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APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, Busan, Korea, November 2005. With kind permission APEC www.apec.org

46 The politics of dress

IIAS NEWSLETTER
International Institute for Asian Studies

Transnational flows and the politics of dress in Asia

Mina Roces and Louise Edwards

The carnival of colour that accompanies the annual summits of Asia Pacific Rim leaders in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group is a unique event of political fancy dress. This invented tradition recorded in the annual formal photographs requires all participating political leaders to wear clothing deemed typical of the host nation. The public sharing of fashion across cultures suggests a willingness to consider the world from an alternative perspective - walking in another's shoes - even if only for a very short period.

If indeed official photographs capture self-representations, then the pageant of leaders from different countries all attired in one 'national dress' is a visual display of group solidarity. But it is also a contemporary example of the political uses of dress - the sea of smiling faces adorned in a 'uniform' obscures differences between the economies and geo-politics of the many nation-states that are members of APEC. For one photo moment, 'national dress' (often reinvented for the occasion) pays homage to the host nation and is symbolic of the transnational 'nation' of APEC.

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Director's note

This issue of *IIAS Newsletter* includes a supplement on what we consider to be an important and interesting exhibit: *Picturing China 1870-1950, Photographs from British Collections*. This is not a gratuitous and incidental event, on a more regular basis we wish to draw attention to the arts of Asia, and of course hope to attract new readers by doing so. We are also working on a website, a 'sister' to New Asia Books, which will represent Asian arts in all its forms: dance, music, literature, photography, painting and sculpture. We hope to develop this website as an interactive platform, where information exchange on arts in Asia can take place. We will call it Arts Asia.

The cover of this issue of the Newsletter is graced by what our guest editors describe as 'a unique event of political fancy dress'. The annual formal photograph from the Asia Pacific Rim leaders in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group is a fitting introduction to Mina Roces and Louise Edwards' fascinating theme on 'The Politics of dress'.

The eyes of the world are on Pakistan. Political murder, terrorist attacks and political instability are shaking the country to its foundations. Pakistan is not only of strategic importance for the fight against international terrorism, it is also a nuclear state and the idea that this state - or what would remain of it - could be ruled by undemocratic elements sends shivers down the spine of the West. In this context it is of interest that the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir faces the prospect of détente, and Sanjeeb Kumar Mohanty's enlightening article illustrates the political will and determination of both Pakistan and India to continue recent peace initiatives.

It is not too often that I can combine my responsibilities for IIAS and for the Erasmus Prize - I happen to have the privilege of being director of both organisations - but now a splendid opportunity presents itself. The board of the organisation that awards the Erasmus Prize has decided to bestow the prize for 2008 on Ian Buruma. (See page 39). The Sinologist Buruma is well known among Asianists for his writings on the relationship between East Asia and Europe. The Erasmus Prize can rank as Europe's most important cultural distinction. At the same time, but entirely independent from it, Leiden University has announced that Buruma will hold the prestigious Cleveringa chair this year. We are thrilled that these two events will bring Ian Buruma to Leiden in November this year. During his stay he will be our guest as IIAS professorial fellow. We will announce activities featuring Ian Buruma on our website nearer the time.

Max Sparreboom
director

Corrigenda

Corrigendum to 'The 'Great Game' continued: Central Eurasia and Caspian Region fossil fuels'. IIAS Newsletter #45, Page 15.
The author regrets that an error occurred in the above-mentioned article. In the third paragraph: '..and 10% of it's oil reserves' Should read: '..and about 22% of it's oil reserves'. The author apologises to readers for this mistake.

Corrigendum to 'Chinese medicine in East Africa and its effectiveness'. IIAS Newsletter #45, Page 22.
The author regrets that an error occurred in the above-mentioned article. In the second paragraph: 'At one stage, the PRC dispatched over two hundred expert teams of Chinese biomedical doctors...' should read: 'over two hundred experts in medical teams'. The author apologises to readers for this mistake.

IIAS
International Institute for Asian Studies

The International Institute for Asian Studies is a postdoctoral research centre based in Leiden and Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Our main objective is to encourage the interdisciplinary and comparative study of Asia and to promote national and international cooperation in the field. The institute focuses on the humanities and social sciences and their interaction with other sciences.

IIAS values dynamism and versatility in its research programmes. Post-doctoral research fellows are temporarily employed by or affiliated to IIAS, either within a collaborative research programme or individually. In its aim to disseminate broad, in-depth knowledge of Asia, the institute organizes seminars, workshops and conferences, and publishes the *IIAS Newsletter* with a circulation of 26,000.

IIAS runs a database for Asian Studies with information on researchers and research-related institutes worldwide. As an international mediator and a clearing-house for knowledge and information, IIAS is active in creating international networks and launching international cooperative projects and research programmes. In this way, the institute functions as a window on Europe for non-European scholars and contributes to the cultural rapprochement between Asia and Europe.

IIAS also administers the secretariat of the European Alliance for Asian Studies (Asia Alliance: www.asia-alliance.org) and the Secretariat General of the International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS: www.icassecretariat.org). Updates on the activities of the Asia Alliance and ICAS are published in this newsletter.

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APEC leaders in Vietnamese traditional costumes at the APEC Economic Leader's Meeting, Ha Noi, Viet Nam, November 2006. The 2006 APEC Leaders photographs are reproduced with the permission of the APEC.www.apec.org.

Theme Introduction

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Before the 1990s, few scholars regarded dress as part of 'hard core' politics. Explanations of the globe's diverse political histories have largely ignored the importance of dress as an expression of political identity - this is no less the case in studies of the countries of Asia. This gap is surprising since political elites of these particular regions have been astute interpreters of the semiotics of dress in their programmes of self-representation and their efforts to legitimise access to political power. When nations first came to be imagined in Asia the invention of national dress became part of the essential accoutrements of 'invented tradition'.[1] And later, as the governments experimented with dictatorships and democracy, authoritarian rulers and democrats alike invoked dress as a symbol of their visions of the 'nations' they claimed to represent. Political leaders have likewise used dress to create more subtle political constituencies - such as those based on locality, language, class, ethnicity, party affiliation or religion. These created constituencies could be mobilised and publicly recognised through distinctive deployment of their particular dress markers. Groups that sought access to previously denied political power, such as women, the colonised and minorities, used changes in their dress to announce their public political aspirations. In Asia, dress - incorporating clothing, hairstyle, footwear, body adornments and headwear, and various states of undress - has served as an important signifier of ideological values and political aspirations as well as a fundamental marker of 'us' and 'them' in struggles for political power. Thus, a detailed analysis of the manner in which dress is mobilised is crucial to building a more complete understanding of formal politics.

This special issue is of *IIAS Newsletter* is based on a new book on the politics of dress in Asia and the Americas.[2] The articles focus on how political elites and political activists represented themselves and crafted national and political identities through clothing and bodily practices. We examine the histories broadly, from the period of first interactions of indigenous people with colonial or imperialist powers - to explore how these particular elites manipulated vestimentary practices in order to negotiate for a higher status, not just in the arena of local or national politics, but in the global hierarchy of nations. As dress historians we are acutely conscious of the fluctuations in fashion - the sorts of attire that hold symbolic capital constantly shift through time and space. We track these fluctuations as they analyse the semiotics of dress in political life. Moreover, we pay particular attention to the role that the gendering of dress plays in politics. Inevitably we grapple with dress as a visual marker for status, identity and legitimacy - how dress or undress includes or excludes individuals or groups from political power, citizenship or prestige.

The authors of this special issue engage with one or more of the following four themes: First, they problematise 'national dress' in Asia by critiquing the binary division between Western dress and national dress, and locating its development in the long history of adopting and adapting clothing styles from internal and external influences. The authors ask here: where is national dress located? Is it with indigenous peoples or ethnic peoples, peasantry or *mestizos* (mixed race)? How has it been fashioned and refashioned and which body of citizens does it claim to represent? Second, the contributors unpack the grammar of the elite's attempts at power dressing - their attempts to exude the gravitas of a scholar or the brute force of the soldier, or to access the support of Western allies, or even to claim equality with the colonisers. Third, they explore the gendering of the politics of dress, particularly the shifts in women's inclusion and exclusion from citizenship of the body politic. Here we reveal how the battle between the sexes for political spaces has been expressed in bodily practice - with women manipulating their physical appearances in a bid to claim the right to exercise political power. We also show that women's appearance in 'national dress' was more than a simple sequestering of the female in a romanticised 'traditional' past. Appeals to tradition became powerful forces for political change, and national dress often served to advance radical causes. Finally, since we see dress as a form of 'text' that could be interpreted by both wearer and audience, some of our authors discuss how political elites personalised and popularised particular forms of attire in their attempts to fashion themselves as icons of particular political programmes - for example, as identities with nationalist, religious or class significance. Needless to say, audiences may differ in their interpretations of these particular custom-made clothes, and based on these interpretations choose to accept or reject these personalised costumes.

The six case studies include countries from East Asia (China and Japan) and Southeast Asia (Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Burma). Through the case studies we demonstrate how dress has been an important part of national politics. We explore clear connections between dress and the self-representations of political individuals and groups who fashioned themselves sartorially to forge unique political identities. These regions present unique scope for exploring the transnational and transcultural aspects of the manner in which dress intersects with politics. Political activists in many countries of Asia have been significant drivers of change in creating hybrid political identities. For example, these new identities may simultaneously recognise multiple layers of different cultures inhabiting the same territory, or elevate sartorial symbols of dispossessed minority populations to signifiers of national status. In sum, the nations in the case studies which follow have a long history of dynamic interactions with international and domestic political constituencies in their mobilisation of dress as a signifier of political sentiment.

With thanks to Jan van Rosmalen, KITLV, for the Indonesia and Burma photographs.

Mina Roces, University of New South Wales
Louise Edwards, University of Technology, Sydney

1 Hobsbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger (eds). 1992. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Canto.
2 Roces, Mina and Louise Edwards. 2007. *The Politics of Dress in Asia and the Americas.* Sussex Academic Press ISBN 978 1 84159 163 4. This is the first book in the Sussex Library of Asian Studies Series

Mina Roces argues that there was an inherent tension between Western dress and Filipino dress throughout the 20th century. The contrast between these two types of dress came to represent opposing identities, though their associations with particular categories were not always static or predictable. Even in the gendering of costume, women were not necessarily always the 'bearers of tradition'. Women's dress however, continued to be the Other of men's dress.

Gender, nation and the politics of dress in 20th century Philippines

Mina Roces

The iconography of the People Power 1 Revolution in 1986 was dominated by the images of two powerful women: First Lady Imelda Marcos, resplendent in her *terno* (national dress with butterfly sleeves), and opposition presidential candidate Corazon Aquino, the widow in yellow. The contrast between the elegant First Lady in the national dress she had popularised and the housewife in yellow dresses problematised the tension between Western dress and national dress. The visual categories of Western dress/Filipino dress did not always naturally correspond to not-nationalist/Nationalist, powerful/disempowered, modern/traditional, or even other/self. Whether Western dress and Filipino dress represented the modern nation shifted constantly in different historical periods. Western dress and Filipino dress took on different meanings and different valences that shifted over time. In the American colonial period, for example, Western suits represented the modern nation-to-be while Filipino dress was associated with the colonised subject. After independence, Filipino dress for men in the 1950s began to symbolise the Filipino 'man of the masses'. But in the martial law years, President Marcos and his First Lady Imelda Marcos popularised the two prominent types of national dress, the *Barong Tagalog* for men and the *terno* for women. Fifteen years later the people who demanded Marcos's resignation rejected the Filipino dress associated with the First Family and expressed their opposition to the Marcos Other with a yellow T-shirt.

Filipino dress for this particular study will refer to the *Barong Tagalog* for the male (see photo) and the *terno* for the women. These are the native clothes most popularly used by politicians and most recognised internationally as 'Filipino dress'.

The politics of dress in the American colonial period

The campaign for Philippine independence during the American colonial period raised different issues for men and women. For Filipino men, supporting the nationalist project meant advocating immediate independence from America and working towards that goal. For Filipino women, supporting the nationalist project meant lobbying for a government that would disenfranchise them as women (since most Filipino men were against women's suffrage, which was not won until 1937). This difference in women's and men's positioning in the composition of the future independent nation-state was reflected in dress. The modern Filipino man became synonymous with the *Sajonista* (pro-American): the English-speaking, university educated, professional politician. This modern Filipino was attired in an *Americana* (the Filipino term for a Western suit, jacket and trousers, American style). Wives of politicians, on the other hand, always wore the *terno* and the *pañuelo* (pichu, this disappears after the 1950s) when accompanying their husbands to official functions and duties. In the American colonial period then, men in Western suits represented political power and modernity. Women in *terno* and *pañuelo*, however, represented the disenfranchised, disempowered non-citizen. In wearing the *Americana,* Filipino male politicians disassociated themselves from the colonised by claiming to be among the powerful, while women wore the attire of the colonised subject.

The fact that suffragists and wives of politicians wore the *terno* and the *pañuelo* did not necessarily mean, however, that these women wholly accepted and internalised male representations of them. Suffragists (most of whom were involved in one way or another in women's education) argued that the 19th century Filipino dress was impractical for daily wear; for example, as uniforms for high school or university or in the workplace.[1] And yet, while advocating Western dress for the new modern woman, suffragists deliberately wore the *terno* and *pañuelo* to all official occasions and often to work. Why? The suffragists were considered to be the 'modern' Americanised women of the time: English-speaking, university educated, professional women and clubwomen (the National Federation of Women's Clubs led the suffrage campaign). They were among the first women university graduates (women being allowed into universities in 1908). These women demanded profound changes, including the reform of the Spanish Civil Code, a move more radical than just demanding the vote. However, in a period when most Filipino men, including the majority of delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1934, were against it, the campaign for the vote was revolutionary. The use of national dress to 'repackage' the modern Filipino woman in a traditional women's narrative played on the male

Painting of Imelda Marcos by artist Claudio Bravo. Photograph from Carmen Pedrosa, The Rise and Fall of Imelda Marcos (Manila: np, 1987)

nostalgia for a romanticised 'Filipina woman'. Popular culture echoed this nostalgia for the 'Filipina' who was shy, timid, beautiful and obedient. One of National Artist Fernando Amorsolo's favourite subjects for his paintings in the 1920s and 1930s (and even beyond) was rural scenes featuring this *dalagang Pilipina* (Filipino maiden) dressed in traditional *balintawak* or *kimona*, shy, smiling, timid, posed against the backdrop of a never changing romantic rural landscape. By the 1920s this 'Filipina woman' was disappearing.[2] Amorsolo's biographer Alfredo Roces argued that Amorsolo's paintings, which were in the genre of the tourist's vision of the Philippines, represented the Filipino's nostalgia for a rural countryside that remained untouched and romantic.[3] Amorsolo's paintings essentialised in visual art the image of the Filipino woman most Filipino men wanted to preserve. As the country experienced vast changes, some became sentimental for the imagined 'unchanging' countryside peopled by beautiful women in national dress winnowing rice or carrying water jars. In the midst of change, women were still imagined as 'traditional' (see photo).

President Magsaysay and the *Barong Tagalog*

The Philippines was proclaimed an independent Republic on 4 July 1946. Since the American regime, Western-style suits or the *Americana* (or coat and tie) had been the only accepted dress for male formal wear and Philippine presidents from Manuel Roxas to President Elpidio Quirino wore Western-style formal attire for their presidential inauguration ceremonies. In 1953, however, Ramon Magsaysay won with a campaign that focused on his self-representation as 'the man of the masses'.[4] Magsaysay hoped to contrast his simple, poor boy image with the previous administration's excess and corruption. His dress at the inauguration declared his dramatic break with the past - he wore the *Barong Tagalog* which until then had not been elevated to formal attire. The theme of 'simplicity'coincided with Magsaysay's message that he was just like the ordinary folk. Dress and consumption patterns deliberately distinguished the new president from the elites with Western tastes. *The Philippines Free Press* reported that Magsaysay had chosen to break with tradition by dispensing with the inauguration ball, substituting it for a luncheon (not exclusive to the elite) with a native menu (described as 'simple') of *sinigang na hipon* (soup with tamarind base and prawns), *lumpia* (spring rolls) and *basi* (Ilocano wine).[5] But the vestimentary and consumption practices of this new president were not so much an attempt to privilege the Filipino over the West, as more specifically, to extol the *masa* or Filipino masses over the Filipino elite. Since the Filipino elite wore Western dress and had Western consumption patterns (after all, prior to 1946, Filipino elites were trying to show they were equal to the West), Magsaysay deliberately chose to represent the common *tao* and not the wealthy elite class.

The Marcos years

When Ferdinand Marcos became president for the first time in 1965, it was his wife First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos who graced the cover of *Life Magazine*, wearing a *terno*. The former Rose of Tacloban and Miss Manila was a raven-haired beauty who according to couturier J. Moreno "carried the *terno* very well".[6] The *terno* was her signature attire from the time of the campaign for the presidency - ("she wore *ternos* even for appearances on small, rickety, makeshift stages of rough wooden planks covered with *nipa* leaves") - to the last Philippine national television coverage of Marcos's 1986 inauguration immediately before the First Family boarded the helicopter that took them to exile in the USA.[7]

President Ferdinand Marcos also chose to popularise Filipino attire and the wearing of the *Barong Tagalog*. Although President Ramon Magsaysay was the first president to wear the garment at a presidential inauguration ceremony and to elevate the humble *Barong Tagalog* to formal wear, President Marcos wore it on all occasions (it was rare to find a picture of him wearing anything else). In 1971 Pierre Cardin redesigned the *Barong Tagalog* by slashing open the front (before that it had to go over the head), removing the cuffs that required cuff links, flaring the sleeves and minimising the embroidery.[8] Popularly nicknamed the 'Pierre Cardin *Barong Tagalog*' it was also tapered to the body, and this represented a radical move from the traditional loose-fitting garment.[9] This style was worn until the 1980s. Marcos favoured the shirtjacket style of *Barong Tagalog* in geometric designs.[10]

When, after the Marcos regime fell, Imelda Marcos was compelled to face trial in New York City, she appeared in court (despite the New York weather) in a *terno*, using it to send the message that the United States was persecuting the country:

> *"When I got indicted, I did not shout at the Americans for the injustice heaped upon me. I made a statement by wearing a terno, to say I am a Filipino. I could not wear the flag, so I used the terno, to make my statement".*[11]

In her interpretation, the *terno* was the flag and by wearing it she embodied the Philippine nation, victimised by the powerful West. But this self-representation was not endorsed by local audiences, and after 1986 was repudiated by international audiences as well. If clothing is one form of 'text', several meanings can be attributed to it, often meanings different from the wearer's agenda. Politicians may imbue particular attire with meaning, but the public, viewing that ensemble of clothing and accoutrements, interpret 'the text' from their own ideological positions. Despite Imelda's attempts to identify herself with the 'national imaginary' by wearing the *terno*, audiences associated the *terno* with her personality, giving her names such as 'the iron butterfly' (referring to the *terno*'s butterfly sleeves and her toughness). By the 1980s, the *terno* was a metonymy for Imelda Marcos rather than metaphor for the nation.

The martial law years (September 1972 to February 1986) transformed the *Barong Tagalog* from costume to attire. In 1975 President Marcos issued a decree proclaiming *Barong Tagalog* Week (5-11 June) and designated the *Barong Tagalog* as the national attire. An informal short-sleeved version of the *Barong Tagalog* known as the Polo Barong, became an 'all round' shirt.[12] Government employees began to wear this new informal variant in cotton or polyester, short sleeves, open in front, with minimal geometric designs in the centre. In the 1970s, private companies began to prescribe the Polo Barong as their uniform - sometimes with the company's initials or logo in the top front.[13]

Western dress became the choice for revolutionary clothing in the events that led to the People Power Revolution of 1986. The ubiquitous yellow T-shirt became the visible symbol of the anti-Marcos opposition.

After Marcos

Of marked significance is the shift from women as 'bearers of nation' in the American colonial period to men as 'bearers of nation' since the 1970s. The *Barong Tagalog* is ubiquitous in the Philippines, and most Filipinos own several types. On the other hand, the *terno* has been relegated to costume for special occasions that require Filipiniana dress. The fact that the Philippines is now an independent country with a self-conscious identity means that men can now proudly wear a *Barong Tagalog* and feel on equal footing with the leaders of the modern nations of the world. When President George W. Bush visited the Philippines in October 2003, he was expected to wear a *Barong Tagalog* at the formal dinner.[14]



Amorsolo painting 1930. From the private collection of Mr. and Mrs. Alfredo Roces

Now that Filipino dress has acquired political status and national identity, men have become proud 'bearers of national tradition'. But why this reversal? Why are women no longer 'bearers of tradition', preferring instead to wear Western attire particularly in the higher echelons of power? When President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo took her oath of office in 2001 she wore a Western suit. This was not simply a matter of rejecting the *terno*, which was so closely associated with Mrs Marcos. The choice of a suit was crucial because President Arroyo wanted to present herself as 'GMA', the efficient professional woman with a doctorate in economics. President Arroyo chose Western dress over Filipino dress because she wanted to represent all that was considered efficient and professional - in contrast to the ineptitude and inefficiency of her predecessor President Joseph Estrada. Western dress was more compatible with a no-nonsense image. Women needed to wear Western dress because they still had to be taken seriously as powerful contenders in the power game. While men could already bask in their political power, women, marginalised in official circles (in 2004 they still only made up 11 percent of politicians) needed to show that they were qualified, efficient, educated, modern and professional. In this case, Western dress delivered that message of professionalism much more than national dress.

Because the history of the post-independence Philippines is fraught with corruption and kinship politics, politicians are keen to represent themselves as Filipino heroes who will save the country from deterioration and chaos. The wearing of national dress demonstrates a visible attempt to make that claim. Hence, the fact that men rather than women are the bearers and wearers of 'nation' further marginalises women from becoming national icons. Precisely because dress can express a multitude of codes, the battle over 'national dress' or Filipino dress becomes more than a struggle to alter appearances.

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***Barong Tagalog.* Filipino dress for men.**

Notes

1 Alzona, Encarnacion.1934. *The Filipino Woman: Her Social, Economic and Political Status 1565-1937.* Manila: Benipayo Press.
2 Roces, Alfredo.1975. *Amorsolo* Manila: Filipinas Foundation. See paintings and pp. 90 and 180. Roces, Alfredo 'Amorsolo: Painter of the American Time'. Roces, Alfredo, ed. *Filipino Heritage*, Vol. 10. pp. 2612-19.
3 Roces, "Amorsolo: Painter of the American Time", pp. 2616-17.
4 Abueva, Jose 1971.*Ramon Magsaysay, A Political Biography.* Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House
5 *Philippines Free Press*, 9 January 1954, pp. 21-6.
6 Interview with J. "Pitoy" Moreno, Manila, 10 July 2002.
7 Navarro-Pedrosa, Carmen. 1969. *The Untold Story of Imelda Marcos.* Manila: Bookmark.
8 Cordero-Fernando, Gilda and M.G. Chaves.2001. *Pinoy Pop Culture*.Manila: Bench/Suyen Corp; de la Torre, Visitacion. 1986. *The Barong Tagalog, The Philippines National Wear.* Manila: np.
9 de la Torre, Visitacion.1986. *The Barong Tagalog, The Philippines National Wear.* Manila: np.
10 Interview with J. "Pitoy" Moreno, Manila, 10 July 2002.
11 'The True Confessions of Imelda Marcos, as Told to Sol Jose Vazi', *Philippine Graphic*, 15 October 1990, p. 7.
12 de la Torre, *The Barong Tagalog*.
13 *Ibid*.
14 Javellana, Juliet L. 'Bush to Don 'Barong' at Palace State Dinner'. *The Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 17 October 2003, http://www.inq7.net/nat/2003/oct/17/nat_11-1.htm.

Like political leaders the world over, those of China's dramatic 20th century sought to dress in styles they anticipated would connote their authority and legitimacy to rule or signify particular ideological inflections of their rulership. As China moved from a Qing monarchy, to Asia's first and very fragile Republic, through to a communist state its leaders adopted a wide range of different fashion styles that reflect fundamental principles underlying the political culture of 20th century China.

Dressing for power

Scholars' robes, school uniforms and military attire in China

Nationalist Party, Shanghai, Women's Bureau. *Funü zazhi* (The Ladies' Journal) 10, no. 8 (1924).

Louise Edwards

Three major trends in the transformations of political dress codes emerged in China in the 20th century: the shift from an elitist, rarefied style signifying remoteness from the people to one that indicated growing proximity with and responsiveness to the people; the increasingly confident adoption and adaptation of European fashion to a new Chinese style; and the continued importance of sartorial invocations of scholarly virtue replete with their associations with wise leadership. This brief study focuses on the third aspect.

Imperial robes and scholars gowns: clothing for men in politics

For male political leaders in the early Republic the imperial court robes needed to be discarded to signify the end of the monarchy, but their replacement was a vexed issue. Antonia Finnane has noted that many anti-Qing political reformers at this time argued that a switch to European dress was a prerequisite for the formation of a democratic political system.[1] Radical reformers presumed that the international political world expected European-style formal morning and evening dress and top hats. Accordingly, a woollen three-piece waistcoated suit was common among anti-Qing rebels like Sun Yat-sen from the late 1890s.

Yet, these men were only one part of the politically active elite. Many of their peers resisted the adoption of European formal dress for political work wear. Some saw the wholesale adoption of European style as a pathetic aping of foreign ways. This contestation is reflected in the government's August 1912 decisions on formal clothing for China's politicians. The legislation presented four different European models of suits and one Chinese option - the long scholar robes (*changpao*) with a riding jacket (*majia*) - albeit with the addition of European bowler or top hat.[2] Importantly, according to Henrietta Harrison, the three European suit options were less commonly adopted than the scholar's robes - the political class largely remained in scholars' robes.[3]

The continued common adoption of the *changpao* well into the 20th century was by no means a simple case of men wearing the clothes already in their wardrobes. Nor can it be regarded as indicating conservatism. Verity Wilson warns against regarding the retention of the scholar's robes as "unfashionable or politically unsound". She argues that it symbolised a quintessential 'Chineseness' at a time of "self-conscious nation building".[4] I would go further and argue that the scholar's robe was not simply 'Chinese'; it was an important signifier of virtue gained through learning, and therefore made an important claim to legitimate exercise of both formal political power and community influence. For centuries men had gained formal government positions only after proving their moral suitability through success in Imperial examinations. Thus, while the scholar's robes were indeed identifiably 'Chinese' their appeal to scholarship drawing on centuries of Confucianism's notion of virtuous leadership made it the most 'correct' political clothing.

Reformist politicians wearing '*changpao* and bowler hat combination' could draw on both the Confucian tradition and the reformist Western-modernisation trend. A wholesale rejection of the *changpao* risked jettisoning a key sartorial symbol of legitimate power - learning. In this regard, the failure of the European political wardrobe to take hold does not derive from resistance to European domination or resistance to modernisation as it might have in other countries in Asia and the Americas; rather, it relates to their presumption that 'power dressing' in China still required the imprimatur of the scholar's robes, complete with their references to traditional learning and virtuous leadership from centuries of China's past.

School uniforms: political work wear for women

The dress styles adopted by women entering the public political stage also show the link between education and power. Politically active women adopted a school uniform-style of clothing which simultaneously signified their legitimate access to public space and their educational attainment. Winning access to education was central to the women's claims to access political power since accusations about women's widespread illiteracy and ignorance had long hampered the suffrage cause.[5] Moreover, the girl student style indicated that its wearer was progressive but still respectable. Student status was an important driver of change for women, and the clothing emerging from the education sector served as an important political marker.

The dominant model of girls' school uniforms was the *cheongsam* or *qipao* and it became a common form of clothing for China's politically active women in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly in its looser form. Hazel Clark notes that the *qipao* was first worn among the university female set as the demand for a practical, but modest uniform for women grew.[6] Wu Hao's study shows a picture of graduating women students in 1930 where they wear a variety of school uniform *qipao* with varying hem and sleeve lengths - all are holding newly awarded certificates.[7]

There are a number of competing explanations for the increasing appearance of the *qipao*. Finnane attributes its growing popularity from the early 1920s to a trend towards 'vestimentary androgyny'. She posits that there was a rejection of "womanhood in its 1911 guise", so that women sought to adopt a clothing style that looked more like the *changpao* scholars' robes of their brothers.[8] Clark challenges this position and argues instead that the *qipao's* spread reflects growing nationalism as women sought to find something essentially Chinese to wear. They sought inspiration from the *changyi* (a long- and loose-sleeved, one-piece full-length gown) worn by Manchu women. Clark argues that the spread of the *qipao* was a consequence of a nationalistic search for a modest, indigenous option for a girls' school uniform, since Western school uniforms were deemed immodest and unfeminine.[9] Extending their points, I argue that its popularisation was also directly related to the importance of education in facilitating women's entrance into public spaces. The school uniform *qipao* enabled a respectable dismantling of well-entrenched norms around the divide between private and public space that had confined women to the private sphere. Women gained access to the public political realm without entirely compromising their virtue aided by a school uniform. This dress style was common among the women in the expanding suffrage movement through the 1920s and 1930s.[10]

Full length qipao. *Dianying huabao* (Screen Pictorial), vol 15 (1934).

The transgressive aspects of women's appearance in the public realm resulted in the sexualisation of the girl student and her eventual commercialisation. In 1912 *Shenbao* published a comment that "Prostitutes imitate girl students, and girl students imitate prostitutes". [11] The ambiguity around the public woman's moral state made girl students eye-catching, desirable and therefore also useful in advertising. Through the 1930s pictures of girl students in *qipao* were invoked to sell medicine and fabric. As the evermore figure-hugging *qipao* spread amongst the public women of the entertainment sector, advertisements for cigarettes and alcohol routinely included alluring *qipao*-clad figures. The movement of student clothing into the commercial and entertainment sectors generated no small measure of concern among the politically active sectors of society.

The anxiety generated by the cooption of the 'once-virtuous' clothing of the politically active women by the entertainment industry and the commercial sector is clear in widespread debates about 'modern women' that circulated in the 1920s and 1930s. Political activists complained that many women adopted the external trappings of modern thinking but were simply interested in shopping. These women dressed as if they were progressive and concerned about national politics but were actually devoid of political commitment. Self-appointed moral guardians of the 'new style women' labelled these *qipao*-wearing beauties 'pseudo-modern women' and dismissed them as vain and ignorant.[12] Commerce effectively co-opted the key signifier of progressive politics - dress - as the public woman became a site of commercial exchange rather than political radicalism.[13]

Militarised politicians

The importance of education to political dress was balanced by rising sartorial militarism. Early in the Republican period China's male political leaders often appeared in full European military regalia. The population was presented with images of alien remoteness in their leaders and these excessively decorated military clothes soon became associated with corrupt, self-aggrandisement. By the mid-1930s this ceased featuring in political leaders' clothing despite the merging of political and military roles. Instead, leaders such as Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong emerged in simpler forms of military attire invoking their increasing proximity to the 'people'. The Sun Yat-sen suit (aka Mao suit) eventually became the communist uniform for both men and women. But, at the leadership level, the premier legitimacy of the scholar as leader remained even through to the Cultural Revolution. A widely circulated image of Mao from 1968, '*Chairman Mao goes to Anyuan*', depicts a youthful Mao in a scholar's robe. At crucial junctures the balance between the Mao-suited 'soldier' and the virtuous 'scholar' reappears to reassure people of the leadership's wisdom, strength and constancy. The famous posters of Mao handing power to Hua Guofeng that carry the caption "With you in charge, I am at ease" depict the two men in Mao suits, surrounded by books, pens and sheafs of paper. The scholar performed political work well past the demise of the Imperial examination system.

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Notes

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Between the 1870s and 1945, dress was a signifier of Japan's transition from an 'Oriental' country - subordinate to the West - to a bearer of 'universal' modernity in East Asia. By the early 20th century, when Japan had largely achieved diplomatic equality with the West and colonial dominion over parts of Asia, Western dress had come to be taken for granted by 'modern' Japanese men and used as a symbol of equal rights by some Japanese women.

Modernity, gender and the empire

Gender, citizenship and dress in modernising Japan

Barbara Molony

The new military adopted Western-style uniforms shortly after the Meiji Restoration (1868) as it constructed a new Japanese masculinity. The Meiji emperor made a famous transition in his public representation from Japanese high nobility to Western martial manliness by changing his dress, hair, and posture. An 1872 photograph shows him in courtly attire that could have been pulled from a trunk stored away a millennium earlier, while a photograph from 1873, the first year of Japan's new national conscript army, depicts him in a Western-style field marshal's uniform. At the same time, colonial subjects were distinguished by their clothing and bodily adornment, although their 'traditional' dress was often part of an invented tradition encouraged by Japanese anthropologists to distinguish quaint natives from modern colonists. Modernity and imperialism toward the rest of Asia and modernity and anti-imperialism vis-à-vis the West were linked through dress.

Ethnic considerations cannot be unbundled from those of gender, as modernity was initially projected by masculine Japanese in Western dress. The Empress attempted to transform the image of femininity by appearing in public in 1873 with unblackened teeth and natural eyebrows (blackened teeth and plucked and repainted eyebrows had been essential for proper adult women for generations) and by wearing Western gowns in 1886. Her practices served as a model for elite ladies to dress in a 'modern' way to persuade Western diplomats that Japan deserved to be freed from its unequal treaties with Western nations. At the same time, female factory workers were put in Western clothing because long kimono sleeves could become entangled in industrial machinery. Except for farm women, who had always had an indigenous form of comfortable work clothes and adopted only bits and pieces of Western attire (e.g. aprons and cloth bonnets), women at the top and bottom ends of the social scale had political and pragmatic reasons to wear Western clothing in the late 19th century. In the early 1920s, some feminists seeking rights of citizenship identified Western clothing with rights held only by Japanese men, who had for several decades worn Western clothing in the public sphere. To be sure, women's choices in dress carried a variety of messages; by the late 1920s Western dress for women had come to be seen as fashionably modern (and not necessarily politicised), and many women's rights activists were equally comfortable in Japanese and Western garb. The gendered shifts in dress did not follow a single trajectory.

Civilisation and enlightenment - men in public

In 1853, several decades of Western countries pressing Japan to end its 'closed country' policy culminated in its forced opening by the United States and the imposition of unequal treaties with the US and European countries. Both government and private proponents of 'civilisation and enlightenment' (*bunmei kaika*), hoping to persuade the West of Japan's modernity and its right to diplomatic and commercial equality, advocated 'modernisation' to survive in the new international environment, propelling Japan into a whirlwind of changes in the decades after 1868. Dress reform was part of the government's modernisation efforts. It included not only policies concerning proper styles for the modern person interacting with Westerners, but also policies about how much clothing to wear. Japanese authorities in 1871 required male rickshaw pullers and day labourers to wear something less revealing than loin cloths, admonishing them not to be laughed at by foreigners. In 1872, the authorities required men to replace their samurai-style topknots with contemporary Western coiffures. Men conducting official business with Westerners or attending government functions were required to dress in the Western mode.



The young Meiji emperor was photographed in the centuries-old dress of the high court nobility in 1872. By the following year, his public representations shifted to clothing that could be read as typical of modern, manly monarchs in Europe.

The Empress (1872, left) continued to wear Japanese clothing in public and private long after her husband abandoned it. As wives of statesmen were called on to play public roles at diplomatic events, they were required to wear Western dress to symbolise their - and Japan's modernity - in 1886. The Empress set the tone.

Western dress signalled an abandonment of old court styles considered by the modernisers to be Sinicised and effeminate and therefore un-Japanese.
At the same time, private individuals undertook their own quests for modernity. Many saw that the way to challenge the Western threat was to become 'civilised and enlightened'. Gentlemen were to learn not only how to behave politely (unlike rough samurai), but also how to dress in ways that indicated that Japan was on a modernising trajectory. For the most part, Western clothes (*yōfuku*) were worn in public, where modern men did their work. Returning home, many slipped off the external symbols of civilisation and modernity and slipped on the relaxing kimono. Many would-be wearers of *yōfuku* in the 1860s and early 1870s were not sartorially inclined, mixing an umbrella with wooden sandals, a top hat with *hakama* (culottes), or an evening cape with an outdoorsman's shirt. In time, men in white-collar jobs in offices, schools, and government service, as well as working-class men in mines and factories wore versions of *yōfuku* identified in the West and in Japan with their class and occupation. By the end of the 19th century, Western clothing had been naturalised for men, and though still called '*yōfuku*', the term itself was increasingly drained of its Western meaning, coming to be translated simply as 'clothing'. The important markers in men's *yōfuku* were those of class, occupation, and wealth.

Modern clothing and the colonies

At the same time, *yōfuku* had not entirely lost its connotation of modern and civilised. That is, men's *yōfuku* also signified 'Japanese' as opposed to 'colonial'. Although Japanese men in the colonies did not confine their clothing choices to *yōfuku*, often wearing Japanese kimono at home or even in public, their tendency to wear Western styles, especially the uniforms of professionalism (e.g., military uniforms, scholars' and bureaucrats' suits), was not only a reflection of the growing naturalness of Western styles but also a way of distinguishing the 'natives' from modern Japanese. Taiwan offers a good example of the nexus of Japanese imperialism, gender, and dress. Soon after Taiwan was made a Japanese colony in 1895, the imperial government sent scholars into the island's towns and villages to describe the state of civilisation and society. Japanese men in professional *yōfuku* used cameras to capture for propagation and analysis the images of the 'backward' Taiwanese. Because the process implied that the Taiwanese were backward and the Japanese in their Western masculine clothing were 'civilised', there was a possibility of advancing Taiwanese civilisation over time, thereby justifying Japanese imperialism.

Sartorial constructions of gender

Japanese women in the late 19th century, like colonial subjects, were in a contradictory position vis-à-vis modernity and dress. Japan itself, under the pressure of unequal treaties, continued to be viewed as 'feminine' in contrast to the 'masculine' West - a trope applied, in turn, by the Japanese to the Chinese by the end of the century. On the one hand, Japanese leaders and advocates of 'civilisation and enlightenment' wished to escape from their unwanted feminisation; on the other, many sought to preserve women as symbolic 'repositories of the past' in an era of dizzying change. If modern subjectivity or even citizenship were the end result of civilisation and enlightenment, then what place did women have? Feminists sought an expanded public role for modern Japanese women, but others believed women's roles should be in the intertwined public and private realms that the Japanese government had crafted with its valorisation of motherhood (private) in service of the state (public). What was a woman to wear in the interstices of public and private if, for men, *yōfuku* represented the public and Japanese clothes the private?

