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New Religious Movements



IIAS

NEWSLETTER

The Brahma Kumaris World Spiritual University

The Indian-based BKWSU arose from a Hindu cultural base, but distinct from Hinduism. It began in the 1930s as a small spiritual community called *Om Mandli* (Sacred Circle), consisting primarily of young women from the Bhai Bund community of Hyderabad Sindh, now part of Pakistan. Since the 1960s the community has been known as the Brahma Kumaris World Spiritual University (BKWSU), translated from the Hindi, '*Brahma Kumaris Ishwariya Vishwa Vidyalyaya*'. It is significant that the movement included a 'world' focus in its name, even though active overseas expansion did not begin until 1971.

tors are all ethnic Indian women although they have long been resident overseas. National coordinators may be ethnic Indian, local members, or third country nationals, and some are males. In this sense the BKWSU closely resembles a multinational corporation (MNC) in tending to have home country nationals posted to key management roles overseas, with a degree of localisation at the host country level. The use of third country nationals, or members from one overseas branch posted to lead another overseas branch, attests to the strength of its organisational culture and the strength of shared values of its members.

BKWSU is an international non-governmental organisation (NGO) that holds general consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN and consultative status with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). It is also affiliated to the UN Department of Public Information (DPI). It is a truly global organisation: with over 7000 centres *continued on page 4 >*

TAMASIN RAMSAY AND WENDY SMITH

The BKWSU headquarters in Mt. Abu, Rajasthan, India, were established in 1952. There are Regional Coordinating Offices (RCO) in London (coordinating Western Europe, South Africa, the Mid-

dle East), the US (America and Caribbean Islands), Russia (Eastern Europe) and Australia (Australia and Asia). The National Coordinating Offices are located in all countries where the activities of the BKWSU are carried out and are officially registered bodies. The six main coordina-

Wendy Smith's fascinating theme on 'Asian New Religious Movements' examines how these NRMs have spread beyond Asia's borders and become global organisations. pp. 1 - 13

'From science fictional Japan to Japanese science fiction' - Chris Goto-Jones reveals his fascination for 'weird-science'. pp. 14 + 15

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Director's note

As I write, the world is coming to terms with the devastation wreaked by a tropical cyclone in Southeast Asia. There are fears of 100,000 dead and more than a million homeless in Burma. It is too soon to know the full extent of the destruction but there is no doubt that a massive humanitarian catastrophe has occurred. When disaster strikes the international community rallies and aid pours in to provide food, clothing and shelter. Let us hope that one effect of this catastrophe will be that awareness about the situation in Burma becomes stronger and that international involvement in the country will grow. Culture is a basic need and we should attend to this in times of crisis, too. This edition of the Newsletter features an article on Cultural Emergency Response - a special programme of the Prince Claus Fund for culture and development. This modest but important activity is helping to restore sites of cultural heritage which are destroyed by war or other catastrophes. As the authors put it:

"Culture defines and reflects who people are. It is both creative expression and social interaction. Although over time, the remnants of daily cultural activities may disappear, the art and architecture that form a people's cultural heritage live on and become the pillars of their identity. They form the sources of hope and pride and the foundation on which people can reconstruct their lives." I fully subscribe to this statement and I am glad that we can offer the authors this platform to expose their project of cultural 'first aid'.

The theme of this issue is New Religious Movements. Many of these movements originate in Asian countries and have found their way into Asian Diasporas and become established in new countries. In fact, the world has witnessed a boom of New Religious Movements in the past 50 years. In countries with basic democratic liberties that led to the formation of a 'religious market', New Religious Movements compete not only with their national counterparts but also with a growing number of foreign groups from every religious stream. This theme covers several aspects of this phenomenon, such as the economy, organisation and leadership of such movements. IIAS is presently exploring possibilities of setting up an international research programme in this field and welcomes reactions.

Max Sparreboom
director



The International Institute for Asian Studies is a postdoctoral research centre based in Leiden and Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Our main objective is to encourage the interdisciplinary and comparative study of Asia and to promote national and international cooperation in the field. The institute focuses on the humanities and social sciences and their interaction with other sciences.

IIAS values dynamism and versatility in its research programmes. Post-doctoral research fellows are temporarily employed by or affiliated to IIAS, either within a collaborative research programme or individually. In its aim to disseminate broad, in-depth knowledge of Asia, the institute organizes seminars, workshops and conferences, and publishes the *IIAS Newsletter* with a circulation of 26,000.

IIAS runs a database for Asian Studies with information on researchers and research-related institutes worldwide. As an international mediator and a clearing-house for knowledge and information, IIAS is active in creating international networks and launching international cooperative projects and research programmes. In this way, the institute functions as a window on Europe for non-European scholars and contributes to the cultural rapprochement between Asia and Europe.

IIAS also administers the secretariat of the European Alliance for Asian Studies (Asia Alliance: www.asia-alliance.org) and the Secretariat General of the International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS: www.icassecretariat.org). Updates on the activities of the Asia Alliance and ICAS are published in this newsletter. <

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Asian new religious movements as global organisations

WENDY SMITH

Religions are the earliest global organisations, their missionary activity proceeding or accompanying trade and political domination across continents from centuries ago.

Unlike the established religions, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, which spread from their founders' societies into totally new cultural contexts in an ad hoc fashion, the founders of new religious movements (NRMs) often adopted a world focus from the outset. This is reflected in the names of several Asian NRMs discussed below: Brahma Kumaris World Spiritual University, Church of World Messianity, World True Light Civilization Church (the original name of Mahikari), and Perfect Liberty Kyodan, significant in using English words in its Japanese name.

New religious movements typically arise and flourish in times of political and economic upheaval or rapid social change. Characteristically, they engage the individual convert in a quest for self renewal and finding 'here and now' solutions to illness, poverty and unhappy relationships rather than focusing on benefits in the hereafter. Often they offer ritual practices for doing so, whose outcomes are frequently seen as miraculous. With the demise of rural peasant communities through industrialisation, rural-urban migration and the creation of urban working class and middle class mass society, religious affiliation disengaged from family or community contexts and became a matter of individual choice. Along with these historic developments, the 'spiritual supermarket' of religious organisations (see Pereira's essay p.8) has grown in size, aided by the accessibility to its products provided by the internet. As a result, even established religions are subject to global market forces and all must chart their long term growth or even survival strategies in a global context. Organisations must structure appropriately to implement these strategies, as corporations do, paying attention to the design of their products and services in cross-cultural contexts and managing their human resources effectively through appropriate training and staffing policies. Here, NRMs are experiencing the benefits of the 'late developer' effect and are able to respond more quickly to opportunities presented by information technology, and more flexibly to the needs and concerns of their membership base in rapidly changing societies.

Fertile ground

Asian societies have been fertile ground for the spawning of NRMs, especially Japan, whose unique experience of almost three centuries of national seclusion during the Tokugawa era provoked a dramatic reversal - aggressive political expansion overseas and rapid social change at home through the adoption of Western industrial technologies and public institutions after the Meiji restoration of 1868. Over 700 Japanese NRMs have emerged in the last two centuries. Homage must be paid to Peter Clarke who has pioneered the comprehensive survey of Japanese new religions overseas in English language publications. (see, for instance, Clarke 2000) Appropriately, five of the six case studies in this special theme issue deal with Japanese NRMs: Soka Gakkai (founded 1930), Church of World Messianity (1935) and Sukyo Mahikari (1959) have a truly global presence; Seicho-No-Ie (1930) and Perfect Liberty (PL) Kyodan (1946) are most strongly represented in North and South America, with representation in other western nations and developing countries, such as France, Portugal, Australia, Thailand (PL), Taiwan, Thailand, UK, Germany, Hong Kong, Australia (Seicho-No-Ie). The Indian NRM, Brahma Kumaris World Spiritual University also has a global presence, between that of Soka Gakkai and Mahikari, in terms of membership and locational range. The rapid expansion of Japanese NRMs in industrialising

economies such as Brazil, a focus of the essays by Matsuoka, Nakamaki and Pereira, or in marketing economies such as Russia (a striking case here is that of the now discredited Aum Shinrikyo), highlights the power of NRMs to organise people into supportive new communities which provide alternative institutions for their daily wellbeing and cultural fulfilment. Indeed the repression of Falun Gong by the Chinese government attests to the perceived potential power of NRMs to challenge the hegemony of the state.

Doctrine and drive

The NRMs' drive to internationalise is sometimes aided by doctrinal elements, the most powerful one being that they are supra-religions, non-denominational, perhaps monotheistic but transcending any one religion. This helps them to attract followers who are reassured that they will not need to renounce their current religious beliefs to join. In this forum, Sukyo Mahikari (Supra Religion True Light) and Seicho-No-Ie (House of Growth) have philosophies such as this. Once inside the organisation however, the comprehensive 'corporate culture' of daily rituals, regular study groups, codified modes of speech and behaviour, usually exert a stronger influence than anticipated and converts gradually drift away from their former social activities and religious observances.

The distinctive cultural base of Japanese NRMs, arising out of Japanese Buddhist (Soka Gakkai) or Shinto (PL Kyodan, Mahikari, Messianity, Seicho-No-Ie) traditions, or the Hinduistic Brahma Kumaris NRM from India, demonstrate just how willing foreign members are to embrace the alien cultural systems underpinning these movements and effectively cut themselves off from family, friends and their wider societies, in order to fulfil the distinct lifestyle requirements of membership in their religion of choice. Asian NRMs are an example of the phenomenon of cultural colonisation of the West by eastern religious, aesthetic and martial arts movements.

NRMs as MNCs?

Building on the pioneering idea of Nakamaki (1985, English translation 1991 and 2003), distinguished, ardent field researchers of Japanese NRMs, Hardacre (1988), Reader (1991), Matsunaga (2000) and Matsuoka (2007), have noted the organisational parallels between Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs), which began their international advance in the 1960s, and the spread of Japanese NRMs which, despite an international presence in the pre- and post World War One eras in Japanese colonies in Manchuria, Korea, China and Taiwan and migrant worker communities in Hawaii and Brazil, began to expand their international membership into non-ethnic Japanese communities at around the same time as the expansion of Japanese MNCs, post World War Two. Did the superior products and production regimes of Japanese multinationals abroad support foreign positive opinion towards these religions, with their emphasis on personal development, positive thinking (see the essay by Matsunaga p.5), the restoration of respect into family and social relationships and their spiritual technologies of miraculous healing (for instance in the case of PL, Mahikari, Messianity)?

Recruitment of foreign members, both spontaneously, through word of mouth and serendipitous expansion into foreign locations (PL, Mahikari), and planned as an internationalisation strategy supported by missionary activity (Soka Gakkai, Messianity), brought organisational challenges to the movements: Language policies had to be decided: should rituals be translated (PL) or would it be more important to preserve the power of the words in their original language (Soka Gakkai International, the mantra 'Namu Myoho Renge Kyo' and Mahikari, the *Amatsu Norigoto*)?

How would foreign branches be staffed? Would it be necessary to send authorities from the headquarters in Japan (PL, short term posting, Messianity, lifetime posting) or India (BKWSU, long term posting), those who had been close to the founder and manifested spiritual power, who would have the credentials to safeguard the doctrine and the purity of ritual practices in a foreign culture where alien cultural practices did not provide adequate support for the new cultural forms associated with the NRM? Or would a training scheme with an international cohort of students provide religious specialists who would be able to fulfil their roles in any centre in the world (Mahikari)?

Where would foreign members be trained in the religious and administrative roles necessary to staff an organisation with growing global reach? Locally (PL, Messianity, Seicho-No-Ie, BKWSU) or at headquarters (Mahikari)? What would be the basis of leaders' authority (kinship ties with the founder (Mahikari), a lineage of discipleship from the founder (Soka Gakkai) or spiritual stature as recognised by peers (BKWSU)? And to what degree would decision making be decentralised to local contexts where leaders would be more in touch with the problems and worldviews of local members?

What strategies could be adopted for recruiting and retaining members in cultural environments very disparate from the core culture of the organisation, causing members to undergo stress and dissonance in their dealings with old friends and family members who were not members of the movement?

These and many more questions relating to the leadership, organisational strategies and structures of six representative Asian NRMs are discussed in the essays which follow.

Aside from making the case for a theoretical comparison between globalised NRMs and MNCs in this special issue, the study by Matsunaga, of Seicho-No-Ie and the department store Yaohan which its leaders created, is a most valuable example of the real life conjunction of a Japanese NRM and a Japanese company with international operations.

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in 128 countries, territories and islands including Africa and the Middle East. Of the countries where BKWSU has centres, a number are located in places of unrest. There are centres in Lebanon, Kuwait, Israel, Jordan, Iran, Pakistan, China and Egypt (BKWSU 2006). In many of these places the BK representative must be extremely cautious and present spiritual ideas in a way which is compatible with the ideas accepted within that culture. This has been true of the proselytisation process of the major religions today, Buddhism and Christianity for instance, when they themselves were NRMs. Since its early days of service, BK practice has been to establish centres on the invitation of someone from the local community (Nagel 1999). So, while the BKs believe that the world will become an increasingly difficult place to inhabit, they consistently place themselves in some of the most challenging areas.

BKs conduct their main teaching activities and programmes in a 'centre'. Each centre is independent, yet there is regular communication amongst all levels of the organisation, and a key feature is that the top leadership are extremely accessible to those at lower levels of the hierarchy and indeed to ordinary members. In that sense, they show all the characteristics of Servant Leadership: humility, leadership by example, nurturing, empowering and a refusal to be treated as gurus or objects of reverence. Centre coordinators are appointed by RCOs, who also determine their transfer postings around the organisation. Coordinators are chosen for their 'spiritual stature' rather than age, gender, and so on, and this does not necessarily correlate to their length of membership in the organisation. While all members have a recognised and important place in the organisation and all are equally beloved by God - the Supreme Soul - there is a concept of 'numberwise' which describes one's position in terms of spiritual stature in a 'rosary' of members. Because of the fact that human resource management in the organisation is based on this principle, there is usually unanimous support for the choice of leaders and conflict over positions of authority is rarely seen.

History

BKWSU's founder, Lekhray Kripalani, was the son of a schoolteacher, a follower of the Vallabacharya sect and part of the Bhai Bund merchant community. He was pious, had a number of gurus, and enjoyed going on regular pilgrimages. While he was young, he saved up his earnings as a small merchant of wheat and entered the diamond trade. He quickly developed a reputation in the jewellery business and, as time passed, he became friends with many of the rulers and wealthy classes of North West India, who became his loyal clients.

Over a period of months, Dada Lekhray (Dada is a term of respect for an older gentleman. We will continue to refer to him as Dada or Dada Lekhray), had a series of striking visions and ecstatic spiritual experiences, some of which were blissful and others disturbing. His first vision was of Vishnu, the Preserver of the Universe in Hindu cosmology, which was accompanied by the feeling of being bodiless and bathed in bliss. A voice said 'You are This'. Some time later he had a vision of light. Dada's next vision was of a catastrophic world collapse that left nothing but chaos, wreckage and misery in its wake. The sorrow and suffering he witnessed was incomprehensible. Following his spiritual experiences, Dada rapidly lost interest in his

jewellery work and began spending extended periods of time in contemplation. He read extracts from his favourite religious scripture, the *Shrimad Bhagawad Gita*. Many of his local Bhai Bund community attended the readings, as such gatherings were common at that time. What was unusual was that the attendees, often women and children whose husbands were away on business, the basis of the Bhai Bund economy, would regularly experience themselves to be bodiless, have visions of Dada as Krishna, an important Hindu god, and of themselves as princes and princesses in a paradisaical world. In October 1937 Dada Lekhray, later known as Brahma Baba, placed his entire wealth into the hands of a small group of women followers. This spiritual community adopted the name of 'Om Mandli'. For 14 years, the small group lived in Karachi, in relative isolation from the rest of society. Many women returned to their families, but some remained. The group slowly grew to a self-sufficient community, of between 300 and 700, devoting their time to intense spiritual study, meditation and self-transformation.

The *Om Mandli* was founded in a patriarchal society where women are primarily daughters and wives and their first duties are to their families and husbands respectively. The BK movement was particularly revolutionary at the time, as women chose to live celibate lives, which in Hindu society was not an option for them. In the Sindh culture of the 1930s only men were considered worthy of the life of a spiritual renunciate (Nagel 1999, Puttick 1997). Yet through association with Dada Lekhray, women of all ages and status were having profound spiritual experiences and

leaving their family homes. Many of these founding members of the organisation underwent physical and emotional abuse when they left home, when, as unmarried women, they decided to remain unmarried or, as married women, they withdrew conjugal rights and informed their husbands in writing that they were free to re-marry. The abrupt declaration of independence from women and girls was seen as a direct threat to family values and, because of this, there were a number of uprisings, with subsequent court-cases and attempts to destroy the spiritual community (Chander 1983, Nagel 1999).

Since *Om Mandli*, the BKWSU has continued to expand. In 1971 the first overseas centre was established in London and in 1981 the BKWSU received NGO status with the UN, by which time its membership had grown to 40,000. In 1984 overseas expansion was evident in approximately 30 countries. In 1986 the BKWSU conducted its first international movement, the Million Minutes of Peace, for which it received seven UN Peace Messenger awards. As international membership has continued to increase, to 100,000 in 1988 and 800,000 by 2007, the organisation has built two new campuses, Gyansarovar (1995) and Shantivan (1998), at the top and the foot of Mt Abu respectively, to accommodate pilgrims who come in their tens of thousands from within India and from overseas for the regular meetings with the Supreme Soul, Shiv Baba.

Following the death of the founder in 1969, three Dadis ('elder sisters' in Hindi) from the original group of the 1930s were designated as spiritual leaders of the organisa-

tion: the Chief Administrative Head who is in charge of the whole organisation, and two Additional Administrative Heads, one overseeing the Indian regions and one, based in London, overseeing the international regions. Despite these titles, the Dadis are more like traditional elders who give spiritual guidance to BKs at all levels and guide the direction of the BKWSU in its service activities.

BK identity

BK members identify themselves as students and informally refer to each other as 'brahmins' or 'BKs'. BKs form a spiritual community with a lifestyle centred on the practice of Raja Yoga. Raja Yoga, the most exalted or 'kingly' form of yoga, is a spiritual practice in which, through meditation, the practitioner seeks to establish and sustain a connection and relationship with the Supreme Soul or God. A BK is considered to be someone who has accepted the Raja Yoga philosophy and lives by the principles. BK philosophy comprises understandings of the self, God, time, rebirth, *karma* (the law of cause and effect), the world and social behaviour.

Those in the *Om Mandli* had experiences of being separate and distinct from the body, and this experience of 'soul consciousness' was central to their life. This awareness of being a soul, that is, a point of conscious and eternal light energy, still forms the foundation of BKs' meditation practice. All the disciplines and rituals they follow are in support of this relationship they experience with the Supreme Soul. BKs believe that all living beings, including both humans and animals, are souls; infinitesimal points of conscious light energy that live life and express themselves through the vehicle of the body. Each soul is unique, indivisible and intrinsically pure and valuable.

Disciplines and lifestyle

BKs are taught to live a virtuous monk-like existence while remaining present in the world (Walsh, Ramsay, and Smith 2007). This involves practices such as early morning meditation (4.00am) and a daily spiritual class, as well as abstaining from alcohol, tobacco, sexual activity and drugs. BKs attribute considerable importance to food and accordingly there are strict principles; only pure vegetarian food, without onions or garlic, is cooked while in the awareness of God, and in a peaceful state of mind. After the food is cooked it is 'offered' to God before being consumed. The majority of BKs will not eat cooked food unless a fellow BK has prepared it. BKs regularly have periods of silence and contemplation and frequently attend retreats for their personal spiritual sustenance, as well as teach meditation and other classes at centres. The majority of BK members follow these principles whilst looking after their family and leading a relatively standard life according to the culture and country in which they live.

Organisational change

In comparison with other NRMs the degree of change and adaptation to local cultures has been minimal in the BKWSU due to the strict principles of daily life which constitute a spiritual technology for establishing the relationship with the Supreme Soul. For the inner circle of members, there can be no modification of these principles. However, in the way the organisation relates to the wider society, there have been some adaptations. When the BKs were new to the West, there was an emphasis on traditional teachings, practicing meditation and living the disciplines

of the path. However, since the late 1980s, the movement has reconfigured its identity to interact more with the wider community and be of service in response to social change. A recent study on BKWSU by Walliss (2002), based on interviews and visits to a number of BKWSU centres in the United Kingdom, suggests that the organisation has undergone a transformation. BKWSU has moved from a clear perspective of world rejection in its early days - when BKs lived an almost cloistered existence - to a state of world ambivalence, where the imminent destruction has not yet taken place. Walliss determines that the movement has gone from one where members isolated themselves from the world, through being solely a teaching organisation in India with firm ideas on the date of world destruction, to a social movement that, placed in a post-modern world, has adapted itself and now offers a variety of programmes to suit the needs of different groups of people (Living Values 2002).

Thus BKWSU is a millenarian NRM now situated in a post-modern world. BKs are now involving themselves more in present day social concerns, such as education, disaster response and health outreach that may serve to make the current world a better place to live. The BKs certainly believe that world calamities, war and natural disasters will only increase, and cannot be prevented (Piven 2004). Yet they also believe in the peace that manifests through self-awareness or 'soul consciousness', and the love and power received through the practice of Raja Yoga meditation as a solid technique for dealing with increasingly calamitous world events and disturbing life events and helping others to do the same.

Howell and Nelson's study of BKs in Australia (1997) follows the trajectory of the organisation. Their study notes the focus on principles such as celibacy, which is unusual among NRMs. They cite the way in which members have adjusted their spiritual practice in western settings as a key to the NRM's success. They acknowledge the BKWSU international expansion, and how it is positioned in the context of wider society, while also noting the disciplines and cohesion of its members. The remarkable status of women in the BKWSU is recognised in a number of scholarly texts on the BKWSU (Babb 1984, Howell 1998, Puttick 1997, Skultans 1993, Sudesh 1993). The fact that the girls and women of the community chose to lead spiritually autonomous and celibate lives, and were subjected to many forms of violence and suffering, may be what led to their early seclusion and world rejection. Babb refers to BK as 'indigenous feminism in a modern Hindu sect', noting that original members were primarily women and that 'the sensibilities of women have contributed in very important ways to the ideology of the movement' (Babb 1984). One recent study explores the role that the BKWSU has had on changing cultural opinions of women (Lalrinawma 2004). Lalrinawma interviewed both male and female members and, coupled with participant observation, he determined that BK teachings and practice had brought about a significant change in the status of women and the regard that men held for women, within the confines of the BK community.

As a global organisation, akin to a multinational corporation in terms of its global sweep, membership size, property holding and budget size, the BKWSU is distinguished by its practice of spiritual



principles in management, leading to, comparatively speaking, very low levels of conflict and organisational malaise in an institution of this size and cross-cultural complexity. This organisational harmony must be attributed to the fact that members share a common 'organisational culture' of practices for all key aspects of daily life, such as a clearly defined daily schedule, including attending early morning class and periodic pauses for meditation, vegetarianism, and celibacy. These are standard across the globe, in other words, they constitute a global cultural system which transcends the national cultures of members. This group cohesion is reinforced by daily readings of a text, the *murli*, the same one being read throughout the world on a particular date, which then forms the basis of study and discussion. The global community's cohesion is reinforced by annual pilgrimages to the Mt Abu headquarters to participate in mass meetings with the Supreme Soul, Shiv Baba, through a trance messenger, and through regular daily meditation and the effort to attain a state of soul consciousness which transcends gender, social status and other culturally determined roles and relationship

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In the Japanese corporate world, the multinational retail group Yaohan, which declared bankruptcy in 1997, was unusual in its close involvement with a Japanese new religious movement, Seicho-No-Ie. An examination of the interaction between these two organisations suggests both possible synergies, and serious potential pitfalls in the interaction of multinational corporations and new religious movements.

Blurring the boundaries between corporation and religion

LOUELLA MATSUNAGA

In her thought-provoking contribution to the Autumn 2007 edition of this newsletter, Wendy Smith suggests a number of parallels between multinational corporations (MNCs) and new religious movements (NRMs). As I have argued elsewhere (Matsunaga 2000), in the case of Japanese MNCs and NRMs in particular these parallels are striking, despite the contrast in the social status within Japan of the two types of organisation (MNCs are elite, highly respected organisations, while NRMs tend to be regarded with suspicion, particularly since the Aum poison gas incident of 1995). In addition to the common organisational characteristics noted by Smith, similarities can also be found in narratives of the lives of the founders of MNCs and NRMs (Matsunaga 2000: 40-43); ritual activities of Japanese corporations (Nakamaki 1992, 1995); and the deployment of ideas, practices, and techniques derived from religious organisations, including NRMs, in company training programmes, in particular those aimed at new recruits (Rohlen 1973, 1974; Reader 1995).

I want to extend the comparison of Japanese MNCs and NRMs through the examination of one particular case where a multinational Japanese company, the (now bankrupt) supermarket chain Yaohan, was closely and publicly linked with a Japanese NRM, Seicho-No-Ie. Although it should be noted that this kind of explicit public linkage is highly unusual in Japan, this case is of interest as it gives an opportunity to explore the interaction between an NRM and an MNC in a context where both are seeking to expand their global reach.¹

Seicho-No-Ie, meaning the House of Growth, is a new religious movement founded in Japan in 1930, and was originally organised as a publishing company, publishing the thoughts of its founder, Taniguchi Masaharu,

before officially becoming a religious organisation in 1941. Put simply, the movement teaches that there is a world of reality in which human beings are perfect, children of God; and a phenomenal world of our perceptions. All problems come from the phenomenal world, which is an illusion. If we cultivate the right state of mind, and thus put ourselves in touch with the world of reality, these problems will disappear. In the emphasis on changing one's life through changing one's state of mind, the influence of the Positive Thinking movement is evident. At the same time, notions familiar from writings on Japanese society and ethics are also stressed: for example the importance of gratitude, especially to one's seniors.

An adaptable philosophy

The philosophy of Seicho-No-Ie has proved itself to be adaptable to the business context in Japan, as its elements have been harnessed to the promotion of a work ethic which emphasises effort and the importance of service to others through work. During World War Two, Seicho-No-Ie was active among medium and small sized enterprises in Japan as part of the drive to increase efficiency and production, and in the post-war era Seicho-No-Ie established a subsidiary organisation called 'The Prosperity Association', which holds seminars, lectures and research meetings devoted to questions of business and management. In the 1990s its most well-known member was Wada Kazuo, president of the Yaohan retail group, who became head of the Prosperity Association in 1995.

By the 1990s the Yaohan retail group had grown from a small, family-run greengrocers with a single store in Kanagawa prefecture to become a multinational chain of stores with branches in countries including China, the US and the UK. Wada Kazuo was the eldest son of the couple who opened the original Yaohan store, and was largely responsible for the company's expansion. Both Wada Kazuo and his mother, Katsu, were active members

of Seicho-No-Ie, and, unusually in the Japanese corporate context, chose to give Seicho-No-Ie a central role in the development of Yaohan.

As the Yaohan business began to expand, and to open more branches within Japan in the 1960s, the company began to offer induction training for new employees, in line with the general pattern for large Japanese companies. However the Yaohan programme was distinctive in its strong emphasis on spiritual training² based on the principles of Seicho-No-Ie. In particular, the idea of expressing gratitude to customers through 'service' – that is, hard work in the store, was stressed. This use of Seicho-No-Ie teachings caused a crisis when an employee reported Yaohan to Taniguchi, the founder of Seicho-No-Ie, suggesting that the Wada family was using Seicho-No-Ie teachings to exploit employees. This led Taniguchi to contact the Wadas, and to suggest that their approach could cause a serious misunderstanding.

Inextricably linked

The response of the Wadas was surprising. They decided to formally extend the connection linking their family with Seicho-No-Ie to the entire Yaohan company, so that henceforward all Yaohan employees would also be members of Seicho-No-Ie. Employees who resisted, some on the grounds that they did not wish to become members of an NRM, were told that they could seek jobs elsewhere, and in the end the majority complied. Yaohan training programmes continued to have a strong Seicho-No-Ie content, and in the following year Yaohan held a six day induction course at a Seicho-No-Ie training centre, which included elements such as Seicho-No-Ie style meditation.

Seicho-No-Ie's close involvement with Yaohan continued to be important during Yaohan's overseas expansion. The first country targeted by Yaohan

was Brazil, a choice suggested to Wada Kazuo by the vice chairman of Seicho-No-le. It seems that Wada calculated that the strength of Seicho-No-le in Brazil would help Yaohan to establish itself by providing both a source of employees and of potential customers. In the early 1970s Yaohan opened a total of four stores in Brazil, however the combination of the oil shock of 1973 and the high rate of inflation in Brazil meant that the venture ran into difficulties, and by 1980 Yaohan no longer had any stores in Brazil.

Despite this setback, Yaohan's overseas expansion continued, to Singapore in 1974, Hong Kong in 1984, and subsequently to mainland China, as well as the US and the UK. Although employees of overseas branches were not required to become members of Seicho-No-le, Seicho-No-le principles continued to be used in Yaohan training programmes, a policy which met with a range of responses from Yaohan's overseas staff. In Singapore Yaohan's approach caused controversy: Muslim employees objected to references to 'God' in Wada Katsu's lectures during the training programme, pointing out that Islam enjoins the worship of one God, Allah, and that they could not therefore recognise Mrs Wada's god. Training materials were re-written as a result, substituting the term 'the Creator' for 'God'.

In Hong Kong the picture appears more complex: May Wong (1994) suggests that the Chinese employees were receptive to the content of the training programme, partly because aspects of the teachings such as the emphasis on filial piety and gratitude to seniors resonated with their own cultural background. However, Heung Wah Wong (1999) points out that local Chinese staff were largely excluded from Seicho-No-le activities within the company, and argues that this exclusion from the symbolic heart of the company reflects the differential value placed on local Chinese staff who were seen as peripheral, compared to the Japanese managerial core.

Drawing on my own research, in Yaohan Plaza in the UK, similarly, participation in Seicho-No-le events such as meditation or prayers was confined to the Japanese staff. Seicho-No-le based training was offered to managerial staff, who attended courses in Hong Kong (an experience which met with a mixed response), but on the whole Seicho-No-le seemed to have little impact on the local staff. It was also noticeable that, at this distance from the headquarters of Yaohan and from the Wada family, even the Japanese employees of Yaohan UK showed little enthusiasm for Seicho-No-le activities, to the dismay of local Seicho-No-le groups, who had hoped that the opening of the UK store in 1993 would provide a boost to their organisation. Between the period of my fieldwork in 1995 and Yaohan's bankruptcy in 1997, Seicho-No-le activities within the store showed a marked decline, a situation which, according to one British manager, may have been exacerbated by the decline of the company itself. He commented: "If the company had been a success [Seicho-No-le] would have been an excellent vehicle to keep everybody interested and positive, and to create a strong culture which creates loyalty...I'm sure things would have been very different."

Yaohan's involvement with Seicho-No-le during the period of the company's growth, initially within Japan and later overseas, highlights both similarities and contrasts between NRMs and MNCs as both types of organisations seek to expand globally. It seems that both Yaohan and Seicho-No-le entertained hopes that they could cooperate in order to promote the Seicho-No-le philosophy, and in so doing to also help to create a distinctive corporate identity for Yaohan characterised by a strong work and service ethic. In addition, they hoped to make use of each other's organisational strengths: for example in Brazil, Seicho-No-le was envisaged as a source of both employees and customers for the new Yaohan stores, while in the UK local Seicho-No-le groups anticipated that Yaohan would provide a new source of members and organisational support.

Patchy commitment, active resistance

In practice, however, these hopes were not fulfilled. Although the incorporation of Yaohan employees as Seicho-No-le members was accomplished relatively easily, at least on a nominal level, in Japan; in other countries the introduction of practices seen as religious into a workplace, or training environment, conceived of as secular, met with resistance, in particular where these practices were seen as in conflict with pre-existing religious affiliations, as in Singapore. Furthermore, evidence from the UK suggests that many Japanese employees may have seen their membership of Seicho-No-le as a purely formal obligation, imposed by the Wada family. Both Heung Wah Wong's research on Yaohan Hong Kong and mine on the UK suggest that in the overseas context membership of Seicho-No-le and participation in Seicho-No-le activities took on a symbolic value, ironically serving to differentiate Japanese and local staff, rather than furnishing a source of corporate unity.

In the light of this, it is perhaps not surprising that Seicho-No-le and Yaohan were also largely unsuccessful in making use of each other's organisational strengths – although individual contacts at the higher levels of the respective organisations seem to have been good, at lower levels individual commitment to Seicho-No-le on the part of Yaohan employees has been patchy at best, and sometimes characterised by active resistance, thus limiting the effectiveness of collaborations instituted from the top down. In the UK case, for example, Yaohan management was willing to let its premises be used for Seicho-No-le meetings, but Yaohan employees and their families would rarely participate in local Seicho-No-le group organised events. In addition the store was very inconveniently located for local Seicho-No-le members, so meetings at the store tended to be poorly attended.

Overall, although Seicho-No-le has a considerable worldwide presence, the expansion of the movement was not helped by its association with Yaohan, nor did Yaohan derive any substantial benefits in its expansion overseas from its association with Seicho-No-le. It is difficult to draw firm general conclusions from one rather unusual case, especially given

Yaohan's eventual bankruptcy – as the manager quoted above pointed out, the story could have been very different if Yaohan had been successful. However, it does suggest that, however compelling the parallels and potential synergies between NRMs and MNCs may be, as the two types of organisation both seek to expand globally, the blurring of boundaries between them is experienced as problematic.

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Notes:

- 1 For a more detailed account see Matsunaga 2000
- 2 Spiritual training programmes are well documented in Japanese companies, see e.g. Rohlen 1973, 1974. However it is unusual for such programmes to be based on the teachings of an NRM.

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In the mid-1980s Hirochika Nakamaki wrote about Perfect Liberty Kyōdan (PL), a Japanese new religious movement with a strong presence in Brazil, comparing it to a multinational enterprise¹. Nakamaki was the first to name such religions 'multinational religions'. A later article by Nakamaki on another popular Japanese NRM in Brazil, Seicho-No-le, employed the analogy of the epidemic to what he called endemic religion². This article briefly summarises the major findings of these two important studies.

Japanese NRMs as 'multinational enterprises' and 'epidemics'

HIROCHIKA NAKAMAKI

PL's propagation in Brazil started when one of its Japanese members went to Brazil in early 1957. Subsequently, an instructor was dispatched from the headquarters in Osaka and its overseas propagation system gradually became well established. It was further intensified after Rev. Tokuchika Miki, the Second Patriarch, began to travel overseas after 1960. Rev. Tokuchika Miki, who worked hard for religious cooperation, had an audience with Pope Paul VI in the Vatican in 1973. The photograph of the meeting between the Pope and the Patriarch is displayed in all PL churches in Brazil, and has had a profound effect on

avoiding friction with the Catholic Church. By the end of 1988, there was a total of 200 PL churches overseas: one in the United States, one in Canada, 172 in Brazil, nine in Argentina, five in Paraguay, 11 in Peru, and one in France. PL has developed its overseas presence in a way which is analogous to that of Japanese multinational enterprises, which spread their business, employing local people and establishing organisational hierarchies. This is because PL has been eager to proselytise among non-Japanese since the late 1960s.

Early propagation in Brazil was focused on Japanese immigrants to Brazil and their descendents, mainly located around the

State of São Paulo, but the number of non-Japanese Brazilian followers has increased since the mid-1960s. The main reasons for this were (1) emphasis on miracle-based faith by *oyasikiri* (the taking of an oath to God) and on thanks-based belief towards the bliss of God; (2) the linking of sympathetic personal counselling with religious practices in everyday life; (3) active propagation in Portuguese; and (4) the adoption of a system that placed Brazilian instructors at the front line of propagation when preaching to Brazilians. The PL Church has thus spread from São Paulo State to Rio de Janeiro, then on to Minas Gerais, and further to other main cities throughout Brazil. An instructor training school was founded

in São Paulo in 1977. 80 percent of its 73 members up to the eighth cohort of graduates were non-Japanese Brazilians. The number of non-Japanese assistant instructors has also increased. PL purchased a piece of land in Arujá in the suburb of São Paulo in 1965, and constructed its South America "Holy Land" there. The outdoor altar, where the spirits of the dead are enshrined, is located at the centre, and is surrounded by the Instruction Department office, training hall, gymnasium, graveyard and Botanical Research Institute. A golf course and a recreational park were also constructed on the property. Fireworks at the Founder's Festival attracted tens of thousands of people from 1973 to 1979.

Then the Festival was cancelled due to the traffic and security problems. Various international congresses and events have been held at the Holy Land.

In principle, all regular rituals and events are held only in Portuguese, differing from other Japanese NRMs with overseas branches, such as Tenrikyo and Sukyo Mahikari. However, the PL newspaper, *Jornal Perfeita Liberdade*, is published both in Portuguese and Japanese. Six works by Tokuchika Miki have already been translated and published in Portuguese. When they were translated, a mention of baseball, for example, was replaced by soccer so that local people might feel more familiar



Multi-ethnic gathering of Seicho-No-Ie in Brazil.

with the discussion. This process of indigenisation has been actively extended to ritual. Japanese sake (rice wine), kelp and dried cuttlefish which used to be offered at major ceremonies, have been replaced by wine and cakes in keeping with Brazilian culture.

Since the late 1960s, the national policy of Brazil's military regime has been rapid industrialisation. This has resulted in an increase in the migration of rural populations to urban areas and the trend towards nuclear families. People have been in search of new, more suitable lifestyles and moral codes to meet with the experience of urbanisation and the nuclearisation of the family, PL adopted measures to deal with these changes in an era of rapid social change, and thus was able to extend its influence among non-Japanese Brazilians in a short time.

Seicho-No-Ie (House of Growth)

Overseas propagation started soon after Seicho-No-Ie was founded in Japan in 1930. It spread first to Korea, Manchuria and mainland China under Japan's colonial rule at that time, then to Hawaii, North America and Brazil, where many Japanese migrants lived. There were magazine subscribers in Brazil from 1930, but the first branch was officially established there in 1938 or 1939.

'Ascendador' was published in 1965 as a monthly journal in Portuguese by the Seicho-No-Ie Young Members' Association. This journal played a major role in propagation among non-Japanese Brazilians. 50,000 copies were published in 1973, and 370,000 copies in 1980. About 500,000 copies of 'Ascendador' and about 120,000 copies of 'Pomba Blanca' (White Pigeon) have been published as of 1987 by the White Pigeons Association, a Seicho-No-Ie women's organisation. This figure, however, does not reflect the correct number of believers, because one believer could buy and distribute dozens or hundreds of booklets to non-members.

The Seicho-No-Ie Propagation Head Office in Latin America is located in São Paulo. There are about 60 disciplinary training centers and two training halls in Brazil, and branch offices in Mexico, Peru, Argentina and Colombia. As of 1980, there were a total of 792 local instructors (*chihô kôshi*) and 216 practitioners (*kômyô jissen*

iin) overseas. Of these, two thirds of local instructors and 80 percent of practitioners were in Brazil. In 2006 there were 304 points of propagation outside of Japan. The major bases of evangelism overseas are distributed across the US, Canada, Brazil and Taiwan.

According to Takashi Maeyama's research³, Seicho-No-Ie in Brazil has the following characteristics: It initially spread as a religion to heal diseases in the 1930s. The number of believers among the World War Two 'winning side' increased in the early 1950s. The number of women



A Brazilian leader talking in a church of Perfect Liberty

and young people of Japanese descent increased remarkably in 1960s. Since Portuguese-language propagation stations were established in 1966, Seicho-No-Ie has spread rapidly among non-Japanese Brazilians. A dual structure strategy was successfully implemented completely separating the Portuguese-language division and the Japanese-language division. In simple terms, Japanese descendants entered Seicho-No-Ie to become good Japanese, while Brazilians entered to become good Catholics. It was symbolic that they named their organisation 'Igreja' (church) in Portuguese in 1970. For the first time, a Brazilian member was appointed as a missionary (*dendmin*) in 1968, but he faced the obstacle of the Japanese language, which

prevented him from being promoted to the level of instructor (*kmsshi*), the higher rank. Instructor-training seminars in Portuguese were finally organised from 1978, and many non-Japanese instructors were produced. However, the organisation itself is in the hands of executive members who are Brazilians of Japanese descent.

