelling moment for photographers, who now invest their monochrome images with life-like and often hyper-real colours, and who further invite the participation of local and professional artists. As we shall see, this dissemination of carefully staged and coloured photographs gradually develops with exchanges between smaller towns, traditional ateliers and emerging city studios.

The uncertainty of this art, both conceptually and practically, is further intensified by the anonymity of the artist and, often, the photographer. I propose that through the investigation of a known artist, Pannalal Parasram Gaur (c.1880-1940), and some known photographers, we may gain a greater perspective on this 'genre' that became popular through its distinctive appeal, its fusing of compatible art forms at the turn of the last century.

Rajasthan and the Nathdwara artist

"The Maharajah Ram Singh is a short man, 45 years of age, with an agreeable countenance and refined features, and of more than ordinary intelligence... He spoke to me with much kindness of the fatigue which I must have gone through during my travels, asked many questions about the courts I had already visited, and the manner in which we had been received... The conversation then turned on photography (he is not only an admirer of this art, but is himself a skilful photographer... of which we talked for a long time."¹

The British administration assumed control of the regency council in 1839, incidentally also the year photography was patented, placing John Ludlow as resident from the mid-1840's, additionally in-charge of Ram Singh II's education.² The 'photographer-king' of Jaipur acquired his own camera in 1862, and was apparently eloquent with his ideas about it in the above brief description by French artist turned photographer, Louis Rousselet (1845-1929), who visited the king in 1866. His personal engagement with photography, through self-portraits and *zenana* (women's quarters) photos, further encouraged the king to become a life-member of the Bengal Photographic Society (fig.1). After his demise, the king was popularised to a great extent by Thomas Holbein Hendley (1847-1917), Administrative Medical Officer and Secretary of the Jaipur Museum. Following the installation of a hugely acclaimed exhibition at the Niwas Palace in Jaipur, as a tribute to Ram Singh II in 1883, Hendley extended his realm of influence all around Rajasthan, thus establishing the prominent role of photography in the region.

Hendley's publication entitled *The Rulers of India and the Chiefs of Rajputana (1550-1897)*, offers some clues about the development of the painted photograph and its overt connection with the history of portraiture in India. The rulers here are depicted in oval thumbnails, concluding in the centre where the first and last ruler are strategically positioned facing each other. This compilation is one of the most lucid representations of the development and refinement of the artist's vision through three centuries,

beginning with a representation in Pahari style and ending with a frontal, photographic *exposé* (fig.2). In his Preface, dated 21 April 1897, the author recalls the names of several artists, including 'Pana Lal'.³ Pannalal Parasram Gaur proudly prefaces his signature with the Sanskrit *kalmi-chitrakar* (hand colour artist) in several images from the Alkazi Collection of Photography, as he does in the recently discovered Udaipur City Palace Museum Collection.

Tryna Lyons' compelling work on the artists of Nathdwara presents a gripping account of artisan families, including Pannalal, unearthed through several discussions with surviving family members.⁴ And so, one of the only painters, as opposed to photographers, identified in this genre from the Alkazi Collection, is Pannalal Parasram Gaur from Mewar in Rajasthan. His engagement with varied forms of depiction, regal and religious, reinforces the benefaction of the court and addresses the inherent modernity in this period of photography in which members of the traditional ateliers change their mediums in order to confront the transforming aura of representation, namely through photography.

The Udaipur government archives notes that Pannalal was from the *adi gaur* caste, traditionally carpenters from Jaipur, who came to the site of Nathdwara in 1672, when the temple was established.⁵ In the Udaipur court, artists were assigned by the *mukhiya* or Director of the temple from the *adi gaur* caste, or the other artisan sub-castes, the *jangir* or *mewara*, each distinct by virtue of its distance from the temple of Shri Nathji in Nathdwara. Pannalal very much headed the royal painting workshop under Maharana Fateh Singh (1849-1929), and still held this position in 1935 when Bhupal Singh (1884-1955), his adopted son, summoned the artists to the palace in Udaipur, where Pannalal oversaw the overall design programme of the Raj Mahal (fig. 3).

Maharana Fateh Singh was a dedicated patron of the arts and photography in the region. However, there were anxieties within his atelier as well. The British government was always trying to oust Fateh Singh, as he was allegedly

Fig. 1
Maharaja Ram Singh II of Jaipur, Bourne & Shepherd, 1876, 140 x 98 mm, Albumen Print (Collection: The Alkazi Collection of Photography)

Fig. 2
Thomas Holbein Hendley "Kotah", Plate 11 from *Rulers of India and the Chiefs of Rajputana (1550-1897)*; With 19 Full-Page Illustrations in Colour and 7 in Monochrome (London: W. Griggs, 1897. (Collection: The Alkazi Collection of Photography)

Fig. 3
Maharana Fateh Singh of Udaipur (1849-1930), Unknown Photographer; Chitrakar Pannalal Gaur, Udaipur (Mewar), c.1920-30, 205 x 160 mm, Gelatin Silver Print and Watercolour (Collection: The Alkazi Collection of Photography)

Fig. 4
Maharaj Kumar Bhupal Singh of Udaipur (1884-1955), Unknown Photographer and Artist, c.1900, 279 x 237 mm, Platinum Print, Watercolour and Gold (Collection: The Alkazi Collection of Photography)

opposed to modernising his state through civic improvements. It was believed that Bhupal Singh, his adopted heir, was eager to take over. Kundanlal, another artist funded by Fateh Singh to study at the Slade School in London between 1893-6, painted a portrait of the Mahanara as old and infirm, allegedly in order to further Bhupal Singh's ambitions, as a young, dynamic ruler (fig.4).⁶ The artist was promptly banished by Fateh Singh from the court, without pay, for one year in 1920-1. If anything, this proves that the practice of art and particularly portraiture was a critical part of courtly life, one that had consequences within the political domain.

The style of painting from which the embellished image in India derives, namely *pahari* folk paintings and even Mughal miniatures, is, sadly, little-researched. If we do need to relate unique trends and understand their relation to one another, then perhaps one of the only means is through understanding their social history. This provides us a perspective that looks upon these images as part of a long-standing tradition, or sporadic occurrences along the path. I prefer, however, to adopt an alternative approach, one that is historical in perception, but also about the imagined lives of painted photographs – what happens to them when they network, freely, in a world of images?

Entering the city

A gigantic leap into the realm of popular 'bazaar' photography in the city and its formal affiliate, 'studio' photography, was made once the medium expanded to and from the courtly domain, and began to cater to a more general society, in the early decades of the 20th century. Photographers were no longer viewed as the scientific originators of the camera and photography, but consumers of that technology as well. The science of the medium now permitted any individual with viable means to participate in the activity of taking images. This growing circle of photographers allowed for a complex melding of image forms, through the constant circulation of works.

The enlarging ambit of photographers gradually led to the appropriation and inclusion of the medium and its technologies by the other arts, primarily fine arts. One possible sociological reason could be the repercussions of intensified English control over India in the aftermath of the Uprising of 1857. The complete subjugation of several princely rulers led to a decline in courtly culture throughout northern India, especially in the rebel cities, creating a migrant community of provincial artisans and performers who moved to larger urban centres in search of patronage through commissions. This was very much the pattern followed by artists of the Company period (1775-1910), the *box-wallah* bazaar artists who steadily adapted to Western naturalistic conventions. They were, as scholar Tapati Guha-Thakurta remarks, artists with 'second-tier' jobs, those that pertained mainly to drawing – draftsmen, engravers, lithographers; and to which I would add, colourists.⁷

The theatre was another sphere which interjected the space of photography in its painted form by the use of the painted backdrop (fig.5). Theatrical performances were performed



Fig. 6



Fig. 7



Fig. 8



Fig. 5
Painted Backdrop by V.V. Divkar (attrib.), Bombay, Early 20th Century (Courtesy: Nissar Allana)



Fig. 9



Fig. 10

extensively by Marathi Natya Sangeet, a performers collective. The point of the Natya Sangeet was to bind people to a demonstrable tradition, that had pan-Indian appeal, and could cut across language barriers to represent a common social identity. These were very much the latent ethics of photography. Theatre was not only a means of entertainment, but was often a space where political activity was negotiated, social reform communicated, including themes that challenged the traditional role of women in Maharastrian society. Performance in a theatre, like photography in studios, was a matter of control. The western notion of realism seen through the Grecian pillars and the Victorian style of furniture, were not only facets of the real but were provided to give a sense of actual perspective (fig.6).⁸

These multiple networks of themes and influences were enabled through a vast distribution scheme that allowed for the free-flow of images. This 'current of exchange' was induced by the commercial popularity of photography, no longer restricted to the agendas of the British administration. We therefore enter the world of circulating images and trends, facilitated also by the format of the photograph. We may therefore ask, how important was the *carte-de-visite* in India and did it vitiate the role of the artist as an independent practitioner? Was the world becoming a commonplace through these photographs? Any individual from the enlarging middle classes found that the world's notables were brought into a common purview, as he or she was able to step out of the quotidian round and enter a world populated by figures of beauty, fashion and high public distinction.

Images such as these (fig. 7), presented to the patron as an independent work and later appropriated within a comical narrative scheme of Medieval games and sport, presents a gentle satiric pleasure of 'topsy-turveydom'. This somewhat burlesque tradition fed naturally upon convention of taste and wider influx of European visual excesses into India. The scope of these photographs, rather than projecting merely social purposes, is therefore about kinds of interaction that the world of images was yielding, its effects. These images are about changing meanings by altering scenarios and also address the success of a global network of images whose ethics comprise aspects such as borrowing, adapting and giving. So much so that photographers such as D Nusserwanjee, Eduljee Sorabjee and Shapoor N. Bhedwar were making quite an impact, seen here (fig. 8) around an oval portrait of Queen Victoria as official photographers to the sovereign.

The growing regard and proliferation of such images and even photographers reinforces that the possibility of art in these images is not annulled by predetermination. What photography makes possible is transition within a visual practice, the occasional and discreet use of colour assures quality, and defies the laws of time by ensuring swift results. It makes it impossible to ignore its superior technology, its easy appropriation and calibration as a viable art-practice.

Embellishment and the aesthetic of discretion

An image from the Royal Collection in Windsor presents an essential notion about the thematic core of the painted

Fig. 6
Performance of Play, *Satwapariksha*, 1915, Nagpur by Maharashtra Natak Mandali. (Courtesy: Nissar Allana)

Fig. 7
Portrait of a Lady, The Bombay Photographic Company; Unknown Artist, Albumen Print and Watercolour inserted onto an album page with watercolour and pencil sketches, 1890s. (Collection: The Alkazi Collection of Photography)

Fig. 8
Collage of Queen Victoria with Photographers and Noblemen, Unknown Photographer, c. 1890s, Silver Gelatin Print. (Collection: The Alkazi Collection of Photography)

Fig. 9
The Duchess of Kent's Sitting Room, Frogmore House, Painted Albumen Print, 1861. RCIN 2101326. Credit: The Royal Collection (c) HM Queen Elizabeth II.

Fig. 10
Inder Prakash Painting a Portrait, Rahaab Allana, Digital Print, 2007

photograph in India. The image is an interior at Frogmore House, on the grounds at Windsor, taken in 1861 by an official photographer from the court (fig.9). The colouring in this image provides a sense of the actual colour schemes within the castle, together with a distinct, reminiscent of paintings from the Victorian world. However, such kinds of hand-coloured images are highly uncommon in the visual culture of India. A majority of tinted images in India are occupied by individuals, not spaces alone. This is not to say that there aren't painted photos of individuals from England or Europe, but that the trope of spaces divested of human beings, is unusual in India.

It is very likely that the early development of the painted photograph arose from a traditional backdrop borne from the royal ateliers in Princely India. The preponderance of hereditary artists in India by the 19th century assumed a sense of originality and continuity, which allowed for various mannerisms and styles to enter and exit the domain of art. The embellished images of the Alkazi Collection are as much about the fantasies of artists and patrons, as they are about the circulation of images in various circles and contexts. An historical study of such images, therefore addresses its ability to cross inter-pictorial norms and enter a ground where a new visual ethics is articulated, perhaps outside historical contextualisation.

To gauge the life of the genre of the painted photograph, I will briefly address the role of a practitioner today and his interjection as an artist in a field that has its own overarching ideological structures. Inder's first encounter with retouching images occurred in mid-1960 in Lucknow. Once in Delhi, Inder joined the acclaimed Mahatta Studios in Connaught Place, working under the proprietor, Madan Mehta, who himself trained in the Negative-Positive Process in the 1950s in Surrey, England. Mahatta Studios is known for introducing colour printing to Delhi in 1954.

Today Inder works in an attic above his home, after over 25 long years of devotion to his art. In the solitude of his sunlit room, he gently clips corners from red, blue and green sheets of Fuji-colour paper and as we talk about his peripatetic early life, these immersed pieces are gradually thinned in small cups of water. With proper immersion, the liquid turns deep rust or emerald, derived from different tones. Soaked in this 'paint', a squirrel- or mongoose-hair brush gently dabs a black-and-white photograph. Pinned to a thick piece of cardboard, the print dries out in the sun. Six hours later, the result is an almost surreal image, a quiet yet stunning refraction of a black-and-white image (fig.10).

The presence of Inder and similar artists today compels us to ask why/when a mode of representation becomes obsolete, and whether its necessity and social function is in fact sufficiently strong motive for its continued existence. The eloquent transfer between media in the painted photograph, its insistent subversion of the prescribed logic of representation, the practice of tinting images on enlargements, and of using them as blueprints on parchment for canvas paintings, developed through both patrons and artists questioning the camera's ability to document and render with fidelity in colour.

The presence of individuals such as Inder highlights the spirit of the committed artist, a compelling remnant of our past, situated in the solitary mode of rendering. The space he occupies, though sequestered, is essential to understanding how the historicity of an image form always leaves traces, legible tracks, which lead us back to its early origins. Inder suggests, in an informal conversation about his work, that the application of colour, surreal backdrops, ornamentation etc. is a form of escapism; but perhaps this kind of romantic escapism is so permanent a human condition that at some level, it lies beyond historical explanation.⁹

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This article is based on exhibitions held in four different locations over the last two years, culminating at the School of Oriental and African Studies, the Brunei Gallery, between July-September 2008 (*Catalogue: Painted Photographs: Coloured Portraiture in India, The Alkazi Collection of Photography and Mapin*).


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9. The interactions with Inder Prakash were noted in February 2004, when I was making a short documentary on the artist, entitled '*Inder's Gift*.' As part of a fellowship provided by the organization, Sarai, based in New Delhi.

Tapping global energy stocks

Energy security challenges are topping the policy agenda of the EU and China. Consequently, policy makers of both energy import-dependent polities continue to look for new possibilities. From supply diversification and alternative energies to improved efficiency, the EU and China are well positioned to cooperate to ensure security of supply and develop high-end renewable technologies.

Mehdi Amineh and Yuang Guang



AS ENERGY REMAINS KEY to the accumulation of wealth and power of states, but energy sources become increasingly scarce, it is not surprising to find that energy security challenges are topping the policy agenda of the European Union (EU) and China. In response, policy makers of both energy consuming economies continue to look for new possibilities. These include not only the diversification of source and origin to encourage supply security, but also support for substitutes of fossil energy and improving efficiency in energy use. In this endeavour, the urgency of geopolitical concerns seems to catch more attention than long-term plans of transitions to renewable energy systems. Consequently, the perception that the EU and China might be competitors in the geopolitical arena for access to foreign resources seems to overshadow their common interest in developing renewable energy and sharing efficiency-improving technology. However, such a view neglects that, at the same time, the EU and China are well positioned to cooperate to ensure global oil supply and compete in the development of high-end renewable technologies.

The new joint research programme¹ of the Energy Programme Asia² (EPA), the Netherlands, in cooperation with the Institute

of West Asian and African Studies, (IWAAS), China, challenges such dominant perceptions and aims to provide the wider public with a more balanced account of EU – Chinese energy relations.

EPA's research programme represents a comparative study on the geopolitical and domestic challenges to energy security for the EU and China and their impact on energy security policy strategies in both economies. The aim is to study the geopolitical effects of competition and cooperation for access to oil and gas resources among the main global consumer countries and the domestic opportunities and impediments for policies to increase energy efficiency and exploit renewable and alternative energy resources. The outcome of the research programme will be published in two volumes in 2009 and 2011. The main focus of the upcoming volume (2009) relates to the geopolitical aspects and the follow-up volume (2011) focuses on the prospects of alternatives to fossil fuel energy. In this special edition of *the Newsletter* we present some preliminary results of the upcoming volume. This introductory article provides the background knowledge on global energy markets necessary to understand the geopolitical and domestic challenges for the EU and China discussed in the subsequent articles of this special edition.



Fig. 1 (Left)
Yuang Guang (left)
and Mehdi Amineh
(right) from the Energy
Programme Asia.

Energy security challenges for the EU and China

Global energy security challenges

Global primary energy demand, according to the Energy Information Administration's International Energy Outlook (EIA IEO) 2008 is projected to increase by 50% between 2005 and 2030, although greatly dependent on the level of economic growth until then. It is predicted that by 2030 more than 25% of world energy demand will come from developing Asia, particularly China and India (18% in 2005). By contrast, the share of the US in world consumption is expected to diminish between 2005 and 2030 from 22% to 17%. According to EIA IEO 2008 estimates, world oil consumption will rise from 84 million barrels per day in 2005 to 113 million in 2030. The EIA also anticipates a substantial growth in the global consumption of natural gas for the period 2005-2030 from 104 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2005 to 158 tcf in 2030. The import dependency of the EU and China will grow to about 70% of domestic consumption in 2030 (EU Green paper 2006 and EIA IEO 2008).

In the period to 2030, global oil and gas supplies are predicted to originate in fewer countries than today. This is due to the fact that proven oil and gas reserves are unevenly distributed in the world and only a few countries remain surplus producers. The total global oil stock on January first 2008 was estimated at 1,332 billion barrels (bbl) proven oil reserves, around 70% of which is located in OPEC countries, and 30% of which in non-OPEC countries. Just five countries (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait and Iran) hold about 55% of global proven oil reserves. So far the Gulf has been a critical factor in meeting global demand followed by the states of the former Soviet Union. It is expected that world oil supply will need to be 28 million barrels per day more in 2030 than in 2005. To meet this demand OPEC and non-OPEC countries combined are expected to produce 49 and 63 million barrels per day respectively, according to the EIA IEO 2008. This results in a market share of OPEC of 44% in 2030 and continues a longstanding growth trend. Moreover, non-OPEC supplies are maturing which results in an increasing call on OPEC oil in the very long term.

Proven gas reserves are slightly less concentrated than oil reserves. Russia (including the Caspian Sea region) and the Middle East represent about 1/3 and 2/5 of proven global reserves respectively. Moreover, Russia and Iran held about 42.5% of the global gas reserves on January first 2008 (EIA IEO 2008). The Middle East has a substantial gas potential, but it is largely untapped. This is due to the difficulty or cost at which these gas reserves can be developed and brought to market. Compared to the international oil market, the international gas market is still very much a regional market, divided into Asia's LNG market, the Russian-European market and the North American market. Non-OECD Europe and Eurasia and the Middle East account for around 40% of global production in 2005 and are expected to account for 45% of the increase in production between 2005 and 2030. OECD countries share of global production will decline from 39% to 27% over the same time period. Hence, it is estimated that by 2030 supplies of gas for the world market will originate in fewer countries than today because some of the existing sources will dry up.

Global oil and gas markets are looking bleak as the result of ever-growing energy consumption, a growing exhaustion of reserves and an increasing geographical concentration of production. Against this background it is likely that state and non-state actors will assign more significance to economic and resource concerns and energy relations will become increasingly politicised. On the one hand, the growing energy import of countries such as China and India, adds to that of the EU and the US and these regions start to compete for access to reserves. The anticipation of future supply disturbances is already reflected in generally rising oil and gas prices, especially their volatility, and the inelastic demand of major consumers. Moreover, the competition increasingly involves bilateral contracts as the ongoing renationalisation³ of energy industries in producer countries causes a reliance on transnational energy corporations and the market misplaced. On the other hand, based on the increasing fossil fuel scarcity (and the sense of 'peak-oil' drawing closer), a geographical concentration of energy reserves and supplies is expected to materialise in the politically unstable producer countries of the Persian Gulf, and the Caspian Sea region, including Russia. This changes the overall balance of power in the relationship between energy producer and consumer countries in a way that strengthens the former. Unfortunately, internal conflicts are likely to arise in countries where oil and gas are the main source of income, especially when accompanied by ethnic hostility, terrorism, religious extremism, economic injustice, corruption and political competition. Both competition and cooperation for energy supplies among consumer countries and between consumer and producers countries are likely to become more intense in the coming decades; the more so because policy responses of consumer countries cannot be seen in isolation of each other.

In the period to 2030, global oil and gas supplies are predicted to originate in fewer countries than today.

Summing up, the combination of increasing oil and gas consumption, decreasing reserves and geopolitical rivalry creates a setting for both the EU and China that can be characterised as one of demand-, supply- and structural scarcity or a combination thereof (see, Amineh and Houweling 2005: 80-81). Demand-induced scarcity refers to a situation in which population growth, a rising per capita income and technological changes resulting in higher levels of consumption and technological change that renders fossil fuels more essential for the production of wealth and power, increase domestic demand for fossil fuels. Supply-induced scarcity refers to a situation in which a decrease of the stock (or market-efficient access to it), inefficient use of supplies and a lack of adequate productive capacity and pipeline infrastructure, decrease the supply of energy resources. Structural scarcity refers to a situation in which there is a supply induced scarcity caused by deliberate action of a major power, non-state actors, like transnational oil companies and producer cartels like OPEC. For example, in the current unipolar military order, the US can opt to induce scarcity for allies and competitors alike by interdicting the maritime transport of oil and gas. That option, however, is available only after oil and gas have been brought to ports and ships from the territory of extraction. Russia, on the other hand, has already demonstrated to the EU in both Russian-Ukrainian gas crises what a pipeline monopoly can imply to security of supplies.

Energy security is also affected by environmental constraints and advances in technology. According to the IEA World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2006, global CO2 emissions are expected to accelerate by 55% between 2004 and 2030 (1.7% annually). Emissions are growing faster than energy demand. This is alarming because it stands in contrast to a 25 year long opposite trend towards cleaner energy sources and exemplifies that our future energy use will be more 'dirty'. A likely cause is the switch back to coal occurring in response to the oil and gas scarcity of many countries. Coal resources are more abundant and geographically less concentrated, though have higher levels of carbon than oil and gas. This shift coincides not accidentally with the fact that developing countries are overtaking OECD countries as the biggest emitters of CO2 shortly after 2010 and will reach more than 50% of global emissions by 2030. China alone is expected to represent 39% of the rise in emissions until then.

Where pollution creates cross-border tensions, innovations in alternative and renewable resources, alongside efficiency measures, can reduce energy import dependence and contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However, developing new technologies involves more than a simple replacement of oil and gas by other energy sources. The deployment of solar, wind, hydro, geothermal and hydrogen requires building new production facilities, new storage and distribution means and end-use applications. Apart from time and money, such energy infrastructure transitions also necessitate continued government and popular support, especially when it is likely to be driven by social, political and environmental benefits and the technical and economic side cannot yet compete with existing fossil fuel technologies. On the other hand, existing alternatives like biofuels and nuclear energy face considerable social and political challenges on their own.

In the end, it is expected that even by 2030 the role of renewables in the global energy mix will be marginal at best. The IEA WEO 2006 states that while renewables and alternatives today cover 19% of global primary energy supply (if one includes nuclear and biomass; renewables alone is 3%), by 2030 this will still be only 19% (and 4%). This is not because of a lack of development of renewables, but simply because global oil, gas and coal consumption will also continue to rise. Nevertheless, as oil and gas become increasingly scarce, developing innovative technologies is the only long term alternative.

The way forward

The abovementioned energy security challenges urge the EU and China to respond. The obvious questions to be answered are how they (should) do so and what the impacts of their energy security policy strategies on each other are. To this end, the following selection of articles in this special edition of the Newsletter provide insights into the various geopolitical and domestic challenges for both polities and EU-China energy relations and allows for speculating where possibilities and impediments for cooperation lie:

In the first article, *China's policy and measures to secure the supply of oil: the case of Saudi Arabia and Sudan*, Chen Mo deals with China's energy policy and the question of, on the one hand, focusing on policy towards easier access to oil or, on the other hand, towards diminishing dependency from oil.

In the second article, *China's energy security and student attitudes*, Eduard B. Vermeer discusses China's energy policy, placing it in the context of both domestic and international

security. Moreover, he argues that the Chinese energy agenda is mainly aimed at increasing independence, both now and in the future.

The third article, *Russia's emerging place in the Eurasian hydrocarbon energy complex*, by Robert Cutler, deals with Russian energy policy towards the Central Asian region, the EU, and China, distinguished by the increasingly acute competition between Russian and prospective non-Russian networks for provisioning Europe with natural gas and crude oil from the Caspian Sea basin.

In her article, *The energy policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the European Union and China*, Eva Raket discusses relations between Iran, the EU and China. In light of the desired cooperation Iran needs to overcome several obstacles, while the EU and China simultaneously should join hands in order to secure access to energy resources.

In *Courting the prize in Pakistan: India, China and the geopolitics of Iranian gas*, Philip Sen deals with the question of how the energy interests of India and China, both facing rising energy demands, may intersect.

In the sixth article, *Japan's evolving nuclear energy policy and the possibility of Japan-China nuclear energy cooperation*, Raquel Shaoul discusses energy relations between Japan and China. Nuclear cooperation is increasing being viewed as an interesting way to improve energy security for both countries, as well as possibly positively influencing political relations more broadly.

The seventh article, *Transition management and institutional reform* by Daniel Scholten, deals with the transition to sustainable energy, stressing besides technological development also the institutional aspects needed for such a change.

Finally, in *The EU-China energy relations and geopolitics: the challenges for cooperation*, Frank Umbach deals with the need for both the EU and China to balance energy priorities with economic and environmental objectives.