Women working in Japan's modern economic sectors wore Western style clothing, but unlike the case of the Empress, feminist women or, later, fashionable New Women and Modern Girls, little was said about them. Working women's clothes were not necessarily of their own choosing, and they were donned for pragmatic reasons. No one wore them to make a statement - of the fashion or political variety. This type of alternative clothing included school uniforms, factory uniforms, and professional work clothes for teachers, nurses, and other working women. Alternative clothing in Meiji Japan set the stage for the popularisation of Western clothes after World War One, and made it possible for feminists to make a political statement with their choice of attire. Women had become accustomed, as children and as workers, to wearing *yōfuku* at least part of the time. If *yōfuku* was appropriate to women's participation in the public sector, it helped open the door to feminists' struggles for citizenship after World War One.

The institution ultimately responsible for the expanding thrust of the modernising state was the military. Gendered male, its uniforms were a unique type of *yōfuku*. The uniform created a central place in the modernising state for Japanese manhood and symbolised the projection of Japanese (masculine) power in Asia. It rendered Japanese males imperial subjects, a status that could not be similarly fulfilled by women who had no dress that similarly symbolised projection of power. Even while in the colonies, women who wore *yōfuku* were either fashionable in a modern sense or carving out a space for their personal development.

Dress, gender and the public realm

How one dressed was in part determined by one's location. Professional clothes or work clothes, which were often but not exclusively some form of *yōfuku*, were worn in the workplace, and Japanese kimono were more likely to be worn as comfortable garments while inside the home. Because the home was a locus of women's roles as imperial subjects, it was not, however, a 'private sphere' in the Western sense; the public and domestic spheres were mutually interpenetrated, and men and women occupied both. Thus, conservatives in the 1910s and 1920s were not frightened by women's passive existence in the public sphere; they were threatened by women's forceful declaration that the public world was their place, too, and they would define their role in that space as well as the clothing they would wear while in it. These women were not viewed as virtuous daughters in the textile mills, wearing the uniforms they were handed and sending pay packets home to hungry relatives in the countryside. Nor were they the (stereotyped) image of noble nurses or dedicated 'good wives and wise mothers', active in the public sector, it was believed, only on behalf of the nation or their families. Rather, the bright young women of the 1910s and 1920s who challenged the notion of virtuous women in the public sector were part of a cultural shift represented by a number of symbols, one of which was their modern, hip clothing. It was in that climate that feminists demanding the rights of citizenship emerged.

Stylish fashion worn by the New Women of the 1910s and the Modern Girls of the 1920s could be provocative, in both senses of the term, both challenging old norms and being sexually charged, linking power and female gender representation in ways that factory uniforms did not. The Modern Girls of the 1920s were working women of modest means who enjoyed some independence, worked as typists, teachers, nurses, telephone operators, office workers, and sales clerks, and wore the stylish clothing of women of greater wealth. Many had girls' higher school educations. Their independence and disposable income led critics to suggest they were promiscuous. Modern Girls made exhilarating copy in newspaper and magazine articles as well as in novels, scandalised some of the public by claiming some degree of independence as agents of their own lives, and represented most clearly the modern era in which men and women occupied the same space.

Occupying the same space but not sharing the same rights encouraged feminists to intensify their demands for equality during the reign of the Modern Girl. Even if most Modern Girls were more focused on consumption than on politics or militancy, many worked to enhance women's rights in the public arena. Photos of feminists at work throughout the 1920s show them wearing a mix of Western and Japanese style clothing. Street scenes indicate that women in general were as comfortable with Western as with Japanese clothes, and both styles came to be seen as normative by the end of the decade. This changed rapidly with the onset of World War Two. In 1939, women were pushed to wear *monpe* (baggy work trousers) even in the city, a considerable sacrifice for Japan's fashionable women.

In modernising Japan, dress reflected public policy; it was a tool of imperialism and a marker of citizenship, nationality, and ethnicity; and it defined notions of gender and modernity. By adopting Western clothes, Japanese manhood was empowered to build an empire and to project outward both its military and 'civilising' missions; by devising practical (often though not always Western-inspired) clothing to wear in public, Japanese femininity could claim a space in the public sector into which feminists could insert themselves. In both cases, a gendered construction of citizenship was an essential part of a Japanese modernity defined by the state and signified by individuals' clothing choices.

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In spite of the nationalist claim to have escaped Western colonialism, Thailand (known until 1939 as Siam) was exposed to Western influences as much as colonial Southeast Asia. It is thus no surprise that portraits of King Chulalongkorn, (Rama V), dressed in western-style suit or uniform act today as signifiers of Thailand's status as a modern nation. Becoming modern in the high imperial age, when nations were ranked according to social and technological progress, required not only the demarcation of territorial boundaries, the establishment of a civil service and standing army, infrastructures and public education, but also acceptance of Western standards of public decorum and self-presentation.

Refashioning civilisation

Dress and bodily practice in Thai nation building

Maurizio Peleggi

The domain of bodily practice - encompassing personal hygiene, dress, deportment and language - was central to the nation-building project initiated in the 1890s by the Thai monarchy and continued, after the change of political system in 1932, by the bureaucratic-military elite. The royalty selectively adopted since the 1860s Victorian corporeal and sartorial etiquette to fashion 'civilised' (Thai, *siwilai*) personas, which were publicised both domestically and internationally by means of mechanically reproduced images (photographs, book engravings and postcards). In the early 20th century Western dress and accoutrements became popular with Bangkok's embryonic middle class, who increasingly defined what was fashionable or 'up-to-date' (*samai mai*). Under the authoritarian government of the early 1940s bodily practice was policed through legislation so to discipline the body politic while pursuing modernisation.

Although the early-20th century reform of bodily practice made social and geographical distinction within Thailand more marked, selection and hybridisation were part of the very process by which Western dress and etiquette were localised. As a result, both the adoption and the occasional rejection of foreign corporeal and vestimentary norms enjoyed local legitimation. So, while Asian nationalists rejected Western dress as a symbol of foreign domination and fashioned instead a 'national' dress to express the cultural soul of the oppressed nation, no 'Thai' dress was codified until the 1970s, when a neo-traditional costume was fashioned in accordance with the self-Orientalising that underpinned Thailand's new international visibility as an exotic tourist destination.

Restyling civilisation's accoutrements, 1870s-1920s[1]

The diffusion of the Western bourgeois regime of corporeal propriety by the agents of imperialism (colonial officials, missionaries) in Africa, the Pacific and parts of Asia in the course of the 19th century, determined the global standardisation of bodily practice. But in Siam, where Christian missionaries made only marginal inroads, it was the court that led the way to civility. By 1897, when King Chualongkorn journeyed to Europe with a large retinue, the body of the Thai royalty had become a living - indeed, travelling - advertisement of the modernising mission by which the Chakri dynasty asserted its legitimacy in Southeast Asia's new colonial order. In fact, reliance on cultural practices and materials as a means to connect to the dominant civilisation of the day was not a novelty for the Thai royalty.[2] In Central Thailand's Indianised courts corporeal techniques of self-presentation, from deportment to speech, were highly developed. Tropical climate discouraged elaborate dress except for Brahmans and royalty; still, sumptuary laws regulated clothing's usage as late as the mid-1850s, as attested by the British envoy John Bowring.

The court dress reform saw a fundamental shift from wrapped to stitched vestimentary regime. In the reform's initial phase (1870s and 80s), hybrid court attires were created by matching a high-necked lace blouse (for females) or colonial-style jacket (for males) with the unisex lower wrap (*chongkrabaen*), now often of European silk; import-

Inventing sartorial traditions: King Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit, late 1950s

ed shoes and stockings complemented the outfit. Accordingly, the partial bodily exposure of the traditional female attire was avoided. Later on, full Western-style military uniform replaced the king's and princes' Indic garb at official ceremonies. The unisex close shaven haircut was also abandoned in favour of longer hair, and males start growing moustaches too, in accordance with European fashion. Still, external expectations about a civilised body were negotiated with personal taste and inclinations, as in the case of the chewing of betel (areca nut), which continued to be practiced at court despite its blackening (and, to the Europeans, repulsive) effect on teeth.

While the Thai court's new hybrid outfit shared an aesthetic affinity with the neo-traditional dress of Asian nationalists, it carried none of its political valence because in Siam there was no need to signify, sartorially or otherwise, autonomy from the West; conversely, the absence of colonial domination prevented the rejection of Western dress. One significant change concerned dress as a marker of social identity. As a result of the opening of tailor workshops and stores selling European fabrics and garments in Bangkok, the civilised aura emanating from Western-style dress became available to professional urbanites too, such as the attorney and journalist Thianwan Wannapho, who prided himself on having been the first man in Siam to sport a Western hairstyle, grow a beard and eschew betel chewing. As for Bangkok's ordinary population, a royal decree issued in 1899 in preparation for a Prussian prince's visit, ordering women to cover their breasts and men to wear their loincloth at knee length, suggests widespread indifference to 'civilised' bodily practice among the lower social strata.[3]

The spread of Western fashion in Bangkok was stigmatised by King Vajiravudh (Rama VI, 1910-25), the official 'father' of Thai nationalism, who ridiculed Thais in 'shabby Western clothes' as imitators of Europeans. The targets of the king's class-based sarcasm were in fact the writers and journalists that animated a nascent public sphere and denounced, from the pages of newspapers, periodicals and novels, Siam's social inequalities and women's subjugation. Modern fashion promoted the redefinition of social and gender boundaries through its link to new democratic social spaces, such as dancing and cinema halls, and the representation of women as sophisticated consumers in magazines, advertisements and films.[4] Some, like the editor of the literary magazine 'The Gentleman' (*Suphaburut*), questioned however the assumption that 'universal suit' (*suit sakorn*) was certain proof of the wearer's civility: "Dress is only an outward symbol. ...On the surface a man might appear to be a gentleman when in fact he is not."[5]

Ad-dressing the Thai nation, 1930s-40s

The main concern of the government that came to power by a bloodless coup d'état in June 1932 was establishing its legitimacy as heir to the absolute monarchy. To this end several initiatives were launched, including Constitution Day (10 December). In 1934, the festivity was paired with the new Miss Siam beauty contest, which identified the physical body of female citizens with the abstract body politic. Under the authoritarian regime of Marshal Phibun Songkhram (1938-44) the state sought to standardise bodily practice as a way of disciplining the citizenry in the name of national progress. In 1939 the government started issuing state edicts (*ratthaniyom*) to prescribe "the proper type of etiquette to be observed by all civilised people." The tenth such state edict (15 January 1941) mandated that Thais should adopt a dress code in accordance with civilisation and further instructions were provided by the subsequent "Royal decree prescribing customs for the Thai people".[6]

These prescriptions followed in spirit and content the attempts by the fascist regimes of Italy and Germany, for whose dictators Phibun expressed open admiration, to mold the body politic through mass regimentation and propaganda. Yet, while militarism became a prominent trait of Thai politics, nothing compared to the cult of uniformed masculinity that characterised the Italian Black Shirts and the German Brown Shirts. Emphasis continued to be placed on the adoption of Western dress and accoutrements as an index of civilisation: "The Thais are a well dressed nation" and "Hats will lead Thailand to greatness" were prominent slogans of the period. State propaganda notably privileged women over men as physical embodiments of Thai civility. Even the change in the official spelling of the country's inhabitants from *tai* to *thai*, to make use of the homographic word meaning 'free',was conveyed in terms of the difference between an ordinary and a fashionable woman. Men, on their part, were encouraged to kiss their wives before going to work and compliment them as 'flowers of the nation'.

The state policy on dress heightened the socio-economic disparities between Bangkok and the provinces, where district officials found it impossible to enforce the dress regulation on villagers. Such policy partook, however, of Phibun's overall nation-building programme, which sought to standardise cultural practices across the country as well as across classes in a challenge to the established social hierarchies: mobile units of the National Institute of Culture were dispatched to the provinces to publicise the government's sartorial, as well as linguistic, reforms. But all ended with Phibun's fall in 1944 and the tumultuous period that followed. In the postwar period the cultural divide between city and village grew even deeper as Thailand was brought into the 'Free World' by the alliance with the US and the consequent cultural Americanisation.

Commoner dress: Woman studio portrait, ca. 1900.



Neo-traditionalism and globalisation, 1950s to the 1990s

In the post-war period Western dress became the vestimentary norm in Thai cities. By the 1960s, however, unease about the US military presence in the country, which was behind the proliferation of bars and massage parlours, found an outlet in the censure of US soldiers' disrespect for local customs, often involving offensive manners and behaviour. Another indirect way of criticising US intrusions into Thailand's foreign and domestic policies was criticism of the Westernisation - equated with moral degeneration - of the Thai youth. But while stretch pants and blue jeans were as popular in Bangkok as in the rest of the 'Free World', the bolder items of 1960s and '70s youth fashion (miniskirts, high-heeled boots and long hair) were demonised by both the bureaucratic guardians of public morality and progressive intellectuals as befitting only social outcasts.

The 1960s in Thailand were marked by a monarchical revival that rejuvenated symbols and rituals discarded after King Prajadhipok's abdication in 1935. After a lapse of some 15 years, Thailand acquired again a resident monarch in 1951, when King Bhumibol returned permanently to Bangkok from Switzerland with the recently wed Queen Sirikit. Marshal Phibun's comeback in that same year limited initially the royal couple's visibility, but the situation changed in 1957, when the new strongman, Marshal Sarit Thanarat, fully rehabilitated the monarchy. In the 1960 tour of Europe and the US, Queen Sirikit wore fashionable *tailleurs* to match King Phumiphon's bespoke suits (alternated with uniforms) and project an image of modern, cosmopolitan royalty.

At official engagements back home, however, Queen Sirikit took to wearing attires patterned after the pre-1870 court costume - a sartorial revival arguably connected to the reconstitution of the monarchy's otherworldly aura, yet also following in the wake of the international success of the film version of the Broadway musical, *The King and I* (1959). The costumes for the film had been produced by the Thai Silk Company of Jim Thompson, a US intelligence officer who had settled in Thailand at the end of the war and started reviving the local silk industry. Underscoring Thai 'traditional' costume's origins in pop Orientalism is the fact that it is worn today only by performers of touristy 'cultural shows'. In the 1970s a new two-piece female outfit was designed in order to market silk homespun by northern villagers under the aegis of a queen's charity. The outfit's function as a signifier of 'Thainess' (*khwampenthai*) by virtue of its fabric and design, accorded well with the parallel bureaucratic promotion of national culture and identity for both ideological and commercial purposes.

During the boom time of the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, Thai urbanites fell under the spell of globalisation, which, similar to the civilisational trends that had preceded it, carried a characteristic sartorial dimension - the 'executive look' adopted by Thai managers, professionals and politicians. Fashion and lifestyle magazines also propagated a transnational ideal of beauty, embodied by the greatly popular models and TV personalities of mixed parentage (*luk krung*). But for all its sociological relevance, in Thailand the globalisation of bodily practice is a phenomenon still limited to the capital's upper strata. As for villagers, they too have learnt how to make public statements through dress: in their frequent mass protests in Bangkok, they don proudly their indigo cotton tunic (*morhom*) as a mark of an enduring social identity resisting globalisation.

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Notes

1 What follows is a summary of Chap. 2 of Peleggi, Maurizio. 2002. *Lords of Things: The Fashioning of the Siamese Monarchy's Modern Image.* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002).
2 This theme is developed in Peleggio Maurizio. 2007. *The Worldly Kingdom*. London: Reaktion.
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4 Nawigamune, Anake. comp. and David Smyth. trans. 2000. *A Century of Thai Graphic Design.* Bangkok: River Books; Sukwong, Dome and Suwannapak Sawasdi. 2001. *A Century of Thai Cinema.* Bangkok: River Books.
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Colonial attempts to hem in racial and gender difference through practice, law and lore made dress a potent field of resistance in British Burma, giving rise to new strands of nationalism by design.

Nationalism by design

The politics of dress in British Burma

Penny Edwards

On 22 November 1921, a young male named Maung Ba Bwa was apprehended by police at the Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon. Maung Ba Bwa was one of an unusually high number of Burmans visiting the pagoda on this November evening for an exhibition of weaving, and a performance of a *phwe* (Burmese traditional theatre) by two leading artists. In Maung Ba Bwa's recollection of events, "his attire" had attracted police attention. "He was wearing a *pinni* jacket and Yaw *longyi*, obviously rather self-consciously and in demonstration of his nationalist sympathies," stated the resultant police report; "He seems, possibly not without reason, to think that some Government officers regard such clothes with disapproval". Maung Ba Bwa was brought in for questioning following the storming of the Shwedagon by British and Indian police, when Gurkhas "desecrated the pagoda by rushing up the steps with their boots on". In the ensuing fracas, which pitted monks against such colonial agents of 'order', a Burmese civilian was killed. The scholar-official J. S. Furnivall, who presided over an independent commission of inquiry into the police response, would also pin his diagnosis of Maung Ba Bwa's political orientation on his wardrobe. His *pinni* jacket and his *longyi*, the commission reported, were proof positive of his "nationalist sentiment".[1]

Wearing your politics on your sleeve

By the early 1920s, in a climate where speaking out or publishing critiques of colonialism saw some young monks and other activists jailed for years, increasing numbers of Burmese civilians - like Maung Ba Bwa - chose to express their political leanings in their dress. But nationalism did not have a single uniform. Those western-educated Burmese who formed the vanguard of the secular nationalist movement dressed up their attachment to civic-political, constitutional change in the trousers, waistcoats and jackets of barristers. By contrast, identifiably 'Burmese' clothing became *de rigueur* for those who styled themselves, in an inversion of colonial sociology, as '*Thakin*' [master] (for men) and '*Thakin-ma*' (for women); *Thakin* being the Burmese term of address which the British insisted that Burmese use when addressing Europeans. This latter school of nationalists displayed their allegiance to the Burmese nation and their distaste for colonial rule in the *longyi* (sarong) and *pinni* (a mandarin-collared, white jacket) and a headdress of white cloth. Conflicting views over appropriate male attire contrasted with a general consensus among young male nationalists of both schools, as well as older males and females of a more conservative political bent, over the proper clothing for Burmese women. The latter were expected to safeguard national purity in their dress: a *thamein* (a skirt similar in length to the *longyi*, but with a long split up one side), and a *pinni* jacket.

When Britain secured the conquest of Burma with the ouster and exile of King Thibaw and Queen Suppayalat following the third Anglo-Burmese war of 1885, all manner of customs and mores would unravel. One casualty of this marginalisation of an institution that had functioned as the epicentre of Burmese cultural life, was a complex sumptuary system. Once elaborate markers of status, the lavish costumes of ministers and courtiers soon emerged as coveted museum-pieces, some splendid examples of which now adorn London's Victoria and Albert Museum.

Burma's administrative absorption into British India as a Province - a status it retained until 1935 - combined with the abolition of the monarchy to ensure the exclusion of indigenous trappings of authority from the wardrobe of colonial power.

With colonial conquest came new sartorial *modus operandi*: trousers, berets or 'pith-helmets', stockinged feet and shoes. The latter were not new *per se*. Slippers and cloth, wood and leather shoes were recorded in Burma in European accounts and court paintings, during the century prior to colonisation. But new footwear etiquette contravened socio-cultural norms prevalent among Buddhist Burmese. In India, Europeans had long failed to observe the native practice of removing shoes on entering temples.[2] In Burma, this single issue rallied the public to the nationalist movement more than any other.[3] Under colonial rule, Europeans inscribed their right to wear footwear in pagodas in public notices asserting that "No-one can wear shoes inside this pagoda compound except for British or Europeans". Witnessing such a notice on his return from England in 1916, the lawyer U Thein Maung complained to the chief of the pagoda committee at the Shwe San Taw pagoda in Pyi, who revised the wording to read 'no exceptions', and ignored subsequent requests by the Deputy Commissioner of Burma to remove the notice. The same year, a group of young Burmese men, a number of them dressed in western clothes, assembled in Rangoon's Jubilee Hall for the All Burma Conference of Buddhists to discuss their common outrage at the continued refusal, by Europeans, to remove their footwear when visiting sacred precincts. Their demand that the government legislate the removal of footwear in pagodas was reinforced by a resolution of the Young Men's Buddhist Association the following year. The failure to adopt such laws sparked violence in October, 1919, when outraged monks attacked a group of Europeans wearing shoes in the sacred precinct of Eindway Pagoda, Mandalay.[4]

Burmese man, c. 1903. Picture taken from *Buddhism*. Vol 1 Dec 1903



Advertisement for a European outfitters in Rangoon posted in *Buddhism*. Vol 1. Dec 1903

Homespun symbols of nationalism

Nationalism also left a footprint in the political economy of dress. Influenced by Gandhi's Swadeshi movement, Burmese nationalist students seized upon cloth and clothing as a symbol of national identity and a support to the national economy, encouraging people to wear their nationalism in native homespun and handwoven cotton.[5] On his 1929 visit to Burma, impressed by the superior craftsmanship of the Burmese spinning wheel, Gandhi asked Indians in Burma to boycott all cloth of foreign manufacture. In Moulmein, he chastised Burmese women for wearing foreign silks, and urged them to 'revise [their] taste for foreign fineries'. In Prome, he bemoaned villagers who worked with 'foreign yarn', motivated not by 'any instinct of patriotism' but by revenue streams.[6]

The year after Gandhi's visit, race riots broke out between Burmese and Indians, sparked in part by low rice yields and high rates of interest charged by Indian moneylenders. Established that year, the We Burmans Association (*Do Bama Ah Si Ah Yone*) retained a xenophobic edge to some of its songs, but borrowed from Indian nationalist strategies in its agenda. In September 1930, the Association ruled against the importation of foreign materials such as cigarettes and clothing, and sustained its campaign for traditional homespun clothing and against western apparel.[7]

In the first decade of Burma's Independence, Prime Minister U Nu singled out "dress" as one of many "different channels" that "carries with it that distinctive mark of the culture of the race or nation which is its very backbone".[8] Nine years later, in 1962, General Ne Win inaugurated a new era of military rule with its own, ex-officio sumptuary laws. Long hair, the 'traditional' mode of hair for Burmese men prior to colonial rule, was now associated with western modernity, and outlawed. The *longyi*, or *thamein*, was declared the national dress for men and women, so marking the commoners off from the ruling class whose dress owed more to British and Japanese military tailoring than to Burmese sartorial traditions. In the 1980s, dress once again became a site for resistance. Aung San Suu Kyi's adoption of a *longyi* and a *pinni* jacket echoed the dress code of her father's generation of anti-colonial activists and so subtly undergirded both her political pedigree and her declaration of Burma's "second struggle for Independence". In the contemporary state successor of colonial sumptuary laws, narratives on race, clothing, and national legitimacy remain intimately intertwined.

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Notes

1 National Archives of Myanmar, Government of Burma Police Department, Report of the Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Shwedagon Fracas, 14 January 1922. The Committee comprised J. S. Furnivall, Maung Thin, Maung Hla Pe.

2 Bernard Cohn 'Cloth, Clothes and Colonialism: India in the Nineteenth Century' in Weiner, A. and J. Schneider. Eds. 1989. *Cloth and Human Experience*. Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press.

3 Naw, Angelene. 2001. *Aung San and the Struggle for Burmese Independence*. Chiangmai: Silkworm.

4 *Shoe Issue which paved the way to the independence struggle in Burma*. Lanka Daily News, December 25, 2004 in http://www.buddhistchannel.tv/ Accessed 6 March 2007. The monks' leader, U Kettaywa, was sentenced to life for attempted murder.

5 U Maung Maung, 1980. *Sangha to Laity: Nationalist Movements of Burma, 1920-1940*. Australian National University Monographs on South Asia No. 4. New Delhi. p. 129

6 Gandhi in Burma. 1979. Rangoon: Information Service of India.

7 *Ta Khin Do Bama Ah Si Ah Yone Tha Maing* (The History of the We Burma Association), Translation by Ma Khin Ma Mar Kyi. 1976. Rangoon.

8 Nu, U. *Burma Looks Ahead*. 1953. Rangoon: Government Printing and Stationery.

Dress is a powerful signifier of historical time, age, gender, class, religious and political orientations. It is often discussed in relation to fashion and therefore to change. Dress is also frequently examined in terms of 'native' or 'traditional', in contrast to Western or universal dress. In Indonesia, variations in dress shed light on political and religious changes and mirror contemporary debates about identity, gender and the constitution of the state. Since the fall of Suharto's government in 1998, politicians campaigning in national elections adjust their dress to appeal to specific constituencies.

Identity, nation and Islam

Jean Gelman Taylor

In former times, Indian conceptions of cloth were assimilated into ancient archipelago cultures. Dress styles emphasised loin covering for men and women and ornamentation of the hair. Decorated cloths bore Buddhist motifs such as the lotus flower or the Hindu *garuda*; they protected the wearer against physical and mental disease, and could pass on the quality of a powerful person to the recipient. At important life cycle events ritually significant cloths were exchanged among family members and displayed to guests.

Confucian, Islamic and Christian values have also acted on indigenous conceptions and clothing styles through the introduction of stitched items of dress and the preference for the covered body. Royal etiquette on Java required the male torso to be uncovered, but the photographic record shows that, from the mid-19th century, well-to-do Javanese were covering the upper torso in Western shirt, bowtie and jacket, while retaining the draped, uncut batiked cloth or *kain* for the lower body. From the 1920s, upper class Javanese men wore full Western suits with accessories such as walking stick and fob watch. Uncovered hair and shoulders were part of the Javanese aesthetic of female beauty, but aristocratic women also responded to external pressures to cover up. They wore Chinese style long-sleeved blouses with batiked *kain*. Their uncut hair was arranged in a bun decorated with flowers or jewelled hairpins.

In the last decades of the 19th century factories produced a cheap batiked cloth for daily wear, so that batik soon seemed to be the 'traditional' clothing of all Javanese. At the same time Dutch women introduced the Singer sewing machine to colonial households. Indonesians learned to operate the foot-pedalled, portable Singer. This transfer of technology resulted in the availability of ready-to-wear shirts and trousers for men and *kebaya* (blouses) for women.

The badge of modern men

Young men graduating from colonial schools embarked on a political journey to wrest control from the Dutch. The Western suit became for them the badge of modern men. In these same decades, around the Muslim world, new middle classes were promoting Western costume for women too. Kemal Ataturk banned the veil for urban women in Turkey in 1922, and had his wife photographed at his side in Western dress. In Indonesian societies veiling was not usual. Women wore an adaptation of the Islamic *hijab*, called the *krudung* that only partly covers the hair and is not pinned to conceal the neck. Javanese girls enrolled in colonial schools began wearing Western frocks, but the adult, married woman on Java continued to wear *kain* and *kebaya* with uncovered hair.

As nationalist leader, Sukarno promoted the Western suit for Indonesian men: "The minute an Indonesian dons trousers, he walks erect like any white man. Immediately he wraps that feudal symbol around his middle, he stoops over in a perpetual bow. His shoulders sag. He doesn't stride manfully, he shuffles apologetically. [...] We must be divested of that influence which chains us to the cringing past as nameless, faceless servants and houseboys and peasants. Let us demonstrate we are as progressive as our former masters. We must take our place as upstanding equals. We must put on modern clothing."[1]

Mangku Nagoro VII, his Queen and Their Daughter, Principality of Mangkunagaran, Java, Indonesia, 1925 Courtesy of the KITLV Photographic Archive, Leiden, The Netherlands, photograph #6201. The photograph shows the male transitional or hybrid dress, the "traditional" female attire, and the Western frock for the primary school-age girl of the Javanese elite.

But only the new Indonesian man was to look like a Westerner. On women, Sukarno said, "I like the unsophisticated type. Not the modern ladies with short skirts, tight blouses and much bright lipstick."

As president of Indonesia (1945-67), Sukarno modelled the new male citizen in his suit or military uniform, plus a *peci* or cap he promoted as a symbol of nationalist identity. He continued to favour *kain kebaya* for women. Sukarno did not make concessions to Muslim sensibilities, but promoted this costume without a head covering of any kind. Sukarno also commissioned new designs for a national batik that could be worn by Indonesians of all ethnic groups.

Indonesia's second president, Suharto (r.1967-98), focussed on calming political life and promoting economic development. His Indonesian man and woman should look alike as efficient members of a globalising world. Businesses, government offices, political parties and educational institutions developed 'corporate' batik uniforms for their employees. In place of the suit, Suharto promoted the long-sleeved batik shirt with trousers, *peci* and shoes as national dress and formal evening wear.
Suharto's wife, Ibu Tien, modelled the New Order's conception of women in *kain kebaya*, but with a variation on the Sukarno model in the addition of the *slendang*. Originally a sturdy cloth worn over one shoulder by working women and fastened around babies or baskets, the *slendang* evolved

Teacher Miss. A. Johan with her pupils, daughters of Paku Buwono X of the Principality of Surakarta, Java, Indonesia, c.1926 Courtesy of the KITLV Photographic Collection, Leiden, The Netherlands, photograph #33917. The photograph shows the adaptation of a variant of Javanese dress by Dutch women. This particular photograph is unique in that Miss. Johan is bare-footed; Dutch women usually wore slippers with Javanese dress.

into a fashion statement in fine fabric for ladies. The Suharto-era *kain*, tightly wrapped, worn with high-heeled sandals, imposed a small gait and upright posture, signalling upper class status. The Indonesian woman who represented the nation wore her hair uncovered in an elaborate bun or attached hairpiece, and carried a handbag. When attending state functions, wives of public servants wore identically coloured *kebaya* and *kain* in matching batik patterns.

Sukarno defined Indonesians against the world; Suharto defined them against each other. In lavishly illustrated magazines Indonesia's men and women appear as 'types' in regional dress of elaborately decorated fabrics and ornate headdresses. The growing middle class toured Indonesia to look at 'natives', dressed in their traditional outfits, in Kalimantan and the Toraja highlands. In New Order Indonesia regional costume was for local events and weddings, the formal batik shirt and *kain kebaya* were for events associated with the nation.

Such images contrasted strongly with realities for, by the 1970s, Western dress had become the daily wear of two distinct groups. Male and female members of the professional elite wore Western suits to work; men of the working poor wore Western shorts, singlets and T-shirts, and working women wore short skirts and T-shirts. In a striking reversal of Sukarno's call for well-to-do men to leave 'native' dress to the masses, now the poor majority of Indonesians habitually wore mass-produced factory clothes that linked them to modern, global youth, while the upper classes put on romanticised versions of traditional clothing to project images of Indonesia nationally.

Other groups in Indonesian society looked elsewhere for inspiration. During the Suharto years, experiments with unveiling women came to an end in many Muslim countries. One of the first decrees of the Islamic Republic of Iran ordered women to cover themselves fully in public. In Afghanistan the Taliban government required women to wear an enveloping gown with a mesh over the eyes that both obscured women from viewers and limited their own vision. Unveiling had never been permitted in countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Elsewhere in the Muslim world there was a 'voluntary' re-veiling movement.

Some observers argue that Indonesian women began wearing headscarves in protest against the country's *nouveau riche*. Others point to the Islamic missionary programmes financed by the New Order government from the 1990s and to the novel Islamic behaviours of Indonesia's first family, such as establishing Muslim charities and making pilgrimage to Mecca in 1991. To mark the family's new piety, President Suharto 'dressed' his name with Haji Muhammad, while his politician daughter, Tutut, began appearing in public wearing the *krudung*. A sign of changing times may be seen in rulings of the Ministry of Education that banned the headscarf in government schools in 1982 and allowed it in 1992.

'Southeast Asian Islamic' style

Indonesia's garment industry established lines of 'Islamic clothing'. Trousers are now marketed to women as Muslim clothing and sold in matched sets with headscarves and blouses. There is also a lucrative new industry in school uniforms for girls. More fabric goes into the production of these ensembles, so industry prospers by encouraging women to adopt a 'Southeast Asian Islamic' style. Indonesia's television personalities, magazines, modelling schools and dress-making classes now offer an eclectic mix of fashions, Muslim and Western,[2] while Indonesian *haute couture* designers are redesigning the *kebaya* as modern chic in 'off-the shoulder ' and 'corset' styles.[3]

President Suharto's resignation brought a succession of short-lived presidencies, revision of the constitution, and the emergence of a female contender for the nation's top job. In October 1999 Megawati Sukarnoputri was appointed vice-president, then president in July 2001. Three prominent women offered models for Indonesia's first president. Mrs Suharto suggested tradition in her costume of *kain kebaya*. The London-trained ophthalmologist and political campaigner, Dr Wan Azizah, presented herself as a Malay Muslim woman in her ensemble of headscarf and figure-concealing clothing, rather than as representative for all Malaysians. The Philippines president, Dr Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, wears the Western woman's 'power suit' to establish herself as national leader and someone the West will take seriously.

As Indonesia's president, Megawati chose the Western dress and suit, including the pants suit. On visits to predominantly Muslim regions, such as Aceh, she added a *krudung*, suggesting respect for Muslim values Javanese-style. For her official head-and-shoulders photograph the president chose a blouse that suggested the *kebaya* and a batiked *slendang* in an Indonesian Chinese design, pinned with the presidential medal, and uncovered hair. This official image suggests that Megawati wished to represent a nation that values all its peoples, cultures and religions.

Campaign photographs from May 2004 show the four male candidates for president dressed in Western suit plus *peci* or informal, long-sleeved batik shirt, trousers and *peci*. The sole female candidate presents herself in Western dress. Two other images from the presidential campaign are captured in photographs of Generals Wiranto and Susilo. For some political appearances Wiranto presented himself in the aristocratic costume of Java: chocolate coloured batiked *kain*, headwrapper, and a buttoned jacket in gold, the colour associated in Java with royalty and authority. In this representation of self, appeal is made to Javanese, rather than national, solidarity. Susilo, by contrast, campaigned in casual Western collared sports shirt and baseball cap, surrounded by bare-headed female supporters in T-shirts. Together they presented an image of the confident, modern Indonesian man and woman.

In these campaign images we see a historic reversal. For Sukarno, the Indonesian male in his Western suit represented modernity and national identity, while the Indonesian woman, wearing a contrived costume from the past, represented the essence of the nation. President Megawati presented the Indonesian woman as modern and the equal of men.

In Indonesia today batik has lost status, trivialised as a tourist item. Batik's Hindu and Buddhist motifs cause it to be rejected by some Muslims. The *peci* is still worn by government officials for photo opportunities. There are discussions about an Islamic superstate. Muslim causes are promoted by leaders who, like Abu Bakar Bashir, wear white, Arab-style robes. Western photographers create an image of piety in portraits of young girls in Islamic clothing, but a glance at Indonesia's public places reveals a greater variety of messages from teenagers wearing Muslim fashion and from working women in Islamic outfits. Magazines cover Western fashions as well as featuring Islamic-clad models; they carry many photographs of long-haired Indonesian girls advertising hair care products. But, in comparison with previous decades, the task of essentialising the nation seems to be a male one now, while women have the task of representing Indonesia as Islamic modern.

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Notes

1 Sukarno. 1965. *Autobiography as told to Cindy Adams*, New York: Bobbs Merrill.
2 See, for example, magazines aimed at adolescent girls and young women, such as Aneka Yess, Femina and Kartini.
3 See, for example, the fashion photographs of the new *kebaya* in *Femina*, 19-25 April, 2001.

The end of the cold war provided India and Pakistan with opportunities to develop the concept of cooperative peace and security. The desire for peace, recognition of the futility of confrontation and the utility of confidence-building measures, the cumulative impact of 'track two diplomacy' and the intent to succeed in a dialogue process have all strengthened the peace process in recent years. Added to this is a post-9/11 change in South Asia's security environment and a perceptible shift in US attitude to subcontinental affairs compelling the countries towards peace initiatives.



Badshahi Mosque, Lahore, Pakistan.

Post-cold war Indo-Pak friendship

Giving peace a chance after 9/11

Sanjeeb Kumar Mohanty

External powers have been instrumental in the process of regional peace making. Post-cold war developments have changed the US's attitude to subcontinental affairs. The US accepts that there are possibilities of better relations with India. It also accepts India's security concerns. However, this does not dilute US relations with Pakistan. Pakistan remains important to US interests in the region and 'constructive engagement' is useful and necessary for monitoring and controlling cross-border terrorism and religious extremism. Linkage with Pakistan is also considered necessary in maintaining an atmosphere of restraint in the region in the context of the nuclear weaponisation of India and Pakistan. The US wooed Pakistan during the cold war period, in particular after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. That era is dead and those compulsions are now gone. In the post-cold war era, Pakistan has little choice but to go along with US interests, ending its isolation and carving out a new role as a frontline state fighting the Islamic militants in South Asia.

Locked in a loveless embrace

After 9/11, Pakistan and the US found themselves locked in a loveless embrace. Their mutual relations conditioned more by fundamental differences than by shared convictions and interests. The US believes a strong and friendly India can maintain stability and prosperity in South Asia. India remains an obvious choice for the US: Increasingly powerful in economic terms, militarily responsible (despite Pokharan II) and with a track record of combatting terrorism. The US and India are building a strategic partnership based on their shared commitment to freedom, prosperity and security. This new Indo-US partnership has changed the security environment in South Asia, and India's increased importance in the eyes of the US after 9/11 has forced Pakistan to seek peace in the region.

Changes had already taken place prior to 9/11. When the Taliban took power in Afghanistan "they made use of their ISI and Pakistani military contacts, but also relied on the support of drug barons and provincial governments. For recruits and for influence beyond the country they made use of networks of Deobandi Madarsas in Pakistan".[1] These religious colleges politicised Islam and generated a flow of recruits fed on a diet of religious dogmatism and jihad. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan saw advantage in courting American patronage. India, eager to prove Pakistan an untrustworthy ally, backed the Taliban and promoted insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan supported the Taliban in the hope of protecting its western border in the event of war with India.[2] The fall of the Taliban was seen as a spectacular failure of this policy. It also allowed the US to tilt the regional security environment in favour of India, in turn persuading Pakistan to rein in jihadi elements and obliging Musharraf to collaborate in the 'war on terror'.