The founder, Masaharu Taniguchi takes a strong position regarding the oneness of all religions (*bankyo kiitsu*). In his book, 'Seimei-no-Jisso (Truth of Life)' he insists that there can be only one truth even though preaching methods are different,

analogous to the spread of illness (with no negative connotations intended)⁴. 'Epidemic' religions followed the tracks of Japanese immigrants, settling initially in the communities formed by the Japanese and their descendants; at this stage they may be regarded as 'endemic' religions, internal to Japanese migrant communities. Subsequently they spread among the non-Japanese host society, such as Brazil, which had no immunity to them due to the prevailing social conditions. The majority of such epidemic Japanese religions were NRMs. But that does not automatically mean that all religions become epidemic. It is necessary to examine how the philosophy and practice of Seicho-No-Ie have had a direct application to the problems of the Brazilians.

When I asked Brazilian executives of the Seicho-No-Ie Portuguese division in Rondônia what personal suffering Brazilians generally experience, they told me that top of the list is marital and parent-child problems, second is disease, followed by economic problems. Some pointed out spiritual issues as the fourth problem. As mentioned earlier, PL tries to offer solutions to these problems by face-to-face counselling between instructors and their followers. In the case of Seicho-No-Ie, the examples of ancestor-worship and the memorial service for the aborted foetus have become the most effective solutions it can offer for the daily life problems of its followers.

Regarding the common problems of divorce and abortion, which the Catholic Church deals with coldly, Seicho-No-Ie attracts favourable attention because it deals with these problems through a form of ritual, in addition to individual counselling and articles in the journal which followers subscribe to. Some leaders recommend their followers to worship ancestors to solve not only family problems, but also economic and health troubles. One woman told me that her relationship with her estranged husband improved after she began worshipping ancestors, and furthermore, she could eventually buy a house and a car as a result of this practice. Praying for the repose of both the husband and the wife's ancestors creates not only an intangible sense of security, but also requires that they respect each other, which makes their relationship improve.

Epidemicising multinational religions

Internationalisation and urbanisation in Brazil are producing a middle class, and mass society is emerging as a result. Since the 1990s, globalisation has added momentum to this trend. The roles that Japan's new religious movements performed in the process of the formation of mass society have had an epidemic impact on Latin America where immunity to foreign religions is weak. Japanese popular new religious movements, which grew up in Japan after the War, including PL, Rissei Kouseikai, Reiyukai, Seicho-No-Ie and Sekai Kyuseikyô (Messianity), spread rapidly in Japan itself with their slogans of 'conquering disease and fighting poverty', 'equality of the sexes', 'spirit of diligence', etc. These Japanese NRMs then reached Latin America, and are now performing the same civilisational-historical role in the formation of a globally developing society.

Various other important non-Japanese religious movements have been observed in Latin America in the late 20th century, too. Liberation Theology emerged from the Catholic Church as one response to rapid social change, with its central idea to extend unconditional help to poor people in slums. On the other hand, Pentecostalism created structures of self-defence for the poor, but hardly shows interest in other aspects of social change. In contrast, Japan's NRMs are successful in gathering energy for their followers' desire for improvement in real life. This is because Japan's NRMs are accepted as ethical belief systems for self-salvation. Both Liberation Theology and Pentecostalism have a significant meaning in mass society where the gap in the social hierarchy is wide. On the other hand, Japan's epidemic NRMs may possibly show endemic Japanese religions' hidden infectivity when mass society shifts from class society to non-class society. It is important that research on Japanese religions in Latin America be conducted with reference to this point.

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- 2 Nakamaki, Hirochika. 1993. "Endemic shukyo to epidemic shukyo no kyosei: Burajiru no Seicho-No-Ie no jirei kara" (Symbiosis of endemic and epidemic religions: A case of Seicho-No-Ie in Brazil), *Shukyo Kenkyu* no.296.
- 3 Maeyama, Takashi. 1983. "Japanese Religions in Southern Brazil: Change and 'Syncretism'," *Latin American Studies* 6, Tsukuba University.
- 4 The epidemiologic analogy in relation to religion were first employed by Tadao Umesao in 1965. A discussion of this is included in Umesao, Tadao (2003) *An Ecological View of History: Japanese Civilization in the World Context*, Trans Pacific Press.

Ronan Pereira argues that a charismatic and strategically smart leadership is the key for a new religious movement to survive not just in its original society but elsewhere. His case in point is Daisaku Ikeda who, for good or bad, became the face of the neo-Buddhist NRM Soka Gakkai International, (SGI). He masterminded its transformation from a parochial, lay Buddhist organisation into a major international religious movement that doubles as a non-governmental organisation.

A Japanese new religion in the age of globalisation: *the role of leadership within the neo-Buddhist Soka Gakkai*

RONAN ALVES PEREIRA

The world witnessed a boom of new religious movements (NRMs) in the past 50 years. In countries with basic democratic liberties that facilitated the formation of a 'religious market'¹, NRMs compete not only with their national counterparts but also with a growing number of foreign groups from every religious stream. Therefore, after passing this first test and surviving in its original society, a NRM must possess certain features and conditions in order to survive elsewhere.

In truth, the fate of a religious group in an alien society is dependent on a plethora of elements such as the deregulation of religion² and demand for new religious alternatives in the host society, a choice between becoming an ethnic religion perpetuated by a minority group or a universal movement, and so on. However, for an NRM to become a global cultural system, a key role is played by its leadership. More than just engaging in prolific discourse and having the good intention to be successful, a leader must also be a good strategist and have that charismatic flame to invigorate his or her followers, giving them a sense of purpose, and enlisting them to dedicate themselves to the 'noble cause of spreading the good news'. Charismatic appeal, strategic vision, and managerial ability are just

some of the skills needed in the portfolio of the leader of a NRM aspiring to a global reach.

In the following section I will depict and discuss the case of one of the most controversial religious leaders of modern Japan, yet one whose accomplishments are unsurpassed among Japanese NRMs. Daisaku Ikeda (born 1928) is the president of Soka Gakkai International (SGI), a neo-Buddhist movement that claims to have a presence in some 190 countries and territories (although having only 82 registered constituent organisations), with more than 12 million members.

The ordeals of a rising movement

Since its foundation in the 1930s by the primary school teacher and educational philosopher, Tsunesaburō Makiguchi (1871-1944), it has been a long and turbulent road for Sōka Gakkai (SG) in terms of attaining success in the global scene. During World War Two, SG almost disappeared due to governmental repression and the imprisonment of its leaders, which led to Makiguchi's death while in prison. His disciple, Jōsei Toda (1900-1958) was initially reluctant, but took over the leading position to reorganise this lay organisation affiliated with Nichiren Shōshū ('Orthodox Sect of Nichiren Buddhism') by deemphasising study and education in favour of

the unconditional and exclusive practice of Nichiren's teachings. Thus, in less than a decade, the small study group became a truly mass movement with inroads into politics. Because of its aggressive conversion campaign, massive rallies and festivals, and an organisational structure inspired by the military, SG gained a very negative reputation as a cult-like, fundamentalist, fascist and violent group.

In 1960, Daisaku Ikeda became the third president of SG at the age of 32. Although he kept his mentor's policy of 'destroying the evil religious'³ and expanding the movement at any cost, eventually Ikeda faced the common dilemma of anti-establishment movements: it became clear that the movement could not succeed unless it compromised and accommodated to the surrounding society. Therefore, gradually he deemphasised SG's forceful conversion campaigns and expanded the movement's cultural and educational activities.

In 1991, Soka Gakkai members were excommunicated from Nichiren Shōshū. While this freed the organisation from a traditional and limiting priesthood, at the same time it provoked a crisis of legitimacy. Previously, the two organisations lived in a symbiotic relationship that was mutually beneficial: the Nichiren Shōshū priesthood claimed to be guardians of the



SGI meeting in Sao Paulo, Brazil.
Courtesy of Editora Brasil Seikyo.



Cultural convention of Brazil-SGI. Courtesy of Editora Brasil Seikyo.

doctrine and ritual orthodoxy taught by the 13th century monk Nichiren. While benefitting from the services of this authoritative and legitimating tradition, SGI members had sole responsibility for secular matters such as national and international conversion campaigns, fundraising to build temples, publications, cultural and political activities.

After the split between Nichiren Shōshū and SG, both groups entered into a legal battle over assets and into competition for members. The dispute also exposed the opposing leaders to accusations of sexual deviation, tax evasion, greed for money and power and so on. If Nichiren Shōshū lost most of its adepts to its lay organisation, SG ended up with a major problem: the source of its sacred object (i.e., the *gohonzon* or mandala inscribed by Nichiren) was in the safekeeping of Nichiren Shōshū. Therefore, for a while new SG members had no way of obtaining a copy of Nichiren's mandala. The solution came two years later, in 1993, when the chief reverend of a former Nichiren Shōshū temple started offering SG members a copy of an alternative mandala transcribed by the 26th High Priest, Nichikan Shōnin.

Cohesion around Master Ikeda

In the period following the conflict with the priesthood, Ikeda added to his status of president of the organisation that of teacher and spiritual master for Soka Gakkai members⁴. In order to guarantee internal cohesion under the leadership of Ikeda, some ideological principles and slogans were reinforced, such as *shitei-funi* (unity of master and disciple) and *itai-dōshin* (different bodies united in mind and faith). In his writings and speeches, Ikeda frequently affirms that SG members need to conduct the master-disciple relationship in the same way as between Nichiren and his disciples, and more recently between the founder, Makiguchi and his successor, Toda, than between Toda and Ikeda himself. Ikeda endeavours to nurture this relationship in many ways. For instance, there is no SG event, inauguration, anniversary of a group, or New Year's publication without a note from Master Ikeda written especially for that special event. Thus, in contrast to the opinion of the sceptical Japanese media and critical, rival religious leaders, a member or a sympathiser sees Ikeda as a great leader and mentor who is tireless in spreading the teachings of Nichiren and advancing the cause of world peace.

There is no doubt that Ikeda constitutes a classic case of a charismatic leader who invigorates his followers and inspires them to dedicate themselves enthusiastically to the common cause. In doing so he plays a similar role to that of business leaders in managing their organisations through appeals to their corporate cultures. Among other qualities, a good business leader is expected to be a good team-builder, to get the best from his/her human capital and be a good motivator, to create a positive working environment. In these matters, Ikeda is an expert.

Ikeda: organiser and strategist

In order to sustain his leadership as a visionary with a higher purpose, Ikeda launched in 1958 the project 'Seven Bells' as a working plan for Soka Gakkai in the following 21 years, divided into three periods of seven years. This project was followed by two similar ones, similarly divided into cycles and aimed at developing and propagating the movement. These cycles included specific goals such as achieving a certain number of conversions and the inauguration of branches and culture centres within a designated

period of time. They served as motivational drives that kept the movement focused and enlisted the militant energy of members.

Another high-profile initiative of Ikeda was the formation of the political party *Kōmeitō* (Clean Government Party) which has become one of the main political forces in Japan. While maintaining his role as a great strategist and organiser, he also created a full-scale education system from kindergarten to university, art museums, and a host of other cultural, educational, and environmental institutions. In 1975, Ikeda established the 'Soka Gakkai International' (SGI) to oversee SG's affiliated chapters all over the world. In the following decade, SGI became a non-governmental organisation (NGO) member of the United Nations.

Ikeda has also been a prolific writer with more than one hundred works, ranging from Buddhist philosophy to dialogue with outstanding personalities, poetry, children's stories and photographic collections. His works have been translated and published in more than 30 languages, by the organisation and commercially. Furthermore, Ikeda has been awarded over 200 academic honours and has received the title of honorary citizen from more than 500 cities and countries around the world.

Since 1960, Ikeda has travelled to every continent to propagate Soka Gakkai and has established national and international institutions that have enhanced the movement's visibility and demonstrate its aim to exert influence over both local societies and matters of global concern. He meets continuously with internationally acclaimed writers, artists, politicians, scholars, scientists and others. Such intense activity in Japan as well in the global scene can be interpreted as a way of changing his former image of a fundamentalist militant and ambitious political-religious leader into that of a Buddhist thinker, spiritual master for humanity, peace builder, and educator.

From 'human revolution' to world peace

Similarly to some other religious groups in the Nichiren tradition, SGI claims to be the sole heir of their original patron, Nichiren, from whom it acquired its self-assertiveness, fighting spirit, determination, and active militancy. Its leadership depicts the organisation as 'a lay movement among ordinary people', destined to transform the world. The key to reaching this goal is the catch-phrase and 'philosophy of self-reform' created by Jōsei Toda called 'human revolution' (*ningen kakumei*). This stands for the psychological and cultural reform of a person's life or way of life that bears the potential to transform communities and institutional structures, and eventually change the entire world for the better. In other words, 'human revolution' is the equivalent of the traditional Buddhist concept of enlightenment (*satori*). SGI members are encouraged to make an effort to improve their own lives and reveal their human potential through the chanting of the mantra *Nam-myōhō-rengekyō* ('Devotion to the mystic law of the Lotus Sutra'). Thus, the degree of success of the human revolution of SGI members is expected to decide the future of the movement and, ultimately, of Nichiren Buddhism. From their perspective, world peace and even the future of humankind depends on the global expansion of the SGI movement and its social activism, or at least the concerted effort of SGI and like-minded people and institutions. Then the ideal future of planetary society will be conducted by the United Nations but guided by the principles of SGI's version of Nichiren Buddhism. This

is SGI's recipe for reaching the utopia of the 'Third Civilization' through 'human revolution'.

SGI is an exemplary movement of 'inner-worldly asceticism'. Its philosophy is to be present in society and try to change it from within. There is no code for dressing, diet or particular lifestyle for members. From the outside, members look like regular members of their societies but privately they keep their practice of recitation of the mantra and faith in the *gohonzon*. SGI changes members' participation in their culture of birth and unites them around the world, in a global SGI cultural system in a more invisible way - in the way people think and understand reality in terms of karma, of the mystical relationship with the *gohonzon*, Nichiren and Ikeda. SGI members tend to understand the tragedies in the world (such as wars, terrorism, the tsunami) in terms of the concept of *mappo* (the final days when the practice of the Dharma (law) degenerates). Their praxis is also oriented by its characteristic as an NGO dedicated to education, peace, environment, culture; whenever they participate in society or promote a public event, these events tend to be framed by a focus on these four areas.

The case of SGI not only illustrates the role of leadership in transforming a NRM into a global cultural system, but also reveals some changes in the nature of religion in the contemporary world. For instance, it illuminates the struggle of religion to survive in the era of globalisation in which new rival movements are being proliferated, just as the traditional roles of religion have been appropriated by governmental agencies, NGOs, and liberal professionals, particularly therapists. In this regard, SGI has been successful as it maintains the structures and practices of a religious institution while displaying the dynamics of a NGO. This means that it sustains a strategy of dual speech, internally emphasising its ritual practice and its religious mission while externally focusing on its secular or 'secularised religious' performance.

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Notes:

- 1 A situation where there is no state-run or monopolistic-church which controls religious affairs and people can freely choose which faith to follow and practice. In other words, a 'religious market' is one in which different religious traditions or denominations compete to each other for membership.
- 2 The change or suspension of laws and legal hindrances that make it difficult if not impossible for all religions to exist in a specific society.
- 3 Based on Nichiren's philosophy that all religions different from his own were 'evil' and heretic.
- 4 Before the excommunication in 1991, Ikeda was officially the president of SG. The priesthood held the mystical aura of bearers of tradition, of legitimacy, the mystical link between the members and the *gohonzon*. After the split, Ikeda kept the bureaucratic title, while enlarged his role as spiritual master and guide for SG members.

Japan's two and half centuries of isolation ended in the middle of the 19th century. Since then, knowledge and activities of Japanese culture, people and religion have spread across the world. The first known incidence of the propagation of Japanese religions overseas was in the 1890s when several schools of Japanese Buddhism began to be practiced in Hawaii on the basis of Japanese migration and settlement there. Thus over a century has passed since Japanese religion began proselytising outside Japan.

Maintaining 'Japaneseness':

the strategy of the Church of World Messianity in Brazil

HIDEAKI MATSUOKA

Japanese religions have been propagated in Brazil since 1908 when the first group of Japanese immigrants arrived there. Currently there are approximately 60 branches of Japanese religions in Brazil and more than ten have been engaged in active proselytisation (Matsuoka and Ronan, 2007). Among these religions, Japanese new religions have been the most successful in acquiring followers, overshadowing the traditional Japanese religions, Buddhism and Shinto. The three major Japanese new religions in Brazil by number of followers are Seicho-No-Ie ('The House of Growth') (800,000 followers), Perfect Liberty (*Perfect Liberty Kyodan* in Japanese, henceforth termed 'PL') (70,000) and The Church of World Messianity (*Sekai Kyusei Kyo*, henceforth termed 'Messianity') (400,000). Although these numbers may be inflated, it is safe to say that there are at least one million followers of Japanese new religions in Brazil. This fact may not seem remarkable when the reader considers that there are over 1.2 million ethnic Japanese-Brazilians from the first to the fifth generation, or that São Paulo city has the largest Japanese immigrant population as a city in the world. But it is important to point out that over 95 percent of the followers of these religions are non-ethnic Japanese Brazilians.

By comparing Japanese religions and companies stationed abroad, Nakamaki proposes three categories of foreign-based Japanese religions (Nakamaki 1986). The first category is religions whose headquarters in Japan have neither eagerness nor policies to propagate abroad. Missionaries of this type of religion must proselytise in foreign countries without suggestions or financial support from Japanese headquarters. Examples include Shinto shrines in Hawaii. The second category includes religions that try to proselytise in foreign countries but only adopt some superficial aspects of the host culture and make every effort to maintain their own Japanese ways, rituals and beliefs abroad. Most schools of Japanese Buddhism and Tenri Kyō are typical religions in this category. The third category includes religions that try to grasp the foreign culture positively and sometimes transform their established rituals to fit into the religious arena of the host society. Seicho-No-Ie, PL, and Messianity fall into this category. What happens in reality



Followers gathering in front of the shrine at Messianity's sacred place.

does not fall short of the expectation we may have; the most successful Japanese religions in foreign cultural contexts are those in the third category.

'A pure Japanese policy'

Each Japanese new religion in Brazil has tried to fulfill its own aims in terms of propagation. To understand the organisational aspects of Japanese new religions in Brazil, it is useful to refer to related and suggestive results from the study of Japanese business abroad. Hulbert and Brandt, who study Brazilian companies controlled by multinational corporations (MNCs) headquartered in Japan, the United States, and Europe, reach the following conclusion: in the Brazilian offices of Japanese MNCs, presidents are more likely to be Japanese, and control by Japanese headquarters is stricter than that of American and European MNCs (Hulbert and Brandt 1980). Japanese MNCs have tried to maintain the identities of their group's companies abroad by installing expatriate Japanese managers as executives in these companies and maintaining strict control by the headquarters in Japan. This strategy may be called a 'pure Japanese policy'.

Has Messianity adopted a 'pure Japanese policy'? The Church of World Messianity of Brazil, (about which I published an ethnography entitled *Japanese Prayer below*

the Equator), is a Japanese new religion that has proselytised in Brazil (Matsuoka 2007). The Church of World Messianity, a religion founded by Okada Mokichi (1882-1955), has spread to 78 countries. In terms of the number of followers, significant countries are: the US, Canada, Brazil, Peru and Argentina in the Americas, Korea, Thailand and Sri Lanka in Asia, Angola in Africa and Portugal in Europe. It has approximately 2 million followers world wide. Brazil has the second largest number of followers (400,000) following Thailand (600,000).

I will take the case of Messianity in Brazil in order to introduce some principles of organisational structure in new religions. Messianity was introduced to Brazil in 1955. The group increased the number of its followers steadily and claims that it has 400,000 followers in 2008, and that over 95 percent of them are non-ethnic Japanese Brazilians. Messianity is best known for its religious activity *Jhorei* - transmission of the light of God by holding one's hand over the recipient. Messianity's doctrine and practice is strongly influenced by that of Shinto, a Japanese traditional religion. For this reason, it might be considered that Messianity is rather out of place in the Brazilian cultural milieu and very different from traditional Brazilian religious orientations, which tend towards spirit-

ism and Roman Catholicism. However in terms of doctrine and practice, there are some aspects that indicate continuity between Messianity and several influential Brazilian religions. An example is the belief in the existence of the world of spirits from whom human beings may receive transcendental power, a notion Messianity shares with Kardecismo, a French spiritism that has spread throughout Brazil, and also with the Brazil-born spiritism, Umbanda.

As mentioned earlier, it has been observed that the percentage of non-ethnic Japanese followers in Seicho-No-Ie, PL, and Messianity exceeds 95 percent. There are also many non-ethnic Japanese members of the clergy in these groups. The higher the rank of clergy, however, the higher the proportion of ethnic Japanese, and the presidents of the Brazilian chapters of all of these three groups are ethnic Japanese sent by Japanese headquarters. From this data then, we can surmise that these groups have adopted the 'pure Japanese policy' within Nakamaki's typology, but major differences in the policies of these three groups must also be accounted for. I will try to elucidate Messianity's policy for maintaining its identity by comparing it with those of the two other groups.

Seicho-No-Ie, which has been propagated

in Brazil since the 1930s, has many ethnic Japanese Brazilian clergy, and the president is a second-generation Japanese Brazilian. By contrast, all successive presidents of PL have been Japanese who were sent to Brazil by the Japanese headquarters. They stay in Brazil for seven to nine years and then return to Japan. During this time, some learn Portuguese, some do not. Generally they are not committed to speaking Portuguese with the Brazilian followers. In terms of leadership, Messianity differs from both of these groups. The Brazilian president of Messianity, Reverend Tetsuo Watanabe has been in Brazil for almost 40 years. Since Watanabe holds significant positions in Messianity's global organisation, he travels frequently between Japan and Brazil. Therefore, he addresses followers only at special events such as The Festival of Heaven on Earth, but he speaks Portuguese very well and his dynamic preaching style is popular with followers. His speeches are regularly summarised in the *Jornal Messiânico*, Messianity's monthly journal. In 1992, there were 14 Reverends (the highest rank in the Messianity hierarchy) under Watanabe, 13 of whom were Japanese who immigrated to Brazil in the 1960's for proselytisation. After almost 40 years in the country, the Japanese clergy have assimilated into Brazilian culture, although they sometimes make statements such as: "I am not accustomed to *feijão* (Brazilian popular boiled bean dish)," or "I hope to send my daughter to Japan to receive a college education there." One of them told me "we [Japanese Reverends] are already half Brazilian." In this way it can be seen that Messianity, which sends Japanese religious leaders from Japan for a lifetime posting in Brazil, differs from PL which follows the more corporate model of sending 'Japanese expatriate managers' for a fixed term to Brazil, after which they return to Japan.

According to Maeyama, an anthropologist who researched Japanese religions in Brazil, in 1967 Messianity had around 7,000 committed followers and 60 to 70 percent of them were non-ethnic Japanese Brazilians. When this figure is expanded to include *frequentador*, those who have not yet formally joined Messianity but visit the church, 90 percent were non-ethnic Japanese Brazilians (Maeyama 1983). The percentage of ethnic Japanese among the followers of six groups of Japanese new

religions in Brazil in 1967 is shown in Table 1. According to this research, Messianity had the highest percentage of non-ethnic Japanese among the six groups (although since 1967 this percentage has increased in Seicho-No-Ie and PL also). We can conclude that, from the outset, Messianity has propagated itself among non-ethnic Japanese Brazilians more eagerly than other

Table 1
Ethnic Breakdown among Japanese New Religions in Brazil in 1967

Religious Group	ethnic Japanese Brazilians (%)	other (%)
Ômoto	50	50
Tenri Kyô	100	0
Seicho-No-Ie	99-100	0-1
Messianity	40	60
PL	80-90	10-20
Sôka Gakkai	100	0

groups, and has been very successful in the project. There are indications that the leaders of Messianity at its Japanese headquarters, were, at that time, experiencing ambivalent feelings towards this remarkable achievement. On the one hand, they were pleased to be realising Okada's slogan "Messianity should be international", but at the same time they were afraid that Messianity would become 'Brazilianised.' Faced with the increase of non-ethnic Japanese Brazilians followers, the Brazilian leaders started considering certain procedures which might help maintain the church's identity. One of the main pillars of this identity maintenance project was a seminarist system started in Brazil in 1971. In the beginning, the number of seminarists was around five, but in the last 20 years, five to ten seminarists have been sent to Japan for a year or two after being trained at the headquarters in São Paulo, to study Japanese language and culture and even proselytise in Japan. Messianity branches in Korea, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Angola, and Portugal have adopted the seminarist system, but the Brazilian one has been the most organised.

These seminarists, including both ethnic and non-ethnic Japanese Brazilians, become the elite of Messianity in Brazil and globally. After completing their training in Japan, their main duty will be proselytisation and some of them are most definitely destined to become leaders of Messianity both in Brazil and worldwide. In terms of its organisational ties with Japan, it is highly significant that Messianity sends seminarists to Japan to experience the culture of the country from which the group emerged.

New religions as multinationals?

I return to the comparison of Japanese new religions with Japanese multinational corporations. In general, when Japanese companies start business abroad they establish affiliated overseas companies as subsidiaries. Kono suggests there are three types of management in these subsidiaries (Kono 1984). The first type is a subsidiary whose president and departmental or section managers are all expatriate Japanese, posted to the venture from Japan. A newly established overseas company or a company that is eager to raise productivity tends to adopt this pattern. The second type is a company in which only the engineering and finance departments are con-

trolled by Japanese managers. This type of company is typical of those with a strong focus on engineering and thus it employs many Japanese engineers. The last type is a company that employs many local executives and the role of expatriate Japanese is as consultants. Only the president, the manager of the finance department, and staff who support these local line manager executives are Japanese. This type is seen among companies that have a long history of doing business overseas. Based on Kono's argument, it is possible that a company with the first type of management style would adopt the third type in the long run. It was in 1955 when two young Messianity followers started its proselytisation without financial support from the Japanese headquarters. But in the 1960s, the headquarters sent young Japanese missionaries to Brazil and started dominating Brazilian Messianity. Thus, Messianity has



'Guarapiranga'.
Messianity's sacred place. Courtesy of Messianity.

fallen into the the first category since the 1960s. But 'Brazilianisation' has been progressing steadily in this new religion. As previously mentioned, in 1992 there were 14 Reverends; 13 were ethnic Japanese who came from Japan and one was an ethnic Japanese Brazilian. In 2008, by contrast, there exist 37 Reverends; 13 ethnic Japanese from Japan, five ethnic Japanese Brazilians, and 19 non-ethnic Japanese Brazilians.

So far in Brazil, there has not been a Japanese new religion that resembles the third type of Kono's classification, in which Japanese act as consultants. But in the near future, it seems likely that Messianity will adopt the third type of management style and the organisation has been preparing for it.

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
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CHINA IN POSTERS: THE DREAMT REALITY



Kunsthal, Rotterdam

14 June to 7 September 2008

In anticipation of the Olympic Games Kunsthal Rotterdam presents a broad selection of Chinese posters, originating from the two largest and internationally authoritative collections in the world. 'China in Posters' provides the audience with an historical survey of seven decennia of Chinese poster art, in which both the periods before, during and after Mao are covered. Some of the posters on display are extremely rare and no longer available in China. This exhibition belongs to a successful series of exhibitions on Asian Art — in 2004 for instance, the Kunsthal presented a large collection of North Korean Propaganda Art.

History of China

The posters visualize the modern history of China from the thirties up to the Olympic Games in 2008. Workers, farmers and soldiers set an example to the public during The Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) by working firmly on creating the China as Mao had envisioned it: an industrial nation with an enormous steel production. During the Cultural Revolution the posters showed wildly enthusiastic men and women waving their red books fanatically. In the course of time the tone of the political message and the way people were portrayed changed. Although propaganda and symbolism remained present in the posters that were produced after the death of Mao in 1976, the militant and political messages were more and more pushed aside to make way for posters stimulating and canalizing consumptive behaviour. Western influence had evidently reached China.

The posters belong to collections from the International Institute for Social History (IISG) and from Stefan Landsberger (University of Leiden, University of Amsterdam).

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Mahikari, often classified as one of Japan's 'new new religions', that is, established in the post World War Two era, was founded by Okada Kotama (1901-1974), respectfully referred to in the organisation as *Sukunishisama* (Great Saviour). In 1959, Okada received revelations from God commanding him thus: 'The time of heaven has come. Rise. Thy name shall be Kotama. Exercise the art of purification. The world shall encounter severe times' (Okada Kotama 1967).

A global NRM based on miracles:

Sukyo Mahikari

WENDY SMITH

In Japanese, Mahikari means 'True Light', a spiritual and purifying energy. It can be partially conceptualised in terms of the Japanese 'ki' or the Chinese 'chi' (McVeigh 1992), but is distinguished by its divine aspect, as the Divine Light of the Creator, Su God. People become members of Mahikari, or *kamikumite* (those who go 'hand-in-hand with God'), after attending the three day Primary *Kenshu* (training course), a kind of initiation (Huron 1991). On completion they receive an *Omitama* (Divine locket), which enables them to act as a channel through which they project the True Light to other members, their families, members of the public, or even animals, food and localities. Okada, formerly a member of Sekai Kyuseikyō (Church of World Messianity), adapted its central practice, *Johrei* - channelling God's healing light into the body of another - into Mahikari teachings.

Performing miracles with True Light

The *Omitama* is the spiritual tool which allows ordinary people to perform miracles. It is worn on the upper body of the *kamikumite* and is treated with great respect. It must not be allowed to become wet or touch the ground. That is why children do not become *kamikumite* until around the age of 10, when they are deemed able to take proper care of the *Omitama*. Members then have the ability to transmit the True Light following a detailed ritual procedure of praying to the Creator God, which involves bowing to the *Goshintai* (sacred scroll containing the *Chon*, symbol of Su God, and the central feature of each centre) and then to their partners as an act of politeness. Then, with their backs to the *Goshintai*, they recite in a loud voice, in archaic Japanese, the prayer of purification - *Amatsu Norigoto* - and True Light is transmitted to the forehead of the other person through the raised palm of the hand. Light may then be transmitted to the back of the head and other parts of the body, a complete session taking about 50 minutes. This practice is also known as *okiyome* (purification), *tekazashi* (raising the hand) and *Mahikari no Waza* (the practice of Mahikari). Giving and receiving True Light daily and attending group ceremonies, which magnify the transmission of Light from Su God, are the fundamental activities of Mahikari members. Many new members come to Mahikari through being offered Light by an existing member in response to a problem with their health, relationships or finances. The miraculous healing of incurable diseases such as cancer and the change for the better in relationships and careers, is extensively documented in observably true case histories in the books by Dr Andris Tebecis (the *Bucho* or head of Mahikari's Australia/Oceania division), and the monthly newsletters of the organisation. Mahikari teachings explain that misfortune is caused by spirits who attach themselves to the sufferer due to karmic relationships created by themselves or their ancestors. The process of purification with the Divine Light pacifies these spirits and caused them to leave the person alone. The result is then a healing on the physical, emotional or social plane. The bad deeds of oneself, (in this or former lives), or of one's ancestors are what attracts the resentment of the spirits of those who have been harmed and thus they attach themselves to a victim and cause his or her suffering. Rather than driving these spirits away, in the conventional understanding of exorcism, the process of purification with Divine Light heals them as well and they leave voluntarily.

Mahikari – a supra religion

Mahikari is open to people of all religions and viewpoints and does not attempt to convert people from their existing religious beliefs (Smith, 2007). Rather it intensifies their understanding of the major spiritual teachings of their religion, which are common to all religions. For instance, members explained to me that a Catholic priest would become a better Catholic priest by practising Mahikari (see also Cornille 1994). The non-coercive nature of the organisation is demonstrated by the fact that there is a significant dropout rate of those who have received the Primary *Kenshu*, a fact freely mentioned by senior members. Mahikari beliefs also reflect this openness by incorporating elements of the 'five major religions': Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Islam and Christianity. This syncretism of belief systems is typical of NRMs. It is not only a recruiting device but also an acknowledgment that most religious traditions share key common values from which founders gain inspiration in their need to set up an all encompassing system of beliefs and values very quickly in order to operationalise their organisations and secure membership.

In the case of Sukyo Mahikari, symbols from these and other major religions can be seen in the architecture of the Main World Shrine (*Suza* or *Sekai So Honzan*) and in the Mahikari Divine Emblem, which incorporates the circle, the cross, the six-pointed star and the 16-petalled crest, symbolic of the Japanese Imperial family who are regarded historically as the representatives of the Shinto gods on earth.

Challenges of organisational structure

As NRMs expand and develop over time, they face the problem of structuring the organisation to cope with growing numbers, geographical distance and the loss of the personal link with the founder, either through distance, hierarchy or, sooner or later, his or her death. The problem of succession has already been experienced within the Mahikari movement (Inoue et al, 1996, Cornille, 1991). When the founder died, conflict arose over who would succeed him. The movement split into Sukyo Mahikari, with head-



Sukyo Mahikari Australia-Oceania Regional Headquarters in Canberra, Australia

quarters in Takayama, led by his adopted daughter, Okada Keishu, respectfully referred to as *Oshienushisama* (Great Teacher) and Sekai Mahikari Bunmei Kyodan (World True Light Civilization Religious Organization - the original name of the organisation, note its conceptualisation at the level of the 'world'), with headquarters in the Izu peninsula, initially led by his trusted male associate, Sekiguchi Sakae. Today Sukyo Mahikari has the larger international presence and it is the focus of this essay.

Now with over 300,000 members in Japan and reputedly one million worldwide, and with centres in major capital cities throughout Asia and the developed economies and a presence in all continents, Sukyo Mahikari has made the transition to a global organisation with a clearly defined hierarchy of authority and a sophisticated communication system. A researcher of Mahikari in Western Europe noted that the wearing of uniforms, the marching practice and the emphasis on discipline in the Mahikari Youth Corps imparts a flavour of the military (Cornille, 1991). However, this Corps is not compulsory for the younger members of Mahikari and makes up only a small proportion of Mahikari youth.

Large centres (*dojo* – literally 'practice place') in Japan have video camera monitoring systems installed, explained as a way of making sure that visitors are not neglected. The requirement that those visiting the *dojo* sign in and sign out with the time of their arrival and departure imparts a strict organisational atmosphere. These organisational aspects are not unique to Mahikari but are typical of practices within mainstream Japanese society. For instance academic staff of a Japanese tertiary research institute were required to register the time of their arrival and departure with a receptionist, and the building was subject to video surveillance. However, such features may seem inappropriate in a religious context to non-Japanese.

Mahikari centres are graded according to their size and importance, from *dai-, chu-, sho- and jun- dojo* (large, medium, small and associate centres), followed by *okiyome-sho* (purification places) and *renraku-sho* (communication places). This graded system of centres is common both to Japan and overseas. The largest centre, apart from the Main World Shrine and the Mahikari headquarters in Takayama, is the Kyoto *Daidojo*, with a main hall of 340 *tatami* mats, which accommodated over 1000 people at its New Year ceremony which I attended in 1996. A feature of all these centres is the provision of a family room where parents can be with small children while receiving the True Light or listening to lectures through the installed sound or video system. The homes of senior members who have inaugurated the *Goshintai* and who wish to make them available for this purpose, also serve as *Okiyome* Houses, which are open for several nights a week for people to drop in and receive the True Light, especially if they live far away from the centre.

Overseeing the *dojo* are the Regional Headquarters (*Shidobu*), one for each prefecture in Japan, and one each for Europe/Africa, North America, Latin America, Asia and Australia/Oceania. It is headed by the *Bucho* (division head, a term used for a senior manager in a Japanese corporation), on behalf of *Oshienushisama* and his role (in Sukyo Mahikari, *Bucho* are usually male, as are senior managers in Japanese corporations) includes both spiritual and managerial aspects. He visits centres in all the countries regularly, conducting the Primary Training and bestowing the *Omitama* on new members. He also administers the region, overseeing and recommending staff transfers and promotions in rank, and conducts the *Shidobu* monthly ceremony as the spiritual representative of *Oshienushisama*. Above the Regional Headquarters in the structure of the organisation is the Sukyo Mahikari Headquarters located in Takayama in a building opposite the Main World Shrine. Its role is to transmit spiritual guidance from *Oshienushisama* to the Regional Headquarters. The *Bucho* of Australia/Oceania region is, unusually, a non-Japanese, Dr Andris Tebecis, who wrote the pioneering first book on Mahikari in English, *Mahikari – Thank God for the Answers at Last*, which was a major source of new converts in the early days of the movement outside Japan. Significantly, Dr Tebecis' wife is Japanese and she is a former *doshi*, or minister, see below. This deep personal involvement with Japan gives Dr Tebecis an honorary Japanese status.

Key leadership roles within the movement are appointments made directly by *Oshienushisama*, as they are considered to be spiritual appointments, but they are nevertheless ranked according to modern organisational principles, with clear lines of authority and communication procedures, and are the same both in Japan and overseas. This gives their incumbents an extra dimension of authority beyond the mere fact of hierarchy. Receiving Light from a high ranking leader is considered to be very powerful and beneficial. Below *Oshienushisama* herself are a few very senior members of Sukyo Mahikari Headquarters. In general the main ranks are *doshi* (minister) and *dojochō* (centre chiefs). Centre chiefs below *Bucho* are spiritually in charge of the centre, are usually from the locality and rarely transferred.

Special role of the Doshi

Doshi play a central and unifying role in the organisation. They are the disciples of *Oshienushisama* who have undertaken a three-year training course. There are from 30 to 50 new trainees in every annual intake, selected from hundreds of applicants. Foreign applicants are recommended by

The Sukyo Mahikari Main World Shrine



the Regional Headquarters *Bucho*. Male applicants should be no older than 35 (younger for females) and *doshi* trainees are expected to be single because they must live in the 'bachelor' dormitory accommodation at the Training Institute in Takayama and then be posted for practical training to any centre in the world for two years. The living conditions at the Training Institute are spartan, living expenses are provided by *Oshienushisama* and their personal income thereafter is minimal. About ten percent of each class are non-Japanese. Women slightly outnumber men as *doshi* trainees, but they are required to resign from the role after marriage. It is considered impossible for them to be able to manage the duties of both *doshi* and female family roles together. After marriage and motherhood, many remain active members of Mahikari centres and assume the role of *junkambu* (administrators assisting the centre chief). Male *doshi* often remain unmarried until their late thirties or forties, and live a spartan existence in the *dojo* itself, serving God 24 hours a day, giving Light to members, helping the centre chief, maintaining the centre and looking after the *Goshintai*.

Doshi, being of all nationalities, play an important linking role in the global organisation and may be transferred, often at intervals of about three years across national boundaries. For instance a former *doshi* at the Melbourne centre was a South African, there have been two Japanese *doshi* serving in the Canberra Regional Headquarters and Australian *doshi* has been posted to the International Division in Takayama and to a centre in India. Within the *dojo* there are different group leaders, coordinators and other personnel who coordinate such groups as the Parents' Group, Educators' Group, Older Youth Group, Primary Students' Group, Kindergarten Group and so on. There are also various leadership roles relating to the Youth Corps, *Yoko* agriculture (a horticultural project based on organic and spiritual principles) and medicine. In these systems, spiritual elements and modern bureaucratic principles are combined. For instance, the appointment to a leadership role in one of these groups is officially made by *Oshienushisama* on the basis of the individual's spiritual qualities, yet the size of the group, its hierarchical structure and the communication and recording procedures mirror aspects of the large organisations found in modern society.

A global cultural system

Membership in Sukyo Mahikari organises the lives of its followers on a daily, monthly and annual basis. In daily terms they are required to give and receive Light to family, members of the public both at the *dojo* and outside. They are required to offer small receptacles of food and drink to the ancestors at their home's ancestral shrine. If they have had a *Goshintai* shrine inaugurated in the home, this requires even more care, since it cannot be left unattended for long periods. There are no dietary codes or dress codes for members, but interaction patterns tend to follow Japanese standards of politeness and respect, and especially in the *dojo*, removing shoes, washing hands, bowing when passing in front of the centrally placed *Goshintai*, necessitate mental and behavioural adjustment away from prevailing cultural norms in most non-Japanese societies. Gradually one's social interactions tend to revolve around other Mahikari members and membership becomes a total life path. When visiting Suza on pilgrimage or other centres overseas, the organisational culture is such that members feel no social or cultural distance between themselves and other nationalities. Thus Mahikari can be said to be truly a global cultural system.