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Notes

1. This is a joint research programme between the Energy Programme Asia (EPA) of the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) and the Institute of West Asian and African Studies (IWAAS), in cooperation with the Institute of Industrial Economy (IIE) and the Institute of Russian, East European & Central Asian Studies (IREECAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). This research programme is supported by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Social Sciences (KNAW) and by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) for the duration of three years (2007-2010).
2. The objective of the EPA research programme is to study the geopolitical and domestic aspects of energy security challenges for the EU and the main Asian energy-consuming countries. Special attention goes to the impact on global energy supply security strategies, energy efficiency measures and the possibilities of alternative and renewable resources.
3. Oil and gas companies are already state-owned in most Middle Eastern OPEC states, having recently been nationalized in Russia and Venezuela and subject to government control in China and India.

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Securing China's oil supply

From Saudi Arabia to Sudan

Despite China's endeavours to keep away from oil, it is indisputable that in the coming decades, it will remain a crucial energy source for the nation. Likewise, during the last 20 years, China's oil supply has relied heavily on imports, with import volumes outstripping output. China's future oil imports are dependent on the Middle East and Africa, with countries in those areas, such as Saudi Arabia and Sudan, serving as chief sources of China's oil supply. But cooperation must inevitably involve the restructuring of geo-political relations.

Chen Mo

TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF OIL SUPPLY, China must first guarantee easy access to petroleum. The most obvious way to do this is to rely on domestic supplies. However, China is a highly populous nation with relatively low per capita oil resources. Furthermore, since the 1990's, China's domestic oil production has no longer been able to meet the rapidly growing demand. As the pillar of China's petroleum industry, onshore oil constitutes 90% of the country's total crude oil output. In Eastern China, where crude oil output accounts for 75% of total output, the oilfields have begun to stagnate and Western China, the strategic substitute region for China's oil industry, has been forced to increase contributions to onshore crude oil output. There are high production costs involved in exploiting this source given the area's complicated geological conditions and adverse natural environment. Offshore oil exploitation is a specialised industry that requires huge investment, high-technology and involves high risk. Although some marine spaces in the East and South China Seas offer good prospects for oil and gas resources, territorial disputes with neighbouring countries remain unsolved, making exploitation in these areas problematic, at least in the short term.

In 1993, China became a net oil importer and in recent years China's overall crude oil import volume has maintained a generally upward trend. China relies on the Middle East for a considerable proportion of oil supply, however, this dependence – on a region prone to tensions and with vulnerable export (pipeline and shipping) routes – is a potential threat to the security of China's energy resources.

Strategy for securing oil imports

China has adopted a series of energy policies and approaches in order to realise a steady oil supply:

a) Greater diversity of oil imports

China's diversification policy created the conditions for reducing dependency on the Middle East for oil supply, however, the Middle East and Africa have abundant oil resources and favourable price and transportation conditions, re-affirming them as important sources of supply for China. Other options for China include Russia and the Caspian oil producer countries. China is increasingly co-operating with the oil producing countries of Central Asia, and in particular Kazakhstan. At the same time, China has developed its energy cooperation with Latin America, among others Venezuela.

b) Energy diplomacy

For China, oil security is largely about avoiding disruption to supplies and cushioning the impacts of dramatic fluctuations in oil prices. The Chinese government's energy diplomacy is a substantial guarantee for energy security and indispensable for ensuring oil import security – creating better conditions for domestic companies in the international market, introducing energy saving and environment friendly technologies and carrying out international cooperation on alternative energy resources. Energy diplomacy is a new policy and integral to China's diplomatic efforts since the 1990s.

Expanding energy cooperation with oil importers is a substantial element of China's energy diplomacy. The Sino-US relationship is becoming increasingly important in global affairs and its strategic significance extends to the international economy, politics, security and other fields. China and the US are increasingly finding common interests in maintaining regional and international security and ever-increasing reasons for cooperation. As big energy consumers, oil supply and oil price



changes impact greatly on both their economies. Therefore it is in their interests to work together to maintain the stability of the global oil market and cooperate further on energy resources.

As for energy diplomacy with the European Union, China's policy is to avoid turning the energy issue into a political one. China is committed to maintaining a secure, stable and favourable political environment and to minimise the influence of regional political disputes (such as the ethno-religious conflicts in Central Asia) on the global energy resources supply. China also exercises rational exploitation of traditional energy resources and is actively developing renewable energy resources, in order to realise globalisation and counter external threats to energy security, as well as to maintain stability in the international energy resources market.

For many years, China has been fostering friendly relations with developing countries based on equality, mutual benefits and aid. China and other developing countries share common interests in the 'battle' against the supremacy of, what they see as, the unreasonable international business order and supremacy, and at the same time, benefitting from mutual support and cooperation in the economic field.

In terms of China's relationship with oil exporters, the country is in need of steady energy supplies and investment by oil producing countries. In fact, these oil producing countries see the dynamic Chinese market as an attractive outlet for their surplus production. This has created a 'win-win' environment which favours further cooperation.

c) The 'going global' strategy

The 'going global' strategy is crucial to China's participation in economic globalisation and for Chinese enterprises to compete in the international market. It is also of significant importance for elevating China's GNP and increasing wealth for the Chinese enterprises. China's oil companies have proved that they can retain their position in the global oil industry by making full use of their low-cost advantage. A case in point is China's oil projects in Sudan, which have lower production costs than the average international oil company.

d) Establish strategic oil reserves

After years of discussion and preparation, China established the National Oil Reserve Center on December 18, 2007. This centre is of strategic importance for establishing and improving the oil reserves management system in line with Chinese characteristics, accelerating the accumulation of strategic oil reserves and also regulating the operation of these reserves. The first batch of four strategic oil reserve bases will soon come on stream, and site selection for a second batch of bases has also taken place.

e) Seek energy saving approaches, improve energy efficiency, reduce energy consumption and strengthen environment protection

Efficient use of energy resources requires energy saving approaches, improved energy efficiency, reduced energy consumption and strengthened environment protection. Since 2007, the Chinese government has taken a number of measures in these areas.

Energy cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia openly supports the one-China policy in relation to Taiwan, and in return, the country seeks backing for its policies on the stability and security of the Middle

East and the Gulf Region. In particular, Saudi Arabia hopes that China can play a major role, and take a fair and just stance, in Arab-Israeli issues.

From an economic perspective, China needs energy supplies from Saudi Arabia; in turn, Saudi Arabia has every intention of investing in China, seeing it as an export market with great potential and also as being relatively safe for oil dollars. The nation anticipates that China could serve as an important market for its own petrochemicals and perhaps even for those of the entire Gulf Region.

While China expands oil exports from Saudi Arabia, Saudi oil companies are making their way into the Chinese market as well. Large-scale Sino-Saudi cooperation in the energy field kicked off in 2003 and saw rapid growth of bilateral investment. The Sino-Saudi relationship does not pose any threat to the US. Politically, America tends to take sides with Israel on Middle East issues and Saudi Arabia wants China to play a more important role in the region, but China's influence is quite limited when it comes to Arab-Israeli issues. In fact, China is excluded from the 'four-party mechanism' and the only influence it can exert is through the mediation of its Middle East envoy. China has a long-standing policy of respecting national sovereignty and avoiding interference in other nation's internal affairs. The US government is aware of the importance of maintaining a close relationship with its Middle East allies and in asserting its traditional power in the region. Economically, Saudi Arabia has not yet opened the upstream sectors of its oil industry, a sector which has been designed based on American technology. The Saudi upstream gas industry has been opened up and the biggest overseas investors are still American companies. Even in the construction contracting market, expensive contracts are still obtained by contractors from the US and other developed nations, leaving China with contracts small in both value and scale. Currently then, the emergence of Chinese companies in Saudi Arabia pose little threat to American businesses.

Energy partnership between China and Sudan

China and Sudan have long been on friendly terms. The Sudanese government upholds the one-China policy regarding Taiwan. Economically, China and Sudan appear to be in a win-win situation. Sudan needs Chinese oil companies to exploit its oil resources and it needs Chinese agricultural technology transfer in order to improve people's livelihoods and promote its economy.

Oil cooperation between China and Sudan is carried out under mutually beneficial policies. Chinese investment in Sudan enables joint development of Sudanese oil resources. Under the request of the Sudanese government, China provides capital, technology and human resources to build a complete oil industry – from upstream to downstream sectors.

The oil cooperation between China and Sudan covers areas including prospecting, exploitation, production, oil pipelines, refining, polypropylene, plastic processing and refined oil selling. The oil industry has become a major driving force behind Sudan's economic growth, putting momentum into the development of transportation, manufacture and construction. Under the principle of 'mutual benefit and development', China Petroleum, while investing in the oil industry in Sudan, offers free support to funds for local agriculture, education, culture, healthcare and construction of roads and bridges, all of which is hugely welcomed by the Sudanese people. China Petroleum also stresses its use of environmental technologies and facilities in Sudan, striving to improve local environment.

Conclusion

The oil supplies in China function as a complicated system that includes both domestic and international strategies. In terms of domestic strategies, it covers energy-saving measures, energy efficiency improvement, exploitation of alternative energy resources, establishment of strategic oil reserves and more. Regarding international tactics, it refers to the 'going global strategy', greater diversity of oil sources and developing relationships with oil producers and powerful nations. As a newly emerged oil importing country, China has gained experience from its former oil exporters. At the same time, as a developing nation China also learned lessons from those countries, which has resulted in oil import security policies. The 'win-win' strategy, in terms of China's relations with oil exporting countries, is key for mutual development and co-operation and represents a new concept of energy security.

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Notes

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China's energy security and student attitudes

Cheap supply of coal and electricity is a vital element in the state's provision of basic necessities to its people. Environmental concerns mean China must move away from coal and invest heavily in alternative fuels. Energy security is a high priority for China's policy makers and their choices have great global significance. Eduard Vermeer identifies the driving factors in China's energy policies, and establishes the energy policy preferences of students and researchers in Beijing. They may indicate what future policies will be, or at least whether current policies are in line with public opinion.

Eduard B. Vermeer

ERICA DOWNS CAPTURED CHINA'S energy policymaking apparatus well in a few words: 'ineffective institutions and powerful firms.' Different departments and companies clash over energy pricing, hydropower development, support for cleaner coal technologies, and environmental constraints. Even when central policies are clear, local governments and power companies do not necessarily follow them. Without an open debate and democratic decision-making, it is hard to tell how various arguments and stakeholder interests are weighted by the coordination agencies. The foreign policy dimension of energy security is even less transparent. There we find private daughter companies of state-owned oil companies operating in dozens of foreign countries with or without overt backing by Chinese economic bureaucracies –but apparently uncoordinated in an overall foreign policy framework

Remedial policies seem to be supported by a broad political consensus. China should develop and improve its use of domestic coal as a substitute for oil imports, increase its domestic oil and gas production, invest in the development of overseas oil resources, speed up nuclear power development, develop renewable energy, economise on oil, and build up oil reserves. The exception is the scope for expansion of hydropower, a contested issue because it creates intractable environmental and social problems in minority areas. Moreover, it requires sizeable central government investment in long distance power lines. The Chinese government provides considerable support to wind, solar, hydro, and biomass energy in the form of tax breaks, loan subsidies and special funding. This was spurred on by rising prices for oil and coal. So far, even as prices of oil and coal have come down and most electricity networks suffer from oversupply and falling demand, political support for alternative energy has not been waning.

China's quest for overseas oil.

Since 2001, China has adopted strategy of 'going out' to acquire overseas oil resources. However, Chinese experts realise that the main supply of oil has to come from the international market rather than from equity oil from overseas wells, and thus they stress the need for international cooperation. China has enough money to buy oil from abroad – even if, in the most expensive oil year of 2008, it had to pay US\$169 billion on oil imports –14 percent of its total import bill. China faces a tough world, dominated by other large powers, and must seek cooperation. Its quest for overseas oil and gas has drawn increasing criticism, because of an apparent disregard for UN and US sanctions or Western political sensitivities about Sudan, Iran, Burma and other regimes. Particularly China's Africa policy has been put under scrutiny.

China concluded several treaties with African countries that in addition to investment and trade agreements contain sizeable foreign assistance elements, particularly in the development of infrastructure and hydropower stations. The resulting presence of so many Chinese companies and construction workers in countries characterised by corruption, civil war and failed states has made some foreign governments and existing stakeholders in Africa worry about China's intentions. China is a formidable

competitor, with national oil corporations and Sovereign Wealth Funds with very deep pockets, seemingly willing to go to any length to secure overseas supplies of oil and mining resources and capture the African market with its textiles, machinery and consumer products. However, now that prices of oil and other commodities have plummeted, it may be China that has to do the worrying. Will its investments in Africa still pay off in economic terms?

Chinese analysts see nothing unusual in China's oil activities in Africa. Most other regions (Middle East, Southeast Asia) were already dominated by Western presence, so China's oil companies had easier access in Africa where upstream markets are open to foreign investors. Analysts have wondered in how far China's foreign policy makers were able to set conditions for and influence the behaviour of China's national oil companies CNPC, CNOOC and Sinopec in various African countries. China's political image in the West is of no concern to them.

Technological advances may bring solutions.

Chinese planners assume that even as the use of oil increases, coal will remain the dominant source of energy in the next decades. China's central government and part of the public are concerned about the environmental effects of coal and increased dependency on oil imports, but are unwilling to slow industrial growth or sacrifice the use of cars and other energy-consuming amenities of modern life. Reluctantly but surely the Chinese have become more accepting of high levels of foreign dependency. This conflicts with the general nationalist attitude, even stronger among the populace than in government circles, that China should be self-reliant and foreign countries and markets in general cannot be trusted. This situation has led to a considerable gap between official government propaganda and actual policies, and between technical expert advice and public views as reported in the media.

One way out of the dilemma is a high confidence in future technological solutions. Another is the belief that government policies and measures can be effective in creating a more secure supply of energy and mitigating the environmental effects of increased energy use. The Chinese government favours an all-out approach, under which as many as possible sources of energy are tapped simultaneously. The state invests heavily in nuclear and wind power, in oil wells owned by Chinese companies in Africa and in cleaner coal in the Chinese interior, in giant pit power stations in North China and medium-size integrated heat-power stations in coastal cities, in large hydropower stations and in LPG tanker facilities. The apparent lack of selectiveness may have to do with the size of the country, differences in local geographical and economic conditions, and competing bureaucracies and energy companies.

Energy policy preferences in Beijing.

In order to get a better idea of educated Chinese views, we conducted a survey of 230 advanced students and researchers in Beijing in early 2008. Most were selected because they attended classes (mostly in economics and business) at leading research institutes and universities. Only ten percent was directly involved through education or work in energy questions. Average age was 28 years old. One-third were women. Ten percent had studied abroad. We found significant attitudinal differences between men and women, and between the younger and older.

Less than half of respondents could give a fair estimate of China's dependency on foreign oil. Saudi Arabia, Russia and Iran were well-known as major oil suppliers to China, but Angola was not. One third held that China should be self-sufficient in oil, an obvious impossibility. On average, respondents accepted an increase of oil dependency between 2010 and 2020 by about 7 percentage points. Men, the older and the better-informed were more ready to accept high dependency ratios than others. Two thirds thought that the competition with Japan and the US on the world oil market would produce political conflicts, and almost all were concerned or very concerned that energy shortages and high oil prices would destabilise the world economy. Generally, it was felt that China's access to the world oil market was worse than that of western countries. The best remedial actions were held to be purchase of foreign oil resources (particularly by men and the older), and cooperation with international oil companies (by women). Concluding political treaties was believed to be more effective than taking a share in production agreements with foreign countries. Average trust in the security of oil supply from foreign countries was neither high nor low, with Kazakhstan and Iran trusted most and Russia and Vietnam least. Because so far, China has not suffered from oil supply disruptions from any of these countries, these trust levels should be attributed to past history (1979 war with Vietnam, earlier conflicts with the Soviet Union), perceptions of power relations (Kazakhstan as dependent on China for its oil exports), stability of their regimes and the like.

Many factors have an effect on oil energy security, including the level of reserves, substitution rate, exploitation/reserves ratio, dependency on foreign imports, the concentration of imports and international crude oil prices. Respondents gave the highest scores to the level of reserves and substitution rate, and the lowest ones to the international oil price and import concentration. The low valuation of the world market price of oil may have been influenced by Chinese subsidy policies of keeping domestic oil prices low and stable.

Most respondents felt that China's energy industry should make a substantial contribution to the reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases, and that these should not be voluntary, but imposed by government. However, almost none agreed with our suggestion that high energy prices might have a positive effect on China's energy security by reducing its rate of industrial growth, energy demand in general and stimulating investment in new energy sources. Energy security in general was believed to be furthered most by R&D, diversification of energy sources by type and origin, energy savings and increasing managerial and technical resilience of energy supply systems. Good information, proper functioning of markets and China's participation in the IEA were valued least. Particularly the younger group placed high hopes on R&D.

The best domestic policy for enhancing energy security, according to our respondents, was investment in alternative sources of energy. Optimisation of the energy structure and nuclear power came second and third (men were more positive about nuclear power than women, but only very few people were negative). The least favoured policies were: inviting foreign companies to China; letting the market decide while supporting infrastructure; and subsidising oil prices to stabilise price. These preferences were partly at variance with actual government policies, notably in their strong support for investments in alternative energy sources, clean coal technologies, and raising taxes on energy use and emissions. One reason may be that economic risk and budgetary and managerial constraints played only a minor part in our respondents' preferences.

Finally, most believed that China should give more support to its oil companies to purchase and develop foreign oil and gas fields. At the same time, particularly women favoured China's participation in international cooperation for renewable and clean energy technologies. Concluding supply agreements with producing countries was seen as the third best option. Strengthening the navy in order to protect shipping lanes, and cooperation with foreign oil companies, were least preferred.

Conclusion

Domestic policy preferences reflected a great deal of belief in technological solutions and alternative forms of energy (including nuclear). Government rather than companies should play the leading role in providing secure, clean and cheap energy. The students' foreign policies might be characterised as economically aggressive and independent, technologically cooperative, and placing confidence in governments rather than in markets. Almost all viewed oil supply as a major problem in China's 'peaceful rise', as they feared that foreign powers would deny China an easy access to overseas resources.

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Origin of Chinese crude oil imports 2008 (million tonnes)

Saudi Arabia	36.4	
Angola	29.9	
Iran	21.3	
Oman	14.6	
Russia	11.6	
Sudan	10.5	
Venezuela	6.5	
Kuwait	5.9	
Kazakhstan	5.7	
Arab Emirates	4.6	
Congo	4.4	
Yemen	4.1	
Libya	3.2	
Brazil	3.0	
Other	17.2	
Total	178.9	

China's energy production in 2008 (+ % increase over 2007)

Coal	m. tons	2,793	+ 4.1%
Crude oil	m. tons	190	+2.2%
Natural gas	bn cu.m.	76	+9.9%
Electricity	bn kWh	3,467	+5.6%
- Thermo	bn kWh	2,790	+2.5%
- Hydro	bn kWh	585	+20.6%
- Nuclear	bn kWh	68	+ 8.7%

China's increasing energy consumption (%)

	2007	2008	2009
Coal	7.9	3	2.4*
Oil	6.3	5.1	3.8
Nat.gas	19.9	10.1	10*
Electricity	14.1	5.6	4.5
Total	8.8	4	3*

Sources: NDRC May 2009 * Author's estimate

Russia's emerging place The Eurasian hydrocarbon energy complex

The key bilateral energy relationship, without which the Eurasian hydrocarbon complex would not have acquired its present structure, is the Turkmenistan-Russia connection, particularly Russia's effective monopoly of export options for Turkmenistan's natural gas. Robert Cutler argues that the issues structuring the bilateral and multilateral international energy relationships in Russia's geo-economic relations with Europe, Central Eurasia, and China, have been the directions of export of Turkmenistani natural gas and also Kazakhstani crude oil. Increasingly acute competition between Russian and prospective non-Russian routes is the distinguishing feature of the present conjuncture.

Robert M. Cutler



IN THE CONCENTRATION of multilateral networks around the key bilateral Russia-Turkmenistan relationship, two triangles stand out. The first includes Kazakhstan as its third vertex; the third vertex of the other triangle is the EU. On the basis of the Turkmenistan-Russia-EU triangle, one may analytically construct another quadrilateral, adding the US. This energy-based quadrilateral is analytically decomposable into four trilateral relationships, each of which omits one of the four members. Likewise, the Kazakhstan-Russia-Turkmenistan triangle is a basis for two strategic quadrilaterals, one of which adds China to the triangle and the other of which adds the US.

Although the multi-directionality of Kazakhstan's policy has undergone changes in emphasis since 1991, Russia remains such a key player that the Kazakhstan-Russia-Turkmenistan triangle appears as the generative nucleus for the structuring of multilateral geo-economic relations in Central Eurasia and beyond. The analysis of Russia's emerging place in the Eurasian hydrocarbon energy complex therefore largely means exploring the possible triangularisations of bilateral Russia-Turkmenistan and bilateral Russia-Kazakhstan relations, where 'triangularisation' refers to potentials for decreasing the dependence of the respective Central Asian states on Russia.

The Russia-Central Asia-US triangle in the 'bubbling-up' phase (1989-1994)

In the early 1990s, US-Russian relations remained the principal systemic factor still structuring the evolution of Central Asia. Competition between the two countries was focused mainly through the lens of the hydrocarbon resources in the region. Thus in the years 1989-1994 it was actually the US that stood in such a triangularising role, even against EU protestations of American 'meddling' in the region. During this period, among the EU, the US, and China, with a few important exceptions (e.g., the Karachaganak gas field) only the US was present in Southwest Asia and Central Asia in a manner likely to impinge on Russia's energy interests. The first half of the 1990s saw the Kazakhstan-Russia leg of the fundamental Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Russia triangle pointing towards the US, because American offshore terminals in the Gulf of Mexico were the first intended targets for Kazakhstani oil shipments.

Western interest in Turkmenistan during these years was exclusively American interest, and it concentrated mainly on ameliorating Ukraine's payments situation as a gas importer. Western concerns about Turkmenistan's energy exports had not yet clearly focused on trying to make a trans-Caspian gas pipeline happen. Also, American diplomatic activity and financial interest were the moving force behind this export axis. The Turkmenistan-Russia leg of the triangle pointed towards the EU, through Ukraine, but only vaguely so, since the EU had not yet begun significant imports of natural gas through Ukraine. The Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan leg of the fundamental triangle remained undeveloped.

The first and second phases (1989-1994 and 1995-2000) are bridged by the Russia-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan-US quadrilateral, which began to manifest during the years 1993-1997,

especially as the ruble zone disappeared in Central Asia and American energy interests made themselves felt on the ground in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. In addition to the basic Central Asian-centric triangle of Russia-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan, the other triangles in evidence were therefore Russia-Kazakhstan-US (competition and cooperation manifested in Tengiz), Russia-Turkmenistan-US (competition manifested in the failed TCGP project), and Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan-US (also manifested in the failed TCGP project).

The Russia-Central Asia-EU triangle in the 'settling-down' phase (1995-2000)

During the second phase, the organising triangle shifted from Russia-Central Asia-US to the Russia-Central Asia-EU triangle. The years 1995 through 2000 saw the construction of, or the decisions to construct, the CPC pipeline (Caspian Pipeline Consortium, oil from Kazakhstan to world markets across southern Russia and through the Turkish Straits), the BTC pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Azerbaijani to world markets including the EU via Georgia and Turkey), the SCP (South Caucasus Pipeline, Azerbaijani gas to Turkey and perhaps eventually beyond), and Blue Stream pipeline (gas from Russia to Turkey under the Black Sea), and the failed exploration of the possibility of TCGP pipeline (Turkmenistani gas to world markets under the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and out through Turkey).

These are two oil pipelines to the world market, one from the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea and one from the western shore; two gas pipelines, one from Russia through Turkey and the other from Azerbaijan through Turkey; and one failed pipeline from the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea through Turkey. To them may be added other failed pipelines, most notably the TAP (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan) natural gas pipeline, which has recently attracted new attention particularly with its possible extension to India.

In Central Asia during this period, Russia continued to re-assert its influence through the national energy trusts, particularly Lukoil in Kazakhstan and Gazprom in Turkmenistan. But Russia's attempts, beginning in the late 1990s but still more evident in the first half of the present decade, to enforce its interests in Europe (including the new Eastern Europe, viz., former Soviet republics west of the Urals) has led to cooperative initiatives by other countries and the EU in order to insure their own respective interests. Kazakhstan and more recently Turkmenistan have cooperated with China for the construction of eastward export pipelines; and Azerbaijan hesitates to accept Russia's offer to purchase the whole of the country's natural gas production because of avowed non-economic concerns.

The second and third phases (1995-2000 and 2001-2006) are bridged by the Russia-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan-EU quadrilateral, which began to manifest during the years 1999-2003. In addition to the basic Central Asian triangle including Russia, the other triangles in evidence were Russia-Turkmenistan-EU (with the EU's belated interest in the failed TCGP project), Russia-Kazakhstan-EU (manifested in the Kashagan deposit and other offshore North Caspian developments), and Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan-EU (also manifested in the failed TCGP project). The EU was highly allergic to the notion of US-Russian competition for Caspian oil at the time and opposed American power-projection into the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The final years of this phase, however, saw the international UK-based oil company BP declare in favour of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline from the Azerbaijani offshore to the eastern Mediterranean. This inevitably brought in not only other European companies but also other international and transnational European actors. Towards the end of this period, then, the EU thus injected itself into the South Caucasus and, by inevitable extension even against its declared intent, into at least the western and Caspian offshore regions of Central Asia. Also with the declared American interest in a Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) from Turkmenistan that could also conceivably have picked up natural gas from the Karachaganak deposit in western Kazakhstan, the Russia-Turkmenistan-EU-US quadrilateral came into evidence and established its significance in these years.

The Russia-Central Asia-China triangle in the 'settling-down' phase (2001-2006)

During the third phase, the organising triangle shifted from Russia-Central Asia-EU to Russia-Central Asia-China. Chinese energy geo-economic penetration into Central Eurasia is confirmed as the dominant moment of the 2001-2006 phase, not only with the entry into service of the oil pipeline from Kazakhstan but also with the construction now under way of the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Xinjiang in western China. These realisations are testimony to Chinese strategic planning beginning 15 years ago, when its national energy trusts first implanted themselves ever so delicately in the Caspian littoral. Both Tengiz and eventually Kashagan oil could conceivably reach China. For China to receive Tengiz oil, it would remain only to build the missing segment from Kenkiyak to Kumkol, and reverse the Aqtobe-Atyrau pipeline so that it flows from west to east. However, Kazakhstan's decision in favour of the Kazakhstan-Caspian Transport System and its westward route for Kashagan suggests that the Kazakhstani leadership may not be too keen to repeat with China its mistake of depending too much on Russia.