The Kargil conflict of 1999 revealed the threat of Islamic fundamentalism in the region. India got a taste of this threat and an opportunity to share its fears with the US. Kargil saw Pakistani attempts to internationalise the Kashmir issue fail as the spectre of Islamic militancy struck terror across the world. Islamabad's efforts to persuade the major powers to intervene met with little success. Both regional and international opinion favoured India and its policy of military restraint. The US argued that the rules of engagement in the subcontinent fundamentally changed with the introduction of nuclear weapons into the equation in the 1990s. It believed that irresponsible actions (such as Kargil) by Pakistan could destabilise the region with dangerous consequences. As a result, Pakistan came under tremendous international pressure to enter bilateral talks with India. The American-led coalition operations in Afghanistan in 2001, the international pressure on Musharraf to wind up the jihadi culture and the presence of US Special Forces in Pakistan sent shock waves through Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment, with the effect of persuading Pakistan to work more closely with India and the international community in order to neutralise the networks of extremists.

Compulsions behind peace initiatives

The US has been an effective mediator, encouraging both India and Pakistan to stick to the peace process. It has entered into an historic nuclear deal with India and has chosen Pakistan as an ally in its global war against terrorism. As the world's sole super power the US has proved that it can haughtily influence the course of events. Musharraf clearly anticipates a sympathetic response from the US by cooperating in every possible way to combat Islamic terrorism.

At the heart of the renewed process after 9/11 is an apparent understanding by India to learn to deal with Musharraf. This includes understanding his compulsions and domestic problems. "India is moving from a position of being a victim of Pakistan's terrorism for the last 20 years to a position where we are endorsing Musharraf's assertion that Pakistan is also a victim of terrorism".[3] India also feels that Musharraf has made serious efforts in fighting hardliners and jihadi outfits. Musharraf knows that these groups threaten not only the Kashmir peace process but Pakistan's own stability. India, therefore, does not want to press him too hard, for fear of further undermining his political base and thus India-Pakistan dialogue.

An intense international pressure to normalise relations with Pakistan, plus a desire to address the international community and the Kashmiris meant that India was ready to go the extra mile for peace. Vajpayee wanted to go down in history as a man who wanted peace with Pakistan. "The BJP-led NDA government's legitimate approach to the US has been to leverage good relations with the world's only superpower to project India's interests: persuading Pakistan to abandon support to Kashmiri militants".[4] This approach prompted India to take these peace initiatives unilaterally in the hope of winning US support over Kashmir.

With the jihadi policy collapsing and international pressure mounting, Musharraf used the peace initiative to rebuild his credibility. In order to be a modern and moderate Islamic state, Musharraf believes Pakistan must turn its back on religious extremism. Failure could see world public opinion branding Pakistan as an irresponsible state and earning the wrath of the US in the long run. After 9/11 things changed drastically. the US administration left Musharraf with no choice but to clamp down on state sponsored terrorism against India and begin a dialogue for peaceful resolution of bilateral disputes. When terrorism - the Frankenstein's monster that Pakistan had given life to - struck back, Pakistan's army found it difficult to keep its house in order. "Some critics feel that the rapprochement process with India was a tactical ploy on the part of Musharraf to face the new internal dangers and not a strategic change of heart".[5]

Pakistan's partnership with the US in the 'war on terror' has forced it to be more pragmatic on the Kashmir issue. Pakistan's domestic elites stand divided on Musharraf's Kashmir policy. Mainstream political parties and liberals have made a strong case for ending the insurgency, believing that perpetual confrontation with India has financially bankrupted Pakistan. Peace is achievable only if Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment desists from waging proxy war through militants in Kashmir.[6]

Furthermore, the US has accepted India's argument that Pakistan is part of the terrorism problem in South Asia and has rejected Islamabad's claims that it lends only moral and political support to freedom fighters in Jammu and Kashmir. "The US has also perceived the nuclear threat in South Asia, and for that reason, the Bush administration has pressurised General Musharraf to deliver on his promises to stop cross-border terrorism in India-controlled Kashmir and to reduce the political temperature in the region".[7] Both India and Pakistan have made a commitment not to let terrorism derail the peace process. Even the recent US offer to sell F-16s to Pakistan is "aimed at giving the Bush administration leverage on Musharraf in pushing him in the direction of accommodation over Kashmir and other bilateral disputes with India".[8] The Musharraf regime, confronted with the responsibility of reining in the militant proxies fighting in Kashmir, requires a political cover to hide retreat. India has offered this cover by making reciprocal concessions such as demobilisation of the Indian army and restoring dialogue over Kashmir. This mutual reciprocation has brought the two neighbours closer than even before.

The urge for peace

The cry for peace is palpable across Pakistan especially among the younger generation, which feels that the strife is getting in the way of their desire for economic prosperity. Many of Pakistan's youth want to see their country integrated with the world community. The fact is that 'peace constituency' has expanded much beyond the expectation of the leaders of both countries. There is great curiosity to understand one another. The inability to cross the border and visit the other was a real constraint. Now, the two governments have agreed on a bus service across the Line of Control. Adopting more confidence-building measures (CBMs) to beef up people-to-people contacts and allowing the public sentiment for peace on both sides to emerge, leaders of both countries have succeeded in generating a climate of peace. The potential utility of CBMs became evident in bilateral relations as the focus shifted to suit the changing security concerns and domestic political compulsions. Instead of hastily conceived high-profile summitry as in Lahore and Agra, the two sides are now laying a solid groundwork of confidence-building measures before expecting something spectacular.

CBMs include 'track-two diplomacy' and the process of ongoing dialogue. "Track two diplomacy is not a substitute for track-one official diplomacy but it supplements the process of unofficial manner to promote an environment through education of public opinion, that would make it safe for political leaders to take risk's for peace".[9] During the 1990s, despite officially imposed constraints, both governments found it valuable to have a track-two channel available in the absence of any serious official dialogue. It is non-official dialogue in a bid to promote cooperation and resolve issues through conflict management and it aims to heighten the level of trust and understanding. It tries to overcome past reservations, enmities and misunderstandings and find creative solutions to difficult issues. Track-two has had a cumulative impact on the recent peace initiatives, creating interest in the minds of the Indian and Pakistani public to get to know each other better, to correct misperceptions and create opportunities for rational behaviour by leaders of both countries.

Ongoing dialogue

In the post-emergency phase, a civilian government in Pakistan is likely to be friendly to India. Since the army would have to continue its counter extremist operations for the foreseeable future, there is also the option of 'buying' peace with India. As a civilian President, Musharraf is still able to dictate the terms of the peace process which he initiated, as he enjoys the support of the army and the US. Peace talks have taken place under both dispensations (civilian rule and military rule), making it difficult to draw any facile connections between democracy in Pakistan and good relations between the neighbours.

Intent to succeed is the most important aspect of the current India-Pakistan dialogue process and hopefully both countries will exhibit the required degree of flexibility and openness to offer the best prospects of a détente, if not a solution. Despite continuing political turmoil in Pakistan, the talks to resolve the issues bedeviling Indo-Pak relations continue. While both countries are still unable to address the crucial issues in meaningful terms, mutual tension and suspicion has been reduced. . The peace process remains highly vulnerable to Indian and Pakistani political whims that have always been inconsistent. That said, both sides exhibit tremendous political will and determination and recent peace initiatives have been responded to by both countries with equal vigour. There is room for guarded optimism.

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Notes

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This research is based on original VOC records housed at the National Dutch Archives in The Hague. Till now there has been a regrettable lack of solid data on the Dutch trade in slaves from around the Bay of Bengal, particularly Arakan. Wil O. Dijk's research, based on original VOC records housed at the National Dutch Archives in The Hague serves as a first step towards opening a window onto what has been in effect a 'protracted history of silence' surrounding this sordid trade.

An end to the history of silence?

The Dutch trade in Asian slaves: Arakan and the Bay of Bengal , 1621 – 1665

Wil O. Dijk

Early in the 17th century, the Dutch East India Company (*Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* or VOC) arrived on India's Coromandel Coast in search of cotton piece-goods to barter for spices from the Spice Islands, which were in such great demand in Europe. The Company planted a number of trading settlements along India's Coromandel Coast: in 1605 at Masulipatnam, in 1608 at Tegenepatnam, and in 1610 at Pulicat, which they turned into the Company Coromandel headquarters. The Dutch had already undertaken their first trading voyage to Arakan in 1605 and in 1610 they established a trading post at Mrauk-U. With intermittent closures it remained operational till 1665.

The first official data on the VOC's Bay of Bengal slave trade dates from 1621. This was also the year in which the Dutch, under Governor-general Jan Pietersz Coen, murdered practically the entire population of the Banda Islands in order to gain access to the nutmeg and mace trees that grew there so profusely and which the islanders were not prepared to simply hand over to foreign intruders. Having summarily dispatched the local population, the Dutch now needed to bring in slaves to take over the nutmeg cultivation. In June of that year, the first batch of 150 boys and girls were shipped from Coromandel to Batavia in the *Schoonhoven*.

It did not take the Dutch long to discover that large numbers of slaves were to be had in Arakan, mainly brought there by Portuguese mercenaries and freebooters operating slave raids to Bengal from Chittagong and nearby Dianga. Dutch shipments from Arakan started in 1624, when 88 slaves were shipped in the *Jager* and the *Muijs* to Batavia by way of Masulipatnam. The final shipment from this region took place in November 1665, when 200 slaves (180 women and 20 children) were sent from Arakan to Masulipatnam in the *Cattenburgh,* the *Mees*, and the *Inckhoorn*. This coincided with the closure of the Company's Arakan factory after the Dutch gave up hope of ever procuring slaves from there again.

There is an intriguing story regarding this entire sordid trade, of course, but solid statistics were sadly lacking. Now, however, newly built statistics tell an intriguing story of their own. Although the overall trade in slaves from the Bay of Bengal area was in reality far greater than the data presented here would indicate, I am only able to offer statistics on the Company's share, since that is what the VOC archives have brought to light. Moreover, I have refrained from generalities such as 'thousands of slaves were captured', or 'hundreds of slaves were purchased'. What is presented here is derived from concrete, verifiable data based solely on slaves that were actually transported on VOC ships within the Bay of Bengal and from there to Batavia. To avoid possible charges that batches of slaves might have been counted more than once, each shipment includes the name of the ship and its departure and/or arrival date. A total of 131 VOC ships (from the *Arent* to the *Zuijlen*) were involved in this trade, which lasted from 1621 to 1665.

Total number of Bay of Bengal slaves:

The 'master list' of slaves transported in VOC ships within and from the Bay of Bengal from June 1621 to November 1665 shows a total of 26,885 men, women, and children of which 1379 died, just over 5 percent. When broken down into decades we arrive at the following table:

Bay of Bengal slaves per decade:

1620s -	9072
1630s -	2094
1640s -	9091
1650s -	2509
1660s -	4119
Total	26,885 slaves

Bay of Bengal slaves: percentages of men, women, boys, girls, and infants.

Very few shipping lists give details on gender and ages (children reached their majority at the age of 12). The lists that do provide such details show the following percentages:

Men	63.0%
Women	30.6%
Boys	2.7%
Girls	2.6%
Infants	1.0%
Total	99.9%

Arakan slaves

Arakan slaves were in fact slaves captured in Bengal (raided by the Portuguese and the Arakanese) and brought to Arakan. There they were purchased by VOC factors and subsequently shipped to Batavia. Arakan statistics, distilled from the overall Bay of Bengal data, show that from 1624 to 1665 a total of 11,556 men, women, and children were involved. Broken down into decades:

Arakan slaves per decade:

1620s -	2005
1630s -	1566
1640s -	3555
1650s -	2385
1660s -	2045
Total	11,556 slaves

Arakan slaves: percentages of men, women, boys, girls, and infants:

Men	66.0%
Women	28.5%
Boys	2.0%
Girls	2.5%
Infants	1.0%
Total	100%

General prices of slaves

The price of slaves fluctuated greatly per region and from year to year, depending on the availability of slaves, which in turn was closely related to the local food supply. With a bountiful harvest resulting in generous supplies of cheap rice, the availability of slaves diminished. Conversely, in times of famine with sky rocketing rice prices, slaves were plentiful and cheap. For the slave trader it was vital to find the right balance. It made little sense to purchase cheap slaves only to have to feed him with very expensive rice. And during a famine, it was not advisable to wait too long with the procurement of slaves, in the hope that prices might drop even lower, since the longer the people starved, the weaker they became and the smaller the chance they would recover and survive the journey.

In order to present a clear and balanced overview, all prices are quoted in Dutch guilders (*ƒ*), converted from a variety of local currencies.

Price of Pipli (Bengal) slaves:

Men	*ƒ* 17 to *ƒ* 20 each
Women	*ƒ* 14 to *ƒ* 25 each
Boys	*ƒ* 17 to *ƒ* 19 each
Girls	*ƒ* 14 to *ƒ* 17 each

In Bengal a poll tax of just over a guilder was levied on each slave.

Price of Pulicat slaves:

In 'expensive' years, the price of a slave in Pulicat ranged from 27 to 40 guilders, while in 'cheap' years it could drop to as little as 4 guilders. Most of these slaves had been brought from Bengal or from places further south such as Carcal and Tegenepatnam. In Pulicat, slaves were occasionally categorised as Muslim, Hindu or even *'caffer'*.

Price of Arakan slaves from Dianga:

Men	*ƒ* 16 to *ƒ* 18 each
Women	*ƒ* 9 to *ƒ* 16 each
Boys	*ƒ* 12 to *ƒ* 16 each
Girls	*ƒ* 9 to *ƒ* 14 each

The slaves the Portuguese sold to the Dutch were comparatively expensive and the age groups more precisely defined:

Men	20-36 years	*ƒ* 29 each
Women	12-25 years	*ƒ* 20 "
Boys	8-19 years	*ƒ* 18 "
Girls	7-12 years	*ƒ* 14 "
Children	3-6 years	*ƒ* 6 "
Infants	<3 years - *	

* Infants cost a pittance. However, the Dutch insisted on healthy robust toddlers since, as they were at pains to point out, it took an infant some years to acquire the physique and stamina required to perform any sort of labour.

If the Portuguese had to transport slaves from Dianga to Arakan, they added about three and a half guilders (*ƒ*3:12:00) to the purchasing price of each.

The cost of clothing a slave

Slaves were commonly clothed in dungarees (*dongrys*), a simple coarse cotton cloth, much like a loincloth. Sometimes it was dyed red with a black stripe running through the middle. Dungarees were also used for sails of proas and for packing material, especially for wrapping textiles. The price of a piece of dungarees fluctuated from as little as *ƒ*0:15:00 to as much as *ƒ*1:10:00.

Guinea cloth (*guinees lywaet or negros kleden*) for slaves is also mentioned often. This was a coarse, cheap striped or chequered cotton cloth woven from yarn dyed in bright colours and cost around *ƒ*0:11:00 per piece. It was often exported to the Gulf of Guinea, which gave it its name.

The cost of feeding a slave

Each slave had a daily ration of 1.13 lbs of rice costing on average about *ƒ*0:00:07 per pound. The total daily cost of feeding a single slave (rice, dried fish, sesame oil, etc.) was about *ƒ* 0:05:05. Shipping lists regularly mention singely or sesame seed oil which the slaves consumed and also put on their bodies. It cost from *ƒ*0:09:00 to *ƒ*0:16:00 per litre.

These then are the sad statistics of the VOC's sordid trade in 'human flesh'. It is not an uplifting story but finally needs to be told. As mentioned, there is an intriguing story about all aspects of the Dutch 17th century trade in slaves from Arakan and the Bay of Bengal, but that will have to wait a bit longer since this is still very much 'work in progress'.

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No original writing tradition in Minang – the language of the Minangkabau ethnic group of Western Sumatra – existed before the coming of Islam. The Jawi, or Arabic Malay, Islamic writing tradition, which developed over the 17th and 18th centuries, became the main conduit of Sufi learning on Sumatra, producing manuscripts that have since become quite rare. At the beginning of the 21st century, Irina Katkova undertook a journey to find still existing examples of this almost vanished tradition.

Searching for Islamic manuscripts in Western Sumatra

Irina R. Katkova

According to the Association of Malay Manuscripts, about 15,000 Malay manuscripts are not included in Indonesia's library and archive catalogues and are disseminated across the archipelago. In May 2006, in Minangkabau, Western Sumatra, I sought out Malay Islamic and Sufi manuscripts written in Arabic and Jawi, most of which date back to the 18th century, by visiting several Shattariyah *surau*, Islamic study centres led by Sufi sheikhs (or *buya* in Minang): *surau* Paseban, Surau Baru, Nurul Huda and Lubuk Ipuh in Ulakan.



Sheikh Abd al-Munaf al-Khatib, (d.2006), was the last Minangkabau Jawi language writer

From India to Indonesia: the Shattariyah Brotherhood

The dissemination of the Muslim writing tradition in Arabic and Jawi on Western Sumatra is intertwined with Sufi brotherhoods, mainly the Shattariyah, whose centres continue to keep the Jawi writing tradition alive. The Shattariyah *silsila*, or Sufi chain of spiritual succession, was introduced to India in the 15th century from Transoxiana where it was called 'Ishqiya. Shah 'Abdu'llah (d.1485), a descendant of Sheikh 'Umar Suhrawardi, is credited with having changed the brotherhood's name from 'Ishqiya to Shattariyah, a derivation of *shattar* ('the swift-paced'). In his treatise he divided Muslim mystics into three categories: *akhyar* ('the religious'), *abrar* ('the holy') and *shattar*. Shah 'Abdu'llah believed that the Shattariyas were superior to other Sufis, obtaining direct instructions from the spirits of the great saints and therefore able to rapidly follow the Sufi path.

Having been firmly established in Gujarat, Burhanpur and Bengal, the Shattariyah Brotherhood (*tariqah*) was introduced to Medina by the Indian Sheikh Sibgatullah in 1605. In the 17th century the most prominent sheikhs of Mecca and Medina who were adherents of Shattariyah were al-Qushashi (d.1660) and al-Kurani (d.1691). Their Indonesian disciples had a strong preference for this *tariqah*, so for several generations Indonesian seekers of knowledge in Arabia studied with al-Kurani's successors and sought initiation into the Shattariyah.

Thus we find a number of unrelated branches of Shattariyah in Java and Sumatra. Although the mystical teaching of Shattariyah spread throughout a vast proportion of the Islamic world, it was a native Sumatran, Sheikh Abd ar-Ra'uf as-Singkeli (1620-1693), who most influenced its history. He spent 19 years in Arabia as a disciple of al-Qushashi and al-Kurani and in 1661 returned to Acheh as a Shattariyah *khalifa*, or deputy with the authority to initiate new followers. To the present day Abd ar-Ra'uf (Tuanku di Kuala) is venerated as a *wali*, or Muslim 'saint', and Indonesian national hero.

Shattariyah doctrine was introduced to the western part of Sumatra, Minangkabau, by Abd ar-Ra'uf's disciple Sheikh Burhanuddin of Ulakan in the late 17th century. It subsequently spread via trade routes to villages close to modern Padang Panjang and further to Kota Lawas, Agam and Kota Tua.

Islam's infiltration: the *surau*

One of the unique features of the Shattariyah Sufi Brotherhood is its relatively easy ability to accommodate itself with local tradition. Thus it became the most 'indigenised' of the brotherhoods. Before the coming of Islam the people of Minangkabau had their own well-developed religious system, so it should not be forgotten that Islam was merely added to what had gone before and exhibited itself in a highly syncretistic form. One of the main means of Islamic penetration to the Minangkabau highlands was the *surau*, which in fact already existed before the coming of Islam. During the pre-Islamic Hindu-Buddhist period, a *surau* was used for ascetic practices and praying, and as a home for young single men. Thus, in Malay, '*surau*' can mean a house for praying; a dormitory where post-pubescent young unmarried men lived away from the ancestral house (the dwelling place of women and children) in the matriarchal system of the Minangkabau people; a village Koranic school; or an Islamic studies centre guided by a teacher of a Sufi brotherhood. Therefore, *surau* was an important facet of life in any Minangkabau village.

Islam constructed a whole edifice of learning on the basis of the pre-Islamic *surau*. Large *surau* attracted hundreds of pupils and consisted of many buildings, but most were small, built on high piles and looked like small inns. There can have been little change from the two previous centuries. Not much has not as changed in the two centuries since. Usually a small *surau* consists of two or three buildings used for Sufi rituals, lodging for pupils and sheikhs (*tuanku* in Malay; *buya* in Minang) and preserving manuscripts. Some *surau* are situated near the mausoleum of a local *wali*, such as *Surau* Baru, located near the grave of Sheikh Muhammad Nasir.

Pupils at Shattariyah *surau* were exposed to the full gamut of Islamic learning, especially in the field of *fikh*, Islamic law. Abd ar-Ra'uf's treatises show considerable respect for the *syari'at*, or Islamic law based on religious revelation rather than on custom. Thus there are many books on *fikh* in *surau* collections, such as the most popular handbook of Minangkabau, *Minhaj al-talibin* or *Kitab Fikh* (al-Haitami). However, in response to the increase in the number of pilgrims leaving Minangkabau for the holy land in the latter part of the 18th century, different Shattariyah *surau* began to specialise in different branches of learning. *Surau* Kamang specialised in *ilmu alat* (Arabic language); *surau* Kota Gedang specialised in *ilmu mantik maana* (the logical exposition of the meaning of the Koran); and *surau* Kota Tua housed a scholar from Acheh who had come to teach *ilmu tafsir* (commentaries on the al-Qur'an).

In addition to such specialisations, many *surau* collections include treatises on the mystical teaching of the Shattariyah Brotherhood by Abd ar-Ra'uf as-Singkeli and his Gujarati teacher al-Burhanpuri (such as *Al-Tuhfa al-mursala ila ruh al-nabi*, 'The Gift Addressed to the Spirit of the Prophet'), and historical works by two outstanding local disciples of as-Singkeli, Sheikh Burhanuddin and Muhammad Nasir. All of these works present the basic tenets of Islamic practice. One typical Shattariyah book written by Sheikh Burhanuddin in 1757 indicates a variety of instructional matters available to Shattariyah pupils, such as notes on Arabic grammar, syntax and commentaries on the Koran, Malay notes on medicine and Islamic astrological treatises (*hisab*). These works belong to the repertoire of Jawi manuscripts preserved in many *surau* and private collections, including examples of the Koran, tafsir (*tafsir Jalalain, tafsir al-Qurtubi*) and historical treatises.

Most of these manuscripts were composed or copied in the 18th and 19th centuries on European or locally made paper (*dluwang*). The most unique example, dealing with the history of Minangkabau and written in *nash*, one of the six classical Arabic styles of handwriting, is a beautifully decorated, seven-meter-long scroll. Unfortunately, most of these manuscripts are in a very poor, almost unreadable state because of the humid climate and insects. Attempts to preserve them have included storing them in the building of ritual practice (such as at *surau* Paseban), inside a wall or in the ceiling (Batang Kabung), or in a special separate wooden or stone house (Lubuk Ipuh, *Surau* Baru). In some *surau* Shattariyah pupils are taught not only to read religious books but also to write in Jawi. Copying the manuscripts is one of the most important parts of teaching at Sufi *surau*, as well as a religious duty (*ibadah*). The process of writing and copying manuscripts is considered to be almost magical in Muslim tradition, as it takes a special mystical attitude to undertake, as if one is performing an act pleasing to God.

The last Jawi writer in Western Sumatra

During my field work, there was still one living representative of traditional writing in Jawi among Shattariyah sheikhs of Western Sumatra: Imam Maulana Abdulmanaf Amin al-Khatib from *surau* Nurul Huda in Batang Kabung (Tabing). According to his 2002 autobiography, he was born on 8 August 1922 and was initiated into *tariqah* Shattariyah via *bai'at*, the ritual initiation oath of fidelity to the brotherhood, by Sheikh Paseban in 1936. He copied manuscripts and wrote, and was undoubtedly a real treasure of Islamic spiritual tradition. He maintained a vast network throughout the surrounding *surau* and taught many pupils. Among his 20 books are a series of hagiographical works about the lives of the four eminent *auliya* (saints) of Western Sumatra: as-Singkeli, Sheikh Burhanuddin, Sheikh Paseban and Sheikh *Surau* Baru. In 1976 the series was published for the first time in Padang under the title *Mubaligul Islam* (The Propagators of Islam). One of the agiographical works in this series, *Sejarah Ringkas Auliya Allah as-Salikin. Syeh Burhanuddin Ulakan* ('A Brief History of the Faithful Saints of Allah. Sheikh Burhanuddin from Ulakan'), is considered to be the most important source for studying the history of Islam in Western Sumatra. Sheikh al-Khatib also composed treatises dealing with Shattariyah Brotherhood doctrine, such as *Mizan al-Qulub* ('The Measure of Hearts'), and a history of Muslim penetration into Minangkabau, *Kitab Menerangkan Perkembangan Agama Islam di Minangkabau semenjak dahulu Syeh Burhanuddin sampai ke zaman kita sekarang* ('A book narrating the history and development of the Muslim faith in the land of Minangkabau since the time of Syeh Burhanuddin to the present day'). Sheikh al-Khatib worked not only as a writer but also as a copyist of famous sheikhs' treatises, thus preserving the literary Sufi heritage. I met al-Khatib at Batang Kabung, but owing to illness he was unable to grant me an interview. He died on 12 October 2006 and was buried on the territory of *surau* Nurul Huda.

According to the latest data from local Minangkabau scholars, one year after the death of Sheikh al-Khatib only several Jawi language copyists, and no writers, continue the tradition of handwriting in some old *surau* near Padang (in the coastal city of Pariaman). Thus Sheikh al-Khatib was in fact the last Minangkabau Jawi language writer. Having composed 22 manuscripts, he contributed much to Minangkabau Islamic literature.

Dr Adriyetti Amir (Dean of Philological Faculty of Andalas University in Padang) cites only two more people who wrote and copied manuscripts in Jawi: H. K. Deram (d.1997) and Mukhtar Abdullah (d.2000). They were not sheikhs of Shattariyah but recipients – *orang surau* in Malay; *urang siak* in Minang – of *surau* Islamic education.

It is difficult to cite the total number of manuscripts in Western Sumatra, as there are numerous *surau* and many private collections; 16 manuscripts are in the collection of Adityawarman Museum in Padang and another nine are exhibited in the Philological Faculty of Andalas University. According to my investigations based on visiting several *surau*, approximately 50 manuscripts are preserved in Lubuk Ipuh at Ulakan, approximately 80 at *Surau* Baru and the largest collection, more than 100, belongs to *surau* Paseban. Hence *surau* are Sumatra's so-called *scriptorium*, or places of Islamic manuscript preservation, especially given that some *surau* are no longer active as Sufi centres of learning and ritual practice but now have only one main function – to conserve the Islamic written spiritual heritage.

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Perhaps the most significant side effect of the ongoing reconfiguration of the discipline of French studies in countries outside France has been the thoroughgoing internationalisation of that field of study. As a consequence, scholars of French in European countries with 18th and 20th century empires which competed with those of the French are researching colonialism and its afterlives in a comparative way. This approach is particularly promising in the study of the cultural contact between India and Europe.

French-language representations of India

Globalised research across national disciplinary boundaries.

Ian Magedera

Prompted by the award of a four-year Arts and Humanities Research Council grant to a project on 'Peripheral Voices in European Colonialism' at the University of Liverpool, this essay surveys research into French-language representations of India 1754-1954. That is from Dupleix's departure from India, to the cession to India of Pondicherry, the territory he once governed with the other French *comptoirs* of Yanam, Mahé, Karaikal and Chandernagore.[1] This essay will also place that research in the context of the discipline of French studies which has shifted its focus from the national literature of France, to include the study of francophone cultures in their global contexts.[2] The vitality of English-language work on India from a postcolonial studies perspective, means that the study of French-language representations of a non-francophone nation such as India, must take account of anglophone work in producing research which is historically anchored and yet multilingual and comparative.

A French corrective to 'India as an anglophone space' ?

Early in the investigation, however, two anomalies appear. First, although there are studies in English which address the French presence in India, they tend to examine it in isolation.[3] Far more serious, however, is the way that the vast majority of research on colonial India in English treats it as an anglophone space. Indian languages surface, but the comparative study of two or more European colonisers (the British, French, Dutch, Portuguese, Danes and the Swedes) is a comparatively recent phenomenon (even taking into account the massive differences in scale between the colonial enterprises of the other countries and that of the British).[4] The anglophone bias also applies to Indian historians of India writing in English in the Subaltern Studies school, although they aim to renew their discipline by what they consider as an anti-bourgeois and anti-nationalist analysis of Indian history.

As Harish Trivedi has suggested, post-colonial studies has 'ears only for English'.[5] Thus, despite the major theoretical contributions in studies published from 1983 to 1997, it is striking that none of them mention the French presence.[6] In both anglophone colonial history and postcolonial studies, therefore, India still appears to hold the bejewelled place that the Raj occupied in the former empire.

If one looks to studies written in French to offer a corrective, by elaborating a French dimension, one sees that they too are dominated by a national discourse. With Jackie Assayag (1999) as one of the very few exceptions, the 'Anglo-Indian' bilateralism of the English-language sources is repeated in 'Franco-Indian' forms.[7] Herein lies the second anomaly: while a comparative analysis of the impact of the British colonising other is nearly absent from academic research published in France, French-language primary sources, frequently contain both references to English (viz. the title of Marguerite Duras's *India Song*) and to the 'Britishers' in India (such as Phileas Fogg).

Evidence of this is provided in *India Scripta*, the Liverpool project's bibliography, written by Corinne François-Denève.[8] It will survey all the fiction and non-fiction books on India published in French from 1754 to the present day. Its scope goes further than existing publications because it will be annotated in both English and French and be available via open access.[9]
In France, the institutional embedding of a comparative research practice is hampered by both scepticism about the place of interdisciplinarity and the academic pedigree and state support accorded to the neighbouring disciplines of Indology and Francophone studies.

École française d'Extrême-Orient, Pondicherry, India.

French Indology was consecrated in 1814 at the Collège de France with the founding of the first chair of Sanskrit in Europe for Antoine-Léonard de Chézy (1773 1832).[10] This was the precise time at which France was being reduced to a second order power in India. From that time onwards, Indology has either focused mainly on the languages and cultural products of the period before European colonialism, or bracketed out its effects.

Since its coining, the expression 'francophone' has been an uneasy combination of a prefix and a suffix, failing to reconcile language, ethnicity and colonial domination.[11] The sectorisation used by contemporary institutions such as the OIF (*L'Organisation internationale de la francophonie*) has led to the complete marginalisation of India: official francophone cartographies make the whole subcontinent disappear between the Indo-China and the Indian Ocean sectors. Despite French investment in Pondicherry attested to by the *École française d'extrême orient*, the *Institut français*, *Alliance française* and the popular *Lycée français*, and despite the Marxist-inflected proto-postcolonial writing of Bernard Mouralis in the 1970s, Jean-Marc Moura's 1999 work informed by anglophone theory and studies exploring the Indian dimensions of Mauritian and Réunionnaise writing, there has been little shift in the Francophone studies doxa.[12] Non-metropolitan francophone texts, and, bizarrely, only non-metropolitan texts can be 'francophone' in the official sense, are still reduced to serving in a reductive exoticist mode as 'an elsewhere for the French language'.[13]

France as subaltern coloniser in India

These restrictions imposed by national disciplines encourage the project team to establish a new practice of comparative colonial studies. Using a strategy of triangulation between France, India and Britain in the context of competing colonialisms, this research both applies and simultaneously modifies postcolonial criticism in English, helping to correct its anglocentric and Anglo-Indian-centric bias and joins other projects which seek to bring in a comparative European dimension into postcolonial studies.[14]

Given, the 'second hundred years war' (1689-1815) between them, Franco-British rivalry is an important aspect in European involvement in India.[15] Notwithstanding this, however, triangular relations should be further multiplied by additional colonial competitors. That in turn necessitates a global perspective, including into debates about the colonisation of India and other theatres of rivalry, such as Egypt, and other powers, such as Russia. This opens out the debate to include, not only direct footfalls on Indian soil, but also military activity in Egypt, part of the British Indian empire's supply lines. Since Napoleon's expedition of 1798, and in common with much of 'Franco-Indian' bilateral writing, 'the French considered that they had not merely interests but an affinity with Egypt'.[16] This is confirmed by the expedition's publication, the 21 volume *Description de l'Egypte* (1809-13), which rivalled the work of British Orientalists in India such as William Jones. After his failure in Egypt, Napoleon planned a joint expedition to India with Czar Paul under the leadership of Masséna, but this was abandoned after Paul's murder in 1801.

The project's book-length contributions to postcolonial theory elaborate one element in the history of the French presence in India. The few French people in the *Établissements français en Inde* [the French possessions in India] between 1815 and 1947 were colonisers who were themselves under the hegemony of another European power. France was thus a '*colonisatrice colonisée*' (a colonised coloniser], or, better, a 'subaltern coloniser'.[17]

The status of the French as subaltern colonisers in India brings an understanding of simultaneity to French-language representations of India. French writers can be seen doing several partially contradictory things at once. They criticise British colonialism, from a supposedly disinterested viewpoint, while frequently sympathising with French colonialism. Their criticism coexisted both with a selective solidarity with the European colonial brother (a perspective that is so often masculinist) in the face of threatening Indians, and with an imaginative occupation of the Indian space for nostalgic, fantasist and utopian ends. Their writing is free to explore other Indias, and it is particularly interesting to study French representations at times of change in the colonial status quo, such as in 1857-59.

It is also possible to apply the notion of the subaltern coloniser to other contexts where a double stratification of power prevailed, such as in the relationship, after 1763, between the French and both indigenous peoples in Quebec, and colonised groups in the Caribbean. Indeed, more generally, the notion helps to theorise the role of proxy agents in colonial power relations, such as the Ashanti collaborators in the Atlantic slave trade and that of groups linked to former colonisers living in serially colonised regions under a new status quo (such as the descendants of French settlers in British-ruled Mauritius (1810-1968).

'Subaltern coloniser' is an oxymoron which breaks the coloniser/colonised binary in complementary, but different ways from the Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler's 'bottom up' focus on the individual 'agents of colonialism'.[18] In addition, the geographically disparate situation of these trading posts whose military defence was expressly forbidden in the two treaties of Paris of 1763 and 1815, adds an inter-coloniser dimension to Mary Louise Pratt's understanding of the 'copresence [and] interaction' between coloniser and colonised in 'contact zones'.[19]

The ongoing, open-ended loss in what could be called France's two-hundred-year-long decolonisation in India (1754 1954), means that subaltern coloniser status can contribute to the study of France's colonial policy. This builds on the work of Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard and Sandrine Lemaire in the *Association Connaissance de l'histoire de l Afrique contemporaine* (ACHAC).[20] From the start of the French conquest of Algeria in 1830, and intensifying after 1880, the loss of the Indian trading posts to the British and the concomitant loss of national prestige functions as an example to avoid.[21] More generally, Jean-Marc Largeaud has provocatively equated this focus on loss after Waterloo with a French national culture of glorious defeat.[22] It must be said, however, that these comparisons with India were intended to spur on French colonialists rather than to inhibit them.

Globalised research practice

While attuned to national contexts such as those above, a practice of globalised research should exhibit two qualities at the same time. The first is to be linguistically inclusive. Ideally, this manifests itself concretely, such as in the bi-lingual annotations of *India Scripta*. Alternatively, it can be a cumulative phenomenon, such as conferences and volumes of collected essays which admit more than one language, authors who publish in more than one language, or, at the very least, use source texts in French and English.[23]

The second quality is integrated multiple foci. One of the main domains in which these can function is in a suspicion of nation states, while at the same time acknowledging their importance in the period from 1754-1954. Cross-national comparativism of this sort is standard practice in studies on the pre-history of colonialism in the 17th century and earlier.[24] It is also found in studies of mercantilist colonialism.[25] This is because the shareholders in a company were not necessarily nationals of the country where it was based. Hence the capital flows into and out of trading companies were international. This recalls the occupation of more than one role, associated with the 'subaltern coloniser'. It also recognises the ability of certain individuals to make multinational connections between the different European colonialisms of India.[26]

The project monograph *Passeurs* is a study of three 'French' careers in the 19th and 20th century British Indian empire. These are three lives which go between nationalities, cultures and identities, breaking down the monolithic nature of 'French', 'British' and 'Indian' in the process: Frans Balthazar Solvyns (1760-1824), a Paris-trained Flemish painter who lived and worked in Kolkata with his English wife; Edouard de Warren (1811-98), a Pondicherry-born solider of mixed race who wrote an account of the events of the Indian Mutiny and Suzanne Brière who married into the Tata family at the turn of the 20th century. The focus on such individuals who were French in a multicultural way, adds a global dimension to the understanding of colonialisms in India. This dimension provides an alternative to the parochialism built on nationality, be it French or British.

Taken together, all the project outputs aim for a practice of research which is acutely aware of the continuing role of nationalisms in theories of knowledge, while demonstrating that French and British nationalisms in colonialism were not as hermetic as they once might have seemed.

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Complete list of references available online at www.iias.nl

European Union enlargement brings it geographically closer to Central Asia, which increases the significance of inter-regional relations, stability and security throughout Eurasia. From the first days of independence, Central Asian states made strengthening ties to Europe a foreign policy priority. Especially after signing Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the EU, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in particular brimmed with enthusiasm for closer cooperation.

Toward a true Eurasia?

EU strategy in Central Asia: a view from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan[1]

Aigerim Shilibekova

Eager individuals, but a not so eager union

The foundation of EU-Central Asian cooperation, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA),[2] was signed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1995 and four years later entered into force for a decade. It did not apply to Tajikistan, whose PCA negotiations were delayed by civil war, or Turkmenistan, whose cooperation was based on a separate bilateral Interim Agreement. The PCA is the legal framework for bilateral and inter-regional cooperation in a number spheres (trade, investment, human rights, constitutional reform and regional affairs), and is significant for Central Asia owing to the EU's key role in the world economy, its experience in sustainable economic development and social justice, and its population's educational level and cultural richness.

But this enthusiasm was not shared by senior level EU officials. Dialogue was usually limited to Cooperation Council annual meetings, though even then EU representation was often less than stellar.[3] High level Central Asian authorities, however, were always present, which indicated how significant they felt cooperation with Europe was. Kazakhstan even opened a representative's office in Brussels and signed cooperation and technical assistance agreements and created an environment for their implementation.