In this paper I have argued that the distinctive organisational style of Sukyo Mahikari has facilitated its rapid expansion overseas, and the main element of its spiritual culture, the ritual practice of radiating True Light has been a powerful factor in establishing uniformity in value systems and behaviour of members in diverse cultures through the process of purification of their innermost attitude (*sonen*). Moreover the occurrence of miracles associated with the True Light has been the main reason for its global spread. Thus it has been useful to look at religious organisations from the perspective of globalised corporate practices and corporate styles, even though they are located in the spiritual realm in the first instance. Just as corporate cultures are understood in terms of theories of religion and ritual, so may the rituals and belief systems of NRMs be analysed as corporate cultures, as religions globalise and are forced to take on the attributes of large modern organisations to handle their global staffing, their cross-cultural memberships and maintain and control the orthodoxy of beliefs and ritual practices.

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Science fiction provides us with more than a glimpse of futurist visions, it allows us to probe questions of cultural history, politics and socio-economic change in societies. Chris Goto-Jones reveals his fascination for this sub-culture and Japan's long and mutating relations with 'weird-science'.

From science fictional Japan to Japanese science fiction

CHRIS GOTO-JONES

The term 'science fiction' is of relatively recent origin, apparently coined by the genre-legend Hugo Gernsback in an editorial to his new magazine, *Science Wonder Stories*, in 1929. Nine years later the magazine changed its name to *Astounding Science-Fiction*, and thus the name entered history. However, throughout the 1920s and 1930s there were a plethora of competing terms: pseudo-scientific, weird-science, and Gernsback's own early favourite 'scientifiction.'

Fiction that would eventually become labelled as 'science fiction' (or 'sci-fi') had been in existence for at least a century before. Convention dictates that the first piece of sci-fi was Mary Shelley's gothic masterpiece, *Frankenstein* (1818), although the reasons for this origination are far from uncontested. For some, it is enough to say that *Frankenstein* is the earliest text that still exists within what Damien Broderick (*Reading by Starlight*, 1995) has called the 'megatext' of modern sci-fi (that is, within the set of stories that define literacy in the genre). For others, the issue is not conventional but thematic: sci-fi is about technology and mechanisation, necessarily a product of modernity and of the industrial revolution. Accordingly, the 19th century works of Shelley, HG Wells and Jules Verne should be read along side Nietzsche's proclamations about the death of god, Max Weber's account of the 'iron cage' of modern bureaucratic machinery and Martin Heidegger's stand against the self-alienation of Being in the face of the imperialism of technology.

Science fictional Japan:

In other words, sci-fi is the literature of the hopes and anxieties of industrial modernity, and it should come as no surprise that other industrial societies have produced their own 'weird-science.' Indeed, Japan's relationship with sci-fi began in its so-called 'age of machines' (*kikai jidai*) in the early 20th century with the work of writers such as Mizushima Niou and Yumeno Kyūsaku, who were writing contemporaneously with social critics and philosophers struggling with the problematics of modernity and its overcoming (*kindai no chōkoku*). Already in the late 1920s, Japanese writers (and scientists) were envisioning robots or *jinzō ningen* (artificial people), and stories about them (including some claims to have invented them) appeared in popular science magazines in the 1920s and 1930s; at this time, such stories would have been labelled as *kūsō kagaku* (imaginary science). It was not until the post-war period that the English terms 'SF' or 'sci-fi' entered popular usage.

Historians of Europe as well as Japan will be quick to notice that this period corresponds approximately to what Eric Hobsbawm has called the *Age of Empire* (1989), in which the so-called Great Pow-

ers established and consolidated imperial rule across the globe. It is interesting to reflect that one of the other central, thematic concerns of sci-fi is often considered to be the encounter with difference, and occasionally with either the mystification or the demonisation of difference. In other words, sci-fi can be read as a thread in the weaves of colonialism and orientalism. Indeed, in recent years much of the most sophisticated work on sci-fi has come from the standpoint of post-colonialism. From this perspective, we see the beginnings of the creation of a science fictional Japan, as well as the coincident birth of science fiction in Japan.

The engagement of Western sci-fi with the East Asian 'other' in the first half of the 20th century (and then again during the years around the Vietnam War) is clearly informed by a kind of reactionary and anxious frontier-spirit. Classic comic-strips such as Philip Francis Nowlan's *Buck Rogers in 25th Century* (the first US sci-fi comic strip, starting on 7 January 1929) and Alex Raymond's *Flash Gordon* (beginning 7 January 1934) show America being overrun by the Red Mongols, and pit the all-American hero (Flash Gordon is quarterback of the New York Jets) against an evil (Chinese) Emperor Ming the Merciless of planet Mongo. However, perhaps the most remarkable of these pre-war texts is the *Sixth Column* (1949) by Robert Heinlein, which was originally serialised in *Astounding Science-Fiction* in January, February and March of 1941 (nine months before Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor). Heinlein



Gojira (1954) movie frame.

specific race. In many ways, Heinlein's novel is an intriguing window into American fears about Japan's imperial expansion and its proposed Co-Prosperity Sphere.

As one of the most influential voices in American sci-fi, Heinlein's portrayal of the 'PanAsiatism' has been extremely controversial, variously condemned and praised for its engagement with the volatile race-politics of the time. On the one hand, critics have accused Heinlein himself of buying into American chauvinism and anti-Japanese propaganda during the early 1940s. On the other hand, Heinlein and others have argued that his purpose was anti-racist, and that his text was an attack on Japanese and US racism at the time. Whatever the actual force of this book, the historical interest of *Sixth Column* vastly outweighs its literary quality, which even Heinlein himself lamented.

These sci-fi classics from the early 20th century illustrate very well the ways in which science fiction was a symbolic genre or a metaphorical discourse from its inception. Heinlein's transparency in his depiction of the Japanese as *Japanese*, rather than as aliens from another galaxy with suspiciously Japanese or Chinese sounding names, was actually rather unusual. The tendency in sci-fi is to re-figure the encounter with the 'other' in terms of the encounter with the literally alien. Of course, the question of race politics within sci-fi has attracted a wide critical literature. In the post-war period, Samuel R. Delany would become a leading figure in this field, using his own science fiction (and sci-fi criticism) to explore and challenge questions of identity and difference, of exploration and conquest, of autonomy and assimilation. His 1967 Nebula Award winning novel, *The Einstein Connection*, has become a classic of its kind.

In the post-war period, however, it gradually became clear that the representation of Japan in science fiction did not have to orbit around *negative* racial stereotypes. No longer a military threat, Japan began to recapture some of the romantic mystery that it had once enjoyed in European eyes, such as in the work of Jonathan Swift (*Gulliver's Travels*, 1826), whose archetypal explorer, Gulliver, famously travelled to the mystical land of Japan with a special letter of introduction from the king of Luggnagg, with whom Japan was apparently allied in the 18th century! By the time of the New Wave movement of the 1970s, Asia was already an explicit source of inspiration for the mystical futurities of the West, and 1980s cyberpunk placed the technologically thriving, contemporary Japan into the

fictive futures of Europe and the US. In other words, whilst the fictions had slipped from negative to positive, Japan remained science fictional.

Science fictional Japan in the post-war world:

In the years immediately following the end of the Second World War, anxiety about the emerging Cold War was clear in the so-called 'Golden Age of Science Fiction.' In 1949, George Orwell's masterpiece *Nineteen Eighty-Four* was published, in which the fictional nation of Eastasia is identified as one of the three superpowers of the dystopian future. In general the 1950s and 1960s are marked by intense political activism and by scepticism about the ability of technology to solve all problems, and this agenda is played out in the sci-fi of the time.

Central to these problematics was the horror of wartime technology, culminating in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. A common theme in Anglo-American sci-fi became anxiety over a loss of humanity and the potential collapse of civilisation triggered by the pursuit of technological advancement. Three of the most acclaimed sci-fi novels of all time, Isaac Asimov's *Foundation* (1951), Frank Herbert's *Dune* (1965), and Heinlein's *Stranger in a Strange Land* (1961), all appeared in this period. As we will see, the a-bombs also played a central role in the development of sci-fi in post-war Japan, albeit in a radically different way; the classic monster film, *Gojira* (1954) by Honda Ishirō, will become emblematic.

By the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s, however, there was a real turning of the tide. The so-called 'New Wave' of sci-fi shifted the attention of authors and readers away from the technology-driven glories (and anxieties) of 'outer-space' and towards the complex, human concerns of 'inner-space.' During this period there was a real focus on challenging social and cultural taboos, on radical political stances, and on heightened literary quality. Leading lights in the UK and the US were Michael Moorcock, Brian Aldiss, Roger Zelazny, and of course Samuel R. Delany (although some of these figures rejected the label).

One of the intriguing aspects of the New Wave was the way in which it re-appropriated and re-signified Asia; like many of the other cultural movements of the time, the New Wave was fascinated by spiritual aspects of Asian culture, such as Zen (DT Suzuki established his Zen Centre in California during the 1960s), Indian mysticism (just as the Beatles travelled to India in 1968), and the freshly politicised nature of Tibetan Buddhism. Indeed, Kingsley Amis famously condemned the New Wave for its fixation on stylistic innovation and for its persistent recourse to (what he called) Oriental religions and spirituality. Zelazny's *Lord of Light* (1967) might be indicative.



Image used to promote Nippon 2007.

One of the truly literary moments in this period was Nobel laureate Hermann Hesse's *Das Glasperlenspiel*, which was first published in 1943 in a Germanic context of intoxication with the 'mystic East.' In 1969, it was finally translated into English as *The Glass Bead Game*, a novel that posits the development of a new form of game as the pinnacle of human civilisation, requiring consummate intellectual and spiritual development, which is identified strongly with East Asian traditions. Indeed, Hesse's other novels also enjoyed a revival in the 1960s (after his death in 1962) largely because of their resonance with the counter-cultural, spiritual movements of the time: *Siddhartha* (1922), *Steppenwolf* (1927), *Journey to the East* (1932).

This sci-fi re-figuring of Asia as a spiritual alternative to the technologically angst-ridden West was a common feature of many of the novels of the period, not to mention an already familiar orientalist trope in European literature. Indeed, it bled over into the sci-fi boom of the late 1970s and 1980s that followed the release of *Star Wars* in 1977. For many critics (as well as for George Lucas himself), many aspects of the *Star Wars* galaxy, specifically the mystical 'Jedi Way,' were derived from Taoist and Zen philosophies (sometimes presented with the admixture of Zoroastrianism); the fabled 'force' reconstituted *qi* or *ki*; Yoda's famously garbled English has been seen as a thinly veiled representation of Japanese-English.

Whilst the *Star Wars* phenomenon abandoned the high-brow pretensions of the New Wave in favour of sci-fi's more popularist roots, it retained a certain nostalgic romanticism about representations of Asia as the home of a spiritual (and often more 'human') alternative to coldly technologised and alienated societies in the West. Interestingly, the next major movement in science fiction affected a re-technologising of this mythical spirituality, often via the imaginary of Japanese technological advances.

The 'cyberpunk' movement of the 1980s, led by writers such as William Gibson, Bruce Sterling and the editor Gardner Dozois, witnesses the creation of 'cyberspace' as a futurity in which consciousness, spirituality and digital technology coalesce. In the context of the digital revolution and the rapid emergence of the Japanese bubble economy, visions of the future began to take on a distinctly East Asia visage, with Ridley Scott's sci-fi masterpiece, *Blade Runner* (1982), setting an early standard. Shortly afterwards, Gibson's acclaimed *Neuromancer* (1984) contained some powerful Japanese imagery, and portrayed the future as tinged with 'Japaneseness': the microchip that makes everything possible has the name Hosaka; the best computing power comes in the form of the Ono-Sendai Cyberspace 7; and key characters (such as the cybernetically enhanced and genetically engineered super-ninja, Hideo) have obvious Japanese origins. By the time of Gibson's *Idoru* (1996), which is explicitly set in a version of Japan that is simultaneously represented as a futurity (for the West) and as a slightly fantastical vision of present-day Japan, cyberpunk's love affair with Japan was already profound. This was techno-orientalism or Japanophilia: Japan was no longer merely science fictional, Japan had become the future itself.

Science fiction in Japan:

Given this context, it was not without a measure of intentional ambiguity and perhaps irony that *Nippon 2007*, the first World

Science Fiction Convention (Worldcon) to be held in Asia (but the 65th Worldcon), chose as its slogan: *Nippon – SF no kuni* (Japan – The Land of Science Fiction).

Worldcon began in New York in 1939. As its name suggests, the convention's ambitions were international from its inception. If we can assume that sci-fi was a genre concerned with the future at that time (and this is not a universal assumption, as we have seen), and particularly with a post-national, space-faring vision of humanity, then any lingering sense of national parochialism seems both quaint and ridiculous. Given the nature of the genre, Worldcon should have paid more attention to the 'World' than the World Series... Nonetheless, the dominance of the US and the apparently inalienable centrality of the English language has characterised the history of Worldcon (and especially the prestigious Hugo Awards that are presented at the convention each year).

Of course, it is not merely coincidental that the first Worldcon to be held in Asia comes at the peak of European and American interest in science fictional Japan. However, it is also the case that Japanese science fiction is beginning to play a highly visible role in Euro-American popular culture: the anime and manga explosion of the 1990s and 2000s has made Japan a global force in science fiction, and Japanese video games (often with sci-fi themes) dominate the international market. The influence of Japan and Japanese sci-fi on the US is now unequivocal, leading Tatsumi Takayuki to claim that we are all 'Japanoids' today (*Japanoido sengen*, 1993), whether we know it or not: Ridley Scott freely confesses the influence of Japanese media on his classic *Blade Runner*; the Wakochoiki brothers are open about the importance of anime in their *Matrix trilogy* (and even produced an anime interlude, the *Animatrix*, 2003); and



Akira (1988).

recently Leonardo DiCaprio announced that he would produce a movie version of the classic animanga *Akira*. Not only that, but anime has broken through into the mainstream of Western popular culture: science fiction directors such as Oshii Mamoru (*Ghost in the Shell*, 1995) and Ōtomo Katsuhiro (*Akira*, 1988) are now iconic figures in their own right.

It should come as no surprise, then, that Worldcon has finally had to recognise that Japan is not merely science fictional, but also a real-world context for a specific tradition of science fiction. That said, many *gaijin* (alien) participants at *Nippon 2007* were surprised to learn about the depth and richness of Japanese science fiction, which has developed in dynamic interaction with Western sci-fi, even if that development has gone almost completely unnoticed in the English language literature of sci-fi criticism. *Nippon 2007* coincided with the 46th Japan Science Fiction Convention (the first JSFC was in Tokyo, 1962) – the annual event at which the prestigious



Advertisement for Ghost in the Shell (1995).

Seiun Prizes (the Japanese equivalent of the Hugo Awards) have been awarded since 1970.

One of the intriguing things about the JSFC is its sense of the world. Whilst it makes no claims to being a 'Worldcon,' its history shows a much greater openness to (and awareness of) sci-fi from overseas. Indeed, unlike the Hugo Awards, there is a special Seiun Prize for the best translated novel, which has been won by such genre-greats as Frank Herbert, Robert Delazny, and David Brin. Conversely, the great Japanese sci-fi writers are almost unheard of in Europe and the US, despite the fact that many of them engage directly with the themes and questions raised by European and American authors, providing interestingly inflected, alternative visions. To the extent that the 'world' is aware of Japanese sci-fi, it appears to locate the genre in the media of anime, manga and video games, neglecting the novels and short stories that comprise the backbone of the sci-fi 'megatext' in the West. In other words, the field of science fiction demonstrates international language politics in microcosm.

Some of the more literary classics of Japanese science fiction have been translated into English. The towering figure of Komatsu Sakyō (who has won the Seiun four times) might be known to English readers as the author of *Nihon chimbotsu* (1973, translated as *Japan Sinks*, 1995), which sold over four million copies in Japan; as guest of honour, Komatsu also won the Seiun at *Nippon 2007* for the eagerly anticipated sequel *Nihon chimbotsu II* (2007). Readers may also be familiar with the work of Abe Kōbō, whose mainstream novels have made something of an impact in translation, and whose experimental sci-fi novel *Daiyon kampo-ki* (1958, translated as *Inter Ice-Age 4*, 1970) appeared in English in time for the New Wave. However, other accomplished writers will be lesser known: the unparalleled master of the 'short short', Hoshi Shin'ichi is virtually unknown; even the incomparable Tatsui Yasutaka, famed in Japan as the recipient of both the Tanizaki Prize and the Kawabata Prize for literature (1987 and 1989), who has won back-to-back Seiun Prizes (1975 and 1976), has only recently come to the attention of the international public, partially because he wrote the novel (1993) on which Satoshi Kon's acclaimed anime, *Paprika* (2007), was based. In recent years, science fiction in Japan has reached new levels of maturity and acclaim; non-genre, literary writers such as the Nobel laureate Oe Kenzaburō and the phenomenally successful Murakami Haruki have been experimenting with elements of science fiction and fantasy in speculative ways.

In fact, sci-fi in post-nuclear Japan looks very different from its counterparts in the West, which Japanese authors were hun-

grily reading in translation. Rather than observing the characteristic 'frontiersmanship' that is often present in Anglo-American genre novels, Tatsumi Takayuki (*Full Metal Apache*, 2006) suggests that we can see a spirit of 'creative masochism' (*sōzōteki higayaku seishin*) in Japanese sci-fi, characterised by the anxiety of writers like Komatsu and Abe Kōbō about the ideological heritage of the Second World War and the twin, reinforcing psychological damage caused by defeat and by the apocalyptic nature of that defeat. For these writers, sci-fi possesses a special mission and purpose in post-war Japanese society, since it necessarily contains within it hypotheses for the future development of Japan and visions of 'tomorrow' that allowed the 'New Japan' of the post-1945 era to continuously challenge and re-conceptualise its post-war trajectory. Given the events of the Pacific War, this self-reflective and self-critical task seemed especially urgent in the 1960s, but it also continues as a central theme in Japanese science fiction throughout the subsequent generations of writers; it has witnessed something of a renaissance in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War and Japanese society's concomitant quest for national identity.

In contrast to the 1950s and 60s in the West, the 1970s and early 1980s might be seen as the 'golden age' of Japanese science fiction, during which time a new generation of writers could refer back to classics of home-grown sci-fi (as well as to imported and translated texts), especially after the nuclear monstrosity of *Gojira* and the publication of Komatsu's *Japan Sinks* in 1973. For the first time, young Japanese writers could identify *Japanese* heroes of sci-fi, alongside the big names of Cordwainer Smith and Samuel Delany who were emerging against the background of the Vietnam war. Indeed, the 1970s and 80s were periods of incredible richness in Japanese sci-fi, at least partly because writers absorbed all of the previous SF traditions from the West simultaneously at that time, rather than diachronically, resulting in unusual patterns, motifs and themes that were creatively 'Japanese.'

Unlike his Anglo-American compatriots, Komatsu's sci-fi was characterised not by the claustrophobic paranoia of the Cold War but rather by the grand tectonic movements of history (and the earth's tectonic plates!), which seemed to persist in imperilling Japan. Indeed, the role of historical singularities (such as the apocalypse itself) in Japanese science fiction cannot be understated, and many of the most influential writers to emerge during the 'golden era' seemed to orientate their work around them. One such figure, who would later break through to world acclaim with the anime *Akira* (1988), after the manga of the same name (1982-86), was Ōtomo

Katsuhiro for his manga *Dōmu* (1980-2, 1983). By the early 1980s Japanese sci-fi was rapidly becoming a hermetic and cultural world of its own, both in touch with Anglo-American currents and self-reflectively independent of them.

One of the most exciting and interesting aspects of Japanese sci-fi is, of course, the way in which its own megatext is explicitly open to a range of additional media. We have already mentioned anime and manga, and the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a string of impressive, conceptual works by the likes of Shirow Masamune and Oshii Mamoru, and then Anno Hideaki's remarkable and revolutionary, *Shinseiki Ebuangerion* (1995-96). As was already the case in the 1920s, Japanese sci-fi shows a predilection for exploring the technological limits of the human via robots, cybernetics and 'mecha.' A persistently controversial issue in sci-fi (and Japanese cyborg sci-fi in particular) concerns the gender politics of the interactions between female figures and technological change.

However, it is also noteworthy that the Seiun Prize is sensitive to the demands and potentials of different media as expressive forms. It is notable, for example, that the 2001 Seiun Prize for Best Media was not awarded to a feature film or an anime but to a video game – the characteristically 'Japanese' Playstation title *Gunparade March*, which (like many of the most popular games in Japan) was never even released in Europe or the US. The game was later made into a manga by Sanadura Hiroyuki and an anime series by Sakurabi Katsushi, both of which have been licenced for translation into English.

This openness to varied media as the vehicles for science fiction is symptomatic of a wider embrace of what has been called 'convergence culture' – the increasing tendency for cultural franchises to employ multiple media to relate a core narrative, around which the various media 'converge.' Although the *Matrix* series is often cited as a classic example of convergence in the West, it is in Japan that we see the most highly developed, persistent and pervasive examples. Perhaps the most famous and successful sci-fi example is the sprawling and epic *Final Fantasy* series, which incorporates dozens of video games, manga, anime, novels, and various other 'character goods.' But *Final Fantasy* is not unique in its convergent nature – it is not uncommon for Japanese sci-fi stories to unravel in multiple media. In other words, sci-fi is an unusual expressive form and a socio-economic phenomenon in Japan.

In sum, it seems that science fiction provides an interesting lens on questions of cultural history and the political unconscious in various societies; it expresses political critique and futurist visions of reform; and it manifests important currents in socio-economic change as well as transnational cultural flows. As the 'land of science fiction,' Japan is a fascinating case.

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China has reached a critical point in its development. Widespread poverty and growing social inequality are posing daunting challenges for social stability. The Chinese government seems aware of this, but needs to do more to empower the people to participate in the reform process.

Democracy by degrees: China's roadmap for change?

YONGJUN ZHAO

China's development is uneven and unbalanced, with growing divisions between urban and rural areas, men and women, and different population groups. This trend is further exacerbated by the lack of effective governance. According to the 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) compiled by Transparency International, China ranks 72 out of 180 countries. Former President Jiang Zemin admitted that up to 20 percent of the state budget went missing in 2000, while the National Audit Association revealed that 10 percent of the funds earmarked for poverty alleviation go astray.¹

Since 2002, China's development policy has shifted away from an over-emphasis on rapid economic growth towards sustainable development and deepening governance reform. In the 11th five-year plan for national economic and social development (2006–2010), the agenda for building a prosperous and harmonious society includes the adoption of a scientific or people-centred approach to development. This blueprint was reiterated at the 17th Communist Party Congress in October 2007, demonstrating the party's concerns about the overheated economy and the widening social inequalities. In his political report to the congress, President Hu Jintao expressed his willingness to deepen the political reform process by prioritising democratisation within the party and gradually increasing citizen participation in public affairs, especially at the grassroots level, under the rule of law. For the first time he made it clear that he regards grassroots democracy as the fundamental engine of socialist-style democracy.

These policy changes may signal the determination of China's top leadership to tackle the tensions and problems confronting the country, although some scholars believe it is unlikely that the state will seriously undertake democratisation. Others hold the view that China's economic development will inevitably lead to greater democracy and they believe that China's growing middle class will be the driving force for change. With the impact of globalisation on Chinese society and polity, the quest for democracy is inevitable. The question is to what degree the party/state has the capacity to deepen its experimentation with political reform, and what role society can play in this process.

The state capacity to democratise

Minxin Pei, Director of the China programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is pessimistic. He describes China's transition as being trapped in partial economic and political reforms.² He views the state as neo-authoritarian in nature, and thus self-destructive, and claims that improving its governance and representing societal interests will eventually exhaust its economic and politi-

cal vitality. This is because the state has no effective means to address the current problems, given its inherent institutional weaknesses, characterised by pervasive corruption and the lack of mechanisms to enhance political accountability. The gradualist reform strategy centred on the state's goal of political survival cannot lead to a fully fledged market economy under the rule of law.³ In his recent comments on the 17th congress, Pei stated that the Chinese leaders' obsession with political stability can only hinder the overdue reform, which could be exacerbated by the likely economic consequences – falling consumer demand, diminished household wealth, rising bad bank loans and reduced corporate investment.⁴

Will Hutton, Chief Executive of the Work Foundation and Governor of the London School of Economics, also warns that "China is running up against a set of daunting challenges from within its own political and economic systems that could well derail its rise, leading to a massive



shock to the global economy'.⁵ For Hutton, the state still imposes arbitrary, sometimes totalitarian ideological interventions on society, which has no effective means to participate in the political deliberation process. Consequently, the state faces a crisis of ideological and political legitimacy. The party is, according to Hutton, 'a moral and ideological empty vessel' that is unable to confront the escalating social protests and its own corruption. To address this, Hutton argues that China needs to develop independent and pluralist public institutions built on the rule of law, an independent judiciary, freedom of the press and authentic representative government.

These perspectives on China's transition remain highly controversial. Andrew Nathan, professor of political science at Columbia University, contends that Pei fails to provide ample evidence to support his thesis. He argues that China may not need Western democracy and full marketisation apart from reforms to streamline public administration based on controlled consultation processes. Nathan also questions whether the mounting social unrest

is threatening the regime." He refers to the state's achievements in bringing about change through policy reorientation to redress the negative consequences of economic growth. And he sees unity within the party in deepening the reform process.⁶

Democracy in China is a borrowed concept, according to Yong Xu, Director of the Centre for Chinese Rural Studies of the Central China Normal University, and a leading expert on village elections. The 1998 Organic Law on Village Committees provided the first institutional basis for China's grassroots democracy. This form of rural self-governance is based on the separation of collective ownership of village property such as land, from individual user rights. This means that ownership per se is in the hands of the village committee, which is supposed to represent the collective interests of the villagers, rather than individual villagers. As such, farmers' demands for village governance are inextricably linked with their interactions with the village committees over the management

Step-by-step democracy

Keping Yu, director of the China Comparative Politics and Economics Centre (CCPEC), a central government think-tank, has proposed a concept of incremental democracy for China, which was endorsed by the 17th congress. The prerequisites for this pattern of democracy are a strong economy and modern political and legal frameworks. Given its complex social and economic realities, China can only adopt a gradual approach to democracy by pursuing 'inner-party' and grassroots democracy first. His view resonates with those of other Chinese scholars, such as Tianyong Zhou, professor at the China Central Party School, and Xinjun Gao, senior fellow at CCPEC. In recognition of the current governance structure, characterised by top-down administration and supervision, they claim that local governments lack accountability to the poor, who actually have few incentives to participate in public affairs. To Zhou and Gao, mechanisms for improving inner-party democracy will have to be explored and institutionalised in parallel with grassroots experimentation. Only when the party itself becomes democratic will the centralised governance structure become more decentralised.¹⁰

Culture also plays a role in societal and political change. Michael Johnston, professor of political science at Colgate University, New York, argues that despite the increasing awareness of democratic values, principles and practices among the public and politicians, the majority of the population are still overwhelmed by Confucian values. As a result, Chinese society, to certain extent, is organised in strong networks in which patron–client relationships play an overriding role in social and political relations. It is in these spheres that people are inclined to rely on consensus making and the power of the authorities, which inhibit the development of a pluralist society and further undermine the power of the citizenry in holding the state accountable.¹¹

Political change in China hinges not only upon the state itself, but also on society as the agent of change. People are not entirely constrained by the binding superstructures; rather, they are active agents whose culture, ideas, values and knowledge play an important role in driving the process of change.¹² The roles of the state and society in political and social transformations are mutually reinforcing. This highlights a number of issues that require further study. What and how can power be transferred from higher- to lower-level authorities and newly elected village committees, villagers and the wider public? What will this mean for the elected village committees, which are fettered by their lack of control over resources and have little say in village administration, as the nomination of their leadership is controlled by the higher-level authorities? Who are the champions of change and how are they driving it? And, in the context of the lack

of democracy, as seen by the West, what model of democracy do the Chinese people themselves need?

Policy makers need to be convinced with viable options for tackling poverty and social inequalities through improvements in governance. The realisation of sustained growth coupled with democratic governance can only be a protracted process. The promoters of democratic governance will have to confront resistance from different groups of actors with vested interests and identify and seize opportunities again and again, according to Jesse Ribot, senior associate at the World Resources Institute. All of this will require a viable programme that addresses the poverty and social divisions in a society that is dominated by a hierarchical and compartmentalised state. Perhaps the roadmap is there, but societal demands for measures to implement the new development agenda, and the reactions to them, require further studies.

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Recent scholarship has witnessed an increasing interest in colonial customary law. Law has traditionally been seen in colonial history as an instrument of imperial domination, but the boundaries of investigations have expanded significantly as scholars examined how legal and social customs of the indigenous societies underwent changes under colonial rule.

Colonial courts and custom:

comparative reflections on customary law and colonial modernity in Korea

MARIE SEONG-HAK KIM

The insight that colonial administrators in Africa attempted to consolidate their rule by inventing the notion of customary law has shed light on the relationship between imperial policy and the native systems of rules and practices.¹ At the same time, the theoretical framework of legal transplant has helped our understanding of how old customs were integrated into the legal structure of the colonial powers. The colonial powers were more or less in agreement that indigenous institutions should be recognised insofar as they were compatible with the dictates of natural law and morality and, of course, they did not impede colonial administration. Yet the actual course of implementing customary law in different areas was full of diversity and incongruity, intertwined with the changes in imperial policy swayed by both the complex ties between colonial and metropolitan cultures and tensions among bureaucrats. Colonial customary law presents fascinating material for comparative analysis.

A Japanised version of Western law

The case of colonial Korea (1910-1945; Korea became Japan's protectorate in 1905) is illuminating because its traditional legal system underwent a dramatic transformation into a modern Romano-German civil law system under Japan, which introduced to the colony modern laws that it had received from Europe only a few decades earlier. Shortly after Korea's annexation by Japan, the government general imposed Japan's Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure as the general laws in Korea, but decreed that most private legal relations among the Koreans be governed by Korean customs (the Ordinance on Civil Matters of 1912). Because Chosŏn Korea (1392-1910) did not have a body of private law, except for some scattered provisions included in the criminal code, the Japanese needed to rely on the concept of custom. Colonial customary law was created with a specific goal of reshaping Korean laws and practices in line with modern legal concepts and principles in Japanese civil law. Colonial civil law in Korea was thus a Japanised version of Western law that was further adapted to the Korean situation through the legal machinery of custom.²

Many jurists in the 19th and early 20th centuries were influenced by the major tenet of the German Historical School that law was the spirit of the people. Some prominent legal scholars were drawn to the investigation of native customs of the colonies and took part in the debates over what kind of colonial legal system was to be established. Henry Sumner Maine (1822-1888) was convinced of the absence of the concepts of rights and duties in custom in British India. Cornelis van Vollenhoven (1874-1933), on the other hand, believed in the sufficiency of *adat* law in meeting the needs of Indonesian society. Japanese jurists' treatment of Korean customs seemed to be one of characteristic adaptation and adjustment. Ume Kenjirō (1860-1910) argued that Korea needed modern civil law to protect the individuals' rights but claimed that a blanket imposition of Japan's civil code on Korea would not work due to different cultural and social backgrounds. The colonial legal system in which Korean customs continued to regulate Korean family and succession matters, within the general principles of Japan's civil law and procedural rules, prepared the ground for reconciling Korean legal tradition with the demands of modern civil law.

The implementation of customary law in Korea was mainly entrusted to judges and legal scholars. It was through the jurisprudence of the Chōsen Kōtō Hōin, the colony's highest court, that old usages and practices in Korea were reviewed, redefined, and turned into legal custom. In colonial Korea, there were no separate native courts as in European colonies in Africa or Southeast Asia. There was only one system of courts, staffed mostly by Japanese jurists, with jurisdiction over both Korean and Japanese. This meant that Japanese judges enforced Korean 'customary law'. The colonial courts, thoroughly Westernised in their structure, administration, procedure, and terminology, were given the task of adjudicating cases in accordance with traditional Korean customs.

The problem was that there were no fixed customs or precedents that articulated rights of liberties of individuals. The colonial judges, of whom the majority had no personal familiarity with Korean customs, found themselves operating in a void without any written guidance that would inform them of the legal acceptability of a particular practice claimed by the parties. Where no solution had been prepared either by judicial decisions of local courts as in the Common Law of England or through the drafting of provincial *coutumes* (local customary laws) by the French jurists, the colonial judges were compelled to devise flexible interpretive principles of



Korean painting

custom. Colonial jurisprudence tended to mingle custom with reason, a process that has a long history in the West. Conflation of Korean custom with reason allowed the judges to recognise selectively indigenous practices that conformed to their notion of justice and equity. Under the broad rubric of customary law, the judges were thus essentially free to execute their jurisprudential assumptions.

The main goal of the judges was to effect reasonable restructuring of social practices through juridical abstraction so that they did not contradict legal principles in the Japanese Civil Code. They were cautious not to dispel the fiction of a customary law regime and adhered to the theory that they simply discovered and applied preexisting custom that had regulated legal relations in Chosŏn Korea. Understandably, they were reluctant to admit that (Korean) customary law was declared by (Japanese) judicial decision. In reality, however, the instrument of custom, interpreted through a judicial mechanism that approximated case law, proved extremely useful in moulding Korean practices and procedures in line with modern private law. Colonial jurisprudence of customary law served in this way as a nexus between the concepts of Western law and well-formed social practices. The judicial reworking of customs proceeded with the goal to make a modern state in a radically different ideological and intellectual context.

Customary law and colonial policy

It has been generally argued that the main goal of the colonial legal policy was to bring about the unification of Korean and Japanese laws, as a step towards the assimilation of the two people. Yet scholars have also pointed out the existence of a considerable ambivalence and inconsistency in the Japanese legal and cultural policies about whether their colonial subjects could, or indeed should, become Japanese citizens. Japanese colonial administration was remarkably centralised compared with its European equivalents, but the ideal of building an integrated empire, governed directly from Tokyo, remained largely unattained, as the Japanese decided early on that the legal status of the colonial subjects was different from that of the Japanese. The powerful governor general of Korea enjoyed considerable autonomy, forming a virtual state within a state. Colonial courts in Korea remained outside the Japanese judicial structure and the Supreme Court of Japan had no jurisdiction over them. Indeed the continued existence of the customary law system can be seen as part of the colonial administrators' strategies to carve out autonomous legal jurisdiction.

Constant negotiations between the government general in Seoul and the Japanese government in Tokyo over Korean customary law reveal interesting and significant aspects of colonial policy. The colonial officials stressed the uniqueness of Korean society and hence the need for maintaining a legal system based on custom, which supposedly they, and not the politicians in Tokyo, knew best. The emphasis on custom was a result of less cultural respect for Korean traditions than political consideration of safeguarding the government general's legislative authority. In Korea, many judicial decisions implementing the principles in Japanese civil law were

carefully enveloped with the cover of 'custom'. Under the framework of the colonial customary law regime, upheld by the colonial administrators, the blunt of the clash between traditional and modern legal orders could be avoided. This is how a more thorough transformation of traditional law into a modern law took place in Korea than in most European colonies. Modern civil law rules permeated into Korean society with remarkable speed and effectiveness.

Tradition and modernity

The colonial construction of customary law left a significant impact on modern Korean civil law. A substantial part of postcolonial Korean law is grounded in colonial customary law. The heavy influence of Japanese law is understandable because the first generation of judges and lawyers in independent Korea, including the drafters of the first Civil Code of 1958, had been educated and trained during the colonial period. Was colonial customary law a good thing? Did it contribute to the modernisation of law, or did it rather serve colonial interests and distort the indigenous legal tradition? Many legal historians around the world have struggled to grapple with similar questions. For instance, did the *adat*rechtspolitik (the colonial attempt to preserve the native custom or *adat*) in the Dutch East Indies, pursued apparently out of genuine respect for indigenous cultures, help Indonesians, or did it instead render them more vulnerable to outside manipulations?³ The question of colonial modernity continues to shape the discourses of customary law. A rounded and comparatively conceived study of colonial customary law can contribute to our understanding of the role of law in modern history.

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More than 175,000 Hindustanis (Indo-Surinamese) and non-resident Indians (NRIs) have made the Netherlands their home. In fact, Holland's Indian diaspora is the largest in continental Europe and a significant part of the Indian diaspora worldwide. The diversity of the groups and the complicated relations between Hindustanis and NRIs make the picture of the Indian diaspora in the country a multi-faceted mosaic. Yet, NRIs and Indo-Surinamese are united by their special relationship with the sub-continent.

Double migrants, diversity and diasporas:

A snapshot of the Hindustani and non-resident Indian community in the Netherlands.

IGOR KOTIN

The Indian diaspora has become the subject of considerable academic and practical attention. Scholars speak of a global Indian diaspora or even diasporas (Oonk). In 2000, a high-level committee of the Indian Parliament, led by Dr L.M. Singhvi (former member of parliament and Indian High Commissioner to the UK, 1991-1997), conducted a general survey of people of Indian origin (PIOs) and non-resident Indians (NRIs) having combined these two population groups with Indian links into a single category of the Indian diaspora. While some academics doubt the validity of such a broad category (Markovits), there is arguably much usefulness in it now, as global travel and communication lead to a revival, re-establishment and re-assessment of old links.

Western Europe and North America remain two of the most important migration destinations for Indians and people of Indian origin. In Europe, the United Kingdom has the largest population of South Asians - two million - well over half of whom are Indian. The Indian diaspora in the Netherlands is represented by both PIOs (the Indo-Surinamese) and NRIs. The Netherlands has the second largest population of PIOs on the continent. The majority, approximately 160,000, are Hindustani (Indo-Surinamese), double migrants with Dutch citizenship. The remainder, some 15-20,000, are NRIs who came directly from India and hold Indian passports. (Their loyalty to India is expressed through cultural activities and political lobbying in favour of India). The number of both communities is rising. It is estimated that between two and three thousand Indians in Holland are illegal immigrants. There are also about 20,000 Pakistanis in the Netherlands, who are culturally close to India and share a common history with Indians.

The Lalla Rukh

Holland's Hindustanis are descendents of indentured workers transported to Dutch Guyana (Suriname) from the territory which today forms the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, historically known as Hindustan. The first ship carrying human cargo from India was the Lalla Rukh, and it landed in Suriname on the 5th June 1873, (making 2008 a special year for the Hindustanis in Suriname who celebrate 135 years since their forefathers made the journey to South America). Many Surinamese are familiar with the Lalla Rukh from their history books, but it has also given its name to a foundation for Indo-Surinamese in the Netherlands. Some of my informants claim to be descendents of the first wave of 249 migrants transported on this very ship. The Lalla Rukh was to be followed by seven more ships, and in all about 32,000 East Indians were delivered to Suriname before indentureship

was abolished. Interestingly, while several thousand East Indians returned to India, the family oral history of my informants tells of their forefathers' intention to return to India, but the last ship left for the sub-continent in 1920, and with all hopes of repatriation. However, the 'myth of return' was born.

Suriname gained independence on November 25, 1975. Subsequently, the period between 1975 and 1980 witnessed mass movement of the Surinamese, including those of Indian origin, to the Netherlands. This can partly be explained by economic reasons, but fears of Creole domination in Suriname are also cited as a reason for the massive Hindustani migration to the Netherlands. Interracial relations in Suriname are complex. Both competition and cooperation between ethnic groups occurs in Suriname and these traits have been inherited by the Surinamese community in Holland. For many years, the government of the Netherlands made no allowances for these ethnic differences between the Surinamese and dealt with the community as an homogenous unit. The consequences of this included a rise in competition between the Creoles and the Indo-Surinamese and attempts by the latter to establish their own representative groups such as 'the Lalla Rukh'. Today, the number of Surinamese in the Netherlands is estimated to be 360,000, more than half of whom are Hindustani.

Economic and welfare provisions were made by the government of the Netherlands for the newcomers from the former colony. They were helped to find housing and work. Many Hindustanis found jobs as government and municipal employees, while some of them started their own business, particularly as shop owners. The government's policy of offering the



newcomers accommodation in different parts of the country was designed to avoid a concentration of migrants' in Holland's cities, but in reality, this proved difficult to avoid, and it was not long before Hindustani communities emerged in Amsterdam (Bijlmermeer) and The Hague (Transvaal, Schilderswijk). These communities found themselves engaged in a process of searching for and constructing an identity. This process was itself complicated by the fact that the Hindustani community in both Suriname and in the Netherlands is both linguistically and religiously disparate. While some Hindustanis find themselves happy under the umbrella of Surinamese

identity, others prefer to stress their 'Indianness' instead.