The third phase and the present developments (2001-2006 and the period since 2007) are bridged by the Russia-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan-China quadrilateral, which began to manifest in 2005 and by the foregoing logic will have established itself by 2009. In addition to the basic Central Asian triangle, the other triangles in evidence are Russia-Turkmenistan-China (competition for Turkmenistan's gas resources as in the Caspian coastal pipeline vs. the Turkmenistan-China project), Russia-Kazakhstan-China (competition for Kazakhstan's resources as in the battle between Russian and Chinese companies for Petrokazakhstan the pipeline that this company owned), and Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan-China (cooperation over the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline).

Turkmenistan's agreement with Russia for gas sales extends out to 2028 but the prices are not set past the near future. In 2007, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan negotiated, and in December that year signed, an agreement to refurbish and expand the capacity of the Caspian coastal pipeline, a Soviet-era gas line from Central Asia to Russia. It was Russia's attempt to prevent Turkmenistani negotiations with the EU for the TCGP from restarting. Russia had thought that it was succeeding in purchasing the vast majority of Turkmenistan's potential production over the long term but in October 2008 the results of a British expert firm's audit of the country's gas reserves (commissioned by a Niyazov's successor Berdimuhamedov) revealed that the new Yoloton-Osman field alone contains a minimum of four and a maximum of 14 trillion cubic meters, over and above current exports to Russia and Iran and planned exports to China: and that was the result for this one new field only. Suddenly Turkmenistan's available resources far outstrip Russia's attempts to corral them.

Beginning within the last two years there has occurred the autonomous consolidation, and movement towards realisation, of patterns of energy geo-economic organisation that cohered in the first half of the present decade, after having survived throughout the 1990s, following their emergence as mere possibilities during the years when the Soviet Union was devolving into its successor states.

Conclusion

The evolution of energy geo-economics in Eurasia and Russia's place in that evolution may be periodised, since the Soviet Union began to disintegrate in 1989, tripartitely following the arising of patterns from below, then their stabilisation (or disappearance), and finally the confirmation of their thoroughgoingness. The first phase ('bubbling-up') may be assigned the dates 1989-1994; the second ('settling-down') phase, 1995-2000; and the third phase ('running-deep'), 2001-2006. During the first phase the Russia-Central Asia-US triangle is central (and specifically its containment of the lower-order Russia-Southwest Asia-EU triangle); during the second, the Russia-Central Asia-EU triangle; and during the third, the Russia-Central Asia-China triangle. Those three phases taken together represent a super-phase of 'bubbling-up' that has initiated a new super-phase of 'settling-down'. The present period is then the 'bubbling-up' phase within the new super-phase of 'settling-down'. What is continuing to settle down from the 'bubbling-up' super-phase is that most of the evolving significant international energy networks in Central Eurasia branch out from the Russia-Turkmenistan relationship, or else from Kazakhstan's oil export policy. What is now happening in the new 'bubbling-up' phase within that super-phase is the increasingly acute competition between Russian and prospective non-Russian networks for provisioning Europe with natural gas and crude oil from the Caspian Sea basin.

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The energy policy of Iran towards the EU and China



Iran's huge oil and gas resources make it a strategically important country in the Middle East. Both the EU and China are potentially important economic partners for Iran. The EU can provide foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology and knowledge transfer; and China's national oil and gas companies have signed several import deals and will explore Iranian oil and gas fields to secure its growing oil and gas import dependency. However, domestic and foreign policy factors in Iran seem to be obstacles to large-scale investment by either the EU and China in the country.

Eva Patricia Rakel

THE OIL INDUSTRY has been Iran's main source of income for the last century. At the end of 2007 Iran had 138.4 billion barrels (bbl) or 11.2% of the world's total proven oil reserves. It ranks second behind Saudi Arabia in proven oil reserves and fourth in oil production behind Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the US.¹ The main countries to which oil is exported are Japan, China, India, South Korea, and Italy.

At the end of 2007 Iran had 981.75 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of proven gas reserves, or 15.7% of the world's total proven gas reserves. This ranks the country second behind Russia in proven gas reserves and fourth in gas production behind Russia, the US, and Canada.² About 62% of Iran's proven gas reserves have not been developed yet. But, due to rising domestic demand it has to be expected that gas exports will remain limited in the coming years. The Iranian energy infrastructure has to be modernised extensively and relies on FDI from, for example, the EU to realise this.

Iranian oil and gas and EU energy supply security

For the EU, Iran is a potential supplier of oil and gas as well as an important factor for stability in the Middle East and, in turn, its own backyard. The import of oil and gas are vital for the economies of the EU member countries. The EU therefore needs a long-term strategy for the security of supply at reasonable prices. These goals can only be reached if different producers compete on the European market. Momentarily Iran does not play an important role as a supplier of oil and gas to the EU, but it could become an important supplier in the future.

The urge to develop a common energy policy in the EU has been driven by several developments: declining energy production in Europe, concerns about Russia as a reliable energy exporter to Europe, increasing energy prices, and the necessity to fight climate change. The EU Green Papers³ on security of supply express the concerns that oil and gas supply in the near future will depend on a limited number of oil and gas producing countries, and that import dependence requires an improvement of economic relations with key producer countries. Europe's energy mix is strongly dominated by fossil fuels. Oil accounts for 40% of the total EU energy consumption, gas for 24%.⁴ The EU's dependence on fossil fuels is a reflection of what is a general trend in energy usage on the global level. Oil will

remain the main fuel used in the primary energy mix, though there will be a slight decrease of its share in the overall energy usage. At the same time the consumption of gas will grow more rapidly than any other energy source. Currently, about half of the energy consumed in the EU is produced at home, while the other half is imported. The EU becomes increasingly dependent on the import of energy as domestic production capacity is limited. The EU imports its oil from Russia, the Middle East, North Africa and Norway and most of its gas from Russia and Algeria. It is negotiating deals on the import of gas from Libya, Egypt, Qatar, Iran, and Azerbaijan. Furthermore, Iran and European oil companies have concluded several buyback energy contracts in recent years. For Iran, due to the sanctions imposed by the US, Europe is an alternative option to deliver FDI, modern technology, and know-how.

The planned Nabucco pipeline is a recent indication of strengthening energy ties between the EU and the Middle East and Iran in particular. The Nabucco pipeline is planned to transport gas from the Caspian region, Iran, Iraq, and Egypt via Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary to Austria. It should lower EU dependence on Russian gas. However, the future of the pipeline is no longer clear, since Russia is also following its own pipeline projects that compete with the European pipeline projects, such as the Blue Stream and the South Stream pipelines. The Blue Stream pipeline was inaugurated on 17 November 2005 and is carrying gas from Russia to Turkey via the Black Sea. The planned South Stream pipeline is supposed to carry gas from Russia to Romania, Bulgaria and Greece and from there by a south-western route into southern Italy and on a north-western route into Serbia and Hungary. The diversification of European gas imports is also challenged by other countries competing with the EU for the same resources, above all by China.

Iranian oil and gas and China's energy security supply

Historical ties between Iran and China date back as far as 139 BCE when the Hans and the Parthians established diplomatic and trade relations with each other. Trade was carried out on the 'Silk Road' which linked China to Central Asia and the Middle East. When the Mongols conquered both China and the Persian Empire in the 13th century these contacts even increased. Even today Chinese and Iranian leaders refer to these historical relations to legitimise their recent cooperation. Both countries have no history of war and conflicts with each other, which helps the strengthening of their mutual relationship.

With the rise of Deng Xiaoping to power in 1976, the implementation of economic liberalisation policies in China and economic growth, China's demand for additional energy sources has been increasing. Iran's huge oil and gas resources and rising energy import dependency in China has been the most important aspect of the relationship of these two countries. One form of cooperation is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has developed into an important global political, economic, and security organisation. Established on 14 June 2001,

its six permanent members are China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan have observer status in the organisation. The inclusion of Iran into the SCO would undermine US dominance in the Persian Gulf and increase SCO influence in the region and the Middle East and Central Eurasia at large. On the part of Iran, SCO membership would expand its international political and economic possibilities. It would grant access to SCO projects and, thus, to technology, investment, trade, and infrastructure development. That means, the sanctions on Iran imposed by the US could be undermined by Iran-SCO cooperation and also by Iran-China cooperation on a bilateral level.

It is expected that China's energy demand will double between 2005 and 2030. That means, by 2010 the country will probably have overtaken the US as the main energy consumer in the world. Today, it is the second largest oil consumer in the world behind the US. Coal will remain the main energy source accounting for 63% of total energy consumption in 2030.⁵ Although the country is trying to increase domestic production, oil imports will comprise almost 70% of the country's oil consumption by 2025. Though gas has not been a major energy source in Iran its share in the total energy mix is increasing. According to the Energy Information Administration⁶ China's gas consumption almost doubled between 1999 and 2004 to 1.3 tcf, making up about 3% of the total energy consumption in China. Though natural gas production could significantly be increased due to several natural gas discoveries in recent years China is not only orienting itself on domestic production but also considering the construction of transnational pipelines as well as the import of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from, among others, Iran. In 2006 Iran was China's third largest oil supplier behind Saudi Arabia and Angola providing China with 11% of its oil imports. It has to be expected that relations between Iran and China will intensify immensely, primarily because of China's energy needs and Iran's increasing hunger for consumer goods. However, China, which receives around 50% of its oil imports from the Middle East, is also concerned about political instability in the region and the increasing US involvement there. For this reason, China is also searching for alternative energy sources in Africa, especially Angola, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Gabon.

Prospects

Both for the EU and China Iran could become an important oil and gas supplier in the future. Iran needs the EU to develop its energy industry and the EU and China to export its oil and gas. Increased cooperation in the energy sector with both the EU and China could strengthen Iran's political and economic position in global politics and in the Persian Gulf and Caspian regions. However, to deepen the mutual relationship with both the EU and China several obstacles need to be overcome. The first is the hostile political and economic relationship with the US. Though EU and China's policies towards Iran are not dependent on the Iran-US relationship, a shift from confrontation to dialogue in the mutual relations of the latter two will make Iran-EU cooperation, and to a lesser extent Iran-China cooperation, easier. The second obstacle is an unsafe trade and investment climate both for companies and governments in Iran. These structural problems need to be overcome if Iran's aim is to secure FDI and international trade relations in the long-term. The third obstacle is the nuclear issue, which does not stand by itself but is related to Iran's overall relationship with the rest of the world. A dialogue should be comprehensive and not limited to the nuclear issue. A common approach should include not just the US and the EU, but Russia, China and India as well. With Iran keeping its options open both towards the West and the East, the EU and China should cooperate rather than act as rivals if they are to safeguard long-term access to energy resources from Iran.

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Courting the prize in Pakistan

India, China and the geopolitics of Iranian gas

While China's rapidly growing demand for energy imports is well known, less attention is paid to another rising Asian giant: India. India's energy needs are also soaring, and since many of its fossil fuel sources are identical to China's, some might say that competition and even conflict looms. How will they manage a vital future supplier – Iran – and a key potential transit country – Pakistan – and how might their interests intersect?

Philip Sen

SINCE THE FOUNDING of the modern Republic of India and People's Republic of China (PRC) both have been engaged in a long-running security dilemma fuelled by Cold War politics, regional alliances and territorial disputes. Even before we factor in potential disputes over energy, we can observe a slow-burning conflict of interests. Fearing 'strategic encirclement', India wishes to reduce Chinese influence over its neighbours (such as Pakistan) while China is dead-set against Indian aspirations of regional hegemony (Garver, 2001).

Meanwhile, Iran's major hydrocarbon reserves, its geographical location and its prickly relations with America make it a particularly interesting potential supplier. India's growing need for natural gas means it is looking to Iran – which brings it into something of a *ménage-a-trois* with its arch-rivals China and Pakistan. What are India and China's plans for courting the prize, and how do those plans relate to each other?

Rising China, shining India

It is necessary to understand a little about India and China's internal issues and how this affects energy demand. India's population continues to expand rapidly. By 2007 it stood at 1.13 billion compared to China's 1.32 billion: within a couple of decades it could well overtake China. But in terms of both total and per capita GDP, India is well behind its neighbour.

The IMF estimates India's growth in 2009 at just over 6%, more than twice the unimpressive 'Hindu rate of growth' prior to recent reforms. Such rapid change inevitably heightens the schisms within Indian society and India's rulers must assuage the anxieties of both the middle classes and the deprived rural population. Keeping a grip on such a difficult balancing act implies maintaining economic progress and thus energy security.

India's energy mix is more gas-based than China's: the amount of gas-fired electricity generation is rising by 7.5% per year. About 70% of India's increase in gas demand – which went up 38.7% between 1995 and 2000, and another 36.1% from 2000 to 2005 – is due to the power-generation sector (Vikas and Ellsworth, 2006). By 2025, the plan is for gas to take up 20% of primary consumption (Pandian, 2005).

However, India's gas reserves have only about 36 years to run, compared to China's 47. Now that India's gas demand has begun to outstrip its own production, it will have to find more sources – in 2004, it imported 2.6 billion cubic metres (Bcm) of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from Qatar, and it will need more and more as growth continues (EIA, 2008).

There are some similarities with China's situation. IMF statistics show that ever since the turn of the century, the PRC has experienced double-digit growth. The governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cannot allow this stunning development to derail; such a disaster would not only dislodge the Party but could throw the country into disorder (Wang, 2005). The global slowdown was already beginning to affect employment in late 2008, however, and fears of unrest were growing.

So in order for growth to continue at all, the PRC's manufacturing-based economy also needs fuel, and lots of it. Gas use tripled from 1999 to 2007. In 2007 China was still producing enough gas for its needs, but in the likely event that consumption outstrips production – just as it may in India – it too will soon become a net importer. Moreover, to help reduce pollution the CCP intends to move from coal to gas for its power generation needs (Jiang, 2006).

The pipeline

At present, both India and China obtain high proportions of their imported fossil fuels from the Persian Gulf. Iran is the 'ace in the deck', counting for 11.2% of world oil and 15.7% of gas – this puts it just behind Russia in terms of the proportion

of world gas and oil in million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe). India and Iran are historic partners, and Iran is the source of about 10% of India's oil, ranking third in 2004 behind Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. More importantly, now that India is moving towards natural gas in its energy mix, Iran is potentially India's most critical gas supplier too.

For several years there has been talk of an Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) natural gas pipeline. Around 2,775 km long, its capacity would be 150 million cubic metres per day: the project is valued at over \$7 billion. But the first problem is price. Beyond India's actual demand for energy, the IPI is also about relative cost savings of natural gas over LNG. It remains to be seen whether a price acceptable for all parties can be decided; the wrangling has continued well into 2009.

The second problem is Pakistan. Due to the interminable debate over Kashmir and India's perennial suspicions of Pakistan as a harbour for Islamic extremists, the Indian government has publicly stated that it must be Iran's responsibility to ensure the safe delivery of gas to India rather than Islamabad's. This puts Iran in a sticky position, turning haggling over gas prices from a mere trade dispute into an international political issue too.

The third problem is capacity. In the long term there is a question mark as to whether Iran is even capable of supplying all the energy it promises. The combination of American sanctions and Iran's prohibition of foreign ownership has resulted in deterioration of its energy infrastructure. There is a real danger that Iran won't be able to meet demand as it increases.

And then there's the geopolitics. If India's relationship with Iran is well established, China's is even more so. Significantly, China is heavily involved in Iran's oil and gas development. In 2004, for example, several major gas deals were signed to the tune of \$100bn over a 30 year period, and China is also investing \$750m in Iran's Yadaravan gas field (Garver, 2006).

Were the IPI to go ahead, there is Pakistan to consider too. Whoever has the most influence over Pakistan if it becomes a key energy corridor commands an element of power over their strategic opponent. If China took the upper hand in Pakistan, it would have the option to make India's energy access more difficult, and vice versa.

It is telling that, despite Pakistan's dealings with Washington, the Sino-Pakistan relationship has arguably been the most stable of all Beijing's foreign contacts over the last 50 years. A strong Pakistan is useful for China in countering Indian regional hegemony, and historically, whenever the US has aided India, China has responded by building up Pakistan (Garver, 2001). Beyond China's political and military support, Sino-Pakistani economic relations have also been strong.

The advantage may thus pass to China, and indeed in 2008 there were reports that Beijing had already expressed an interest in the IPI project. Since Islamabad and Tehran are already agreed on the price of Pakistan's share of the gas coming through the pipeline, if New Delhi continues to drag its feet then Beijing could step in and take the Iranian gas for itself (Economic Times, 2008).

The port

In fact, China's energy policy regarding Iran and Pakistan is already beginning to impinge on India's interests. While India develops the Chahbahar port in Iran, 200 kilometres to the east Chinese transnational companies continue to sponsor a rival project at Gwadar in Pakistan.

Aiming to emulate Rotterdam, Dubai and China's Special Economic Zone (SEZ) at Shenzhen (Arthur D. Little, 2006), the former fishing town of Gwadar is intended to become



an internationally competitive port facility. The facility will be linked to Iran and Karachi via the Makran coastal road, for which the Asian Development Bank is contributing \$500m (Hassan, 2002).

The first phase of Gwadar's construction was sponsored mainly by China, which contributed an estimated \$200m, 80% of the \$248m costs (Fazl-e-Haider, 2007). Phase 2 construction costs alone are estimated at around \$600m, and China has already pledged \$200m (Garver, 2006).

Much of that Chinese investment is down to Gwadar's potential as an 'energy hub'. As a major regional container port and refining facility, Gwadar's final role as an 'energy hub' could be as the meeting point of no less than five oil and gas pipelines – including the fabled Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAP[1]) pipeline.

So, should China take over the Iran-Pakistan pipeline, it already has an advantage over India. Gwadar's geostrategic position is clearly useful for China – otherwise, why pay? It is in a good location to connect to China's disadvantaged western province of Xinjiang, for example, and could serve as a useful 'port of call' for the People's Liberation Army Navy too. Should Beijing need to protect oil supplies from the Gulf in the event of a confrontation with Washington, New Delhi or Tokyo, it might even act as a temporary military base (Niazi, 2005).

Thus India has reasons to desire the downfall of the Gwadar project: if Gwadar failed it would boost Chabahar; it would degrade China's potential to siphon off Iranian and Gulf energy; and it would deny the Chinese a naval outpost to cover the Straits of Hormuz. In this sense, Gwadar could become a focal point of the destructive competition for energy and transit options.

China is downplaying the significance of Gwadar for India. Chinese analysts note that if Beijing wanted to control the port it could, but it has allowed the independent Singapore Port Authority to control it so as not to ignite tensions with India.

On the other hand, in economic terms, India could benefit from Gwadar's refinery capacities and as a potential terminal for the TAP(I) and a reference point for the IPI. Buying energy via Gwadar would bind India into a complementary commercial relationship with Pakistan and China that would have benefits for all. And China's construction of a conducive environment for Pakistan as an energy hub could even do India a favour by encouraging growth and stability in Pakistan, thus reducing the risk of an explosion over Kashmir.

Yet there has been little indication that New Delhi is about to sign a deal on the IPI. With its sanctions regime against Iran, Washington remains against the IPI pipeline and in 2008 the Congress government signed a controversial nuclear deal with the Bush administration. This deal played into the hands of leftist and Hindu nationalist political parties, and in India, such things can be vote-winners.

When it comes to courting the prize of Iranian gas, and striking a deal to transport it, China holds the advantage over India. The truth will ultimately be told in some decades time when domestic reserves of natural gas begin to dwindle. Only then might New Delhi regret missing the opportunity to share the prize with China and Pakistan – and look upon them as rivals even more.

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In order for growth to continue at all, the PRC's manufacturing-based economy also needs fuel, and lots of it.

Japan-China nuclear energy cooperation



Maximisation of Japan's nuclear energy production involves more than domestic development and national energy efforts; nuclear energy cooperation with China has the potential to ensure the materialisation of this aim. But under what circumstances would Japan and China engage in nuclear energy cooperation? Raquel Shaoul acknowledges the potential obstacles, but provides a new energy-economic approach which presents cooperation as a win-win energy equation worth consideration by policy-makers in the two countries.

Raquel Shaoul

GIVEN THE CURRENT domestic and regional instability within major oil and natural gas producing countries, the fierce competition between consumers for access to these resources, the accumulated environmental damage due to the extensive use of coal and the uncertain remaining quantity of fossil fuels available to meet global energy demand, development of reliable alternative energy resources, such as nuclear power, is essential. Whether or not nuclear energy will contribute to filling the gap between world energy demand and supply, it is considered significant for the achievement of security of energy supply for big energy consumers, such as China and Japan.

Japan's nuclear policy and capabilities

Japan is dependent on imports for 81.9% of its energy supply, importing 99.8% of its oil consumption, 96.6% of its natural gas, 98.4% of its coal and 100% of its uranium. Of its total electric power generation, including private power generation, of 1,161 billion kWh in 2006, thermal power (coal, petroleum and gas) accounted for 65%, hydro power for 8.4% and nuclear power accounted for 26.1% (Statistical Handbook of Japan 2008). Nuclear power generation therefore enhances Japan's energy self-sufficiency from 6.1% to 17.3%, and as such it has taken on a central role in ensuring Japan's national energy security.

Subsequent to the oil crises of the 1970s, the Japanese government has followed a policy of developing and enhancing nuclear power generation. On 11 October 2005, the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) adopted the Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy as the basic policy strategy to be followed by government and industries for ten years. The Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy determined that the share of nuclear power in electricity generation after the year 2030 should be at the level of 30 to 40% of total electricity production. It also confirmed that nuclear power production would be focused on light water reactors –LWRs (JAEC 2005).

The New National Energy Strategy Report of 2006 reaffirmed these policy directions for nuclear power. Numerical targets to be achieved by 2030 were set in order to accomplish objectives. The New National Energy Strategy called for raising the ratio of nuclear power in the total power production to a level of 30% to 40% or more by 2030. Recently, Japanese nuclear energy policy has been emphasising not only its importance in terms of national energy security but also in terms of Japan's leading role in the international arena.

China's evolving nuclear policy and capabilities

China's primary energy use has increased more than fourfold from 413 Mtoe in 1980 to 1,863.4 Mtoe in 2007, with an average annual growth rate of 12% (British Petroleum 2008). Moreover, China's energy consumption is estimated to increase 30-fold by 2030 (from 1,560 million tons of oil equivalent in 2005 to three billion tons per year in 2030) (IEA 2007). China's

electricity demand in 2007 was the second largest in the world, and is expected to continue to increase significantly for the next 20 years at an annual rate of as much as about 140TWh (Maeda 2007). Chinese electricity demand has been growing at more than 8% per year and electricity shortage occurred especially in the coastal provinces, such as Guangdong and Zhejiang, where industrialisation is booming. Though nuclear energy currently accounts for only 1.9% of the country's total electricity consumption, in coastal provinces it currently accounts for 13% (Xu 2008).

Whether or not China's increased nuclear power capacity will cover expected increases in energy demand in the near future, the Chinese government currently concedes that China has no alternative but to develop nuclear power.

According to the Three Stage-Strategy in the National Medium- and Long-term Plans for Science and Technology Development announced by the Chinese Government in February 2006, throughout the Second stage (2021-2035), China's goal is to increase the nuclear share to the current global average of 16% (Maeda 2007). Furthermore, in the 11th Five-Year Plan 2006-10 of March 2006, the Chinese government declared its support for nuclear power plant development and construction. China's National Plan for Coping with Climate Change, released by the government in June 2007, confirmed once more that the government's objectives to address climate change by 2010 include, among others, to boost nuclear power plant construction (State Council of the People's Republic of China 2008).

Several factors have encouraged China to pursue nuclear energy: the first factor is China's deteriorating energy situation, as manifest in electricity shortages. Second, some inherent problems exist within coal-fired energy production. In 2007, 'burning coal contributed to 90% of the national total sulphur dioxide (SO₂) emissions, about 70% of the national total dust, nitrogen oxide (NO_x) emissions and carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions' (Zhang 2007: 3547).

Is nuclear cooperation feasible?

Enhancement and materialisation of current and future nuclear energy cooperation will largely depend on how Japan and China manage to reconcile their different energy needs and domestic political limitations. China's expanding energy needs contrast sharply with the stagnant energy demands of Japan.

China's current central energy problem is the result of a lack of effective governmental mechanisms to promote and materialise energy efficiency and conservation. Despite this, the Chinese energy market is 90% self-sufficient. The Japanese energy market, in contrast, shifted its high energy consumption and environmentally-unfriendly heavy industries and adopted major energy efficiency measures. However, due to its almost total lack of domestic energy sources, Japan's primary energy self-sufficiency accounts for merely 17.3% of its energy consumption. Consequently, the two countries have adopted different 'Energy Mix' approaches to assure energy security. While development of nuclear energy is vital to enhance Japan's energy security, China's energy market, in the short term, can continue without significant nuclear energy development.

While development and utilisation of nuclear energy provides many advantages for China's energy market, especially in the mid and long-term, the Chinese government may choose to develop alternative energy solutions, such as clean coal technology and renewable energy technology instead of or in addition to nuclear energy development.

Mutual distrust derived from historical rivalry; ongoing geo-political and territorial disputes; hostile domestic public opinion and political nationalist sentiments in both countries also have the potential to obstruct energy cooperation.

An additional factor potentially obstructing nuclear energy cooperation has to do with the Chinese government's demand for full transfer of nuclear technology to local partners as a pre-condition to concluding nuclear agreements. As a result, Japanese companies may be reluctant to invest in the Chinese market. Companies are concerned about potential technology being lost to low-cost Chinese competitors, due to the deficient imposition and protection of intellectual property rights in China.

Despite the above mentioned impediments to nuclear energy cooperation, there are also shared interests which could incline Japan and China to engage in, develop and deepen their nuclear energy cooperation. The first of these interests is already leading to nuclear cooperation and the second offers potential for future nuclear cooperation:

Capital investment and business opportunity:

Actual nuclear energy cooperation between China and Japan is taking place as a result of the Chinese government's needs for capital to develop and expand its nuclear industry and

Japanese companies looking after energy business opportunities – especially at a time when the Japanese economy is facing difficulties. In order to attract foreign direct investment, China has been improving laws and policies related to the opening up of its market. And in the face of the massive potential of the Chinese energy market, the three big Japanese businesses dealing in power systems – Toshiba, Hitachi and Mitsubishi – have begun to run nuclear energy business in China.