The EU's passive approach contrasted with the active foreign policy of the individual states of Germany, France, Poland, the Netherlands, Italy and Great Britain, which were successful in developing bilateral relations with their Central Asian counterparts and today seem to operate in the context of EU strategy. But will they sacrifice their national interests in the region in order to pursue EU interests? Different national interests translates into different Member State perceptions, positions and approaches to solving global issues. Thus we cannot speak of a clear EU political position, as European debate over the Iraq War sharply revealed. The basic reason for this 'weakness' is the EU's complicated organisational and heterogeneous structure.[4]

Turning point: 9/11 and a new strategy

EU foreign policy toward Central Asia improved after 11 September 2001, when the EU realised it could not ignore regional security threats. Inter-regional cooperation increased. As a result, on 30 October 2002, the European Commission released the 'Strategy Paper 2002-2006 & Indicative Programme 2002-2004 for Central Asia'. The Strategy Paper identified EU-Central Asia cooperation objectives based on PCA agreements with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The core objectives were to promote stability, security, sustainable economic development and poverty reduction. The new agenda, however, did not include developing new EU policy implementation tools. Instead, the Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) was adopted. TACIS provided a broad framework for developing European Commission policy documents, including Strategy Papers to highlight major priorities; 'Indicative Programmes' that determined cooperation objectives and costs; and Annual Action Programmes that specified projects and TACIS aid. The 'Indicative Program 2002-2004' entailed regional cooperation and support programmes implemented nationally, and a 'Pilot Poverty Reduction Scheme' that targeted the most vulnerable populations. This three-track approach aimed to promote security and conflict prevention, eliminate political and social tension, and improve the trade and investment climate. Annual TACIS project implementation allocations were increased from €25 million to €50 million during 2002-2004. Given rampant corruption in post-Soviet states, direct assistance was emphasised: consulting, training, courses, grant allocations and educational programs.

Central Asian officials praised the Strategy Paper but lamented the complexity of European institutions. European scholars criticised TACIS for its overly bureaucratic procedures, centralisation and insufficient attention to local conditions. Examining regional perceptions of EU policy in Central Asia can shed light on how to improve efficiency and cooperation.

Donor rather than equal partner: the EU in Kyrgyzstan

Senior EU officials called Kyrgyzstan 'an island of democracy' during its first years of independence. However, although the EU has supported its democracy and economic development, Kyrgyzstan has not cultivated an absolute political and economic orientation toward the EU, especially given opposition calls to join the union of Russia-Belarus.

The PCA and Strategy Papers form a sufficient foundation for more productive and dynamic cooperation. But as of the 2005 Tulip Revolution that overthrew President Askar Akayev, goals have not been reached and security and stability remain an urgent problem. One reason for this, according to Kyrgyz analyst Joomart Ormonbekov, is that TACIS projects are not well adapted to local circumstances. The needs and capacities of states do not always coincide, thus projects should be designed and coordinated jointly by EU and Kyrgyzstan representatives. This would help coordinate all aspects of project implementation and avoid what has often occurred in Kyrgyzstan: duplication of project areas and objectives.

Moreover, Ormonbekov believes that Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated an irresponsive attitude. Rather than developing its own strategies, it has contented itself with receiving EU aid. If the aid disappears, the sustainability of reforms will be at risk.[5] EU-Central Asian cooperation should not be a one-way street: regional countries must strive to develop their own strategies, which will contribute to regional development.

An international 'Marshall Plan' for Central Asia? The EU in Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan's more developed infrastructure makes it economically attractive to the EU. However, Tashkent's regime and politics of isolation provide no hope of political or economic dialogue. Despite this, between 1992 and 2005 TACIS implemented 188 projects funded by €150 million; most targeted agriculture, public health, technical education and training and small business enterprise.[6] TACIS was the most frequently used mechanism in bilateral relations with the EU, for as long as TACIS aid addresses development, and not internal political issues, local authorities encourage it. Uzbek political scientist Shafkat Arifkhanov, in his recent book on security and regional integration, sees TACIS and other programmes as part of the broader EU policy of strengthening its position relative to Russia and China, the external actors most involved in Central Asia. He considers a constructive, sustainable dialogue with the EU as positive for Uzbekistan's development, but that the success of EU policies depends on its perception of democracy in Central Asia, which 'does not fit standards of the West'.[7]

Uzbek scholars consider TACIS inefficient. Dr Farkhod Tolipov, a political scientist in Uzbekistan, believes the region must develop a 'Central Asia first' strategy to unify their foreign policy and to 'answer' the EU's regional strategy, which would foster cooperation at an equal level. Moreover, Dr Tolipov states that the independence, modernisation and democratisation of newly independent states require larger scale international support, suggesting an international 'Marshall Plan for Central Asian states' to undertake regional cooperation efforts from which the international community can benefit.[8]

Evolution from observer to participant: the EU in Kazakhstan

The period of 2000-2007 is viewed as a new stage in EU-Kazakhstan cooperation. Dr Saniya Nurdavletova believes the EU is changing its role from 'observer' to'participant' in Kazakhstan's development.[9] In a March 2004 speech, Chris Patten, a former EU representative on External Relations, cited new priorities in Kazakhstan, such as economic cooperation, working against terrorism and reducing poverty, which the EU's new strategy is supposed to help achieve.[10] Technical assistance is the main means of economic cooperation; provided through TACIS, it addresses all major economic and social sectors and is the gateway to European experience and knowledge. Key projects realised in Kazakhstan are in the fields of tax reform, agriculture, energy, public administration and education.
Owing to higher rates of economic development and a better social situation, TACIS aid to Kazakhstan was the lowest among regional states. Despite this, Dr Nurdavletova concludes that TACIS created a stable investment climate for economic modernisation. According to TACIS, between 1993 and 2005 Kazakhstan received approximately €200 million, or half the total sum of international assistance provided to finance entrepreneurship, privatisation reforms and human resource investment.[11] The French scholar Catherine Poujol, at a regional conference in Hudjend, Tajikistan, said that while the EU provides more assistance to Central Asia than any other international power, this fact is not always known by the population, which perceives America as the main provider of democratisation and development assistance owing to its stronger informational support and probably because the UN's special agencies (UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF) are usually associated with America. Thus the EU's efforts do not receive due recognition.

Kazakhstan realises that Central Asia is crucial to the EU's effort to diversify its energy suppliers. Both parties want to expand Kazakh energy transportation routes. The EU also wants to defend the interests of European companies in Kazakhstan's oil and gas industry. Kazakhstan, though it can secure alternative economic cooperation from Russia, China and Japan, according to its multi-vector foreign policy, remains eager to develop relations with European companies in order to tap their investment potential.

Central Asia to EU: Cooperate better among yourselves and you'll cooperate better with us

Because the EU is a confederation of equal and sovereign states, Central Asian countries are forced to build a two-level system of relations: one with the EU, another with each individual Member State. Dr Nurdavletova believes these two levels complement each other in a positive way, but that contradicts that the lack of a unified EU policy in Central Asia prevents efficient implementation of Strategy Paper goals and stifles the development of bilateral relations.

On 30 July 2007 in Berlin, the EU declared a new Strategy for Central Asia for the period of 2007 to 2013, when a new instrument will replace TACIS. For Central Asia, this augurs further interaction, investment, exchange of knowledge and experience, individual and institutional contacts and, consequently, development. For Europe, it means playing an important role in setting the international agenda, maintaining stability and promoting its geopolitical interests.

The European Council will evaluate the Central Asia strategy for the first time in June 2008 and every two years thereafter. This will serve to improve the efficiency of strategies and fill the gap pointed out by Dr Alexander Warkotsch, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Würzburg, who believes inefficiency is caused by a lack of oversight.[12] Moreover, the EU intends to open Commission Delegations in all five Central Asian states. It is hoped that these delegations work more closely with local experts and officials, incorporate the latter's propositions and views in project implementation and foster more dynamic cooperation. Joint programmes in European studies and Central Asian studies for both regions would also contribute to bilateral relations.

European integration continues at the same time as Central Asian regionalisation (improving intra-regional cooperation in order to function as a coherent actor), thus transformations in bilateral relations are unavoidable. The consequences are unpredictable, thus all Member States should accept the most recent EU Strategy Paper as a guide to their individual bilateral relations with third countries and strive for closer cooperation among themselves. Only then will the EU gain an advantage over Russia, China, Japan and America, who are feverishly competing to gain a foothold in Central Asia.

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Notes

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Emilia Sulek's first day in Dawu, a small town in Golog Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai Province, started with a rude awakening. A violent hammering at the door and dramatic voices in the corrider of the apartment where she was staying was enough to wake up the entire household. Tseren, our hostess' brother-in-law had been kidnapped, and the kidnappers were demanding a ransom...

Tseren's last gold rush

Tales of yartsa-hunting in Tibet

Emilia Sulek

Tseren came to Dawu from the part of Tibet that today belongs to the Chinese province of Sichuan. Its mild weather, barley fields and warm log-houses are famous among Tibetans who are unlucky enough to live in harsher climes. But it is Golog that gives them a reason to brave the rough mountain roads which lead to a land where even in May the yaks still wake up covered with night snow. For May is the start of *yartsa*-hunting season. *Yartsa gunbu* is a much sought after caterpillar fungus that is sold at high prices to pharmaceutical companies and Chinese medicine clinics across the country.

Yartsa gunbu is the strange result of a parasitic fungus (*Cordyseps sinensis*) infesting the larvae of several *Thitarodes* (*Hepialis*) moth species. The Tibetan name *yartsa gunbu* – 'summer-grass winter-worm' – reflects the origins of this extraordinary organism. The caterpillar, (which lives in the soil), is infected with the spores of a parasitic fungus that enters the caterpillar's body, takes it over and eats it up from the inside. To end the reproductive cycle the fungus produces a fruiting body growing out of the larval head. It is this part that is visible above the soil and is designated by Tibetans as a 'grass'. Caterpillar fungus has been used in Traditional Chinese Medicine, and the Golog highlands are known for particularly good yartsa. A combination of altitude and humidity creates conditions favourable for *yartsa* growth. The quantity of *yartsa* in a given season depends on the quantity of rain and snowfall. Harvesting lasts until mid-June, when grass and mountain flowers cover everything. But until then, every rain is welcomed by gatherers and traders with joy: "*gormo bab gi!*" – its raining money!

Selling yarsta at the market place. Courtesy of the author.

A masked lady with yarsta in her hand. Courtesy of the author.

As the season for harvesting *yartsa* approaches a fever takes hold of the area. Schools schedule a holiday to let students help their families with harvesting. Even distant relatives that have long left behind the life of a herder in hope of making a career in Xining, the provincial capital, come back home. It's not just Tibetans wanting to take part in the 'gold rush', however, this year local authorities introduced a regulation banning entry to Golog to all those without relatives or land of their own in the area. Travellers to Golog meet checkpoints on its roads, along with queues of landcruisers, and people sitting at the roadside waiting for somebody to lift the barrier to the pasturelands still covered by last year's dry grass.

In *yartsa* season Golog nomads generally stay in their winter houses before they move to their summer settlements of black tents woven from yak hair. During the day these settlements are almost empty. Having drunk a few bowls of butter tea with cheese and roasted barley *tsampa* flour everybody who can sets off for the mountain slopes. Through the ice covered river and between herds of yaks that already have calves bravely marching to the grasslands. That is where *yartsa* grows. The work of a *yartsa* gatherer is not easy – crawling on hands and knees, patiently looking for the tiny brownish 'head' of the fungus sticking out of the ground. An eleven hour day high in the mountains ends in the evening with counting the number of plucked pieces of yartsa. Kalsang Drolma, on yartsa-holiday from her middle school in Dawu, has found 22 pieces in one day. Her mother collected over 40 pieces of fungus. Cleaned of the earth and dried on the stove, the *yartsa* wait for someone to take them to the town for sale. People say that this year a large piece of *yartsa* can fetch up to 20 yuan.Tseren has a family, but rather than looking after his wife and children he prefers to hang around looking for some quick money that will allow him to enjoy the pleasures of city life. He would like to be a businessman, but the black baggy suit he wears – a reflection of his imagined status – is the familiar uniform of the unemployed. When Tseren arrives in Dawu he learns that there is an owner of abundant grasslands who is willing to sell the right to pluck *yartsa* on his property for 1800 yuan per gatherer. Success is not guaranteed, but he is offering safe passage through checkpoints. Tseren, together with a few others, agrees to buy the 'licence'. But after three days it appears that either the gatherers are out of luck or *yartsa* does not grow there. The gatherers want to return to the town. The owner of the land takes this as a breaking of the verbal contract and demands 6000 yuan in compensation from the group (the price of a good second hand Wuyang Honda motorbike). He lets everybody go but Tseren whom he holds as a hostage. He negotiates with Tseren's family in Dawu by telephone, threatening to strand the unlucky *yartsa* gatherer in the middle of nowhere.

The *yartsa* trade brings together three large ethnic groups within the modern day borders of China: Tibetans speeding on motorcycles through the dusty streets of Dawu, Hui Muslims in white caps (their wives in black mantillas) and Han Chinese – local administrators and small-businessmen that came here to try their luck at the market where competition hardly exists. But it is Tibetans who are the first link in the chain of the flow of *yartsa* from Tibet via mainland China to the outside world. In every town or village in Golog groups of people sit on the pavements with bags full of tightly packed yartsa. Calculator and scales are the tools for determining price and quality. In the folds of the overlong sleeves of Tibetan robes prices are being silently negotiated using gestures. For many nomads it is a rare opportunity to take a break in town, so discussions are long and nobody is in a hurry to get back home. Outside the Agricultural Bank of China there is an almost permanent crowd of Hui traders buying *yartsa* from nomads and gatherers. "I sell to the one that pays me more" – Herpo, a Tibetan wholesaler, says. His competitor, Tseten Gyel, adds: "It would be good if the Chinese big bosses came directly to us, otherwise Huis paint the *yartsa* yellow to improve the colour and insert pins in them so that the *yartsa* gains weight – these are not honest tricks".

The *yartsa* trade offers a chance to nearly everybody with modest capital to invest and a nose for business. Herpo sits on a small carpet in front of a motorcycle repair shop. His narrow eyes quickly count the *yartsa* he has been brought by gatherers. Only six years ago his family still lived a nomadic life. But Herpo decided to sell all of their 80 yaks and move to the town to look for a better future. Tseten Gyel, a former monk at the Ragya Monastery, had similar hopes when he returned to society six years ago. For an ex-monk, a man with no job, no land and no animals, the *yartsa* trade was the only way to start a new life. He borrowed 3000 yuan and for the first time in his life bought *yartsa* to sell later at a profit. Although the bulky contents of the money belt that he carries under his robe suggests that its owner is a mobile bank, Tseten Gyel complains that compared to other wholesalers he owns nothing. It's a risky business – he says:

"I lost my money not once but twice as the prices can change between a morning and an evening several times". His poor knowledge of Chinese worried him, but he found a Hui, Xiao Ma, to do business with and to make sure that the Chinese documents are properly filled in and all tax regulations duly followed.

Kalsang Drolma's family has 70 yaks and around 150 sheep. Some ten years ago they still lived in a sod house in the upper part of the valley. Thanks to savings from trading in *yartsa*, they hired Chinese contractors to build them a three-room house with a portrait of the late Panchen Rinpoche above the kitchen door. This house is a big change in the family's life. Kalsang Drolma has recently enrolled in a middle school that guarantees her later success in entering one of the colleges in the area. Her family knows that the girl's future is founded on a good education. Without savings from trading *yartsa* it would be almost impossible to pay for. The mathematics is simple: for the price of one middle-sized caterpillar fungus you can buy 10 kilos of *tsampa* flour, over 2.5 kilos of mutton or yak meat or 1.5 kilos of butter. Kalsang Drolma's mother remembers a different time. W hen she was young her family used to bring full bags of *yartsa* down from the mountains, but there was no demand for it in those days. "It started sometime around 2000" – she says. "I don't know what the Chinese use *yartsa* for. I've heard it's good for cancer and when hair goes grey it helps to restore the colour. And when you put it into a *baijiu* (rice liquor) bottle you will get a drink that helps your health – but only in small amounts!"

A day has passed since Tseren was kidnapped. From early morning searches for money and feverish negotiations with the people holding Tseren take place. 6000 yuan is an unthinkable amount of money for somebody that – even with a good job – earns one twelfth of this sum per month. Finally Tseren's relatives manage to collect 2000 yuan and a rescue team heads off to the grasslands with the mission of releasing the hostage. There, under the moonlight they confront four men. The darkness of the night, and the kidnappers' appearance – long hair, shining gold teeth and daggers at the belt of their scruffy woollen robes – intensify the sense of fear. After a long night of tense talks the kidnappers finally agree to console themselves with 2000 yuan and everybody can go home.
As *yartsa* trading fever takes over, prices of all the goods in town go up. Suddenly, renting a car to Golog gets more expensive. *Yartsa* is the most common topic of conversation at the table or behind the wheel. Tseren's uncle, who runs a Tibetan carpet factory in India, will visit China soon. Maybe he will be interested in starting a *yartsa* business as well? His nephew sent him an e-mail: "If you're going to buy, buy now as it's fresh and the best quality". Tseten Gyal's brother, also a monk, admits that he dreams of many yartsa. Although he gives no importance to dreams at all, he is worried by the ever-growing scale of the trade. It is a bad omen for the grasslands and the *yartsa* itself. Extinction may happen soon he says. Over-exploitation is one of the reasons why the ban on entry to Golog for collectors from other areas was introduced. But those who are lucky enough to have land in Golog or manage to slip through the checkpoints are still collecting yartsa.

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The making of a new ethical code of conduct

The Convention on Biological Diversity,

Indigenous peoples and the world of science

Gerard A. Persoon and Myrna Eindhoven

Under the banner of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) some hundred nation states and a large number of representatives of indigenous peoples from all over the world gathered in Montreal from 15 through 19 October 2007. The so-called Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions, WG8(j), made a step forward in the development of a new ethical code of conduct during its fifth meeting. This code will apply to those wishing to carry out research involving traditional knowledge with regard to biological and genetic resources within the territories of indigenous and local communities. While indigenous peoples make up less than one percent of today's world population, at present they occupy some 20 percent of the world's land surface, including many of the proclaimed biodiversity hotspots. It is likely that many scientists will be confronted with this code while undertaking field research. The code will be applied to a broad spectrum of scientific disciplines such as anthropology, archaeology, linguistics, biology, (ethno)botany, medicine and pharmacology. Although the code is likely to influence research activities in the near future, its drafting has largely been done without substantial input from the world of science. This alone is sufficient reason to take a closer look.

CBD

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) dates back to 1992 when, during the United Nations (UN) Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, over 150 governments ratified this first global agreement on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. Since then more than 185 countries have signed this legally binding document.

Working group on Article 8(j)

The CBD recognises not only the dependency of indigenous and local communities on biological diversity, but also their role in the conservation of this diversity. It is for this reason that in Article 8(j) of the CBD, governments have committed themselves to respect, preserve and maintain the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities.

In order to implement the commitments of article 8(j) and to enhance the role and involvement of indigenous and local communities in the achievement of the objectives of the Convention, a Working Group on article 8(j) and related provisions was established during the fourth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP4) in 1998. Over the years the WG8(j) has evolved into an interesting meeting to which the Secretariat of the CBD invites not only official Parties but also indigenous and local communities and non-governmental organisations. Within the context of the UN, it is rather exceptional that indigenous peoples' representatives are given the opportunity to speak out during such discussions. They have vigorously grasped this opportunity, attending the meetings in large numbers and representing a wide range of indigenous peoples from around the world. In Montreal representatives of various indigenous peoples from North and Latin American countries, as well as from African, European and a variety of Asian countries were present. Many of them wore traditional clothing, adding some colour and variation to the otherwise quite grey scheme of the diplomatic delegates' outfits. Although final decisions can only be made by the parties, indigenous peoples' representatives do fully take part in the discussions. The special character of the WG8(j) meetings is also evident from the opening ceremony. It has become a tradition that WG8(j) meetings are opened with a ritual, performed by one of the indigenous peoples. In Montreal all participants to the meeting, held in traditional Mohawk territory, were welcomed by a delegation of Mohawk Indians.

Discussions in Montreal were more intense than during earlier WG8(j) meetings, not least because just two months prior to the meeting, on 13 September 2007, the General Assembly of the UN approved the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The UN Declaration was adopted by a majority of 143 states, 4 countries voted against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States) and 11 abstained (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa and Ukraine). With only three of the states which voted against the Declaration present at the WG8(j) meeting - the Unites States has not subscribed to the CBD - the indigenous peoples' representatives in Montreal expected to receive extra support for the protection of their rights during the meeting. This however proved not to be the case.

Protection of traditional knowledge

Discussions about the protection of traditional knowledge can only be understood when the long history of the misappropriation of such knowledge is considered. There are countless cases in which medicines and new varieties of plant species are developed on the basis of knowledge and plant resources available within the territory of indigenous peoples, without indigenous communities enjoying any of the benefits derived from such innovations. Unfortunately the current system offers little to no protection of the traditional knowledge held by indigenous communities. Such knowledge is often in the (local) public domain, transmitted orally and not written down, complicating its protection under the present system of intellectual property rights.

The main objective of the work of WG8(j) is the protection of traditional knowledge with regard to biodiversity and genetic resources. It is, however, not only traditional knowledge as such that should be protected, but also the holders of such knowledge, the indigenous and local communities. Therefore WG8(j) supports the full and effective participation of indigenous and local communities in decision-making processes related to the use of their traditional knowledge. WG8(j) is simultaneously encouraging governments to take measures to enhance and strengthen the capacity of indigenous and local communities and develop appropriate mechanisms, guidelines, legislation or other initiatives to foster and promote their effective participation.

An ethical code of conduct

A major element within the current biennial programme of work (2006-2008) of WG8(j) includes the development of an ethical code of conduct to ensure respect for the cultural and intellectual heritage of indigenous and local communities. In Montreal both official delegates and representatives of indigenous peoples have again been working hard on the drafting of this code, but the development of the code turns out to be much more complicated than expected before hand. The endless diversity in experiences of different countries makes it almost impossible to develop a system that covers this variety while maintaining compatibility with existing national legislation. While the diplomats were interested in the compatibility of proposed texts with national legislation, representatives of indigenous peoples were focused on instances of ruthless bio-piracy and abuse of good faith. These two perspectives proved difficult to reconcile and discussions became defensive and non-constructive. An agreed text could not be produced. It was decided that WG8(j) will propose to COP9, to be held in Bonn, Germany in March 2008, that it's mandate be extended to work further on the final drafting of this code.

Impact on research

In our opinion, a cause for concern is the fact that the world of research and higher education has so far largely been absent during the WG8(j) meetings. This absence can be explained by the fact that scientists are not generally attracted to diplomatic meetings, which are seen as lacking scientific relevance. This, however, is a misunderstanding. While discussions such as those at WG8(j) do not follow the logic

continued on page 22 >

Patents on taro varieties from Hawaii issued and disclaimed

There are hundreds of cases involving the appropriation of traditional knowledge from indigenous peoples by outsiders who then succeed in obtaining a patent, for example, on a new variety of plant based on genetic manipulation of a number of traditional varieties. Indigenous organisations across the world are fighting such patents, but often they are confronted with powerful global corporations and complex legal procedures.

A recent example of a successful protest against an existing patent is found in Hawaii. In 1999 Hawaii University submitted requests for patents to the US Patent Office on three new varieties of taro. In 2002 the office issued these patents with world-wide patent rights.

For the indigenous people of Hawaii, taro is a sacred plant. It is mythically related to their ancestors and over the centuries farmers in Hawaii have developed about 300 different varieties. One of these varieties, *Maui Lehua*, is the female parent of all patented varieties. Hawaiians themselves do not recognise exclusive ownership over any of the traditional varieties. Ownership of this knowledge is collective, recognising the efforts of their ancestors. They certainly did not want a university claiming exclusive rights to what they consider their staple food. Permission was never granted by the farmers to the scientists of the university, and so procedures stipulated in existing ethical codes for ethno-botanists were not followed.

Hawaiian farmers and indigenous organisations protested and demanded that the university withdraw the patent rights. It was argued that the patents were invalidated by considerations of 'prior art' (existing knowledge pre-dating the innovation). Initially the university refused to comply with this request, claiming intellectual property rights over the work of its scientists. However, later it offered to hand over the patent to an indigenous organisation. The protesters refused, stating that they did not want to patent a plant handed down to them from their ancestors. The matter was concluded when the university filed legal documents with the US Patent Office disclaiming proprietary interests in the hybridised taro, and in June 2006 the patents were cancelled.

Source: W. Ritte and L.M. Kanehe (2007) '*Kuleana no halao (responsibility for taro): protecting the sacred ancestor from ownership and genetic modification*'.
In: Mead, A.T.P. and S. Ratuva (eds.) *Pacific genes and life patents.* pp 130-137. Wellington, University of Wellington.

of persuasive reasoning and scientific debates, and are often perceived as having a high degree of political correctness and diplomatic modes of behaviour, these meetings produce instruments and legislation that will impact science and the execution of field research. The CBD is one of those conventions that produces a multitude of measures for the protection of biodiversity worldwide that will sooner or later influence the way science is conducted.

Of particular concern is the drafting of the code and which parties are present and which are absent in this process. As mentioned earlier, the representatives of indigenous and local communities contribute to the drafting of the code from a rather negative perspective on research. Their contributions reflect injustice and anger, dismissing research as the root of all iniquity imposed upon them. Without wanting to downplay the negative impact that research might have had on indigenous peoples' lives, we fear the drafting of this code of conduct is being influenced by such distrust. Instead of creating a guarantee that traditional knowledge is valued, and treated with the same respect afforded to other knowledge domains, the current draft seems to depart from a negative and defensive perspective.

For instance, Principle 15, as it is formulated now, will seriously complicate research within a territory under indigenous legislation. This principle requires researchers to only start research activities after all possible impacts on communities involved have been acknowledged and documented and agreed upon by the communities involved. The fact is that claims and rights to traditional knowledge are often diffuse and subject to internal debate and controversy. Furthermore it is not always known to the community itself which members of the community are the rightful owners and decision makers with regard to such knowledge. Often traditional knowledge is collectively owned or not subject to rules of ownership at all. This, together with the debate on who has (and does not have) the right to claim indigeneity and which boundaries actually constitute an indigenous community, may render future research fairly impossible.

So far the target group of the code is described as anybody involved in intervening with indigenous and local communities. This can refer to research, but also to tourism and the extracting industries. Limiting the discussion for the moment to researchers, it is not yet clear whether the code only targets foreign researchers or also researchers from the country of the indigenous communities. And what about researchers who belong to the indigenous community themselves? Not all indigenous peoples' representatives seem to be willing to discuss the applicability of the code to their own circles. This question is relevant because there are several instances of indigenous people marketing traditional knowledge at the expense of their fellow community members.

Another area of concern is the relationship between this ethical code of conduct and existing codes as issued by associations of professionals. Numerous professional organisations have discussed ethical issues at length and come up with ethical codes for professionals working in these fields, including . ethical codes for anthropologists, archaeologists, ethnobiologists, and museums. These codes generally also include steps to be taken in case of violation of the stipulated principles and norms. Committees within such professional organisations have the authority to look into official complaints and, if necessary, take measures including expelling members and seriously inhibiting the successful careers of such members. So far, there have been no discussions regarding the complementarity of the code with other professional codes, or about the establishment of an authority to mainstream the implementation of the code and monitor violations.

At a higher level there is also another important issue to consider. In addition to this ethical code of conduct only addressing the relationship between researcher and informants there are other normative fields in the scientific process. These fields are related for instance to the fundaments of scientific inquiry in general but also to the use of scientific knowledge, the position and influence of third parties in case of contract research, and the call for transparency in the scientific process itself. In case of conflicts between these norms and ethical principles, it is unclear which one should be prioritised. We believe it is necessary that the world of science, through its professional organisations, should be involved in the next phase of the drafting of this new code. This could avoid future complications and inconsistencies between codes of conducts and the wider normative context within the world of science. In particular, there is a need for critical reflection on the scope of the new code and the forum that will be made responsible for its implementation, including complaints and appeal procedures. Hopefully this would also create an ethical code that is less based on mistrust and suspicion and that will allow well-intended, carefully designed and implemented research to be continued.

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The draft elements of a code of ethical conduct discussed at the CBD WB8(j) meeting in Montreal can be found at: www.biodiv.org (UNEP/CBD/WG8J/5/L.10). There are numerous ethical codes for all kinds of professional scientific organisations. Some of the most relevant codes in this context are:

1. American Anthropological Association (AAA)
   Code of Ethics, as approved in June 1998.
2. Archaeological Institute of America (AIA)
   Code of Ethics as approved in December 1997 and Nederlandse Vereniging van Archeologen (NVvA) Gedragscode voor beroepsarcheologen, as approved during the General Assembly in Amsterdam (7 December 2001).
3. International Society of Ethnobiology (ISE)
   a. Declaration of Belem (July 1988)
   b. ISE Code of Ethics, adopted at the 10th General Assembly, Chiang Rai (8 November 2006)
   c. Complementary Tool Kit for the 2006 ISE Code of Ethics
4. International Council of Museums (ICOM) Code of Ethics for Museums as revised by the 21st General Assembly in Seoul (8 October 2004).

People, park and partnership

Problems and possible solutions in the Morowali Nature Reserve

Jabar Lahadji

Indonesia's diverse ecosystems contain some 500 species of mammal and 12 percent of the world's bird species. But Indonesia's tropical rainforest, which originally covered more than a million square kilometres, is being lost at a rate of 10,000 square kilometres each year, and many species are on the verge of extinction. Morowali is a nature reserve of 2,250 square kilometres in Central Sulawesi. It is home to a number of rare endemic birds, including the the maleo, and mammals, including the anoa and babirusa. The Morowali forest is also the home of the To Wana, one of the several indigenous peoples in Central Sulawesi. Around 3,000 Wana live within the reserve, and approximately another 3,000 in villages just outside its boundary. The To Wana traditional culture and economy depend on swidden agriculture (shifting agriculture, or 'slash and burn'), hunting, and the collection of forest products, particularly *damar* (conifer resin).

After Brazil and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia has the greatest area of rainforest of the world, and its forests are uniquely biodiverse. But Indonesia's economic development depends partly on the exploitation of natural resources, including timber. This is a major cause of destruction of primary forest and degradation of biodiversity. Aware of the seriousness of the situation, many individuals and groups have come into action to preserve the country's tropical rainforest. The Indonesian state has long protected particular areas and species. In the 1970s some international organisations, including the World Conservation Union (IUCN) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), started to assist the government in proposing further areas to be protected. One such area was the Morowali Reserve. The establishment by law of national parks and reserves, however, has had only a limited effect on the rate of destruction of primary rainforest. Numerous non-governmental organisations in Indonesia are active in local nature conservation projects, and in situations where nature and the environment are threatened by commercial operations, whether legal or illegal.

'No to government, no to religion, no to villages'

Long before the designation of Morowali as a nature reserve in 1980, part of the area concerned was under communal ownership by groups of To Wana. These people have a cultural heritage of adaptation over many generations to life in the mountainous Morowali rainforest. Their lifestyle was disturbed by the establishment of the reserve, which limited the Wana in their movements and prevented them from carrying out the normal activities necessary for their subsistence: swidden agriculature, hunting and collecting. Furthermore, they were blamed for damaging the forest and its wildlife. For this reason, the government attempted to force the To Wana to settle in new villages along the border of the reserve and to adopt mainstream Indonesian culture and lifestyles. From that experience the To Wana learnt a costly lesson which inspired them to adopt the slogan: *tare pamarentah, tare agama, tare kampung* - 'no to government, no to religion, no to villages'.

The life of the forest-dwelling To Wana depends strongly on their consciousness and knowledge of their natural environment. Unusual or dangerous events, whether natural or man-made, are interpreted by the Wana as consequences of anger on the part of the spirits which protect the forest. When such events occur, the Wana will perform a ceremony in the form of a ritual offering called *kapongo*. The same is done when a patch of forest has to be cleared to make way for a new swidden field. It is indicative of the special importance of the natural environment in To Wana beliefs that no ritual is held upon the building of a swidden house in the clearing. In other parts of rural Indonesia, by contrast, the inauguration of a new house is typically a key ritual event.

The way in which the Wana classify forest likewise reflects the intensity of their relationship with their environment. Within the untouched primary forest, firstly, there are many places, called *junju*, where all exploitation is strictly forbidden, *kapali*. Secondly, there is the primary forest which can be used provided the appropriate ritual is performed; this category is called *pangale* or *rampangale*. And thirdly there is the secondary forest, *tobu*, which has grown up on former swiddens.

After the *kapongo* ceremony has been carried out, a swidden is opened by cutting down the shrubs and trees and burning the chopped vegetation at the appropriate time, in November, shortly before onset of the rains which will disseminate fertilising nutrients from the ashes into the soil. The size of the field, which supplies food crops for domestic consumption, ranges from under half a hectare up to two hectares per family. The swidden is only used for one season, after which a new field is cleared nearby. After four to eight years, an old overgrown swidden is again ready to be exploited in a rotational manner. For practical reasons primary or fully grown forest is rarely used in this agricultural system, since the Wana do not have the heavy tools needed to cut big trees without great effort.

In the periods when there is no work to be done in the swidden, the Wana, both men and women, collect non-timber forest products such as *damar*, rattan, honey and some medicinal materials. The intensity of these activities is low, and the traditional methods of collecting are very much sustainable. In the past most forest products were exchanged directly for imported goods supplied by traders, although nowadays cash payments are increasingly involved.

Hunting, using traps or blowpipes, is a minor activity of the Wana. Traps are placed around the swidden, or in the forest, during trips to collect forest products. Almost all types of game that can be trapped, included protected animals like anoa and babirusa, are consumed. Blowpipes, shooting poisoned darts, are used to hunt all kinds of tree-dwelling animals. A study by Michael Alvard has confirmed the sustainability of Wana hunting practices: 'The potential for sustainable harvests by traditional Wana hunters in Morowali nature reserve, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia', *Human Organization* 59 (2000): 428-440.

Friends of Morowali

In 1987 a small group of young people, brought together by a common love for hiking and nature, began to gather information concerning the Wana people and the Morowali reserve. This group, headed by myself, volunteered to assist the few (at that time only two, nowadays six) rangers responsible for patrolling and protecting the reserve and for informing the public about it. In 1991, Marty Fujita of the American conservation organisation The Nature Conservancy (TNC) paid a visit to Morowali and inspired the group to form a non-governmental organisation which was called *Sahabat Morowali*, Friends of Morowali.



In its early years Friends of Morowali, in collaboration with other local Indonesian NGOs, was strongly focused on advocating the right of those Wana indigenous to the reserve to remain within it, against attempts by the government to resettle them outside it. Among the main arguments used in this struggle was the need to protect the unique traditional culture and knowledge of the Wana people. Information regarding the To Wana and their way of life, collected over the years through collaboration with the Wana, was conveyed by Friends of Morowali to the outside world, including government officials and institutions, the management of the Morowali reserve, tourists, and scientists, who were assisted in visiting and studying the reserve and its ecosystems.

Collaborating with Friends of Morowali made the Wana themselves more aware of their traditional way of life and cultural heritage, and encouraged them to express their own opinions regarding development and conservation. Friends of Morowali aspires to help them make their own choices - for instance, to remain within the reserve and continue their sustainable use of its resources. Those who prefer to resettle, meanwhile, are assisted in acquiring the skills necessary for successful integration into mainstream society.

In 1996, Friends of Morowali also began to address the problem of local but non-Wana village people encroaching on the Morowali reserve in order to profit from its natural resources. Firstly, a socio-economic study was initiated to compile an inventory of the economic needs of the communities involved. A second initiative was to set up an educational awareness programme for the villages surrounding the reserve. Thirdly, Friends of Morowali, together with invited specialists, organised workshops for a wide range of government officials - including the rangers of Morowali - to help boost their professionalism and cement the political will to enforce the law.

Results and prospects

These efforts have not been without results. Villagers, for instance, have been successfully encouraged to use fish traps in the sea, reducing their need to encroach on the reserve. Several other similar programmes exist, supported or implemented by the government. In the field of environmental education, each village now has an informal leader who organises informative and discussion meetings on the importance of nature conservation. Local *imam* and church ministers also pay attention to the topic in their weekly sermons, and teachers introduce it to children at primary school. And the reserve's rangers genuinely try to enforce the law, in so far as this is possible for six men in a forested area of more than 2,000 square kilometres.

Friends of Morowali cooperates with many other Indonesian NGOs which have networked with each other to form a strong movement, also supported by international NGOs, to advocate a moratorium on the commercial use of primary rainforest. Other activities kept under scrutiny for their environmental impact are mining (gold, nickel), oil drilling, large palm oil plantations causing forest destruction, and involuntary resettlement. At the same the network initiates and promotes traditional community forestry, which it believes is the only way to preserve rainforest and natural resources.

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In 1948, after returning from China and publishing an influential book on the Chinese leftist writer Lu Xun, the famous Japanese literary critic Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910-1977) developed a provocative account of modern Japanese culture in his influential essay 'What is Modernity?[2] He contrasted Japan, whose modernity merely aped the West, with China, whose modernity grew out of fundamental resistance to European invasion. Takeuchi's theory anticipates the ideas of contemporary critics of Eurocentricism, which makes his work particularly relevant today.

Takeuchi Yoshimi and the dilemmas of resistance to global capitalist modernity[1]

Viren Murthy

Like contemporary post-colonial theorists, Takeuchi stresses that Europeanisation is often achieved by Asian nations' attempts to resist colonialism through nationalist movements. With respect to East Asia, where discourses of resistance and modernisation are salient but often do not penetrate the deeper structures of cultural domination, his thought is especially meaningful. However, Takeuchi's blind spots are as significant as his contributions. He often gestures toward but does not grasp the expansive dynamic of capitalism that makes his discourse possible. To understand the significance of Takeuchi's thought, we need to rethink his concept of resistance in relation to both capitalism and geographical distinctions such as Europe and Asia.