Religion

Both the Hindustani and NRI communities in the Netherlands are multi-faith groups. The majority of Hindustanis are Hindus (80% or approximately 125,000). The remainder are Muslims (16%) and Christians (4%). In terms of the NRI community, there are approximately 2,000 Sikhs in addition to Hindus, Muslims and Zoroastrians (Parsees).

The Indian and NRI Hindu communities within the Netherlands are affiliated to

different sects (*sampraday*). The majority of Hindustanis are traditionalist Sanatan Hindus. Roughly 16% of them adhere to the 'Arya Samaj', a Hindu reform movement founded in India in 1875 by Swami Dayananda. Research by Choenni shows, however, that the differences among the new generation of Hindustanis in Holland are not that significant, and in fact many Indian and NRI Hindus are unaware of the nuances of traditionalist and reformist Hinduism. Another study (Lynebakke), claiming a significant divide between the Hindustanis and the NRIs in Amsterdam, admits the growing number of intermarriages between the young generation Hindustanis and Holland-born Indians of subcontinental origin. For the younger generation (especially for the Hindus) religion is more a matter of belonging, rather than active participation. There is however, some evidence that young Hindustani Muslims are increasingly influenced by the ideas of global Umma and Muslim brotherhood. My research suggests that among NRI Muslims in the Netherlands, there is considerable common ground between the Pakistani community and Sarnami Hindustani Muslims. For example, the Indian language of Urdu is one of the languages of religious instruction in their mosques.

The Hindustani Hindus are most eager to claim their links to India. The 1980s saw a significant number of marriages between Sarnami Hindu women and Indian men. This produced a significant number of children of mixed parentage but with strong Indian links. These families usually choose Standard Hindi as the language of communication at home. (For a period of time in late 1980s this trend stopped, but increasingly now there appears to be a renewed interest by Dutch-Indians and Hindustanis in each other). Despite these intermarriages, the Hindustanis and NRI communities remain wary of each other. Hindustanis from Suriname are often considered as being 'low caste' by the NRIs, while the Hindustanis often view NRIs as opportunists. Interestingly, a number of illegal immigrants within the community are Indians from India. So some Hindustanis see Indians as being of a lower social class. The existence of very influential Indian businessmen in the Netherlands and importance of the Brahman priests among the Indo-Surinamese perpetuates the stereotypes.

Language

It is apparent that for younger generations of Hindustanis and Dutch-Indians, the Dutch language and identity are important. Those Hindustanis who were born in the Netherlands are often not well-practiced in speaking and understanding Sarnami Hindi, also known as Sarnami. Sarnami Hindi is a derivative of local Indian dialects close to Awadhi and Braj, and it developed in isolation from the other Indo-Aryan languages (Damsteegt). There also

Surinamese grocery store in The Hague. Photo courtesy of the author.



appears to have been a general neglect of the oral traditions of Sarnami by those communities in the Netherlands. Although Sarnami literature exists, there has been a steady decline in the publication of books and journals in this language. That said, there are still many Hindustanis, and indeed NRIs, in the Netherlands who have retained their language and continue to be influenced by subcontinental Indian culture, not least through Bollywood movies. The Indian cinema has a huge impact on both groups in the community (Verstappen and Rutten 2007). Hindi, the state language of India is the main language of Bollywood productions, making the films a primary resource for Hindustanis or second generation Dutch-speaking Indians to learn Standard Hindi. There are also Hindi classes at local centres, as well as four Hindi schools in the Netherlands. Of note however, is the apparent shift from Surinami to the Dutch language. Also, the emergence of the English language as the *lingua franca* of Europe, suits the emergence of a culturally Indian but mostly English-speaking Indian diaspora. Bollywood movies, remain one of the most popular and important Indian exports, strengthening positive feelings of Hindustanis towards India. Their feelings towards Indians from India in the Netherlands are more complicated, however.

Despite a long history of Dutch-Indian relations, (including episodes of temporary Dutch colonial possession of the Hoogly, Cochi and Pulicat in India), until the last century Indians were rare guests in the Netherlands. In fact, Indians from the subcontinent of South Asia didn't really arrive in the Netherlands until after 1980. Up until then there were only 500 Indian families living in Holland (Madan, 1999). The Hindustanis community clearly outstripped non-resident Indians in the Netherlands in terms of number. However, the NRIs who arrived brought with them contemporary Indian traditions which were able to breath new life into those somewhat out-of-touch and out-of-date traditions and practices of the Indo-Surinamese. It is important to add, however, that the Hindustanis in Suriname were not entirely isolated from subcontinental Indian influences. For example, the previously-mentioned 'Arya Samaj' reformist Hindu movement established a branch in Suriname in 1912. 16% of Hindus in Suriname and an approximately similar percentage of Surinami Hindus in the Netherlands adhere to the 'Arya Samaj' vision of Hinduism.

The first influx of newcomers from India to the Netherlands were diplomats, professionals and entrepreneurs invited by various institutions, government organisations or multinational companies. They brought with them the image of Indians as successful engineers, doctors, professors, lawyers or business managers. The second group of arrivals, those coming after 1980, were mostly Punjabis of rural origin (Madan, 1999). Those non-resident Indians who came to the Netherlands as professionals or businessmen tend to have closer links with India. For example, they often have their families in India; they watch Zee-TV and read Indian newspapers. However, the importance of NRIs in the Netherlands is not confined to their direct links with India. Among them is an active group of politicians, economists, lawyers and other intellectuals who devote their time to the service of India from the Netherlands. They have formed an association known as the Foundation for Critical Choices for India (FCCI). Founded in

1980, the FCCI is an independent, secular non-commercial, non-partisan think tank. It aims to identify, define and study critical issues facing India and to work towards long term, rational solutions. It also strives to mobilise moral, intellectual and financial resources of Indians abroad for the solution of critical problems facing India and to effectively project and promote the general interests of India and the Indian Diaspora in local communities. The emergence and effectiveness of an institution such as this in the Netherlands, puts the country with its significant Hindustani (Indo-Surinami) and influential Non-Resident Indian communities in an influential position in the global Indian diaspora.

The above-mentioned information, obtained from various publications gave impetus to my research, which included field-trips to the Hague, Amsterdam and Utrecht, during which interviews with both Hindustanis and NRIs were undertaken. Further research is required. The author thanks Dr. Theo Damsteegt (Leiden University), Dr. Dipika Mukherjee (IIAS, Leiden), Mrs Ingrid Grant, Dr. Vasant Moharir, Dr. Vikas Kohli, Mr. R.L.Lakhina, and Mrs Lakhina, Dr. H.U. Qureshi, Dr. Wahid Saleh, Mr. Chris and Mrs. Indra Gopal, Mr. Hendrik and Mrs Ursi Poeram and many others for their help and cooperation.

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Chinese Confucianism gradually broadened its scope from traditional to modern owing to the influence of Ching Dynasty scholarship. Tai-Chen (1723-1777), in particular, believed that sentiments and desires are a valuable part of human nature, an idea in opposition to traditional Confucianism, notably to Sung-Ming's Neo-Confucianists, who claimed that rationality is good and emotions are evil. Modern Chinese scholars, however, continue to greatly value and appreciate Tai-Chen's work.

An 'aesthetic education': the role of 'sentiments' in the transition from traditional Confucianism to modern aesthetics

MEI-YEN LEE

Two such scholars were Liang Chi-Chao (1873-1929) and Tsai Yuen-Pei (1868-1940), who saw sentiments in particular as the foundation of aesthetic education. According to them, sentiments in an aesthetic context are a combination of elevated feelings, beliefs and attitudes related but not limited to altruistic personality. Aesthetic evaluations are made based on the sub-structure of sentiments. Thus they are different from emotions, desire, love, friendship or affection, and as a whole are elevated forms of thinking derived from the sublimation of the human spirit. They drive us to make contributions to our country and people.

Simultaneously, these two masters, under the influence of Western approaches to aesthetic education, responded to public yearnings by developing a new way to appreciate aesthetic values. Aesthetics here refers to more than mere art; it's a more general appreciation of beauty, of harmony and idealisation, or what is termed in many areas of art as composition. Liang Chi-Chao and Tsai Yuen-Pei created a sense of urgency to reassess the importance of aesthetic education so that it might play a constructive role in developing their beloved nation.

A means to a harmonious society

Liang Chi-Chao was an emotionally profound and colourful man. His ideas about sentiments were derived from his experiences, and also from the social value of sentiments towards the end of the Ching Dynasty: a social 'aesthetics' whose object is a harmonious society, well ordered like a work of art. Like art, it elevates us beyond the mundane and self-centred. He often emphasised that sentiments alone are what motivate people to live and to work. If a man vows to perform a great task, for example, sentiments are like a demanding emperor to which mere rationality should yield. If a man is aware of his sentiments and follows them to the end, then he can achieve great things. Thus Liang claimed, 'A good teacher should give judicious guidance to students according to their individual sentiments'. The most efficient instrument for learning about sentiments is art, such as music, painting and literature, since they embody aesthetic principles that are universal and elevate the human spirit.

Tsai Yuen-Pei divided human spiritual functions into knowledge, will and emotions. He emphasised the importance of sentiments in particular and, like Liang, believed that music, painting and literature can help restore a person's lost contact with sentiments. He coined the Chinese term *Mei-Yu* ('aesthetic education') and advocated it as a means of educating people to appreciate all forms of beauty. Ultimately, the practice of aesthetic educa-

tion aims to cultivate the sense of sentiments in order to experience the sublime of the human spirit. 'Man can be fearless in any "life or death" situation', Tsai stated, 'ignore the fact of whether he or she is blessed, treat anything with enthusiasm, share enjoyment with others, sacrifice himself for others, etc., if the instruction of aesthetic education is properly provided'. He was referring to art's moral aspect and sacrificing of ego; art, like society, takes us beyond the self or the limitations of the individual to the level of species. In this way it elevates us to the realm of the universal. Therefore, aesthetic education complements intellectual education, and subsequently ends with the completion of moral education. They are all linked in the sense of achieving a harmonious and satisfactory result.

Freedom from the phenomenal

Tsai's aesthetic views are not so much linked to Western aesthetics in general as to the aesthetic thoughts of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) in particular. According to Kant, humanity's sentiments are based on the nature of one's freedom. Anything, whether it's pleasant or not, is determined by whether it's beautiful. Beauty, to Kant, is defined by transcendence (with no external or secondary 'purpose'; art for art's sake); universality (human nature and things common to all people); spontaneity (determined by free will); and inevitability (led by human nature without effort).

Tsai held that all men experience love, hatred, fear, happiness, anger, sadness, etc., in the 'phenomenal world'. Our emotions rise and fall like waves in response to the phenomena of life, death, fortune, misfortune, gain and loss. Art can prevent us from being distracted by the phenomenal world and thus help us to maintain a purer aesthetic sensibility, 'to see the world in a grain of sand'. Art can dissolve prejudice against others and reconcile the differences between gain and loss. When a man frees himself from the 'relative' emotions of this phenomenal world, and sublimates his emotions to form an aesthetic wholeness, then he can realise the meaning of the world beyond the individual, mundane or corporeal.

It is, therefore, obligatory for an educator to lead us beyond the phenomenal world through the introduction of aesthetic education, whose aim is to cultivate one's disposition and soul. Tsai devoted himself to the promotion of aesthetic education, especially during the period of Japanese invasion. He thought the best way for people to love and help one another is by extending sympathy, and that the aesthetic function of 'empathy' is the key to uniting people. That is why Tsai tried so hard to promote aesthetic education. He thought aesthetic education should not only be provided in the form of art education in schools, but also within the family and

across society as a whole.

From theory to implementation: combining east and west

There was an inevitable contradiction between Tsai's theory and that of Kant. For example, in Kant's theory, sentiments are the essence of 'aesthetic sense', and the disinterested nature of aesthetic sentiments helps to make a man disinterested in gain or loss and even helps to eliminate the obsession of self-interest. Yet, to both Tsai and Liang, it's inevitable that sentiments as the foundation of aesthetic education had no subjective purpose, while aesthetic education as the tool of cultivating man's spirit includes the property of being purposeful.

According to Tsai, 'aesthetic sentiments' are derived from the interaction between a human's inner sentiments and his external environment. In Kant's opinion, however, aesthetic sentiments are neither inner emotions nor experiential, and they are certainly not concerned with the material objects in question. Rather, Kant believed that when people bracket physical sensations and practical utility derived from external stimulations, they will acquire a free mind capable of experiencing pure aesthetic sentiments.

In sum, Liang and Tsai claimed aesthetic sentiments were experiential 'products', whereas Kant stressed that they were transcendental and pure. The difference may lie in their focuses, with Liang and Tsai looking towards the source and Kant at the result. Yet, in spite of these differences, Tsai laid the foundation for modern Chinese aesthetic education by adapting some of Kant's viewpoints, and Tsai's theory of human sentiments injected new life into a traditional Confucianism that had always valued rationality and disparaged emotions.

Liang and Tsai initiated a series of plans to introduce lifelong aesthetic education to families, schools and society, to make aesthetic education a necessary tool for building the nation. Unfortunately, their plans failed to come to fruition, mainly because the Chinese were hard pressed by political unrest and economic hardship. But they undeniably made a great contribution by laying the groundwork for modern Chinese aesthetic education. Because of their efforts to promote the paramount value of human sentiments, modern Chinese thinking regarding aesthetic education can develop into a new and promising field.

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Natural and man-made disasters draw an immediate response from humanitarian organisations around the world. They provide invaluable service meeting the immediate physical needs for the victims and survivors. But an important element is often missing from humanitarian efforts and policy: help restoring the objects that help people know who they are. The Prince Claus Fund for Culture and Development established the Cultural Emergency Response program because it believes culture, too, is a basic need.

'Culture is a basic need'

The Prince Claus Fund's Special Program: Cultural Emergency Response

GINGER DA SILVA AND IWANA CHRONIS

In the spring of 2003, the bombing and invasion of Iraq unleashed a wave of lawlessness that led to the looting of the National Museum in Baghdad. Thousands of priceless artefacts were stolen or destroyed. A year later, in December of 2004, an earthquake in the Indian Ocean triggered a tsunami that killed hundreds of thousands of people and devastated coastal areas from Indonesia to East Africa. Whatever the source of a catastrophe - floods, wars, earthquakes or other - the impact on people is profound and usually long term. Many humanitarian organisations are quick to come to the aid of victims and survivors, but their emphasis is on the immediate needs for food, water, shelter and health care. The Prince Claus Fund for Culture and Development maintains that these are important, but not enough. The Fund believes that culture, too, is a basic need and essential for people's recovery, a fact that should be recognised internationally in policies on humanitarian relief.

Culture defines and reflects who people are. It is both creative expression and social interaction. Although over time, the remnants of daily cultural activities may disappear, the art and architecture that form a people's cultural heritage live on and become the pillars of their identity. They form the sources of hope and pride and the foundation on which people can reconstruct their lives.

'First aid' for cultural heritage

The images of looting of the National Museum in Baghdad were the catalyst that set the Prince Claus Fund in motion. When the River Arno burst its banks in 1966, thousands of volunteers and organisations from Italy, Europe and around the world came to the rescue of the museums, libraries and churches of Florence. In contrast, half a century later, there was no infrastructure that could help Iraq undo the damage. This sparked the Fund to establish the Cultural Emergency Response program (CER) in 2003. Its first action was to help reconstruct the library of the University of Baghdad. In 2004, the library was reopened and students could resume their studies.

CER's mandate is to provide 'first aid' globally for cultural heritage that has been damaged or destroyed by man-made or natural disasters. Although there are a number of international organisations concerned with the protection of cultural heritage, CER was the first that was empowered to work swiftly for its rescue. CER's 'first aid' comes in the form of initial financial support in order to implement basic repairs, help stabilise the situation and prevent further damage. The financial support is relatively modest - a maximum of €35,000 - but comes quickly and is an amount designed to carry out the necessary work to protect the object involved from further degradation. CER's prompt action is intended not only to save priceless heritage, but also to focus public and political attention on its importance and to create space, after the initial shock of disaster, to assess what further action needs to be taken. If additional funds are required, CER will help its contract partners to find other sources.

How it works

Iwana Chronis, the CER program coordinator, spends her days scanning the world for disasters, following the news, checking websites, receiving tips from concerned contacts. For instance, if a quick check of the UN Disaster Net reveals an earthquake, Iwana immediately contacts CER's network in the region, calling and e-mailing local or regional heritage organisations, architects, journalists or others who know the area. The process moves quickly, and within a week she makes contact with someone who knows in detail about the disaster and can provide information about the institutions, the buildings or objects that constitute cultural heritage in the area.

Iwana's challenge as coordinator of CER has several elements: to get good and accurate information about the situation and to find a responsible contract partner for the emergency work that needs doing. A basic principle of CER's approach is respect for local knowledge and for community needs. Therefore, CER acts as a facilitator-collaborator rather than an implementer-independent actor.

Once contact is made with someone who knows about the affected heritage, the CER coordinator works together with the local contact to try to build a proposal for action. The project proposal is submitted for second opinions to external advisors, people in the region the Prince Claus



Yu Aw synagogue Herat, Afghanistan before the reconstruction.

Copyright Aga Khan Trust for Culture



Yu Aw synagogue Herat, Afghanistan during the reconstruction. Copyright Aga Khan Trust for Culture.

Fund has worked with and who will have relevant knowledge. If there are questions, Iwana gets back to the contact person and together they seek answers until they feel the proposal is strong enough to present to the CER Steering committee. The committee of six is committed to responding to a request within 48 hours, but their response often raises more questions requiring additional information. Once a proposal is finally approved by the committee, a contract is drawn up and the work can begin. The time frame is short. The contract must be signed within six months of a disaster. The work must be carried out by local organisations and must be completed within a year of the contract signing.

CER's work in Indonesia

Indonesia is an interesting illustration both of CER's principles and CER's work. When an earthquake followed by a tsunami struck the Indian Ocean in December 2004, Banda Aceh was the city closest to the earthquake's epicentre. The regional capital was massively affected. Several mosques in Banda Aceh miraculously survived the water's onslaught. They were left standing in the middle of the devastated landscape, and some - including the Baiturrahman and the Ulee Lheue mosques - were virtually untouched, a fact that many local people interpreted as divine intervention. In the weeks following the tsunami, these mosques not only offered a space for prayer and community activities, they also provided a symbol of hope and consolation for tsunami survivors. The importance of these surviv-

ing mosques illustrates how symbols of culture can have a therapeutic or healing function for people recovering from a catastrophe.

Indonesia in general has a high awareness of its cultural past and an impressive network of heritage organisations. But in the immediate wake of the disaster it was difficult to find a representative of a cultural heritage group in Banda Aceh. So CER commissioned two journalists who were in the area to go scouting for potential projects. They identified a manuscript library and a music studio that held significant meaning for the community. The library was reconstructed and the music studio refurbished. CER also contributed to the rebuilding of an earthquake-proof museum depot for the Heritage Museum on the island of Nias.

In May 2006 another earthquake struck the city of Yogyakarta causing extensive damage and the loss of many lives. It also affected much of the city's most beautiful and historical architecture, including a number of World Heritage Sites. CER worked closely with several local heritage organisations to identify damaged cultural heritage that needed CER's support. The Imogiri neighbourhood - which was close to the earthquake's epicentre - had been particularly badly affected. For centuries, Imogiri has been Yogyakarta's batik district, and a great many of its inhabitants depend on this industry for their livelihood. But the earthquake brought this to a standstill. CER provided immediate support for the rebuilding of a batik centre with workplaces, a temporary museum and a flea market along with batik-training workshops. The reconstruction made it possible for Imogiri residents to resume their batik activities. It not only contributed to the preservation of their cultural heritage, but also to their social and economic recovery.

In March 2007, the Indonesian archipelago was again hit by an earthquake, this time affecting the province of West Sumatra. It was not recognised as a national disaster by the central government, a fact that had major implications for the level of emergency relief that the government provided. CER offered immediate support for the restoration of the Rao-Rao mosque in the Tanah Datar regency of West Sumatra. It was built in the early 20th century in a unique architectural style that represents the region's four ethnic communities. The earthquake shifted the roof from its supporting walls and further tremors could have caused the mosque's collapse.

CER contacted a local heritage organisation, which approached the mosque's management. With the backing of the Rao-Rao community, a request was submitted for CER's support to stabilise the roof and the supporting walls so that the community could resume its religious activities without fear that the building would collapse. The contract partner was the committee that managed the mosque, a group of mainly elderly villagers. They assumed responsibility for the restoration activities, while an architect, who was an active member of the local heritage association, served as a liaison between the committee and CER.

Of course CER's work is not limited to Indonesia. In Sri Lanka, when the southern port town of Galle was hard hit by the 2004 tsunami, CER action helped a maritime archaeological institute resume its work quickly. Also in 2004, the roof of a Greek Orthodox church in Nablus, Palestine that had been badly affected by bombing was restored. Following an earthquake that devastated the city of Bam in southern Iran, CER intervened to salvage and restore an important archive. Work is nearly completed in Herat, Afghanistan on the restoration of a mosque and a synagogue, both badly damaged by flooding and lack of maintenance. The list continues.

An open definition

CER defines cultural heritage as something tangible. This could include museums, archives, libraries, monuments, artefact collections, or documents. The definition is flexible and not limited to the past. For CER, material heritage may be historical or contemporary, formal or informal. Whether something is eligible for CER support depends greatly on the extent of the cultural value that the disaster-stricken community places on the damaged object.

CER believes that an emphasis on rescuing cultural heritage not only demonstrates respect and concern for culture; it also brings hope and consolation to disaster-affected communities, and expresses solidarity with their plight. In addition, the community's role in the identification and implementation of the project works to restore self-respect, a feeling

of responsibility and independence among people whose lives have been shattered.

Political choices and consequences

The identification of cultural heritage and its reconstruction is inevitably a political process. When assessing emergency relief proposals, CER always tries to consider the position of the proposed cultural heritage in its local context and its significance to the surrounding community. As a program of the Prince Claus Fund, CER shares a particular concern for heritage in 'Zones of Silence' – that is in communities that are marginalised or disadvantaged. The 'silence' may also mean smaller scale or geographically remote emergencies that might otherwise go unnoticed.



A CER action in West Sumatra, Indonesia: The restoration of the mosque of Rao-Rao
Copyright: Prince Claus Fund

But societies are complex and a choice to restore a particular object will not only have political consequences for the community in question, it may also affect CER's image and effectiveness within that region. As a Western based organisation, CER has to be very sensitive to competing interests and to the potential impact, for instance, of getting involved with the restoration of an exclusively Christian heritage in a Muslim-dominated area. Local sensibilities must always be considered when providing cultural emergency relief, as the very act itself can and will be interpreted along political lines.

In the five years since its inauguration, the Cultural Emergency Response program has steadily expanded its reach. CER works together with other international organisations concerned with the protection of cultural heritage, like UNESCO and the International Committee of the Blue Shield (ICBS), an umbrella organisation that includes ICOM (the International Council of Museums), ICOMOS (the International Council on Monuments and Sites), ICA (the International Council on Archives), IFLA (the International Federation of Library Associations) and CCAA (the Coordinating Council of Audiovisual Archives Associations). This network of heritage associations it is not structured to respond quickly to emergency situations but it offers a wealth of knowledge that is invaluable in CER's selection and restoration processes.

In its first few years, CER could accommodate up to 4 projects a year. In 2007 it contracted 10 projects, nine of which had been completed by March, 2008. CER's budget initially came directly from the Prince Claus Fund, but its message that culture is a basic need especially in times of disaster has drawn the interest of other funders. CER has received 200,000 for a period of five years in additional funding from the Dutch National Postcode Lottery. CER has also approached the Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation and begun talks with other organisations, including the Centre Ceramique of the Municipality of Maastricht, which flagged funds for release as soon as the next emergency project was identified. In March, 2008, CER gave a presentation in Maastricht at the European Fine Arts and Antique Fair, TEFAF. Subsequently, several individuals came forward with pledges of €10,000 each for the 'CER Guarantee Fund' to be tapped as emergencies arise.

Why not prevention?

Catastrophes, by definition, are not preventable, but being prepared can make recovery a lot easier and faster. One of CER's objectives, like those of other heritage organisations, is to draw national and international attention to the importance of cultural heritage and to the need to document it. After the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, it became apparent that there were no official records of heritage sites in the affected area, so it was difficult to take any action. Privately funded organisations like the World Monuments Fund and the Aga Khan Trust for Culture are taking inventories around the world and helping countries set priorities for their own cultural heritage under threat, not only from disasters but also simply from neglect. In Indonesia, heritage associations are systematically identifying, recording and photographing important sites. So when an earthquake strikes, they are immediately prepared to visit each site and assess any damage. They understand what information they need to preserve their heritage and, if necessary, to react quickly to a cultural emergency.

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Each year the Prince Claus Fund grants awards to artists and cultural organisations who are doing outstanding work in their fields. The Fund's criteria include artistic quality, innovation and social engagement. Each year the Fund identifies a theme, such as 'Culture and Conflict'(2007) or 'The Positive Aspects of Migration'(2004) that helps focus the search for laureates and the activities undertaken in that year.

Prince Claus Fund Asian Laureates, partners and activities

There have been 48 Asian laureates in the 11 years that the Prince Claus Fund has been granting awards. They come from 22 different countries and territories, from Papua New Guinea to Turkey, from Malaysia to Syria, from Armenia and Tajikistan to West Timor, and Burma. They represent a wide range of different cultural disciplines: They are actors and visual artists, architects, cartoonists, dancers, filmmakers, graphic designers, historians, museum directors, musicians and musicologists, poets, philosophers, puppeteers, weavers, writers, and even a Chinese rock musician. Some are not individuals but organisations, such as Bhutan's Archery Federation, the Reyum Institute of Arts and Culture in Cambodia, the magazine *Jahan-e Khetab* in Iran and the Al Kamandjâti music school for children in Palestine. They represent a very rich tapestry of Asian arts and culture, and they form an invaluable network of advisors for the ongoing work of the Fund.

In addition to granting its yearly awards, and the special Cultural Emergency Response program, the Prince Claus Fund for Culture and Development is active in a number of other ways:

- It extends financial assistance for special projects, including a 'travel budget' to help promote artistic exchange by allowing artists to participate in workshops, festivals and other activities in other countries. Nepalese poet Chirag Bangdel, for example, was able to participate in the International Poetry Festival in Medellin, Colombia in 2007 and Indonesian composer Michael Asmara was given the opportunity to take part in 'The Timbre of Hue,' the International Symposium of Composition in Vietnam, in 2006.
- The Fund publishes its own occasional Prince Claus Fund Journal together with a publishing house in Asia, Africa, Latin America or the Caribbean. The latest Journal, #15, on the theme 'Culture and Conflict' deals with Cultural Conflicts in China. It was published together with the magazine (and museum) *Art Today* in Shanghai.
- It supports cultural publications and through the Prince Claus Fund Library, it initiates books of special interest, particularly in the visual arts. For example, an interdisciplinary book on the graphic design and visual culture of Pakistan, *From Mazaar to Bazaar*, will be published shortly in cooperation with Oxford University Press, Karachi.
- In its Network Partner programme, the Fund selects cultural organisations around the world with whom it forms a longer term, collaborative relationship. Its recent Asian Network Partners include Komunitas Utan Kayu in Indonesia, the Drik Picture Library in Bangladesh, the Reyum Institute in Cambodia and BizArt Art Center in China.



Asian Laureates

Mehri Maftun (*Afghanistan*) musicologist

Omara Khan Massoudi (*Afghanistan*)

director of the national museum

Lida Abdul (*Afghanistan*) visual artist

Michael Poghosian (*Armenia*) actor

Harutyun Khachatryan (*Armenia*) filmmaker

Bhutan Archery Federation (*Bhutan*) archery

Tin Moe (*Myanmar/Burma*) poet

Reyum Institute of Arts and Culture

(*Cambodia*) cultural institute

Tian Zhuang Zhuang (*PR China*) filmmaker

Cui Jian (*PR China*) rock musician

Wu Liangyong (*PR China*) architect

Wang Shixiang (*PR China*) crafts

Kumar Shahani (*India*) filmmaker

Jyotindra Jain (*India*) museum

Communalism Combat (*India*)

publication/magazine

Bhupen Khakhar (*India*) painter

Komal Kothari (*India*) musicologist

G.N. Devy (*India*) cultural activist

Sardono W. Kusumo (*Indonesia*)

choreographer, dancer

Jim Supangkat (*Indonesia*) art critic

Heri Dono (*Indonesia*) visual artist

Ayu Utami (*Indonesia*) writer

Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial

(*Indonesia*) organisation

that promotes debate and liberal discussion/

interpretation within Islam

Slamet Gundono (*Indonesia*) puppetry

Rakhshan Bani-Etemad (*Iran*) filmmaker

Jahan-e Ketab (*Iran*) publication

focusing on cultural criticism

Ebrahim Nabavi (*Iran*) writer

Reza Abedini (*Iran*) graphic designer

Jawad Al Assadi (*Iraq*) theatre director and author

6 Redza Piyadasa (*Malaysia*) art historian, critic

Ken Yeang (*Malaysia*) architect

Arif Hasan (*Pakistan*) architect/urban planner

Madeeha Gauhar (*Pakistan*) theatre director

Michael Mel (*Papua New Guinea*) performance artist

Elena Rivera Mirano (*Philippines*) musicologist

Tsai Chih Chung (*Taiwan*) cartoonist

Farroukh Qasim (*Tajikistan*) actor/theatre

Biboki Weavers: Yovita Meta (*West Timor*) weavers

18 Duong Thu Huong (1947, *Vietnam*) author

The coast of the east Indian state of Orissa has been home to intense maritime activity for centuries. Its coastal and estuarine waters have been used to transport hinterland grain and salt via ports in river mouths and lagoons, and traditional fishing-based maritime commerce still flourishes. While traditional boat-building has declined since the colonial era, Orissa remains one of the world's richest areas for traditional boats, including the carvel-built chhoat and salti, the non-reverse clinker-built danga, and the catamaran, whose structure was a sophisticated solution to navigating deep waters and aggressive surf.

The wisdom of 'tied logs': traditional boats of India's Orissa coast during the colonial era

GANESWAR NAYAK

While the availability of materials, tradition of boat-building craftsmanship, and culture in general all influenced the design and structure of boats of the Orissa coast, climate, the precise purpose for which a boat was needed, and geography played more important roles. Indeed, the relationship between boat design and coastline geography was crucial. Geographic characteristics of a coastal region's waters could be as unique as the boat designed to operate there. Each coastal region became known for its own type of fishing boat, built according to a design hundreds of years old.

The evolution of boat design on the Orissa coast was determined mainly by the continental shelf. Orissa's southern coastline has a narrow shelf, only 40 kilometres wide, resulting in an aggressive surf that pounds its wide sandy beaches and, further north, river mouths that are silted and inaccessible from the sea. Orissa's northern coastline, however, is defined by the much wider Bengal shelf, its gradual slope providing shallower waters and a greater tidal range. Therefore, boats that could withstand aggressive surf operated along the southern coast, while the extended tidal shelf of the northern coast allowed the use of displacement craft in estuarine and coastal waters.

The estuaries in the north provided landing facilities and shelter for plank-built displacement boats such as the chhoat, patia, botali and donga, which could not be operated from the open surf-beaten beaches in the south. There, the raft-like type of catamaran called the 'teppa' came into use because it was able to cross heavy surf and land on the beach. Since the catamaran was easily assembled and disassembled it could be carried up the beach to where it was protected from breakers and could dry out.

Fishermen's ethnic and cultural background was linked to the kinds of boats they built. The catamaran became the predominant watercraft of the Telugu fishermen in southern Orissa (the Ganjam coast), whereas the Oriyas and Bengalis of northern Orissa became known for using displacement crafts.

A millennium of the same structural design

Watercraft innovation is possible when it satisfies the demands of all the above influences. Independent of physical geography, innovation in boat structure is an interplay between cultural tradition and economic imperatives. For instance, installing a false keel or rudder on a traditional boat might be induced by the new economic environment of marine fishing, but such additions do not change the existing traditional boat structure. Even today, the fibre-made motorised watercraft that operates off the Puri coast is a replica of the teppa catamaran.

In order to gain acceptance among a society's fishermen true innovation in boat structure or shape must be sanctioned by relevant cultural practices and belief. In other words, it must be in harmony with long established cultural tradition. This was why there was no innovation in the catamaran's structure, which satisfied locals for hundreds of years. So how and why did such an extraordinary form come into existence? And, more important, what were the factors that led to such remarkable continuity over several hundred years? The evolution of the catamaran boat-building tradition of Orissa might provide an explanation.


'Tied logs': the catamaran

The paravas, a Tamil Nadu fishing community, were the first known users of the log raft called the catamaran – derived from the Tamil Kathu Maran, 'tied logs'. In the fifth century the Tamil Chola Dynasty used them to invade parts of Southeast Asia. Up until the British colonial period, the surf-beaten sandy coastline that runs all the way from Tanjore, near India's southern tip, to Orissa hardly ever saw any sail other than the brown triangle of this specialised seagoing raft. It's still used today, though in a different form, by fishermen of southern Orissa, where traditional catamarans ply the coastal waters from Konark to Ganjam.

In general, during the British colonial period, two distinct types of traditional catamaran existed: the finer and more elaborate model was found in the south, on the Coromandel coast from Cape Calimere to the Krishna and Godavari delta; the other was more primitive and less efficient and found north of the Krishna and Godavari delta.

The former, Coromandel model, was the catamaran at its most advanced state of development. Since a catamaran was essentially a log raft, an obvious inference was that it must be inherently clumsy in form, but this was by no means the case with the Coromandel catamaran, which possessed considerable elegance and beautiful lines. The Tamil Nadu coast fishermen produced a design with more variations, adapted for different methods of fishing, but the general type consisted of a variable number of precisely shaped logs tied together and accessorised with pieces such as bow stems and rowing-rails.

The more primitive and simpler type of catamaran was employed almost uniquely by the Telugu fishermen north of the Krishna and Godavari deltas. In Orissa, for example, on the shore of Ganjam District, it consisted of five logs joined to form a sharp point at the fore end, which was accessorised with two stem pieces that gave it a Tamil-style beak-shaped bow. The aft log ends were perfectly aligned, thus the craft's stern was abruptly truncated. Instead of being lashed together with rope, the logs were permanently pegged together; the craft's comparatively small size allowed the crew to carry it up the beach without separating the logs. The three middle logs were usually the only boat-length pieces used, while the two exterior 'logs' were actually comprised of shorter logs carved and joined end to end to form two long, slightly concave pieces that were pegged to either side of the three middle logs. An equally concave 'weatherboard' was attached to the top of each of these exterior pieces to form the sides of the boat, which protected the crew and gear; the fore end of each weatherboard butted up against the aft end of the stem piece on its own side of the bow.



Source: Hornell, J. 1920. 'The Origin and Ethnological Significance of Indian Boat Design'. *Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* 7-3.

The teppu: an intermediate catamaran

A variation of these two general types came into being further south, on the coast of Vizagapatnam: a catamaran of larger size and superior timber and workmanship. Called 'teppu' in Telugu, the hull consisted of two halves lashed together fore and aft, each comprised of a long log with a washboard sown onto its outer edge and a beak piece pegged onto its fore end. When landing the rope lashings were untied and the two halves parted for easy carriage. The largest of these 'intermediate' catamarans included a long middle log and two shorter side logs held together by means of fore and aft lashings; when unlashed the catamaran separated into three pieces. A pointed but loose and not pegged on bow piece was also attached to the middle log, and a small, loose rudder hung aft between the outer log ends. Typically, two men operated this craft, but it was possible for one highly skilled, dextrous man to do it. Its main advantage was being able to pass through surf to the beach, and its main purpose was transporting cargo to and from ships anchored off the coast. For balance during the monsoon, a small outrigger was attached by means of two poles, and a bamboo mast was erected with a mat or cotton sail. When the sail's tack and sheet were released, the sail fell alongside fore and aft; its light weight made it easily manageable.

Additionally, two or more catamarans could be joined to provide a wider platform in order to transport more materials or undertake a longer journey. Called a chapa (meaning 'float' in Oriya) in southern Orissa, it's still operated during the Chandan Yatra or Sandal festivals to commemorate the representations of Radha and Krishna. In northern Orissa the chapa is known as 'pui pulia' and is capable of carrying considerable loads.

Today traditional boat-building is in decline, but the design of the catamaran lives on. The Orissa coast demonstrates its unique importance: bigger, 'better' or technologically advanced boats cannot perform in such waters. Observing the catamaran in the context of the enormous range of boats found on this stretch of India's east coast, one sees primitive man's earliest conception of gratifying his ambition for a life afloat, a design to enable him to steal across a river or estuary in pursuit of or in flight from his enemy, and one wonders at this ancient design's staying power.

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One of the most important reforms of the post-Suharto period has been the creation of a highly dynamic and competitive party system - particularly remarkable given an absence of democratic party politics in Indonesia for more than 40 years. Yet despite positive indicators for a healthy and functioning party system, Indonesians are highly critical of the parties and their leaders; and opinion polls rank political parties among the institutions considered most corrupt, ineffective and unresponsive. Marcus Mietzner examines whether this criticism is justified.

Stable but unpopular: political parties after Suharto

MARCUS MIETZNER

Since the late 1950s, two authoritarian regimes (first Sukarno's Guided Democracy, then Suharto's New Order) had tightly controlled and regulated the existence and activities of political parties in Indonesia. Under Suharto, the number of parties had been reduced to three, with the government's electoral machine Golkar ensured of regular triumphs at the ballot box. By contrast, the post-1998 party system has witnessed almost no institutional restrictions or government interference. Except for a continuing ban on communist-leaning platforms, parties are largely free to choose their ideological orientation and organisational structure. In addition, all post-Suharto elections (two parliamentary polls and two rounds of a presidential ballot) have been widely acknowledged as free and fair. In this liberal climate, parties of all colours and convictions have mushroomed, with 17 of them holding seats in the current parliament and another 95 registered at the Department of Justice and Human Rights.

Yet, ten years after Suharto's fall, Indonesian political parties are the target of fierce criticism by observers, civil society leaders and the general public. Opinion surveys show that Indonesians view the parties as corrupt, unresponsive, self-absorbed and ineffective. Newspaper columns regularly launch stinging attacks on party leaders, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have focused many of their programmes on scrutinising the activities of political parties – or the lack thereof. At the same time, however, the party system seems surprisingly stable. Despite the constant outpouring of criticism, there have been very few calls for the disbandment of the party-based democratic system, and parties continue to receive large numbers of new members.

What are the reasons for this seemingly paradoxical situation? How to explain this love-hate relationship between Indonesians and their political parties? This article discusses the reasons for the institutional solidity of the Indonesian party system, but also explores why this significant success has not been accompanied by higher levels of public support among ordinary Indonesians for the parties. After evaluating structural, political and ideological issues involving the state of Indonesia's party system, I conclude that, despite ongoing problems, Indonesia's parties deserve more credit for their contribution to the strength of the democratic polity than is usually extended to them.

Stable

The first significant feature of Indonesia's post-Suharto parties is their relative stability and continuity. All large parties that contested the 1999 elections still exist a decade later. They are: the secular-nationalist PDI-P (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*, Indonesian Democratic Party

of Struggle), the former government party Golkar, the traditionalist Muslim party PKB (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, National Awakening Party), the Islamic PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, United Development Party), the modernist Muslim party PAN (*Partai Amanat Nasional*, National Mandate Party), the PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) - a puritan Islamic party that participated in the 1999 polls as PK (*Partai Keadilan*, Justice Party), and the ultra-modernist Islamic party *Partai Bulan Bintang* (Moon and Crescent Party). There has been only one noteworthy addition to this club of major parties in the last ten years: President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's Democratic Party (PD, *Partai Demokrat*), founded in 2001.

This stability of the party system is an unusual phenomenon among Asia's emerging democracies. Even in more established democratic systems, the lifespan of political parties is often much shorter. For instance, the average life expectancy of political parties in South Korea is three years, while parties in Thailand and the Philippines survive only a little longer. In Indonesia, by contrast, three of the biggest parties were founded in the 1960s and 1970s, with the rest established after Suharto's fall. Ten years into the post-authoritarian era, there are no signs that any of the larger parties will collapse anytime soon.