In July 2007, Toshiba's subsidiary Westinghouse Electric Company signed an agreement with consortium partner Shaw and several Chinese companies to construct four AP1000 nuclear power reactors in China (CNNC 2006). Two plants are to be constructed at Sanmen and another two at Haiyang, with each plant estimated to cost up to \$US4 billion. Construction of these third generation plants is to start in 2009 and completion of the first plant is expected by 2013. In other words, more than 50% of the current Chinese nuclear power plant construction (four out of seven plants) is being managed by a Japanese company.

Reliable energy supply and maximisation of nuclear energy utility:

The concept of electric power grid interconnection in North East Asia is not new. There are electricity grid interconnections between Japan and Korea, made possible by recently developed High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) undersea cable technology (Kanagawa and Nakata 2006). The idea behind transnational electricity supply grids as a means to promote nuclear energy cooperation between Japan and China relies on these same HVDC technology breakthroughs. One breakthrough relates to the world's longest transmission link from the Xiangjiaba hydro power plant, located in the south-west of China, to Shanghai, located 2,071 km away (ABB Corporate 2007). Another technological HVDC improvement is to do with undersea electricity transmission.

Electricity cannot be stored; therefore, supply and demand must be kept in balance in real-time. Moreover, supply of nuclear electricity is inflexible to momentary fluctuations in energy demand due to its lack of substitutability –for this reason, electricity generation in Japan is powered by mixed energy sources (including oil and natural gas together with nuclear power) which compensate for nuclear energy inflexibility. Taking this into account, nuclear energy's share of the total power plant's electricity generation can only rise to a maximum of about 40%. Electricity sales to China might permit Japan to take full advantage of nuclear energy production and promote nuclear energy cooperation.

China is currently facing intensified urbanisation and a sharp increase in electricity demand. Development of nuclear energy, in concert with other energy measures, might permit China to continue to carry on economic development and avoid negative side-effects from accelerated industrialisation. Moreover, nuclear energy purchase from Japan might be an economic solution to sustaining China's energy security supply.

To achieve the potential benefits from power grid interconnection and trade there are many issues that need to be resolved. There could be technological problems due to differences in standards and quality of power by country. There is also great concern about the reliability of interconnected power grids, because their malfunctioning may lead to costly and hazardous blackouts (Yun and Zhang 2006). Nevertheless, in principle, it offers a win-win energy option for the two countries.

Prospects for nuclear energy cooperation

The governments of Japan and China recognise the significant advantages of nuclear power cooperation. Japanese companies have succeeded in entering China's promising nuclear energy market. However, broad nuclear energy cooperation can only possibly be achieved as a result of governmental support in a capital-intensive field.

Nuclear energy cooperation can significantly improve the two countries' energy security when this initiative is also materialised at governmental level. Nuclear energy cooperation occurring at the bilateral and domestic mentioned levels can be a significant positive influence on regime stability and the countries' broad-spectrum political relations - e.g. with regards to the long-standing territorial and energy dispute over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea.

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Transition management and institutional reform

A transition to a sustainable energy system involves more than developing new technologies; institutions ensuring the proper functioning are also necessary. With this in mind, Daniel Scholten examines what the Dutch transition management policy has achieved in terms of institutional reforms so far.

Daniel Scholten

INCREASING FOSSIL FUEL SCARCITY and deteriorating environmental conditions urge for a transition towards a more sustainable energy system. Behind this simple notion lies a very complex reality however: such change does not only involve technical and economic aspects but also institutional reforms. As many scholars have already noted, to be effective with new technologies, 'a nation requires a set of institutions compatible with and supportive of them. The ones suitable for an earlier set of fundamental technologies may be quite inappropriate for the new' (Nelson 1994: 58). Indeed, history is full of examples where existing institutional structures pose an obstacle to the success of new technologies and complementary industries which 'require institutional reform if they are to develop effectively.'

Consider in this respect that the Dutch cabinet restated its ambition to achieve a sustainable energy system in the Energy Report 2004. It also adopted 'transition management' as the official governance framework for the energy transition. The question arises, what has transition management so far been able to achieve with regard to institutional reform? On the one hand, transition management is a promising approach because it addresses technological innovation processes within their wider institutional and societal context, claiming that changes in one without the other will remain fruitless in the long run. On the other hand, transition management is a novel policy perspective that has yet to prove itself in practice.

Promises and practice

Bruggink (2005: 6) classified an energy transition as a process of 'socio-technical evolution in which economic, institutional and technological structures develop interactively and change drastically in the long run.' To manage such a societal transformation, transition management treats institutional design as an innovation process where technologies and institutions co-evolve and intend to inject 'goal-directing processes into socio-technical transformations' (Kemp and Loorbach 2006: 22). Thus, transition management is more a governance perspective than an instrument to obtain predefined policy outcomes. Key in the proposed method are energy transition platforms where various public and private stakeholders continuously readdress visions, transition paths and experiments in an iterative and reflexive manner consisting of four phases: 1) organising a multi-actor network, 2) developing sustainability visions and transition agendas, 3) mobilising actors and executing projects and experiments, and 4) evaluating, monitoring and learning (Kemp and Loorbach 2006: 17). Finally, once a dominant technology emerges transition management advocates 'control policies to put pressure on the existing regime [...] to bring about transitions' (Kern and Smith 2008: 2). This focus on the institutionalisation of new technologies poses a step forward from the energy policies of the 1990s based on bottom-up, market oriented approaches because it not only looks at market incentives and technology push policies, but also tries to create a framework where government policy makers, industry stakeholders, NGOs and scientific institutes actively pursue accompanying institutional changes to ensure the emergence of a new energy system.

The Fourth Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan (2000) is the starting point for both a transition towards a more sustainable energy system and the introduction of transition management as the governance framework. The Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ), in charge of energy and innovation policy, has taken the role of 'transition manager'. The heart of the energy transition project is currently based on seven

transition platforms where public and private actors meet to develop shared visions, pathways and experiments: new gas, chain efficiency, green resources, sustainable mobility, sustainable electricity, the built environment and the greenhouse as energy source (SenterNovem 2009).

Most of the seven themes stem from consultations among existing energy sector incumbents and scenario studies conducted under the long-term energy supply strategy project drawn up in 2000 (Kern and Smith 2008: 3). In addition, EZ started in 2002 with the Project Implementation Transition management which aimed to find out whether the various themes would have enough 'support, enthusiasm and commitment' from the relevant stakeholders (Kemp and Loorbach 2006: 19). The beginning energy transition also led to the government looking for new energy policy instruments and redefining its relationship with society and business (Kern and Smith 2008: 4).

After these initial developments, the Ministry of Economic Affairs started to develop the themes into strategic visions in 2003-2004. To this end, public-private transition platforms were established for each theme and were tasked to work out 'possible transition pathways along which an energy transition can be achieved' (Kern and Smith 2008: 3). The platforms consisted of stakeholders recruited from existing policy networks. Since 2005 the first transition pathways have been explored in technological niche experiments carried out by stakeholder coalitions.

2005 also saw two major organisational changes to the energy transition project. First was the introduction of the energy transition taskforce made up of high-level members from Dutch industry and the public sector to complement existing platforms. Second was the creation of an inter-departmental energy transition directorate encompassing civil servants from various relevant ministries.¹ While the taskforce is essentially an advisory group that oversees the transition process, identifies strategic directions and aims to 'strengthen the role of the platforms' (Kern and Smith 2008: 3), it is hoped that the directorate will integrate transition and other ongoing policies.

On 25 February 2008 the *regieorgaan energietransitie* or energy transition directing organ succeeded the taskforce as the leading body of the energy transition for the coming five years (SenterNovem 2009). The organ consists of seven platform chairmen, three independent members and the organ's own chairman. Its main task is to advise the government how to best facilitate the market, create support for the transition by public and private actors, guard the coherence among the various platforms and experiments, and prioritise promising pathways. Whereas the taskforce aimed at sketching ambitions, planning visions and creating a high profile for the transition, the organ focuses on the execution and has therefore a more directing character.

Assessing institutional reform

Institutional reform has so far largely been neglected in the energy transition project. The core cause of this neglect is often ascribed to the over-representation in the transition platforms of stakeholders in the existing energy sector (Kern and Smith 2008: 7; Loorbach et al. 2008: 311-312). This is perhaps not surprising since transition stakeholders were mostly selected from the existing energy sector incumbents to begin with. Indicative of this is Shell's prominent position within Dutch energy transition policy; it holds the chair of the energy transition taskforce, and has representatives on the various transition platforms. Unfortunately, this dominance of business actors has led to a situation where platform members are urging for investments that primarily benefit themselves. Consequently, the focus of the platforms has been on more immediate and attainable technical and economic goals, such as CO₂ storage technologies or using hydrogen for the 'greening' of natural gas. More advanced options for the long-term, that might produce more favourable outcomes, like a transition to the use of hydrogen as a motor fuel, have been neglected. Consequently, most of the seven platform themes represent innovations that are complementary to or an extension of existing energy technologies.

The focus of transition management seems to be on incremental optimisation rather than developing radically new technologies. While this may turn out not to be a problem – the accumulation of small steps can result in big change – it is more likely that the gradual process ends in incremental change; that is to say, changes which conform to the existing technological regime.

Prospects for institutional reform

We can put transition management's neglect of institutional reforms squarely into the hands of policy makers, who failed to include sufficient innovative newcomers in the platforms.

The obvious remedy lies in the expansion of niche market actors (such as renewable energy companies with no stake in the current energy infrastructure), NGOs and other societal groups. However, in defence of policy makers, it may still be too early to assess transition management's track record on institutional reform. In the early phases of a transition the focus is on exploring and developing technical alternatives. This renders institutional change premature as one does not know which technology is going to be the next big thing and, in turn, which institutional requirements need to be fulfilled.

Hisschemöller et al. (2006: 1234) approach the issue from a different angle. They state that transition management 'reveals an institutional bias in that it articulates opportunities for collaboration and competition in a particular way, thereby creating a context for policies, regulations, and instruments.' Consider in this respect that the government plays the role of a facilitator and not an authority. Finding consensus among stakeholders might inhibit quick and responsive decisions, consequently leading to a more incremental change process favouring business as usual options. As such, stakeholder dialogue on innovation might inhibit exactly what it aims to achieve: innovation. Hisschemöller et al. (2006: 1234) hypothesize further that 'the more complex infrastructure requirements, the greater the likelihood that major government interventions will be needed' and doubt whether low profile governance is able to really include advanced technical options into the energy transition project.

As technical change has economic repercussions, struggles between incumbent industry actors and innovative newcomers are an important dynamic behind the emergence of new technologies and accompanying institutions. Transition management addresses these struggles during 'institutionalisation' but does not address how these struggles influence and condition policy options, formulation and implementation beforehand. As such, the transition may well be determined by politics before it gets started.

Summing up, the key problem in assessing the lack of institutional reforms seems to be whether the cause is decisions by policy makers that can be remedied in the future or that transition management itself is inherently biased and that therefore improvements are unlikely to occur. Although this could serve as closure on transition management's efforts concerning institutional change, there is one thing I feel is sincerely neglected in the debate so far. There has been no serious attempt to address the two difficulties in aligning institutions to technologies as developed by Nelson (1994: 61): a) it is not yet clear how various institutions can be represented so as to compare them to technologies in order to align them; b) it is unclear how the (social) (co) evolutionary processes involved in changing institutions, can be operationalised (and influenced). On both accounts transition management has made no relevant effort to date.

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
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1. Economic Affairs (EZ); Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM); Transport, Public Works and Water Management (V&W); Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV), Finance (Fin); Development Cooperation (OS) (part of Foreign Affairs).

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Transition management is a novel policy perspective that has yet to prove itself in practice.



EU-China energy relations and geopolitics

Challenges for cooperation

Beijing's rapidly rising import dependencies on energy and raw materials have numerous consequences for foreign, security and defence policies, as its policies to the EU or to the Iranian nuclear question have demonstrated during the last years. The EU, China, India and others may compete for the same energy resources in the Middle East, Russia and Central Asia. Whether they follow a 'market strategy' or a 'strategic approach' may ultimately decide whether they are able to cooperate for regional and global energy security or whether they will increasingly compete.

Frank Umbach

GERMANY DID NOT WAKE UP to the new geopolitical and geo-economic realities until its industry experienced mounting difficulties with its imports of raw materials because China, India, and other states were prepared to pay far more than customary international market prices for them. On 8 March 2005, the Federal Association of German Industry (BDI) held a congress on protecting Germany's supply of raw materials and energy, its first such event in more than twenty years. Since then, a high-ranking BDI group with three working groups has been created to address issues of international raw materials and to formulate a national supply concept to them until 2008. Although they have published the research results in a final report, the German government has not published its official concept on supply security for raw materials (with a focus on non-energy resources). Meanwhile, China's energy policies and strategies have become an important issue for bilateral cooperation between Germany and China, particularly in regard to renewable energy sources, energy efficiency and conservation as well as clean coal technologies.

Evolving EU-China energy cooperation

In contrast to the bilateral cooperation between Germany and China, the EU started its dialogue on energy policies already in 1994. The bilateral energy discussions are one of the oldest of the 24 sectoral dialogues between China and the EU. Those energy dialogues take place in the form of annual working group meetings and a bi-annual Conference on EU-China Energy Cooperation. It includes discussions of energy policy and development strategies, the evolution of energy markets, and security of supply and sustainable development. The 'Memorandum of Understanding on Transport and Energy Strategies' of September 2005 envisages cooperation in areas such as energy regulation, renewable energy (including alternative transport fuels), energy efficiency, natural gas, clean coal technology (near zero emissions) and other new technologies in the energy sector. Furthermore, a new EURATOM agreement with China focuses on research into the peaceful use of nuclear energy and grants researchers from both sides access to each other's nuclear facilities. Both sides are also participating in the international ITER-programme for the construction of a experimental controlled fusion reactor. In 2005, the European Commission and the Chinese Ministry for Science and Technology (Most) signed an Action Plan on Clean Coal and terms of reference for an Action Plan on Industrial Cooperation on Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energies.

Most recently, both sides have broadened their energy dialogue by including climate protection issues (in addition to the newly established EU-China Partnership on Climate Change) in their governmental and track-two energy meetings, such as working groups and conferences. At the same time, both sides are now more willing to take over more global responsibilities for coping with these global challenges, as China's efforts to create low carbon zones and eco-cities, funded jointly by Chinese and foreign sources, or common research projects on carbon capture and storage (CCS) highlight.

These forms of official cooperation and the many other common discussions on bilateral Track-2 or Track-3 Conferences have become more urgent and important for the EU for two major reasons:

China as a global challenge for energy security and climate change

During the last years, China has replaced the US as the centre of the world's raw material's market and as a price setter for these industrial raw materials. In 2009, it is expected even to surpass Germany as the largest exporter of goods in the world. Since 2000, China has accounted for 40 percent of the world's crude oil demand. In 2003, it already displaced Japan as the world's second largest energy consumer, and surpassed even the US and Japan as the second and third largest exporter (after Germany). Although having the third-largest coal reserves worldwide, China became a net importer at the beginning of 2007. Domestically, China's heavy reliance on coal in its primary energy consumption has raised enormous environmental problems and costs that increasingly threaten its future economic growth. According to an analysis of the Environment Assessment Agency of Netherlands, China has already replaced the US as the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG) in 2006.

Like many other Asian countries (with the exceptions of South Korea, Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong), China has long subsidised energy consumption. The result has been an increasing inefficiency: China consumes up to five times as much energy to produce each dollar of economic output – a factor often underestimated in the government's energy forecasts. China's energy (foreign) policy seems to be based on a strategic approach (but with an increasing market orientation), thereby focusing on guaranteeing the rising energy imports for its social economic stability and its supply security. Until recently, it has rather neglected energy conservation, economic efficiency factors and environmental costs until very recently. At the same time, China has experienced an acute shortage of energy since 2003, which severely disrupted its industrial output and electricity supply.

China's 'neo-mercantilist' energy foreign policy and high risk diplomacy

As a consequence of its hunger for energy and industrial raw-materials, China has become ever more dependent on imports from distant, often politically-unstable parts of the world. It was forced to conduct much more pro-active foreign and security policies both on the regional as well as global level - reflecting China's self-perception of its energy insecurity. In the last 15 years, the economic rise of Asia, and above all China, has created an enormous regional and global energy demand that raises not only important economic issues, but also countless foreign and security policy issues for both regional and global stability. In order to solve many of China's rising social economic, energy and environmental problems, the great power is dependent on a peaceful environment in its Asia-Pacific region as well as on a global scale. Internationally, Beijing seeks increased legitimacy for rising great power status which is bolstering its political stability at home. By cherishing its concept of non-interference in domestic affairs in other countries, China has been surprised by the increasing criticism not just in the US at its energy diplomacy but also in the EU and even increasingly in developed countries themselves such as in Africa and Latin America.

Given the new energy policy dependencies in the 1990s, China's foreign and security policy had to deal with regions and countries that until then had played either no or only a secondary role in its traditional foreign policy. In the future, the possibility of greater economic and political rivalry, in particular with Japan, India, the US and, in the medium and long-term with Russia in Central Asia, for shrinking global oil reserves cannot totally or principally be excluded. Furthermore, Chinese energy experts are often more sceptical about global energy reserves and do not even rule out a serious shortage of oil reserves in the next 20 years. For that reason, they frequently arrive at much more alarming analyses than Western experts.

Conclusions and perspectives

In this light, it becomes clear that, more than ever, both the EU and China need to develop integrated solutions to the energy-climate nexus in order to balance energy priorities with economic and environmental objectives. For China, even more than the EU, the primary challenge in the years and decades ahead remains how to transit to a more secure and a low-carbon energy system by taking actions without weakening the economic and social development remains.

In the past, China largely responded to environmental crisis on a rather piecemeal basis instead of a broader and comprehensive strategy in keeping a stable ecological system and on seeking sustainable development. Future research on China's energy policies and the future EU-China energy relations and geopolitics needs to address the major challenges of Beijing's energy policies as well those for bilateral cooperation, such as:

1. Although Beijing has set new priorities for increasing energy efficiency, such as adjusting electricity supply structure for higher efficiency or importing modern coal-mining technologies with high efficiency and clean burning technology, they are insufficient and need to be an integral part of an overall comprehensive strategy which would include all sectors of the economy and private households.
2. Furthermore, though China does not have to fulfil any obligations of the Kyoto-protocol, international pressure on Beijing will increase to improve energy efficiency in the years ahead. Hence China needs to design more radical incentive strategies to promote energy efficiency comprehensively, thereby including renewable energy development as well as enhancing its cooperation with the international community. Given that the EU-members and Japan are the leading and most experienced countries of high energy efficiency standards, the EU's sectoral dialogues with China on energy and climate change challenges need to be based on a more comprehensive concept and integrated strategy that takes into account more systematically both the domestic challenges of China's energy-climate nexus as well as its energy foreign policy directions, which are increasingly interrelated and cannot be separated and de-linked as was the case with past EU-China energy dialogue.
3. The Western aim of encouraging China's integration into the international global cooperation structures, while insisting, in return, that Beijing abide by the same rules as everyone else, will remain the major strategic goal and challenge for the years to come. Decisive will be whether the EU has the political will, attention and resources as well as whether China will offer more transparency, openness, and strengthening its market orientation of its energy policies and develop integrated concepts for its energy and environmental/climate protection policies. In order to exert a larger influence on the direction of China's energy and environmental/climate protection policies, it will be important for the EU to take China's views, perceptions and political-economical priorities more into account and to develop a better understanding of them in the light of its often underestimated domestic problems and challenges. Otherwise the EU will marginalise its own future leverage and influence towards China's energy and environmental/climate protection policies.

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
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




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Objects of Translation: Material Culture and Medieval 'Hindu-Muslim' Encounter.
Finbarr B. Flood
Princeton University Press. 2009
ISBN 978 0 69112594 7

OBJECTS OF TRANSLATION offers a nuanced approach to the entanglements of medieval elites in the regions that today comprise Afghanistan, Pakistan and north India. The book – which ranges in time from the early 8th to the early 13th centuries – challenges existing narratives that cast the period as one of enduring hostility between monolithic 'Hindu' and 'Muslim' cultures. These narratives of conflict have generally depended upon premodern texts for their understanding of the past. By contrast, this book considers the role of material culture and highlights how objects such as coins, dress, monuments, paintings and sculptures mediated diverse modes of encounter during a critical but neglected period in South Asian history.

The book explores modes of circulation – among them looting, gifting and trade – through which artisans and artefacts travelled, remapping cultural boundaries usually imagined as stable and static. It analyses the relationship between mobility and practices of cultural translation, and the role of both in the emergence of complex transcultural identities. Among the subjects discussed are the rendering of Arabic sacred texts in Sanskrit on Indian coins, the adoption of Turko-Persian dress by Buddhist rulers, the work of Indian stone masons in Afghanistan, and the incorporation of carvings from Hindu and Jain temples in early Indian mosques. Objects of Translation draws up contemporary theories of cosmopolitanism and globalization to argue for radically new approaches to the cultural geography of premodern South Asia and the Islamic world.



A History of Bangladesh
Willem van Schendel
Cambridge University Press. 2009
ISBN 978 0 521 67974 9

BANGLADESH IS A NEW NAME for an old land whose history is little known to the wider world. A country chiefly known in the West through media images of poverty, underdevelopment and natural disasters, Bangladesh did not exist as an independent state until 1971. Willem van Schendel's history reveals the country's vibrant, colourful past and its diverse culture as it navigates the extraordinary twists and turns that have created modern Bangladesh. The story begins with the early geological history of the delta which has decisively shaped Bangladesh society. The narrative then moves chronologically through the era of colonial rule, the partition of Bengal, the war with Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh as an independent state. In so doing, it reveals the forces that have made Bangladesh what it is today. This is an eloquent introduction to a fascinating country and its resilient and inventive people.



Japan's Holy War: The Ideology of Radical Shinto Ultrationalism
Walter A. Skya
Duke University Press. 2009
ISBN 978 0 822 34423 0

Japan's Holy War reveals how a radical religious ideology drove the Japanese to imperial expansion and global war. Bringing to light a wealth of new information, Walter A. Skya demonstrates that whatever other motives the Japanese had for waging war in Asia and the Pacific, for many the war was the fulfillment of a religious mandate. In the early 20th century, a fervent nationalism developed within State Shintō. This ultrationalism gained widespread military and public support and led to rampant terrorism; between 1921 and 1936 three serving and two former prime ministers were assassinated. Shintō ultrationalist societies fomented a discourse calling for the abolition of parliamentary government and for unlimited Japanese expansion.


Skya documents a transformation in the ideology of State Shintō in the late 19th century and the early 20th. He shows that within the religion, support for the German-inspired theory of constitutional monarchy that had underpinned the Meiji Constitution gave way in the late 1890s to a theory of absolute monarchy. That theory was superseded by an emperor-centred totalitarian ideology in the 1910s and 1920s. Skya suggests that the creeping democracy and secularisation of Japan's early 20th century political order were the principal causes of the terrorism of the 1930s, which ultimately led to a holy war against Western civilisation.

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Shedding light on Malaysia's Special Branch

When Malaysians think of the work carried out by the Special Branch of the police, they tend to think of infiltration and spying on opposition parties and non-governmental organisations. During elections, the observant can spot them at political rallies, often obvious in their conspicuous attempt to appear inconspicuous.

Julian C. H. Lee



Comber, Leon. 2008.
Malaya's Secret Police, 1945-1960: The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency.
Singapore: ISEAS/MAI.
324 pages. 978 981 230 815 3

While the general Malaysian public may fear the power of these agents and their informers, seasoned activists and politicians are not, generally, terribly troubled by them. Indeed, the *Options* supplement to *The Edge* newspaper, published on the polling day of Malaysia's 2008 general elections, featured a photograph showing members of the civil society organisation, the Women's Candidacy Initiative, giving one unfortunate SB (as Special Branch officers are known) agent a hard time. The photographer has captured

the relentless but good-hearted ridicule to which this poor man was subjected when he asked the women for information about who they were.

Drawing on personal experience
Of course, the Special Branch was not established to harass opposition party politicians or to be harassed by women's groups. Its roots lie in the Malayan Emergency which came into effect as the result of the Communist Insurgency. Given the significant role that the Special Branch play today both in the political sphere as well as in the minds of the public, it is important to understand its beginnings. Leon Comber's book, *Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60*, which due to its popularity has been given another printing this year, provides this in unrivalled fashion. As an SB during the Emergency, Comber is unusually well placed to draw on both personal experience and contacts to provide the reader with insights into the formation and *raison d'être* of the Special Branch.

The book is divided into twelve chapters. These describe the political context of the Emergency and Malaya's transition to independence from Britain. They also describe the demise of the under-resourced and underperforming Malayan Security Service, and the subsequent birth of the Special Branch. Two of the chapters are case studies illustrating Special Branch operations. One examines the role of the double-agent Lee Meng and how the Special Branch dealt with the communists' communications mechanisms, and the other case study examines the Special Branch's handling

of problems along the Thai border. Other chapters focus on the roles of significant figures in Special Branch history, including Sir William Jenkin, General Templer, Colonel Young, and Sir Henry Gurney who was killed, practically by accident, in a communist ambush in Fraser's Hill.

'Principles of intelligence collection'
Those interested in the *modus operandi* of today's Special Branch may find, as I did, Chapter Four the most rewarding. In it, Comber describes 'the principles of intelligence collection' which included the planting of moles, the 'turning' of communists into double agents, 'strong-arm measures', 'truth-drugs' and mass relocations of civilians. Interestingly, however, he notes that a former head of the Special Branch later came to the conclusion that many of these tactics were counter-productive and alienated the people they sought to win over.

The book is clearly written and often engaging and it is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the history of the Special Branch in Malaysia, the operations of which remain shrouded in so much mystery and about which there is much apprehension amongst ordinary Malaysian citizens.

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Fig. 1 (left)
The headquarters of Malaysia's Special Branch on Robinson Road, Kuala Lumpur

Women in the Portuguese colonial empire

This miscellaneous collection is most welcome, for it makes available to anglophone scholars recent and very challenging feminist work on the position of women in the Portuguese colonial empire. The editor, Clara Sarmiento, claims that women have been generally neglected in writings on the Lusitanian empire.