Takeuchi Yoshimi's life spanned from the end of the Meiji to the Showa periods, during which time Japan became a major competitor in the global capitalist system. While there have been a number of excellent works on Takeuchi Yoshimi,[3] few have attempted to understand his ideas in relation to Marxist theories of the cultural antinomies of capitalism. Scholars may have avoided linking Takeuchi's analysis to Marxism because he famously opposed scientism and evolutionary theories of history, both of which were affirmed by most Marxists of his time. However, a Marxist theory that could explain scientism and progressive visions of history as misrecognitions of the logic of capitalism would also provide a framework to grasp Takeuchi's discussion of modernity.

Misrecognising capitalism: the dynamic of capitalism as evolutionary history

On this point, Moishe Postone's suggestion to read Marx's *Capital* not as a text about economics but as a metacommentary on the history of philosophy is helpful. Postone compares Hegel's idea of Spirit and the movement of capital:

> *'For Hegel, the Absolute, the totality of the subjective-objective categories, grounds itself. As the self-moving substance that is Subject, it is the true causa sui as well as the endpoint of its own development. In Capital, Marx presents the underlying forms of commodity-determined society as constituting the social context for notions such as the difference between essence and appearance, the philosophical concept of substance, the dichotomy of subject and object, the notion of totality, and, on the logical level of the category of capital, the unfolding dialectic of the identical subject-object'.*[4]

Postone distinguishes between two levels of capitalism, the level of the commodity form and the level of the category of capital. The commodity form consists of the opposition between exchange-value and use-value, which corresponds to antinomies between object and subject and appearance and essence. From the standpoint of exchange-value all things are equal and denuded of their particularity; they are all commodities that can be measured by money. We find this type of levelling out of difference in the rationalising tendency embedded in modern forms of bureaucracy. Since Max Weber, scholars have associated rationalisation with modernity; however, this is only one side of modern society. Equally essential to the commodity form is use-value, which is often associated with particularity and feeling. Many movements against modernity attempt to counter the alienation associated with exchange-value and the abolition of difference by affirming the use-value side of the commodity form, expressed as feeling or irrationality. We see this, for example, in the reaction against Hegel by Nietzsche and Schopenhauer.

The level of capital involves both sides of the commodity form and refers to a historically specific movement to ever higher levels of productivity. In Postone's view, Hegel misrecognises the dynamic of capital as a transhistorical development of Spirit. We could further stipulate that proponents of evolutionary visions of history similarly construct a moral narrative of development by generalising a dynamic of history specific to capitalism.

I expand, therefore I am: Europe in Asia, behaving like Marx's capital

Takeuchi describes something similar to the above mentioned dynamic of capitalism, with his concepts of modernity and European expansion. In the beginning of 'What is Modernity?' Takeuchi suggests a connection between modernity, European expansion and capitalism, but remains inconclusive:

> *'I do not know if the European invasion of the Orient was based upon the will of capital, a speculative spirit of adventure, the Puritan spirit of pioneering, or yet another spontaneous capacity (honnō) for self-expansion. In any event, it is certain that there existed in Europe something fundamental that supported this capacity, making the invasion of the Orient inevitable. Perhaps this something has been deeply intertwined with the essence of what is called modernity.*[5]



'Takeuchi's Europe behaves like Marx's capital, which must expand to remain itself'.

Takeuchi refers to an unknown dynamic associated with European expansion and gives a number of possible sources of which capitalism is but one. Later, however, he returns to this theme and refers to the spirit of capitalism as a constant self-transcending activity:

> *'The constant activity to be their own selves makes it impossible for them (Europeans) to simply stop at themselves. They must risk the danger of losing the self in order for the self to be itself. Once liberated, people cannot return to their originally closed shells; they can only preserve themselves in activity. This is precisely the spirit of capitalism. It grasps the self in the course of its expansion through time and space. The notion of progress, and hence the idea of historicism, first came into being in modern Europe'.*[6]

Takeuchi's Europe behaves like Marx's capital, which must expand to remain itself. Moreover, Takeuchi connects European invasion, the spread of capitalism and the misrecognition of history as evolutionary progress.

> *'Europe's invasion of the Orient resulted in the phenomenon of Oriental capitalism, and this signified the equivalence between European self-preservation and self-expansion. For Europe this was accordingly conceptualised as the progress of world-history and the triumph of reason'.*[7]

Imperialism presents itself as global historical progress or the triumph of reason, and like anti-colonialists, Takeuchi's fundamental concern is resistance (teikō) to such domination. But writing in post-War Japan, he sees the significance of European imperialism not just in terms of political sovereignty. Like post-colonialists, he stresses that liberation movements themselves reproduce aspects of European hegemony[8] and describes this process as objectification, which recalls the denuding of the qualitative dimension of things. Thus Takeuchi explains that even 'resistance could not change the thoroughgoing rationalist conviction that all things can ultimately be objectified and extracted…through resistance the Orient was destined to increasingly Europeanise'.[9] Takeuchi grasps European domination at a fundamental level, but, consequently, real resistance appears impossible. The dialectic between resistance and re-incorporation makes it difficult to imagine a movement that twists free from European domination broadly conceived.

However, Takeuchi contends that as Europe invades Asia it also becomes other and its movement thus opens a space for resistance through the production of heterogeneity. 'At the same time that world history was approaching its completion with the comprehension of the Orient, the contradictions of this history surfaced through mediation of the heterogeneity contained in the Orient'.[10] The key to transformative resistance is intimately connected to affirming this heterogeneity, which is constantly concealed through dominant epistemological categories.

Like a slave: putting despair into action

Throughout the essay, Takeuchi highlights the difference between Japan, which does not resist, and China, which does, and contends that China's resistance, embodied in both Lu Xun and the Chinese revolution, actually succeeded in producing an alternative to the West. Japan competes with the West but does so on the West's own terms, namely capitalism, and hence is unable to think of an alternative. China, on the other hand, is like a slave, but it is precisely because slaves have nothing that they are filled with potential. They must awaken to their own nothingness. Because everything, including Being, has been colonised, their individuality or heterogeneity appears as nothing, and the only standpoint from which to resist is nothingness. In Takeuchi's view, Lu Xun's despair is precisely a result of this nothingness.

According to Takeuchi, the slave in Lu Xun's poem 'Wild Grass' [11] faces this nothingness and thinks of an alternative at a point when all paths seem to be occupied by the oppressor/imperialist. Takeuchi describes this existential crisis with characteristic poignancy:

> *'"The most painful thing in life", awakening from a dream, occurs when the slave rejects his status as slave while at the same time rejecting the fantasy of liberation, so that he becomes a slave who realises that he is a slave... Such a slave rejects being himself at the same time that he rejects being anything else. This is the meaning of despair (zetsubō) in Lu Xun and what makes Lu Xun possible. Despair appears*

as resistance which travels a path when there are no paths. Resistance appears as putting despair into action (zetsubō no kodōka to shite arawareru) .[12]

Unlike Japanese intellectuals who were caught in the same general framework of capitalist competition and historical progress, Lu Xun represents a new form of resistance, like the slave who follows a path when all paths have receded.

A path beyond paths: resistance to modernity haunted by global capitalism

Takeuchi's analysis of modernity leads him to a path beyond paths, which implies a negative standpoint outside of history, such as death or nothingness, two constant themes in his reading of Lu Xun. Indeed, as Nakajima Takahiro argues, Takeuchi develops an eschatological theory of history.[13] This is in line with Takeuchi's claims that history and Europe make each other possible,[14] which parallels Postone's idea that the temporal structure of capitalism makes history possible. However, because Takeuchi does not specify the source of the dynamic of modernity and often identifies it with a geographical site, it is difficult to give direction to his phrase 'putting despair into action'. Thus Takeuchi at times simply asserts that resistance to Europe, modernity or capitalism was embodied in the communist revolutions in China and Russia.[15] This of course suppresses the tensions between Lu Xun's literature and party politics, which Takeuchi so eloquently discusses in his *Lu Xun*.

Takeuchi attempted to use Lu Xun's concept of despair to deal with the impasse between a conservative critique of Eurocentric visions of modernity expressed by Kobayashi Hideo and the Kyoto School, and a Marxist critique of capitalism wedded to a progressive vision of history. Moreover, he identified something fundamental that gave rise to the above antinomy and called this modernity. Although he could not think of a concrete way to negate modernity, throughout his life he tried to develop a politics of despair that brought various sides of modern antinomies together. Thus, in the post-War context, his politics constantly involved drawing on resources discarded as fascist or conservative in order to develop a politics of resistance for the present. However, this resistance would constantly be haunted by what it left untheorised, namely its conditions of possibility in global capitalism.

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Notes

The author would like to thank Arif Dirlik and Prasenjit Duara for reading and discussing this essay.

2 Yoshimi, Takeuchi. 1948, 2005. 'What is Modernity? (The Case of Japan and China)'. Calichman, Richard F., trans., *What is Modernity: Writings of Takeuchi Yoshimi*. New York: Columbia University Press, 53-81. Japanese text: 1993. '*Chtgoku no kindai to nihon no kindai: rojin wo tegakari to shite*'. *Nihon to Ajia*. Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 11-57. Throughout this essay, I refer to Calichman's translation and the above Japanese text. I have amended the translation where I have deemed appropriate.

3 See suggested readings at the end of the essay.

4 Postone, Moishe. 1993. *Time, Labor and Social Domination*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 156.

5 Op. cit., Takeuchi, Eng. 54, J., 13.

6 Ibid., Eng., 55, J., 14.

7 Ibid., Eng., 55, J., 14.

8 For an analysis of the complex dialectic between imperialism and national liberation, see: Duara, Prasenjit. Winter 2006. 'Nationalism, Imperialism and the Case of Manchukuo: A Response to Anthony Pagden'. *Common Knowledge* 12-1:47-65.

9 Op. cit., Takeuchi, Eng., 55-6, J., 15.

10 Ibid., Eng., 56, J., 15. Arif Dirlik discusses the problem of resistance to global capitalist modernity in a similar manner in the contemporary context in: Dirlik, Arif. 2007. *Global Modernity: Modernity in the Age of Global Capitalism*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 158-159.

11 Xun, Lu. 1982. 'Yecao' (Wild Grass). Ishangwen, Shi and Deng Zhongqiang, eds. *Yecao qianxi* (Wild Grass, with a Preliminary Analysis) Hubei: Changjiang wenyi chubanshe. For Lu Xun's parable of the slave, see pp. 153-161.

12 Op. cit., Takeuchi, Eng., 71, J., 41.

13 Nakajima, Takahiro. 2007. *'Fufukujt no isan: rokujt nendai no Takeuchi Yoshimi'* (The Legacy of Disobedience: Takeuchi Yoshimi in the 1960s). *Hō to bōryoku no kiyoku: tō ajia no rekishi keiken* (Law and Memories of Violence: The Historical Experience of East Asia). Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 207-233, 214. An English version was recently presented as 'An Eschatological View of History: Takeuchi Yoshimi in the 1960s' at the *Conference on The Writing of History in 20th Century East Asia*, Leiden, June, 2007.

14 Op. cit., Takeuchi, Eng., 54, J., 13.

15 For Takeuchi's remarks on the Russian Revolution, see op. cit., Takeuchi, Eng., 56, J., 15.

Suggested reading in Western Languages:

1. Calichman, Richard. 2004. *Takeuchi Yoshimi: Displacing the West*. Ithaca: Cornell East Asia Series.
2. Guex, Sameul. 2006. *Entre nonchalance et désespoir : Les intellectuels japonais sinologues face à la guerre (1930-1950)*. Bern: Peter Lang.
3. Uhl, Christian. 2003. *Wer war Takuchi Yoshimis Lu Xun: Ein Annäherungsversuch an ein Monument der japanischen Sinologie*. München: Iudicum Verlag GmbH

Suggested reading in Chinese and Japanese:

1. Okayama, Asako. 2002. *Takeuchi no bungaku seishin* (Takeuchi's Literary Spirit). Tōkyō: Ronshōsha.
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Just as theatrical show panoramas were making a comeback in late-19th century Europe, photographic panoramas were made of exotic lands thousands of miles away for visual entertainment. The appeal of these wide-angle photographs reveals much about these commercial and amateur photographers who make them and how they frame the foreign surroundings around them.

Photographic panoramas

by German and Chinese photographers in Singapore

Fig. 6: Panorama of church congregation, The Eastern Studio, 1930s, Carbon print

Jason Toh

Singapore, strategically located between the trading routes connecting Europe with East Asia, has been photographed since the early 1840s. Initially, photography trade was dominated by the Europeans, particularly the Germans. After World War One, the Cantonese and subsequently the Hainanese from China took over. Firms such as Sacthler & Company in the 1860s, G.R. Lambert and Company in the 1880s and Lee Brothers Studio in the 1910s left thousands of photographs behind as material proof of their popularity and staying power in this highly mobile trade.

Views of the town of Singapore and its environs were appropriated by the enterprising commercial photographer to cater to visiting tourists and wealthy locals alike during the mid-19th century global market exchange of photographic imagery. Photographic panoramas, given their ability to capture exceptionally wide fields of view, became part of the commercial photographer's repertoire of picturesque landscape views sought after by collectors and travellers, both past and present. This paper presents to the reader several such examples in the collection of the National Museum of Singapore.

Framing an empire

The earliest known photographic panorama made in Singapore was a 10-part image taken from the spire of the St Andrew's Church by the firm Sachtler & Company in 1863, made for presentation to the British Colonial Governor Colonel Orfeur Cavenagh. The firm was one of two listed 'Photographic Artists' (note the early emphasis on their aesthetics qualities rather than technical abilities) in the 1870 *Straits and Singapore Directory*, operating in Singapore up till the early 1870s. In John Falconer's book on early colonial photography in Singapore and Malaya, half of this panorama is illustrated. The museum owns parts of this photographic panorama (figs. 1, 1a). Making a photographic panorama in the 1860s, especially on elevated ground was not an easy task. The 17 October issue of the 1863 *Straits Times and Singapore Journal of Commerce* reported on the challenges one would face mounting the about to be completed spire of St Andrew's Church which was accessible only with scaffolding. The editor, however, acknowledged that "the view [on the top] is magnificent and amply repays the difficulty of ascent."

19th century photographic panoramas were made by overlapping a series of individual views. Each glass plate had to be prepared, exposed and developed individually and even exposures had to be achieved to ensure consistency of tone and definition. Such technical virtuosity would not have been possible without the dry-collodion method available since the mid-1850s as the wet-collodion method necessitated the development of the glass negative on the spot after making the exposure. Alignment of the parts was a tricky business requiring extra-dexterous fingers. Albumen prints, the type of paper available in the 1860s, also necessitated the quick mounting onto a secondary support as the albumen paper curls easily.

Evidence from Fig. 1 indicate that custom-made photographic panoramas could also be broken up for sale as individual pieces as this piece was dated to 1866, three years after the panorama was made.
This raised perspective was not the only privileged point of view employed by these early European commercial photographers. Another example is a five-part photographic panorama taken by the firm G.R. Lambert & Company dated to the 1880s (fig.2). This photograph was likely taken between the time Lambert arrived in Singapore from Dresden in 1875 and before he left Singapore for good in 1885, making this one of Lambert's earliest panoramic works in extant. The distinctive dome of the National Museum of Singapore, to be built on the left side of the cross-gabled building on the left end of this panorama, would only be up by October 1887. The identities of both the Malay and European men are unknown. A successful commercial photographer of the 19th century would have assistants providing help with carrying the heavy equipment and even act as models if needed. The 1881 *Singapore and Straits Directory* listed three native assistants on Lambert's payroll. Could the Malay man be one of his native assistants and the European man his First Assistant, J.F. Charls as listed in the directory? Such questions linger on in early uncaptioned photographs.

Both figures occupy privileged positions in the top right corner overlooking the expanse of the growing colonial city. The appropriation of Fort Canning Hill, the colonial governor's residence between 1820s to 1850s, as a vantage point for painting and photographing the prosperous town under colonial rule has been a well-established pictorial tradition dating back to the 1820s (fig. 3). The viewer, through the photographer's lens, is also placed in a strategic position looking at the two men surveying the progress of Singapore through its physical environment guided by colonial intervention. In the span of half a century, Singapore has morphed from a frontier coolie town into a busy emporium for British and international trading interests. On the right, the tightly packed but ordered Chinese style roof-tops of godowns and shophouses represent the burgeoning ethnic Chinese immigrant working-class population oiling the machinery of trade. This is contrasted sharply with the evenly spaced out bungalows and churches of the European part of town on the left. 20 years later, this image is still ingrained into the collective colonial memory as it appears, in 1903, in the picture postcard format (fig. 4), continuing the tradition of framing the Empire.

Another photographic panorama from the 1880s attributed to Lambert shows the vast expanse of the Padang (fig. 5), the social hub for the ruling elites of the day. Again, conventional rules of photographic aesthetics were employed as part of the colonialist vocabulary for consumption by a predominantly western audience. Here, the native people are placed as picturesque figures (most likely as indicators of scale) against the backdrop of civic institutions like the Cricket Club, the Hotel de l'Europe and the St Andrew's Cathedral (elevated status since 1869), symbols of western civilisation. These photographic panoramas show the technical expertise of Lambert with their sharpness, an important criteria for good saleable 19th

Fig. 2: Panorama taken from Fort Canning Hill, G.R. Lambert & Company, Mid-1880s, Albumen print



Fig. 7: Panorama taken from Fullerton Building, Lee Sow Lim, 1963, Gelatin-silver print

Fig. 1: Left part of panorama taken from St Andrew's Cathedral, Sachtler & Company, 1863, Albumen print

Fig. 3: View from Government Hill of the Plain, Singapore River and Chinatown, Robert Elliot, 1822-1824, Uncoloured aquatint



Fig. 1a: Middle part of panorama taken from St Andrew's Cathedral, Sachtler & Company, 1863, Modern silver gelatin print

century photographs. With the rise of global capitalism driven by an expansionist colonial policy, these exotic foreign photographs appealed to the 19th century Western middle class trying to articulate its own consumerist identity.

Building an identity

This tradition of making topographical photographs for sale seem to have ceased once the ethnic Chinese photographers took over from the Europeans towards the end of World War One. Ethnic Chinese studios like the Lee Brothers Studio and The Eastern Studio seem to focus their attentions primarily on their studio business catering to family and individual portraits. For one, this attested to the growing numbers of families being formed in Singapore, thus diminishing the need to cater towards tourists' needs. The rise of popular amateur photography since the late 1880s also meant that people who could afford to own their own cameras no longer needed to purchase landscape views from professional photographers as they too, can wield the camera like a paint brush out in the nature.

This shift in subject matter focusing on portraiture is best illustrated by the photographic panorama made by the Eastern Studio (fig. 6) of a church congregation, likely to be the Methodists who established themselves in the Armenian Street area. The Eastern Studio situated on Armenian Street was founded in the early 1920s by Lee King Yan, who had earlier on co-founded the Lee Brothers Studio with his younger brother, Lee Poh Yan. His break-away was typical of family run businesses whose increasing overheads necessitated expansion to survive. Photography was a trade secret exclusive to family members while outsiders were hired to retouch and mount the ready-made photographs. Unlike the Lee Brothers Studio who managed to safeguard thousands of its glass negatives, the Eastern Studio's premises and negative stock were destroyed during a Japanese air raid. Very few of its images survive which makes the existence of this photographic panorama even more exceptional.

What the uncaptioned photograph lacks in empirical information, it makes up for with its choice of pictorial composition. The difficulties experienced in photographing people outdoors in an uncontrollable environment during the late 19th century no longer hampered the 20th century photographer as camera technology improved. The elderly and the privileged are seated in the front row with the children seated before them on the grass. The men follow behind in successive rows forming the central block with the female folk relegated to the two ends. Nature has become the photo studio with the tropical foliage acting as the painted backdrop while the carefully manicured grass mimicked the studio flooring. In a single panoramic shot, Lee has managed to convey a hybrid image combining Asian values with western photographic convention.

Panoramas continued to be made in 1960s Singapore by a burgeoning class of ethnic Chinese amateur photographers. This group of self-taught amateurs who learnt from British photography manuals and experimented with photography began in ernest in the 1950s. The establishment of the Singapore Camera Club (now the Photographic Society of Singapore) in 1950 and the popularity of national and international salon photography competitions in the 1960s and 1970s gave these amateurs avenues and opportunities to exhibit their works as well as learn about photography development worldwide. Lee Sow Lim was one of them. Lee belonged to the group of of local post-World War Two photographers known for his technical proficiency in the darkroom as well as for his early experiments with solarisation and colour-dyeing techniques. Active in the salon competitions between 1955 to 1965, he has participated in over 80 competitions and his works have been exhibited in France, the U.K., Germany, Australia, Cuba and America.

Highly reminiscent of established 19th century colonial views of Singapore seen earlier, Lee incorporates his own cultural identity into his photographic panorama made in 1963 (fig. 7). This view taken from the Fullerton Building (office to the first elected Finance Minister of Singapore in 1959) looks at the oldest part of the city in new light, pondering over its own new identity at the brink of gaining its independence in 1965. Unlike Lee King Yan who signs off with his studio name on the right, Lee Sow Lim purposefully places both caption and his signature red Chinese seal on the left, combining Chinese ink-painting tradition with modern photographic composition. As such, he effectively claims ownership of the work as an ethnic Chinese photographer working in post-colonial Singapore, giving rise to a distinctively personal style.

Trade and business opportunities have brought multitudes of foreign commercial and amateur photographers alike to Singapore's shores, positioning her as a significant node in Asian photography history. These photographic panoramas of Singapore spanning a century form part of photographic history that is still under-explored. Just like these early panoramas, the fragmented histories of Singapore photography are waiting to be pieced together, part by part, before a single coherent wide-angle view can be formed.

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Fig. 4: Panorama taken from Fort Canning Hill, G.R. Lambert & Company, 1903, Postcard



Fig. 5: Panorama of the Padang, G.R. Lambert & Company, Mid-1880s, Albumen print

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

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

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

Adam Smith in Beijing : Lineages of the Twenty-First Century
By Giovanni Arrighi
Verso Books. 2008. ISBN 978 1 84467 104 5

In the late 18th century, the political economist Adam Smith predicted an eventual equalisation of power between the conquering West and the conquered non-West. Demonstrating Smith's continued relevance to understanding China's extraordinary rise, Arrighi examines the events that have brought it about, and the increasing dependence of US wealth and power on Chinese imports and purchases of US Treasury bonds. He traces how the recent US attempt to bring into existence the first truly global empire in world history was done in order to counter China's spectacular economic success of the 1990s, and how the US' disastrous failure in Iraq has made China the true winner of the US War on Terror. Smith's vision of a world market society based on greater equality among the world's civilisations is now more likely than at any time since "The Wealth of Nations" was published in 1776. In the 21st century, China may well become again the kind of non-capitalist market economy that Smith described, under totally different domestic and world-historical conditions.

The Netherlands Indies and The Great War, 1914-1918
By Kees van Dijk
KITLV Press. 2007. ISBN 978 90 6718 308 6

In the first book-length study in English of the Netherlands Indies during the First World War, Kees van Dijk examines the impact of the Great War on the political and economic constellation of the Dutch East Indies. Special attention is given to relations with the mother country, developments in the colonial export sector, the position of the Islamic nationalist movement and the Netherlands Indies as a smuggling station used by Indian revolutionaries and German agents.
World War One had just broken out, but colonial authorities in the Netherlands Indies heaved a sigh of relief: The colonial export sector had not collapsed and war offered new economic prospects; representatives from the Islamic nationalist movement had prayed for God to bless the Netherlands but had not seized upon the occasion to incite unrest. Furthermore, the colonial government, impressed by such shows of loyalty, embarked upon a campaign to create a 'native militia', an army of Javanese to assist in repulsing a possible Japanese invasion. Yet there were other problems: pilgrims stranded in Mecca, the pro-German disposition of most Indonesian Muslims because of the involvement of Turkey in the war, and above all the status of the Netherlands Indies as a smuggling station used by Indian revolutionaries and German agents to subvert British rule in Asia.
By 1917 the optimism of the first war years had disappeared. Trade restrictions, the war at sea, and a worldwide lack of tonnage caused export opportunities to dwindle. Communist propaganda had radicalised the nationalist movement. In 1918 it seemed that the colony might cave in. Exports had ceased. Famine was a very real danger. There was increasing unrest within the colonial population and the army and navy. Colonial authorities turned to the nationalist movement for help, offering them drastic political concessions, forgotten as soon as the war ended. The political and economic independence gained by the Netherlands Indies, a result of problems in communications with the mother country, was also lost with the end of the war.
Kees van Dijk examines how in 1917 the atmosphere of optimism in the Netherlands Indies changed to one of unrest and dissatisfaction, and how after World War One the situation stabilised to resemble pre-war political and economic circumstances.



The Indian Uprising of 1857-8: Prisons, Prisoners and Rebellion
By Clare Anderson
Anthem Press. 2007. ISBN 978 1 84331 295 6

During the military, social and economic unrest that spread across North India during the period 1857-8, mutineers and rebels targeted dozens of colonial jails. In what was the largest mass jail break in the history of the British Empire they set over 20,000 prisoners free. Until now, the scale, nature and impact of this phenomenon has remained unexplored.

This fascinating book, based on extensive archival research in Britain and India, examines why mutineer-rebels chose to attack prisons and release prisoners, discusses the impact of the destruction of the jails on British penal policy in mainland India, considers the relationship between India and its penal settlements in Southeast Asia, re-examines Britain's decision to settle the Andaman Islands as a penal colony in 1858, and re-evaluates the experiences of mutineer-rebel convicts there. As such this book makes an important contribution to histories of the mutiny-rebellion, British colonial South Asia, British expansion in the Indian Ocean and incarceration and transportation.

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

Tag clouds in the research sphere

The New Asia Books site is instantly recognisable by its 'tag clouds'. A tag cloud is a weighted list in visual design, a depiction of all the regional and disciplinary categories - mainly within the Humanities and Social Sciences - used to classify the books on New Asia Books. These terms are supplied to us by publishers of academic titles on Asia Studies, and follow the Book Industry Communication (BIC) classification schemes and taxonomy structures (for more information: http://www.bic.org.uk). Those terms, which occur more frequently in our book database, are shown in the cloud with a bigger font. The tag cloud on the home page of New Asia Books shows, for example, that publishers are producing many books related to India, China and Southeast Asia, International Relations, History, and Politics & Government. We can also visualise the regional weight of recent publications in a geo-tag cloud, which shows the prominence of books about India, China and Japan.



The entire navigation structure of the New Asia Books site is driven by classification schemes. A menu on the left hand side provides you with several browsing options, allowing you to drill down through the taxonomies structures. You can browse the categories available and combine them according to your topics of interest. To give an example: selecting 'Malaysia' as initial regional category will bring up thematic subjects such as 'Anthropology', which can be further refined to 'Indigenous peoples'. These terms are also shown in the 'breadcrumb trail' at the top and the pager on the bottom of each product page.

As you might already have noticed, each book is labelled with at least two and often three tags: region, category 1, and category 2. These multiple taxonomies are the so-called 'facets' of a single object. The Indian librarian Shiyali Ramamrita Ranganathan (1892-1972) first developed faceted classification schemes in the 1930s. He recognised that it often isn't sufficient to classify an object in one single taxonomic order only, and that there are multiple dimensions, which describe content. A faceted search option is built into the New Asia Books site, offering you a navigable overview of all the taxonomies used. In addition, multiple navigational paths to any end-term of a book item are shown at the bottom of each product page, and can be filtered out using the refinement menus.

For registered users who are not satisfied with the pre-determined taxonomies, we offer a 'free tagging' option on every product page. This enables you to categorise a book according to your needs. All the free tags are shown in a cloud, representing a bottom-up approach to the classification schemes. Please bear in mind though that this functionality is still being developed. As always, I welcome all your suggestions on how to improve our online services: info@newasiabooks.org
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Thomas Voorter
New Asia Books

Li, Lilliam M., Alison J. Dray, and Haili Kong. 2007. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 321 pages. ISBN 978 1 4039 6473 1

Beijing: from imperial capital to Olympic city

2008 is a big year for China, as everyone now knows. On the auspicious date of the 8th day of the 8th month, 2008 (8 is a lucky number in Chinese) the Olympics opens. China's ultimate coming out party will commence, and for three weeks, the world's eyes will be on the country, as it displays as never before the fruits of breakneck economic development over the last three decades, and its rapid escape from Maoist isolationism and economic autarky. But as Li, Dray and Kong make clear in the preface to their new history of the country's capital, while the Olympics will be China's moment, it will also be Beijing's. For much of the last 800 years, the history of Beijing, under its various former names (named *Dadu* - meaning Great City - by the Mongolians in the 13th century, and ironically christened Beiping - meaning 'Northern Peace' - in the 1920s and 1930s, at a time when the city and the region were slipping into chaos) has been, in many ways, the history of the dominant dynasties and regimes of China.

Beijing's centrality to most western narratives of Chinese mainstream history over the last millennium is problematic. This is a problem shared in this book. In its early sections, it is an excellent and fascinating history of the day-to-day life in imperial Beijing, and the extraordinary rituals and political and social infrastructure around the various emperors. In its later chapters, however, (those dealing with the current century), it becomes, to all intents and purposes, a history simply of the main political currents of Republican China, and then the People's Republic. The chapter, `Economic Reform and Cultural Fever' dealing with the years 1976 to 1989, for instance, has great detail in it about the events leading up to the 4th of June incident in 1989, and the student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. It also runs through the various artistic reactions - by writers like Wang Shuo and film makers like Zhang Yimou - to the epic disruption of the Cultural Revolution, and then the move from Maoist Utopianism with all the turmoil this created, to the opening up and reform process under Deng Xiaoping, where economic freedoms were granted in spades, but the ideological constraints of a defeated and discredited belief system (Marxism Leninism) kept in place for forms sake. These really are issues for China as a whole, rather than simply Beijing. From time to time this account does relate to physical and cultural changes in the city. Take, for instance, the inhabitation, from the early 1990s onwards, of the 798 Factory area by avante garde artists, and high style shops and restaurants. This is a process that continues, almost in the spirit of self-parody, to this day. On the whole, however, it reads much like a standard, accessible history of the 1980s and 1990s.

Unchanging hinterland

Beijing's dominance is a problem for those looking to unpack the regional contribution to China's development over the last half a century – or, for that matter, to try to convince sceptics that, while all is well in the capital, there is another China, a vast space where poverty, backwardness and lack of development reign. This is only a specific case of the more general problem that while development has really taken off in the coastal provinces, in the hinterland things remain disturbingly the same. Mao Zedong, on the victory of the communists in 1949, was, according to the authors, offered three choices for a capital: Nanjing, Xian and Beijing. Advisors such as Liang Sicheng, the son of the great reformer Liang Congjie, and a respected architect in his own right, counselled that the choice of Beijing was problematic because so much of its architecture belonged to the old China, the very China that Mao and the new leaders were trying to break away from. He proposed the construction of a wholly new city, next to Beijing – partly to symbolise clearly this clean break but also to preserve the magnificent buildings that still remained in the city, despite years of war, and the humiliating period under the Japanese in which it served as the junior partner to Nanjing, a hub for the occupied north east region. Nanjing, because of its association with the Japanese, was rejected. Xian, despite being the centre of great dynasties in the past, and very central, lacked strategic force. Beijing, while being one of the few world capitals not based beside a major river or the sea, occupied a perfect position, (close to the Russian border), to the major port of Tianjin. Tianjin was a gateway to the great routes to Japan and Korea. It also held sway over the crucial north east region where so much of the early industrial infrastructure of the new republic was to be built. Tellingly, Shanghai was never even considered for the role of capital, despite its many strengths. It was under political suspicion from the very beginning, as a place more wedded to commerce and money-making than really bringing home the revolution.

The Communists choice of Beijing for strategic regions connected to the very reason that Bejing had been expanded, and made into a capital in the first place. During the Yuan dynasty, Kubla Khan set up three capitals, running against the nomadic instincts of previous Mongolian rulers. One of the capitals was Shangdu, immortalised as Xanada. While pleasant in the summer and impressive enough to be eulogised by the visiting Marco Polo, (the authors eloquently run through the very strong reasons for why Maro Polo's account of his visit might have been wholly fabricated), was simply too isolated. It was also, crucially, deep into traditional Mongolian territory, and the great Khan was motivated mainly by a desire to stake out his power within the conquered Han Chinese territory. Beijing, or, as it was called, *Dadu*, was just within the Great Wall. It occupied a key strategic point between the Mongolian lands to the north, and the Chinese ones to the south. This effectively sealed its fate, and a century of building and construction meant that by the start of the Ming Dynasty after a peasant rebellion in 1368, Beijing was the natural site for the new regime. Beijing remained the capital, despite regime change two centuries later when the Manchus conquered China in 1642-44.

Spooks and scuffles

The accounts the authors give of Beijing as it developed over these centuries are impressive. Beyond the expansion of the immense Forbidden Palace complex, and the construction of various fortified walls, the city, according to accounts of visiting foreigners, and of the Jesuits who were based there from the 16th century onwards, was peaceful, with a high ratio of law enforcement officers to people. This has a haunting parallel with the Beijing of the 21st century, where, rumours have it, on any one day in Tiananmen Square the personnel of the security services make up as much as a quarter of the crowd milling around, seeking early signs of trouble and protest. Like Victorian London, it was to become a city that placed immense wealth next to grinding poverty – a magnet attracting people from elsewhere in the country coming to take the civil service exams. Towards the end of the Qing Dynasty, from 1860 onwards, it was also to be one of the primary focus points for foreign aggression, with the sacking of the Summer Palace, the Boxer Rebellion, and then the uprisings that led to the fall of the Qing in 1911, and the creation of the Republic. Beijing's suffering and wounds over these decades were China's wounds, and the indignities forced on it were to be symbolic of those on the country as a whole as it slid towards disunity and decay.

Mao's choice of Beijing in 1949 was also accompanied by a wholesale rebuilding of parts of the city. The great medieval city walls were, famously, torn down, a process completed as late as 1965 when the final remnants made way for the underground being built then. Mao authorised the clearing of over 20 thousand buildings and dwellings in Tiananmen Square to make way for the world's vastest open space – a space into which his dead body was placed in permanent state in 1976 when he died. New stations, housing complexes, and roads were built. The city was to uniquely depopulate in the Cultural Revolution from 1966 as cadres and young students were sent down to the countryside. But from the late 1970s onwards it was to get into its stride once more, meaning that those who claim they are `Beijingren' (people of Beijing) now have a hybrid and complex background.

Beijing in the 21st century presents many of the complexities of China as a whole. Undergoing breakneck redevelopment, it has almost lost its soul in the process, with some groups agitating to preserve at least some of its ancient heritage. Car traffic pollution has replaced the fumes spumed out by factories once based near the city. It hosts almost two million migrant workers, and sprawls over vast swathes in all directions, with precious little heed taken of planning or sustainability. In many ways it symbolises the voracious energy of the country it remains the capital of. But as Li, Dray, Novey and Kong repeat several times, Beijing's story, while intimately linked to the story of China as a whole, is only part of that story. And the ways in which it is in control of that story are decreasing, as it goes into the 21st century.

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Rubinger, Richard. 2007. *Popular Literacy in Early Modern Japan*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. xii, 238 pages, ISBN 978 0 8248 3026 7

Learning letters on cold nights

Anna Beerens

Professor Rubinger has produced a study about early modern literacy, that is both captivating and concise. This is no mean feat, given the vastness and complexity of the subject. With the help of original and often unfamiliar source material (one of the book's greatest assets) he manages to present a clear picture of the "the period before schooling became universal and regular" (p.2), that is, from the beginning of the Tokugawa era to the early years of the 20th century. His focus is on "commoners", mainly "the rural farming class" (p.2). Crucial to the book is the notion of persistent and dramatic "gaps in literacy attainment between leaders and followers in peasant villages", the so-called 'two cultures' phenomenon that "lasted well into the 19th century and possibly beyond" (p.7).

A broad scope

Rubinger is very much aware of the complexities of his subject. He refrains from using a "rigid definition" of literacy "beyond the notion of some ability to read and write" (p.2), because "...literacy takes different forms at different times for different sectors of the population" (p.3). Another key concept that remains undefined is 'village elite', in order to leave room for the diversity of the rural communities he describes. Of course he could have done otherwise, but this might have resulted in an altogether different book; the story of Japanese popular literacy can perhaps only be told by maintaining maximum openness. Rubinger's nuanced approach makes quite some demands of his readers, but I do not think he is 'vague'. He genuinely takes care to consistently put matters into context. It is a great achievement that he carries it off so well, and not only manages to reveal patterns in the development of popular literacy (which is more or less what we expected him to do), but also to demonstrate again and again what difference literacy made in real people's lives.



Three centuries of history

Rubinger's book covers three centuries. The table of contents shows that he devotes 70 pages to the 17th and 82 pages to the 19th century, but only 32 pages to the 18th century. We will return to this imbalance below. Let us first take a look at the course of the argument. Rubinger begins by outlining the important role of (often highly literate) village officials in a country saturated with rules and regulations. These are the core of the 'village elite', that over the years also came to include wealthy farmers, local entrepreneurs, village physicians and the like. Rubinger's fascinating exploration of 17th-century writing skills, through the analyis of signatures, ciphers (*kaō*), carved seals and marks for the illiterate on 'Town Rules' (*sadame*), registers and apostasy oaths (*nanban kishōmon*) is entirely new to the study of literacy in Japan (for this part of his research Rubinger took as an example the internationally acclaimed study of François Furet and Jacques Ozouf, *Reading and Writing: Literacy in France from Calvin to Jules Ferry*, Cambridge 1982). Rubinger contends that, during the 18th century, the quality of rural literate culture improved as a whole, but that very few people outside the 'village elite' moved beyond rudimentary literacy. To illustrate the general "enrichment of country culture" (p.94) he mentions amongst others the home encyclopedias (*setsuyōshū*) of the 'village elite', and the highly accessible agricultural manuals (*nōsho*) that could even be of use to farmers who were barely literate. However, remarkably, Rubinger does not investigate the level of actual skills present in the 18th century. "For the most part", he concludes, "literacy remained as it had been in the seventeenth century, the prerogative of the village leadership class" (p.110). Only in the first half of the 19th century literacy began to "expand beyond the limited confines of the provincial leadership group" (p.113). However, the 'two cultures' phenomenon persisted and there were still pockets of illiteracy in rural areas in the early years of the 20th century. Here again Rubinger presents a number of fine sources that shed light on skills and literacy levels, including a village literacy survey from 1881, village election ballots (*ire-fuda*), and data from the *Rikugunshō*(Office of the Army) and *Monbushō* (Education Office).