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The relative longevity of Indonesian parties is due to a mixture of politico-ideological and structural reasons. To begin with, most Indonesian parties are still rooted in distinct social, religious or ideological milieus, and the majority of voters feel reluctant to move between those constituencies. This entrenchment of paradigmatic divisions in Indonesian society has obstructed the internal modernisation of the mainstream parties, but has also been responsible for their institutional persistence. Furthermore, Indonesian law forces parties to establish a nationwide structure down to the sub-district level, strengthening their organisational roots and making it difficult for newcomers to challenge the already established parties.

The stability of the national party system is also reflected in the continuously high voter turn-out. In 1999 and 2004, participation in national elections ranged between 75 and 93 percent, a rate that even consolidated democracies would consider healthy. Even in direct elections for local government heads, in which the



Many Muslim parties in Indonesia suspended their campaign for Sharia law following the failure to pass a constitutional amendment in 2002.

role of the parties is weaker, an average of 69 percent of registered voters took part in the ballots. While these figures are not an endorsement of the party system as such, they indicate that Indonesians deem it important to express support for the party of their choice.

Another factor in the resilience of Indonesian party politics is the almost complete absence of extremist parties that reject the current democratic system. In contrast to the 1950s, when most parties wanted to remove or substantially alter parliamentary democracy (and replace it with either a communist regime, an Islamic state or authoritarian rule), the parties of the post-Suharto era have been strongly supportive of the democratic system. Even the more formalist Muslim parties have suspended their campaign for the introduction of *syariat*, or Islamic law, after their proposal for a constitutional amendment was voted down by an overwhelming majority in 2002. Since then, their politico-ideological orientation has been largely moderate and centripetal, further consolidating the core of the post-authoritarian polity.

Criticism

Despite these positive indicators for a healthy and functioning party system, Indonesians have not held back with their criticism of the parties and their leaders. In opinion polls, political parties have invariably ranked among the institutions considered most corrupt, ineffective and unresponsive, and academic observers have echoed this sentiment with their critiques in seminars, newspapers and booklets.

The disappointment of ordinary Indonesians with their parties is reflected in stunning and unambiguous statistics: more than 1,000 local legislators, almost ten percent of the total number of parliamentarians across Indonesia, have been investigated for corruption since 2004. At the same time, more than 75 percent of Indonesians do not feel a strong sense of emotional attachment to any of the existing parties. In local elections, voters have

mostly opted for independent figures with only superficial ties to their nominating parties. In Aceh – the only province where non-party candidates have thus far been allowed to stand – nominees put forward by established parties suffered a series of crushing defeats.

To be sure, post-Suharto party politics have drawn a large number of rent-seekers, power brokers and opportunists into the centre of Indonesia's new democracy. This is hardly surprising, given that the political parties today hold much more power than at any other time since the 1950s. Through their parliamentarians, the parties have authority over legislation, and through their participation in government, they dominate the executive as well. These extensive powers are too tempting for political and oligarchic operators to ignore.

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However, the problems of Indonesian party politics are not only about the failing morals of politicians. Structural deficiencies and unrealistic societal expectations also play a role. Most importantly, Indonesia has no coherent system of party financing in place. The vast majority of party members pay no membership fees; the small state subsidies to parties were cut by almost 90 percent in 2005; and contributions to parties by entrepreneurs are typically slammed by the media and civil society groups. Accordingly, party boards force their representatives in legislative and

executive institutions to come up with the money needed to run an efficient organisation. Squeezed by their parties, parliamentarians subsequently turn to corruption and rent-seeking to raise fresh funds.

This vicious cycle of political corruption has been aggravated by the populist attitudes in Indonesian society and some circles of the NGO scene. In recent years, it has become a cherished habit for political commentators to decry every attempt by political parties to obtain monetary or institutional resources from the state. In 2007, even the planned acquisition of fax machines and laptops for members of the national parliament created a huge uproar. Similarly, it took ten years of post-Suharto reforms for legislators to be allocated a single research assistant each. While such anti-party critics can be certain of thunderous applause from the public, they have rarely come forward with alternative concepts for proper and transparent funding mechanisms for Indonesia's parties.

Ultimately, the problem of corruption in Indonesian political parties can't be solved without ground-breaking reforms of the party financing system. It would be naïve to believe that parties can simultaneously engage in fund-raising activities, stay away from corrupt practices and be effective vehicles of political representation and aggregation. In the absence of membership contributions and public funding, Indonesia's parties have so far been forced to concentrate on raising money instead of carrying out their functional duties. Indonesian observers and the general public should acknowledge this issue as an institutional defect. In addition, they should recognise that for all their faults, the parties have played a significant role in stabilising the post-authoritarian polity. As Indonesia approaches the 2009 elections, the party system appears reasonably solid, and the introduction of a parliamentary threshold of 2.5 percent for the upcoming polls is likely to make it even more compact and cohesive. Given the vulnerability and ineffectiveness of party systems in other emerging democracies, this is more than Indonesians could have hoped for when they began their journey into an uncertain transition ten years ago.

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Don Lorenzo Diaz Vieira Godinho of Larantuka, Flores, became Raja on 14 September 1887 and was deposed on 1 July 1904. During his reign he was the hope of the local Jesuit mission and often the despair of colonial civil authorities. In the end, as the Dutch leached power from the rajas, Lorenzo's reign marked the end of any pretence of independent power.

Raja Lorenzo II

A Catholic kingdom in the Dutch East Indies

R. H. BARNES

Purchased from the Portuguese in 1859, the small kingdom of Larantuka was one of the very few Catholic realms in the Dutch East Indies. Spread across the islands of Flores, Solor, Adonara and Lembata, it was interspersed irregularly with the holdings of five smaller Muslim kingdoms. Before the Dutch took over, the Rajas of Larantuka regarded themselves as independent monarchs with a tributary relationship to the Portuguese Crown. They were surprised and appalled to be sold.

In contact with Catholicism since the 16th century, the kingdom's Christian minority was guaranteed freedom of conscience by treaty between The Netherlands and Portugal. Dutch Catholic priests were sent to the Christian population in 1860, and within two years the Jesuit Order assumed responsibility. The dealings of the Order's members with successive Rajas of Larantuka often placed them in conflict with civil authorities, particularly regarding the religious practices of those who were not Catholic and the rajas' obligations to them.

The Rajas' line

The royal house of Larantuka claimed descent from the union of a man from the famous south Timor kingdom of Wehale Waiwiku and a woman of mythical origin in the nearby extinct Ili Mandiri volcano (Dietrich 1995). The family were Catholic and spoke a Malay dialect but maintained important customary ties with those they more or less governed, the Lamaholot-speaking peoples whom the Dutch priests usually referred to as the 'mountain people'. Rajas played a central role in their ritual system, including maintaining traditional temples. That system was not Catholic and was thus fiercely opposed by the priests, who were much more purist than their Portuguese predecessors.

For nearly half a century, the title of raja passed consecutively among three brothers. The first, André II, was, like his father Lorenzo I, an opium addict. He left governing to his brothers Don Gaspar, 'a very dangerous subject', and Don Dominggo Ilé (referred to in letters as Mingo), 'a great ranter, but like the Raja himself [he] is enslaved to opium', both of whom, according to the first Dutch priest Jan Sanders, were responsible for several murders. Another brother, Don Quino (Kinu), was said to be the leader of a band of pirates (Laan 1962-1968: 8, 11; Steenbrink 2003: 300). All of the brothers had multiple wives, and Kinu was even married to a Muslim woman (Laan 1962-1968: 19).

André died on Easter Day 1861 and was replaced by Don Gaspar. Locals linked André's death with his efforts to rebuild the traditional temple in Lokea (the centre of Larantuka), which the mountain people wanted but which Sanders opposed because he deemed it a 'house of the devil'. He was shocked to discover that the chief instigator pushing André to rebuild the temple was his brother Mingo, whom Sanders described as a blackguard without equal (Laan 1962-1968: 25, 101). He also said of Mingo that his brother Gaspar called him a *tukang tidur* (expert at sleeping) and liked to slumber half the day. He was, however, fluent in Malay, spoke some of the local language, was pacific and got along with Europeans (Laan 1962-1968: 101).

Their brother Kinu, a mere village head, was heavy, muscular, broad-chested, covered with hair – a 'rough Hercules figure with a Nero head'. 'The Raja Gaspar called this brother *tukang mabuk* [expert at drunkenness]...Another brother seems to have called him a *kuda putih*, a white horse, which people here use for someone who lays treacherous snares and disturbs the peace in the family'. Once, when his half-brother Dominggo (Ence) (not to be confused with Don Mingo above) accompanied Sanders to Konga, Kinu broke into Dominggo's house, fleeing in the face of his family's screams. Dice was one of his favourite pleasures, and he was in no hurry to convert to Christianity (Franssen Report 5, Laan 1962-1968: 101-102). Such was the father of the future Raja Lorenzo II.

Gaspar was brought up by Roman Catholic priests in Dili, Timor, and was therefore 'more intellectually developed than the other rajas' (Humme 1874, Heynen 1876a: 46-47). Heynen (1876a: 15) praised his acumen and memory. Nevertheless, the missionaries were disappointed in Rajas André and Gaspar, both of whom seemed imperfect Christians, too given to supporting heathens. The missionaries had several clashes with them over attempts to rebuild native temples. They placed their hopes instead on Lorenzo, whose father Kinu died at an early, unknown date. Lorenzo was born in July 1859 and baptised ten years later (Laan 1962-1968: 376). He seems to have been educated personally by the first Jesuit priest Gregorius Metz. Lorenzo could understand spoken Dutch and write Malay. Furthermore, he was a more committed Christian and evidently more pliable.

Premature hopes

Expectations ran high for the missionaries after Gaspar died of dysentery at the age of 57 on 24 January 1877, when Lorenzo was only 17 (Laan 1962-1968: 375-376, Ecoma Verstege 1877a). Resident Ch. M. G. A. M. Ecoma Verstege commented at the time, 'according to the general feeling this death cannot be regarded as a loss...he alienated himself from subjects, while he was treated with a sort of disdain by his fellow rulers and neighbours'. Father Metz showed no sign of regret either.

The missionaries felt that Lorenzo, despite his youth, should now become raja. None of the other brothers had produced a male heir and, so far as the mission was concerned, Lorenzo was the only legitimate successor. According to Father Metz, 'On the whole island there is no one better to be found...if he overcomes the difficulties, then things here will take another direction' (Laan 1962-1968: 375). The *provicaris* Josef Lijnen wrote to Bishop Claessens, 'it is to be hoped that the new raja is a man who understands that he must support the work of the ministers instead of breaking away through a heathenish way of life. Should Metz try to get influence over him? I hope so!' (Laan 1962-1968: 375).

Metz did gain influence over him, but things did not turn out as expected. Civil Commissioner E. F. Kleian sent word that the local heads wished to pass over Lorenzo, who was too young to take over the government, which had fallen into decay owing to Gaspar's indolence. Instead, they appointed Gaspar's half-brother Dominggo (Ecoma Verstege 1877b). A shocked Father Metz wrote the Bishop that things, 'definitely against my desires', had taken a completely different course. Metz objected to the fact, as he saw it, that Dominggo was a bastard of Lorenzo I. He had confidentially told two Christians who had the right to vote for raja that they should know the difference between legitimate and illegitimate children (Laan 1962-1968: 396). Later he faced charges of having interfered in government matters, made by Civil Commissioner Kleian to the Resident. 'He did this to besmirch Lorenzo and to get me out of the way', Metz complained. His efforts were in vain, for Dominggo was elected raja. Metz was indignant, 'because now a precedent has been established that there is no difference between a legitimate and an illegitimate child...The new raja sees this himself and now has told me quietly that he accepted the staff, but does not want to hold it longer than is necessary and that he will surrender it to Lorenzo as soon as he is married and comes of age' (Laan 1962-1968: 376).

Metz later wrote hopefully that, 'Our new monarch shows more industry than his predecessor and is according to his own declaration animated with goodwill; I also hope to be convinced of that. If he keeps his word not to reign after Lorenzo reaches his majority, then I am satisfied, otherwise not easily' (Laan 1962-1968: 383). Thus Raja Dominggo began his tenure not only without Metz's full support, but with a degree of his resentment. Metz had an even lower opinion of Civil Commissioner Kleian. 'The new Raja is certainly better than the departed; in my judgement he would be [even] better if we ever had the luck to be freed of Kleian...The Raja is not yet sufficiently self-reliant and dances too much after his [Kleian's] pipes' (Laan 1962-1968: 383).

A raja in waiting

Metz compensated for his disappointment by appointing Lorenzo schoolmaster in his fledgling school, teaching the children reading, writing and arithmetic, singing, and increasing the number of students. 'His affable character and determination make him very suited for it; the children like him very much' (Laan 1962-1968: 371, Laan 1962-1968: 384).

Lorenzo was drawn into a controversy when the hamlet of Lewerang, 'out of fear of the mountain people, and perhaps also out of superstition [and] encouraged by the weakness of the Raja', wanted to erect its temple again. When Metz told Raja Dominggo, he called on the village head and forbade it, but the villagers did not stop, even when Metz himself went there. Dominggo forbade it a second and even a third time, to no effect. Finally, Metz sent Lorenzo to Dominggo, who in turn sent him to Lewerang with the demand that they stop. But he failed, and half an hour later they continued building. Dominggo sent Lorenzo back to take away a drum – which the Raja had perhaps supplied to the temple – and found the mission-educated Doctor Jawa Migel Lobato beating it despite his being repeatedly forbidden to do so (Laan 1962-1968: 401). This episode's outcome is unknown but exemplifies missionary attempts to use Lorenzo to suppress local ritual.

Lorenzo was also drawn into conflicts with traditionalists living in villages behind the Ili Mandiri volcano. Lewoloba's village head threatened Lorenzo's life, plainly because he was seen as the priests' agent, but was murdered before he could follow through (Laan 1962-1968: 451). These events took a serious turn and eventually shook the government's confidence in Raja Dominggo, whom Resident Samuel Roos, in 1882, threatened to depose and replace with the now 23-year-old but as yet unmarried Lorenzo (Laan 507, Roos 1882). Unable to find a suitable wife, Lorenzo sought the mission's assistance. After various false starts, he married in time to replace Dominggo when he died in 1887 (Laan 1962-1968: 663-664).

A change of purpose

Lorenzo made it known that things would be different under his reign. For example, he altered inauguration ceremonies to make them less 'heathen' and more Christian, and punished laxness in religious observations, imposing a one guilder fine on those who missed mass. A month after inauguration he put 20 people in stocks for practicing traditional rituals or superstition (Laan 1962-1968: 686-687). By doing so he was storing up trouble for himself and the priests with the colonial authorities, who thought that freedom of religion guaranteed in the treaty with the Portuguese extended to those the missionaries called 'heathens'. He forbade anyone to make an alliance with any ruler without his permission. In case of war, no one could have anything to do with the Raja's enemies, except to help to restore peace. No one could be judge in his own affairs, not even those in leadership positions. Disputing parties were not permitted to resort to an ordeal in which they or their delegates attempted to outlast each other under water to see who was right. Every subject was required to work. Whoever did not work for ten consecutive days was condemned to forced labour. The alternative to paying a guilder for missing mass or for working on Sunday was five days of forced labour. Anyone caught drunk was arrested. No one could become a debt slave. No children or servants could be sold. Leaders and dignitaries always had to be decently dressed; since all those they ruled over also wanted to pass as being distinguished, this regulation resulted in no one going about half-naked anymore (Laan 1962-1968: 687-688).

In 1888 Lorenzo made a serious political misstep in a matter from which he might have held himself aloof, when he allowed himself to be drawn into a dispute between the Muslim Rajas of Lamahala and Adonara. This led Resident G. G. de Villeneuve to threaten to depose him (Laan 1962-1968: 728; for details, see Dietrich 1989: 66-67). In 1889 de Villeneuve wrote unfavourable reports about priests on Flores, which Bishop Claessens rebutted with a long defence. On a visit in April the Resident, accompanied by Kleian, asked Lorenzo why he was forcing people to attend mass under threat of a penalty and why he had not rebuilt the temple in Lokea. Lorenzo answered that he had rebuilt the temple, replacing a small roofless



Figure 1: Crown Prince Lorenzo aged 12, drawing from a photograph taken in Surabaya, ca. 1871 (Heynen 1876b: 64-65).

building with a much larger building and a meeting house, where 100 mountain people could overnight. Furthermore, he claimed, the mountain people were more satisfied with the new buildings. However, when the Resident said that the Raja must officiate in making sacrifices in the heathen manner – which to the dismay of the priests his predecessors willingly did – Lorenzo refused (Laan 1962-1968: 780).

De Villeneuve retired and his successor W. C. Hoogkamer smoothed things over. The Raja was permitted to continue to levy fines for failing to attend mass and for marriage outside the church, and he did not have to erect a temple (the building Lorenzo claimed he had erected actually might not have counted in local eyes as a temple). Nevertheless, Hoogkamer also told the priests that Lorenzo should think more about his obligations to the Dutch and less about his rights. 'He is not an independent ruler' (Laan 1962-1968: 813-818).

Lorenzo's fall

Lorenzo began to show traits not just of independence, but waywardness. Complaints were made in 1894 that his agents were attempting to extract taxes in territory belonging to the Raja of Sikka (Laan 1962-1968: 969-971). In that year, too, Lorenzo led an army of 500 to Maumere (Steenbrink 2003: 146-147). The same charges were then repeated four years later (Laan 1962-1968: 1033). He executed a relative whose supporters had attacked him, further displeasing the government (Barnes 2005: 9, Laan 1962-1968: 1036-1041). Father Frencken charged that Lorenzo had repeatedly committed adultery, brought false charges against his subjects, exiled some and imposed exorbitant fines on others who moreover were innocent. Many fled to safety with the priests. The people and then the priests began to think that Lorenzo had gone crazy (Laan 1962-1968: 1065-1071, Steenbrink 2003: 93). Next he tried to get some of the heads of mountain villages to take the refugees from the priests by force, where they were formally on government land. Resident J. Vijzelaar asked Frencken to submit a report of the charges against Lorenzo, which Frencken did. It soon caused Lorenzo much damage (Laan 1962-1968: 1079-1087, Verbaal 21 April 1906. No. 55).

Disputes in Sikka continued, and in September 1902 Lorenzo intervened with 1,000 troops (Koloniaal Verslag 1903: 103-104, Laan 1962-1968: 1123-1130). Meanwhile, difficulties were developing on Adonara, in particular a war in east Adonara in which the civil authorities thought Lorenzo was deeply implicated (Barnes 2005). They responded by deposing and exiling him to Java in 1904, where he died November 1910.

Historically, Lorenzo's reign was the last time a raja of Larantuka could try to claim any degree of independent sovereignty. His fall marked the beginning of a move toward a 20th century form of bureaucratic administration shaped by a militarily and financially much more powerful Dutch East Indies in which those local rajas who remained in office increasingly served only as figureheads. In the Flores region, the process was completed in 1960, when the national authorities eliminated the last remnants of the 'feudal' power structure that the Republic inherited from the Dutch, by abolishing the office of raja. Summing up the consequences of the fall of Lorenzo II, Steenbrink writes, 'With the deposition of Lorenzo II in 1904 the dream of a Catholic kingdom came to an end' (Steenbrink 2003: 99). In contrast to the kingdom, however, Catholicism flourished in the 20th century, and its leaders frequently found it easier to cooperate with civil authorities than their predecessors had in the 19th century (Steenbrink 2007: 81). Many of the underlying cultural and religious issues remain current, however, in the 21st century.

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Southeast Asia is the cradle of betel-chewing. Used as a stimulant and to treat minor ills, the custom spread from Southeast Asian islands to mainland Vietnam probably around the first millennium B.C. Thailand seemingly received the practice from neighbouring countries to the west. These two main regional actors influenced Laos and Cambodia. Our decade-long research and observation, which intensified in 2002-04 and 2006-07, delved into this declining but storied tradition.

Betel-chewing in mainland Southeast Asia

NGUYỄN XUÂN HIÊN AND P. A. REICHAERT

Betel-chewing goes way back. Areca nut and betel leaf are its two crucial components, born by the areca palm tree and betel vine, respectively. The areca palm tree was domesticated somewhere in the Malaysian archipelago. While excavations of ancient archaeological sites have never turned up betel vine or leaf remains, human skeletons bearing evidence of betel-chewing, dated to about 3,000 B.C., have been found in Duyong Cave in the Philippines. At Spirit Cave in north-west Thailand C. F. Gorman found carbonised areca-like grains carbon-14-dated to 7,000-5,500 B.C. (1970: 98), but their domesticity needs to be scientifically confirmed (C. F. Gorman, personal communication to Hiên, 1978).

Hailing from a time closer to ours, the Vietnamese folktale 'The Story of the Betel and the Areca Nut' is well known all over the world and quoted in publica-

tions on betel-chewing. Until 2004, it was believed that this was the only betel-chewing-related folktale in existence, with multiple versions adapted from its original source, *Linh Nam chích quái liệt truyện* (*Collection of Extraordinary Tales from Linh Nam*, hand-written version, 1695). But a careful screening of ancient and modern literature written in *chữ Nho*,¹ *chữ Nôm*,² *chữ Quốc Ngữ* (*chữ Việt*),³ French, English and German from the 11th century to the present led to a wonderful discovery: the tale is actually only one of a series of six different types on the motif 'The Origin of the Betel Chewing Custom'. The five other types are less popular, and each one presents its characters differently. All are told by the Việt ethnic group, while seven other ethnicities (Dao, Tày and Tháy in the north, Co, Katu, Sedang in central Vietnam and the Khmer in the south) contribute their own folktales on the same motif.


Moreover, folktales about other motifs related to betel-chewing were also dis-



Traditional lime tube from Thailand (P. A. Reichart).



Traditional lime pot from Vietnam (Nguyễn Xuân Hiên).



Typical cancer risk of betel chewers (P. A. Reichart).



Areca nut

covered, such as 'The Monk Turned into a Lime Pot', 'The Novice Turned into a Spittoon' and a tale about the specific way the Vietnamese prepare betel rolls, 'Why Do We Use a Tip-cut-off Betel Leaf?'. In addition, we found nine tale variants with details and/or episodes concerning the areca tree, betel-vine, betel quid and quid remains. Betel-chewing peoples are familiar with at least some of this rich folktale tradition. All of the tales share the same clear impact of Buddhism, as their characters experience endless incarnation, enlightenment.

Betel basics

Betel quid composition varies from place to place, but its core elements remain the same and consist of three components: the betel leaf, the areca nut and slaked lime. In northern Thailand, and to a lesser extent in Laos and Cambodia, dried areca grain is used in place of the fresh areca nut that is popular in other areas. White lime is popular in north and central Vietnam, while coloured (mainly pink) lime can be found in betel-chewing areas throughout mainland Southeast Asia. Tobacco is sometimes added to betel quid and the geographic distribution of its use is supposedly linked to coloured lime use. The manufactured ready-to-chew variety (usually sold under the name *pan masala*) is unknown in Southeast Asia, except in southern China.

Every betel chewer has to use certain tools to prepare his betel quid: a cutter or knife to cut the areca nut into quarters and a container for slaked lime. A complete betel service includes up to five components in Laos and Cambodia-areca cutter, lime tube, betel box, spittoon and betel mortar and nine in Vietnam-areca knife, lime pot, bronze betel box, wooden betel box, spittoon, betel bag, lime tube, betel mortar, betel cloth/towel. Betel service style and materials differ largely from country to

country. Handicraft skills, patterns, and decorative motifs depend on local history and culture.

Lime containers in mainland Southeast Asia can be divided into two types: lime tubes in Thailand, Cambodia and Laos, were made of bronze or silver with a stupa-shaped lid, richly decorated and never taller than 15 cm; lime pots in Vietnam were made of ceramic or porcelain (or, very rarely, of bronze, silver or gold), shaped like the areca nut or a globe and stylistically glazed. The latter type is divided into two sub-types: one has a curved handle (north and south Vietnam) and the other has a nodule-shaped handle (in central Vietnam, where Champa influence still exists). A round spatula hole is also a main characteristic of Vietnamese lime pots, and some are decorated with calligraphic poems. Some Vietnamese lime pots were actually made in China or England.

The Buddhist sects strongly influenced lime container shape and design. In Thailand, Cambodia and Laos, where the Theravada sect attracted major followers, the tube lid was stupa-shaped. In Vietnam, where the Mahayana sect was strongest and pagodas didn't include a tower, the potters chose to make their products in the shape of the areca nut. Today these once popular lime containers have totally disappeared from daily life. Collectors seek out ancient lime tubes and pots, while fake pots are made with a modern design and reserved for foreigners.

In Thailand, and to a lesser degree in Cambodia and Laos, areca cutters were developed in several forms and shapes, especially in royal courts and aristocratic families of dethroned dynasties. Nowadays, these highly decorated cutters have disappeared and been replaced by ordinary but sharp knives. In Vietnam, where areca cutters were unknown, areca knives



Betel nut stand in Burma

became smaller and the blade thinner and sharper owing to technological advances. In the Bangkok suburbs, the Sam Sen market is famous for different commodities from Vietnam. The market is located in the former *làng Gia Long* (Gia Long village), where at the end of the 18th century Prince Nguyễn Ánh (who later became King Gia Long) twice sought refuge and local villagers are still called (pejoratively) *yan Sam Sen*. The betel service there expresses some Vietnamese characteristics, such as an areca knife in place of an areca cutter.

Roll me a quid

Betel roll preparation was highly developed in traditional Vietnamese society. A. Landes has called it 'the great art' and said that 'not everyone can prepare a quid that meets all requirements and only highly skilled ladies from *une bonne maison* can do it'.⁴

Nowadays the casual quid is popular and chewers don't care about skillful prepara-

tion. However, the special quid named *trầu cánh phượng* (betel quid in the shape of phoenix wings) is highly appreciated in rituals, wedding ceremonies, religious festivities, and sometimes daily offerings to the ancestors altar or Spirit house. This kind of betel can be prepared in multiple ways and it's not easy to decide which is the most elegant and attractive. The betel quid's ritual role in such ceremonies has evolved to a level of such importance that even younger generations, whether living in the homelands or abroad, accept it.

In mainland China, Hu-nan Province, the young generation has been influenced by the new Taiwanese custom of betel-chewing and uses something similar to *pan masala*. This despite the fact that the Han majority group did not chew betel for centuries. On the other hand, in Yu-nan Province, near the Vietnam border, home to many people of the Tai ethnic group (Tai Hoa Yu branch), areca palm trees that once provided nuts for chewing are now

only decorative, because the chewing custom is disliked among the young. The Vietnamese enclave of Jiang-bin District, in Kwuan-xi Province, is home to 19,000 Chinese- and Vietnamese-speaking inhabitants (as of 2004). According to a local folk song, they moved from the Đổ Sơn area (which today is a commune in Hải Phòng City) to Jiang-bin in 1511. While another age-old custom, the consumption of fish sauce (*nước mắm*, a typical Vietnamese sauce), has attained new popularity, betel-chewing is in decline. The elderly still chew it, but only in moderation.

Forever or nevermore? Custom versus cancer

For centuries, people saw betel-chewing as a useful and elegant custom, as the following quotation attests: 'When betel is chewed, hunger and thirst are inhibited and energy-requiring activities decrease in energy consumption. It generates a pleasant, bittersweet taste and stimulates in mild fashion the mind and the spirit, being

able to freshen and sweeten the breath and to cleanse the mouth' (Đỗ Thiện 1914: 243).⁵ But recent research reveals numerous high risks and side effects. The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC 2004), in its *Betel-quid and Areca-nut Chewing*, states that there is sufficient evidence in humans of the carcinogenicity of betel quid without tobacco, which causes oral cancer, and of betel quid with tobacco, which causes oral cancer and cancer of the pharynx and oesophagus. Areca nut alone is also carcinogenic to humans. Cancer-screening conducted by P. A. Reichart revealed many cases of oral cancer/pre-cancer in elderly chewers throughout the region. Risk prevalence among various age groups still must be determined. Betel-chewing has declined by various degrees throughout the region, though no religion forbids its followers from chewing betel. At the beginning of the 20th century, 80-90% of the population practiced it; today no more than 5% do. It appears betel-chewing prevalence in Vietnam is still

higher than in neighbouring countries, as statistical data reveals a stable old guard of chewers, but only time will tell how long that will last. The presence of betel and areca in rituals, however, seemingly flourishes everywhere: among majority and minority ethnicities, from Vietnam in the east to Thailand in the west. Sustained by religion, spirituality and fashion, and posing less of a health risk than tobacco, we hope that the ceremonial and ritual use of betel will endure.

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
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Notes

- 1 *Chữ Nho* is an old Vietnamese script that uses Chinese characters but with different pronunciation, grammar and syntax; it is not a kind of 'WYW is WYS'.
- 2 *Chữ Nôm* is a Vietnamese script that was modified from the *chữ Nho* and represented the language of people on the street; it is a kind of 'WYW is WYS'.
- 3 *Chữ Quốc Ngữ* = *Chữ Việt* is the current script of the Vietnamese, based on Latin characters.
- 4 Landes, A. 1885. 'Contes et légendes annamites : Histoire de con Tầm et de con Cám'. *Excursions et Reconnaissances* 9-22: 363.
- 5 Đỗ Thiện. 1914. *La coutume de chique du bétel*. Hanoi: F. H. Schneider.

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During a recent visit to China, Bob van der Linden read Gao Xingjiang's novels: *Soul Mountain* (1990) and *One Man's Bible* (1999). In 2000, Gao was the first Chinese ever to receive the Nobel Prize in Literature. Yet, few of the Chinese van der Linden met knew of Gao's existence and were surprised to hear that a Chinese had won this prestigious prize. In this essay he looks at why Gao's work is banned in a country which annually regrets the absence of Chinese among the Nobel Prize winners and, with the 2008 Olympics just months away, is so eager for international recognition as a world civilisation and power.

Individuality, literature and censorship: *Gao Xingjiang and China*

BOB VAN DER LINDEN

Gao Xingjiang's own life story provided the inspiration for his novels and it certainly remains amazing. Born in 1940, he studied French in Beijing and subsequently became a professional French and English translator (of Samuel Beckett for example). His career as a writer began in the 1960s but he burned all his early manuscripts at the height of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) for fear that they could be used as evidence against him and might make his life in the countryside (where he was sent for 're-education' during the 1970s) even worse. As a member of the Chinese Association of Writers, Gao visited Europe (Paris) for the first time in 1979. One year later, he became a screenwriter and playwright for the Beijing's People's Art Theatre and subsequently gained a reputation as a pioneer of absurdist drama. Gao was the first to introduce the latest developments in literary theory and practice to the Chinese public and to redefine China's literary heritage, so it was apposite to the times. His public criticism of the Chinese government, however, brought him under state scrutiny. Consequently, when he visited Europe again in 1987, he decided to live in exile in Paris. He took French citizenship and sustained himself successfully as a painter. Following the publication of his political play about the Tiananmen Square massacre, *Fugitives* (1989), the Chinese government banned his work (which ever since has been published in Hong Kong and Taiwan).

A meditation on the human spirit

In 1983, Gao was arrested and faced being sent to a prison farm. His plans to leave Beijing for southwest China became concrete following a misdiagnosis with lung cancer. Having confronted death, this experience left him feeling reborn and he resolutely decided to live life to the full. He began a 5-month journey from Beijing to Sichuan province and from there followed the Yangtze-river to the coast. His flight became the basis for *Soul Mountain*, which equally can be read as a meditation on the human spirit confronted with societal oppression. As his English translator, Mabel Lee (University of Sydney), writes in the introduction to the book:

Soul Mountain is a literary response to the devastation of the self of the individual by the primitive human urge for the warmth and security of an other, or others, in other words by socialized life. The existence of an other resolves the problem of loneliness but brings with it anxieties for the individual, for inherent in any relationship is, inevitably, some form of power struggle. This is the existential dilemma confronting the individual, in relationships with parents, partners, family, friends and larger collective groups. Human history abounds with cases of the individual being induced by force or ideological persuasion to submit to the power of the collective; the surrender of the self to the collective eventually becomes habit, norm convention and tradition, and this phenomenon is not unique to any one culture.

The novel is full of melancholy for the past (stories from ancient Chinese history, visits to temples, monasteries, archaeological sites etc.) as well as for the 'authentic' and 'exotic' ('dirty' folks songs, rituals, shamans etc.), which Gao finds particularly among the ethnic minority peoples. On the whole, *Soul Mountain* deals with a world that, according to the author, was much destroyed during the Cultural Revolution and will be even more so in the near future, by, for example, the Three Gorges Dam in the Yangtze and by the ever-growing presence of the Han Chinese who today are to be found everywhere 'there is money to be made' (pp.242-3). Also revealing in this context is Gao's description of the few remaining pandas wandering through southwest China's ever shrinking forests wearing electronic transmitters.

Somewhat confusingly, the characters in Gao's novels are singular pronouns. Thus in *Soul Mountain* the authorial self is dissected into 'I', 'you', 'she' and 'he', who together make up the protagonist, while in *One Man's Bible* 'you' stands for the contemporary exiled author and 'he' for the author at the time of the Cultural Revolution. *One Man's Bible* is located in 1996 Hong Kong, where the protagonist (the author) is present for the staging of one of his plays. The narrative, addressed to his current German-Jewish lover, is a fictionalised account of the author's youth and, above all, of the Kafkaesque anxieties of the Cultural Revolution, during which Gao played the three different roles of political activist, victim and silent observer. Undeniably these experiences made him into the individual writer he is. As he puts it himself:

You absolutely refuse to be a sacrifice, refuse to be a plaything or a sacrificial object for others, refuse to seek compassion from others, refuse to repent, refuse to go mad and trample everyone else to death. You look upon the world with a mind that is the epitome of ordinariness, and in exactly the same way you look at yourself. Nothing inspires fear, amazement, disappointment, or wild expectation, hence, you avoid frustration. If you want to enjoy being upset, you get upset, then revert to this supremely ordinary, smiling, and contented you (p. 198).



The fate of the writer in exile

For Gao Xingjiang literature can only be the voice of the solitary individual writing in exile, away from the harsh daily political reality:

His sense of writing in exile came particularly to the fore when, in his earlier mentioned play *Fugitives*, he chose to portray the 1989 student protest movement (which led to the Tiananmen Square massacre) as naïve rather than heroic. This naturally led to criticism from the students but at least he remained true to his commitment to literary truth above politics and showed no illusions about changing the world through his writings. All the same, I wonder if Gao (like the well-known intellectual and political activist Edward Said) does not confuse his living and writing in exile with 'the actual state of every critical humanist in opposition to the professional expert who serves power while pretending detachment' (Linden 2007). As he also wrote himself in relation to this:

When writing is not a livelihood or when one is so engrossed in writing that one forgets why one is writing and for whom one is writing it becomes a necessity and one will write compulsively and give birth to literature. It is this non-utilitarian aspect of literature that is fundamental to literature. That the writing of literature has become a profession is an ugly outcome of the division of labour in modern society and a very bitter fruit for the writer (Xingjian 2000).

In his Nobel Lecture, *The Case for Literature*, Gao emphasises that despite being an atheist, he always has had 'reverence for the unknowable' (Xingjian 2000). Literature has a spiritual value for him and, accordingly, the search for the 'soul mountain' is a metaphor for all spiritual striving. Though, unlike Tan Twan Eng in his brilliant debut *The Gift of Rain* (Eng 2007), Gao's novels do not have predestination, as opposed to free will, as a major theme, there certainly exhibit a sense of fate. This is, in part, because his detached writing style, with pronouns functioning as characters, reflects his notion of the individual in exile. Alternately, in Eng's novel the theme of predestination (i.e. the spiritual East!) together with the 'exotic' setting of colonial Malaya intentionally gather to the Western market. In contrast, Gao's mourning for the 'authentic' (in denunciation of progress and practicality) and overall spirituality (if not acceptance of fate) in *Soul Mountain* seem more in line with the current Romantic but 'imperial gaze' among the (mostly young) Han Chinese towards the country's ethnic minority peoples than with a conscious commercial choice.

Lost in translation?

Towards the end of *Soul Mountain*, Gao Xingjian writes:

Because of his use of pronouns as characters, numerous details from Chinese history and culture, philosophical 'excursions' etc., Gao's novels (and especially *Soul Mountain*) are not easy to read. One also wonders how much got lost in the no doubt excellent translations by Mabel Lee and to what extent these novels should be read in Chinese to be fully appreciated. Be that as it may, in English one can already sense the uniqueness of Gao's autobiographical fiction. Hopefully his novels will soon be available in China, for any world civilisation should at least allow a niche for a creative individual in search of new developments in language.

Bob van der Linden is an historian of modern South Asia and the author of *Moral Languages from Colonial Punjab: the Singh Sabhas, Arya Samaj and Ahmadiyahs* (New Delhi: Manohar 2008). Contact: vanderlinden.bob@gmail.com

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"This is not a novel!"

"Then what is it?" he asks.

"A novel must have a complete story."

He says he has told many stories, some with endings and others without.

"They're all fragments without any consequence, the author doesn't know how to organize connected episodes."

[...]

"No matter how you tell a story, there must be a protagonist. In a long work of fiction there must be several important characters, but this work of yours...?"

"But surely the I, you, she and he in the book are characters?" he asks.

"These are just different pronouns to change the point of view of the narrative. This can't replace the portrayal of characters. These pronouns of yours, even if they are characters, don't have clear images they're hardly described at all."

He says he isn't painting portraits (p. 452-3).

The so-called writer is nothing more than someone speaking or writing and whether he is listened to or read is for others to choose. The writer is not a hero acting on orders from the people nor is he worthy of worship as an idol, and certainly he is not a criminal or enemy of the people. He is at times victimised along with his writings simply because of other's needs. When the authorities need to manufacture a few enemies to divert people's attention, writers become sacrifices and worse still writers who have been duped actually think it is a great honour to be sacrificed (Xingjian 2000).

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
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
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
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
After Alexander: Central Asia Before Islam

Edited by Joe Cribb & Georgina Herrmann
Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press. 2008
ISBN 978 0 19 726384 6

This is a new study of the history, archaeology and numismatics of Central Asia, an area of great significance for our understanding of the ancient and early medieval world. This vast, land-locked region, with its extreme continental climate, was a centre of civilisation with great metropolises. Its cosmopolitan population followed different religions (Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Buddhism), and traded extensively with China, India, the Middle East, and Europe. The millennium from the overthrow of the first world empire of Achaemenian Persians by Alexander the Great to the arrival of the Arabs and Islam was a period of considerable change and conflict.

The volume focuses on recent investigations in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. It provides a complex analysis of the symbiosis between the city life based on oases, and the nomadic peoples grazing their animals in the surrounding semi-deserts. Other topics include the influence of the Greek colonists on military architecture, and the major impact of the Great Kushans on the spread of Buddhism and on the development of the Central Asian metropolis. And although written documents rarely survive, coinage has provided essential evidence for the political and cultural history of the region.

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The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis


By Yoichi Funabashi
Brookings Institution Press. 2007.
ISBN 978 0 8157 3010 1

In October 2002 the United States confronted North Korea with suspicions that Pyongyang was enriching uranium in violation of the Agreed Framework that the nations had worked out during the Clinton administration. North Korea subsequently evicted international monitors and resumed its nuclear weapons program. The Peninsula Question chronicles the resulting second Korean nuclear crisis.

Japanese journalist Yoichi Funabashi, informed by interviews with more than 160 diplomats and decision makers from China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States, provides a behind-the-scenes look at the negotiations to denuclearize

the peninsula. Between 2002 and 2006, a series of top level diplomats, including the prime minister of Japan, attempted to engage with North Korea. Funabashi illustrates how the individual efforts of these major powers laid the groundwork for multilateral negotiations, first as the trilateral meeting and then as the Six-Party Talks. The first four rounds of talks (2003-2005) resulted in significant progress. Unfortunately, a lack of implementation after that breakthrough ultimately led to North Korea's missile tests in July and subsequent nuclear tests in October 2006.

The Peninsula Question provides a window of understanding on the historical, geopolitical, and security concerns at play on the Korean peninsula since 2002. Offering multiple perspectives on the second Korean nuclear crisis, it describes more than just the U.S. and North Korean points of view. It pays special attention to China's dealings with North Korea, providing rare insights into the decision-making processes of Beijing. This is an important, authoritative resource for understanding the crisis in Korea and diplomacy in Northeast Asia.