Michael Pearson




Fig. 1 (left)
Old Portuguese canon
at Dili harbour, East
Timor. Photograph
by Kok Leng Yeo

Fig. 2 (inset top)
Cathedral of St. Paul,
Macao, China.

Fig. 3 (inset below)
Se Cathedral, Old Goa,
India. Photograph
by Danny Burke.

Sarmiento, Clara, ed. 2008.
*Women in the Portuguese Colonial Empire:
the Theatre of Shadows.*
Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
xxi + 304 pages, ISBN 978 184 718718 5.

CLARA SARMENTO WRITES THAT THE AIM is to remedy the 'absence of women in Portuguese historiography' especially such 'socially marginalised and destitute' examples as slaves, orphans and nuns (p. xi). This complaint of neglect of women seems to apply mostly to non-Portuguese scholarship, for the 16-page bibliography shows how much has been done in Portuguese. The absence of women in anglophone work was recently made apparent with the publication of a very comprehensive collection edited by Francisco Bethencourt and Diogo Ramada Curto, *Portuguese Oceanic Expansion, 1400-1800*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007. (I must disclose here that I contributed to this volume.) Already well reviewed, and apparently fast becoming the standard text on the empire for an English-reading audience, it is regrettable that while most of the major themes are covered, there is no separate discussion of women, and nor are they mentioned in any detail in any of the chapters. The value of Sarmiento's collection is that it makes available to a wider public feminist work based on Portuguese sources but presented in English.

Women as witches and slaves

There are a total of 21 chapters in the book, some very short and speculative, others more substantial. Of the authors, ten come from Brazil, nine, including the editor, from Portugal, while there is one each from the US and from Macao. They come from a wide range of disciplines, though a cultural studies approach certainly underpins many of the essays. Overall, the book 'is an attempt to reclaim the position to which women were entitled, jointly with men, in social spaces in general and in colonial spaces in particular...' (p. xix)

A brief summary of each of the chapters will reveal the diversity of this collection. The editor's introduction opens with a plea to take seriously the role of women in the empire, and concludes with a brief discussion of each contribution. The first seven chapters deal with slavery. It will be remembered that in Brazil the slave trade was prohibited only in 1850, while slavery itself

continued until its abolition in 1888. Readers will also recollect that Brazil became independent from Portugal in 1822, Maria Ângela de Faria Grillo writes on memories of slavery in Brazil. It is notable that children born of a slave were also ranked as servile, thus making children very valuable. Like any other possession, slaves were merely commodities. Using newspaper advertisements, she sketches appalling conditions, and also resistance. This took various forms, including suicide and attacks on owners. Daniela Buono Calainho uses Inquisition documents to write on witchcraft and slavery in the metropole. Showing a mixture of Christian and 'African' ideas, witchcraft was very widespread, and should be seen as a means of survival in a hostile world. Unlike some of the other contributors, Calainho locates her data in a wider framework. She demonstrates an excellent knowledge of the copious European literature on witchcraft in other areas.

Women as slave owners

Eugénia Rodrigues' chapter is one of two on Portuguese Africa. She is concerned with slavery in the *prazos* of the Zambezi river valley in the 18th century. Many of the female *prazo* holders were of mixed race, and owned vast numbers of male domestic slaves, this being important for status reasons. There is excellent detail on their food and clothing. The most valued were those who could cook according to European methods. There follows an analysis of parts of the '*Anais de Vila Bela*,' relating to Mato Grosso in Brazil. The author, Leny Caselli Anzai, provides a sample of information concerning slavery from this very valuable source, and especially the *quilombos*, or settlements, established by escaped slaves. Margarida Seixas gives a detailed legalistic study of the position of slave women's children. The central concept is the rather daunting notion of 'freedom of the womb,' which was accepted only in 1856, though even then any such 'free' child still had to work for the owner for 20 years.

The chapter by Selma Pantoja uses travellers' accounts and early photographs, some of which are reproduced in an appendix, to discuss women's work in the fairs and markets of Luanda. She subjects these photographs to a very interesting cultural studies oriented 'unpacking.' They essentially exoticised the market women. As she notes, 'Far from being neutral and innocent images, purely mechanical copies of reality, as was thought in the 19th century, the photograph displays a selected aspect from reality, thus being a determining cultural fact'

(p. 82). The final slavery chapter, by Zélia Bora, is again in the cultural studies vein. It looks at women's role in food and religion in Brazil in the late 19th century, focussing on *angú*, a type of dough, and an African based spiritual expression called *Candomblé*.

Women as agents and objects of sin

The next section deals with literature and female voices. Betina Ruiz briefly discusses the love letters of a 17th century nun, Mariana da Costa Alcoforado, which have been subjected to various analyses. This is followed by a substantial piece by the editor, Clara Sarmiento, on the vexed topic of St. Francis Xavier's view of women. He found there were four types: European; converted; of another religion; agents and objects of sin. The last could include people from the first three categories. For him women and original sin were inextricably linked. He always saw them through the prism of his two main objectives: to convert people, and expand the Society of Jesus. Sarmiento says she is dubious about the oft-made claim that Xavier was a misogynist, yet I regret to say that the data she presents seems to make a strong case for exactly this criticism. This is followed by two succinct chapters. Cristina Pinto da Silva analyses the diary of a teacher in Macao, and her problems in teaching Portuguese to Chinese students. Dalila Silva Lopes then discusses a well known novel on the fall of the Portuguese empire, '*O Esgendor de Portugal*,' by António Lobo Antunes. She is concerned to foreground female voices in the novel, an example then of the focus of the whole book, which is to bring to our attention the usually neglected role of women in the empire. The contribution of Maria Helena Guimarães is rather similar. It discusses a novel about Swiss migrants to Brazil in the mid 19th century.

The last four chapters in this section are rather diverse. Luisa Langford Correia dos Santos provides a rather discursive but interesting account of Portuguese migration to Brazil after the end of slavery. Most of the incomers were men, and their aim, rather predictably, was to make money and then return to Portugal, marry and build a big house. There follows an analysis by Monica Rector of what she calls a pre-feminist play manuscript of 1898, which uses humour to criticise the position of women in Portuguese society. Finally, Teresinha Gema Lins Brandão Chaves gives us extracts from four female travellers' books about women in Brazil in the 19th century.

Women as religious observers

The final six chapters are concerned with cultural behaviour. Célia Maia Borges writes on females in the religious sphere. This fine study of ascetic-mystical movements in the 16th and 17th centuries shows that women, whose practices included mortification, prophecies and visions, were often (and I suppose not surprisingly) badly treated by established church authorities, and especially by the Inquisition. The next chapter is by Daniel Schroeter Simião, who writes on education in East Timor. This has been something of a success. Before independence village women were rarely given a role, but now they have done much better, including serving in parliament and even as Cabinet Ministers. Maria de Deus Beites Manso gives us a fascinating case study of a Brazilian woman who was divorced, and then incarcerated by the Misericórdia. She challenged this patriarchal society and finally was released, ironically to the custody of her son-in-law.

Isabel Pinto's chapter runs somewhat against the grain, for her study of female subordination claims that this ostensible discrimination is balanced by the fact that only women can ensure 'the reproduction of the species.' The next chapter returns to 19th century Brazil. Larissa Patron Chaves discusses immigration to Brazil after the end of the slave trade. Much attention has been paid to Italian and German migrants, but as one would expect the majority were Portuguese. She looks at the role of Benevolent Associations, charitable bodies which, unlike the better known Santa Casas de Misericórdia, were funded by its members. Given the social context, they were, with few exceptions, dominated by men. The final chapter is a welcome detailed study of the relationship between women and the Misericórdia in Macao. There is good data on who got charity—mostly women—and how funds were raised.

My succinct notices on these 21 chapters show how diverse this collection is. Theoretical and methodological underpinnings vary greatly. Some are very short and on very specific topics, others quite the reverse. It must also be said that the scholarly quality ranges from excellent to weak. However, the diversity of the book is really one of its strong points, for it gives some impression of the very wide range of feminist scholarship concerned with the position of women in the 'Theatre of Shadows' that is the Portuguese empire. I hope that this publication will bring this important genre to the notice of a wide international audience.

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The most
valued
[slaves] were
those who
could cook
according
to European
methods.

Tibetan literary movements

In the new edited collection *Modern Tibetan Literature and Social Change*, editors Lauran R. Hartley and Patricia Schiaffini-Vedani and their contributors have developed a bold and comprehensive vision of modern Tibetan literature and the cultural discourse that surrounds its creation, dissemination and reception.

Amy Holmes-Tagchungdarpa

Hartley, Lauran R. and Patricia Schiaffini-Vedani, eds. with a foreword by Matthew T. Kapstein. 2008. *Modern Tibetan Literature and Social Change*. Durham: Duke University Press. Xxxviii+ 382 pages. ISBN 978 0 8223 4277 9 (pbk.)

THIS PROJECT FILLS A LONG NECESSARY GAP not only in the study of Tibetan language and literature, but also in modern Tibetan cultural studies. It succeeds admirably in a task that is not attempted nearly often enough: of bringing Tibetan-related topics into meaningful dialogue with other areas and disciplines. This book positions modern Tibetan literature as part of several wider conversations regarding the modern history of Tibet; significant writers and critics of Tibetan literature, and their influences; issues of Tibetan identity, for both Tibetans who are part of the modern People's Republic of China as well as exile communities that stretch from South Asia to North America; and theoretical considerations of Tibetan literature as a form of World literature. While these themes represent over-arching concepts developed throughout the essays, the book is divided into two broad sections. The first part of the book, 'Engaging Traditions' sets out the broad social and historical contexts and key players that have informed the development of modern Tibetan literature. The second part, 'Negotiating Modernities,' develops case studies of particular works of literature and important themes in order to flesh out some of the theories developed earlier in the book. The essays can be read fruitfully through a thematic prism as well, and indeed, through this reading the wider significance of the essays as stand-alone pieces of research is also highlighted.

A rich and sophisticated literary movement

A number of articles within the book explore the influence of modern Tibetan history on the development of the genre of modern Tibetan literature. The Foreword, by Matthew T. Kapstein, and the Introduction by the editors both succinctly contextualise why the continuity of Tibetan literature has been so vital for Tibetans in the modern era. As Kapstein points out, in the early years of exile, language was seen as a bastion for all things culturally Tibetan and thus of special importance for preservation in the face of Chinese colonialism (p.vii). In the Introduction, the editors set out the traditional understanding of Tibetan literature as mostly derivative of Indian literature and tied closely with Buddhism (p.xvii), as literature was influenced by wider cultural events around the import of Buddhism into Tibet. Taking this into account, the appearance of vernacular literature that deals with modern themes in the 1980s appears all the more extraordinary (p.xx), as we are reminded throughout the book that, although modern Tibetan literature is a very new literary movement, it is already very rich and sophisticated.

In the Introduction, the editors emphasise the themes of development and 'a literary fixation on the grassland' and other pastoral modes within modern Tibetan literature as representative of the way that writers used symbolism and types of 'anticipatory nostalgia' to create resonating depictions of Tibetan society (p.xxviii). Riika J. Virtanen returns to the depiction of development in modern Tibetan writing in her article 'Development and Urban Space in Contemporary Literature.' In 'Oracles and Demons' in Tibetan Literature Today, Françoise Robin also considers how culturally powerful images in Tibetan culture, and in particular religion, have been treated in modern Tibetan fiction. She suggests that the attitude of young Tibetan intellectuals who have rejected 'superstitious' aspects of Buddhism over what they consider to be 'universal' elements of religion have been significantly influenced by governmental attitudes and treatment of religion in different parts of the Tibetan Autonomous Region and other culturally Tibetan areas in western China (pp.152-153).

The essays in this book establish a very strong case for why Tibetan literature should be included in World literature categories and given consideration for its artistic and literary quality as well as its political content.

These papers are particularly important, for they un-pack images in Tibetan fiction that may otherwise be construed as stereotypically Tibetan, and add new dimensions to such works. Tsering Shakya's article, 'The Development of Modern Tibetan Literature in the People's Republic of China in the 1980's,' also addresses the historical context in which modern Tibetan literature appeared. His consideration of the appearance of literature journals, novels and Tibetan 'scar' literature in the midst of the enormous change in the 1980s endows Tibetan literature with a heightened political depth. According to Shakya, understanding literature in modern Tibet is essential to understanding modern history, as literature has become a crucial venue for competing and dissident ideas in contemporary Tibet to the extent that '[F]or Tibetan writers and intellectuals, the Tibetan language alone has the power to preserve and reinvent Tibet,' as opposed to any other potential forum (p.83).

Shakya's article mentions how the political aftermath of the 1970s and reforms in the 1980s laid way for a new form of literature to be developed, and how one figure particularly influenced this development. Döndrup Gyel (1953-1985) casts an important shadow throughout this collection as a prolific savant who challenged conventions of Tibetan literature through his unconventional use of 'free verse' poetic forms. Rather than eulogising him though, several articles actually bring to light unexpected new information about his writing. Nancy G. Lin, for example, writes of his fascination with classical Tibetan poetry as well, as evidenced in his work on the story of the Ramayana, and convincingly creates the case that he saw the tale as 'a suitable narrative to affirm the legitimacy and continuity of the classical Tibetan literary tradition' following the Cultural Revolution (p.88). Such an argument is a departure from studies that depict Döndrup Gyel as an iconoclastic rebel, but lead us to further appreciate his tragically short-lived talent and lasting influence. Lauran R. Hartley also provides a treatment of several well known Tibetan intellectuals, including Gendün Chömpel (1903-1951), Giteng Rinpoché (1881-1944), Shelkarlingpa (1876-1913) and Geshé Sherap Gyatso (1884-1968). She places them at an important crossroads for Tibetan literature, and explores how they situated themselves in regard to Communist policy that aimed to increase Tibetan literacy (pp.23-24) before they were disrupted by the Cultural Revolution. Writer Sangye Gyatso (also known as Gangzhün) contextualises the legacy of these figures in the modern TAR and surrounding Tibetan areas through exploring the rise of modern writing groups, and how these teams of writers have influenced the development of modern literature. The book also includes resources that have themselves influenced Tibetan literary culture – for instance, Pema Bhum's iconic article on the development of modern Tibetan poetry, 'Heartbeat of a New Generation,' has also been re-printed here, along with a new article that revisits its themes.

The importance of these figures in contributing to modern Tibetan literature is enormous, but more recent and well-known ethnically Tibetan writers have also written in Chinese language. The book outlines 'the language debate' in all its complexity, and refuses to trivialise the importance of the issue of language to the concept of modern Tibetan identity by making a judgment regarding the authenticity of Sinophone Tibetan literature as a part of modern Tibetan literature. Instead, several articles develop sophisticated treatments of the polemics of the issue. Yangdon Dhondup's article explores the historical development of modern Tibetan poetry in Chinese from the works of Yidan Cairang (Tib. Yidam Tsering, 1933-2004) through to the appearance of modern literature in the 1980s. She focuses on Yidan Cairang's works as exemplary of the ability for ethnically Tibetan writers to use Chinese language mediums to express concepts of cultural national-

ism through the deployment of Tibetan imagery and ideas. The article seems particularly pertinent considering the well-publicised case of the banned writer Weise (Tib. Öser), and is nuanced in its treatment of a sensitive issue. Lara Maconi explores how the term diglossia is more appropriate in the modern TAR than bilingualism, as Tibetan language remains inferior to Chinese language socio-politically and economically (pp.175-176). Maconi carefully looks at all perspectives of the issue, and concludes that new frameworks are needed to really understand modern Tibetan literature that incorporate 'plurality, hybridity, and 'otherness'' (p.196). Maconi's conceptualisation of this subject may indeed be useful in wider contexts to understand modern Tibet.

Modern Tibetan Literature and Social Change also situates modern Tibetan literature in a wider context of international literature, and the article by Maconi above as well as contributions by Howard Y.F. Choy, Patricia Schiaffini-Vedani and Steven J. Venturino regarding some of the more famous recent Tibetan literary movements add theoretical richness to the book. These articles consider Tibetan literature in the context of discussions about magical realism, postcolonial literature and postmodernism. These studies also importantly disrupt the concept that world literature can only emerge from the context of modern nation states, and persuasively develop how, considering the multi-sited locality of the modern Tibetan community, Tibetan literature challenges concepts of 'international postmodernism' (Venturino, p.307). While most of the works and authors explored in this book are writers based in the People's Republic of China, there is a historical reason for this. Hortsang Jigme's article develops the literary scene in exile by considering ethnically Tibetan writers in South Asia as well as North American and Italian exile communities. He argues that members of these communities may not have access to Tibetan language education in early exile days as they struggled for survival, or may have more immediate impetus to learn languages from their local areas, and that therefore the literary scene in exile has not yet flourished. It appears from his more recent research however that there is interest in literature among the Tibetan community in India, and Tibetan writers are also publishing in other languages as well. These facts, along with the continuing strength of Tibetan writers in the People's Republic of China, act as indicators that modern Tibetan literature will only continue to grow stronger. Hopefully, this book will lead to the further studies, as the implications of internet publishing and blogging technologies for the development of new literature are pertinent topics that would be fascinating to explore further.


A new world literature?

The essays in this book establish a very strong case for why Tibetan literature should be included in World literature categories and given consideration for its artistic and literary quality as well as its political content. *Modern Tibetan Literature and Social Change* moves far beyond this audience however, as its mature and thought-provoking meditation on concepts of identity, ethnicity, language, and the limitations of the modern nation state in conceptualising culture will not only make it a useful text for courses on modern Tibetan history and culture, but also generally interesting for readers interested in postcolonial/ postmodern cultural studies. The editors should be applauded for putting together a selection of exciting and stimulating papers that represent the cutting edge of research in this emerging field. Hopefully this project represents only the beginning of more inter-disciplinary adventures in Tibetan cultural history.

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Fig. 1 (above)
The Potala Palace,
Lhasa, Tibet.

The rise of the 'new rich' in China



On April 14th, 2009, the China Daily ran the headline 'Millionaire's Club gets bigger in China.' Yet, who are these millionaires and how have they acquired their wealth? Does their money translate into political, social, and cultural capital as well? How do they live, and what distinguishes them? Is there even such a category as 'the rich' *vis-à-vis* other social groups?

Friederike Fleischer

Goodman, David S. G., ed. 2008. *The New Rich in China. Future rulers, present lives.* London and New York: Routledge. 302 pages. ISBN 978 0 415 45564 0

These are all pertinent questions that arise in the context of growing socioeconomic stratification processes in China. David S. G. Goodman's timely edited volume *The New Rich in China. Future rulers, present lives*, which sets out to investigate the 'political, socio-economic and cultural characteristics of the emergent rich in China, the similarities and differences to similar phenomenon elsewhere, and the consequences of the new rich for China itself,' (p. 1) gives us a good start into this field of inquiry.

The collection is divided into three sections, 'Class, status and power,' 'Entrepreneurs, managers, and professionals,' and 'Lifestyles,' preceded by Goodman and Xiaowei Zang's Introduction. Here, the authors discuss the difficulties in defining 'the new rich' who are, in fact, a highly heterogeneous group. To a certain degree they are a 'consequence of globalization' (p.1). But the authors caution to assume that the new rich are a middle class comparable to a 'universal middle class.' Instead, they suggest examining the beneficiaries of economic growth together to highlight the importance of wealth and the impact of economic growth on other aspects of social, political, and cultural changes. At the same time, they acknowledge that the new rich are rather a broad idea than a precise social group or distinct analytic category.

A different kind of 'middle class'

The argument against conceptualising the new rich as 'middle class' (or classes) is continued and elaborated on in Goodman's own chapter in the first subsection of the volume. Here the author highlights that the historic specificity of the concept of 'middle class' cannot simply be transferred or applied to the case of China. While there undoubtedly exist certain similarities, in Goodman's view the differences to the Western European concept of middle class are far more important. Further supporting the argument, Yingjie Guo contends that the middle class in China is actually rather a discourse than a reality. By emphasising the growth of the middle class, the CCP, which today claims to represent no longer the 'working classes' but the 'majority of the people,' is able to divert attention from the new rich and gloss over the contradictions that have arisen from the economic transformations for the sake of political stability.

One of the fascinating conundrums of growing wealth in contemporary China is that money does not automatically lend status and reputation, a theme that runs through the entire volume. Xiaowei Zang explains this social fact with the background of the new rich. They are often entrepreneurs who are considered to be corrupt and to have ripened their riches on the back of the workers. Despite Deng Xiaoping's lobbying, for them 'to get rich is not that glorious' (p. 54). Maybe this is also the reason why the CEOs in Colin Hawes fascinating study in the second section of the book seek to enhance their influence and social standing by celebrating their own cultural sophistication and promoting that of their employees and cus-

tomers. The disconnect between wealth and social prestige in contemporary China also looms in the background of Carillo's case study of entrepreneurs in Shanxi province. After achieving wealth in what is considered the 'dirty' business of coal mining, they enter 'cleaner' sectors to enhance their social standing. It is through engaging in charity donations, investing in education and the health care sector – business activities that are seen as benefitting society – that they gain social prestige, despite the fact that this is also highly profitable for them. The contrast between the dirty, hard, and dangerous work of coal mining and the clean, modern, sophisticated, and socially beneficial health care sector is shown to be deeply suffused in the official discourse of renkou suzhi or 'population quality.'

The new professionals

The introduction to the volume emphasised that the new rich are not only entrepreneurs, but also professionals. This group is discussed in the chapters by Cucco and Yang. Specifically, Ivan Cucco studies the professionalisation of managers and technical specialists in high-tech, post-manufacturing enterprises in Nanjing. He shows their lack of real autonomy which starkly differentiates them from middle classes in European and North American contexts. Yet at the same time, Cucco suggests that the new professionals take on an important bridging function between the public and private sectors. Yang's discussion, in turn, offers a more complicated picture of university professors, doctors, and lawyers' situation. He argues that low wage policies and limited political autonomy have actually prevented the majority of these professionals from gaining significant material benefits in the reform era. Only in the legal profession is individual wealth likely to remain legitimate and obtainable, but also only for a small minority. The professionals in his discussion can thus not automatically be counted into the 'new rich.'

The third part of the book, 'Lifestyle,' deals in more detail with issues of class making. Luigi Tomba and Beibei Tang open the section with an investigation of the 'transformative power of the new rich' that highlights consumption power as an impor-

tant factor in value production in China today. In the context of urban renewal and the housing reforms, the chapter illustrates the overlapping interests of real estate developers, the local level Party-state, and affluent homeowners. The new, white-collar, professionals and entrepreneurs effectively realise the Party-state's ambition to transform the rust-belt city Shenyang into a clean and modern metropolis. This connection between wealth, consumption, and place-making is also addressed in Carolyn Cartier's contribution about the diamond business. Beyond simple luxury consumption, it is also the place where one purchases these goods that lends status and prestige. Yet Carter's chapter also emphasises that these are shifting scales: Shanghai is gaining ever more importance in the 'positionality' of style, desire, and demand.

Edwards' contribution to the volume challenges the notion that the workings of the Chinese state have not changed. At the same time, she also highlights that the frames of political manoeuvring are still set by the Party-state. Notably, the new rich have taken up political engagement with issue-based politics. But these movements do not challenge the political structure. Instead, Edwards argues, they serve to consolidate the regime's stability by approaching issues as discrete and solvable problems within the existing structures. Edwards thus reaffirms Goodman's introductory point that China's new rich are not to be confounded with the notion of an independent and politically active middle class as it emerged in Western Europe.

Wealthy women

Gender is addressed in three contributions to the volume. In the first section, Minglu Chen examines female entrepreneurs and the interconnection of their success with the political realm. She shows how connections with the Party-state support the women's entrepreneurship. At the same time, their business success leads to more political appointments. Importantly, gendered expectations that women should keep to the private domain persist. Yet wealth draws distinctions in this regard as well: the wealthier women in Chen's sample could hire maids to assist with housework. Interestingly, as the major breadwinners, they were also the most likely to get support from other family members.


Wanning Sun, in turn, explores the dynamics of class making within the new rich's household where domestic servants are both indispensable and invisible. Here 'dirt' is once again a key concept to understanding these contradictions. While maids' central duty is to deal with dirty tasks, concomitantly they are seen as an intruder who brings dirt and disease to the new rich's home. Jeffreys, finally, highlights how the corruptive behaviour, including the consumption of commercial sex, undermines the new rich's ability to convincingly challenge the CCP as a progressive social force, as they are commonly regarded the most advanced productive forces but also the most serious moral corruptors.

In sum, the (qualitatively disparate) chapters offer an overview of, and a good introduction to the issues that arise in the context of the new rich's emergence. Nevertheless, the volume also raises new questions; the most important one is about 'class': Despite Goodman and some of the other contributors' argument against the concept of 'middle class,' almost all authors continue to use it in their discussion. Apparently there is some descriptive and/or conceptual value in the phrase. Not only for this reason, the introduction and the chapters of the first two sections especially could have profited from a more explicit engagement with the literature on class and social stratification.

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Fig. 1 (below left)
Young Chinese millionaire, Zhang Min.

Fig. 2 (below right)
The Chinese god of wealth.



Only in the legal profession is individual wealth likely to remain legitimate and obtainable, but also only for a small minority.



Re-thinking Christianity in Japan

A stunning 40 years have passed since George Alison submitted the PhD thesis which became the basis for his 1973 book *Deus Destroyed: The Image of Christianity in Early Modern Japan*. Since then, our understanding of the Japanese Christian century or the fate of Christianity in the Tokugawa Period has not been seriously challenged by new Western-language publications. The image of Christianity in Japan between 1550 and 1850 presented to us in Alison's work, and by and large shared by the profession over the last decades, has been Christianocentric not only because the narrative was informed largely through reliance on Jesuit sources, but also in the sense that there has never been any doubt that historical documents from that period dealing with Christianity were in fact about, well, Christianity.

Hans Martin Krämer

Paramore, Kiri. 2009.
Ideology and Christianity in Japan.
London: Routledge.
230 pages. ISBN 978 0 415 44356 2

IN HIS NEW STUDY, KIRI PARAMORE has set out to radically revise this view by arguing that the bulk of Tokugawa period writing on Christianity was in fact hardly concerned with actual Christians. Instead, 'the key political and ideological drivers for anti-Christian writing lay not in some clash between Eastern and Western religions and cultures, but in concrete conflicts occurring in domestic Japanese politics' (p. 5). Paramore further narrows down these 'concrete conflicts' to one major confrontation he sees at work in most of the texts he analyses. Put simply, this was the clash between a position arguing for individual autonomy and the conservative argument for externalised hierarchical sociopolitical relations. The surprising twist in Paramore's narrative is that he sees Christians as well as Confucians (and later Buddhists) on both sides of the fence.