The missing middle ground

What about this stagnation in the 18th century? Rubinger gives an excellent account of the dynamics of the ongoing urbanisation process and the positive impact this, on the whole, had on popular literacy. But he seems to wonder about the whereabouts of a middle group (between the 'village elite' and the poorest farmers) whose improved literacy skills might have shaken the notion of 'two cultures' (p. 111-112). Why was he unable to find them? The answer must lie in the bias of his approach, both in his focus on the rural situation and in his preference for documentary sources. Biographical sources indicate that throughout the Tokugawa period people made good use of their talents and achievements to fundamentally improve their circumstances. There can be little doubt that many of those who left for the urban centres, taking their accomplishments with them, belonged to this very middle group. Maruyama ōkyo (1733-1795, one of Japan's greatest painters), Yosa Buson (1716-1783, master of *haikai* and the *haiga* style of painting), Katayama Hokkai (1723-1790, *kanshi* poet and founder of the famous Kontonsha poetry society), and Hanawa Hokiichi (1746-1821, the revered blind *kokugaku* scholar), to name but a few, were from farming backgrounds. The first two settled in Kyoto, the others in Osaka and Edo respectively. They were no longer 'rural' and out of Rubinger's sight. Geographical and social mobility should not be ascribed only to the very end of the 18th century, as Rubinger does (p.160). They were part of the mechanisms of the urbanisation process that, as Rubinger himself rightly points out, "had begun in the late sixteenth century" (p.82). Moreover, they should have been integrated into his treatment of the 'two cultures' phenomenon, for those who went to the cities not only left behind the ones who were not doing so badly, but also a lot of poor creatures, physically and mentally weighed down by their poverty, who had no opportunities whatsoever.

But all this does not fundamentally affect the story of popular literature in early modern Japan as presented by Rubinger. In fact the inclusion of mobility would have thoroughly supported his idea that literacy can "push some people forward while holding others back" and in this way may "actually increase the social distance between haves and have-nots" (p.1). This is an excellent book for those who want to gain insight into some fundamental aspects of early-modern Japan.

The title of this review is taken from a poem by Kobayashi Issa (1763-1827), quoted by Rubinger on page 158.

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Dutton, George. 2006. ***The Tay Son Uprising: Society and Rebellion in Eighteenth-Century Vietnam.*** **Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 293 pages. ISBN 978 0 8248 2984 1**

Brothers in arms: the Tay Son uprising

Ku Boon Dar

1971 postage stamp issued in North Vietnam to celebrate the 200th Anniversary of the Tay Son Rebellion

The Tay Son movement (1771-1802) was a cataclysmic event that greatly altered the 18th century Vietnamese political and social landscape. It emerged during a period in which Vietnam had been partitioned into two parts along the Gianh River: the Trinh family controlled the north, the Nguyen family the south, while an Emperor of the Le family presided over both regions in name only. George Dutton, assistant professor in the UCLA Department of Asian Languages and Cultures, traces the steps of three brothers, Nguyen Nhac, Nguyen Hue and Nguyen Lu, from the hamlet of Tay Son in Binh Dinh Province (west of modern day Qui Nhon), as they lead a heterogeneous military force that ousts the Trinh and Nguyen families and eventually topples the 348 year-old Le Dynasty (1428-1776).

Dutton argues that the nature of the Tay Son movement and its transformation into a series of political regimes is best understood through an analysis of the dynamic interactions between the various segments of Vietnamese society during this period (p. 5). Indeed, Dutton's analysis challenges the prevailing Vietnamese scholarly traditions, by questioning the assumption of a convergence of interests between the Tay Son movement and the peasantry. Arguing that what might have begun as a movement for the peasants ended up becoming a regime that exploited them, he portrays the movement's leaders as political opportunists whose world view remained constrained by their provincial origins and the exigencies of ongoing warfare and political struggles.

Bandits or populists? Revising history again and again

In fact, during the 19th century, the Nguyen Dynasty (1802-1945), which vanquished the Tay Son regime with the assistance of French mercenaries, wrote its own account of the events of the last three decades of the 18th century. The Dynasty's court historians depicted the movement as an uprising of bandits, rejecting any notion that it was a popular uprising, denying its political legitimacy and arguing that the people had been duped into supporting the Tay Son: they hadn't believed in its objectives, they simply hadn't known any better. The Nguyen Dynasty ensured the dominance of its interpretation of events, at least at the official level, and laid the groundwork for the reinterpretations of early nationalist and Marxist historians trying to understand the Tay Son in light of the Vietnamese revolution. Early 20th century scholarship began to neglect references to the Tay Son as 'bandits' or 'rebels' and suggested the brothers had made legitimate claims to political authority. But even as this shift occurred, it did not address the question of the movement's popular support. Indeed, references to 'peasants' were almost completely absent in the writing of the two most well known early 20th century historians, Phan Boi Chau (1867-1940) (*Viet Nam Vong Quoc Su*, 1905) and Tran Trong Kim (1883-1953) (*Viet Nam Su Luoc*, 1928). They're more comfortable discussing the political and military leaders of Tay Son period. It was not until after the Second World War, in the wake of the Communist Revolution and its association with rural Vietnam, that characterisations of the Tay Son as a peasant movement (*phong trao nong dan*) began to emerge. These representations, most often promulgated by Communist historians of the second half of the 20th century, now dominate discourse pertaining to the Tay Son.

This politicisation of historiography over the course of the 20th century made it difficult for Vietnamese historians to entertain alternative interpretations. The contemporary Vietnamese state has invested so much in its interpretation of the Tay Son, especially the place of Nguyen Hue in the pantheon of national heroes, that historians cannot readily challenge it. When in the late 1980s the noted Vietnamese writer Nguyen Huy Thiep wrote several short stories (including *Vang Lua* (Fired Gold)) that challenged prevailing interpretations, it created an uproar in the Vietnamese intellectual community. It was a strong indication that the Tay Son movement and the ways in which it has been historicised still carry considerable political and emotional weight.

Peasants and pirates: an exploitative regime

Tracing the manner in which Tay Son leaders transformed an inchoate uprising into a new political regime, and by considering the multiplicity of social groups and other pressures that shaped and defined the movement, Dutton challenges common depictions of the Tay Son brothers as visionaries or revolutionaries and the existing scholarship with its simplified view of the Tay Son as a peasant movement. To establish a context for this analytical approach, Dutton's first chapter provides his readers with an extensive historical background of the Tay Son period as a means of understanding the Tay Son army, or *hissing armie* (p. 18). He examines the major causes of the movement and outlines its trajectory. In chapter two, he addresses the three brothers' leadership, how they saw themselves and how their objectives and political strategies changed over the last three decades of the 18th century. What is interesting in this chapter is that Dutton also examines the period's political culture to look at the ways in which claims to power were made by the Tay Son brothers. He argues they relied on various sources of legitimacy, ranging from references to the supernatural to elements of Confucian political philosophy, namely mandate of heaven (*menh troi*) (p. 64), righteous uprising (*khoi nghia*) (p.74) and virtue (*due*) (p. 77), to concrete connections with existing political institutions and ruling families. In fact, the Tay Son brothers, who were of the Ho clan (to which Ho Quy Ly had belonged), adopted the name Nguyen in an attempt to establish a marital link to the Chinese imperial family. These various affiliations and justifications were extremely important to the Tay Son, who in reality emerged from an economic backwater.

In the following chapter, Dutton examines the manner in which the peasantry was affected by the movement and provides a detailed and concrete look at the nature of peasant existence in a time of enormous political upheaval. Rather than characterising the Tay Son as a peasant movement, he argues it was led by men who were arguably not true peasants but opportunists who quickly lost focus on peasant aspirations to become leaders of a conventional political regime. Peasant lives did not improve during the 30 years of the Tay Son administration. Instead, ordinary people suffered the vicissitudes of military service, forced labour, heavy taxation and the constant uncertainty produced by the incessant cycle of conflict. Consequently, the peasants began to look to the growing strength of Nguyen forces in the far south as a potential source of salvation from their miseries, just as they had earlier looked to the Tay Son (p. 170).

Finally, Dutton considers the dynamics between the Tay Son leadership and various segments of Vietnamese society, or those living at the 'social margins' whom Dutton classifies as bandits, pirates and ethnic and religious minorities. He reveals the critical role each of these groups had played in shaping the course and nature of the movement and how their role had frequently been misstated, overlooked or misrepresented in previous studies. For example, outlaws and Chinese pirates* were integral to Tay Son military success-es: 'The rebel leader connected himself to the Chinese pirates as their [his] protector, just as these same pirates were, through their control of the seas, protecting the Tay Son leader and his regime' (p. 227).

Debunking common narratives

For those who are well versed in Vietnamese language (*Quoc ngu*, modern Vietnamese written with the Latin alphabet), there are a great number of sources available on the Tay Son. According to Li Tana, thousands of books and articles have been published since the beginning of 20th century (Li Tana 1998:139). Nevertheless, Dutton has written the comprehensive Western-language study of the Tay Son movement, which permanently altered Vietnam's political trajectory. He uses the movement as a lens through which he examines the period's complex social dynamics, and weaves together an impressively broad range of sources from northern and southern Vietnam while integrating invaluable manuscripts and printed materials of the *Quoc Su Quan* (Historical Academy), *Archives des Missions Etrangères de Paris* (MEP), and writings of Vietnamese, French and English scholars.

While the overall scope of the volume is comprehensive, the reader will find that there is an emphasis on a social historical approach, which is Dutton's area of specialisation and results in some areas being neglected. One is Tay Son foreign policy; Dutton merely lists a representative selection of relevant works. It would have been useful to include the information that, after 1785, one the three brothers, Nguyen Nhac, had already been installed as an emperor with a functioning court and capital near Qui Nhon, and that the Tay Son were developing foreign trade contacts, minting coins and organising the populations under their control. Having been transformed from a movement into a government, the Tay Son exercised a true foreign policy; examining its nascent foreign policies in the far south and north of the country when those regions were under Tay Son control in the 1770s and 1780s can help explain how people throughout Vietnam perceive this 18th century rebellion. Scholars commonly bisect Vietnam into south and north (Dang Trong and Dang Ngoai), which helps one avoid generalisations about a culturally diverse country, but inadequate when we are trying to understand regional Vietnamese politics during the first half of the 19th century. A model that shows the trisection of Vietnamese territory (north, centre and south) is more appropriate. Thus the Tay Son movement is best understood not as an isolated event but as part of a longer era in Southeast Asian history.

The Tay Son Uprising is a splendid, important and well researched contribution to Vietnamese studies. More important, Dutton delves into previously poorly understood topics and in the process undermines many common narratives of the Vietnamese past. Scholars studying other parts of Southeast Asia, as well as those interested in Chinese and Japanese regional involvement, will benefit from this engaging and exceptional book.

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*See Murray, Dian H. 1987. *Pirates of the South China Coast*, 1790-1810. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Her excellent study describes how the Tay Son government integrated numerous Chinese pirate groups into its military ranks (pp. 32-55).

Hansen, Anne Ruth. *How to Behave: Buddhism and Modernity in Colonial Cambodia 1860-1930.* 2007. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 254 pages ISBN 978 0 8248 3032 8

Khmer Buddhists respond to the challenges of modernity

MARTIN STUART-FOX

This scholarly monograph makes use of previously unused sources (the writings of Khmer intellectuals of the late 19th and early 20th centuries) in order to discover how Cambodian Buddhists responded to the challenge of modernity posed by French colonialism. The religious modernism they developed took the form of propagating a more authentic, purified ethics, whose implications, given the Theravada Buddhist worldview, went well beyond the monastery to shape the Khmer response to the political and social changes introduced by the French.

The author begins by showing how the traditional Khmer Buddhist worldview envisages the cosmos as a morally constructed stage on which is played out the drama of the human quest for enlightenment. The key texts for this understanding in 19th century Cambodia were the *Trai Bhūm* and the *Vessantara Jātaka*, which demonstrated the superiority of religious merit over royal power. Pursuing the path of moral purity, it was believed, would produce just such superior power in the face of French political domination.

Ambiguities and contradictions

As the French presence became more intrusive and Cambodian royal power declined, however, this Khmer response was perceived by a coterie of younger monks to be inadequate. Millenarian-inspired rebellion had proved unsuccessful in challenging French control. French laws were replacing Cambodian customary law, and challenged the traditional moral order. For example, under French pressure slavery was abolished, but the use of opium was encouraged as a means of raising finance. While the former placed in question the Cambodian social order as reflecting the law of karma, the latter went against Buddhist moral precepts. Such were the ambiguities and contradictions that Khmer Buddhists were forced to confront.

For Cambodians, the French view of them as backward and lazy was particularly demeaning. So too was the historiographical justification for the protectorate assiduously propagated by French authorities, which portrayed France as the protective saviour of a Khmer nation in decline, threatened by its neighbours with cultural annihilation. Though the author does not make much of this point, both attitudes betrayed the influence of social Darwinism, in the face of which Khmer Buddhist modernisers sought a way of behaving (social conduct) that would reinforce their cultural identity and pride, and so strengthen the nation.

This response was again ethical, and not confined to debate. What Khmer Buddhists sought was a way of responding to the changing world that they encountered that would influence political developments by strengthening the moral status of Cambodians vis-à-vis the French. Part of this response was to demythologise Khmer Buddhism by setting aside the magic rituals of popular religion and going back to the intellectual and spiritual roots of Buddhism as found in the texts of the *Pali Tipiṭaka*, shorn of all commentaries and accretions. The model for their movement was taken from the monastic reforms introduced in Siam by Prince Mongkut before he became King Rama IV.

The Buddhist Renovation movement in Cambodia sought to improve monastic education and conduct, so that monks could provide better role models and teachers for the lay community. French influence was to be countered by renewed emphasis on Khmer language, history and culture. Similar responses took place in Burma, but interestingly the author compares the Cambodian Buddhist response to that of Indonesian Muslims faced with similar challenges. The effect in both cases was a return to the fundamentals of faith as expressed in original texts which goes to confirm Karen Armstrong's contention that fundamentalisms are essentially modernist and modernising responses to the West.[1]

The focus of the reformers was particularly on the *Vinaya*, the text defining monastic discipline. The reformers believed that only by thoroughly understanding the relevant texts could they be properly applied. This explains why the trope of 'purification' was so persistent, in relation to both texts and the behaviour based upon them. Resistance was strong within the Sangha, however, from those monks who feared that reforms would distance the order from lay followers, and so weaken rather than strengthen its social influence.

Illustration by Chinkata Nwachukwu.2007.



Triumph of the modernisers

The irony is that the 'modern Dhamma movement' in Cambodia was successful largely because of the support it received from French patronage. Cambodian (and Lao) monks used to travel to Bangkok to undertake higher monastic studies, and French colonial officials were eager to sever this relationship between Cambodian Buddhism and the Siamese Sangha. They were far more comfortable with a reformed national Khmer Buddhism, free from both the 'superstition' that encouraged millenarianism and from the equally suspect influence of Siam. French authorities therefore backed the reform movement, though their political motives took little account of what animated Khmer reformers. Monasteries were given a significant role in state-supported education. Pali studies were encouraged, museums and libraries were established in the name of Khmer Buddhist culture, and books on proper Buddhist conduct were printed and distributed, all with French support. The climactic symbol of this cooperation was the establishment in 1930 of the Buddhist Institute, an occasion that marked the triumph of the modernisers, and marks the conclusion of this study.

A particular strength of this study lies in the way the author has illuminated the Cambodian Buddhist response to the challenges posed by French colonialism, by focusing on the thought and teachings of a leading group of highly influential monks. This was just as much an intellectual response as was the path followed by those who took advantage of French education to construct secular Khmer nationalism. But it was a dimension that has been largely ignored by scholars, but for reference to the Buddhist Institute. Another strength is the way this Buddhist dimension has been placed within the social and political context of the times.

Anne Ruth Hansen is one of a third generation of scholars now writing on Cambodia, following the French colonial initiators (Aymonier, Coedès, Finot, Leclère) and the illustrious second generation of the later 20th century (Chandler, Vickery, Osborne, Kiernan, Bizot, et al.). This third generation (represented, among others, in addition to Hansen, by Penny Edwards, John Marston and Trudy Jacobsen,) is marked by their use of Khmer language sources to arrive at an understanding of Cambodian history that takes seriously Cambodian views of the world. Judging by the high level of scholarship and the revealing insights provided by this book, Cambodian studies are in good hands.

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Notes

1 Karen Armstrong, 2000. *The Battle for God*. New York: Alfred A Knopf.

Huang, Chun-chieh and John B. Henderson, eds. 2006. *Notions of Time in Chinese Historical Thinking*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. 223 pages. ISBN 962 996 222 5 (hardback)

The past is never past:
making sense of Chinese time

Gregory Bracken

Is there a characteristic Chinese conception of historical time? *Notions of Time* attempts to answer this question by comparing notions of time in Chinese and Western historical thinking. Nine essays are divided into four sections – an introductory 'Setting the Stage' and three sections dealing with time as perceived in ancient, traditional and modern China. In their attempt to cover everything from macrocosmic characterisations on the level of civilisational discourse to microcosmic comparisons between particular Chinese and Western thinkers, they progress from the universal to the particular, from the classical to the modern.

As Chun-chieh Huang states in his introduction, while 'Sino-Western cultural comparisons are common currency in a number of fields, they are particularly appropriate in historiography, given the unsurpassed richness of both the Chinese and Western historiographical traditions, as well as their relative independence and isolation from one another before modern times'. Huang also suggests that while other civilisations 'might reasonably claim to have produced the "first" or "greatest" academic-style historians…a good case can be made for Chinese historiography's having developed the most profound sense of time'.

This book is a follow-up to *Time and Space in Chinese Culture* (Huang, Chun-chieh and Erik Zürcher, eds. 1995. Leiden: E. J. Brill), and the essays in it were first presented at a conference in Taiwan in May 2000. One of its main arguments is that Chinese notions of time are peculiarly concrete; that they developed not so much from 'processes of theoretical abstraction or philosophical reflection as from the lived experience of people in history', which is all part of China's rich sense of historical connectedness with its past. The Chinese approach to history is to see it as a normative pattern and not a series of discrete and disconnected events; the past and present engage in a complex dialogue where the past is never static but is part of a living tradition that continues into the present.

Space, time, 'supertime': temporal perspectives

'Time, History, and *Dao*' by Q. Edward Wang is perhaps the most stimulating essay in the whole book. It compares the work of Zhang Xuecheng (a late-Qing historian) with Martin Heidegger, who, despite the dissimilarity in their backgrounds, both emphasised the everydayness of *Dao* or being. By reintroducing the notion of time into ontology, Heidegger, according to Wang, adopted a spatio-temporal approach similar to Zhang Xuecheng's, namely, the ultimate relation between cosmos and man. But in challenging the entrenched idea of the mind/matter split in modern Western philosophy, Heidegger also had to overcome more hurdles than Zhang. Wang reinforces his argument by citing the excellent *Heidegger and Asian Thought* (Parkes, Graham, ed. 1987. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press), where Heidegger's relationship with Eastern philosophy is examined in detail.

John B. Henderson's essay 'Premodern Chinese Notions of Astronomical History and Calendrical Time' deals with the history of astronomy, where we come across the distinctive terminology of French sinologist Henri Maspero (Ma Bole), who is cited as differentiating 'sidereal' and 'tropical' time, which 'separated two things that the Chinese had always believed to be two faces of the same reality, the calendar and astronomy'. In pre-modern China astronomy was the science of time *par excellence*. The heavenly bodies were conceived primarily as visible markers of the invisible order of time, and not so much as objects in three-dimensional space. Accurately regulating the calendrical system (*shoushi*) was one of the top priorities of the ruler, who was, after all, known as the Son of Heaven; and remember, if his calculations did not reflect the celestial patterns, he could lose the Mandate of Heaven.

Chun-chieh Huang's essay '"Time" and "Supertime" in Chinese Historical Thinking' posits that time in Chinese historical thinking consisted of two elements: the temporal and the supratemporal. He takes a reconstructive approach that contrasts ancient Greek and Chinese conceptions of historical time, and states that 'the concrete and particular events that constitute the temporal aspect of the Chinese notion of time are distinguishable yet inseparable from the abstract and universal principle that is what we call in this paper Supertime'. This 'Supertime' can be discerned only in history, and is best exemplified in the works of the historical sages. Unlike the ancient Greeks, who regarded history as something 'against Time', time in China is not clock time (*chronos*) but humanly lived time. The Chinese believed that time helped shape history; it was humanly lived, shaped and achieved by individuals, sometimes disastrously, sometimes admirably. Chinese people, especially their historians, capitalise on this latter conception of time, calling it 'sagely', and worthy of being re-enacted and re-lived today.

An overly Western bias

Time is a basic dimension of human life, but, as Jörn Rüsen points out in 'Making Sense of Time', it is difficult to compare treatments of the past without thinking through an intercultural perspective. The problem is that such a perspective has been distorted because comparisons have tended to take the Western form of historical thinking as a parameter and then considered other cultures in terms of their similarities or differences from it. To a certain degree, the book under review is no exception.

This collection of essays makes good use of the ancient Chinese classics, notably the *Lunyu* (*The Analects*), the *Yiching* and Sima Qian's *Shiji* (*Records of the Great Historian*), as well as interesting though lesser-known scholars such as Zhang Xuecheng. But there is copious use of Western sources as well, from Herodotus to Heidegger; Husserl, Nietzsche and Benjamin; not to mention the more esoteric choices of Herbert Spencer, Paul Ricoeur and Stephen Hawking. Heidegger, in particular, is a useful and fruitful link, particularly given Wang's citing of *Heidegger and Asian Thought*. This reliance on Western scholarship probably stems from the fact that every one of these academics has received their training in the West. However, as highlighted by Rüsen, one has to question the efficacy of examining Chinese notions of time using so many (and varied) Western examples.

Part of a long-standing academic debate, the investigation of Chinese concepts through the lens of Western scholarship highlights other problems, notably the difficulty of translation (for example, in Chen Chi-yun's essay where *sui* and *nian* seem to be problematic). But even the notion of time itself is left hanging in this book, as seen by the difficulties with terminology such as sidereal, calendar and almanac time, particularly in some of the later essays that deal with time only in the most oblique way. Note also that the word 'time' itself is always in quotation marks in the different section headings, almost as a sort of warning that it is indeed a very slippery notion. Another issue is that of religion, which remains an often hidden element in these historical investigations; not enough is done to differentiate Chinese philosophy from religion, nor indeed to illustrate the unique blurring that occurs between the two in the Chinese tradition. While this book is undoubtedly a useful exercise, even an important one, its overly Western bias has to be considered somewhat misleading. Some stand-alone Chinese examples might perhaps have been beneficial – if there are any, that is, but even if there aren't, they will no doubt arise over time.

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Cole, Benjamin, ed. 2006. *Conflict, Terrorism and the Media in Asia*. London and New York: Routledge, 149 pages, ISBN 1 O 415 35198 7

Wagging the dog?
The media's role in Asian conflicts

Naresh Kumar

In states across Asia in recent years, separatist movements, perpetrators of inter-communal violence, and revolutionary and terrorist groups have increasingly tried to use the mass media to attain their political objectives. The contributors to *Conflict, Terrorism and the Media in Asia* attempt to assess how and to what extent non-state combatants in Asia access and influence the media; how the War on Terror influences the media's perspective of Asian conflicts; and how – or whether – the media influences those conflicts.

The book is a thorough examination of the media's role in conflict and terrorism in Asia. Focusing on conflicts in Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, China and India, and showing how each involves the media as an interlocutor between combatants, government and society, it addresses how the media report political violence and conflict, and the media's impartiality in its relations with governments and insurgents. It also shows how the focus of the media, Asian states and America on the War on Terror has led to violence, notably by states responding to sub-national conflicts that, since 11 September 2001, have been increasingly portrayed in the West as part of a global terrorist threat.

Those engaged in political violence use violence to attract the attention of the public, political elites and policy-makers, and to spur debate on their objectives. Violence focuses media attention and attracts publicity, thereby enabling non-state combatants to set the media agenda. By setting the media agenda and influencing political debates, combatants transform their violence into political power. In the same way, governments communicate their own messages via the media to challenge the legitimacy of the methods, ideology and objectives of their opponents and to maintain popular and political support. This is typically achieved through mainstream negative reporting of their opponent's ideology and objectives, combined with the positive reporting of the political and security initiatives that the government is employing.

But the media can be more than just a passive conduit for relaying messages. In fact, the media is a political actor in its own right and is capable of playing a number of political roles, as an agent of stability, of restraint (through monitoring and challenging government) and of change. And yet, this book argues, while the media plays a major role in sub-national conflicts, its impact is generally limited.

From America to Malaysia to Indonesia: moulding mainstream public opinion

The book's first chapter, 'US Journalism: Servant of the Nation, Scourge of the Truth?' by Toby Miller, demonstrates how mainstream American media, notably network and cable television, have worked as effective spokespersons for nationalism in ways that coincide with the state's enunciated national interest. For example, almost three-quarters of Americans supported the invasion of Iraq. Miller argues that the American state and media mould public opinion in favour of government policy. In the service of the nation, he asserts, mainstream journalism has become a baying scourge on the truth.

Chapter two, 'Al Qaeda and the struggle for moderate Islam in Malaysia', by Benjamin Cole, attempts to explain the media's impact in Malaysian society. He argues that Malaysians are subject to numerous competing mainstream and new media (Internet) information flows from militants and governments. The impact on community action and the growth of militancy within Malaysia is difficult to assess, but it's important to bear in mind that Malaysia is not a fertile recruiting ground for militant groups because the majority of Malaysian Muslims follow a moderate view of Islam. Another reason why it is so difficult to assess media impact on community action is that there are so few opportunities for direct political action in Malaysia. The mainstream media acts as an agent of stability by reflecting and reenforcing the views of both the government and mainstream public opinion. The media is not, however, totally an instrument of government, and some media do attempt to perform a limited role as an agent of restraint in challenging the government, although there is little evidence of it having any impact.

The link between the media and political change remains ambiguous, even in Indonesia, where the media and the control of information clearly played a role in the creation, survival and collapse of President Suharto's New Order. The third chapter, 'Perning in the Gyre: Indonesia, the globalised media and the "War on terror"', by Jonathan Woodier, argues that while national censorship was formally defeated with the Suharto regime's collapse in May 1998, elements of the old power elite are seeking to use the media to further their ambitions and interests. The collapse of Suharto's system and the highly centralised state has 'opened the door for a new struggle to reforge coalitions and build regimes'. Though press freedom increased, which contributed to the emergence of a public sphere and civil society, Woodier maintains that at the edges of shrinking states many journalists, including the foreign media, are under threat. Today's political elites are trying to regain central control over the flow of information within and across state borders by criminalising the work of journalists and by invoking defamation laws to silence critics.

'Nothing but a cock fight'? The Philippine free-for-all

The political stability and territorial integrity of the Philippines are threatened by a number of sub-national conflicts, including the world's longest standing communist insurgency, a separatist rebellion centred around the Muslim Moro Community on the Island of Mindanao, and Al Qaeda-linked terrorist groups pursuing national and regional objectives. The rebellion was initially led by the secular Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), before hard line Islamist elements broke away in 1977 to form the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MNLF entered mainstream politics through a 1966 peace agreement according to which parts of Mindanao became autonomous, but the MILF has continued an armed struggle for full independence, operating in highland and rural areas covered in thick jungle. Since 2002 the MILF has sought a negotiated peace settlement with the government; the parties agreed to a ceasefire, but it's been broken many times.

After 11 September 2001 some of these conflicts were drawn into the American War on Terror when the State Department placed the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New Peoples Army (NPP), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Pentagon Gang (a criminal gang specialising in kidnap for ransom) on its list of foreign terrorist organisations. While all groups currently engaged in conflict with the Philippine government are able to exert considerable influence over the media through violence, they have struggled to do so to their fullest advantage.

In chapter four, 'The Philippines Media: Agent of stability or restraint?', Benjamin Cole assesses how the media has reported sub-national conflicts in the Philippines since 2000, the extent to which various groups and communities engaged with the government to influence media coverage and the impact that the media has had on these conflicts. Cole states that the quantity of reporting on conflict-related stories is huge, having considerably increased since 2000, but that its quality is seriously flawed. In 2000 the media was acting as an agent of stability with respect to these conflicts. Its reporting of the Moro rebellion, for example, was largely one-sided in favour of the government, with many news reports simply reiterating official statements. The press did develop some contacts with the ASG, but most reporters were dependent on military and government sources.

Since then, however, there has been some improvement. The Centre for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR) analysed reports in the five most circulated newspapers and found that roughly three-quarters of articles that appeared in 2000 were government-sourced. By 2003 this had fallen to 60% and the number of sources had doubled. This included a better distribution of sources: over 13% came from civil society, while almost 35% of articles cited more than one source. In 2000, the media was also accused by some sections of civil society and opposition parties of being superficial and failing in its duty to explain the Moro rebellion. The media was reporting the conflict as 'nothing but a cock fight – who's losing, who's winning', without posing the crucial question of how government policy was being crafted. This was confirmed by CMFR, whose studies found that just over 1% of stories published in 2000 contained background information, insight into the history of the violence, details about the ceasefire or statistics that fleshed out the bigger picture. By 2003 that figure was close to 5%.

Despite improvement between 2000 and 2003, media in general were still not up to the task of explaining the complex and multi-faceted character of contemporary political violence, or of advocating citizens' rights. By 2003, some media elements were increasingly playing the role of agent of restraint, but as a whole the media was still acting as an agent of stability. Since 2003 there have been encouraging signs that the media is striving to correct these flaws, gradually improving its performance and increasingly adopting the role of agent of restraint.

Struggling to restrain, daring to change: Indian blood, Chinese silence

In chapter five, 'Shooting the messenger? Political violence, Gujarat 2002 and the Indian news media', Prasun Sonwalkar states that the level of media access that a group or community has tends to vary between different sections of the media, which can have a significant impact on determining which audiences see their messages. In Gujarat, for instance, a strong pro-Hindutva bias has challenged the media's role as an agent of restraint. Addressing the spring 2002 political violence in the western Indian state of Gujarat, which was widely seen as a pogrom against Muslims, Sonwalkar explores some of the ethical, political and professional dilemmas faced by journalists covering such events. Gujarat, the land of Gandhi, is likely to be long remembered for this anti-Muslim rampage, during which a mob perpetrated some of the most gory acts of violence since independence. The nature of the media coverage was as newsworthy as the political violence itself. Although most media (both English and Hindi) reported the violence boldly and independently, the two local newspapers, which were the most likely ones to have been read by those sections of the Hindu community who had formed the mob, exercised a strong pro-Hindutva bias. This limited the media's ability to act as a restraining influence on those perpetrating the violence.

Michael Dillon's chapter six, 'Uyghur separatism and nationalism in Xinjiang', finds that media coverage of the conflict in Xinjiang has been patchy, to say the least. Xinjiang is the contested region of Western China, administered by the PRC as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. But many Uyghurs, who comprise the region's largest ethnic group, and other non-Chinese residents consider this illegitimate and refer to it as Eastern Turkistan. The Uyghurs are a Turkic people who have been Muslims since at least the 15th century and their language is closely related to that of the Uzbeks and distantly to other Turkish languages. In China, positive news from Xinjiang is reported regularly, particularly when it supports the picture of successful economic development that the government wishes to present. Coverage of separatist activities was extremely rare until the 1990s, when there was press and television coverage of the trials of those accused of separatist activities. The political case for independence is never allowed to appear in the official media in China, and virtually all media remains under state control. Alternative sources of information include newsletters published by Uyghurs themselves and, more recent, websites of Uyghur organisations based outside of Xinjiang, but these don't have the resources of professional press and television organisations and their access to first-hand information is often limited.

The Chinese government has strongly discouraged journalists from visiting Xinjiang for many years; Western journalists based in Beijing were even barred from the region on pain of losing their accreditation. As a result, Xinjiang has appeared only rarely in Western media, when there have been major disturbances. The authorities have carefully managed visits for groups of journalists since China's declaration of its support for the War on Terror in an attempt to garner international support for the suppression of sentiment among Uyghurs that they really belong to East Turkistan, but access to ordinary Uyghurs, particularly those living in outlying areas, has been severely restricted.

This silence was broken by a number of books published in Chinese by the separatist movement in the 1990s, which take a very confident attitude towards Beijing's suppression of the Uyghurs and provide an unprecedented amount of detailed information both about the separatist movement and the methods used by Beijing to contain it. The Internet is becoming more widely available in Xinjiang but is subject to regular monitoring by the Public Security Bureau, which filters Internet content throughout China. Because of this the Internet has not been used as a major vehicle for transmitting information about the separatist cause, but it has increased the availability of information from outside Xinjiang. Although the media has played a role in the development of the independence movement in Xinjiang, it has not been a major player. Since the movement is considered illegal and all of its operations are clandestine, it has no access to mainstream state-controlled media.

Access isn't everything: influencing the media influences little

In the book's conclusion Cole tries to understand how groups and communities engaged in, or suffering from, violent political activity are attempting to access the media to highlight their grievances; to publicise their objectives or ideology; to influence public opinion; and to build popular support both within and outside of their natural constituency, including international support from governments or militant groups. The ability of any group or community to achieve these purposes depends upon the nature and extent of the reporting of their conflict, and in Asia this varies widely.

All of these groups and communities have been able to successfully access the media and influence its agendas. But the level of access that different groups and minority communities have to the mainstream media varies widely from state to state and even from group to group within the same state. Since most of these governments work to deny these groups and communities media access and attempt to control media coverage, the level of access that each group or community has is primarily determined by the extent of media freedom in each state. At one end of the spectrum, the Filipino media provides MILF and CPP spokesmen extensive access, and similarly the majority of the Indian media objectively reported the politically inspired anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat. At the other end of the spectrum, China has the most restrictive media, providing no direct access to the Xinjiang separatist movement. But whatever level of access any of these groups has falls far short of the access accorded to their respective governments and other elites.

The media's impact on the conflicts identified in this book has been varied but generally limited. In particular, the book demonstrates no relation between media coverage and the spread of militant ideologies, nor has media reporting generated widespread public or political pressure to accede to the demands of any of these groups. Even where the media has articulated the root causes of violence and the objectives of combatant groups and communities (as in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines), those conflicts have not widened. The possible exception is in Gujarat, where local pro-Hindutva newspapers have complemented the work of the Sangh Parivar in spreading the Hindutva ideology.

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Soni, Sharad K. 2006. *Mongolia-China Relations. Modern and Contemporary Times*. New Delhi: Pentagon Press, Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, 328 pages, ISBN 81 8274 196 3

Mongolian foreign policy: the Chinese dimension

Irina Morozova

All of official Beijing's talk of China's 'peaceful rise to power' and 'Asian harmony' is of particular concern to Mongolia. Although the Great Wall that once separated the ancient and medieval Chinese dynasties from the 'northern barbarians' has become a historic relic, geopolitics, of course, still matters. What security arrangements should Mongolia pursue in the face of its growing great neighbour? What might be the long-term effects on the Mongolian economy and society of China becoming a regional and even global superpower? Could China's huge, migrating population overwhelm Mongolia's smaller one? These and other intriguing questions are the subject of Sharad Soni's ambitious book.

In the Introduction the author correctly observes that the history of Sino-Mongolian relations embodies much more than 'border raids and tribute missions' and calls for a *longue durée* approach. He does so, however, without providing an overview of pre-Mongol polities in the Eurasian steppes. Soni defines historical-cultural features that, in his perception, always distinguished the world of the Mongol – nomadic way of life, 'horse culture', mobility of the army and integral system of administration – from the world of the Chinese. But historians would dispute that the ethno-genesis of the northern Chinese was complex; they would argue that no distinct border between the sedentary and nomadic worlds existed and that the 'northern barbarians' were familiar with agriculture and even irrigation. Meanwhile, Soni's support of the popular idea that Genghis and Kublai brought centrality and despotism into Chinese imperial structures would be criticised by medievalists for his lack of sources and of concrete analysis of imperial administration structures.

Modern Mongolia: did the Manchu provoke pan-Mongolism?

Soni explains the modern 'decadence' of the Mongols through the late Middle Ages' fratricidal wars between various Mongol tribes that were played off against one another by the Chinese, which finally disintegrated the Great Mongol State and forced its remnants under the jurisdiction of the Manchu Emperor. The author is at his strongest when he describes Manchu influence in separating the Chinese from the Mongols. He rightfully mentions the special role of Inner Mongols in developing 'national' identity and the idea of pan-Mongolism. Inner Mongols were the southern Mongolian tribes first subdued by the Manchu. Today Inner Mongolia is a part of the People's Republic of China, while Outer Mongolia, known in the 20th century as the Mongolian Peoples's Republic (MPR), is independent Mongolia. Christopher Atwood, in his fundamental work, showed that the Inner Mongolian revolutionary movement emerged out of opposition to the Qing system, while Inner Mongolia's new intelligentsia grew out of a 'calling, quasi-religious cause' and desire for an alternative career path.[1]

However, Soni, following Mongolian and Soviet historiographies but without himself providing sufficient evidence, holds that a 'national liberation movement' existed among the low strata of Mongolian society. By 1920 this nationalism spread to higher circles of the Khalkha, the central and politically dominant ethnic group in Outer Mongolia, and manifested itself, the author believes, as loyalty to the Buddhist hierarch Bogdo-Gegen, the theocratic ruler and symbol of Mongolian autonomy proclaimed in 1911, and as hostility toward Chinese oppression imposed in 1919 by General Hsu in the Outer Mongolian capital Urga.

Mongolia in the Cold War: a lucrative position?

Using various secondary sources, Soni presents a well-balanced and rational analysis of Chinese, Russian and Japanese interests in Mongolia in the early 20th century. Historiography on later periods, particularly the Second World War, still reveals serious gaps. He describes the Yalta Conference, at which the Soviet delegation made Mongolia's independence a condition for the USSR's participation in the war against Japan, as 'humiliating' to China, and Chiang Kai-shek's 1946 recognition of the Mongolian People's Republic as a 'liberal step': made under Soviet diplomatic pressure, it finally granted the MPR *de jure* independence from China. In his chapter on the Cold War era, Soni addresses Sino-Mongolian rapprochement in the 1950s and the easing of tensions during Détente. Benefiting from the Sino-Soviet 'great friendship', Mongolia pursued closer ties with both the USSR and China (although the Chinese provided far less aid than the Soviets). Internationally, however, as the author correctly states, Mongolia remained 'in the shadow' of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s.