The Afterlife of Images: Translating the Pathological Body between China and the West.


By Larissa N. Heinrich
Duke University Press. 2008.
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In 1739 China's emperor authorised the publication of a medical text that included images of children with smallpox to aid in the diagnosis and treatment of the disease. Those images made their way to Europe, where they were interpreted as indicative of the ill health and medical backwardness of the Chinese. In the mid-19th century, the celebrated Cantonese painter Lam Qua collaborated with the American medical missionary Peter Parker in the creation of portraits of Chinese patients with disfiguring pathologies, rendered both before and after surgery. Europeans saw those portraits as evidence of

Western medical prowess. Within China, the visual idiom that the paintings established influenced the development of medical photography. In *The Afterlife of Images*, Larissa N. Heinrich investigates the creation and circulation of Western medical discourses that linked ideas about disease to Chinese identity beginning in the 18th century.

Combining literary studies, the history of science, and visual culture studies, Heinrich analyses the rhetoric and iconography through which medical missionaries transmitted to the West an image of China as "sick" or "diseased." She also examines the absorption of that image back into China through missionary activity, through the earliest translations of Western medical texts into Chinese, and even through the literature of Chinese nationalism. Heinrich argues that over time "scientific" Western representations of the Chinese body and culture accumulated a host of secondary meanings, taking on an afterlife with lasting consequences for conceptions of Chinese identity in China and beyond its borders.

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
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
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Thomas Voorter
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Schaedler, Luc. 2005. *Angry Monk: Reflections on Tibet*. Zurich: Angry Monk Productions. 97 min. English, German, French and Tibetan.

Rebel with a cause: debunking the mythical mystical Tibet

MARA MATTA

In May 2003 I heard that a documentary was being made about the famous Tibetan monk Gendun Choephel (in Tibetan, dGe 'dun Chos 'phel). I was in Dharamsala, India, interviewing Tibetan filmmakers who were producing the first Tibetan feature films to challenge the stereotyped Tibet conveyed by Hollywood. The Tibetan scholar Tashi Tsering told me about director Luc Schaedler's painstaking effort and research: he'd travelled throughout Asia for many years to collect information about Choephel and interview people who had known him and scholars who had been researching this controversial figure now so popular among intellectuals and Tibetan youngsters as an incarnation of the rebellious spirit of 'Tibetanness'. As Schaedler says:

*'While their parents lost Tibet, the younger generation looked for role models that would allow a critical view of their own society. But the western world only slowly became aware of Choephel because his life story doesn't mesh with our rigid image of Tibet, which prefers to portray Tibetans as victims rather than the makers of their own history.'*¹

A best-selling New Age commodity

The long history of Tibet's cinematic representation intersects with politics, power and diplomacy. Perhaps no film can claim to be an objective portrayal of a civilisation, but filming in Tibet in particular was never a neutral act of documenting the culture. In the 1920s the British sent their first missions to Mount Everest and experienced the great difficulty of shooting film in Tibet. Apart from being 'tremendously expensive', there was the 'ever-present temptation to heighten the incident, to stage effects, to compete with the product of the studio, and thereby to increase its value as a public entertainment, but ruin it as a sincere record of events'.² Tibetans themselves, however, were aware of the need to negotiate the cinematic representation of their culture and religious traditions in ways that clearly challenged the assumption that Tibetans had always been victims of the Orientalistic view without having any real agency in it. As Peter Hansen states, '...the Everest expeditions redefined the power of Orientalism, the power to represent the Other, as the possession of both British and Tibetans'.³

This fiercely negotiated relationship must be taken into account when viewing Schaedler's 'Angry Monk: Reflections on Tibet', especially when comparing it to the many other films and documentaries on Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism in particular.⁴ Schaedler himself claims that his film is meant to counter those documentaries 'full of admiration for the monasteries, for the lamaism and also for the nomadic society which has been celebrated as a remnant of an age-old, intact culture'.⁵ Such attitudes have strongly affected the Western vision: Tibet as fairy-land, mystical kingdom, a lost paradise to be rediscovered, saved and preserved as an antidote to the Western materialistic way of life is a paradigm that has flattened the complex history of this ancient civilisation.


While Spencer Chapman described the Tibetan nomads in Lhasa in 1937 as 'attractive-looking people' and 'proud sunburnt men with a faraway look in their eyes',⁶ Hollywood was releasing Frank Capra's 'Lost Horizon', which created the long-lasting myth of Tibet as Shangri-La. During the last 70 years hardly any film challenged this mythical view. If, as claimed by the Tibetan writer Jamyang Norbu, 'Hollywood, more than anyone else, could perhaps be held responsible for foisting the 'magic and mystery' image of Tibet',⁷ Tibetans themselves must also take responsibility for helping to nurture it. The images of a victimised Tibet and endangered culture that must be saved from the ravages of the Chinese have become best-selling New Age commodities.

Leaving out the West and the Dalai Lama to focus on one monk's struggle to tell the truth

This is the current perception against which Schaedler's film must be viewed. When screened in Rome in November 2006, at the seventh annual 'Asiatica Film Mediale', I was curious not only to watch the film but to see the audience's reaction. Interestingly, the festival director chose to screen the film last and not on the same day as the three other Tibet-related films. In previous days, John Bush's documentary 'Vajra Sky Over Tibet', Liliana Cavani's 'Milarepa' (1974) and the Tibetan lama Neten Chokling Rinpoche's 'Milarepa' (2006) were shown, preceded by introductions to Tibetan Buddhism and Milarepa and followed by a discussion with an audience keen to know about the history of a 'holy' Tibet. When I

heard the same old stories being told, I thought back to the much more conflicted audience reaction to the Tibetan filmmaker Pema Dondhup's 'We're No Monks' presented in Naples and Rome in 2004. That film portrays the anger and frustration of exiled young Tibetans, one of whom resorts to terrorism and finally becomes a suicide bomber. Part of the audience reacted very strongly to what they regarded as an act that could not possibly be committed by a representative of the 'peaceful Tibetans' and vented their anger at the director, accusing him of misrepresenting his own culture, which was for them the last hope for world peace.

'Angry Monk' also raised a great deal of interest but not the same degree of criticism and denial. I assume it's been far more difficult for a general audience to criticise a film presented as historical fact. Following the arc of Choephel's life, the audience is drawn into the complexities of recent Tibetan history, with all its contradictions and unsolved issues. Choephel wanted to challenge the political power of the conservative clergy by writing the first historical account of Tibet that would not rely on a Buddhist interpretation of historical facts. In 1946, on his return to Lhasa from a decade of travels in India and Sri Lanka which exposed him to new cultures and ideas and deeply affected his thought and behaviour Choephel



was imprisoned by the conservative Tibetan authorities on trumped up charges of counterfeiting and treason. Toni Huber points out that 'it is certain his detention was motivated by the Tibetan elite's fears of his newly made progressive political connections, and perhaps more so by his outspoken criticisms against the traditional government and monastic system and the jealousy of enemies he had made within it'.⁸ He was released from Nangtse Shak Prison in May 1949, but took to drink and cigarettes and his health deteriorated. He never fully recovered and passed away in 1951, at 47 years old. His historical book, *The White Annals* (in Tibetan, *Deb ther dkar po*), despite being left unfinished, became a reference for all research on Tibetan history.

Alternating archival footage with interviews and images of contemporary life, Schaedler succeeds in producing a fairly balanced account of this controversial figure. Although he has been accused of using 'Choephel's life as a metaphor to drive [his own] view on the politics of Tibet',⁹ the director is justified in his opinion that the film is not a 'purely biographical film on Gendun Choephel, but he serves as a key to the understanding of the history and the complex present of Tibet'. His choice to exclude his interviews with Western Tibetologists and the Dalai Lama might be

questioned, but the film's credibility doesn't suffer for it. Rather, by concentrating on one key historical figure instead of trying to exhaust the intricate subject of recent Tibetan cultural history within a mere two-hour film, it sets an example for future documentaries, highlighting the need to present a more complex and better researched image of Tibetan culture.

The art of demystification: digesting the indigestible

As Tibetan cinema is beginning to flourish in the Diaspora, with more young Tibetans turning to filmmaking as a professional career, there is a risk that this new trend might be used to foster what Klieger calls 'indigenous Tibetan hyperreality...created from a conscious and selective presentation of self to an audience with highly conditioned expectations'.¹⁰ He says the Tibetan culture presented in the West is indeed 'idealized, homogenated [sic] and pasteurized' to the extent that any challenge to this conventional image is deemed indigestible.

Though no less challenging, 'Angry Monk' may be easier to swallow. It's a thought-provoking film that introduces the Western public to a new way of looking at Tibet as a real country with a complex history and a far less mystical reality than they may have thought or hoped for. Less idealised, Tibet emerges as a land of intricacies where Buddhism sometimes contributed to a certain deal of obscurantism. While the film enlightens the general public, it could also be an excellent didactic tool in university courses and seminars. It would be truly disappointing if even now the same forces that imprisoned Choephel would once again hide reality, discarding it in favour of the mystified image so welcome in the West. Schaedler's film is a non-conformist representation that follows in Choephel's rebellious steps to debunk such myths as misrepresentations.

Mara Matta,

a freelance writer and researcher, holds a PhD in Southeast Asian Studies from the Università degli Studi di Napoli 'L' Orientale', Naples, Italy. mattamara@yahoo.it

Notes

- 1 See 'Angry Monk: Reflections on Tibet' Press Kit at <<http://www.angrymonkthefilm.ch/en/press/>>.
- 2 January 1923. 'The Mount Everest Kinematograph Film'. *The Geographical Journal* 61-1: 48-51.
- 3 Hansen, Peter. 1966. 'The Dancing Lamas of Everest: Cinema, Orientalism, and Anglo-Tibetan Relations in the 1920s'. *The American Historical Review* 101-3: 744.
- 4 Grunfeld, Tom. Last updated 10 January 2008. 'Films and Videos on Tibet'. <<http://www1.esc.edu/personalfac/tgrunfeld/>>.
- 5 Op. cit., 'Angry Monk...'
- 6 Chapman, F. Spencer. 1938. 'Lhasa in 1937'. *The Geographical Journal* 91-6: 501.
- 7 Norbu, Jamyang. Continually updated. 'Cinema and Tibet: A Brief Historical Overview'. <http://www.freespiritfestival.com/film/articles/jamyang_norbu_cinema_and_tibet.html>.
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- 9 Voynar, Kim. 2006. 'Angry Monk: Reflections on Tibet'. *Sundance Review*. <<http://www.cinematical.com/2006/01/19/sundance-review-angry-monk-reflections-on-tibet/>>.
- 10 Klieger, Christiaan. 1997. 'Shangri-La and Hyperreality: A Collision in Tibetan Refugee Expression'. Korom, Franz J., ed. *Tibetan Culture in the Diaspora, Papers presented at a Panel of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Graaz 1995*. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 67.

Lambert-Hurley, Siobhan. 2007. *Muslim Women, Reform and Princely Patronage: Nawab Sultan Jahan Begum of Bhopal*. London and New York: Routledge, 256 pages. ISBN 978 0 415 40192 0.

Lifting up women without lifting the veil: an early 20th century Muslim women's movement in colonial India

KARUNA SHARMA

In the 19th and 20th centuries, the central Indian Muslim state of Bhopal was led by a succession of Begums, or high-ranking Muslim women. Siobhan Lambert-Hurley's *Muslim Women, Reform and Princely Patronage*, an account of Indian Muslim women's first attempts to secure their own education and rights, tells the story of perhaps the most important one, Nawab Sultan Jahan Begum.

Though Sultan Jahan's reform movement began among the elite of Bhopali society, her ideas on women's autonomy eventually transcended community and class boundaries. Interestingly, she was quite conservative compared to other Muslim socio-religious reformers in India and other Muslim countries. Her Muslim identity evolved as she progressed in her educational reforms. She wore the veil and didn't criticise purdah, yet upheld women's rational search for self through discipline, education and a thorough understanding of their rights (as written in the Koran). Because many Islamic injunctions are interpretable, she envisioned programmes befitting women's autonomy according to her own understanding of Islam and strengthened by certain colonial imports, such as class sensibilities and health awareness. Since the reforms were initiated by Bhopal's highest authority, they were autocratic in many ways though not immune to criticism. But her stature and motivation helped her prevail over many of those criticisms, and she ingeniously mediated differences of opinion among two generations of women reformers.

Islamic in her own way

The author uses both personal and official records, and the reports of early organisations and institutions of the Bhopal state to identify socio-political organisation by (Muslim) women. This categorically debunks the stereotypical distorted picture of Muslim women as prisoners to household drudgery and sexual frustration, and instead brings to light issues related to their socio-political status, political identity and educational development. Movement leaders pinned for social and educational opportunities and to play a role in public affairs. The book reviews the administrations of previous Begums and their impact on Sultan Jahan. While all were aligned with Islamic precepts, rulers were largely tolerant of other religious and social groups, including Sultan Jahan. Her forays into politically charged Islamic universalism were essentially a product of the times, as the 1920s was an era of the Allied occupation of Turkey and the subsequent Khilafat movement. She soon realised Islamic universalism was not an intelligent choice in a state where the ruler did not share the same religion as her subjects. Moreover, as the author demonstrates, her political administration and educational programmes for women were patently different from the governments of other

Muslim countries. Reformist ulema and male and female intellectuals formed the core of her administration, its members chosen on the basis of ability rather than clan or group solidarity. She was Islamic in her own way, equally embracing purdah and English education.

Contextualising women's empowerment within the Prophet's message as articulated in the Koran and Sunna, Sultan Jahan employed Islamic rhetoric to strike a balance between a woman's domestic and official duties and her quest for knowledge. This was the best way to convince conservative Muslim parents to allow their daughters to attend school and to peacefully comply with what was essentially an educational programme imposed from on high. Bhopal was the first Indian state to take such steps.

Its programme, eventually, addressed the masses; blended modern and traditional education; highlighted areas of women's expertise – the home and the family – thus facilitating awareness among women to use their education their daily lives; and justified a course of study that was designed by women and for women, resulting in a women's movement with a distinct identity. Crucially, the programme made it possible for students to observe purdah, arranging for enclosed carriages, female staff and separate quarters to hold classes. Not long after the programme succeeded among the elite, scholarships were offered and the programme's influence spread to the poor, enrolling widows, orphans and even non-Muslim women.

In health care education, her programme again stood at the interface of modern and traditional practices. Juxtaposed with Western medicine, *unani tibb* medicine was revised and traditional health practitioners, or *hakims*, and more specifically midwives, improved their skills through proper, comprehensive *tibb* training and the introduction of certain scientific techniques. She was driven to spread knowledge about sanitation, hygiene, basic child birth, first aid and home nursing because she believed they were all essential to making women autonomous in matters related to maternity and child welfare, which, by extension, contributed to national welfare. This was how Sultan Jahan envisioned empowering women in and outside the home. After participating in the programme, elite women took on the responsibility of educating poor women, according themselves professional stature and fulfilling one of the five pillars of Islam, charity.

Balancing act: increasing autonomy, but not at the expense of custom or social duty

For Sultan Jahan, separate spheres for men and women were crucial, as a woman's self-actualisation had to take place in an environment where women edu-



The Begum of Bhopal

cated other women. She strongly felt that women interacting with women, exchanging bodily knowledge no less than religious knowledge, was a source of female autonomy. She appealed to Islamic and early Muslim history to buttress her educational reforms, promoting Islamic learning and adding doses of English education. The latter was necessary to broaden her reforms beyond a strictly religious model and provide mothers and wives with practical training. Once Sultan Jahan instilled a woman's official and domestic duties, she addressed cultural and other scholarly activities with élan.

Sultan Jahan was a visionary whose reformist discourse within a traditional context was a model for women to change their perception of themselves. It was made possible, as the author emphatically states, because the reforms emanated from the highest state authority – the Sultan herself. Her success lay in emphasising female domesticity and training capable housewives and good mothers – roles that received God's admiration. The author discusses at length the initiatives taken

to compose the curriculum, which overlapped other socio-religious reformers' justifications for promoting female education. Her programmes created a constituency of women within the Bhopal state who were educated and could look beyond community, religious and gender boundaries. She encouraged preparing (especially poor) women for practical female occupations, training housewives and wage earners rather than offering a strictly academic curriculum, which was quite unsuitable to the poor's socio-economic conditions. This prevented them from falling into disreputable jobs. More than anything else, it was Sultan Jahan's efforts to educate lower class adult women that set her apart from her fellow Muslim reformers.

Though she endorsed incremental change within the traditional context, Sultan Jahan was not averse to the West. She encouraged women to be selective in their approach to new ideas and Western culture. Her aim was to increase female political participation without compromising their social duties or the institution of the veil, which was why radical (women) reformers of later generations questioned her ideas, especially her approach to the veil, and sometimes labelled her conservative. But she didn't allow her programme to be overcome by internal fissures and accepted the idea that women could take part in public affairs without wearing the veil. This never meant that she compromised her orthodox ideas; she neither called for radical change nor gave up the veil herself. A paradox, perhaps, but to her the veil did not obstruct women's literary skills, leadership abilities or political wisdom.

Another interesting facet of Sultan Jahan's – and, for that matter, of the Bhopal state's – administration was the viability of the institution of kingship. Sultan Jahan maintained her loyalty to the British and proclaimed everlasting allegiance and submission to the king. Nevertheless, her

administration's particular traits, reflected in her reforms, reveal an ongoing negotiation between colonial power and the princely state. She used English education to advance and fit into the imperial structure, and negotiated with a range of colonial and Islamic models to empower women.

Unveiling a visionary

Lambert-Hurley has contributed an interesting perspective of a movement that placed Indian Muslim women on the cusp of a new feminism that crossed boundaries and strengthened the social and intellectual bonds of the women involved. An all-female sphere provided leadership roles and opportunities to organise and build networks, which, the author remarks, prepared them for future political activity.

In my understanding, Sultan Jahan wanted to create female camaraderie through issues that permeated their lives, and she drew on a wide range of reformist models – those provided by the colonial state, Aligarh modernists and Deobandi Ulema – but in the end her enterprise could not be bridled by any of them, as her main aim was to assert women's autonomy in a hitherto unknown way. Commendably, the author imparts this originality. Sultan Jahan was able to negotiate with Islamic conservatism and colonial discourse with ease, and engage with Western scientific knowledge and adapt it to address the specific concerns of Indian Muslim women. The Bhopal women's reformist discourse responded to its colonial counterpart by extracting the best from it and then blending it with indigenous traditions to speak for the movement and other women. In sum, the author has deftly unveiled the poorly known story of Sultan Jahan.

Karuna Sharma

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Camilleri, Joseph, Larry Marshall, Michael, Michális S. Michael and Michael T. Seigel, Michael, eds. 2007. *Asia-Pacific Geopolitics: Hegemony vs. Human Security*. 264 pages. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. ISBN 978 1 84720 098 3.

Three's a crowd?: declining US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific

THOMAS S. WILKINS

This edited volume brings together 13 scholars from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, largely based in Japan and Australia, to consider the tension between the American hegemonic order and the progressive notion of 'human security'. Working in concert with the United States, Japan and Australia constitute one of the most important 'sub-regional triangles' in the Asia-Pacific. Recent developments such as the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (2006) attest to the increasingly close security cooperation between these powers, around which a burgeoning academic literature is now appearing.¹ Placing these three powers at the centre of their analysis, the contributors cast a critical eye over Tokyo and Canberra's complicity in maintaining the American hegemonic system and point to the vulnerabilities of the trilateral accord.

The volume is divided into four parts, plus introduction and conclusion. In the Introduction Michális Michael and Larry Marshall establish the overarching framework of the book; that is, the contradictions between hegemony and human security in the prevailing regional order. First they establish a working definition of 'hegemony' as 'used both in its traditional definition as inter-state predominance/rule by force and its Gramscian meaning as an organizing principle' (p. 5.). They note that Washington's attempts to bolster fading US hegemony poses the danger of 'entrapping' Tokyo and Canberra in policies detrimental to their real interests. Moreover, they contend that pursuit of hegemony is largely incommensurate with basic 'human security', defined by The United Nations *Human Development Program Report* (1994) as 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' and by Sean Kay as focusing on 'the problems that affect the basic safety and wellbeing of individuals.'² Human security presents an alternative to the traditional notion of military security by relocating the security 'referent' to the individual, rather than the state 'level of analysis'. Furthermore, human security expands the very definition and scope of 'security' to concentrate not solely on military-territorial threats, but to incorporate democracy, human rights, demographics, food scarcity and health risks and the environment (known as broad' or 'extended' security). The whole project is thus a challenge to the dominant Realist and state-centric paradigm of International Relations.

A global 'state of emergency?'

In part one, entitled 'Hegemony and East Asia Relations', Mustapha Kamal Pasha records how the hegemon constructs and employs the 'war on terror' as the necessary global 'state of emergency' that justifies the maintenance and expansion of its imperium. This results in a binary, and arbitrary, division of the region into 'friend and foe' that distorts regional interactions and degrades efforts to provide for human security. In the following chapter Nick Bisley identifies how Japan and Australia, by acting as the north and south 'anchors' of the American forward military presence, are estranging themselves from wider engagement in the region. He argues that the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (1951) and ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-US (1951)) are outmoded legacies of the Cold War and impediments to a more stable regional order. Chandra Muzaffar reinforces these views. He claims that the PRC is also made to serve as a useful 'bogyman' for justifying American hegemony, and that the 'China threat' is greatly exaggerated by certain groups in the US for their own political ends. Since they have colossal trading interests at stake in China, willing participation in the 'containment' of the PRC runs serious risks for Japan and Australia. He concludes that 'there is no reason to contain China. But there is every reason to check Washington's global hegemony' (p. 59).

Part two – 'Japan's Security Dilemma' – examines the ongoing transformation in Tokyo's international relations towards a more assertive posture. Essentially, this part addresses the 'Japan rising' thesis, one that is now gaining serious traction among policy-makers and academics.³ The authors of chapters 5-7, Michael T. Seigel, Jiro Yamaguchi and Yoshikazu Sakamoto, dissect some of the key aspects of this thesis, focusing their attention on the political efforts to revise Japan's 'peace constitution' and the ramifications this would have on regional security. Naturally, such questions feed into the controversial role that Japan's colonial history, in particular its alleged lack of contrition for its wartime excesses, plays in shaping identity politics around the region.

A new role for 'middle powers?'

The potential of Japan and Australia as 'middle powers' is the focus of Part three. Here the central question is whether these two states can con-

U.S Pacific Island Territory of Guam.



tribute individually, or in tandem, to a more effective system of regional security cooperation. Once again, this builds on an important debate surrounding the recent augmentation of bilateral ties between these states, as shown by the 2007 Joint Security Declaration.⁴ Michael Hamel-Green's chapter contends that Tokyo and Canberra's loyalty, subservience even, to Washington undermines their efforts at multilateral solutions and support for the UN. He cites their intensified diplomatic and military relationships with Washington, and their participation in coercive military exercises such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), as evidence. Next Allan Patience looks at the role these two powers have played in the South Pacific 'arc of instability'. He suggests that if these countries can overcome the legacy of 'neo colonial arrogance' there may be a chance for 'niche diplomacy' in which their middle power identity is reinvented to address issues of poverty, governance failure, and aid delivery more constructively. In this way they could prevent the small/weak countries of the South Pacific becoming 'failed states' – breeding grounds for violence, instability, and terrorism.

The subject of Part four is 'Global Governance and Sustainability' in which Tetsuya Yamada and Shigeko Fukai interrogate the complex question of regional (and global) governance and present their cases for how states and civil society compete for influence in a multipolar world. Yamada reveals his scepticism over whether the reform of the UN can effectively challenge the hegemonic power of the West/US since the very institutions upon which the structure of the international system is predicated are manifest instruments of its propagation (APEC, IMF, World Bank, UN Security Council). Fukai rejects the American *Realpolitik* assumption, as articulated by Condoleezza Rice, that 'national interest' should override the development and function of the 'international community'. She addresses the vital issues of managing global resources in a sustainable fashion and one that represents a more equitable distribution between the global 'north' and 'south'.

When contemplating 'Future Possibilities' in the book's conclusion, Joseph Camilleri asserts that Japan and Australia are unduly constrained in reforming their security outlooks because of their close alliance relations with the US. These defence pacts were forged over half a century ago at a time when the geopolitical landscape looked completely different and the Cold War security agenda was basically confined to opposing the alleged 'Soviet threat'. Camilleri suggests that both countries would do well to reevaluate their alliance ties by breaking free of their dependence upon their 'great and powerful friend' to pursue security policies that better reflect broader human security and regional integration priorities. For Japan and Australia they advocate joining the growing list of countries that now uphold the human security foreign policy paradigm, which includes Canada (another 'middle power'), most of Scandinavia, and Ireland.

One of the great strengths of this volume is the way it addresses so many of the key intellectual and policy debates appertaining to Asia-Pacific security. These include 'hegemony' and 'human security', but also US-Japan-Australia 'trilateralism', 'Japan rising', and the 'future of the UN'. One of the core arguments of the book, that of declining American hegemony, fits well with Realist predictions in International Relations, which posit that states will seek to maximise power/security through internal mobilisation of resources and alliance formation/strengthening. The US is currently pursuing both, though for how long this can be sustained with an economy teetering on the brink of recession and in the face of waning public support among its traditional allies, is uncertain. The current crisis

of American ideology and 'soft power', triggered by the 'war on terror' and invasion of Iraq, has 'severely eroded America's international credibility and legitimacy' meaning that partnership with Washington has become a much less enticing prospect (p. 6.). Being seen to act as America's 'deputy' in the Asia-Pacific now incurs substantial costs. First, Washington has become a more demanding protector, pressuring Japan and Australia to increase their 'burden sharing' through military integration and participation in overseas expeditions, in order to ameliorate the effects of its own 'imperial overstretch'. Second, elite support in Japan and Australia for the alliance through involvement in American wars in the Middle East not only attracts international opprobrium, but is also manifestly unpopular with very large sections of domestic opinion. In light of these factors, the contributors suggest that Japan and Australia should detach themselves from such encumbrances and seek more independent paths as middle powers.

The contributors effectively juxtapose the second major aspect of the book – an advocacy of 'human security' – with 'hegemony', demonstrating how this new paradigm better captures the complexity of International Relations as it is today. As the discipline adjusts to the globalised security environment of the new millennium, human security is therefore increasingly seen as 'a concept whose time is approaching' (p. 18). For the Realists labouring to defend the state-centric paradigm that has so long monopolised the discipline, this is another battlefield in which American theoretical hegemony finds itself out of step with the rest of the world and thus under siege.

In conclusion, this volume should appeal both to academics and to policy-makers interested in the dichotomy of Asia-Pacific geopolitics. The diversity of the contributor's backgrounds – public policy, social ethics, defence, human security, and sustainability – is a notable strength when looking at the multifaceted dimensions of geopolitics. Though the book may be considered a 'critical' project – in the sense that security is equated with 'emancipation', rather than 'national defence' – the arguments presented are measured and never slip into polemic, while at the same time add up to a persuasive case for the reassertion of human security priorities in the destructive wake of the American 'war on terror'.

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Notes

- 1 See Tow, William T. et al. eds. 2007. *Asia-Pacific Security: US, Australia and Japan and the New Security Triangle*, London: Routledge and Wilkins, Thomas S. 2007. 'Towards a "Trilateral Alliance?" - Understanding the Role of Expediency and Values in American-Japanese-Australian Relations,' *Asian Security*, Vol. 3 No. 3: 251-278.
- 2 Kay, Sean. 2006. *Global Security in the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 258.
- 3 Pyle, Kenneth B. 2007. *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*, New York: The Century Foundation and Hughes, Christopher. 2006. *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*, Adelphi Paper, Oxford: IISS.
- 4 See: Williams, Brad and Newman, Andrew. eds. 2006. *Japan, Australia and Asia Pacific Security*, London: Routledge.

Crump, Thomas. 2007. *Asia-Pacific: A history of empire and conflict*. New York: Hambledon Continuum. xv+383 pages. ISBN 978 1 85285 518 5.

Hara, Kimie. 2007. *Cold War Frontiers in the Asia Pacific: Divided territories in the San Francisco System*. Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies Series. London and New York: Routledge. xiv+247 pages. ISBN 978 0 415 41208 7

Gill, Bates. 2007. *Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution. xii+267 pages. ISBN 978 0 8157 3146 7

The search for security in East Asia

FRANS PAUL VAN DER PUTTEN

East Asia does not have a multilateral security organisation capable of addressing the main security issues in the region. The 'rise of China' is widely regarded as a development that simultaneously complicates security relations in East Asia and makes them more relevant to the rest of the world. Three recent books explore these issues and their wider Asia-Pacific context. The historical background to security issues in this part of the world is provided by Thomas Crump's *Asia-Pacific*. By dedicating chapters to specific countries, this book chronicles the modern history of the various countries in East and Southeast Asia, most of the chapters covering a specific country each. Additional chapters focus on Russia, the US and Australia, with two thematic chapters dealing with migration and crime in the region.

The time frame and geographic scope of Crump's work are wide-ranging. By combining the histories of many countries into a single volume, the book is a welcome addition to existing literature. However, a consequence of the country-based approach is that the narrative largely avoids taking a regional viewpoint. Apart from the two thematic chapters on migra-

tion and crime, only the conclusion gives a brief analysis of how security affects stability in the Asia Pacific as a single geographic entity. While the book has much to offer, it does little to highlight the common characteristics of the Asia Pacific area during the twentieth century, in terms of security or otherwise.

A less than perfect plan for peace?

The San Francisco Peace Treaty was a predominantly American plan for a new order in East Asia and the northern half of the Pacific Ocean. While the UK government was involved in the drafting of the treaty, the main decisions were made on the American side of the Atlantic. Other countries involved in the Pacific War were

Republic of Korea (North Korea), and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) were not even invited to sign the treaty. Thus, the treaty was fundamentally flawed from the outset. Many of the key players were not involved, and yet the treaty laid the security groundwork for East Asia for many decades to come.

The treaty was originally intended to embody the ideals of the 'Yalta system'. Yalta was the location for the February 1945 conference during which the US, the UK and the USSR mapped out the post-war world international order. Following the war, Japan would no longer be able to play the role of the predominant power in eastern Asia. Instead, the victors would jointly manage peace and stability in the region. Apart from establishing the United Nations Organisation, the allied powers would take responsibility for specific geographic areas: the US in maritime East Asia and the northern Pacific Ocean, the USSR in Northeast Asia, and the UK in Southeast Asia. China, formally the fourth of the new Big Four, would be a strong and independent buffer between these areas.

The central element in Hara's analysis is that the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 caused a radical change in the drafting of

invasion caused the US to overtly abandon the Yalta system. Japan was not to be punished severely, because this might strengthen anti-Western nationalism among its population. Territorial issues that existed because of the collapse of the Japanese overseas empire were now to be approached in ways that provided direct strategic benefits to the US. Initially the US policymakers had been inclined to solve territorial issues according to historical and legal guidelines, in principle providing a solid basis for long-term regional stability. The final treaty no longer had this aim.

Hara contends that Washington intentionally maintained, or even created, territorial disputes in order to insert 'wedges' between the US area of control and the communist world. The purpose of these wedges was two-fold: firstly, to keep regional allies firmly on the side of the West, and secondly, to fortify the US military position in the region. One example is the Kuriles dispute between the USSR and Japan. Hara posits that this dispute could probably have been resolved, but that the US ensured that this would not happen, in a bid to block closer ties between Tokyo and Moscow. Moreover, an end to the Kuriles dispute could threaten the American position on Okinawa, the main US military stronghold in East Asia. Hara also argues that the way in which the San Francisco Peace Treaty was drafted intentionally exacerbated tensions over Diaoyu/Senkaku, South China Sea and Takeshima/Tokdo island. Furthermore, the author suggests that American policy towards these issues has not fundamentally changed since 1950.

The author explores the effects of the peace treaty rather than the root causes of current territorial disputes. It would, therefore, be premature to conclude that the treaty and US foreign policy are the primary cause of these problems. Still Hara's conclusions question how committed the US really is to stabilising international relations in East Asia. Would Washington allow a peaceful resolution of these issues at the cost of a weakened strategic position? Costs that could ultimately include military withdrawal from South Korea and Japan, the end of Taiwan's role as a barrier to China's naval expansion, and a shift of Washington's regional allies towards closer cooperation with Beijing.

Closer through cooperation?

The question should also be asked, how does China view regional security and the role of the US? Highly relevant in this regard is *Rising Star* by Bates Gill, a leading specialist on China's foreign policy. His book has two main purposes: First, it answers the question, what is Beijing aiming to achieve with its foreign security diplomacy? Gill concludes that Beijing seeks three things: overall external stability in order to focus its attention on economic growth; to allay the fears of neighbouring countries that China's rise

poses a threat; and to cautiously limit US influence in international relations without entering into a conflict or overt rivalry. While this view is in accordance with what other experts in this field have written, the importance of Gill's book lies in the clarity and consistency of this message. He achieves this through analysis of Chinese foreign policy in relation to regional security mechanisms, non-proliferation and arms control, and sovereignty and intervention.

The second purpose of this book is to identify which approach would be useful for the US to adopt to deal with China's growing security role. The author argues that although China and the US are unlikely to become friends, there are sufficient motives and opportunities for both countries to move towards building a good working relationship as two world powers. Gill observes that China's security diplomacy is moving in a direction that in many ways supports US foreign policy aims. Mutual benefits could be broadened, while more could be done to reduce conflicts of interest. As Gill states, a better understanding of Beijing's security diplomacy would help Washington achieve its long-term aims without entering into a conflict with China.

With regard to security in East Asia, Gill's work emphasises that Beijing gives top priority to regional stability and that it is very active in several initiatives towards multilateral security mechanisms. China promotes a multilateral approach towards the dispute over the South China Sea islands and to US-North Korea nuclear tensions. The Chinese government also plays an active role in the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit. While US influence in the region is a major concern to Beijing, the Chinese government prefers to leave American interests largely untouched rather than entering into intensive military competition. Still, two factors seem to stand in the way of a Chinese endorsement of a comprehensive multilateral security organisation for the whole region. One is Beijing's insistence that its relationship with Taiwan is a domestic issue in which other countries should not interfere. This means that the single most direct threat to peace in the region cannot be addressed at the multilateral level. The other factor is the military alliance between Japan and the US. This prevents Tokyo from operating as an independent party, while at the same time providing the Japanese government with powerful backing. An East Asian security organisation that is jointly dominated by the US and Japan is unacceptable to China.

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The American forward-deployed aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk arrives at her homeport, Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan. (Courtesy of United States Department of Defense).

limited to the role of signatories; Japan as the defeated nation was obliged to sign. The USSR, denied any influence during the drafting process, refused to be a party to the treaty. The People's Republic of China (on the mainland), the Republic of China (on Taiwan), the Democratic People's

the peace treaty. While the Americans had cautiously begun to adjust their drafting to the realities of the Cold War - that old allies USSR and China were becoming the new enemy, while the old enemy Japan was to become a key ally - the North Korean

Conclusion

To conclude, Crump provides us with a useful historical overview of modern history in the Asia Pacific, while Hara offers a thorough analysis of the origins of the main security issues in East Asia. Finally, Gill's work spearheads English-language writing on China's role in international security. The most provocative of the three books is Hara's. His conclusion that 'present US strategy may [...] not necessarily favor clear resolutions' of the various unresolved territorial disputes (p.193) is noteworthy. It suggests that ultimately, United States foreign policy - often credited with keeping the peace in East Asia since 1953 - might be less committed to regional stability than many in the West acknowledge.

Cold War frontiers

A regional perspective on international security is provided by *Cold War Frontiers in the Asia Pacific* by Kimie Hara. This book analyses how current territorial issues have their origins in the Peace Treaty of San Francisco that ended the 1941-1945 war between Japan and the Western Allies. The author focuses on how the

Chua Beng Huat, ed. 2007. *Elections as Popular Culture in Asia*. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge. 197 pages. ISBN 0 415 42570 0.

Elections as popular culture

MEREDITH WEISS

Watching the pomp and absurdity of this year's US presidential elections, one cannot help but be struck by what such rituals represent, beyond the mere fact of choosing a new head of government and state. There is the element of carnival, of course, but also a persistent subcurrent of deeper meaning: that this overblown, pricey, closely-managed circus still does represent a chance for 'the people' self-consciously to assert their sovereignty. Against such a backdrop, Chua Beng Huat's lively edited volume, *Elections as Popular Culture in Asia*, offers an especially welcome stimulus. The volume presents a series of engaging descriptions and analyses of campaign festivities and foibles across states, but also poses deeper questions of how citizens interpret and enact their own roles in election tableaux - the distinction between "democracy as a political goal and the election as an instrument for attaining it" (p.140).

Chua's straightforward introduction lays out the rationale for the book and synthesises insights from the case studies that follow. The volume grew out of a workshop in early 2005 on the preceding "year of elections across Asia." It takes as a premise that campaigns are about more (or less) than just providing information for the rational weighing of choices, and elections, the aggregation of rational, solitary actions. Rather, even where electoral rules keep real choice in check, elections hold out hope for the governed of a better future - that *this* time, their vote could make a difference - and "remain the primary channels of popular participation in politics" (p.6). Contending parties assert their popularity by drumming up crowds and creating 'news', offering the illusion, at least, of sufficient popular mobilisation to confirm the winner's legitimacy in a world of hegemonic electoralism. Meanwhile, elements from civil society take advantage of relaxed rules and crowds to press their own agendas, including encouraging deeper and broader participation. The full syndrome is embedded in a specific culture and context, though; the script is hardly universal, however much elections as a concept may be presumed to be so. It is with this paradox that the volume engages, reading elections as an artefact and aspect of the popular culture in which they take place.

The chapters that follow address elections of 2004 (or the closest thereto) in Taiwan (by Ko Yufen), Hong Kong (Wan-chaw Shae and Pik-wan Wong), Indonesia (Jennifer Lindsay), the Philippines (Filomeno V. Aguilar, Jr.), Thailand (Pitch Pongsawat), Malaysia (Francis Loh Kok Wah), India (M. Madhava Prasad), South Korea (Keehyeung Lee), and Japan (Kaori Tsurumoto). While the quality is high throughout, some contributors follow Chua's prompt better than others. Several could have benefited from deeper engagement with the

workshop process and other chapters to sharpen their points. For instance, in faulting Japan's Public Office Election Law for discouraging popular engagement, Tsurumoto might have considered a comparison with Malaysia, or with pre-transition elections in a place like Indonesia, to tease out other contributing factors. A few chapters, too, for instance on Hong Kong, detour substantially into extra-electoral matters, reviewing wider political developments and sentiments. Most of the authors are part of the publics and cultures they describe; Lindsay is an exception, but can claim authority based on decades of observance of Indonesian elections. Some focus on the meaning with which citizens vest candidates and campaigns (for instance, the chapters on Thailand or the Philippines); others more on detailing what parties do (as for Japan and Malaysia).

Mobilisation and manipulation of emotions

Overall, the set of cases offers a set of colourful snapshots and a host of riddles. Campaigns, per these accounts, range

'cosplay' (the candidates' 'costume play'), sloganeering, and rampant commodification, with enough kitsch for sale "to transform the candidates into household celebrities" (p.35).

Elements of humour - of irony, parody, and sheer playfulness - recur across accounts. Voters in Hong Kong, for example, satirise leaders in cartoons, plays, cyber-protests, and other forums, 'modifying' official propaganda and 'photoshopping' pro-Beijing leaders' photos. Thais transformed even the September 2006 coup to entertainment, escaping the confining rationality of constitutionalism as they posed with the tanks and soldiers. And in South Korea, Lee proposes, online parody "often works as a semiotic guerrilla practice and a symbolic act of rebellion" (p.166), particularly easily disseminated and understood images.

At the intersection of popular culture and formal politics in nearly all the cases presented are the media, whether mainstream newspapers and television programs or

publications and messages. Surveys and exit polls are featuring increasingly, as well, for instance in the Philippines.

Testament to the entwining of media with politics, too, is the prevalence of celebrities in campaigns, whether as endorsers, entertainers at events, or candidates themselves. As Lindsay describes for Indonesia, the "intense slippage between the world of performance and politics at election time" (p.56) is apparent not just in television talk shows and other media spectacles, in the itinerant performers who work the campaign circuit, and of presidential candidates' crooning for the cameras, but in the mass media celebrities who seek the validation of being pursued by parties - confirmation of the worth of their name, and increasingly, of their own electability.