Thus, he sets out in his chronological treatment of political ideology in Japan between 1600 and 1900 by painting a portrait of Japanese Christian thought around 1600 as doctrinally diverse (Chapter 1). While the Jesuit text *Myōtei mondō* by Habian (also known as Fabian Fukan) construed human ethics as based on the individual's capacity to discern right and wrong, the contemporaneous *Dochirina kirishitan*, produced under the supervision of Alessandro Valignano, emphasised original sin and faith as the main road to the afterlife, thereby diminishing the role of human agency in attaining salvation. In Chapter 2, Paramore then parallelises these insights with his analysis of the thought of Fujiwara Seika and Hayashi Razan, discovering 'surprising points of similarity' (p. 37). The difference between the two early Japanese Confucian thinkers is set in terms of 'individual vs. institution' (p. 39). Seika, structurally similar to Habian, stressed human agency in his interpretation of the Confucian practice of 'the investigation of things' (*kakubutsu*). Razan, in contrast, stressed an external, preexisting, and predetermined paradigm, which rendered individual knowledge useless in the process of attaining truth. Interestingly, Paramore is able to link these positions to broader sociopolitical developments at the time: 'the social conditions of Japan at this time [...] appeared to support intellectual approaches that placed emphasis on autonomous human (often spiritual) practice. [...] As the early seventeenth century progressed, however, a new more stabilized political situation emerged [...] and structures of orthodoxy and heterodoxy capable of ordering intellectual traditions in

an authoritarian framework began to emerge' (pp. 41-42). Paramore also situates Habian's post-apostasis *Hadaiusu* in these new circumstances. In 1620, Habian no longer defined the principles of nature as discernable by the human mind but rather 'as something immanent in the sociopolitical order' (p. 49).

Anti-Christianity without Christians

In Chapters 3 to 5, Paramore turns to the period in which actual Christians had ceased to constitute a real threat but, seemingly paradoxically, anti-Christian rhetoric did not subside. In searching for the anti-Christian theme, Paramore examines a number of texts of differing provenance. Beginning with the bakufu's *Bateren tsuihō no fumi*, these are, first, political texts such as edicts or diplomatic documents. Secondly, he deals with what he calls 'populist texts' such as the mid 17th century anonymous *Kirishitan monogatari* and Suzuki Shōsan's *Hakirishitan*. Thirdly, he deals extensively with writings from the high thought tradition, in particular works authored by Hayashi Razan and Kumazawa Banzan (Chapter 4) and Arai Hakuseki, Ogyū Sorai, Miura Baien and adherents of the Mito School (Chapter 5). Paramore's main argument in these chapters is that '[t]hrough the 1640s, 1650s and 1660s, anti-Christian discourse becomes gradually less related to the question of Christianity in contemporary Japan' (p. 101). Instead, as Paramore shows in some detail, Hayashi Razan used 'anti-Christian discourse' to attack his rival in competition for the bakufu's attention Kumazawa Banzan. Banzan is portrayed by Paramore, in a manner reminiscent of how he had described Habian and Seika, as having favoured 'immanent knowledge [...] over knowledge authenticated by an externalized order' (p. 99). Razan, in contrast, advocated a 'Shinto-Confucian orthodoxy' (p. 100) and thus perceived Banzan as a threat to that orthodoxy, slandering his thought as 'just a mutation of Christianity' (p. 95). While Paramore's two arguments about the difference in opinion between Razan and Banzan and about the changed referent of anti-Christian rhetoric is convincing, the reader is left wondering whether the anti-Christian element which Razan employs in few and isolated instances really constitutes a 'discourse' of its own. It might just as easily be interpreted as a metaphor for a particularly dangerous heterodoxy, which had by the second half of the 17th century lost most of its original, specific meaning.

While Razan was not apt to showing a genuine interest in the doctrine of that Christianity he spoke so deridingly about, later Tokugawa period writers such as Hakuseki and Aizawa Seishisai made efforts to delve more deeply into the foreign creed. In one of the strongest passages of the book, Paramore shows

how both Hakuseki and Seishisai relied on the same crucial political argument in denouncing Christianity as heterodoxical, namely the opportunity it opens up for the individual believer to directly address a transcendent god, thereby circumventing the earthly authorities. In this way, argued Hakuseki and Seishisai, Christian teachings upset the five (Confucian) relations and especially the relationship between ruled and ruler (pp. 108 and 120).

Modern continuities

Paramore, however, takes the discussion beyond Edo times by extending it into the modern period. His analysis of the Imperial Rescript on Education and writings by Inoue Enryō and Inoue Tetsujirō leads him to conclude that the late 19th century anti-Christian discourse diverged from that of just a few decades earlier in not being anti-Western anymore. Instead, the two Inoues resorted to the framework of Western philosophy, and more specifically conservative traditions such as Spencerian social organism theory or early Neo-Kantian philosophy, in attacking Christianity. While Paramore acknowledges this break, he also sees a continuity from the Tokugawa period 'in the use of the Christian issue to argue against liberalism and egalitarianism in the early 1890s' (p. 163).

Paramore's study convincingly presents a highly original argument and corroborates this argument by adducing a host of both well-known sources (references to volumes of the *Nihon shisō taikei* series are copious) and more unusual ones such as diplomatic correspondence of the 1620s and 1630s (pp. 70-75) or two little known texts by Hayashi Razan on rebellions plots in 1651 and 1652 (pp. 87-98). Furthermore, the strongly focused narrative contains such philological gems as an extended discussion of the dating of Razan's *Haiyaso* (pp. 66-70), not to speak of the many original translations contained within the text.

Three reservations, however, should be mentioned at the end. First, Paramore claims to have 'presented the first comprehensive study which demonstrates links between the anti-Christian writings of the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries' (p. 161). This claim is somewhat painful to accept for a German-language reader who is aware of Monika Schrimpf's 2000 study *Zur Begegnung des japanischen Buddhismus mit dem Christentum* ('On the Encounter Between Japanese Buddhism with Christianity'). Schrimpf, whose work Paramore does not refer to, in fact treats both Tokugawa-period and Meiji-period anti-Christian tracts and comes to the conclusion that Tokugawa-period writers had focused less on doctrinal divergences in their anti-Christian texts than on 'interpreting them with regard to their political meaning' (p. 195), a discursive move which Schrimpf sees at work in the 19th century as well, thus coming reasonably close to Paramore's main point.

Second, different from the ease with which Paramore treats authors associated with the Christian and Confucian traditions, he does not seem to feel equally at home with Buddhism. His portrayal of the Jōdo priest Kiyū Dōjin (also known as Ugai Tetsujō) as virtually unknown in academia (pp. 124-125) seems somewhat out of place considering that texts by Tetsujō have in fact been included (and commented upon) in the major collections of Meiji-period Buddhist writing since the 1970s and that he has received a fair amount of attention as leader of the supra-confessional *Shoshū dōtoku kaimei* by leading scholars of Meiji-period Buddhism such as Ikeda Eishun or Kashiwahara Yūsen. Equally, Paramore confesses surprise about the continuity of Buddhist thinking about the state beyond the divide of the Meiji Restoration (pp. 126-127), although proper contextualisation of the two Buddhist texts he briefly quotes would render any sense of surprise obsolete. Seen in the context of the massive corpus of anti-Christian writings by Buddhists in the *bakumatsu* period, it is rather obvious that Buddhist writers would not have abandoned their well-established logic of 'protecting the dharma is protecting the nation' (*gohō soku gokoku*) over the course of only a few years.

The last point of criticism has to be directed towards the publisher. Not only does Routledge charge the usual outrageous 75 pounds sterling for a 230-page book, but for that price the reader does not even get the full expected value: Paramore presents only a 'shortened bibliography', 'due to space constraints' (p. 200).

None of this, however, diminishes the worth of this well-written and provocative study, which not only significantly adds to our understanding of Japanese political ideology between 1600 and 1900, but indeed forces us to rethink a number of boundary drawings which we have grown accustomed to such as those between Confucianism and Christianity, East and West, or conservative and progressive.

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Fig. 1 (above)
Japanese Christian
stepping blocks
bearing wood
carving of the Virgin
Mary, were set in
the ground by
persecutors.
Christians were
hanged for refusing
to walk on them.
Photograph by
Alfred Eisenstaedt.
February 1942. Life.
Courtesy of Time inc.

Fig. 2 (below)
St Francis Xavier.
Believed to
have introduced
Christianity to Japan.



The politics of Islamic instruction



The early 21st century saw a string of terrorist actions in the US, Asia and Europe. Most prominent among these were, of course, the 9/11 attacks on the WTC in New York and the Pentagon; the Bali bombs; the bomb attacks in Madrid and London; and those on the Australian Embassy and the Marriot Hotel in Jakarta. Islamic inspired violence seemed to spread like an oil stain and Islamic inspired murders and other criminal acts were feared to be spreading like wild fire. All the major attacks were considered to be inspired by organised international Islamic radical movements and the West (and others) began to seriously worry where all this radicalism stemmed from and how it is disseminated, especially among the younger generations. Attention soon focused on Islamic schools and educational politics, especially those in Southeast Asia.

Dick van der Meij



Hefner, Robert W., ed. 2009.
Making Modern Muslims. The politics of Islamic education in Southeast Asia.
Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
x + 246 pages. ISBN 978 0 8248 3280 3

There is a large variation in Islamic schools in the region but two kinds stick out clearly. One is the Islamic boarding school, known as pesantren in Indonesia and as pondok in Malaysia and Southern Thailand, while the other is the madrasah. The first is more traditional and more or less restricted to Islamic studies whereas the second is a mixture of Islamic studies and general sciences. I hasten to add that the variety among these schools is enormous and local traditions and personal preferences of school leaders tend to colour these schools. Some pesantren are traditional to such an extent that modern sciences don't seem to exist whereas others teach in English and Arabic and pay great attention to instruction in sciences and the modern world using computer sciences and the internet on a daily basis. Madrasah also differ but not to the extent that the pesantren do.

The purpose of the book is 'to shed light on the varieties and politics of Islamic education in modern Southeast Asia' (p. 3). The combination of attention paid to the variety in combination with the politics of education is what makes this book interesting. The following countries are discussed by the following experts: Indonesia (Robert W. Hefner), Malaysia (Richard G. Kraince), Thailand (Joseph Chinyong Liow), Cambodia (Bjørn Atle Blengslil) and the Philippines (Thomas M. McKenna & Esmal A. Abdula) whereas other countries, notably the Islamic state of Brunei Darussalam fall out of the picture, and including Singapore might also have been interesting. No reasons for the omission of these countries is provided.

Defining Islamic education

Hefner starts the book with an introduction on the politics and cultures of Islamic education in the region which is very interesting but left me with some matters to ponder about. Nowhere in the introduction – or the rest of the book for that matter – is it explained what is to be understood by 'Islamic school'. The picture is not quite as simple as a divide between pesantren and madrasah and, when the roots of the dissemination of radical ideas are to be found in schools, these need not be the two kinds of schools mentioned. If the notion of Islamic education was supplemented in more detail with other methods of Islamic instruction – such as traditional gatherings for Islamic and Quranic studies and that taking place in the host of other venues where Islamic studies are practiced – the picture might have been more complete. The term Islamic education is in itself ambiguous, because for true pious Muslims Islam is everywhere and indistinguishable from any other aspect of life on earth. What Islamic schools are or should be is, therefore, not only an issue for the authors of this fine book, but also for policy makers concerned with education and development in the region and with finding a place for Islamic instruction in a world demanding other knowledge as well in order to survive.

Traditional Islamic schools somehow seem to be out of place in the modern world. To instruct children only in Islamic knowledge does not school them in tackling practical issues in the modern world, something the governments of the countries under discussion know all too well. The various ministries of education and religious affairs in the region share a history of reconciling highly sensitive relations with powerful religious scholars and leaders with the need to ensure the presence of a generation of indigenous experts and scholars, and people endowed with skills and knowledge to enable them to find their own livelihood.

Fig. 1 (above)
Photograph by
Eko Yudha.
Courtesy flickr.com

Fig. 2 (left)
While Pesantren
in Indonesia keep a
close eye on Islamic
sciences, many open
up to the modern
world as well.

Fig. 3 (right)
Girls in Bekasi, West
Java walk home from
the local Madrasah.
Photograph by
thebigdurian.
Courtesy flickr.com



Parent power

Needless to say, parents also have a say in the matter. Many parents do wish their children to be thoroughly versed in Islam but also want them to finish modern education. Interestingly, the reactions to these desires of people in the various countries seem to differ. In Indonesia, pesantren thrive as never before and many, while keeping a close eye on Islamic sciences, open up to the modern world. They grow and prosper and their role in rural development and in the making and breaking of national and sub-national politics increases as we speak. They are in no way threatened by the modern world but consider their place in the modern world a challenge they are willing – and increasingly able – to face. This is a far cry from the situation in Malaysia where the pondok has lost the battle with the madrasah because parents are acutely aware that Islamic knowledge alone does not provide for a family and that the modern world has other requirements. The role of governments in providing for, or withholding, financial support for Islamic schools is crucial. No educational system can survive without governmental support and the withholding of this support is an important tool in influencing the educational situation.

Instruction in important aspects of traditional Islamic knowledge continues to be facilitated by the use of so-called kitab kuning, loose-leafed books printed on yellow paper, usually in Arabic (with or without translation/interpretation in the local vernacular) and in Arabic script. These used to be, and still are to a large extent, the binding links of Islamic knowledge in the entire region and because of their specific role it is a pity that the valuable list of these kitab kuning compiled by Nicholas Heer from Seattle, Washington, USA has not been mentioned in the book.

The links Islamic schools entertain with the Middle East and the flow of students from Southeast Asia to the Middle East is an important issue in the way Islam is taught and in the kind of Islam studied. The scope of the book has not allowed for an in-depth study of this but hopefully it will be an area explored in the future. Clearly explored in the book are the historical links between Southeast Asia and sufficient background information is provided for a general picture of the international dynamics of Islamic knowledge and instruction in the region and, in particular, on the pivotal role of Malay Islam and Islamic education in mainland Southeast Asia.

The second thread of the book deals with the different kinds of Islam: radical, fundamentalist, moderate and such. It is a pity that a kind of consensus among the readership is presupposed as to what these terms mean. Apparently, however, a term like 'moderate' is open to different interpretations. For example, I was surprised to read that the Indonesian political party Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party) is considered to be moderately Islamist. Many people I talk to in Indonesia think they are anything but moderately Islamist!

Three major conclusions

The introduction ends with three major conclusions: The first is that Islamic education in the countries covered is neither unchanging nor backward looking. The second is that 'in addition to showing the effects of pietistic reform, Islamic education in the 20th century showed the imprint of three uniquely modern influences: the developmentalist state (in both its colonial and postcolonial forms); the capitalist marketplace; and mass education' (p. 42). The final conclusion is that 'the dynamism that Muslim educators have shown should dispel once and for all the illusion that the educational mainstream in this region is narrow-minded or absolutist' (p. 45).

The book provides a wealth of necessary information about the present and near-past situation of Islamic education in Southeast Asia. The chapters on the various countries covered are all well-informed and finely carved, and the dynamics of the individual countries and the relationships between the countries and the Middle East boosts the appetite to know more. The idea behind the book – that a link between Islamic schools and terrorism/radicalism really exists – has to be tempered, however. Of the tens of thousands of Islamic schools in the area, only a tiny number can clearly be said to provide this link. The overwhelming majority does not. Perhaps a future programme could pay attention to other means of Islamic instruction where these links may be more apparent and, because of their fluidity and mobility, are much more difficult to understand and monitor, especially in far-off places such as the many islands in insular Southeast Asia. Future study on the role of Islam in Islamic and general universities would also be very welcome in order to complement the picture.

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News and comment

EUforAsia launch at the European Parliament



The Launch of the Europe-Asia Policy Forum, which took place in the European Parliament on Wednesday 29 April 2009, was a great success. The event began with the first EUforAsia Brussels Briefing on 'The ASEAN Charter: A milestone in ASEAN History'; followed by the formal launching of the Europe-Asia Policy Forum. The project was warmly welcomed by Mr. Tomasz Kozłowski, Principal Advisor for Asia and Latin America in the Directorate-General for External Relations, European Commission and by H.E. Ambassador Mr. Nadjib Riphart Kesoema, Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia to the European Union.

This was followed by short statements by representatives of the Partners in the Project, the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS, Leiden/Amsterdam, The Netherlands), the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS, Brussels, Belgium), the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) and the Singapore Institute for International Affairs (SIIA), both in Singapore.

EMSCAT Online

Founded in 1970, *Études mongoles et sibériennes, centrasiatiques et tibétaines* (EMSCAT) is one of the oldest currently published journals dealing with the Mongol world and surrounding areas in eastern Asia. In 1976, EMSCAT expanded coverage to include Siberia, and in 2004, central Asia and Tibet. It is EMSCAT's intention to provide a forum for scholarship on cultural issues by both established scholars and young researchers new to the field. The editorial line encompasses regular issues, monographs, and comparative thematic issues often produced by guest editors. The journal is published annually.

From now on, EMSCAT will appear solely in an online format. EMSCAT is hosted by [Revues.org](http://www.revues.org), the federation of online journals concerning the social and human sciences. Several back issues of EMSCAT are already available freely online, with others slated for release in the coming year. For access to the journal please visit <http://www.emscat.revues.org>



The G20 seems to have become part of the global decision making infrastructure, after only two meetings. The next one is already planned for New York, in September. Whether the series of measures discussed in London will have come to fruition by then remains to be seen. Many estimate that the real outcomes of this meeting will not be clear until long after many of the representatives of the governments attending have left office. More cynical observers complain that the G20 is in danger of becoming a massive, expensive, and, as London discovered, highly disruptive talking shop.

Kerry Brown

Asia and the G20

This conveying of the G20 did serve to make one thing clear. The Asian economies of South Korea, China, India, Japan, and Indonesia are integral to any solution to the current problems the world is suffering. Indonesia in particular was keen to see more help for developing countries, and can count the final communiqué issued by the G20 on the 2nd April as a success. It commits to USD50 billion of new aid for developing countries, as part of the grand (but highly disputed figure) of USD1.1 trillion which was announced on the final day. Quite how this money will be used is still not clear. China, somewhat confusingly, agreed to contribute USD40 billion to the whole package, by the novel means of not dissenting when its support was announced by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, rather than proactively announcing it itself. When asked for clarification on whether it had made such a commitment, the Chinese delegation spokesperson mysteriously replied that 'In not disagreeing with the announcement that was made, we are therefore agreeing.' Perhaps this was to take the bite out of any complaints back in China that while Chinese migrant workers are losing their jobs in droves, the government is generously doling out money to people abroad. Creating confusion was the Chinese government's way of burying difficult news.

JULIAN MILLE

SPLASHED BY THE SAINT

Ritual reading and Islamic sanctity in West Java

Julian Millie spent a year attending a supplication ritual in which Muslims of West Java directed their prayers to Allah through 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaelani (d. 1166).

This book captures the variety of understandings that participants bring to the ritual when it is held in various contexts, including Java's largest Sufi order, religious schools and private homes. It is of interest to scholars of Indonesian religions, Sufism and the anthropology of Islam.

Leiden, 2009
Verhandelingen 262
paperback – xii+214 pp. – illustrated – €24.90
ISBN 978 90 6718 338 3
For more information and a sample chapter,
visit www.kitlv.nl/book/show/1261

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The USD50 billion for developing countries was taken as a victory by the development lobby. The environmental lobby came away less pleased. The UK in particular was keen to get as many green projects into the global fiscal stimulus package, but in the end the preoccupations of countries like Japan and China to see GDP growth above all else meant that these were scaled back, and the final communiqué had only the barest and most general language about this problem. Even so, the sense from some commentators in Asia and elsewhere was that, while this focus might solve the short term problems, it means that the bigger problems of cleaning up the environment, tackling energy usage, and dealing with food security and population issues, have been left for the time being.

As though to offer a reminder that there was a whole world outside the cogitations of the G20 leaders, North Korea decided in April to go ahead with the launch of its satellite, regarded by most other countries as a missile, sent up into space. This followed an appearance by a very frail looking Kim Jong Il at a meeting, which was broadcast on TV. It is now clear that Kim suffered a major heart attack last year, and that his eldest son, who has been talking down his possibilities of ever being his father's replacement to Japanese reporters, reportedly summoned a surgeon from France to treat his ill father. The succession problem remains, and the missile test, happening when it did, signified two things – that Kim Jong Il was back in action, and that the US was being sent a message that the DPRK was still there, and still had the capacity to make the rest of the world tense. Economic crisis in the rest of the world, for a country that has seen its economy shrink by 30% in the last decade, and hundreds of thousands of its people die of starvation, is largely irrelevant. The DPRK's leadership preoccupations remain the same – to ensure the continuing survival of the regime by whatever means necessary, and to continue to extract whatever concessions are necessary from the rest of the world to do this.

The G20 at least offered President Hu and Present Obama the chance to meet. The arrival of the new US administration has been met with surprising smoothness in Beijing, to date, with none of the ups and downs that characterised the early Clinton and Bush administrations. Secretary of State Clinton's visit to China earlier in the year went well, as did the calls she had made in Japan. Obama promised Hu he would, time permitting, visit China and the region later in the year. It will be interesting to see if the Asian public are as ecstatic about him as the Europeans were. Even so, the short, confusing clash between Chinese and US submarines in what the Chinese said were its waters, and what the US claimed were its, served as a light warning that there are some areas where the two countries, whatever the common concerns at the moment, work to different purposes. China's unveiling of a nuclear submarine in Qingdao in late April was another demonstration of how rapidly its military capacity is developing. Events in Asia, even despite the current woes throughout the rest of the world, still have the power to surprise, and sometimes amaze, and often the only thing to be certain of is the lack of certainty itself.

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His latest book, *Friends and enemies: the past, present and future of the Communist Party of China* was published by Anthem Press on 1st July.



Report on Conference on Contemporary Mongolia

Professor Julian Dierkes organised a Conference at the University of British Columbia from November 14 to 17, 2008 about the status of contemporary Mongolia almost two decades after the collapse of communism. Mongolia has progressed toward multi-party and democratic systems, but its economic, social, and environmental problems imperil its political achievements. Corruption, increasing disparities in income, and declines in education and health services have resulted in considerable poverty, challenges to the pastoral economy's survival, and attendant social problems such as alcoholism, domestic abuse, and crime.

Morris Rossabi

BECAUSE ABOUT 30 PER CENT of the Mongol population consists of herders, several papers dealt with the changes in the pastoral economy caused by privatisation in 1991-1992. Temuulen Tsagaan Sankey and colleagues at Idaho State University, using satellite images, concluded that privatisation and lack of regulation of pasturelands had resulted in declining rangeland productivity. Raffael Himmelsbach (University of Lausanne) focused on the efficacy of collaboration of users and local government in managing pastureland, as opposed to the privatisation schemes developed after the fall of communism. Troy Sternberg (Oxford) analysed the current problems confronting the pastoral economy, especially the lack of government support and the reduction of wells and other sources of water.

Mining is one of the main culprits in the depletion of water sources yet parenthetically the Mongol government plans to rely upon it for much of its economic growth, a policy that has aroused opposition. Sarah Combellick-Bidney (Indiana University) probed the reasons for opposition, which included the lack of transparency and questions about the divisions of profit between mining companies and Mongolia. Oyuntogos Lkhasuren (Health Sciences University of Mongolia) revealed the occupational hazards and illnesses in the mines. Mette High (London School of Economics) supplemented these accounts with a study of the illegal mining, which has accompanied the gold rush in the country. Rebecca Darling (Asia Foundation) proposed transparency, accountability of all stakeholders, and active participation of civil society as means of tapping Mongolia's rich resources. All concurred that it remains to be seen whether the Mongol government can work out an agreement with foreign and domestic mining companies, as well as the illegal miners known as *ninja*, to gain a proper share of profits and to protect the environment.

Several papers attested to other challenges. Erdenetuya Urdnast (Mongolian State University of Education) described the strains on Ulaanbaatar because of the accelerating in-migration from herders fleeing from pasture degradation and poverty in the countryside. This migration contributes to air pollution and poor sanitation and places a great burden on the capital's infrastructure. Byambayav Dalaibuyan (University of Hokkaido) pointed to increasing inequality which has limited access by poor Mongols to both formal and informal social networks which could help them. Mungunsarnai Ganbold (Swiss Development and Cooperation Agency) and Thomas Spoorenberg (University of Geneva) found that deteriorating health conditions and rising male mortality began during communism's twilight but the 'transition to democracy and market economy,' with the attendant social problems and the decline of the health system, has accelerated these trends. Studying the 2008 elections, Manduhai Buyandelgeriyin (MIT) discovered that many Mongols, despite professed beliefs in gender equality, were critical of individual women candidates, leading to disproportionately few females in the Khural. Paula Sabloff (University of Pennsylvania) noted that economic problems shape Mongols' perceptions of democracy, resulting in an association of the term with elimination of economic risk and government assistance to the population rather than with majority rule. Two papers focused on the economic turbulence which affected the concept of democracy. Astrid Zimmermann (Cambridge University) portrayed the nepotism and corruption that has bedeviled the Mongols, while Gaëlle Lacaze detailed the corruption and activities of the traders in the market towns along the Russo-Mongol and Sino-Mongol frontiers. A final set of papers centred on educational challenges for Mongolia. Altangerel Choijoo (Mongolian State University of Education) described the difficulties of introducing civic education, which would foster democratic principles, into the curricula, and Borchuluun Yadamsuren (University of Missouri), together with Catherine Johnson (University of Western Ontario), and Anne Riordan (University of Wisconsin) emphasised the post-communist problems faced respectively by libraries and by special education.

Two papers addressed the topic of Mongol relations with minorities. Cynthia Werner (Texas A&M University) and Holly Barcus (Macalester College) reported on trends in the post-1990 migration of Kazakhs from Mongolia to Kazakhstan and concluded that the return of some migrants to Mongolia and the slowing down of such emigration owed much to declining incentives from the Kazakh government but also to greater information about difficulties experienced by earlier migrants. Joakim Enwall (Uppsala University) compared inter-ethnic relations in Mongolia and Inner Mongolia and found that Kazakhs in Mongolia faced scant discrimination while considerable tensions divided the Chinese majority and the Mongol minority in Inner Mongolia.