Soni's analysis of the competition among socialist states, communist parties and their leaders in the world communist movement leaves the reader wondering about the accessibility of archival materials on the inter-party struggle and changes in power in the USSR and the MPR. The book's use of archival sources does not provide much new insight compared to the main published monographs.[2] Recent research on politics within the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party has uncovered evidence that Mongolia's role in Cold War geopolitics was not solely passive;[3] in fact, the Cold War in East Asia placed Mongolia in a lucrative position: it received international recognition and membership in international organisations via Soviet diplomatic support; gained Chinese economic assistance; and traded on a larger scale with the USSR and European socialist states.

In search of a regional identity

In the last chapter Soni discusses Sino-Mongolian relations in the post-Cold War era, starting with the power vacuum left by the USSR's dissolution. While the economic vacuum was filled by Chinese business, the political arena in Mongolia was and still is not dominated by any single player. Mongolia's foreign policy of neutrality – mandatory for a small state clenched between two great powers – is reflected in Mongolia's willingness to achieve membership in various regional organisations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Nevertheless, Soni argues that Mongolia identifies itself predominantly with Northeast Asia, 'which is the only sub-region having no organisational structure of its own' (p. 217).

The author doesn't rule out the possibility of Mongolia falling prey to a security threat at the hands of its direct neighbours. Referring to other scholars, such as Guudain Tumurchuluun, Soni expresses concern about the possible growth of China's geopolitical interests in Mongolia against the background of a retreating Russia. At the same time, he mentions the improvement of Russia-Mongolia cooperation after 2000 and China's preference for a stable northern neighbour able to contribute to its 'peaceful rise'. However, he does not comment on the implications of Mongolia's small population in the face of increasing numbers of Chinese migrants, an issue made more urgent in light of new legislation regulating the possession of lands by foreigners.[4]

Soni's book is free of Cold War bias (in favour of one block or the other) and politicisation, and, despite its shortcomings, should be appreciated by Mongolists, especially as it represents the new generation of energetic researchers in Asia relative to the general decline of Mongol studies in Europe. As the author is very adept at presenting data from various sources to expound upon the vast theme of Sino-Mongolian relations, his most welcome volume can also be recommended as basic literature on the topic for a wide audience.

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The new decentralisation: 'blossoming' ethnic and religious conflict in Indonesia

Karel Steenbrink



Re-invented aristocracy in Indonesia, Bali 2006.

From October 1966 until his forced abdication in May 1998 General Suharto was the dominant figure in Indonesian politics. His so-called New Order delivered rapid economic growth, improved infrastructure and political stability while sternly emphasising unity. His political agenda of a unified and prosperous Indonesia could not be reached without a robust and centralised administration. While many military and civil personnel moved from Java to the so-called Outer Islands, many young students came to the dominating but very densely populated island of Java to seek education and often a career.

General Suharto was succeeded by his Vice President, Bacharuddin ('Rudy') Habibie, a keen and energetic engineer who had established an ambitious but rather inefficient and overly expensive naval and airplane industry. To address the biggest problem in the country's east, the former Portuguese territory of East Timor, he promised the possibility of independence after a referendum; to address the biggest problem in the west, the freedom fighters of Aceh, he promised the possibility of the full application of *shari'a* law and a strong Islamic identity. Immediately, there were complaints: giving away East Timor was seen as a Christian attack on the unity of Indonesia and likely to be followed by giving away other eastern regions with a strong Christian presence, such as Papua and Maluku. Meanwhile, Papua Christians reacted to the introduction of *shari'a* in Aceh with the request that Christian law be introduced, beginning with a 10% religious tax in favour of churches and their ministers.

This process of *reformasi* soon resulted in a nationwide call for decentralisation, comprised of a dual process: a devolution of power from top to bottom, especially from the central government to provinces and districts; and the division of provinces and districts into smaller administrative units, a process referred to as *pemekaran*, literally, 'blossoming', or the growth of more flowers on a tree. *Pemekaran* was often based on ethnic and religious identity, and it eventually also referred to the general fragmentation of power resulting from the broader process of *reformasi*. In June 1999 parliament agreed to implement Laws 22 and 25, which gave much more power to the 26 provinces and their districts (*kabupaten*) and spawned the creation of new ones; between 2001 and 2002, for example, the number of districts increased from 341 to 370 and has continued to increase, while the number of provinces today stands at 33. Also as a result of these laws, provincial governors and district heads are no longer nominated in Jakarta but directly elected by regional parliaments; income from gas, oil and forestry are to a large degree allocated towards local administrations; and regions have more authority to introduce elements of Islamic law. In 2004 a new regional government reform law restored some of the state's former centralism, but the basic changes introduced by Laws 22 and 25 have remained intact.

Pemekaran: the fragmentation of power (and corruption)

KITLV Press in Leiden has published a vivid, but also academically solid book on this policy of decentralisation. This magnificent work's 20 contributions (six by Indonesian scholars, the rest by foreign experts) reviews *pemekaran*'s first results. The book's cover shows a military official sitting in ceremonial posture in his air-conditioned office, waiting for visitors: this is symbolic of the military's enduring power in post-Suharto Indonesia, although it has tended to act more often from the sidelines and through local civil politicians; only in violent regions, like the Poso district of Central Sulawesi, has the military exercised its full power. But even the military has taken part in *pemekaran*. Violence in various regions of East Indonesia is exacerbated by internal rivalry between army units that support conflicting local parties, as shown in the contribution by Arianto Sangaji on Poso. In her study on the tin trade in Bangka, Erwiza Erman cites close cooperation between local police and Chinese businessmen as the motor behind the informal economy that organises mass quantities of tin for export to Singapore. This is, indeed, corruption, which was common during the Suharto era but controlled by the highest levels of government. So while *pemekaran* has since decentralised power, it has also decentralised corruption. The latter is not official policy, of course, but it is unfortunately the reality.

Indonesia's 33 provinces are more or less the size of European countries or American states. They are divided into districts – some have five, others more than 25 – all of which, given the policy of *pemekaran*, want to stress their distinctive character. They do greatly differ, but they also share a common early 20th century colonial history and all became part of the Indonesian Republic in 1945. Thus the central government is still quite dominating, which is clear in the nearly humorous story of the people of West Sumba, who wanted their district to be divided into three new districts, mainly because of animosity between Catholics and Protestants. Jacqueline Vel describes the intense lobbying of local politicians who went to Jakarta and persuaded a parliamentary delegation to visit Sumba. About €80,000 was spent on air tickets, food and bribes, but the region was too poor to pay the minimum price for a government decision to divide their district.

With the exception of two articles on regions in Java (Banten and Jepara), the contributions all deal with the Outer Islands, where religion often plays a role in local conflicts. Lorraine Aragon cites religion as crucial to the struggle for power between Muslims in coastal areas and Protestants who dominate the mountainous regions around Lake Poso. Her article (like several others in this book) can also be read as a how-to course in corruption: how to set up a *panitia sukses* (a team that organises election lobbying and propaganda); how to obtain a high position in the civil administration, especially that of district (*bupati*) head; how political power produces financial and social profits. While religious and ethnic differences often cause conflict, so does migration. Granted, migrants often differ ethnically and religiously from those among whom they find themselves, but in Indonesia they often come from distant provinces and, because of the archipelago's vastness, must feel like strangers in their own land.

The islands off the western coast of Sumatra are not populated by a Muslim majority, but they were until recently administered by Muslims from the Minangkabau region on mainland Sumatra. The Mentawai archipelago was one of the first new districts created through *pemekaran*, separated from the Padang-Pariaman district but part of the majority Muslim Province of West Sumatra. In 2004 Edison Saleleubaja, a Protestant minister, became the new district head after he allegedly had paid €130,000 to obtain the job. He had to borrow the money and so became a 'political puppet in the hand of the [Muslim traders in the] logging sector' (p. 80). Myrna Eindhoven concludes that the Mentawaians could finally control the civil administration but that 'corruption and money politics seem to have decentralized as well' (p. 86). For example, the local administration was unable to collect logging retribution fees; in the 1980s and 1990s several NGOs had campaigned against illegal logging, but then most of their activists joined the new civil administration and thus the general culture of corruption.

Religion: moral guide or instrument of power?

Religion is not a purely private affair in modern Indonesia, and the new decentralisation has intensified religious and ethnic boundaries. With greater emphasis on small communities as important political actors, the role of religious identity has intensified, but not in a way that has led to a transparent, clean and efficient society. Religion is used more as an instrument of power than as a moral guide. Two contributions include an identical quotation of Burhan Magenda, stating that in the Outer Islands of Indonesia 'local aristocracies survive all changes in national politics and remain in power locally' (pp. 102, 373). This reminded me of the Dutch colonial policy from 1945 to 1949 to regain power through traditional chiefs. In both cases the political goal was not the renewal of *reformasi* but rather the restoration of an ancien régime. Religion has been used similarly: not to guide and critique but rather as a means and justification to seek popular support.

Shari'a law was introduced in Aceh Province through 1999 and 2001 national parliament laws, and further solidified by its governor, Abdullah Puteh, and his provincial parliament in 2002. It banned gambling and enforced strict Islamic dress codes, but one of the arguments in favour of introducing *shari'a* had been the hope that it would help eliminate corruption. Minor corruption cases involved Islamic charity organisations, but, more ironic, the most prominent wrongdoer was Governor Abdullah Puteh himself. Elected in 2000, he was forced to step down in 2004 and go to prison owing to several corruption scandals, including the purchase of a helicopter for the governor's personal transport.

Not all the book's stories are sad ones. In Minahasa, the northern section of the island of Sulawesi, it was feared that conflict between Christians and Muslims of the Maluku Islands would cause new conflicts. Among refugees from Ambon, for example, many Christians and Muslims thirsted for revenge. Some Minahasa hardliners created Christian militias, such as Brigade Manguni and Legium Christum, but close cooperation between the civil administration, military and religious leaders prevented violent conflicts. David Henley, Maria Schouten and Alex Ulaen conclude that 'even old, deep religious and ethnic divides need not lead to violent conflict provided the society divided is also a civil society, provided economic and demographic conditions are favourable, and provided the state is able to play its proper role as ultimate guardian of the peace' (p. 325).

Although the book has 22 contributors, it's not the usual patchwork of edited articles published one or two years after a short conference. Written in a detached, lucid style, with thorough knowledge of local developments across many different regions, the contributions express a strong collective identity, coherence and agreement in methodology and conclusions. In sum, *Renegotiating Boundaries* presents modern Indonesia beyond Jakarta: the many local quests for identity amidst new structures of power, corruption and economic growth.

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NETWORK ASIA

On the occasion of its 450th anniversary in 2008, the Bavarian State Library is displaying several treasures from its collection of 13,500 Asian manuscripts in the recent exhibition *Love, Gods and Demons*

Love, Gods and Demons

Asian manuscripts in the Bavarian State Library, Munich

Helga Rebhan

The acquisition of Asian manuscripts stretches right back to the foundation of the Bavarian Court Library (later renamed Bavarian State Library) in 1558, when the scope of the collections was far from limited to European literature but already included items in Oriental languages. After the purchase of the private libraries of the Orientalist Johann Albrecht Widmanstetter (1506–1557) and Johann Jakob Fugger (1516–1575) in 1558 and 1571 respectively, orientalia formed a significant part of the Court Library's founding collections. The provenance of these two accessions (the Near East and Northern Africa) reflects the historical trade relations of the time, and the first items representing the beginning of an Asian collection were soon to follow in the late 17th century in form of Jesuit prints from China.
The Library's Oriental and Asian collections were enhanced further by the dissolution of the Jesuit Order in 1773 and the secularisation of Bavarian monasteries in 1803.

The 19th century saw a more systematic expansion of the Asian collections, which coincided with the growing general interest in Asia and the establishment of specialised university chairs. The Asian holdings were significantly enlarged through the purchase of works collected by Karl Friedrich Neumann (1793–1870), a Sinologist who had travelled through China in 1830-31. In 1851 the Bavarian King Ludwig I, a great supporter of the Chinese collection, presented the library with 2,700 volumes from the collection of the explorer Onorato Martucci (1774–1846). The well-known scholar of German Johann Andreas Schmeller (1785–1852), librarian in the service of the Court Library, even learnt Chinese! The most significant acquisition in the collection's history took place in 1858, when the huge library of the Orientalist Etienne Quatremère (1782–1857) was purchased, comprising about 32,000 items, among them 1,250 Oriental and Asian manuscripts.

Shortly afterwards the collection of the Orientalist Marcus Joseph Müller (1809–1874), containing important Zend manuscripts, was obtained, as well as the collection of the Indologist Martin Haug (1827–1876), comprising 343 Sanskrit manuscripts.
Further important acquisitions followed with the collections of the Semitist Ernst Trumpp (1828–1885) and the Indologist Julius Jolly (1849–1932), through which manuscripts in Indian languages were added to the library. Some important purchases came from a book-buying tour to China, Japan and Korea, undertaken by Georg Reismüller (1882-1936) in the 1920s. In 1953 the Sinica collection was enlarged by the acquisition of the library of the Sinologist Carl Hentze (1883–1975).

Buddha Shakyamuni Bavarian State Library, Munich

When the situation at the Bavarian State Library had been consolidated in the post-war years, a very fruitful period in terms of expanding the Oriental and Asian collections of manuscripts and prints began, stimulated by a growing public interest in Asian culture leading to offers from the region. It was mainly due to the commitment, far-sightedness and profound knowledge of Karl Dachs (former head of manuscript collections) and Günter Grönbold (former head of Oriental and East Asian collections), that the collections have been significantly enlarged since the early 1970s. From 1973 onwards the number of Oriental and Asian manuscripts increased steadily from 3,300 to about 16,500 today.

The main focus was not limited to manuscripts from the classical areas of Near and Middle Eastern Studies (i.e. Arabic, Persian), whose numbers were doubled. Special attention was paid to the expansion of important and substantial collections of primary sources from South and Southeast Asia, Central Asia and the Far East. Previously, these areas had been classified in small collections under the collective shelfmark *Cod[ices] Or[ientales] mixt[i]*.
To date, 51 new language-based shelfmark classes have been introduced, partly through the acquisition of single items or smaller groups of texts, partly through the purchase of whole collections. In 1976 a major collection with manuscripts from Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand was established, followed by collections for codices from India (Sanskrit and Oriya) and Tibet in 1977. From 1978 onwards more Chinese manuscripts were obtained, while 1980 saw the beginning of a collection of carved wooden book covers from Tibet, which has grown to more than 100 items today. Since 1984 a medium-sized collection of Japanese manuscripts has been assembled.

Major acquisitions to follow were palm-leaf manuscripts from Bali purchased since 1984 and Tamil manuscripts from southern India collected since 1987. A remarkable collection of Yao manuscripts from South China and mainland Southeast Asia has gradually been added to the collections since 1989, and a Mongolian manuscript collection was begun in 1996. More recently, a set of Tibetan musical scores and a bundle of illuminated Tibetan manuscripts from Mongolia came to the library in 2005 and 2006 respectively.

In sum, the present collections of 16,500 Oriental and Asian manuscripts in the Bavarian State Library comprise 5,000 items from Europe (Hebraica), the Near and Middle East and North Africa; 1,600 items stem from Central Asia, while 2,600 are of South Asian, 4,100 of Southeast Asian and 3,200 of East Asian provenance. Thus the Library sees itself amongst the other major institutions with significant holdings from Asia. Today, the acquisition of more than 13,000 Oriental and Asian manuscripts, which have entered the collections since 1973, would represent an impossible task for any of the bigger libraries and museums.

Access to collections

All manuscripts are recorded in hand-written lists. The library makes every effort to make its collections more accessible by publishing detailed catalogues. Within the framework of the nationwide project *Katalogisierung der Orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland* several volumes describing parts of the Oriental and Asian manuscript collections in the Bavarian State Library have appeared. The library already makes available digital surrogates of a few selected manuscripts via the Internet,[1] and plans to completely catalogue, digitise (with a focus on long-term preservation) and thoroughly examine manuscript holdings of selected languages in the near future. The Oriental and Asian manuscripts are available for consultation by interested academics in the reading room of the Department of Manuscripts and Early Printed Books.[2]

Exhibitions

An important objective for the Bavarian State Library is to make its holdings of not only Occidental but also Oriental and Asian manuscripts available to a wider audience, and to present theses materials in exhibitions accompanied by catalogues. Several Asian objects have regularly been on display in the past, for example in the following great exhibitions: *Erwerbungen aus drei Jahrzehnten* (1978), *Thesaurus librorum* (1983) and *Schrift-Stücke* (2000). In 1982 the library hosted a major exhibition of its Oriental and Asian manuscripts and rare prints entitled *Das Buch im Orient*[3], which included more than 100 items of Asian provenance. In subsequent years several exhibitions dedicated to special collections took place, showing Tibetica[4] (1985), Japonica[5] (1988), Tibetan book covers[6] (1991) and Yao manuscripts[7] (1999). A highlight of exhibition work in the Asian context took place in 2005, when under the title of *The words of the Buddha in the languages of the world* [8], the great diversity of manuscripts from the Buddhist realm was shown.

Notwithstanding these manifold activities in the past three decades, the library is now showing previously unseen material in its current exhibition *Liebe, Götter und Dämonen: wertvolle asiatische Handschriften der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek*, which is accompanied by a detailed catalogue. Manuscripts with an exceptional range of illuminations, shapes, sizes and materials have been selected from the Library's Asian treasures.
The extraordinary manuscript culture of the Indian subcontinent is reflected in graceful miniature paintings, meticulously carved palm-leaves and religious manuscripts from Nepal.

A palm-leaf manuscript from Sri Lanka is held by jewelled book-covers, the items from Thailand, Burma and Indonesia are impressive by their colours, shapes and their exotic illustrations. Of particular charm are a Thai 'Book of Cats', a Burmese leporello displaying the Royal ploughing ceremony and depictions of horoscopes. Among the richly annotated exhibits from Mongolia is found the Secret Autobiography of the 5th Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Book of the Dead. From Tibet itself musical scores and a book cover are on display. Chinese culture is represented by a scroll from Dunhuang, a Daoist leporello, miniature paintings of Arhats and an Imperial document made of silk. From Japan an edition of the *Genji Monogatari* consisting of 54 fascicles kept in a gift box and decorated with varying dark blue and gold-coloured paintings presents one of the highlights of the exhibition.

It is our hope that this exhibition will aptly demonstrate that, 450 years after its foundation, the Bavarian State Library remains actively involved in the preservation of foreign languages and cultures and that its Oriental and Asian holdings are a collection of international standing.

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Notes

1. http://mdz1.bib-bvb.de/~mdz/kurzauswahl.html?url=http://mdz1.bib-bvb.de/~db/ausgaben/uni_ausgabe.html?projekt=1157984516
2. http://www.bsb-muenchen.de/Lesesaal_fuer_Handschriften_un.201.0.html
3. Dachs, Karl (ed.). 1982. *Das Buch im Orient*. Wiesbaden: Reichert
4. Grönbold, Günter. 1985. *Tibetica in der Bayerischen* Staatsbibliothek. München: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek.
5. Dufey, Alfons. 1988. *Kalligraphische japanische Werke der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek*. München: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek.
6. Grönbold, Günter. 1991. *Tibetische Buchdeckel*. München: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek.
7. Höllmann, Thomas (ed.). 1999. *Botschaften an die Götter*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz
8. Grönbold, Günter. 2005. *Die Worte des Buddha in den Sprachen der Welt* (The words of the Buddha in the languages of the world). München: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek. (http://www.bsb-muenchen.de/Archiv_Einzeldarstellung.404+M5cb0fb3d71a.0.html)

The exhibition catalogue is available for purchase from the Bavarian State Library:http://www.bsb-muenchen.de/index.php?id=265

Rebhan, Helga (ed.). 2007. Liebe, Götter und Dämonen: München: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek. ISBN 3 9807702 9 X

Muslim Youth

as agents of change in Indonesia

From 27-29 November 2007, the towns of Batu and Malang in East Java played host to the first international conference of the 'Indonesian Young Leaders Programme', the latest framework of international cooperation between Leiden University and the Indonesian Ministry of Religious affairs. Like its predecessor INIS (Indonesian-Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies), the programme fosters academic collaboration through scholarships for graduate study as well as workshops, seminars, and other scholarly meetings.
(Further information on the programme can be found at: www.indonesianyoungleaders.org). This inaugural conference was sponsored by the main partners in this cooperation, Leiden University and the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs, with the support of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Dutch Embassy in Jakarta, and the Islamic University of Malang (UNISMA), East Java. The opening ceremony was held on the UNISMA campus in Malang, with addresses by Abdul Mukri Prabowo (Rector UNISMA), Nikolaos van Dam (Ambassador of the Netherlands) and Tholhah Hasan (UNISMA). The presentations – in English, Arabic and Indonesian – raised issues of youth leadership and development, with particular reference to challenges faced by young Indonesians in the sphere of education. These questions were later taken up enthusiastically in the discussions that followed. The remainder of the three days of sessions was held at the Klub Bunga Hotel in the nearby town of Batu. The proceedings there began with a plenary address by Dick Douwes (Erasmus University), who presented a paper on the modern history of Muslim youth in the Middle East. This served to open up comparative perspectives on the main topic of the conference that were discussed further in later sessions with contributions by Muslim participants from neighbouring ASEAN countries, as well as from Africa and South Asia. The views of these scholars, a number of whom were in Indonesia for the first time, helped to highlight salient points of both comparison and contrast between developments there and other trends in the broader Muslim world.
The panels covered a wide range of topics vital to the experience and understanding of Islam by Indonesian youth, including: leadership, education, student and Islamic youth organisations, *da'wa* strategies, contemporary Islamic literature, art and popular culture, fundamentalist discourses, radicalisation, Islamic economics, gender and peace building. While the discussion of these issues was centred on Indonesia, the conversations were by no means provincial thanks to the high degree of academic rigour and critical perspective brought to the table by both the majority Indonesian participants, as well as by colleagues from Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Australia, the United States and Kenya.
However, one prominent invited international speaker was not able to participate in the discussions. Nasr Abu-Zayd (Leiden University), who had been scheduled to give the keynote speech for the conference, withdrew from the programme following pressure from the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs. Despite the Ministry being an official co-organiser of the conference, upon arriving in Indonesia, Abu-Zayd was informed that he should not speak at the conference, as the Ministry was concerned about vocal opposition to his participation that had been expressed by the local branch of the Indonesian Council of Ulama (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*/ MUI) in the Sumatran province of Riau. This regrettable incident highlighted the continuing emergence of increasingly sharp divisions between various parties in contesting public discourses on Islam in contemporary Indonesia. While the Abu-Zayd affair served as a stark reminder of the challenges faced by the next generation of Indonesian leaders, the actual discussions of the conference in Batu itself took place in an open-minded academic atmosphere, allowing for a critical and constructive exchange of ideas between participants of diverse backgrounds. With this, the Young Leaders' Programme is off to a good start with its project to support and promote the academic work of up-and-coming Indonesian scholars.

R. Michael Feener
National University of Singapore

Ian Buruma wins Erasmus Prize 2008

The Praemium Erasmianum Foundation (Amsterdam) has awarded the Erasmus Prize 2008 to the Dutch/British journalist, author and political commentator Ian Buruma. Since 1958 this distinction is awarded annually to a person who, within the cultural traditions of Europe, has made an especially important contribution to culture, society or social science in Europe. Previous laureates include Charlie Chaplin (1965), Henry Moore (1968), Claude Lévi-Strauss (1973), Václav Havel (1986), Bernard Haitink (1991), Jacques Delors (1997), Hans van Manen (2000) and Alan Davidson (2003). The prize money is a sum of € 150.000. In 2008 the Praemium Erasmianum Foundation celebrates it 50th anniversary with a broad range of activities around the theme of 'the New Cosmopolitan'. The award ceremony will take place on 7 November.

Ian Buruma typifies a new cosmopolitan. After studying Chinese in Leiden and Japanese film in Tokyo, he became cultural editor of *The Far Eastern Economic Review* and foreign editor of *The Spectator*; since 2003 he is Henry R. Luce Professor of Democracy, Human Rights and Journalism at Bard College, New York. He was chairman of the Humanities Centre of the Central European University in Budapest, fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin and the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington. He is member of the scientific advisory council of the Einstein Forum in Potsdam and member of the board of Human Rights in China in New York. Ian Buruma has written about Japan, China, Asia and their often problematic relationships with the West. He is one of the leading international essayists on East-West relations. Ian Buruma is a regular contributor to the *New York Review of Books*. In 2004 he received a honorary doctorate from the University of Groningen. In 2008 Buruma is holding the Cleveringa-chair at the University of Leiden and will be professorial fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) in Leiden.

'The New Cosmopolitan' is a citizen of a new world, in which boundaries of all sorts are easily transcended; where people of diverse cultures work together readily and economic and cultural exchange is intrinsic. The new world citizen likes to picture a world without hindrances, but is forced to confront societal realities, where identity is frequently defined by traditional differences such as nationality, culture, religion or ethnic origins. With this thematic the Praemium Erasmianum Foundation raises the issue of the tension that exists between a cosmopolitan attitude and the responsibility for one's own social environment.

Erasmus

Established in 1958 by His Royal Highness Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, the Erasmus Prize derives its name and inspiration from the Dutch humanist scholar, Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536). Renowned theologian and teacher, Erasmus was a true world citizen; his view of life was universal: knowledge must prevail over ignorance, order over chaos and humaneness is of greater value than any dogma. Erasmus defended the integrity of the intellect and pleaded for moderation and tolerance. Praise of Folly is one of his best known works.

Further information at www.erasmusprijs.org and www.ianburuma.com.

'All Things Asia'

The inaugural IIAS Fellow Symposium day took place on 29 November, 2007 at Leiden University. This unique event was an opportunity to showcase the wide-ranging research carried out by our fellows in the field of Asian Studies. The IIAS Fellow Symposium is designed to give academics, the press and all those interested in 'all things Asia' the chance to get to know our researchers and join in lively discussions about diverse subjects, from marriage migrants in Taiwan to the transformation of political elites in Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia. Highlights of the day included Dr Sekhar Bandyopadhay's engaging presentation entitled: Decolonisation and its anxieties: Politics of transition in West Bengal, 1947-52 and Dr Hiroko Sakamoto's journey into the world of The Shanghai Modern Girls as represented in the cartoon magazines of the Republic of China. Special mention should also be made of Dr Allessandro Graheli's ability to engage a lay audience in the Sanskrit secrets of the theology and aesthetics of Gaudiya Vaisnavism.
The day also hosted two book launches, Dr Alex McKay's new work about the introduction of Western medicine in Bhutan and Tibet - *'Their Footprints Remain: Biomedical Beginnings across the Indo-Tibetan Frontier*; and *'Global Indian Diasporas: Exploring Trajectories of Migration and Theory'* edited by Dr Gijsbert Oonk, a critical reflection on the concept 'Diaspora' in general and the Indian Diaspora in particular. Both books are from the ICAS book series published by Amsterdam University Press.

The next IIAS Fellow Symposium takes place on 28th May, 2008, in Leiden
For further details email s.jans@let.leidenuniv.nl

Contemporary urban culture

Comparative perspectives via Taiwan

The 5th annual London-Taiwan conference brought together a range of scholars from the UK and Taiwan to discuss aspects of contemporary urban life in Taiwan. Held at the LSE under the auspices of the Taiwan Cultural Research Programme which advocates the comparative study of Taiwan, the six conference papers and the lively discussions which followed explored a range of issues including urbanisation and memory, alienation, architecture and representation, hybridised urban spaces, urban sub-cultures and gender and feminism.
Paul-François Tremlett's (SOAS, UK) 'Death-scapes in Taipei and Manila: A Postmodern Necrography' juxtaposed recent shifts in practices of disposal in Taiwan and Manila, arguing that such shifts reflect changing patterns of residence, fraternity and belonging in both places. Tremlett's de-emphasis of local culture and privileging of state and economic processes was contentious and provoked some interesting exchanges. Stuart Thompson's (SOAS, UK) 'Simmelacrum(b)s: Depictions of the Metropolis in Taiwan Cinema' addressed the representation of Taipei in the films of Tsai Ming-liang via a series of puns on simulation (a reference to Baudrillard and Simmel). Baudrillard's longing for unequivocal representation and Simmel's search for authentic sociality in the city – when juxtaposed with Tsai's crumbling urban scapes – suggests a narrative of loss associated with the disappearance of local, village cultures and their replacement by anonymous and alienating conurbations. Tremlett's paper also hooked into this problematic narrative.
Doreen's Bernath's (Architectural Association, UK) 'The Intrusive Rendering: The Dictation of Stereotypes and the Extra-Ordinaries' focused on the architectural practice of 'rendering', addressing problems of reality and representation, aesthetics and the technical plan and the relationship of buildings to spaces (places). Bernath introduced the vector of the global to the discussion, and much of the subsequent discussion focused on the centrality of new technologies not merely to architecture but also to philosophical questions and problems. Nicole Lai's (Westminster, UK) paper 'Art in a Hybridised Urban Space: Contemporary Taiwanese Art in an Eslite Bookstore' focused on the 'democratisation' of art and culture in Taipei, in particular the shift in the display of contemporary art outside the sacred, hallowed spaces of the museum and gallery to bookshops and cafés or hybridised spaces and the relation of this phenomena to new practices of consumption and the commercialisation of culture. Shang-Min Chien's (Courtauld Institute) 'Art and Internet 2.0 in East Asian Culture' looked at Taiwan in relation to Japan and the US, in particular vis-à-vis the explosion in new communication technologies and the role played by such technologies in mediating the articulation of centre(s) to periphery(ies) and processes of localisation. Shu-Ching Lee's (Cambridge, UK) ambitious paper 'Time-Space, State-Society, Yin-Yang: The Embedding of Gender in Education' interpreted the women's movement and feminism and the gendering of education in Taiwan in terms of the traditional cosmological principles, yin and yang. This provoked some controversy and questions as to how or whether yin and yang – concepts associated by some with the marginalisation of women in Chinese culture – could then be used to theorise feminism in Taiwan.
The conference was rounded off by Mark Harrison (Westminster, UK), whose salient remarks pulled together the themes, issues and trajectories that the various papers had addressed. Harrison then asked whether the study of Taiwan could have its own methodology, and whether the study of Taiwan was marked by a distinct problematic in comparison to China or Japanese studies. A useful and reflexive discussion ensued during which a number of suggestions were aired, from the need for more detailed, empirical studies, to the need to clarify the term 'culture'. As with the previous London-Taiwan annual conferences, thoughtful and stimulating papers were enjoyed and discussed in a lively atmosphere.

Paul-F. Tremlett (SOAS), Richard Bartholomew (SOAS)

Call for Abstracts

The Twelfth

INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON MALAY/INDONESIAN LINGUISTICS

26-27 June 2008

Leiden, The Netherlands

ISMIL is an annual event the goal of which is the advancement of scholarship in Malay/Indonesian Linguistics, through the bringing together of linguists from Malay and Indonesian speaking countries and their colleagues in other parts of the world.

Papers presented at ISMIL are concerned with the Malay/Indonesian language in any of its varieties. In addition to the standardised versions of Bahasa Melayu and Bahasa Indonesia, papers are particularly welcome dealing with non-canonical isolects such as regional dialects of Malay and Indonesian, contact varieties, and other closely related Malayic languages. Papers may be in any of the subfields of linguistics, and may represent variegated approaches and diverse theoretical persuasions. Presentations at ISMIL are delivered in English.

Persons wishing to present a paper at the symposium are invited to submit a one-page abstract in electronic form (preferably pdf, but MsWord also acceptable) to David Gil at the following address: **gil@eva.mpg.de**

Deadline for submission of abstracts

15 March 2008

For further information

http://email.eva.mpg.de/~gil/ismil/

Registration fee

Participants: € 50
Students (including PhD): € 30

Organising committee:

Marian Klamer, Leiden University
Peter Cole, University of Delaware
David Gil, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology
Uri Tadmor, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology
Martina van den Haak, International Institute for Asian Studies

ISMIL 12 will immediately be followed by
The International Workshop on Minority Languages in the Malay/Indonesian Speaking World.
Leiden, 28 June 2008
For further information:
http://email.eva.mpg.de/~gil/minlang/

A royal charter of 1824 states the purpose of the RAS as 'the investigation of subjects connected with, and the encouragement of science, literature and the arts in relation to Asia'. Ever since, the society's mission has been to foster scholarship and dispel ignorance of Asia by encouraging and disseminating research. Over the years membership has increased, library, collections and publications have expanded and, more recently, its London premises have changed. The society's President updates us on recent happenings and affirms the renewed RAS vision for the the 21st century.

The Relaunch of the Royal Asiatic Society

Professor A J Stockwell

IIAS readers will be interested to hear of major changes which have recently taken place at the Royal Asiatic Society. In 2006 the Society was relaunched in its new home at 14 Stephenson Way, London. These premises are ideally located; a short walk from the British Library and the School of Oriental and African Studies. Euston Station and the Eurostar terminal at St Pancras. The building has been refitted to meet the Society's needs; for example, the library and collections are housed in conditions that match highest archival standards and the lecture theatre is equipped with state-of-the-art audio-visual systems.

These changes have been made to enable the Society to pursue its historic purpose in the circumstances of the 21st century. Over the years, the Society has developed links with kindred learned societies in Britain and founded branches in Asia, (though the latter have long-since established their autonomy). For example, the origins of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs, whose interests focus upon contemporary Asia, can be traced to the RAS as can the creation of London University's School of Oriental and African Studies, which was inaugurated as the School of Oriental Studies in 1917 after thirty years of intermittent discussions and planning in which the RAS played the leading role. Following the growth of Asian studies in university departments since the Second World War, the RAS has come to complement institutions of higher education. Thus, it fosters learning, independent of the vagaries of government funding, and it provides a forum in which professional scholars from universities, museums and libraries join those with a general interest in Asia. From its new base at Stephenson Way the Society is now in a strong position to reach out to a wider public.
Four features of the Society will particularly interest readers of *IIAS Newsletter*: its library and collections, its programme of events, its publications, and its meeting rooms.

Library and collections

The Society's Library provides first-class and in some cases unparalleled secondary material on Asia. Understandably, the Society has not been able to keep pace with the expansion of publications during the last half-century, and acquisitions have been concentrated on areas for which we already have unique material. We have therefore attempted to complement rather than duplicate other major collections and libraries in the London area.

The collections include manuscripts in Arabic, Malay, Javanese, Sanskrit, Pali, Burmese, Sinhalese, Thai, Chinese, Japanese, Tibetan, Mongolian, and European languages. In addition, there are prints, drawings and photographs. The Persian, Arabic and Turkish holdings are particularly prized and the Society's most treasured possession is the *Shahnameh* of Muhammad Juki (or *Juki Shahnameh*), an illuminated, Persian manuscript which was once held in the imperial library of the Mughal dynasty in Delhi and which was presented to the RAS in 1834.

The Society has made progress in recent years with the cataloguing and conservation of its collections, notably Raymond Head's *Catalogue of Paintings and Drawings in the Royal Asiatic Society* (1991) and the commencement of a catalogue of some 5,000 early photographs of India, China and Japan. We are currently working on the cataloguing and conservation of other collections, such as: the unique collection of Malay and Javanese manuscripts of Sir Stamford Raffles; the manuscripts, paintings and scrolls relating to Rajasthan collected by Sir James Tod, first librarian of the Society; the collection of Tibetan manuscripts, many presented by Brian Houghton Hodgson, the father of Himalayan Studies; the many collections of the private papers of eminent orientalists. We aim to raise funds to enable the completion of these projects and the digitisation of the catalogue in order to increase public access to our resources. Those wishing to use the Library should make an appointment with the Librarian, Kathy Lazenbatt kl@royalasiaticsociety.org.

Programme of events

In 2006-07 events at the Society doubled in size and frequency. A new Student Series has been added to the regular programme of monthly lectures offering a varied menu of musical performance and Asian films as well as illustrated talks and research reports. The Student Series provides a forum for those who have recently completed, or who are about to complete, their theses, but it is open to all Fellows. In May 2007 we held a two-day seminar, entitled 'Britain and the Malay World', to mark the 50th anniversary of Malaysian independence. Sponsored by the Association of SE Asian Studies in the UK, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and the journal *Southeast Asia Research*, the seminar examined the impact of Britain and the colonial experience on the Malay world with reference to literature, cinema, history and the humanities generally. The success of the event owed a good deal to the participation of a strong contingent of scholars from South East Asia. The Society is planning to publish selected papers from the seminar's proceedings. In July a one-day international workshop of scholars at the Society considered the significance of the rising of 1857 in South Asian history. It was part of Edinburgh University's AHRC-funded two-year project on 'Mutiny at the Margins' and the day ended with a very well-received public lecture given by Professor Mushirul Hasan, Vice-chancellor of Jamia Milia University, on '1857: The Other Face of the "War of Independence".
A key element of the Society's events is the vital collegiality, or fellowship, which they engender, and the informal receptions which are held after each occasion play an important part in fostering this spirit.

Publications: Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society

Since its foundation the Society has been at the heart of Oriental scholarship in Britain. In 1829 it began to publish key works of Asian literature. Since 1834 the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* has been publishing articles of the highest quality on South Asia, the Middle East (together with North Africa and Ethiopia), Central Asia, East Asia and South East Asia. JRAS is peer-reviewed and published in conjunction with Cambridge University Press. It appears four times a year and is also available online. Submissions of articles based on original and previously unpublished research should be sent in both hard and soft form to the Executive Editor, Charlotte de Blois, The Royal Asiatic Society, 14 Stephenson Way, London NW1 2HD, cdb@royalasiaticsociety.org.
Readers may be interested in details of three JRAS awards. Winning articles are published in the *Journal* as are short-listed entries. Authors of the winning papers also receive a cash prize.