Motorbikers, singers and 'smart mobs'

However colourful the election process, it remains a part of a broader political context. Lee's discussion of elections in South Korea, for instance, draws relatively little


and for participation beyond the mere act of voting. One wishes some of the contributors, however, had addressed these dimensions more clearly - to what extent the staged, shallow drama of Indonesian elections, jazzed up with hired bands of motorbikers and singers, for instance, actually represents or inspires engagement; whether the emotionally-battered Taiwanese have any 'gut feeling' to follow; or what outlets remain for older South Koreans, less keyed in than the '2030 generation' (in their twenties and thirties) to the "mobility and interactivity" (p.160) of online networks and 'smart mobs'.

Indeed, the volume as a whole might have benefited from a more nuanced analysis of who is excluded or included in campaign dramas. Lindsay, for instance, calls attention to those dynamics in noting how male the terrain of campaign parades and rallies has been, in terms of both participants and audience. Increasingly, women have been included in pawai (motorbike cavalcades), but still in an auxiliary role: as pillion riders performing choreographed movements. Pitch presents a disjuncture between how urban middle class and urban lower-income and poor communities understand, participate in, and are pursued during campaigns - though the analysis, unfortunately, focuses almost entirely on the former category. Loh, too, hints at the possibilities for different understandings of electoral processes and messages among those exposed to NGO messages, persistently marginalised from developmental rewards, or truly able, from experience of opposition rule, to imagine stability under an alternative to the long-dominant National Front.

The book will appeal to readers across the social sciences and humanities: it is a work on politics, both institutions and behaviour, but also on media, perception, and discourse. The actual details of the case studies will probably be familiar to most country experts, though the perspective and other cases on offer may encourage new lines of inquiry and comparison. Moreover, the volume is eminently approachable, suitable for undergraduates as well as more advanced scholars, and offers side notes in, for instance, fieldwork methods (most charmingly in Tsurumoto's contribution) and ways to work with emerging electronic media (especially the chapters by Lee and Pitch). Overall, the volume is an engaging addition to studies on popular culture and a useful corrective to overly structural approaches to elections, without pretending to offer the last word.

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from excessively structured and "dull and mind-numbingly similar" (p.179) in Japan, to "a spectacle of color, enthusiastic popular participation, [and] innovative modes of self-expression" (p.149) in India. Contenders aim not just to lure supporters, but to convince citizens to care and to vote at all. Ko describes that process of full-scale mobilisation and manipulation of emotions in Taiwanese elections, at least, as "akin to a provisional, contingent, and flexible guerrilla war" (p.23). Traditional symbolism complements modern touches across cases. Aguilar draws an elaborate, but convincing, analogy between campaigns and cockfights - elections as a gamble in the Philippines. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, campaign styles and events draw on such rituals as wedding ceremonies and all kinds of performance, presenting a degree of continuity with everyday life. And in Taiwan, 'image-making' extends from candidates' kneeling before citizens *in loco parentis* and begging for votes at temples, night markets, weddings, and funerals, to

free-wheeling internet-based communities and forums. Controls on mainstream media, or the manicuring of messages therein, are subverted by the ready availability cyber-alternatives in Hong Kong, Thailand, or South Korea, which allow new forms of debate, mockery, engagement, and empowerment. (One wonders whether jaded voters in Japan, too, engage in cyberpoliticking.) In India, where media (especially regional or vernacular outlets) are less fettered, coverage is flamboyant, from slick advertising campaigns to gossip, mudslinging, and free-wheeling discussion, generally premised on an assumption of politicians' essential corruptness. Party-linked mainstream media in Malaysia, meanwhile, carefully calibrate their sycophancy, as Loh describes, building hype and getting out the vote, but steering clear of actual substance. Opposition parties and NGOs, in turn, monitor these media as part of a broader critique, as they take advantage of loosened controls during the brief campaign to issue their own

distinction between elections and other 'political events' such as impeachment proceedings, just as Shae and Wong elide rallies in 2003 over a proposed National Security Bill and in 2004 over the establishment of universal suffrage with their analysis of the polls of a few months later. And elections in Hong Kong and Indonesia transpire in a political order transformed within the past decade - the former's handover to China in 1997 and the latter's abrupt change of regime the following year. Not just political institutions, but popular culture - and especially outlets such as mass media - have changed dramatically in the process. That imbrication helps to explain why citizens across the region still do vote: voters in the Philippines or Malaysia, for instance, see it not just as their duty and as a chance to assert a stake in rewards, but as a legitimate and even promising means of political change. In a larger sense, as Chua notes in his introduction, the volume offers evidence of campaigns as an avenue for political voice,

Heidbuchel, Esther. *The West Papua Conflict in Indonesia. Actors, Issues and Approaches*. 2007. Wettenberg: Johannes Herrmann J and J - Verlag. 223 pages. ISBN 978 3 937983 10 3.

A complex conflict



NICHOLAS TARLING

This book rightly describes the West Papua Conflict as complex. Held outside Indonesia when the Dutch accepted its independence in 1949, the territory was subsequently incorporated – after a long Indonesian ‘confrontation’ of the Dutch – as a result above all of the intervention of the United States and the involvement of the UN. The Bunker agreement brokered by the US prescribed an Act of Free Choice. Indonesia carried that out in ways of the inadequacy of which the UN did not complain, and which indeed the Indonesians were to use as a precedent for incorporating East Timor, though that by contrast was not met by UN complaisance.

Partly as a result of the inadequacy of the process, incorporation led to new conflicts. Though members of the small Papuan elite were a little more involved in the Bunker process than the author suggests, the Act of Free Choice was, as John Saltford has shown, something of a scandal. Papuans could only resent the policies the Indonesians pursued, displacing even the cooperative element in the elite, exploiting Papua’s mineral resources, in particular through the deal with Freeport that Denise Leith has explored, introducing large numbers of migrants from other parts of the archipelago, who came both under government transmigration schemes and of their own volition. Such activities provided a fertile ground for resistance, often described as OPM, Organisasi Papua Merdeka, though it was not unified. In turn the Indonesian army, TNI, secured a reason and an excuse for action, and as elsewhere it acted in a way that maximised abuse and increased opposition, so enhancing its argument that it continued to be needed: it gets a per diem for a special deployment, whereas it would be better rewarded for creating situations that did not need one.

The dislodging of the Soeharto regime changed the situation, but only in part, making the conflict yet more complex. Though their implementation was sure to be no easy matter, decentralisation and democratisation held out the prospect of improvement. But the independence of East Timor added to the Indonesian fear of breakup and distrust of foreign intervention. The reforms in Papua were as a result all the more half-hearted and confused, and the TNI’s repressive activities all the more difficult to restrain.

My own study of Britain’s policy towards West New Guinea in the period before the Bunker agreement showed how small the Papuan elite was and also how divided (while one British official referred to the Javanese as ‘born imperialists’). Divisions among Papuans remain a feature of the complexity of the situation, encouraging divide-and-rule tactics and making any overall negotiation more difficult.

Repetitive analysis but sensible conclusions

It is on the prospects of a negotiated settlement that the present book focuses. It proceeds by an extensive and at times repetitive process of analysis which may try the patience of the reader. But, well informed by interviews and by research in libraries, on the net and among unpublished theses, it reaches sensible conclusions, which reward the reader and, more important, may provide materials for the negotiation that seems the

best chance for an unhappy land in which a relatively few outsiders have an informed but passionate interest.

Independence seems an unlikely prospect, and even if achieved, might only create a non-viable state, rent with internal dispute. The best prospect, the author suggests, is special autonomy, and properly carried out,

it might meet the expectations popularly attached to the magic word independence. But it has, of course, been on the tapis so long and so ineffectually that the Papuans have lost any trust in the Indonesian government’s promises. It is essential to restore or create that trust. The Indonesians have, after all, good reason to do so. If it can be done, its implications will carry across the rest of the archipelago and improve the Republic’s relations with the outside world, though none of that can really be achieved without putting the role of the TNI on the constitutional and fiscal basis it should occupy in a modern state.

It is also, the author rightly suggests, necessary to seek means by which the Papuans can negotiate and accept such a solution. She sees the greatest hope in the concept of Papua Land of Peace. Papuans might find their unity in that rather than in the concept of Papua Land of Suffering. The focus should be on the future, putting off, without abandoning, the redemption of past abuses.

The book, a thesis at Giessen, is published in Germany but in English. We must be grateful that the results of German scholarship thus become more widely available. The English is far from idiomatic, however, and at times its idiosyncrasies obscure the meaning. An English copy-editor would have made an important message clearer.

Nicholas Tarling

New Zealand Asia Institute
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NETWORK ASIA

COMMENT

History and the present in Asia

KERRY BROWN

In the space of seven decades, the Asian region has gone from being torn apart by conflict, both ideological and military, to enjoying a period of untrammelled development, prosperity and growth. In the era of the cold war, it saw the US keep its sights on Communist China, with no open diplomatic contact, from its military bases in Japan, and South Korea. In the 1960s and 1970s, even after the US's rapprochement with China, the war in Vietnam saw overspill into Cambodia, and Indo-China, leading to tens of thousands of deaths. Indonesia's bloody suppression of Communist insurgency in the mid 1960s and its annexation of East Timor in 1975 were the more dramatic symptoms of a region judged by one writer in the late 1960s to be on a knife edge. The skirmishes between the USSR and China in 1969 were the most potentially disturbing of these, bringing two nuclear powers face to face.

In 2008, China and India are charging ahead, contributing more to global GDP growth this year than the US or Europe. China remains a one party state, but its politicians and business people talk the language of commerce with remarkable conviction – enough to persuade foreign investors to make China, year in and year out, the largest receiver of Foreign Direct Investment globally. Consumer markets in China and India offer the real growth potential. Even Vietnam and Laos are embracing capitalism, inspired by what they see as China's 'Beijing consensus' state led development model. There is an Asian way, they seem to be saying, and Japan, China, and a host of other Asian countries are showing it.

The stability and security of Asia is a good thing. No wars were more terrible than those fought in this region in the 1930s and 1940s. That these countries now co-exist peacefully is an extraordinary political achievement, ranking alongside that of the creation, and growth, of the European Union, with all the prosperity that has delivered. China and India are lifting more people out of poverty than any other governments in history. This is China's chief defence in justifying its lack of political reform. ASEAN plus three has been one attempt to create a political cohesiveness around these very diverse countries, and supplement and help this stability.

There are two things that might worry us, even while celebrating the achievements in Asia, in the months and years ahead, however. The first in fact is that history might have been forgotten, but it has not been buried. The hawkishness of the Chinese population, more than their pragmatic politicians, is, as Susan Shirk points out


in her interesting account of Chinese-Japanese relations in 'China: Fragile Superpower' a good case in point. Under Mao, from 1949 to his death in 1976, Japan was regarded oddly benignly. There were no anti-Japanese riots, nor, after diplomatic relations were resumed in the early 1970s, constant imprecations from one side for apologies over historical injustices. In the last ten years, though, Japan's perceived lack of contrition has become a big issue in China, in the blogosphere, in chat rooms, and in the press. The hint of China becoming a member of the UN Permanent 5 in 2005 was enough to bring students out in the streets in Beijing. There are similar historical 'issues' left over in the Korean peninsula, which has been called the last front of the Cold War. And Japan's desire to assert itself a little more away from American oversight is the continuation of a long process of emerging from the impact of the Second World War. Throughout Asia, history is perhaps silent, but not absent. The start, after years of negotiations, of the trial of the Khmer Rouge leadership still alive in Cambodia under the auspices of the UN is a reminder of just how recent, and unhealed, some of this terrible history is.

This connects to the second issue. Scratching the surface of history in Asia soon leads back to some uncomfortable questions. The unresolved problem of Taiwan is only the most striking of these. As a country like China starts to flex its muscles, and shows it has genuine economic and political clout, this creates real concerns, in the region, and in the rest of the world, about how it, in particular, might revisit some of these historic questions. In the past, its leadership could at best berate the outside world for being 'capitalist' oppressors, belonging to the other side, enemies who would never come round. Now China is so plugged into the global economy, it can actually back up some of its words with hard action. Are we really so confident as we were a decade ago during the last cross straights crisis, that China won't actually do something if Taiwan does move towards declarations of out and out independence? And is the nationalist strand in Japan so wedded to its pacifist constitution now that it doesn't look at the militarisation of China as a major issue that it will need to start doing something about, and build broader political support for this? North Korea may have started to co-operate again – but as the era of Kim Jong Il draws to a close, and issues of succession raise their heads, will it accept that radical economic reform is the solution to the separation of the Koreas – or a final, all or nothing devastating attack?

Essentially, the question that remains unanswered is this: with so much prosperity, and with a clear dividend from years of

peace, is it realistic to think that the issues above can just be tolerated, left on a shelf out of the way, to a day, in the future, when in a sense they wither away, and become resolvable? If China's development, in particular, is sustainable (and there are big questions about this), will that be the end of its aspirations? Or will it seek to show it matters more by actively sorting out Taiwan. China may say it has a long history – but a strong, outward looking, internationalising China is a new thing, and something the outside world has little knowledge to go on in interacting with. One way or the other, my guess is that in the years head, in this region, history will throw up some surprising issues we thought were long forgotten, and there will be some major dislocations. That's when we really know that the Asian century isn't just an aspiration. It has arrived, and we're all living in it.

Dr Kerry Brown
Associate Fellow, Asia Programme
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New resource: VerreTaal - Chinese Literature in Dutch Translation


We are pleased to announce the launch of VerreTaal, an online database of Chinese Literature in Dutch Translation:

VerreTaal is a collaboration between the Department of Chinese Studies and the Sinological Library at Leiden University and the Research Centre for Translation at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Using English as the interface language, VerreTaal aims to provide a research tool for translation studies, (comparative) literary studies, (inter)cultural studies and area studies, Chinese studies and other academic fields -- and for the general reader and library user.

The database lists Dutch-language, direct and relay translations of works originally written in Chinese. At present it includes book titles in poetry, fiction and non-fiction, and drama. Entries in multiple-author anthologies contain individual author names, story / essay titles and corresponding page numbers where available. In the near future, we hope to expand the database to include journal publications.

VerreTaal can be browsed by authors, translators, titles and subjects, or searched using traditional and simplified Chinese and Hanyu Pinyin. It has been tested on various platforms and browsers and is accessible free of charge at <http://www.unileiden.net/verretaal/>.

Audrey Heijns, Research Centre for Translation, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Hanno Lecher, Librarian, Sinological Library, Leiden University
Maghriel van Crevel, Professor of Chinese language & literature, Leiden University



Announcement Wertheim Lecture 2008

Asia from Down Under: Regionalism and Global Cultural Change

By: Prof. Dr. Ien Ang (University of Western Sydney)

5 June 2008, in the Auditorium of the University of Amsterdam, 15:00 – 18:00

Globalisation has seen nation-states increasingly align themselves into regional blocs, perhaps the most prominent of which is the European Union. The formation of such transnational regions is based on geographical proximity and shared economic and political interests, but the very idea of a region, such as 'Europe', is underpinned by strongly held notions of cultural affinity. It is often cultural arguments and discourses - pertaining to identity, civilisation, religion, even race - that determine regional inclusion and exclusion.

What does this mean for a country such as Australia and its place within (or outside of) the Asian region? As a Western nation-state in an overwhelmingly non-Western region, Australia holds a prime position for observing processes of global cultural change in a time when Asia - home of the two new economic powerhouses of China and India and of the world's largest Muslim nation, Indonesia - is set to become the centre of the global force field. Australia's complex and ambivalent relationship with Asia provides valuable insight, particularly for Western Europe, into the cultural manifestations of the gradual decentring of the West.

Ien Ang is Distinguished Professor of Cultural Studies and Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow at the Centre for Cultural Research, University of Western Sydney. She holds a doctorate from the University of Amsterdam, where she studied and worked from 1973 until 1990. She is the author of a number of books including *Watching Dallas* (1985), *Desperately Seeking the Audience* (1991), *Living Room Wars* (1996) and *On Not Speaking Chinese* (2001).



The Wertheim lecture is jointly organised by Asian Studies in Amsterdam (ASiA), the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research (ASSR) and the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS).

The Namgyal Institute of Tibetology

ALEX MCKAY

Gangtok, the capital of the Indian Himalayan state of Sikkim, is home to the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology (NIT), India's foremost centre for the study of Tibetan and Himalayan Buddhist culture. The Institute includes a museum, a Tibetan library and a general reference centre on Tibet and the Himalayas. Set in extensive grounds on a ridge at Deorali, to the south of central Gangtok, the main buildings are constructed in typical Tibetan Buddhist style, with the wall paintings of the veranda depicting the four celestial guardians kings located in the four directions of the World-Mountain, Mount Meru.

The Institute was established on land donated by the 11th Chogyal of Sikkim, Sir Tashi Namgyal, in memory of his late son Paljor Namgyal, and the foundation stone of the Institute was laid by His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet on the 10th of February 1957. It was declared open by the then Prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, on the 1st of October 1958.

Since its inauguration, the Namgyal Institute has sponsored and promoted research on the religion, history, language, art and culture of the people of the Tibetan cultural area, which includes the Indian Himalayan state of Sikkim. Interested researchers and visitors are welcome, and the NIT welcomes and can facilitate scholarly research in relevant areas.

The Institute has published a scholarly journal, the *Bulletin of Tibetology* since 1964, along with numerous books over the years. The NIT's library holds one of the largest collection of Tibetan works in the world outside of Tibet, as well as a museum of Tibetan iconography and religious art. The museum contains a collection of rare statues, ritual objects, traditional art objects, thangka (painted, woven and embroidered scrolls) and ancient manuscripts in Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese and Lepcha (the language of one of Sikkim's indigenous tribal groups). Among the most notable of the manuscripts are: the *Prajna Paramita and Astasahasra* written in Tibetan golden script; an 11th century palm leaf manuscript of the *Saratama Prajnaparamita* by Ratnakara Shanti; and a 12th century Chinese manuscript of the *Prajana Paramita Sutra* that was brought from South Korea. The exhibition of statues and art objects is dominated by a majestic silver image of Manjushri – the Bodhisattva of knowledge – that was brought to the Institute from Tibet.

In the summer of 2002, the NIT's current Director, Mr Tashi Densapa, undertook to expand the Institute, restructure its research wing and increase international collaboration. This is being done through the creation of new research programmes, lectures, seminars, exhibitions, fellowships, publications and collaboration with foreign scholars.

Among its new research programmes is a project to document the social history of Sikkim's 60-odd monasteries and digitalise their textual holdings, while the Visual Sikkim project undertook to digitalise and document old and rare photographs of Sikkim, both in India and abroad. This has resulted in the creation of a digital image bank and a number of photographic exhibitions at the NIT; currently the Institute is hosting an exhibition of photographs documenting the historical relations between Sikkim and Bhutan, which was opened by the Bhutanese ambassador to India in November 2007.

The Institute has also established a visual anthropology project in order to produce an enduring digital record of Sikkim's vanishing indigenous and Buddhist cultures. Its first film, "Tingyong: a Lepcha village in Sikkim" has been screened at several ethnographic film festivals in Europe and Asia.

The Institute can assist PhD level students and senior scholars in carrying out field research in Sikkim. Sikkimese Studies are indeed in their infancy and we would particularly welcome research in Lepcha ethnography and ethno-botany, archaeology, history, linguistics, art history and Buddhist Studies. With the aim of promoting Sikkimese Studies, recent research carried out by both local and foreign scholars on Sikkim's Buddhist and indigenous cultures has been published in the latest volumes of the *Bulletin of Tibetology*.

Further details on the NIT may be obtained via its website, www.tibetology.net, or by email from info@tibetology.net. The website includes a link to the Digital Himalaya site, where articles from the collection of editions of the *Bulletin of Tibetology* published between 1964 and 2004 may be freely downloaded.

Further details on the NIT may be obtained via its website, www.tibetology.net, or by email from info@tibetology.net.

The Encompass programme, established in 2006 by the Department of History at Leiden University, aims to make the priceless sources left by the Dutch East India Company available to students from Monsoon Asia and South Africa. Access to these sources has long been problematic due to the distances involved and an unacquaintance with the Dutch language.

Encompass: of local histories and global perspectives

CAROLIEN STOLTE

Encompass students receive training in reading and working with Dutch source materials, as well as a broad introduction to histories that may be written by using these sources. They also have the opportunity to develop their general research skills. The programme stimulates students to develop a global outlook in their studies, and to use Dutch primary sources to write local and regional histories that go beyond the traditional colonial interpretations. This two- and three-year educational programme, which begins with a conversion year at the BA level, ultimately leads to an MA or MPhil degree. It is carried out in close cooperation with the Dutch National Archives, the Arsip Nasional Republic Indonesia in Jakarta, and several partner universities in Asia. For five consecutive years - from 2006 to 2010 - twelve scholarships are available annually for students from Monsoon Asia and South Africa. The first year commences with a one-month intensive Dutch language course, followed by semi-intensive language courses throughout the rest of the year. In addition, the students take courses in history and write a BA thesis.

As this goes to press, the students of the Encompass BA group are writing those theses. Subjects vary from concubines in the Dutch Indies between 1900-1935 to the cultural history of interaction in 17th century India. The academic background of the students is as diverse as their thesis subjects, but as it turns out, the two are not necessarily related. Many of the students seize the Encompass programme as an opportunity to get involved in new fields of study. An interview with four of the Encompass students reveals that one student has moved from urban history to the history of nationalism, another has switched disciplines from sociology to history and for a third, the Early Modern period is a whole new subject.

The primary sources used by students for their research are equally diverse and paint an excellent picture of the wealth of material that is available in and around Leiden: pictures in the collections of the KITLV (Royal Netherlands Institute for Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies); 17th century travel accounts in the Dousa Room of the University Library; newspapers and other documents in the National Archives in The Hague are but a few examples of the sources that are currently used by the BA group. All students are excited about the proximity of so many sources, and intend to work on them even more in-depth during the MPhil phase of their programme.

However, using Dutch sources also means that the students have to master the Dutch language prior to going to the archives. For some, this has

met with considerable difficulties. All agree that the first year of Encompass is an intensive one in terms of language acquisition, and that there is a world of difference between reading Dutch and speaking it. Second-year student Farabi Fakhri confirms that while he is now able to read Dutch without much difficulty, conversational Dutch is progressing at a slower pace. BA student Johny Qusyairi too is able to read Dutch now, even if not at as fast a pace as he would like to, but he does not feel confident speaking it. BA student Manjusha Kurrupath summarises the conversation: 'It's a complicated language'.

In the second year, students take part in the regular MA/MPhil programme of the Leiden History department. Students acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to carry out historical research on Asian history between 1600 and 1950 in Dutch-language archives. Those students who wish to focus on the VOC sources may take additional courses in reading Dutch manuscripts from that era. Students have the option of specialising in either the History of European Expansion and Globalisation, or Historical Archival Science. In the middle of the second year outstanding students may apply for the MPhil programme in History. These students work on an MPhil thesis and write a PhD research proposal under intensive personal guidance of experts in the field. The Department of History is currently raising funds for an Encompass PhD programme centered around the theme 'Changes of Regime in Asia, 1600-1960', which will be launched in 2009.

The BA students are enthusiastic about starting their next year of Encompass. They especially look forward to having more interaction with Dutch students, as they will take courses in the regular MA and MPhil programmes and their classes will consist of larger groups. Since they spend many hours in language acquisition in the first year and their history courses are in English, they do not meet many regular Dutch students, which is something they all look forward to.

The broad outlook of the programme is a recurring theme. As Johny Qusyairi says: "You learn the global context of your own history, which I never really thought of before." BA student Yulia Irma confirms that the connection of local histories to a larger global story is one of the most attractive features of the programme. All of the interviewed students mention the fact that their classes on European Expansion also paid attention to the world across the Atlantic, which is new for many. Manjusha Kurrupath: "It is a very new perspective from what you learn back home."

An International Conference in Guangzhou and Macao, December 3-7, 2007.

Guangzhou and Nagasaki compared

EVERT GROENENDIJK

In commemoration of 400 years of Dutch relations with Guangzhou (Canton), the Consulate General of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Guangzhou published an edited volume in 2004, written by Chinese and Dutch historians titled: *Sailing to the Pearl River*. Because the book was very well received, an academic follow-up on a comparative theme seemed a good idea. In close cooperation with scholars from Japan, China and the Netherlands it was decided to organise two international academic conferences – one in China in 2007, and one in Japan in 2009 – on the ancient port cities of Canton and Nagasaki, as well as their satellite cities Macao and Hirado.

The first of these two conferences, titled: *Canton and Nagasaki Compared 1730 – 1830: Dutch, Chinese, Japanese relations*, was held between December 3-7, 2007, in Guangzhou and Macao. This conference was organised by the Consulate General of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Guangzhou, in cooperation with the Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, the Guangzhou Museum, the Cultural Affairs Bureau of the Macao S.A.R. Government, and financially supported by Leiden University, the Univer-

sity of Tokyo, the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, and the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) in Leiden. Some 25 scholars presented their research. Comparative studies of the port cities of Canton and Nagasaki, which both served as a window to the outer world during the early modern period of China and Japan, are few and far between, even though in the past both cities played similar historical roles as brokers of trade, information and culture with foreign powers. Coincidentally, Dutch East India Company servants were active in both cities for a very long time and kept diaries of their daily routine and dealings with the Chinese and Japanese merchants and officials. (The English translations of the diaries composed at the Deshima factory in Nagasaki have been published for most of the 17th and 18th centuries and are available at the Japan-Netherlands Institute, Tokyo and the Leiden History Department. The first Canton diary was recently published in Macao and is available at the Macao Cultural Institute.)

The conference started at the Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou. The three keynote speakers and co-organisers opened the conference on Monday morning: Professor Cai Hongsheng (Sun Yat-sen University) described Canton and Nagasaki and their respective hinterlands, Professor Leonard

continued on page 40 >

continued from page 39 >

Blussé (Leiden University) sketched the global context of the development of trade in Canton and Nagasaki at the end of the 18th century, and Professor Haneda Masashi (University of Tokyo) compared the institutional organisation of both cities with harbour cities in the Middle East at that time, thereby setting the framework for the meeting.

Four central themes had been chosen to compare the port cities with each other. Most speakers were able to make direct comparisons themselves, others complemented each other.

The first theme was Control and administration of the (local) government. Papers included a view on both cities from the Imperial Palace in Beijing (Prof. Iwai Shigeki of the University of Kyoto); the import of Chinese and Dutch books into Japan (Prof. Wim J. Boot of Leiden University), and immigration aspects for Chinese travelling to Japan (Dr. Watanabe Miki of the University of Tokyo).

Tuesday morning started with the second theme: Acceptance and refusal of foreign thoughts and foreign influences on the arts. Six speakers gave a comprehensive overview of foreign influences on painting and porcelain, the transport of these articles to and from both cities, and the collections of these pieces of art abroad. Ms. Ito Shiori (Chiba City Museum of Art) and Dr. Jiang Yinghe (Sun Yat-sen University) described the development of specific themes in paintings destined for the foreign market; Ms Zeng Lingling (Guangzhou Museum) and Dr. Liu Zhaohui (Fudan University, Shanghai) talked about the influence of foreign trade on porcelain production, pointing out interesting similarities between Chinese Jingdezhen porcelain and Japanese Imari porcelain. Dr. Daniel Finamore of the Maritime Art and History Department of the Peabody Essex Museum in Salem, Massachusetts, highlighted the role American ships played in the Dutch trade between Batavia and Canton and Nagasaki during the Napoleonic War, and Dr. Jan van Campen of the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam commented on the extensive Chinese collections of late-18th century Dutch collectors.

Tuesday afternoon was spent visiting local historic sites. Professor Zhang Wenqin (Sun Yat-sen University), armed with books full of illustrations, showed us pictures of the Huangpu anchorage and contrasted them with the present situation. Although the harbour scene has changed dramatically over the years, he was still able to give us a good impression of what it must have looked like. The foreign cemetery nowadays consists of just 28 tombstones placed together. There must have been hundreds of them in the past. The cemetery was reconstructed in 2001 on the basis of a painting in the collection of the Peabody Essex Museum. Finally, we visited the Huangpu Military Academy, where Professor John E. Wills Jr. (University of Southern California) gave a short introduction on the early Republican period.

Before setting sail for Macao where the second part of the conference was hosted, we spent Wednesday morning visiting the Guangzhou Museum and Shamian Island, where foreign factories were established from 1858 onward, after big fires had destroyed the original buildings in Shisanhang (or 'Thirteen Factory Street'). En route to Macao, we visited the old Humen Fort along the narrows of the Bocca Tigris, where ships used to pass on their way to Huangpu Anchorage.

In Macao the second part of the conference kicked off with the third theme: Acceptance and refusal of foreign thoughts: influence on people's daily lives. Eight speakers presented their research on different aspects of ordinary life, trade life, dangers etc.

The differences in the daily life of the people representing the European Companies in Guangzhou and on Deshima (Nagasaki) became clear with the presentation of Cynthia Viallé (Leiden University) on the Dutch diaries. In Guangzhou, various foreign countries had representatives stationed in their respective factories, whereas on Deshima the VOC was the only Western company allowed to keep an establishment. Dr. Liu Yong (Xiamen University) spoke of the business culture in both cities, and Dr. Yao Keisuke (University of Kitakyushu) focused on the fundamentally different roles that linguists played in both harbours. One of the interpreters who provided simultaneous translations of the presentations during the conference mentioned afterwards that he had learned a lot that day about his predecessors. Dr. Paul van Dyke (University of Macao) entertained us with a richly illustrated PowerPoint presentation on fire fighting in Guangzhou in the past. This lecture drew much interest from the Japanese participants who pointed out the very different organisation of fire brigades in early modern Japan.

In the final session Professor Murao Susumu (Tenri University) discussed the role of Christianity in Guangzhou and Macao; Dr. Cheng Cunjie of the Guangzhou Museum described the role of Hong Merchants in Guangzhou with regard to the financing of the Lianfeng Temple in Macao; Professor Matsukata Fuyuko (University of Tokyo) discussed Dutch reports in Japan on the Opium War and Patrizia Carioti (University of Napoli) concluded with a comparison of the founding histories of Macao and Hirado.

On Friday, the role of Macao was placed within a somewhat broader time frame. Professor John E. Wills Jr. opened the day with a survey of the main events in the South China Sea during the 18th century. He was followed by Dr. Oka Mihoko (University of Tokyo), who discussed Macao as a financial centre in 17th century maritime Asia. Professor Zhang Wenqin discussed the development of Pidgin Portuguese in Canton, and Professor Qi Jinping (Zhejiang University) presented his views on the trade between Japan and Macao, and the role played by the Jesuits. Ms. Rosalien Van der Poel (Museum of Ethnology, Leiden) was the final speaker. She made a plea to preserve and restore Chinese export paintings of the late 18th century in the holdings of the Leiden Museum and the Guangzhou Museum.

The transactions of the conference will be published in the course of 2008. The second conference in Japan is scheduled to be held in 2009, when the foundation of the first Dutch trading factory at Hirado 400 years ago will be celebrated. Without doubt that conference will be as great a success as the present one which brought together a choice of scholars from China, Japan and the West.

Niels Mulder reflects on his retirement in the Philippines, home to the longest running Mao-inspired insurgency in Asia

Among Neighbours

NIELS MULDER

As if my life in 2007 had not been exciting enough, happenings in far-away Holland cast their shadow over my newly revitalised existence when the public prosecutor in The Hague ordered the remand of Joma Sison, founding father of the reconstituted communist party of the Philippines and, more pertinently, its armed arm, the National People's Army (NPA). The government in Manila holds him to be the NPA's perennial supremo, and so he has to take the blame for many things that happen in its name.

Of course, whatever his friends say to the contrary, people who profess with Mao that power flows from the barrel of a gun, are not precisely peaceable, and so the widows of two former ranking comrades in arms, who had fallen out with the policy of violence and were consequently killed by NPA death squads, thought to have a case against Sison who, ever since 1987, basks in the open-mindedness of the Dutch. Whereas this may mean that he is not held to direct a rebellion against a friendly government half a world away, the prosecutor, backed up by the claim to evidence of the Philippine authorities, thought to be able to make his case, and so, on the 28th of August, Joma landed in the Scheveningen High Security Penitentiary.

Hullabaloo among the youthful left from Amsterdam and Sydney to San Francisco; demonstrations; articles about Dutch fascism and the sorry state of human rights in the Netherlands; in brief, the usual rigmarole of those who still believe in Maoist solutions and who have mercifully been spared the experience of life under people's democracy. On the other side the hurrahs of the Philippine government which currently has a rather unenviable reputation as far as justice and human rights go.

Then, at the height of a pandemonium of hopes and indignation and just a few days after the arrest, I was visited by local representatives of the NPA. It was a Saturday, and so Girl was there. They introduced themselves politely as neighbours, Ka Kokoy and Ka Lewis, who came to make the acquaintance of new people in the, or their, area, and as we sat down, I was impressed by the depth of brainwashing in Mao's and Sison's violent gospel they had undergone.

My conversation partner had graduated as an engineer and spoke English well. He came with lots of Maoist propaganda and defended the Movement by insisting that it was an insult that it had meanwhile been blacklisted as a terrorist organisation. He was a revolutionary and I cautiously observed that he had a cause, without,

however, observing that violence had not furthered it in the 38 years that the armed branch of the CPP has been active or that those who deserted and tried to achieve their aims peacefully are shot as a matter of course.

Somehow, I couldn't dislike the fellow, all the more so since he confessed to his isolation among his semi-literate brothers in arms. Whenever one of them had business down the slope—buying food or cigarettes, hardware or other supplies—he asked that he buy a newspaper in order to be informed about what perspired in Manila. He was the only one so inclined and had no partner to exchange views. He visibly enjoyed talking with me, and when I gave him a few articles I recently published in the local university journal, he was deeply satisfied and promised to react to them, most probably in writing. At the same time he romanticised his peripatetic existence, never staying long in any one place while pinning his hammock in isolated farms, lonely barns and sheds, or just between the trees. He had even married a fellow revolutionary, a woman with clear ideas about the socialist paradise; yet, he had nobody to talk to.

You should know that I live in relative isolation seven kilometres up from town on the slope of Mount Banahaw where members of the NPA freely roam. The locals know

'Even in Inner Mongolia they



Henk Schulte Nordholt

Anna Yeadell, Editor of IIAS Newsletter and Manon Osseweijer, Coordinator of Academic Affairs at IIAS interview Henk Schulte Nordholt, on his appointment in January 2008 as Chair of the IIAS Board.

AY: I think readers will be interested to know a little of your background Henk, you are currently Director of Research for the Royal Netherlands Institute for Southeast Asian and Caribbean studies (KITLV); you started there as a project leader?

HSN: Yes, before that I studied history at the Free University of Amsterdam. I became involved with anthropology because I did my PhD project and field

work on the island of Bali. Bali proved to be a wonderful laboratory in exploring all kinds of disciplines. Then I worked in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Amsterdam, where there was a happy mixture of history, sociology and anthropology and I felt very comfortable in that kind of environment. In 2002 there was an opportunity to co-ordinate a big new research project at KITLV on modern Indonesia and I was very happy to jump into that. It introduced me to a lot of new topics, and it was important for putting KITLV on the map in terms of doing research on modern Indonesia. It had an image of being a bit old fashioned, being oriental. I had to pull it, a little bit, into the present. We decided to do research on the present state of the state. There is, worldwide, an enormous decentralisation going on. You might say that after the cold war the strong state lost its relevance, whereas new liberalism urged for more open markets, less states. Sometimes with the legitimising slogan 'less state, more democracy', well that remains to be seen. But it forced us to reconsider. After decentralisation we found ourselves back in the regions where we hadn't been for a long time. It forced us to formulate new questions about the nature of the local state. And that doesn't only apply to Indonesia, this is a much wider phenomenon, I think.

MO: other than the topic of decentralization and the state of the state, what are your current research interests?

HSN: Following on from the 'embeddedness' of the state in society, that leads you to the kind of every day practice of the state. How do people experience the state? The past in many post-colonial societies is totally dominated by the nationalist project. The nationalists won and they monopolised history. Gradually it becomes clear that in many colonial societies the option for the nationalist trajectory was very risky. And it was a very unlikely outcome. If we try to imagine how life was in, say, 1935 in most places, hardly anybody could predict that 10 years or 15 years later there would be de-colonisation all over the place. So I think we should not underestimate other ambitions, other options people had. For instance, maybe modernity was much more attractive than nationalism.

AY: in January of this year you became chair of the board of IIAS, I wonder what it was about the role that attracted you, and what you see as the challenges for you in this position?

HSN: I think IIAS comes, for me at least, at exactly the right time. After many years of conducting research on Indonesia, I very much need a broader comparative field. At the same time, looking at IIAS over the years, the first phase of IIAS expansion and the amazing achievement of Wim Stokhof with his team then, he really put IIAS irreversibly on the map. It's there and everybody knows it. Even

the faces of many of them as they try to influence my neighbours with their revolutionary rhetoric. In this way, they advise them to refuse to work for the pittance of the standard wage, but as the woman who works for me put it, they then would starve because nobody is going to pay more and people are desperately short of both work and cash. Alas, apart from words, these NPA's also carry guns in an area that is beyond the reach of army or police, and hereabout Ka Kokoy and his ilk are my neighbours, too.

That evening I wondered why they had not come much earlier in my four-year stay on the slope. Simultaneously, the Dutch foreign ministry issued a negative travel advice for the Republic of the Philippines, and the embassy in Manila was closed. On top of these came Girl's agitation, and so the next day I moved to the hot and humid hotel room where I had spent my days as a researcher. After all, the assurances of the NPA spokesman and the Philippine government notwithstanding, I would, in view of my circumstances, be the easiest hostage to take if the rebels wanted to put pressure on The Hague. Of course, at the time I was an adventurous, young anthropologist, I would not have minded to enjoy a few weeks of jungle hospitality, but now, in my retirement, I happily leave such experiences to those who still

are in the springtime of life. As a result, I granted Girl's dearest wish of me leaving the country for the time being. My travel agent could still squeeze me in on one of the suddenly heavily booked KLM flights, and so I arrived as a refugee in Amsterdam on the 5th of September.

After being held incommunicado for seventeen days, Joma, or rather the prosecutor-general, had his day in court, and one wonders why they had it at all. Already under Marcos, Joma spent seven years in prison with little chance to influence or direct his fellow revolutionaries. When Corazon Aquino came to power in February 1986, she released the former dictator's political prisoners, among whom – much to the dismay of the army brass – Joma Sison. When in January 1987 the peace negotiations between the government and the political Left collapsed, and the old oligarchy was restored, Joma thought – and rightly so – he had better exile himself to the Netherlands, a traditional safe-haven for all sorts of Filipinos opposing Marcos.

Meanwhile, Sison and his group of ranking cadres have been living there for 20 years, and even as the various Philippine governments have sought their extradition, the Dutch cannot get rid of them because they cannot extradite to countries that have capital punishment on their books. Sison

and his comrades in arms do not enjoy asylum status, yet could profit from the Netherlands' social security guarantees until, in the aftermath of September 11, their party and its armed branch were characterised as terrorist organisations. Only since then their life has become slightly less comfortable in the now, because of them, well-known city of Utrecht.

Anyway, the P-G had a hard time to convince the judge that somebody who has been relatively isolated from the movement he founded, first for seven years, and then for twenty, has the power of ordering the killing of former comrades half a globe away. To understand that he was willing to order the suspect's remand at all can only be because he took the bait of President Arroyo who is rabidly opposed to any deal with the militant Left and who has vowed to wipe them of the face of the Philippine earth before the end of her term in 2010. Yet, all their bragging and documentation notwithstanding, they couldn't beef up their claim of being able to prove their case, and so the judge dismissed it and set Joma free.

Tenaciously, the P-G appealed, and when, three weeks later, a panel of judges found that it was merely based on hot air – and it must be said that Sison, as a loud-mouthed spokesman, keeps producing a

steady stream of it – the not-unfriendly Dutch could not oblige the authorities in Manila. When this became abundantly clear in the first week of October, I could safely retire to my hermitage on the slope of the sacred Mt. Banahaw, but since, at that time, I spent my days with a friend at his retreat on a slope of the Alpes de Provence, I arrived at mine three weeks after Joma's triumph.