The largest cluster of papers centred on religion, which has played such a vital role in Mongol history. Christopher Kaplonski (Cambridge University) sought explanations for the lack of current emphasis on the deaths of Buddhist lamas in the 1930s purges. Other essays dealt with the post-1990 era. Matyas Balogh (Eötvös Lorand University) described the reappearance of shamans in the country while Krisztina Teleki (Eötvös Lorand University) reported on a mini-revival of Buddhism in several provinces and Zsuzsa Majer (Eötvös Lorand University) studied the establishment of Buddhist temples in Ulaanbaatar, the few monks, and the paucity of sophisticated religious education in these temples. Intensive analysis of a Buddhist revivalist movement was at the core of Matthew King's (University of Toronto) paper. Marie-Dominique Even (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) reported on the arrival of foreign religions and Johan Elverskog (Southern Methodist University) delineated the activities of Christian missionaries in Mongolia. In his keynote address, Morris Rossabi (Columbia University) offered an analysis of the current political and socio-economic status of Mongolia.

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Digitisation at SOAS

SOAS HAS BEGUN AN AMBITIOUS PROJECT of digitising the archive of Christoph von Furer-Haimendorf (1909-1995). The project, funded by JISC (Joint Information Services Committee, UK) aims to make this rich and varied collection available to everyone online. Containing photographs, film and written materials, it is widely recognised as the world's most comprehensive study of tribal cultures in South Asia and the Himalayas. The project website is www.soas.ac.uk/furer-haimendorf/.

Christoph von Furer-Haimendorf was born and educated in Vienna, gaining a PhD in anthropology from the University of Vienna in 1931. He studied at the London School of Economics under the eminent anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski and in 1936, he went to the Naga Hills in northeast India for his first fieldwork. Over the next four decades, he worked extensively in south and central India, northeast India, and Nepal. In 1951 he was appointed Professor of Asian Anthropology at SOAS. During his career he published 17 books, most of them ethnographies of tribal cultures. In 1999, Nicholas Haimendorf formally donated his father's archive to SOAS, where it was deposited in the Special Collections department of the Library.

His unique archive contains more than 20,000 images, mostly 35 mm b/w photographs taken from the 1930s to the 1950s in what is now the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland, as well as the northern regions of Nepal. The collection also contains several thousand colour slides from these same areas and dating from the 1960s and 1970s. Furer-Haimendorf was one of the few anthropologists of the inter-war generation in Europe to realise the importance of visual documentation, and was one of the first in South Asia to use moving film to document culture. He produced over one hundred hours of ethnographic film, some of which have been used for BBC television documentaries, such as the Land of the Gurkhas (1957) and The Land of Dolpo (1962). This film footage has been digitised by the 'Digital Himalaya' project at Cambridge University. www.digitalhimalaya.com/collections/haimendorf/.

The archive contains extensive written materials, too, including dozens of unpublished field notebooks and diaries from which Furer-Haimendorf drew in writing his published ethnographic monographs, essays and theoretical works. The catalogue to the written material may be browsed at <http://squirrel.soas.ac.uk/dserve/>.

The SOAS project will enable people across the world to see and learn from an archive that is currently inaccessible. Users of this online resource will be able to access rare images as well as specialist descriptions of tribal cultures, which are today rapidly being absorbed by mainstream populations.

For some of the societies seen in the archive, the rapid and fundamental changes in the 20th century have led to visible transformations. For example, the photographs record practices that have been abandoned among the Apatanis in central Arunachal Pradesh such as holding 'slaves', blacksmithing, pottery, feud negotiations, facial tattoos, nose-plugs on women, a form of 'potlatch' and mock warfare. We can also see that the gender division of agricultural work has changed, that houses are built with different materials and that even the landscape has changed. On the other hand, the photographs reveal that the overall ritual pattern of major festivals has remained largely intact.

The photographs record the effects of external administration, education and literacy on tribal populations who once governed themselves without writing. Uniquely, for example, there is a photographic record of negotiations held between feuding parties in the 1940s and of the first elections held in Arunachal Pradesh in the late 1970s.

The current project will digitise and produce metadata for approximately 12,000 photographs and an unpublished field diary from the Furer-Haimendorf archive. This is a pilot project that will lead to others in the future. Eventually SOAS intends to mount online the entire Furer-Haimendorf collection.

Centre for Digital Asia and Africa

SOAS is also planning to establish a Centre for Digital Asia and Africa, which would work with partners to develop new technologies and tools for digitisation, metadata entry and enhanced usability. A specific aim will be the development of a cross-collection retrieval tool, which will enable users to view material held independently at several institutions.

Finally, it is hoped that the SOAS Centre will become a repository for current and future researchers to deposit their digitised resources.

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Asian cultural actors connect in Bangalore and ponder their cultural gaps

Why is Asia not an established cultural idea and an integrated cultural realm? Cultural activists from Central and South Asia explore mutual ignorance and differences in a rare Bangalore encounter.

IN EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL AND ACADEMIC CIRCLES the Old Continent is frequently invoked as a cultural idea and a pattern of cultural practices, as an emerging integrated cultural space. Such discourse seems to be impossible in Asia, where Asia as a cultural idea and as an integrated cultural realm is denied and resisted, not least because the notion carries an irreversible colonialist connotation. What makes Asia impossible as a coherent cultural idea is not just the stunning diversity of its cultural traditions and contemporary cultural expressions but, perhaps more so, the lack of pan-continental interactions, cultural engagements and debates and the colonialist history of divisions and partitions. On the occasions that Asian cultural producers and theorists think beyond own borders, they turn to the US, Europe and eventually Japan, where public and private funders can be found.

This lack of inter-Asian cultural experience and communication was clearly visible at a conference held in Bangalore in December 2008. CultureAsia: Connecting Asian Cultural Actors (www.cultureasia2008.org), was organised by the Arts and Culture Network Program of the Open Society Institute (Soros Foundations,) and Hivos, a Dutch development cooperation agency, together with the Center for the Study of Culture. The event brought together some 60 cultural activists from Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Mongolia), and South Asia (India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia). The contrast could hardly be greater. Central Asian countries share a common post-Soviet turmoil, decay and a forceful nation building by mainly despotic regimes. South Asian countries share a post-colonial experience, specified in the growth of Indian high-tech and Bollywood, Sri Lanka's exhausting civil war, and a fragile Indonesian democracy, undermined by radical Islam and entrenched military authoritarianism. Central Asian countries have experienced de-industrialisation and re-islamisation, a loss of privileged cultural ties with Moscow and St. Petersburg that were the main conduits of modernization, albeit on Soviet terms.

In his key note address, the Calcutta theorist Rustom Bharucha criticised the political economy of curiosity in Asia. He targeted, in particular, those dominantly regionalist Indian vistas that signal a lack of interest in other Indian cultural constellations, beyond own state and own language, turning India into 'multiple closed societies'. Bharucha also questioned civil society in India, recognising many grass root movements for equality and against poverty but also the ersatz civil society provided by the endless parade of gossiping and opinionated celebrities on television talk shows that claim to present a social debate. Despite the invisible migratory flows within Asia, no Indian would call himself Asian, reiterated Bharucha, noting that cultural communication, artistic and intellectual exchange among Asian players lag behind the flow of commercial cultural goods, made in Asia or elsewhere in the world.

The OSI-HIVOS-CSCS event sought commonalities in divergent cultural constellations and paradigmatic and inspiring action models and strategies, a slow exploratory work that relied on presentations and discussions in numerous working groups. For if even Indians stumble in trying to explain why there is no national cultural policy in India and provide a coherent and concise presentation of current cultural policy dilemmas, it is much more difficult for someone from Sri Lanka to render the tense, repressive circumstances in which he or she makes a play or film and seeks to engage with a broader audience.

There were some encouraging examples from Indonesia, such as an autonomous Jakarta Arts Council, distributing public subsidies at arms length from the authorities, or the fast growing Video Art Festival. These incidences stand in contrast to the more general trend of cultural inertia, decay and limited cultural production witnessed in all countries represented at the conference. There were echoes of cultural nationalism from some Central Asian participants, a homogenising, forceful assertion of national identity to reinforce the new state against discarded Soviet models of universalism. Hence an occasional disregard of ethnic and linguistic minorities or indications of a growing tension between the Kazakh- and Russian-speaking cultural producers in Kazakhstan. In Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia oppressive poverty and isolation lead to a desperate search for some future perspective in the revival of the traditional shamanistic practices. Inevitably, the dominant discourse was about globalisation which affects the entire region, albeit in contradictory manners, creating new opportunities and imposing uniformity, and a preponderance of commercially produced goods. Moreover, a consequence of globalisation is a dominant economic perspective in the cultural discussions and an expectation that culture produces economic gains instead of seeking subsidies, along the lines of the Bollywood model (whose profitability was also brought into question). Witness also the submission of cultural production to the tourism industry, an association which brings little cultural opportunities and stimulates the avalanche of the artisanal souvenir kitsch which government-sponsored stores seek to unload on gullible tourists.

A panel on cultural diversity voiced much scepticism about the ways national governments will implement the UNESCO 2005 Convention. The notion of sustainability, derived from development cooperation vocabulary, rings hollow in the cultural production discourse: while profitable commercial cultural production remains, at least in principle, an option for audiovisuals, book publishing, some sorts of music, design and architecture, albeit in an underdeveloped market, the other stream of artistic production, in visual and performing arts, remains dependent on external (public and private) funding, and thus never truly sustainable. Between indifferent public authorities and whims of foreign and domestic donors, artists can only rhetorically invoke the sustainability prospect in application forms and then put up with their own precariousness as a fact of life. The other caricature of sustainability is the infrastructure of the tired cultural institution, set up in the Soviet or colonial or post-colonial period, now passive, dysfunctional, with little output and no policy, and yet kept on a minimum level of subsistence by government subsidies covering a few meager salaries and less than essential maintenance. This is the common burden of South and Central Asia – public institutions in an advanced state of decay, all those museums with permanent exhibits gradually disintegrating due to climate and benign neglect. The cultural activists gathered in Bangalore spoke about them with resignation, feeling unable to resuscitate them, and in fact much more eager to create another alternative infrastructure of small, dynamic, mobile and audience directed cultural NGOs.

How those NGOs can interact, connect, collaborate and jointly advocate policy changes was discussed in the CultureAsia conference without many ready-made solutions. What could count as an outcome is the idea to set up travel and exchange schemes between Central and South Asia. Also to initiate a summer school of cultural activism, bringing together potential agents of change from Central and Southern Asia, giving them an opportunity for joint reflection and learning, from which some sustainable patterns of mutual curiosity and understanding might emerge, leading ultimately to collaborative ties across cultural spaces in Asia.

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Asian governance

IIAS launches new centre for regulation and governance

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ASIAN STUDIES is proud to announce the establishment of a new research centre: IIAS Centre for Regulation and Governance. It is the first European research centre devoted to the study of regulation and governance in Asia. The Centre will engage in innovative and comparative research on the theories and practices of regulation and governance. Focusing on emerging markets in Asia such as China, India, South Korea, and Indonesia, the Centre serves as a focal point for collaborative research between European and Asian scholars. It emphasises multidisciplinary in its research undertakings which combine approaches from political economy, law, public administration, criminology, and sociology in the comparative analysis of regulatory issues in Asia and in developing theories of governance pertinent to Asian realities.

From the outset, the rising influence of Asia has necessitated an in-depth understanding of the way Asian societies and markets are regulated and governed. After several decades of rapid economic growth, many emerging markets in Asia are striving to establish effective regulation of social and market activities in order to safeguard public interests. They face the challenging tasks of establishing as well as adapting regulatory institutions and governance mechanisms that suit their contexts and circumstances. In particular, these regulatory institutions work in societies governed by a fragmented state structure, with a legal system where formal rules often play a secondary role to informal norms and practices, and with a hybrid market economy that defies a public-private distinction. Furthermore, most of them have experienced rapid societal transformation which requires constant adjustment of their ruling structures. Under these circumstances, major challenges to effective governance abound. Regulatory failures have resulted in rapid environmental deterioration, unsafe and deplorable working conditions, the production of sub-standard consumer products, absence of food safety, volatile financial markets, corruption, and rent seeking. With the advent of globalisation, regulatory failures of individual countries have now assumed a global effect. Comparative research on these problems is therefore timely and necessary.

So far current theories about regulation and governance have been of limited use in Asia, as they were largely derived from case studies conducted in developed countries in the West, whose applicability to the special context of emerging markets remains unexplored while specialised theories remain underdeveloped. The new Centre for Regulation and Governance will undertake this challenge to advance new theoretical understandings and to offer a forum of exchange for academics and practitioners in their study and practice of regulation in Asia.

Being unique in the Netherlands and the first of its kind in Europe, the Centre aims to realise a strategic role in the study of regulation and governance of Asia. In seeking to become a focal point for innovative and concerted research, the Centre's approach in its research under-

takings distinguishes it from conventional research centres. The uniqueness can be summarised in the following:

- It undertakes enquiries on a well-defined subject area with a sharp focus of contemporary relevance: regulation and governance.
- It combines multidisciplinary (political economy, law, public administration, criminology, and sociology) with area studies (Asia) and emphasises comparative analysis.
- It pursues enquiries from both top-down, state-centred, and practice-oriented perspective (regulation) and bottom-up, society-centred, and political perspective (governance).
- It emphasises the need to study Asian markets and societies inductively and to develop non-Eurocentric theories of regulation and governance.
- Instead of undertaking discrete projects, the Centre organises its research into a chain of interlocking projects. This will maximise the cumulative effect of coordinated research and yield greater synergy.

As a major initiative of IIAS, the Centre will build upon the solid foundation already established by IIAS over the years, taking advantage of the extensive research network and the wealth of knowledge and experience in Asian studies in the Netherlands. The Centre commands exceptional expertise and resources through its integration into national and international research networks and alliances. Through its distinctive research approach and programmes, the Centre sets to achieve the following aims:

- Engage in interdisciplinary and comparative research on the theories and practices of regulation and governance in Asia
- Stimulate research collaboration between European and Asian scholars in this area of study.
- Serve as a forum of exchange among government regulators, politicians, entrepreneurs, civic organisations, and academics concerning issues of regulatory policies and public governance in Asia; Train talented young scholars from Europe and Asia in comparative research on regulation and governance.

A number of Centre activities have taken place or are planned for 2009. Among them, an international conference on Rent Seeking and Industrial Development in China was jointly convened by the Centre and Tsinghua University on 15-16 May 2009 in Beijing. A Young Scholars Workshop on Changing Governance in Asia will be organised by the Centre on 26-27 November 2009 in Leiden. In addition, it is worth highlighting that the Centre has started a new book series on Governance in Asia, under the editorship of Tak-Wing Ngo. Published by NIAS Press (Copenhagen), the book series aims to publish carefully selected, high-quality research monographs which advance our understanding of the problems of changing governance in Asia.

Researchers who work on a subject area closely related to our research endeavours are most welcome to take part in the activities of the Centre and to join our mailing list. For more information about our research programmes and activities, please visit our website at:

<http://crg.iias.asia>
Email: crg@iias.nl

For enquiries please contact:
Tak-Wing Ngo
Head, IIAS Centre for Regulation and Governance; and IIAS Professor of Asian History at Erasmus University Rotterdam
Email: t.w.ngo@iias.nl

Call for Proposals/Papers

IIAS Centre for Regulation and Governance
Young Scholars Workshop on Changing Governance in Asia
26-27 November 2009, Leiden

YOUNG SCHOLARS in their early stage of academic career are cordially invited to participate in a workshop organised by the newly established IIAS Centre for Regulation and Governance at Leiden, the Netherlands. The workshop offers a unique opportunity for junior researchers to present new research initiatives, to get feedback for project plans, and to exchange views on research frontiers. Researchers with an outstanding project proposal will have the possibility of receiving a post-doc fellowship at the Centre.

Workshop themes

The workshop will be organised around the themes of public sector and market governance under the increasingly volatile global environment. Specifically, it hopes to explore innovative ideas about changes in political institutions, the legal system, government-business relations, and/or cultural and administrative traditions which shape the governance of market exchange, social policies, public sector reforms, media practices, and environmental regulations in Asia. Researchers working on these areas are most welcome to take part in the workshop. Selected participants will present their research findings and/or innovative proposals for new/follow-up research during the workshop.

Keynote address

'Rebuilding Government for the 21st Century:
Can China Incrementally Reform the Public Sector?'
Christine Wong, School of Interdisciplinary and Area Studies and Said Business School, University of Oxford

Requirements

Participants should be affiliated to a university or research institution in the EU. He/she should have completed his/her PhD within the last two years. Doctoral students in their final year of writing their dissertations are also encouraged to submit their proposals. Preference will be given to participants with social science training and an Asian focus.

Travel and accommodation

The organiser will cover the travel costs (economy class) to the Netherlands as well as accommodation for 3 nights in Leiden.

Submission instructions

An abstract of not more than 500 words should be submitted in digital format before 1 September 2009. Selected participants will be notified before the end of September 2009. Selected participants should send in a paper/proposal/research plans of not more than 3000 words before 1 November 2009.

Contact information

The International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) is a postdoctoral research centre based in the Netherlands. The Institute encourages the interdisciplinary and comparative study of Asia and promotes national and international cooperation. The Institute focuses on the human and social sciences and on their interaction with other sciences.
www.iias.nl

The IIAS Centre for Regulation and Governance engages in innovative and comparative research on the theories and practices of regulation and governance in Asia. It also aims at training young scholars and serving as a forum of exchange between academics and practitioners. The Centre is headed by Tak-Wing Ngo, IIAS Professor of Asian History at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
<http://crg.iias.asia>

For enquiries about the workshop and submissions of paper/proposal, please contact:

Martina van den Haak
Email: m.c.van.den.haak@iias.nl

New book series from NIAS Press

Governance in Asia Series Editor: Tak-Wing Ngo (IIAS Centre for Regulation and Governance)




Most Asian countries have experienced radical social transformation in the past decades. Some have undergone democratization, yet are still plagued by problems of political instability, official malfeasance, and weak administration. Others have embraced market liberalization, but are threatened by rampant rent seeking and business capture. Without exception they all face the challenge of effective governance. *Governance in Asia* explores how Asian societies and markets are governed in the rapidly changing world.

The series explores the problem of governance from an Asian perspective. It encourages studies sensitive to the autochthony and hybridity of Asian history and development, which locate the issue of governance within specific meanings of rule and order, structures of political authority, and mobilization of institutional resources distinctive to the Asian context. The series publishes well-researched books that have the cumulative effect of developing theories of governance pertinent to Asian realities.

We welcome book proposals fitting the series profile. For inquiries please contact Series Editor Tak-Wing Ngo, e-mail t.w.ngo@iias.nl or NIAS Press Editor in Chief Gerald Jackson, e-mail gerald@nias.ku.dk.



NIAS Press is a scholarly press specializing in publishing innovative research on modern Asia. The Press is a globally focused publisher with authors from every continent, and distribution covering all parts of the world. *Governance in Asia* is the successor to the *Democracy in Asia* series. Recent publications include



Beyond Democracy in Cambodia
Political Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Society
ed. by Joakim Öjendal & Mona Lilja
Publication 2009, 320 pages
ISBN 978 87 7694 043 0
Paperback £18.99

Constructing Singapore
Elitism, Ethnicity and the Nation-Building Project
by Michael D. Barr & Zlatko Skrbis
Published 2008, 320 pages
ISBN 978 87 7694 029 4
Paperback £16.99



Announcements

6-9 August, 2009

NIAS + alliance partners will organise a panel on 'East Asian Peace 1979'

6th International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS), Daejeon, Korea.

You are invited to attend!

East Asia has been relatively peaceful since 1979. Peace in East Asia since 1979 forms a stark contrast not only to the previous period but also to other regions. How could East Asia make a transition to this relative peace? Is the current peace likely to be durable?

Presentations

Stein Tønnesson

Director Peace Research Institute of Oslo: 'Explaining the east asian peace, 1979-2009.'

Timo Kivimäki

Senior Researcher, NIAS-Nordic Institute of Asian Studies: 'East asian peace: is it just a matter of definition.'

Mathilda Lindgren

Associate Professor, Uppsala University: 'East asian peace and the nonviolent campaigns for governmental or territorial changes.'

Registration

www.icas6.org/Registration/m_01.html

Information about ICAS 6

www.icassecretariat.org/about-icas-6

Time of the Panel

7 August, 13:00-15:00.



26-28 August, 2009

Religion, identity and power

Consortium of African and Asian Studies* Inaugural Conference, Leiden

This conference looks at the relationship between religion and politics in a global context – focusing particularly on East Asia, South Asia, South East Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. Instead of using the often assumed comparative referent of 'the West', this conference seeks to confront different Asian and Middle Eastern societies experiences with each other. The conference is multi-disciplinary, including participants from history, religious studies, philosophy, anthropology and area studies disciplinary backgrounds.

DAY ONE: Wed 26th August

10:30-12:00

Session One. *Introductory Remarks and Key-Note Speech*
Prof Peter van der Veer
(Max Planck Institute for Religious and Ethical Diversity)
The Value of Comparison: India and China

14:00-14:30

Session Two. *Religion, Community and National Identity*
Dr Asghar Seyed-Gohrab (Leiden, Institute for Area Studies)
No Reward – Martyrdom as Piety, mysticism and national icon in Iran

14:30-15:00

Prof Keiko Sakai (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)
Political mobilization of communal networks in contemporary Iraq: religion as an ideology, or social service?

15:00-15:30

Prof Izumi Niwa (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)
The Yasukuni Controversy – from the perspective of separation of church and state.

16:00-17:00

Discussion: Prof Judith Pollmann (Leiden, Institute for History)

DAY TWO: Thursday 26th August

9:00-9:30

Session Three: *Categorizing Religions and Politics*
Prof Prasenjit Duara (National University of Singapore)
Religion and the State in China and the non-Abrahamic traditions of Asia

9:30-10:00

Prof Abdellah Bounfour (INALCO)
What is meant by "Radical Islam"?

10:00-10:30

Prof Oscar Salemink (VU Amsterdam)
Secularization, Sacralization and the Profane:
The categories of religion and sacred in post-secular Vietnam

11:00-12:00

Discussion: Prof Heleen Murre van den Berg
(Leiden, Institute for Religious Studies)

14:00-14:30

Session Four. *Church and State in East Asia*
Dr Ya-pei Kuo (International Institute for Asian Studies)
Confucian arguments for the Separation of Church and State (late 19th century China)

14:30-15:00

Prof Boudewijn Walraven (Leiden, Institute for Area Studies)
Ultimate Concerns: Religion, State and Nation in Late 19th and 20th Century Korea.

15:00-15:30

Dr Kiri Paramore (Leiden, Institute for Area Studies)
Religion as the Core of the Modern Western Nation:
19th century Japanese analyses of the role of religion in modern Western empire.

16:00-17:00

Discussion

The THIRD DAY of the symposium will be a Post-Graduate Workshop where post-graduate students from Leiden, TUFs, SOAS and other universities will present their research with discussion provided by an international panel of eminent scholars.

Contact: Dr Kiri Paramore, k.n.paramore@hum.leidenuniv.nl

* CAAS: National University of Singapore; INALCO, Paris; SOAS, University of London; Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Tokyo; Leiden University.

27 September -1 October, 2010

Crossing Borders in Southeast Asian Archaeology

13th International Conference of the European Association of Southeast Asian Archaeologists (EurASEAA13), Free University of Berlin.

Call for Papers

This conference, organised by the Institute of Ancient Near Eastern Archaeology at the Free University of Berlin, the Ethnological Museum, and the German Archaeological Institute (DAI), brings together archaeologists, art historians, and philologists with a common interest in Southeast Asia's past from prehistory to the historical period. It aims to facilitate communication between different disciplines, provide a survey of present work in the field and to stimulate future research.

Papers are invited for all topics on Southeast Asian archaeology, in particular on the theme 'Crossing Borders in Southeast Asian Archaeology', chosen to reflect the conference's interdisciplinary approach and to encourage participants to broaden their thematic context.

'Early Bird registration' (registration after this date is possible but will cost more) + deadline for abstract of 150 words: 1 August 2009.

Please visit <http://euraseaa.userpage.fu-berlin.de/> for further information and the online registration form.

Contact:

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Fax 0049 30-838 52106
euraseaa@zedat.fu-berlin.de



18-22 November, 2009

Chinese and East Asian Music: The Future of the Past

14th Chime Conference, Brussels.

Check our website

<http://home.wxs.nl/chime> for a preliminary conference programme and a preview of CHIME's music and theatre events.

For practical questions concerning the conference, contact Claire Chantrenne at claire.chantrenne@mim.fgov.be

7-18 October, 2009

2 international conferences on energy

Organised during the ASIA-PACIFIC WEEKS, Berlin

8-9 October

'Energy for the Future':
Venue: Berlin City Hall

8-10 October

'Global mobility'
Venue: Berlin City Hall

For more information

www.apwberlin.de

Contact:

Dr Iris Vrabec
Iris.vrabec@berlin-partner.de

30 November - 4 December, 2009

Canton and Nagasaki compared

2nd Conference, Tokyo and Nagasaki, Japan.

Organised by The University of Tokyo and Nagasaki University in co-operation with Prof. L. Blussé, Leiden University.

Contact:

Prof. Masashi Haneda
Director
The Institute of Oriental Culture
The University of Tokyo
canton.nagasaki@gmail.com

November 5-7, 2010

Asian Borderlands: Enclosure, Interaction and Transformation

Call for papers, Chiang Mai University.

The Asian Borderlands Research Network invites conceptually innovative papers, based on new research, which explore the viability and relevance of non state-centred views, in order to develop new perspectives on the study of Asian borderlands.

For more details

www.asianborderlands.net.

Deadline

December 1, 2009.

IIAS research programmes and networks

Programmes

Science and History in Asia

The complex links between science and history in Asian civilisations can be studied on at least two levels. First, one can focus on the ways in which the actors have perceived those links; how, on the one hand, they have used disciplines that we now categorise as sciences, such as astronomy, for a better understanding of their own past; and, on the other hand, how they have constructed the historicity of these disciplines, giving them cultural legitimacy. Secondly, one can reflect on historiographical issues related to the sciences. How can the sciences be incorporated into historical narratives of Asian civilisations? This question is crucial, given the dominant 19th and 20th century view that science is a European invention, and that it has somehow failed to develop endogenously in Asia, where 'traditional science' is usually taken as opposed to 'Western' or 'modern science'. This project will address various approaches to the issue by organising five international workshops in Cambridge, Leiden and Paris.