On the slope of the mystical powerhouse Mt. Banahaw, end of October 2007

10 March 2008

These days I live in a war zone. Inspired by Presidential rhetoric and despite torrential rains, the Army shows determination in flushing out the NPA's. Instead of driving them back into the forest-actions my neighbours and I have grown accustomed to – they are hot on their heels in the forest on the higher slope. It started with an encounter at the edge of the Forestry Reserve, about eight-hundred meters up from my house that, according to neighbours, three followers of the Great Joma did not survive. In view of the massive presence of the Army, this body count is not impressive, but neither NPA spokesman Ka Roger nor the newspapers give a clue. As usual, some of the rebels retreated through the adjacent district of Sampaloc – its border runs through my gar-

den-but operations are still going on, as illustrated by the evacuation to the lower slope of my neighbours four to five-hundred meter further up.

10 April 2008

At a quarter to six this morning, the vicinity was enlivened with fireworks. It was a little early to start celebrating a marriage, and when two, three half-hysterical women tried to recover their breath in front of my house, I understood that it was serious. After the Army had set up a field kitchen in a field adjacent to the District Captain's house, people felt safe, and had long returned to their houses, not realizing that they had become part of an NPA target. At this moment, the attractive daughters of my near neighbour and a baby have taken refuge behind the stone walls of the ground floor of my house, but as far as I understand, after twenty minutes of firing, the action was over. It was a typical hit-and-run affair in which the NPA surprised the soldiers at their breakfast. A passing refugee reported that one of them had been hit.

Niels Mulder

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know about IIAS!

in Inner Mongolia they know about IIAS! I think we should capitalise on that. Now, under the new Director, and I and the board very much want to support him, we should try to elaborate more on the potential in terms of innovative and comparative research. I think IIAS is the only place in the world where a really Asia-wide field of comparative research can be at least initiated. And that is a wonderful challenge. I think for the next couple of years it is our intention to initiate innovative new comparative projects and to make IIAS into a kind of new laboratory where all kinds of new research will be conceptualised. I think that is the logical next step.

AY: so you've mentioned how you see IIAS developing in terms of research, there are other developments as well.

H: in terms of communication, IIAS has established this Newsletter, a very important means of communication and I think that should be continued. And the way IIAS is also trying to explore the border area between strict science, academic work and art, public intellectuals, those kind of wider debates, that's very intriguing. That is an effort that has been set in motion and that should be continued. There are a number of interesting discussions going on, on the fringes of academic life, which might be very inspiring for future research. If IIAS can be a kind of friendly host for those activities and develop a good sensitivity for what is going on in the field of arts,

design and media in Asia, we can benefit from that. I think that all kinds of new ideas should get a chance and we should invite young promising scholars to come together and we say, ok, here's money for three to four months, invent a beautiful new programme and if it's good we will support it. So you cannot predict the kinds of directions it will take, it should be open. Apart from that I think what is important is research on energy, bio-fuel; I mean in that respect we see an enormous shift going on, gravitating towards China. China is everywhere in the world where anything is for sale in terms of energy. If you only look at Indonesian Papua, probably millions of hectares of rainforest will be converted into palm oil plantations, so the effects in terms of economy, culture, social relationships, political relationships are immense and it is impossible to stay away from that. It is imperative that IIAS is somehow involved in research and also in debate in that field. Another level is religious movements - not so much the formal side but also the very informal side. In the West, because of fear for radicalism and so on, if you talk about Islam its political scientists that analyse political Islam. We know very little about what these new movements do in terms of everyday Islam for ordinary people. An issue which is often overlooked - maybe because its considered to be old fashioned - but I think is extremely relevant, is the state of citizenship. People talk a lot about civil society and don't talk about citizenship. There is a relationship,

and well maybe that is a discussion that could be stimulated as well.

AY: IIAS has a very clear role in terms of research, but in order to survive it needs to stay relevant and develop outside of research. We have the expertise to become a knowledge hub, we have the expertise to become the place for people to come to connect with other Asianists, for information on Asia, but also it's incredibly important for us to develop this role as a bridge between academia and the outside world.

HSN: absolutely, I can only agree with that. That is one of the very attractive things. Because IIAS is not fully part of a university. That is the kind of liberty we have and that should be capitalised on as well.

MO: Asia's going through a lot of changes at the moment and it's a hot topic in the media and the world at large, China in particular. Do you see this reflected in the research going on in the Netherlands and Europe?

HSN: There is this danger in the Netherlands that we might be in the process of provincialising. That has to do with university politics, because at the level of the universities its now the Deans that decide what is most profitable and, based on market considerations, Asia is not relevant. It's too small, it's too far away and faculties think they should invest in multicultural diversity, that kind of thing. And its basical-

ly focused on the Netherlands, and that is extremely dangerous. But there is very little we can do other than to engage universities in these debates. What I'm really worried about though is that there is a loss of the simple ability to learn a language. How many students today learn Indonesian, or for that matter how many are able to speak Thai? I think there is a considerable number that are still interested in China, that's not my main worry, but how many are able to speak with ordinary people in India apart from in English? And that also has to do with the decline of Area Studies after the cold war. Area Studies was over, it was no longer necessary, except for the Middle East and Afghanistan of course, these hotspots.

AY: Do you think that there is a case now for Area Studies in terms of Asian Studies? Particularly in respect of the position of China and India?

HSN: I'm very ambivalent on Area Studies, because areas don't produce the kind of analysis that is really helpful. What we do need is a kind of deep local knowledge combined with broader disciplinary themes, good training, to connect wide theoretical debates with particular local interests. And in that respect, knowledge and access to areas is extremely important. I think its totally useless to try to define what Asia is, I mean people in Japan have no sense of belonging to people in Sri Lanka whatsoever, it is a Western construct

which indicates more or less an area in our world, in which we're interested; there are a lot of dynamics directly interacting with interests in the West. So in terms of dialogue, its is extremely relevant. Also to invest in this local knowledge. And really then language matters.

MO: to finish then, what words of advice would you have for people at the start of their career in the field of Asian Studies?

H: Go for it! I mean, this is the most exciting and most dynamic developments that are taking place and it's your chance to experience all kind of vibrant changes and such rich dynamics. And it helps if you've been there, it helps after you're back, you start to learn about you're society.

IIAS Research

Programmes

Asia Design

This programme will consist of a number of individual projects related to graphic design - from classical graphics in art and communication to the rapidly emerging fields of cyberculture (New Media, videogames, etc.) and animanga (anime and manga) in East Asia - and architectural design in Asian megacities. The projects address both the physical and social aspects of design.

Institutes involved: IIAS, Modern East Asia Research Centre (MEARC), Delft School of Design (DSD)

Sponsored by: IIAS and Asiascape

Coordinators: Prof. Chris Goto-Jones and Dr Manon Osseweijer

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Catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts

In 1929, two crates of 17th and 18th century Sanskrit manuscripts arrived at the Kern Institute, University of Leiden. This Gonda/IIAS project is preparing a scientific catalogue of the roughly 500 South Indian Sanskrit manuscripts written on palm leaves in ancient Indian scripts such as Grantha, Telugu, Malayalam, Nagari and Nandinagari.

Coordinator: Saraju Rath

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Cross-border marriages in East and Southeast Asia

The past decade has seen a rapid increase in the intra-Asia flow of brides, particularly between Southeast and East Asia. While in Europe inter-mediated marriages continue to be seen as a form of the commodification of women, recent scholarship in intra-Asia cross-border marriages challenges this dominant view.

Coordinator: Melody Lu

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Energy programme in Central Asia - EPA

Established in September 2007, this programme addresses the domestic and geopolitical aspects of energy security for China and the European Union.

The geopolitical aspects involve analysing the effects of competition for access to oil and gas resources and the security of energy supply among the main global consumer countries of the EU and China. The domestic aspects involve analysing domestic energy demand and supply, energy efficiency policies, and the deployment of renewable energy resources. Within this programme scholars from the Netherlands and China will visit each other's institutes and will jointly publish their research outcomes.

Institutes involved: Institute of West Asian and African Studies (IWAAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)

Sponsored by: KNAW China Exchange Programme and IIAS

Coordinator: Dr Mehdi Parvizi Amineh

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Illegal but licit: transnational flows and permissive politics in Asia - IBL

This research programme analyses forms of globalisation-from-below, transnational practices considered acceptable (licit) by participants but which are often illegal in a formal sense. It explores limitations of 'seeing like a state', and instead privileges the perspectives of participants in these illegal but licit transnational flows.

Sponsored by: NWO and ASiA

Coordinator: Willem van Schendel

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Socio-genetic marginalisation in Asia - SMAP

The development and application of new biomedical and genetic technologies have important socio-political implications. This NOW/ASSR/IIAS research programme aims to gain insight into the ways in which the use of and monopoly over genetic information shape and influence population policies, environmental ethics and biomedical and agricultural practices in various Asian religious and secular cultures and across national boundaries.

Sponsored by: NWO, IIAS, ASSR

Coordinator: Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner

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NEW: Searching for sustainability in Eastern Indonesian waters

The threat of biodiversity depletion calls for the establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), especially in rich natural environments like the marine space of eastern Indonesia. Most approaches to the establishment of MPAs, however, are science-based. Several interconnected developments demand a constructive analysis of the societal impacts of a predominantly technical and science oriented approach to the establishment of MPAs around the world. This new programme focuses on MPAs in eastern Indonesia (Wakatobi, Komodo, Derawan, Raja Ampat) and will facilitate the exchange of Dutch, Indonesian, German and Austrian researchers. The aims of the programme are to (1) engage in a methodological training workshop for the three Indonesian partners plus six of their colleagues/staff members and (2) to collectively write a research proposal (2009-2013) on the social-economic and governance conditions of Marine Protected Area development.

Sponsored by: KNAW, IIAS, Wageningen University, Australian Research Council, Center for Tropical Marine Ecology Bremen (ZMT), Germany
Partner institutes: Wageningen University, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Bogor Agricultural University (IPB), The Nature Conservancy, Murdoch University (Perth, Australia), ZMT (Bremen, Germany)

Coordinators: Prof. Leontine Visser (WUR/IIAS) and Dr Manon Osseweijer (IIAS)

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Networks

Ageing in Asia and Europe

During the 21st century it is projected that there will be more than one billion people aged 60 and over, with this figure climbing to nearly two billion by 2050, three-quarters of whom will live in the developing world. The bulk of the ageing population will reside in Asia. Ageing in Asia is attributable to the marked decline in fertility shown over the last 40 years and the steady increase in life-expectancy. In Western Europe, ageing populations developed at a slower pace and could initially be incorporated into welfare policy provisions. Currently governments are seeking ways to trim and reduce government financed social welfare and health-care, including pensions systems, unleashing substantial public debate and insecurity. Many Asian governments are facing comparable challenges and dilemmas, involving both the state and the family, but are confronted with a much shorter time-span. This research programme, in short, sheds light on how both Asian and European nations are reviewing the social contract with their citizens.

Research network involved: Réseau de Recherche Internationale sur l'Age, la Citoyenneté et l'Intégration Socio-économique (REIACTIS)
Sponsored by: IIAS

Coordinator: Prof. Carla Risseuw

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ABIA South and Southeast Asian art and archaeology index

The Annual Bibliography of Indina Archaeology is an annotated bibliographic database for publications covering South and Southeast Asian art and archaeology. The project was launched by IIAS in 1997 and is currently coordinated by the Postgraduate Institute of Archaeology of the University of Kelaniya, Colombo, Sri Lanka. The database is freely accessible at www.abia.net. Extracts from the database are also available as bibliographies, published in a series by Brill. The project receives scientific support from UNESCO.

Coordinators: Ellen Raven and Gerda Theuns-de Boer

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www.abia.net

Islam in Indonesia: the dissemination of religious authority in the 20th and early 21st centuries

Forms and transformations of religious authority among the Indonesian Muslim community are the focus of this research programme. The term authority relates to persons and books as well as various other forms of written and non-written references. Special attention is paid to the production, reproduction and dissemination of religious authority in the fields of four sub-programmes: ulama (religious scholars) and fatwas; tarekat (mystical orders); dakwah (propagation of the faith); and education.

Coordinator: Nico Kaptein

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IIAS ANNUAL LECTURE 2008



'Trauma, Memory and Amnesia' Given by Ong Keng Sen

Thursday 30 October, 15.30
Lutherse Kerk, Amsterdam

Ong Keng Sen (1963) is world renowned theatre maker and Director of TheatreWorks, an international performance company based in Singapore. TheatreWorks is known for its reinvention of traditional performance through a juxtaposition of cultures. It is an organisation dedicated to the development of contemporary arts in Singapore, and a politics of interculturalism in Asia, thereby contributing to the evolution of an Asian identity and aesthetics for the 21st Century.

In his lecture Ong Keng Sen will explain how theatre contributes to coping with traumatic experiences. He will give examples of his work with Cambodian dancers, and will address themes of 20th century history which are painful or taboo, but which can find expression through theatre (Vietnamese boatpeople; Rape of Nanjing, Chinese in Indonesia).

Alongside the IIAS Annual Lecture, Ong Keng Sen will give a masterclass for MA students in International Performance Studies at the Department of Theater Studies at the University of Amsterdam on Friday 31 October.

For information: s.bala@uva.nl.

The Annual Lectures of the International Institute for Asian Studies are given by authorities in their field and address issues of contemporary relevance for developments in Asia and the world. The lectures are open to academics, journalists, politicians, artists, and anyone with an interest in Asia. The 2008 lecture is co-organised with the Praemium Erasmianum Foundation, Amsterdam, on the occasion of its 50th anniversary, featuring the them of 'the New Cosmopolitan'.

Previous IIAS Annual Lectures include:

Chris Patten (2001), Pransanjit Duara (2004), Rem Koolhaas (2005).

For details: www.iias.nl



Call for Panels and Papers

Korea

Seoul

Daejeon



Think Asia!

Daejeon, Korea 6-9 August 2009

ICAS 6 will be hosted by the Chungnam National University (CNU), the Center for Asian Regional Studies (CARS) and Daejeon Metropolitan City and will be held in the Daejeon Conventon and Visitor's Bureau. The overarching theme is: Think Asia! More than 1,500 Asia Studies specialists are expected to come to Daejeon. This city is located in the heart of the Korean peninsula and successfully merges its long history of culture and tradition with leading research in science and technology.

Deadlines are:

- 15 October 2008: Submission of Individual Abstracts
- 15 October 2008: Submission of Organized Panels: organized by a group of different (national) backgrounds.
- 15 November 2008: Submission of Institutional Panels: constituted and sponsored by an institution, an association or a network.

Submission of abstracts and panels is possible as of 15 March 2008 at the ICAS website.

Please note that all abstracts and presentations should be in English. Submission of abstracts for panels and papers can be made through ICAS 6 registration forms available at <http://www.icassecretariat.org>

Information

The International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS) is one of the largest biennial gatherings for Asia scholars to meet and discuss new developments in the fields of the Human and Natural Sciences. Since 1998, ICAS has brought more than 5,000 academics from 60 countries together at five conventions.

For more information on ICAS 6 and requirements for participation, please visit <http://www.icassecretariat.org>

ICAS Book Prizes

For the third time the ICAS Book Prizes will be awarded in the categories: Humanities, Social Sciences, Best PhD and Colleagues' Choice Award.

Deadline: 31 August 2008

ICAS Publications Series

A selection of the ICAS 6 papers will be included in edited volumes of the ICAS Publications Series at Amsterdam University Press.

Financial support

Financial support for travel and lodging will be made available to a selected number of PhD students and young academics.

Announcements

Experiences, ideologies and politics: Conference on return migration in Asia

31 July – 1 August

National University of Singapore, Singapore

Despite the burgeoning literature on a wide range of transnational migratory flows in Asia, research on “return” remains scarce. Return migration is not just a form of reverse flow; “return” is a highly emotive and contested notion. Why, for example, is the Nikkeijins’ journey from Latin America to Japan called “return” although for most of them Japan is but a foreign country? Why are the governments of China, India, the Philippines and Singapore, to name a few, actively encouraging “return” which supposedly becomes less relevant due to globalisation and circular migration? How should we understand the recent proliferation of bilateral “readmission agreements” between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries aimed at enforcing return?

“Return” is both emotional and political because it is regarded as at once an unquestionable right and an uncontested duty, and is by definition bound to such primordial notions as “home,” “roots,” and “belonging.” In this workshop, we attempt to problematise these conventional understandings and open up the concept of “return” as a strategic moment of redefining economic, social and political relations in contemporary Asia:

Firstly, at the individual level, return constitutes a defining moment in a migrant’s life cycle and social relations. Return as an important life experience provides a powerful lens for analyzing how individuals interact with local societies, particularly in terms of social stratification, gender relations, family ideologies and identity, within a transnational context.

Secondly, return (re)defines states’ relations to mobile citizens and mobile foreigners. The admission of unskilled foreign workers in Asia is typically based on the assumption that the migrants would return. Indeed, deportation programs, often legitimated as a duty of return, have been crucial for the formation of migration policies in several Asian countries in the last decade.

Thirdly, return redefines Asia’s relations with the world. Historically, large-scale return migrations are always related to changes in international relations. The migration of South Asians back to the subcontinent following independence in 1947, Chinese descendants in Southeast Asia to the newly founded PRC in the 1950s and 1960s, and more recently, Viet kieu to socialist Vietnam, are just a few examples. Today, in most parts of Asia, return is an enterprising project instead of an exercise due to nostalgia. Returning to China or India from the West, for example, is perceived as a “return to the future”—to be ahead of global business and technology curves. Returnees are significant because the action of return reinforces allegiance and loyalty, yet the returnees are expected to rejuvenate

and even revolutionise the old. Return energizes nationalism in the globalizing world.

In sum, return destabilizes and alters some social relations, and at the same time serves to valorise and reinforce others. Return is as much an experience as a discourse. We thus see return as part of the project of remaking order in an increasingly mobile, open and inter-connected Asia.

The following are the themes of the conference:

1. The process and experiences of return migrations that complicate the notion of “return” (e.g. return as a transitory phase leading to a further migratory project, and return as a continuation of mobility by moving to a major city instead of home village in the country of origin);
 2. The social and political production of return migrations (e.g. ethno-nationalism in South Korea and Japan that encourages the return of ethnic Koreans and Japanese from overseas, and the 1997 financial crises that triggered large scale expulsions of migrant workers in Southeast Asia);
 3. Return and the changing economic order;
 4. Return programs and policies, both those aimed at pulling desirable returnees and those removing the undesired;
 5. Return as a dream, a topic, a metaphor, and an idea (for example, return as a recurrent theme in arts, and the linkage between the meaning of return and the politics of return on the ground).
- Convenors: XIANG Biao, Brenda YEOH, Mika TOYOTA

For more details please contact Ms Alyson ROZELLS at alysonzells@nus.edu.sg

Waters in south and southeast Asia: interaction of culture and religion 3rd SSEASR conference

3 – 6 June 2009

Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia

The 3rd SSEASR (South and Southeast Asian Association for the Study of Culture and Religion) conference on Waters in South and Southeast Asia: Interaction of Culture and Religion, co-sponsored as an IAHR Regional Conference, will be held in Denpasar from 3 – 6 June, 2009. The conference will be held in collaboration with Institut Seni Indonesia (ISI) and Universitas Hindu Indonesia (UNHI), Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia.

More information on the website: www.sseasr.org

Contact: Prof I Wayan Rai, PhD.,

Rector, ISI, Chair,

Organising Committee,

thirdSSEASR@hotmail.com

Amarjiva Lochan, President, SSEASR at secretariat@sseasr.org

Young academic research on contemporary Chinese art conference, 2009

Free University, Berlin, Germany

For attention of all those working on aspects of contemporary Chinese art in the academic context.

With reference to an international conference, planned for the year 2009 at the Free University in Berlin, Germany, we are currently setting up a list of persons around the world, who are active in the academic research on contemporary Chinese art, with a special focus on graduate students writing their PhD in the field.

The aim of the conference is to reflect the international state of academic research on contemporary Chinese art and will therefore include a focus on methodological approaches. It is designed to provide a forum of vital exchange and to strengthen further international cooperation within this growing, yet largely undefined field.

We are very much looking forward to your answer and suggested topics in order to conceive the ideal call for paper. Further recommendations as well as suggestions for the conference are warmly welcome.

Please let us know your name, institutional affiliation, the title of your project, as well as a very brief outline of your thesis (2-3 sentences).

Please send your information to: birgithopfener@gmx.de

Chair of the Institute for East-Asian Art History at FU Berlin:

Prof. Jeong-Hee Lee-Kalisch

8th ICOPHIL in Manila Conference

July 23-26, 2008

PSS Center, Quezon City, Philippines

The Eighth International Conference on Philippine Studies (ICOPHIL) will be held on July 23-26 and is hosted by the Philippine Studies Association at the Philippine Social Science Center on Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City. The Philippine Social Science Council serves as Secretariat. The ICOPHIL conference series is held once every four years at an international hosting institution and provides anyone working in any aspect of the study of the Philippines the opportunity to meet colleagues from around the world. Many friendships have been made or renewed and valuable collaborative projects have been launched thanks to contacts made at earlier ICOPHIL meetings. In 2004, the 7th ICOPHIL was hosted by Leiden University in The Netherlands where almost 270 scholars presented papers during seventy panel sessions. Looking ahead, in 2012 the 9th ICOPHIL will be hosted by Michigan State University in East Lansing.

This year’s conference theme is “Philippine Studies for the 21st Century: New

Meanings, Critiques, and Trajectories.” There are plans for over eighty panels, special sessions designated for plenary speakers, and evening cultural events. The organizers hope that this year’s ICOPHIL will provide a forum for scholars to reflect on Philippine realities in the new global era. If this goal is realized, the conference should help re-conceptualize Philippine Studies and chart new directions for the 21st century.

The 8th ICOPHIL is also coordinated with this year’s celebration of the Centennial of the nearby University of the Philippines which should add an additional festive air to the proceedings.

Although the date for submission of proposals is past, attendance is encouraged as the conference is open to the public. For further information about the conference, registration cost and methods of payment, housing, and other relevant information, see the website maintained by the Secretariat (www.pssc.org.ph/icophil). For inquiries or further information, please contact: Bernardita R. Churchill, President, Philippine Studies Association.

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Call for papers

Rethinking Urban-rural Interactions in China’s Agricultural Development: Beyond the Urban Bias?

9th European Conference on Agriculture and Rural Development in China (ECARDC IX)

3 – 5 April 2009

University of Leeds, UK

China has witnessed remarkable economic growth, unprecedented industrialisation and urbanisation, and dramatic transformations of the urban and rural development landscape since the initiation of the market reforms three decades ago. The impact on the rest of the world has been huge, catching the attention of academics, development practitioners and policy makers worldwide. A large and still growing body of research has been devoted to investigate and understand China’s phenomenal growth and its broader implications, while relatively less effort has been dedicated to critically analyse and reflect on the many dilemmas of rapid growth and drastic societal change, including particularly the ever widening urban-rural inequalities that have in many ways overlapped with inter- and intra-regional disparities, and separated urban and rural societies in all

conceivable dimensions. The challenges that this poses to the realisation of the larger development vision – the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), at both the global and national level – the promotion of human well-being and the widening of the choices and freedoms for all Chinese citizens, have yet to be fully confronted.

Following the 16th and 17th CCP National Congresses convened in 2002 and 2007 respectively, the current Chinese leadership has given high priority to effectively address the serious human development challenges. Official discourses have begun to de-emphasise the exclusive pursuit of GDP growth and now also attach importance to social security and welfare; equity, social justice and redistribution of resources between different sectors, regions and social groups; sustainability, and equal sharing of development benefits by the Chinese people; represented in such discourses and campaigns as ‘building a harmonious society’, ‘upholding the “scientific development view”’, ‘people-centred and balanced development’ and ‘industry subsidising agriculture’, and since 2006 the ‘construction of the new socialist countryside’ movement. New policy initiatives introduced in 2007 involve piloting in Chengdu and Chongqing of an urban-rural integrated development programme, and various social protection schemes for rural-urban migrants across the country. Yet we may only be able to glean the gravity of the problems and the daunting nature of the tasks of integrating urban-rural development from the provisional official timetable: full integration of urban and rural social welfare, for instance, is currently scheduled for 2020. Whether this timescale is realistic is probably less important than the longer-term effects of the new policies.

Against this backdrop and in commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the historical turning point in China’s modern history – the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, ECARDC IX has launched the conference theme – Rethinking urban-rural interactions in China’s agricultural development: Beyond the urban bias? We invite Chinese indigenous academics and international scholars, development practitioners and those from diverse policy arenas to contribute thoughts, papers and panels around the broad theme as stated above. The wider aim and objectives of the conference involve not only a critical reflection on and rethink of China’s recent development trajectories entailing development strategies, policies and outcomes, but also, on a historical and contemporary basis to compare with developed and other developing countries and regions of the world, consider similarities and differences with regard to the urban-rural divide or integration, the lessons that China can learn from such a comparison, and what contributions that the Chinese experiences can make, theoretically, methodologically and empirically, to our understanding and knowledge of

processes of development and change and what effects this can create on development policy and practice within China and beyond.

Topics under this broad conference theme may include the following:

- 1 Exploring theoretical and methodological approaches to understanding urban-rural relations and interactions, as well as their policy implications for urban-rural integration in China;
- 2 Historical experiences of agricultural and rural development in China and beyond;
- 3 Examining and comparing the differences and similarities of agricultural and rural development, industrialisation and urbanisation processes, and the dynamics of urban-rural interactions in the Chinese Mainland, Taiwan and Hong Kong, and the rest of the world and mutual lessons to be learned;
- 4 Charting and comparing the various aspects in respect of the complexities, diversity and dynamics of the urban-rural 'divide' or 'integration' across time and space in China drawing on empirical evidence;
- 5 Exploring the theoretical, methodological, empirical and policy relevance of a risk perspective on agricultural and rural development or urban-rural integration;
- 6 Globalisation and its impact on local processes in China's agricultural and rural development;
- 7 Examining the institutional and social contexts where urban-rural differences have been sustained, reproduced or reshaped in respect of resources and their (re)distribution, rights and entitlements, fiscal reforms, policies and practice; kinship, family, marriage and gender relations;
- 8 Livelihoods, rural-urban and rural-rural migration and linkages, rural entrepreneurship, social capital, and social networks and connections in China.

When addressing the above topics, you may wish to discuss their specific aspects, for example, the market (of commodities, labour, credit and finance, property rights, ownership,), the state (e.g. democratisation, civil society, governance, fiscal systems), society (e.g. poverty, inequality, social exclusion/inclusion, social support mechanisms, community organisation and participation), culture (e.g. changing values, norms and social practices, consumerism, discourse and power, shifting identities), technology (e.g. emerging forms of agriculture, including hi-tech farming, agro-industries, agro-businesses, skills development, scale, investment, extension and innovation, as well as commercial integration), environment (e.g. environmental degradation and the impact on farming practices, ecologically sustainable farming and diversified management, organic agriculture and green products), social risk (e.g., its social context and public policy relevance, risk regulation and management regimes, and perceptions of and responses to societal and environmental risks), and the impact of climate change.

**"Rock-Paper-Scissors:
Dynamics of Modernity
in China"
4th International Sinology
Forum:**

**5-7 February 2009, Lisbon / 12-14 February 2009, Oporto
Call for papers**

The Portuguese Institute of Sinology is currently organising its 4th International Sinology Forum, to be held in 2009 from 5 to 7 February in Lisbon and from 12 to 14 February in Oporto, on the topic "Rock-Paper-Scissors: Dynamics of Modernity in China". For this purpose it is inviting specialists on China, and in particular researchers, scholars and postgraduate students, to apply for participation. The 4th International Sinology

Forum, like in past editions, will be following a multidisciplinary approach and will be looking forward to congregating a wide range of analyses from a variety of perspectives. It shall be interested especially in developing, subject to the general focus, the following themes:

- 1 Modernities: historical analyses.
- 2 Dynamics in philosophical thought and the idea of modern philosophy.
- 3 Political thought in modern China.
- 4 The reinvention of Chinese religions and new religions.
- 5 The institutionalisation of Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM), and intercultural perspectives of TCM: an alternative modernity?
- 6 Expressions of modernity in Chinese language and literature.
- 7 Dynamics of modernity in the development of science and technology in China.
- 8 Notions of modernity in the Chinese Diaspora.
- 9 Dynamics of artistic creation: visual modernity in China.
- 10 Pragmatism and constructions of modernity in China.
- 11 The new Chinese economic model and its effects.
- 12 New models of internal and external politics in the PRC.
- 13 Spaces of modernity and identity representations.

The Portuguese Institute of Sinology asks all those wishing to participate to send an abstract of their proposed paper and a short Curriculum Vitae of no more than one page to ipsinologia@gmail.com by 31 May 2008. The abstracts of proposed papers should not exceed 500 words and will be analysed by an international committee of experts. The Portuguese Institute of Sinology will notify applicants of its final decision by 31 July 2008. Panelists will be offered a three-night stay in Lisbon or Oporto, depending on where they will be presenting their papers, and some of the papers will possibly be chosen for later publication in the Journal of Chinese Studies of the Portuguese Institute of Sinology, the Revista de Estudos Chineses

A key note speaker from Indonesia will comment on these findings and reflect on land law and justice in the second democratic decennium.

Honouring the work of the Leiden scholar Van Vollenhoven, the workshop on 28 August focuses on adat law. It revolves around the question whether and if yes, how the deployment of customary law in Indonesia and other developing countries can benefit indigenous peoples. The evening programme is a film screening of a recent Indonesian film comedy (with English subtitles) showing issues of land disputes and customary law in a modern urban setting.

On Friday 29, researchers, policy makers, and activists will discuss issues of urban land management in the big cities in Indonesia.

The seminars and workshops, in cooperation with the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), will include the launching books on law and politics in Indonesia.

For more information and updates as well as for registering: www.vvi.leidenuniv.nl/ and click on "events"

**International Conference:
Ritual Dynamics and the
Science of Ritual**

**29 September - 2 October 2008
Heidelberg, Germany**

Collaborative Research Center 619 highlights the relationship between ritual studies and ritual dynamics and breaks new ground in the research.

The Collaborative Research Center 619 "Dynamics of Ritual" (SFB 619) at Heidelberg University is holding an international conference "Ritual Dynamics and the Science of Ritual" from 29 September till 2 October 2008. Experts from around the world have been invited to Heidelberg to discuss their current findings and present them to a wider audience. With this conference, SFB 619 aims to consolidate and expand its interdisciplinary approach.

As an interdisciplinary facility founded in 2002, SFB 619 is the largest research centre worldwide dedicated solely to the subject of rituals, the ways they change and their inner dynamics. The center performs pure research with the aim of developing theories with cross-cultural validity, and presenting explanatory models for the socio-cultural significance of ritual action, as for instance in the legitimisation of power or creation of identity, crisis therapy, or the maintenance of order. At present, nineteen projects are being conducted by over 90 researchers from the fields of Anthropology of South Asia, Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern History, Assyriology, Classical and Modern Indology, Comparative Religion, Egyptology, the History of East Asian Art, the History of South Asia, Islamic Studies, Medical Psychology, Musicology, and Theology. SFB 619 Spokesman Axel Michaels is Professor of Classical Indology and Managing Director of the Excellence Cluster "Asia and Europe" (www.vjc.uni-hd.de). So alongside such interests as creating theories with an interdisciplinary perspective, Asia will also constitute a major regional focus of the conference. The range here extends from Hindu monarchies of southern India from the early Middle Ages to the Colonial era, and from historical to contemporary China and Japan. Asia specialists such as Johannes Bronkhorst (Lausanne), Jan Heesterman (Leiden), Hermann Kulke (Kiel),

Alexis Sanderson (Oxford), Frederick M. Smith (Iowa), and Frits Staal (Berkeley), together with renowned specialists from the world of ritual research, such as Ronald Grimes (Nijmegen/Ontario), Bruce Kapferer (Bergen), and James Laidlaw (Cambridge), have agreed to participate in the conference.

The interdisciplinary teamwork will first be focused on twenty-one panels lasting in some cases several days. Around 250 experts will give brief talks in these panels on their findings and put them up for discussion. In order to underscore the social relevance of ritual research and heed its educational remit from the university, the Dynamics of Ritual Collaborative Research Center also wishes to communicate the topics of its research over and beyond the academic framework, particularly through its accompanying programme.

The official period for registration began on 15 February 2008. All those interested can find the relevant information at www.rituals-2008.com and sign up for the conference newsletter. Please also note the SFB 619 website www.ritualdynamik.uni-hd.de.

**Chinese to English literary
translation
CELTIX PROJECT**

A project to develop a comprehensive database on Chinese to English Literary Translation (CELTIX) has been launched by Research Centre for Translation at The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) with the support of the Asia Pacific Centre. Cooperating partners include among others the CUHK University Library System, the Foreign Languages Press in Beijing and the Centre for Chinese Studies, National Central Library, in Taipei.

The database will be searchable in English and Chinese (characters and Hanyu Pinyin); fields include author and translator, source and translation titles, author and translator's dates and gender, and bibliographical data on source and translation publication; it will cover English translation publication world-wide of traditional, modern and contemporary Chinese literature from China's mainland, Hong Kong and Taiwan; and access will be free of charge.

Users will include English-speaking teachers and students of Chinese as a foreign language; Chinese speakers learning English; scholars in Chinese Studies, Translation Studies and Cultural Studies; Chinese-English translators, publishers and scholars; and general readers of Chinese literature in English translation.

Preparations are underway for a pilot to demonstrate the project's feasibility prior to full-scale operation by the end of 2008. Interested parties who would like to contribute as partner institutions or individuals are welcome to contact the project coordinator, Bonnie S. McDougall, or project manager, Audrey J. Heijns, at the Research Centre for Translation (email: rct@cuhk.edu.hk).

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Dr Irina Morozova

Moscow State University, Russian Federation
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Conflict, Security and Development in the post-Soviet Era: Towards regional economic Cooperation in the Central Asian Region
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Research fellow within the Energy Programme Asia
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1 September 2007 - 1 September 2008

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1 March 2005 - 1 September 2008

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1 October 2008 - 31 March 2009

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1 October 2007 - 30 June 2008

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1 January 2008 - 1 January 2010

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Ethnic Identity of Okinoerabu Islanders in Japan
1 January 2008 - 31 December 2008

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Center for the Pacific Rim, University of San Francisco, United States
Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam
Systems of Alignment in the Asia Pacific
26 May 2008 - 6 July 2008

GENERAL

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Asia from Down Under: Regionalism and Global Cultural Change
5 May 2008 - 7 June 2008

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1 October 2000 - 1 May 2008

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1500-1800

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1 October 2008 - 28 February 2009

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Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, Russian Federation
Annotated Database of Early Mediaeval North Indian Copper Plate Grants
6 October 2008 - 14 November 2008

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29 May 2008 - 28 August 2008

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Cultures of Coping: Community and Natural Hazard in the Philippines
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1 September 1998 - 1 September 2008

International Conference Agenda

MAY 2008

22 - 23 May 2008

Amsterdam, Netherlands

Indonesia ten years after (1998-2008)

conference
 convenor(s): Oost Indisch Huis,
 University of Amsterdam
 organized by KITLV/ASiA & Inside
 Indonesia
 kitlv@kitlv.nl
 www.kitlv.nl

28 May 2008

Leiden, Netherlands

IIAS Fellow Symposium

symposium
 organized by IIAS
 contact: Saskia Jans
 s.jans@let.leidenuniv.nl

JUNE 2008

2 - 4 June 2008

Bonn, Germany

Media in Peacebuilding and conflict

prevention
 conference
 organized by Deutsche Welle Global
 Media Forum
 gmf@dw-world.de

3 - 6 June 2008

Bali Island, Indonesia

*3rd SSEASR conference: Water in South and
 Southeast Asia: Interaction of Culture and
 Religion*

conference
 organized by SSEASR, ISI and UNHI
 secretariat@sseasr.org
 www.sseasr.org

13 - 15 June 2008

British Columbia, Canada

*42 Annual Conference of Asian Studies on the
 Pacific Coast*

conference
 convenor(s): H. Tyedmers
 organized by Centre for Asia-
 Pacific initiatives, University of Victoria,
 Canada
 contact: tyedmers@uvic.ca
 http://capiconf.uvic.ca/index.
 php?cf=3

16 - 17 June 2008

Leiden, Netherlands

*Secularization and Changing Religiosity.
 Cases from Taiwan and the Netherlands*

workshop
 convenor(s): Prof. Hei-yuan Chiu
 organized by IIAS
 contact: Martina van den Haak
 m.van.den.haak@let.leidenuniv.nl
 www.iias.nl

21 - 22 June 2008

Liverpool, United Kingdom

24th ASEASUK Conference

conference
 organized by John Moores University
 contact: Dr. Ben Murtagh
 bm10@soas.ac.uk

26 - 27 June 2008

Leiden, Netherlands

ISMIL12

conference
 convenor(s): Dr Marian Klamer
 organized by IIAS
 contact: Martina van den Haak
 m.van.den.haak@let.leidenuniv.nl
 www.iias.nl

28 June 2008

Leiden, Netherlands

*International Workshop on Minority
 Languages in the Malay/Indonesian*

Speaking World
 workshop
 convenor(s): Dr Marian Klamer
 organized by IIAS
 contact: Martina van den Haak
 m.van.den.haak@let.leidenuniv.nl
 www.iias.nl

30 June - 3 July 2008

Nantes, France

*3rd World Forum on Human Rights
 conference*

convenor(s): International Convention
 Center
 organized by Permanent International
 Secretariat Human Rights and Local
 Governments
 secretariat@spidh.org
 www.spidh.org

JULY 2008

1 - 3 July 2008

Melbourne, Australia

*17th Biennial Conference: Is this the Asian
 century*

conference
 convenor(s): Marika Vicziany
 organized by ASAA/Monash
 University
 http://www.secureregistration.com.
 Asia

10 - 12 July 2008

Verona, Italy

*Seventh ESFO Conference: Putting People
 First: Intercultural Dialogue and Imagining
 the Future in Oceania*

conference
 organized by Università di Verona
 contact: Sigrid Hafner
 Sigrid.Hafner@formazione.univr.it

AUGUST 2008

8 - 9 August 2008

Bandung, Indonesia

*Creative communities and the making
 of place*

conference
 convenor(s): Organizing Committee,
 Arte-Polis2
 organized by Institute of Technology
 Bandung (ITB)
 contact: Dr. Woerjantari Soedarsono
 artepolis@ar.itb.ac.id
 www.ar.itb.id/artepolis2

15 - 18 August 2008

Hanoi, Vietnam

The Harvard Project for HPAIR 2008 Aca-

ademic Conference

conference
 convenor(s): Harvard University
 Cambridge, MA
 organized by Harvard University
 help@hpair.org
 http://www.hpair.org

21 - 24 August 2008

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

HPAIR Business Conference 2008

conference
 convenor(s): Harvard University
 Cambridge, MA
 organized by Harvard University
 help@hpair.org
 http://www.hpair.org

29 - 30 August 2008

Leiden, Netherlands

*Empires and emporia: the Orient in
 World-Historical Space and Time*

conference
 convenor(s): Jos Gommans

organized by Leiden University
 contact: r.j.wensma@let.leidenuniv.nl

SEPTEMBER 2008

1 - 5 September 2008

Leiden, Netherlands

*The 12th International Conference of the
 European Association of Southeast Asian
 Archaeology (EurASEAA)*

conference
 convenor(s): Marijke Klokke
 organized by IIAS
 contact: Martina van den Haak
 euraseaa12@let.leidenuniv.nl
 www.iias.nl/euraseaa12

1 September - 1 November 2008

Bangkok, Thailand

*The 10th International Conference on Thai
 Studies*

conference
 organized by Thai Khadi Research
 Institute, Thammasat University
 contact: Anucha Thirakanont

thaiconference@gmail.com
 www.thaiconference.tu.ac.th

18 - 21 September 2008

Washington, D.C., United States

*Central Eurasian Studies Society
 Ninth Annual Conference (2008)*

conference
 convenor(s): Center for Eurasian,
 Russian & East European Studies
 organized by Georgetown University,
 Washington D.C.
 CESS@muohio.edu

19 - 22 September 2008

Buggiba, Malta

The Social Capital Foundation (TSCF)

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