Sponsored by: NWO Humanities, Needham Research Institute, Recherches Epistémologiques et Historiques sur les Sciences Exactes et les Insitutions Scientifiques (REHSEIS), and IIAS.

Coordinators:
Christopher Cullen
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Harm Beukers
(Scaliger Institute, Leiden University)
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Asia Design

This programme consists of a number of individual projects related to graphic design – from classical graphics in art and communication to the rapidly emerging fields of cyberculture (New Media, videogames, etc.) and animanga (anime and manga) in East Asia - and architectural design in Asian megacities. The projects address both the physical and social aspects of design.

Institutes involved: IIAS, Modern East Asia Research Centre (MEARC), Delft School of Design (DSD). Sponsored by: IIAS and Asiascape.

Coordinators:
Chris Goto-Jones (MEARC)
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Greg Bracken (DSD)
gregory@cortlever.com

Illegal but licit: transnational flows and permissive polities in Asia (IBL)

This research programme analyses forms of globalisation-from-below, transnational practices considered acceptable (licit) by participants but which are often illegal in a formal sense. It explores limitations of 'seeing like a state', and instead privileges the perspectives of participants in these illegal but licit transnational flows.

Sponsored by: NWO and ASIA.

Coordinator: Willem van Schendel
h.w.vanschendel@uva.nl

Energy programme Asia (EPA)

Established in September 2007, this programme addresses the domestic and geopolitical aspects of energy security for China and the European Union. The geopolitical aspects involve analysing the effects of competition for access to oil and gas resources and the security of energy supply among the main global consumer countries of the EU and China. The domestic aspects involve analysing domestic energy demand and supply, energy efficiency policies, and the deployment of renewable energy resources. Within this programme scholars from the Netherlands and China will visit each other's institutes and will jointly publish their research outcomes.

Institutes involved: Institute of West Asian and African Studies (IWAAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Sponsored by: KNAW China Exchange Programme and IIAS.

Coordinator: Mehdi Parvizi Amineh
m.p.amineh@uva.nl

Gender, migration and family in East and Southeast Asia

Developed from an earlier research project on 'Cross-border Marriages', this project is a comparative study on intra-regional flows of migration in East and Southeast Asia with a focus on gender and family. It aims at studying the linkage between immigration regimes, transnational families and migrants' experiences.

The first component of the project looks at the development of the immigration regimes of the newly industrialised countries in East and Southeast Asia. The second component looks at the experiences of female migrants in the context of the first component. To investigate these issues, this project will bring together scholars who have already been working on related topics. A three-year research project is developed with an empirical focus on Taiwan and South Korea as the receiving countries, and Vietnam and the PRC as the sending countries.

Coordinators: Melody LU (IIAS)
m.lu@iias.nl
Wang Hongzhen (Graduate School of Sociology, National Sun Yat-Sen University, Kaoshiung, Taiwan)

Socio-genetic marginalisation in Asia (SMAP)

The development and application of new biomedical and genetic technologies have important socio-political implications. This NWO/ASSR/IIAS research programme aims to gain insight into the ways in which the use of and monopoly over genetic information shape and influence population policies, environmental ethics and biomedical and agricultural practices in various Asian religious and secular cultures and across national boundaries.

Sponsored by: NWO, IIAS, ASSR.

Coordinator: Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner
m.sleeboom-faulkner@sussex.ac.uk

Searching for sustainability in Eastern Indonesian waters

The threat of biodiversity depletion calls for the establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), especially in rich natural environments like the marine space of eastern Indonesia. Most approaches to the establishment of MPAs, however, are science-based. Several interconnected developments demand a constructive analysis of the societal impacts of a predominantly technical and science oriented approach to the establishment of MPAs around the world. This new programme focuses on MPAs in eastern Indonesia (Wakatobi, Komodo, Derawan, Raja Ampat) and will facilitate the exchange of Dutch, Indonesian, German and Austrian researchers. The aims of the programme are to (1) engage in a methodological training workshop for the three Indonesian partners plus six of their colleagues/staff members and (2) to collectively write a research proposal (2009-2013) on the social-economic and governance conditions of Marine Protected Area development.

Sponsored by: KNAW, IIAS, Wageningen University, Australian Research Council, Center for Tropical Marine Ecology Bremen (ZMT), Germany.

Partner institutes: Wageningen University, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Bogor Agricultural University (IPB), The Nature Conservancy, Murdoch University (Perth, Australia), ZMT (Bremen, Germany).

Coordinator: Leontine Visser (WUR/IIAS)
leontine.visser@wur.nl

Networks

Ageing in Asia and Europe

During the 21st century it is projected that there will be more than one billion people aged 60 and over, with this figure climbing to nearly two billion by 2050, three-quarters of whom will live in the developing world. The bulk of the ageing population will reside in Asia. Ageing in Asia is attributable to the marked decline in fertility shown over the last 40 years and the steady increase in life-expectancy. In Western Europe, ageing populations developed at a slower pace and could initially be incorporated into welfare policy provisions. Currently governments are seeking ways to trim and reduce government financed social welfare and health-care, including pensions systems, unleashing substantial public debate and insecurity. Many Asian governments are facing comparable challenges and dilemmas, involving both the state and the family, but are confronted with a much shorter time-span. This research programme, in short, sheds light on how both Asian and European nations are reviewing the social contract with their citizens.

Research network involved: Réseau de Recherche Internationale sur l'Age, la Citoyenneté et l'Intégration Socio-économique (REIACTIS). Sponsored by: IIAS.

Coordinator: Carla Risseeuw
c.risseeuw@iias.nl

ABIA South and Southeast Asian art and archaeology index

The Annual Bibliography of Indina Archaeology is an annotated bibliographic database for publications covering South and Southeast Asian art and archaeology. The project was launched by IIAS in 1997 and is currently coordinated by the Postgraduate Institute of Archaeology of the University of Kelaniya, Colombo, Sri Lanka. The database is freely accessible at www.abia.net. Extracts from the database are also available as bibliographies, published in a series by Brill. The project receives scientific support from UNESCO.

Coordinators:
Ellen Raven and Gerda Theuns-de Boer
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www.abia.net

Islam in Indonesia: the dissemination of religious authority in the 20th and early 21st centuries

Forms and transformations of religious authority among the Indonesian Muslim community are the focus of this research programme. The term authority relates to persons and books as well as various other forms of written and non-written references. Special attention is paid to the production, reproduction and dissemination of religious authority in the fields of four sub-programmes: ulama (religious scholars) and fatwas; tarekat (mystical orders); dakwah (propagation of the faith); and education.

Coordinator: Nico Kaptein
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National MA Thesis Prize

IIAS seeks to honour the best of Asian Studies by offering an award to the Best MA Thesis in the field of Asian Studies, written at a Dutch university

The award consists of:

- The honorary title of Best MA thesis in Asian Studies
- A max. 3 month stipend (€1500 per month) to come to IIAS to write a PhD project proposal or a research article

Criteria:

- The MA thesis should be in the broad field of Asian Studies; both humanities and social science topics are eligible
- Only MA theses which have been marked with 8 or above are eligible
- The evaluation of the thesis should have taken place between 1 August 2008 and 1 August 2009
- Both students and their supervisors can apply
- Deadline: 1 September 2009
- Submissions should be sent to The Secretariat, IIAS, PO Box 9515, 2300 RA Leiden



IIAS Fellows

Central Asia

Dr Irina Morozova

Moscow State University, Russian Federation. Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam & Leiden, and GIGA, Hamburg. Sponsored by the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung. *Conflict, Security and Development in the post-Soviet Era: Towards regional economic Cooperation in the Central Asian Region.* **24 Apr 2003 – 31 Dec 2009**

East Asia

Dr Mehdi P. Amineh

Stationed at the Branch Office, Amsterdam & Leiden. Programme Coordinator of Energy Programme. Asia (EPA). Sponsored by KNAW/CASS & IIAS. *Domestic and Geopolitical Energy Security for China and the EU.* **1 Sept 2007 – 1 Sept 2010**

Prof. Wim Boot

Leiden University, the Netherlands. *Japanese and Korean Languages and Literatures.* **1 Sept 2006 – 1 Sept 2009**

Dr Gregory Bracken

Delft School of Design, TU Delft, the Netherlands. Sponsored by IIAS and DSD. *Urban Complexity in Asia.* **1 Sept 2009 – 1 Sept 2011**

Dr Mo Chen

Institute of West-Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China. Research fellow within Energy Programme Asia (EPA). Sponsored by CASS/KNAW. *Domestic and Geopolitical Challenges to Energy Security for China and the EU.* **15 Sept 2009 – 15 Oct 2009**

Prof. Christopher Cullen

Needham Research Institute, Cambridge, United Kingdom. Sponsored by NWO/NRI/REHSEIS. *History of Chinese Science and Medicine.* **1 Sept 2008 – 31 Dec 2010**

Prof. Shi Dan

Energy Economic Research Centre, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China. Research fellow within Energy Programme Asia (EPA). Sponsored by CASS/KNAW. *Domestic and Geopolitical Challenges to Energy Security in China and the EU.* **21 Sept 2009 – 7 Oct 2009**

Prof. Yang Guang

Chinese Academy for Social Sciences, Beijing, China. Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam. Researcher within Energy Programme Asia (EPA). Sponsored by CASS/KNAW. *China Energy Security towards the Middle East and Africa.* **24 Sept 2009 – 15 Oct 2009**

Prof. Robert I. Hellyer

Department of History, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, United States of America. *Tea in Nineteenth-Century Global Trade Networks.* **21 Jul 2009 – 14 Aug 2009**

Prof. Hsin-chuan Ho

National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. IIAS Professor, holder of the European Chair of Chinese Studies. Sponsored by BICER and the Ministry of Education Taiwan. *The Debate between Liberals and Neo-confucians in the Modern Chinese-speaking World.* **1 Sept 2008 – 1 Sept 2009**

Dr Zhao Huirong

Sponsored by CASS/KNAW. Researcher within Energy Programme Asia (EPA). *Energy Policy of China towards Kazakhstan concerning Energy Supply Security and its Impact on EU-energy Security.* **1 Aug 2009 – 15 Nov 2009**

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REHSEIS, Paris, France. Science and History in Asia. Sponsored by NWO/NRI/REHSEIS. *Circulation of scientific Knowledge between Europe and China, 17th and 18th Centuries.* **1 Sept 2008 – 31 Dec 2010**

Dr Masae KATO

Leiden University, the Netherlands. *A comparative Study on Socio-genetic Marginalisation: Japan in 'Asia' in relation to the 'West' as a Reference Group.* **1 May 2008 – 1 Sept 2009**

Ms. Takako Kondo

Department of Japan Studies, Leiden University, the Netherlands. Sponsored by Asiascape and IIAS. *Japanese Contemporary Art: Translating Art, Culture and Nation in the Age of Globalization* **1 Sept 2009 – 31 Aug 2012**

Dr Ya-pei Kuo

Sponsored by NWO. *Cultural Wars: Conservatism in Early Twentieth Century China.* **1 Feb 2009 – 31 Dec 2009**

Dr Jesse Yu-Chen Lan

Department of Sociology, National Taiwan University, Taiwan. Sponsored by NSC and IIAS. *Regulating Medical Profession: The Politics of Health Insurances in Taiwan* **1 July 2009 – 30 Sept 2009**

Dr Xiao-hua Li

Sponsored by CASS/KNAW. Researcher within Energy Programme Asia (EPA). *China's Renewable Energy Policies and Development.* **30 Jul 2009 – 30 Aug 2009**

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Sponsored by MEARC and IIAS. *Gender, Migration and Family in East and Southeast Asia.* **1 Feb 2006 – 1 Sept 2009**

Prof. Tak-Wing Ngo

Faculty of History and Arts, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, the Netherlands. IIAS Extra-ordinary Chair at the Faculty of History and Arts, Erasmus University, Rotterdam. *History of Asia.* **1 May 2008 – 1 May 2012**

Prof. Carla Risseuw

Leiden University, the Netherlands. *Ageing in Asia and Europe.* **1 Jan 2008 – 1 Jan 2010**

Dr Margaret

Sleeboom-Faulkner Socio-genetic Marginalisation in Asia Programme (SMAP). Sponsored by NWO and IIAS. *Human Genetics and its political, social, cultural and ethical Implications.* **17 Sept 2001 – 1 Sept 2009**

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Department of History, Central China Normal University, Wuhan, China. *A Comparative Study on Women's Position in Modern China and India.* **10 Jul 2009 – 10 Sept 2009**

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Chung-Ang University, Korea. IIAS Professor, holder of the European Chair of Korean Studies. Sponsored by the Academy for Korean Studies. **20 Aug 2009 – 20 Aug 2010**

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Chinese Academy for Social Sciences, China. Researcher within Energy Programme Asia (EPA). Sponsored by CASS/KNAW. *Chinese Energy Diplomacy in the Middle East.* **10 May 2009 – 10 Aug 2009**

South Asia

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Sapienza University of Rome, Italy. Sponsored by the J. Gonda Foundation. *An Annotated Translation and Study of the Chapter on Dance in the Nāyasastra and its commentary Abhinavabhāratī.* **20 Sept 2008 – 20 Dec 2009**

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Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris, France. *Vedic Ritual in Asian-European Context.* **1 Jul 2008 – 31 Dec 2009**

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University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. *Development and Security in conflict-affected Afghanistan.* **1 Sept 2008 – 1 Sept 2009**

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South Asian Studies, Kern Institute Leiden University. *Tantric Rituals as described in the Kalikapurana* **1 Oct 2009 – 30 Nov 2009**

Dr Ghulam Nadi

Georgia State University, United States. Sponsored by the Georgia State University. *A History of the Commercial Dye: Indigo Industry and Trade in Pre-colonial and Colonial India.* **25 Jun 2009 – 9 Aug 2009**

Dr Prasanna Kumar Patra

Research fellow within the Socio-genetic Marginalisation in Asia Programme (SMAP). Sponsored by NOW and IIAS. *Cross-cultural comparative Study of genetic Research in India and Japan.* **15 Dec 2005 – 1 Sept 2009**

Dr Saraju Rath

Scanning, Preservation, and Transliteration of Selected Manuscripts of the Taittiriya Tradition. **5 Jan 2004 – 1 Jan 2010**

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Leiden University, the Netherlands. Researcher within the South and Southeast Asia Art and Archaeology Index (ABIA). Sponsored by the J. Gonda Foundation. *Art, Material Culture and Archaeology of South and Southeast Asia* **1 Oct 1996 – 31 Dec 2011**

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Institute of Oriental Philology, Jagiellonian University, Poland. Sponsored by the J. Gonda Foundation. *History and Society as depicted by South Indian Poetesses: Gangādevi, Tirumālāmbā, Rāmabhadrāmbā and Madhuravāni.* **15 Jun 2009 – 31 Aug 2009**

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Leiden University, the Netherlands. Researcher within the South and Southeast Asia Art and Archaeology Index (ABIA). Sponsored by the J. Gonda Foundation. *South and Southeast Asian Art and Archaeology Index.* **1 Nov 2002 – 1 Jun 2011**

Dr Dominik Wujastyk

Wellcome Centre for the History of Medicine at University College London, United Kingdom. Sponsored by the J. Gonda Foundation. *A Sanskrit Polemical Tract on Medical Science: Vireśvara's Rogārogavāda, edited, translated and discussed.* **1 Mar 2009 – 1 Aug 2009**

Southeast Asia

Dr Birgit Abels

Ruhr University Bochum, Germany. Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam. Sponsored by Fritz Thyssen Stiftung. *Of Islam, Ancestors, and Translocality in Borderlands: Identity Negotiation and the Performing Arts among the Bajau Laut of Southeast Asia.* **1 Oct 2008 – 1 Feb 2010**

Azhari Aiyub

Aceh-Indonesia Writer Residency Sponsored by Prince Bernhard Cultural Foundation, The Ludo Pieters Guest Writer Fund, Poet of All Nation (PAN) Holland and IIAS **Nov 2009 – April 2010**

Dr. Tom van den Berge

KITLV, The Netherlands. *H.J. van Mook, 1849-1965: Een vrij en gelukkig Indonesie* **1 June 2009 – 31 May 2010**

Dr Michele Ford

The University of Sydney, Australia. *In the Shadow of Singapore: The Limits of Transnationalism in Insular Riau.* **1 Jan 2008 – 1 Jan 2010**

Dr Katrina Gulliver

Pembroke College, Cambridge, United Kingdom. Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam. Sponsored by the British Academy. *Historical Geography of Colonial Malacca.* **1 May 2009 – 31 Jul 2009**

Ms Yetty Haning

Centre for Studies & Advocacy of Human Rights of Nusa Cendana University, Indonesia. *Timor Sea Border Issues.* **1 Sept 2008 – 1 Sept 2010**

Dr Nico Kaptein

Leiden University, the Netherlands. *Islam and State in the Netherlands East Indies: The Life and Work of Sayyid 'Uthmān (1822-1914).* **1 May 2006 – 1 Jan 2010**

Dr Julian C. H. Lee

Department of Anthropology, University of Kent, UK. Sponsored by the Economic and Social Research Council (UK). *Islamization and Activism in Malaysia* **8 Oct 2009 – 23 Oct 2009**

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Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies, University of Wollongong, Australia. Stationed at the Branch Office. *In the Shadow of Singapore: The Limits of Transnationalism in Insular Riau.* **1 Jan 2008 – 1 Jan 2010**

Dr Dipika Mukherjee

Negotiating Languages and Forging Identities: Surinamese-Indian Women in the Netherlands. **1 Dec 2006 – 1 Jun 2009**

Prof. Maurizio Peleggi

Department of History, NUS, Singapore. Sponsored by NUS. *Colonial hotels and the Asian city* **17 Aug 2009 – 17 Oct 2009**

Prof. Oscar Salemink

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam. *Sacred Canopies in Vietnam: Religious and ritual Sacralizations of everyday Practice.* **1 Feb 2009 – 31 Aug 2009**

Dr. Eric C. Thompson

Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore. *Associating Southeast Asian Nations: Regionalism as a Cultural Process* **1 Oct 2009 – 1 Dec 2009**

In search of the new Director of IIAS

The position of Director will be available from 1 December 2009 for 19 hours per week (0.5 fte)

Tasks and responsibilities of the Director:

- Develop strategy concerning research policy, programme and organisation
- Negotiate cooperation with (inter)national partners
- Acquisition of external funding for research projects
- Representation and promotion of the Institute

In the research field:

- Accountable for the integrated management of the Institute (including finance and implementation/execution of the HRM policy).

For further information about this position: www.iias.nl



Call for Papers

JAPANSTUDIEN

Journal of the German Institute for Japanese Studies Tokyo

In celebration of the twenty year anniversary of the German Institute for Japanese Studies Tokyo (DIJ), its annual journal gets a facelift. Whereas previous issues of *Japanstudien* were in German, yet welcomed English language submissions, the journal now is IN ENGLISH (German language submissions are still accepted).

Japanstudien, the annually published PEER-REVIEWED JOURNAL of the German Institute for Japanese Studies Tokyo accepts submissions by scholars of any relevant academic discipline. The topic of volume 22, which is to be published in autumn 2010, is

Mind the Gap: Stratification and Social Inequalities in Japan

Hibiya Park, Tokyo, New Year 2009: Around 500 laid-off temporary workers, who not only became unemployed but also homeless due to the recent financial crisis, spent the New Year's holiday in a temporary tent village, established by volunteer groups and labor unions. This event, highly covered by the media, happened to be right in front of the noble Imperial Hotel – a pure coincidence, yet highly symbolic for the heated debate on growing social disparities in Japan.

Volume 22 of *Japanstudien* invites research papers from various disciplines, in order to cover diverse facets of the development to a more stratified society. Both empirical and discursive aspects are to be analyzed. What effects does Japan's re-differentiation have on work, society, family, education, the economy, and politics? How is the concern about increasing inequalities to be assessed from a historical perspective, especially as regards the long-held self-perception of an all-middle class society? Which role does the media play in the discourse on *kakusa shakai*, how is the topic negotiated in art, literature, film, and television? In what ways are power relations between young and old and male and female affected? And how do the drastic demographic changes impact social inequalities?

Manuscripts should be about 5,000 – 8,000 words in length. Please submit an abstract of about 300 words and a brief bio-blurb (up to 100 words) by **August 15, 2009** (editors: Barbara Holthus holthus@dihtokyo.org and Kristina Iwata-Weickgenannt iwata@dihtokyo.org). Accepted manuscripts (in English or German) should be submitted no later than **November 30, 2009**. Articles previously published or submitted for publication elsewhere cannot be accepted.

Furthermore, we also welcome articles on other topics (5,000 – 8,000 words) and reviews of current Japan-related publications (1,000 – 2,000 words).

All contributions will be peer-reviewed by external international reviewers.

Previous issues of *Japanstudien* – partially in full text – can be found on our homepage (http://www.dijtokyo.org/?page=publication_list.php&p_id=1).

Volume

22

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Key Issues in Asian Studies

“KEY ISSUES IN ASIAN STUDIES” booklets are designed for use in undergraduate humanities and social science courses, as well as by advanced high school students and their teachers. These booklets introduce students to major cultural and historical themes and are designed to encourage classroom debate and discussion. The AAS plans to publish 2–3 booklets each year. See website for forthcoming titles.

Understanding East Asia's Economic “Miracles”

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Gender, Sexuality, and Body Politics in Modern Asia

Michael G. Peletz, 2007, \$10

Political Rights in Post-Mao China

Merle Goldman, 2007, \$10



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Gerard Persoon ‘Environment (and development) Southeast Asia’ Extraordinary Chair at the Faculty of Social Science, Leiden University 1 July 2009–1 July 2014

Tak-Wing Ngo ‘History of Asia’ Extraordinary Chair at the Faculty of History and Arts, Erasmus University of Rotterdam 1 May 2008–1 May 2012

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IIAS Newsletter #51 Spring 2009 ISSN 0929-8738

Editor: Anna Yeadell
Guest Editor: Mehdi Amineh
Design: Artmiks, Amsterdam
Printing: Wegener Grafische Groep, Apeldoorn
Circulation: 26,000

Advertisements

Submit by: 1 September 2009

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for Asian Studies

Chinese snuff bottles

Chinese snuff bottles, designed to contain powdered tobacco or snuff, were invented at the court of Kang Hsi (1661-1722), the second Emperor of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). Tobacco had been introduced to the Imperial Court as early as the late Ming period but it wasn't until the succeeding Qing Dynasty that the habit or, better yet, the addiction to tobacco became ubiquitous at court.

Vincent Fausone

Because tobacco was so very expensive, it was limited to the Imperial family, high officials and the influential minority of China for at least the first 100 years of its use.

Snuff had been presented to the Emperors from Western emissaries in snuff boxes, elegant enamelled and jewelled containers that were popular in Europe. However, the boxes could not be sealed to make them air tight and the high humidity in Peking resulted in caking of the snuff. The bottle form, one that had a long history in China as a container for medicine, was more practical, both because it protected the snuff from moisture and because it could be more easily carried in sleeves and pouches, since Chinese garments did not have pockets.

The first bottles made specifically for snuff were glass. They were fabricated in the glassworks established by Kang Hsi and supervised by a Bavarian Jesuit Priest, Kilian Stumpf, who introduced western glass-making techniques. Glass bottles of this period are highly prized by collectors.

Though glass continued to be one of the most popular materials for snuff bottles, it soon became evident that they were not suitable for use in Peking's winter season, because of their proclivity for shattering in the extreme cold. This led to the fabrication of bottles made of stone, jade, chalcedony, quartz and even semi-precious materials such as lapis lazuli and tourmaline.

The bottles were highly prized by China's emperors, and fabricated by the very best craftsmen. Early in the evolution of snuff bottles, came enamelled bottles with designs on metal and later on glass. Many of these enamelled bottles were designed by the Jesuits at court who introduced Western enamelling techniques, although the execution was done by Chinese craftsmen. They were highly valued when made and continue to be sought after by collectors today.

In the 19th century, when tobacco became more affordable, the habit of taking snuff diffused to the population at large. A profusion of blue and white porcelain bottles were fabricated. Likewise the technique of inside painted bottles was developed and remains an important snuff bottle art today.

Some of the finest decorative art of the Qing Dynasty is exemplified in snuff bottles. Though they may never have been considered high art per se, they were treasured as personal items of virtue, much in the way that expensive Swiss watches are today.

Snuff bottles often display designs with specific meanings; wishes for long life, for many children, for success in the civil service examinations, for a happy marriage, for wealth and status etc. This, along with the enormous diversity of material from which they are made, and the refined and exquisite craftsmanship of their execution, guarantees their continued appeal to collectors today.

Vincent Fausone
International Chinese Snuff Bottle Society
www.snuffbottle.org



Fig. 1
Gourd and ivory snuff bottle. Moulded in four main sections, two on each main side, each with a different auspicious motif: a flying bat, a spray of cherries, a fan and a be-ribboned, hanging musical chime, c. 18th century. Bloch collection.



Fig. 2
Palace Petals. Translucent white and ruby-pink glass. Mother-of-pearl stopper. The ruby-pink glass ground to powder and sandwiched between layers of translucent white glass. Carved as a vessel contained within overlapping, formalised lotus petals. Palace workshops, Beijing, 1730-1800. Height: 4.4cm. Marakovic Collection.



Fig. 3
Transparent ruby-red, and bubble- and white-fleck suffused glass. Carved as a single overlay of ruby-red on a colourless ground with a continuous design made up of archaic depictions of a flying bat, a deer holding a *lingzhi* in its mouth, and a *chi* dragon holding a leafy branch bearing three peaches in its mouth. The bodies of the two larger beasts, and the extended wings of the bats carved to resemble the bodies of *kui* dragons. Imperial Palace workshops, Beijing, 1700-1770.



Fig. 4
Green inkstone bottle. 1750-1795. 'By Imperial Command' mark on the back and a poem. Marakovic Collection.

Fig. 5
Lotus cloisonné snuff bottle. Originally from the Monimar collection. Now belongs to the Marakovic collection. No mark. 1760-1820.