*** The Barwis-Holliday Award**
This award is made for an article based on original research on any of the following subjects; anthropology, art, history, literature or religion of any part of East Asia. (East Asia is defined as being Japan, China, Korea and the easternmost regions of the former Soviet Union).

*** The Professor Mary Boyce Prize**
This prize, inaugurated as part of the Society's relaunch, is awarded for an article based on research that makes an innovative contribution to understanding and learning within the field of religion in Asia.

*** The Sir George Staunton Prize**
This prize was also established as part of the Society's relaunch. It is awarded for an article by a young scholar (i.e. someone who is either in the process of completing a doctorate or who has been awarded a doctorate within the previous five years) working on the history, archaeology, literature, language, religion, archaeology, or art of any part of Asia.

Publications: monographs
The Royal Asiatic Society has a flourishing publications programme in conjunction with its publishing partner, Routledge. In 2006-07 the following titles appeared in the Society's monograph series: *The Theory of Citrasutras in Indian Painting: A critical evaluation of their uses and interpretations* by Isabel Nardi; *The Politics of Self-Expression: The Urdu Middleclass Milieu in Mid-Twentieth Century India and Pakistan* by Markus Daechsel; *Tribal Politics in Iran: Rural Conflict and the New State, 1921-1941* by Stephanie Cronin; *Muslim Women, Reform and Princely Patronage* by Siobhan Lambert-Hurley; and *Hindi Poetry in a Musical Genre: Thumri Lyrics* by Lalita du Perron. Book proposals based on original research should be sent to the Society's Publications Consultant, Anna Lethbridge al@royalasiaticsociety.org.

Meeting rooms for hire
RAS facilities, located within easy reach of Euston station, offer a unique setting for events of all kinds. The Society has various rooms for hire for meetings, lectures and receptions. Further information is available from the Curator, Alison Ohta, ao@royalasiaticsociety.org.

Prof. A.J. Stockwell is the President of the Royal Asiatic Society

Call for Panels and Papers



ICAS 6

Think Asia!

Daejeon, Korea 6-9 August 2009

ICAS 6 will be hosted by the Chungnam National University (CNU), the Center for Asian Regional Studies (CARS) and Daejeon Metropolitan City and will be held in the Daejeon Conventon and Visitor's Bureau. The overarching theme is: Think Asia! More than 1,500 Asia Studies specialists are expected to come to Daejeon. This city is located in the heart of the Korean peninsula and successfully merges its long history of culture and tradition with leading research in science and technology.

Deadlines are:

- 15 October 2008: Submission of Individual Abstracts
- 15 October 2008: Submission of Organized Panels: organized by a group of different (national) backgrounds.
- 15 November 2008: Submission of Institutional Panels: constituted and sponsored by an institution, an association or a network.

Submission of abstracts and panels is possible as of 15 March 2008 at the ICAS website.

Please note that all abstracts and presentations should be in English. Submission of abstracts for panels and papers can be made through ICAS 6 registration forms available at http://www.icassecretariat.org

ICAS Book Prizes

For the third time the ICAS Book Prizes will be awarded in the categories: Humanities, Social Sciences, Best PhD and Colleagues' Choice Award.

Deadline: 31 August 2008

ICAS Publications Series

A selection of the ICAS 6 papers will be included in edited volumes of the ICAS Publications Series at Amsterdam University Press.

Financial support

Financial support for travel and lodging will be made available to a selected number of PhD students and young academics.

Information

The International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS) is one of the largest biennial gatherings for Asia scholars to meet and discuss new developments in the fields of the Human and Natural Sciences. Since 1998, ICAS has brought more than 5,000 academics from 60 countries together at five conventions.

For more information on ICAS 6 and requirements for participation, please visit **http://www.icassecretariat.org**

IIAS research

Programmes

NEW: Asia Design
This programme will consist of a number of individual projects related to graphic design - from classical graphics in art and communication to the rapidly emerging fields of cyberculture (New Media, videogames, etc.) and animanga (anime and manga) in East Asia - and architectural design in Asian megacities. The projects address both the physical and social aspects of design.

Institutes involved: IIAS, Modern East Asia Research Centre (MEARC)
Sponsored by: IIAS and Asiascape

Coordinators: Prof. Chris Goto-Jones and Dr Manon Osseweijer
c.goto-jones@let.leidenuniv.nl
m.osseweijer@let.leidenuniv.nl

Catalogue of Sanksrit manuscripts
In 1929, two crates of 17th and 18th century Sanskrit manuscripts arrived at the Kern Institute, University of Leiden. This Gonda/IIAS project is preparing a scientific catalogue of the roughly 500 South Indian Sanskrit manuscripts written on palm leaves in ancient Indian scripts such as Grantha, Telugu, Malayalam, Nagari and Nandinagari.

Coordinator: Saraju Rath
s.rath@let.leidenuniv.nl

Cross-border marriages in East and Southeast Asia
The past decade has seen a rapid increase in the intra-Asia flow of brides, particularly between Southeast and East Asia. While in Europe intermediated marriages continue to be seen as a form of the commodification of women, recent scholarship in intra-Asia cross-border marriages challenges this dominant view.

Coordinator: Melody Lu
m.lu@let.leidenuniv.nl

Energy programme in Asia - EPA
Established in September 2007, this programme addresses the domestic and geopolitical aspects of energy security for China and the European Union.
The geopolitical aspects involve analysing the effects of competition for access to oil and gas resources and the security of energy supply among the main global consumer countries of the EU and China. The domestic aspects involve analysing domestic energy demand and supply, energy efficiency policies, and the deployment of renewable energy resources. Within this programme scholars from the Netherlands and China will visit each other's institutes and will jointly publish their research outcomes.

Institutes involved: Institute of West Asian and African Studies (IWAAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
Sponsored by: KNAW China Exchange Programme and IIAS

Coordinator: Dr Mehdi Parvizi Amineh
m.p.amineh@uva.nl

Illegal but licit: transnational flows and permissive polities in Asia - IBL
This research programme analyses forms of globalisation-from-below, transnational practices considered acceptable (licit) by participants but which are often illegal in a formal sense. It explores limitations of 'seeing like a state', and instead privileges the perspectives of participants in these illegal but licit transnational flows.
Sponsored by: NWO and ASiA

Coordinator: Willem van Schendel
h.w.vanschendel@uva.nl

Socio-genetic marginalisation in Asia - SMAP
The development and application of new biomedical and genetic technologies have important socio-political implications. This NOW/ASSR/IIAS research programme aims to gain insight into the ways in which the use of and monopoly over genetic information shape and influence population policies, environmental ethics and biomedical and agricultural practices in various Asian religious and secular cultures and across national boundaries.
Sponsored by: NWO, IIAS, ASSR

Coordinator: Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner
m.sleeboom-faulkner@sussex.ac.uk

Syntax of the languages of southern China
This programme aims to achieve a detailed description and in-depth analysis of a limited number of syntactic phenomena in six languages, both Sinitic and non-Sinitic, spoken in the area south of the Yangtze River. The project will systematically compare these descriptions and analyses to contribute to the development of the theory of language and human language capacity.

Coordinator: Rint Sybesma
r.p.e.sybesma@let.leidenuniv.nl

Trans-Himalayan database development: China and the subcontinent
The project's main goal is to combine the database of cognate words in Tibeto-Burman languages, maintained by the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) with language data of the Himalayan Languages Project (Leiden University) to create a joint, online database of Tibeto-Burman languages with a mirror-site in Leiden. The project's second objective is to continue documentation of endangered Tibeto-Burman languages in China in cooperation with the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology.

Coordinator: Prof. George van Driem
g.l.van.driem@let.leidenuniv.nl
Institute involved: Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, CASS, Beijing, China
Sponsored by: KNAW China Exchange Programme and IIAS

Networks

NEW: Ageing in Asia and Europe
During the 21st century it is projected that there will be more than one billion people aged 60 and over, with this figure climbing to nearly two billion by 2050, three-quarters of whom will live in the developing world. The bulk of the ageing population will reside in Asia. Ageing in Asia is attributable to the marked decline in fertility shown over the last 40 years and the steady increase in life-expectancy. In Western Europe, ageing populations developed at a slower pace and could initially be incorporated into welfare policy provisions. Currently governments are seeking ways to trim and reduce government financed social welfare and health-care, including pensions systems, unleashing substantial public debate and insecurity. Many Asian governments are facing comparable challenges and dilemmas, involving both the state and the family, but are confronted with a much shorter time-span. This research programme, in short, sheds light on how both Asian and European nations are reviewing the social contract with their citizens.

Research network involved: **Réseau de Recherche Internationale sur l'Age, la Citoyenneté et l'Intégration Socio-économique (REIACTIS)**
Sponsored by: IIAS

Coordinator: Prof. Carla Risseeuw
c.risseeuw@let.leidenuniv.nl

ABIA South and Southeast Asian art and archaeology index
The Annual Bibliography of Indina Archaeology is an annotated bibliographic database for publications covering South and Southeast Asian art and archaeology. The project was launched by IIAS in 1997 and is currently coordinated by the Postgraduate Institute of Archaeology of the University of Kelaniya, Colombo, Sri Lanka. The database is freely accessible at www.abia.net. Extracts from the database are also available as bibliographies, published in a series by Brill. The project receives scientific support from UNESCO.

Coordinators: Ellen Raven and Gerda Theuns-de Boer
e.m.raven@let.leidenuniv.nl
www.abia.net

Islam in Indonesia: the dissemination of religious authority in the 20th and early 21st centuries
Forms and transformations of religious authority among the Indonesian Muslim community are the focus of this research programme. The term authority relates to persons and books as well as various other forms of written and non-written references. Special attention is paid to the production, reproduction and dissemination of religious authority in the fields of four sub-programmes: ulama (religious scholars) and fatwas; tarekat (mystical orders); dakwah (propogation of the faith); and education.

Coordinator: Nico Kaptein
n.j.g.kaptein@let.leidenuniv.nl

Announcements

20th Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia November 14-17, 2008 JNU, New Delhi, India

First Announcement

The first Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia (IAHA) was held at Manila in 1960 and since then it has been held regularly every two years in different capitals/cities in Asia. Over the years IAHA has grown in membership, encouraged new themes and brought together scholars working on Asia from different parts of the world. The first conference had set three main objectives:
1.To afford scholars in different countries an opportunity to come together for an exchange of views, ideas, and information regarding what was being done in their respective countries toward the extension, improvement, and refinement of historical knowledge relative to the national and regional needs of Asian peoples.
2.To find ways and means of solving common problems in research for fruitful information with a view to discard myths, fables, and stereotyped claims appearing in the guise of facts in history books.
3.To consider the possibility of organising an association of historians living in this part of the world, having as its main objective the enhancement of the usefulness of written history as an instrument for the promotion of world peace, goodwill, and understanding.
Through the years, the IAHA has proven to be at the cutting edge of historical scholarship in Asia. Recent conferences have included papers focused on such timely and relevant topics as migration, technology, globalisation, inter-religious dialogue, and new historical paradigms. Participants have ranged from established experts in their fields to up and coming young scholars; historians as well as scholars from other disciplines. The aspirations and ideals of the founding fathers of the first IAHA have thus borne fruit in this dynamic and learned gathering of historians and scholars of Asia. The 20th IAHA conference scheduled for November 2008 at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, will continue the tradition of erudition and break new ground in the study of Asian culture and history.

10th March 2008: Submission of abstracts with registration form
10th May 2008: Acceptance notification
30th August 2008: Last date for sending registration fee
30th Sept. 2008: Submission of full papers

Please direct all correspondences and abstracts to:
Professor Deepak Kumar
Convenor, 20th IAHA,
Zakir Husain Centre for Educational Studies,
School of Social Sciences,
Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi-110067.
Fax : 91-11-2670 4192
Tel.: 91-11-26704416/ 26704535/ 26704459
iaha2008jnu@yahoo.co.in

For more information: www.jnu.ac.in/conference/IAHA

24th ASEASUK Conference Liverpool John Moores University 21-22 June 2008

If you are interested in convening a panel or presenting a paper please contact Dr Ben Murtagh at bm10@soas.ac.uk for the former and panel convenors for the latter. Below is a list of proposed panels.

Convenor: Prof Terry King (V.T.King@leeds.ac.uk)
The middle class in Southeast Asia: consumption, lifestyles and identities
With the rapid economic development and modernisation in Southeast Asia, transformations in occupational structures and the increasing access to education and training, the new middle class is appearing ever more frequently on social science research agendas. The comparative research coordinated by Michael Hsiao on 'the middle classes' in East and Southeast Asia has provided us with a range of useful issues for investigation, including boundaries; social characteristics; lifestyles and identities; and political views and activities. An interesting dimension is that significant elements of the middle class are of relatively recent origin and from modest backgrounds. How do they express their middle classness? What are the worldviews, identities and lifestyles of young middle class people and the second-generation middle class? Can we talk of 'a' middle class or 'multiple middle classes'? Are there differences between the middle class in different Southeast Asian countries, particularly with the emergence of consumerism and the influence of the market and globalization in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos?

The focus of the panel is on consumption practices, lifestyles and identities and also seeks to develop certain of the themes raised by Richard Robison and David Goodman in their work on 'the new rich' and Joel Kahn's work on culturalisation and Southeast Asian identities.

Convenor: Dr Annabel Gallop (Annabel.Gallop@bl.uk)
Indonesian/Malay manuscript studies
Papers are welcomed on all aspects of the study of the writing traditions of maritime Southeast Asia. Of particular interest would be contributions on manuscript illumination and the art of book; documents and chancery practice in the courts of the archipelago; Islamic manuscripts from the southern Philippines and the majority-Buddhist states of mainland Southeast Asia; and previously undescribed manuscript collections.

Convenors: Dr Matthew Isaac Cohen and Dr Laura Noszlopy (Matthew.Cohen@rhul.ac.uk)
Southeast Asian arts in transnational perspective
Studies of the performing arts and visual cultures of Southeast Asia have until recently emphasised local origins and significance over international links and cross-cultural flows. This academic focus is at odds with the region's long history of intercultural exchange, and the interest of many Southeast Asian arts workers in situating their practice in relation to extra-local configurations. This panel examines the arts of Southeast Asia and their dynamics of movement and exchange across national boundaries, with an emphasis on the period of WWII to the present. Possible topics include: cultural diplomacy, intercultural collaboration, local artistic practice in relation to the global arts market, performance and art for tourism, diasporic arts, the international circulation of mediated performance (via the internet, VCD etc), ASEAN art projects and teaching Southeast Asian arts outside the region.

Convenor: Dr Gerard Clarke (G.Clarke@swansea.ac.uk)
Civil society in Southeast Asia: new themes
Civil society has been a significant locus of concern in the field of South-East Asian Studies for almost two decades now and this panel will consider recent research which makes a theoretical or empirical contribution to this evolving literature. The panel organiser welcomes papers that look at civil society from one or more of the following perspectives, loosely interpreted:
Macro: the changing nature of civil society across the South-East Asian region and the political, economic and social consequences that arise, for instance in the context of globalisation, economic integration, or political mobilization;
Meso: the (changing) nature or structure of civil society in individual South-East Asian nations, including the political, economic or social drivers behind any reported change;
Micro: the activities of individual civil society organisations (CSOs) or groups of CSOs and their political, economic or social implications.

Convenor: Dr James Warren (jameswarren23@googlemail.com)
Sinful pleasures: attitudes towards and depictions of vices in Southeast Asia

Humans have long indulged in activities and substances that while stimulating and pleasurable also have detrimental effects upon the participant or user, especially if done to excess. These activities and substances include commonplace habits such as gambling, smoking, and drinking alcohol; they are often addictive and in the West are collectively grouped together as 'vices'. Most religions have injunctions against some or all of these forms of behaviour. Their dichotomous nature means secular attitudes towards these vices are diverse and often contradictory; ranging from tolerance, and sometimes even encouragement, to condemnation and criminalisation. In turn, these differing responses are conditioned by political, economic and cultural factors that change over time. Crucially, because of the potential for contradictory attitudes, vices frequently become areas of contestation between, for example, the state and its citizens or the colonisers and the colonised. Studies of attitudes and policies towards vices can thus reveal much about the society or culture in which they occur. South East Asia is no different in this regard but to date this topic remains a little explored area. This panel seeks papers dealing with any aspect, past or present, of attitudes to and portrayals of vices in Southeast Asia.

Dr Ben Murtagh (bm10@soas.ac.uk)
Emerging scholars panel
This panel presents a space for doctoral students working on any subject relating to South East Asia to present their research. It is an opportunity to try out new presentation techniques, to gain experience in presenting papers and also to meet colleagues working across the UK and beyond. All this is in a positive and supportive environment.
Dr Nick White (N.J.White@ljmu.ac.uk)
Liverpool and Southeast Asia
2008 is Liverpool's year as European Capital of Culture, and the city's council has proudly identified Liverpool as the 'World in One City'. In both popular and academic discourse that 'World' is usually assumed to mean the 'Atlantic' given Liverpool's dominant role in the 18th-century slave trade, and its 19th-century centrality in European emigration to North America. This panel is not seeking to polemically downgrade 'Atlanticism' in Liverpool's modern and contemporary history. But the papers presented here do hope to emphasise another Scouse past and present, one which is intimately tied up with Asian trade, shipping and migration. In this context, it is apposite that ASEASUK's 2008 conference is taking place in Liverpool. Liberated from both the Atlantic slave trade and the East India Company's monopolies on trade to 'The East', Liverpool merchants had a central impact in the 'opening up' and European colonisation of Southeast Asia from the early-nineteenth century. Here was a 'provincial' significance which challenges Cain and Hopkins's focus on the City of London in the expansion of British imperial interests. Admittedly, the grand Liverpool-Asia trading concerns shifted their centre of operations to London as the 19th century progressed. Nevertheless, Liverpool could still boast the headquarters of the leading British shipping companies to Southeast Asia as late as 1980. Southeast Asian imports – rubber particularly – have had a profound influence on Merseyside's economic life until very recently. Moreover, significant, if not marginalised and forgotten, Southeast Asian communities remain in Liverpool to the present day.

Buddhist Himalaya: Studies in Religion, History and Culture

Conference
October 1-5, 2008.
The Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, Gangtok, Sikkim

The Namgyal Institute of Tibetology in Gangtok, Sikkim, will celebrate its Golden Jubilee in 2008. Since its inauguration by His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet in 1957 and official opening by the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1958, the Institute has been India's leading centre for the study of Tibetan and Himalayan Buddhist culture. As the centrepiece of the Jubilee celebrations, the NIT will host an international conference in Gangtok from 1-5 October 2008 on the theme of 'Buddhist Himalaya: Studies in Religion, History and Culture'. The conference will be officially opened by a relevant dignitary and include a programme of cultural events. It will coincide with the presentation of an Atisha relic to the NIT's museum, as well as the release of new publications by the Institute. The conference will also suitably inaugurate the Institute's new library and conference facilities wing, which is scheduled for completion early in 2008.

The conference will bring together around 60 leading scholars, educators, dignitaries and interested persons in the field of Himalayan Buddhist studies (particularly as they relate to Sikkim). While the majority will come from various parts of the India and the Himalayan states, there will also be a number of distinguished scholars attending from Europe, Japan and the United States. Participation will be by invitation only, and there will be no call for papers, although observers are welcome to attend under their own auspices.

The language of the conference will be English, which is widely spoken in Sikkim, however there will be one panel for local scholars which will be held in Sikkimese/Tibetan. The academic programme has yet to be finalised but it is expected that a maximum of 30 papers will be presented by local and foreign participants during the course of the conference under such panel headings as 'Himalayan Buddhism', 'Himalayan History', and 'Buddhism and Environment'.

The conference proceedings will subsequently be published under the editorship of the conference convenor, Dr Alex McKay, a historian of the Himalayas and affiliated fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies in Leiden.

Enquiries to Gangtok2008@gmail.com

Further details on the NIT may be obtained via its website, www.tibetology.net, or by email from info@tibetology.net.

Central Eurasian Studies Society Regional Conference

August 4-7, 2008
Choq Tal Village, Issyk-Kul, Kyrgyzstan

The Central Eurasian Studies Society (CESS) announces that its first regional conference will be held in the summer of 2008 in Kyrgyzstan. Conference registration is open to the public. The programme will feature approximately 16 panels in sessions running from Tuesday morning till Thursday noon. There will also be a supplementary programme including films and other cultural events, a welcoming reception on Monday, August 4 and a conference conclusion and lunch on Thursday, August 7.

The working languages of the conference are Russian and English. Translation will be provided for a key lecture and closing speech.

For more information on the conference, see CESS's website: www.cess.muohio.edu/regional_conf_08.html.
Due to space limitations, we may have to close registration when capacity is reached, and thus, non-presenting attendees are urged to pre-register to ensure that their place is reserved.

Virtually all informational questions about the conference can be answered by consulting the above-mentioned web pages. If necessary you can contact the conference organisers by e-mail at: frc _cess@gmail.com

Communications regarding local arrangements, including invitation letters, should be addressed to:

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Transitions, Development and Social Transformations

Conference on contemporary Mongolia
November 15-17, 2008

Vancouver, Canada
Since the 1990 political revolution, Mongolia has emerged as one of the most stable democracies in the post-Soviet world. Exploration of mineral resources seems to offer the promise of economic development. Mongolia has forged new international alliances with "third neighbours". At the same time, development remains hampered by corruption, a lack of infrastructure, and the turbulences associated with transition to a market-economy. Politically and economically, Mongolia continues to feel threatened by China. Some of the achievements of social development under state socialism are eroding with declining funding levels for education, rapid urbanisation and increasing social inequalities.
In the year of the 35th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Canada and Mongolia, a major conference will be organised, co-hosted by the Peter Wall Institute for Advanced Studies, UBC and under the auspices of the Program on Inner Asia at the Institute of Asian Research of the University of British Columbia. The conference will take stock of the current social-scientific research on contemporary Mongolia and offer opportunities for an exchange between academics, policy-makers and business people with an interest in Mongolia. The academic presentations will be collected in an edited volume representing the state of the field of research on contemporary Mongolia.
Spread over two days, academic discussions will focus on developments in Mongolia in the areas of research on agricultural economics/pastoralism, education, health, transition studies, religion, eco-systems, mining and economic development, and politics and international relations. The third day of the conference will be devoted to roundtable-discussions of an outlook for contemporary Mongolia. Participants will include the most prominent researchers on contemporary Mongolia, as well as government representatives, policy-makers and interested business people. The conference will be open to the interested public.
For more information, please contact Dr. Julian Dierkes at mongolia@dierkes.net.

21st Century Capitalisms in Europe and Asia

11th EADI General Conference
June 24-28, 2008
Geneva. Switzerland

The 11th EADI General Conference carries the theme, 21st century capitalisms in Europe and Asia: Developing concepts, institutions and partnerships.

The post-Cold War triumph of the Anglo-American model of capitalism and globalisation has been resisted or mitigated in various ways both in Asia (new capitalist power house) and in Europe (old capitalist power house), as this model has not been perceived as an adequate recipe to deliver sustainable development and alleviate poverty worldwide. The beginnings of the 21st century have shown that the predominance of economic and financial transactions across the Pacific and the Atlantic are increasingly counterbalanced by rising transactions within the EurAsian continent. This trend could lead to the possible emergence of new rules, norms and standards within and among the American, Asian and European power houses in shaping the future of global governance. The rapid growth of the Asian hybrid market economies confronts a variety of continental European capitalist regimes, which themselves used to diverge from the economic and especially social model of America. Therefore, there is a need to assess how and how far Asian and European development regimes may converge, diverge, or mitigate in transforming the capitalist paradigm.

The provisional organisation of the working group panels during the EADI June 2008 general conference is suggested as follows:

(1) A group of papers addressing the nature and profiles of European and/or Asian capitalist regimes at national, regional, inter-regional and/or global levels,

(2) A group of papers addressing the possible development of new methodological and theoretical approaches to the analysis of capitalism in an Europe-Asia cross-fertilised setting,

(3) A group of papers addressing institutional change in Europe and/or Asia, and institutional interplay in an Europe-Asia cross-ferlilised setting,

(4) A group of papers addressing Europe-Asia economic and social governance partnerships for regional, inter-regional and global sustainable development.

Publication of papers:
Based on the paper presentations and discussions of the working group during its first session (June 2008), a selection of papers will be called for publication either through the facilitation of EADI (book series with Amsterdam University Press, EADI journal) or through facilitated access to European or Asian scientific journals.

For more information : www.eadi.org

Is This The Asian Century?

Biennial conference
Asian Studies Association of Australia
July 1-3, 2008
Melbourne, Australia

The biennial Asian Studies Association of Australia conference is the largest gathering of expertise on Asia in the southern hemisphere. The theme for 2008 invites you to assess how the regions and issues on which you are interested are faring. The ASAA conference is multi-disciplinary and covers Central, South, South-East and North East Asia and the relationship of all of these with the rest of the world.
The 17th biennial conference on 1-3 July 2008 will bring together specialists to assess trends in Asian law, medicine and health, science, ethics/human rights, politics, regional security, economics, culture, religion, environment, media, the performing arts and many other fields.

Given the theme, we encourage cross-country and inter-regional analysis.

To assess how Asia is doing, we need to think broadly about Asia and compare trends in India and China, the new giants of Asia, with the older industrial power Japan and newly emerging economies of Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia. We also need to link up these trends with events outside Asia.

Join us either as a presenter of a conference paper or as a participant to debate what is happening in the Asian region and its impact on the rest of the world. In some fields, trends in Asia are driving world affairs but in other areas Asia lags behind. What is the case in your field? Will this be the Asian century?

It is our pleasure to host the conference in Melbourne, Victoria's capital city. The Sebel Albert Hotel is just on the edge of the central business district of Melbourne, close to restaurants, entertainment, galleries etc.

We have an impressive line up of key note speakers including:

* Aitzaz Ahsan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan (is a guest of the MAI). He is Pakistan's most prominent human rights lawyer and instrumental in the release of the Chief Justice of Pakistan some months ago. He is currently fight a major court case in favour of a young village woman who was gang raped as punishment for an offence by another male member of her family.

* Henk Maier is Luce Professor at the University of California, Riverside. Prior to taking up his chair at Riverside, Maier was the Professor of Malay at Leiden University, the Netherlands. He has published extensively on Malay writing. His latest book, 'We Are Playing Relatives', is an innovative work that proposes a new framework for observing continuities over five centuries of writing in Malay.

* Bob Sugeng Hadiwinata, Assoc Prof International Relations, University of Parahyangan, Indonesia, is the author of an important book on /Democratization in Indonesia: Challenges of Consolidation /(Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 2007) - it deals with political Islam amongst other things.

Check the conference website for more details and write to the organisers to be placed on the mailing list: www.conferenceworks.net.au/asaa/

Marika Vicziany (Monash Asia Institute)
Conference Convenor

IIAS fellows

Central Asia

Dr Irina Morozova
Moscow State University, Russia
Sponsored by the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung
Conflict, Security and Development in the post-Soviet Era: Towards Regional Economic Cooperation in the Central Asian Region
24 April 2003 - 31 December 2008

Dr Elmira Nogoibaeva
International Strategic Research Institute under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Kyrgyzstan
Formation of Political Elite in Kyrgyzstan
1 January - 31 January 2008

East Asia

Dr Mehdi Amineh
Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam/Leiden
Sponsored by KNAW/CASS and the IIAS
Project Coordinator of the EPA-IIAS and IWAAS-CASS Research Programme
Domestic and Geopolitical Energy Security for China and the EU
1 September 2007 - 1 September 2010

Prof. Wim Boot
Leiden University, the Netherlands
Japanese and Korean Language and Literature
1 September 2006 - 1 September 2009

Dr Mo CHEN
Institute of West-Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China
Sponsored by KNAW/CASS
Research fellow within the EPA-IIAS and IWAAS-CASS Research Programme
Domestic and Geopolitical Energy Security for China and the EU
1 April - 30 June 2008

Dr Katia Chirkova
Sponsored by KNAW/CASS
Project Coordinator within the
Trans-Himalayan Database Development: China and the Subcontinent Programme
1 September 2006 - 1 April 2008

Prof. Hei-yuan CHIU
Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan Sponsored by BICER and the Ministry of Education Taiwan
IIAS Professor, holder of the IIAS Chair of Chinese Studies
Religion, Occultism and Social Change in Taiwan
1 September 2007 - 1 September 2008

Prof. Shi DAN
Energy Economic Research Centre, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China
Sponsored by KNAW/CASS
Research fellow within the *EPA-IIAS and IWAAS-CASS Research Programme*
Domestic and Geopolitical Energy Security for China and the EU
1 June - 31 October 2008

Prof. Feng HAN
Chinese Academy for Social Sciences, China
Security in the Asia-Pacific Region
1 December 2007 - 2 January 2008

Dr Xiaoming HUANG
Victory University of Wellington, New Zealand
The Invisible Hand: Modern Studies of International Relations in Japan, China and Korea
1 December 2007 - 1 July 2008

Dr Masae KATO
Research fellow within the Socio-genetic Marginalisation in Asia Programme
Sponsored by NWO
Japan in "Asia" in relation to the "West" as a reference group
1 March 2005 - 1 September 2008

Prof. Marie Seong-hak KIM
Department of History, St Cloud State University, United States
Law, Custom and Colonial Modernity in Korea, 1905 - 1945: A Comparative Perspective
1 January 2008 - 31 January 2008

Prof. Myungshin KIM
Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea
IIAS Chair of Korean Studies
The Correlation of Aesthetics and Politics: North Korean Literature
16 January 2007 - 16 January 2008

Jan Eerik Leppanen (MA)
Research fellow within the Socio-genetic Marginalisation in Asia Programme
Sponsored by NWO
Socio-genetic Marginalisation and Vulnerable Ethnic Groups in Southwest China
1 September 2005 – 1 September 2008

Dr Melody LU
International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), Netherlands
Intermediate Cross-border Marriages in East and Southeast Asia
1 February 2006 - 1 September 2008

Dr Morgan Perkins
Department of Anthropology, State University of New York, United States
'China' on Display: Past and Present Practices of Selecting, Exhibiting, and Viewing Chinese Visual and Material Culture
1 February 2008 - 1 April 2008

Prof. Kurt Radtke
Sponsored by KNAW/CASS and the IIAS
Research fellow within the EPA-IIAS and IWAAS-CASS Research Programme
Domestic and Geopolitical Energy Security for China and the EU
1 October 2007 - 30 June 2008

Prof. Carla Risseeuw
Leiden University, the Netherlands
Ageing in Asia and Europe
1 January 2008 - 1 January 2010

Prof. Hiroko SAKAMOTO
Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hitotsubashi University
Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam/Leiden
Intellectual History and Culture of Cartoons in Modern China: From the Points of View of Multicultural Linkage, Media and Gender
1 August 2007 - 31 January 2008

Dr Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner
Project Coordinator of the *Socio-genetic Marginalisation in Asia Programme*
Sponsored by NWO
Biobanking and Genetic Counseling in China and Japan
17 September 2001 - 1 September 2009

Prof. Hyun Joon SHIN
Institute for East Asian Studies, Sungkonghoe University, Korea
Sponsored by the Academy for Korean Studies
IIAS Professor, holder of the European Chair of Korean Studies
History and Present of Popular Culture in Korea from inter-Asia(n) Perspective
21 January 2008 - 21 January 2009

Dr Suli SUI
Research fellow within the Socio-genetic Marginalisation in Asia Programme
Sponsored by NWO
Social, Ethical and Legal Issues of Genetic Testing in Chinese Context – A Socio-science Approach to the Practice of Genetic Testing in China
1 September 2005 – 1 September 2008

Dr Takayo TAKAHASHI
Waseda University, Japan
Ethnic Identity of Okinoerabu Islanders in Japan
1 January 2008 - 31 December 2008

Prof. Yu YAKE
Yunan Academy of Social Sciences, China
Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam
Theory and Practice of Regional Integration: A Comparative Study on the Cases of EU and ASEAN
1 August 2007 - 31 January 2008

Ms Ying Ping ZHENG (MA)
China State Centre of Information, Beijing, China
Strengthening Asia-Pacific Multilateral Security Cooperation: the European Experience
1 February 2007 - 1 February 2008

Dr Ellen Raven
Researcher within the South and Southeast Asian Art and Archeology Index (ABIA)
South and Southeast Asia Art and Archaelogy Index
1 June 2003 - 1 June 2008

South Asia

MariaPiera Candotti
Université de Lausanne, Switzerland
Sponsored by the J. Gonda Foundation
'Playing by the Rules': How new Grammars reinterpreted Panini
1 May 2008 - 30 September 2008

Dr Peter Custers
Religious Tolerance and Intolerance - The Historical Experience of Bangladesh
22 October 2007 - 22 October 2008

Dr Alessandro Graheli
Associazione per gli Studi Sudasiatici, Rome, Italy
Sponsored by the J. Gonda Foundation
Theology of Paradox in Rūpagosvāmin's Bhaktirasāmrtasindhu and Jīvagosvāmin Durgamasangamanī.
1 November 2007 - 1 March 2008

Dr Jyotsna Gupta
Research fellow within the *Socio-genetic Marginalisation in Asia Programme*
Sponsored by NWO
Reproductive genetics and counselling in India: Decision-making regarding genetic screening and prenatal diagnosis
1 September 2004 – 1 September 2009

Dr Binu JOHN
Colonialism, Communalism, and Commerce: The Mappila Muslims of Kerala, India (1900-1948)
1 February 2008 - 1 May 2008

Dr Igor Kotin
Peter the Great Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian federation
Sponsored by the J. Gonda Foundation
Surnamis (Hindustanis) and non-resident Indians in the Netherlands
1 November 2007 - 15 January 2008

Prof. Donald Lopez
Department of Asian Languages and Cultures, University of Michigan, United States
History of the European Encounter with the Figure of Buddha in the 18th and 19th Centuries
1 April 2008 - 30 June 2008

Dr Alex McKay
School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, United Kingdom
The History and Culture of the Indo-Tibetan Himalayas
1 October 2000 - 1 May 2008

Dr Prasanna Kumar Patra
Research fellow within the Socio-genetic Marginalisation in Asia Programme
Sponsored by NWO
Cross-cultural comparative study of genetic research in India and Japan
15 December 2005 - 15 December 2008

Dr Rituparna ROY
From across the Shadow Lines: Tracing the Trajectory of Bengali Hindu Refugees in the Novels of Amitav Ghosh
1 January 2008 - 31 December 2008

Dr Markus Schleiter
Sponsored by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung
Localized Statehood: Social and Cultural Practices of a 'Tribal' Development Project in India
1 October 2007 - 30 September 2008

Southeast Asia

Dr Birgit Abels
Ruhr University Bochum, Germany
Sponsored by NWO/Rubicon
Sounds of (Be)longing. Islam, Place and Music in the Philippine Sulu Archipelago: The Bujau.
1 September 2007 - 1 September 2008

Prof. Leonard Andaya
University of Hawaii, Department of History, United States
A World beyond the Center: Interlocking Regional and Local Socio-Economic Networks in Eastern Indonesia, c. 1400-1800
19 May 2008 - 31 August 2008

Dr Greg Bankoff
School of Asian Studies, University of Auckland, New Zealand
Cultures of Coping: Community and Natural Hazard in the Philippines
1 September 2004 - 31 August 2008

Michele Ford
The University of Sydney, Australia
In the Shadow of Singapore: The Limits of Transnationalism in Insular Riau
1 January 2008 - 1 January 2010

Dr Edwin Jurriëns
School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of New South Wales at ADFA, Australia
Radio Active: Broadcast Journalism and the Dialogical Public Sphere in Indonesia
1 January 2008 - 31 March 2008

Prof. Mashudi Kader
School of Humanities, University Sains Malaysia, Malaysia
Sponsored by the Ministry of Education in Malaysia, Leiden University and the IIAS
IIAS Professor, holder of the European Chair of Malay Studies
The Morphology and the Movementsof Constituents in the Syntax of Classical Malay
1 October 2006 - 1 October 2008

Dr Nico Kaptein
International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), the Netherlands
Research fellow
Islam and State in the Netherlands East Indies: The Life and Work of Sayyid 'Uthmân (1822 - 1914)
1 May 2006 - 1 May 2009

Dr Lenore Lyons
Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies, University of Wollongong, Australia
In the Shadow of Singapore: The Limits of Transnationalism in Insular Riau
1 January 2008 - 1 January 2010

Dr Dipika Mukherjee
Negotiating Languages and Forging Identities: Surinamese-Indian Women in the Netherlands
1 December 2006 - 1 January 2009

Dr Nathan Porath
Sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace, Washington
Islamic Education, Secular Education and Civil Society in South Thailand
1 March 2007 - 31 August 2008

IIAS Extraordinary Chair in Asian Studies

Prof. Hein Steinhauer
Department of Southeast Asian Languages and Cultures, Leiden University, Netherlands
IIAS professor
Ethnolinguistics with a special Emphasis on Southeast Asia
1 September 1998 - 1 September 2008

International Conference Agenda

February 2008

19 February 2008
Amsterdam, Netherlands
Jongeren en interne grenzen: Meervoudige identiteiten bij Hindoestaanse jongeren in Nederland
lecture
organized by IIAS
www.rodehoed.nl

19 February 2008
Den Haag, Netherlands
Guanxi.nu Visum en Verblijf voor Chinezen
thema-event
convenor(s): Stadhuis Den Haag
organized by min. van EZ en BuZa
contact: www.Guanxi.nu
www.Guanxi.nu

March 2008

26 - 28 March 2008
Leiden, Netherlands
Malay as a Language of Knowledge and Practical Communication: Appraisal, Challenges and the Future
workshop
convenor(s): Prof. Mashudi Kader
organized by IIAS
contact: Martina van den Haak
m.van.den.haak@let.leidenuniv.nl
www.iias.nl

April 2008

3 - 6 April 2008
Campus Harvard University, United States
The Harvard Project for Asian & Intern. Relations (HPAIR 2008 Conference
conference
convenor(s): Harvard University Cambridge, MA
organized by Harvard University
help@hpair.org
http://www.hpair.org

22 April 2008
Amsterdam, Netherlands
Labour Migration
lecture
organized by IIAS
www.rodehoed.nl

June 2008

21 - 22 June 2008
Liverpool, United Kingdom
24th ASEASUK Conference
conference
organized by John Moores University
contact: Dr. Ben Murtagh
bm10@soas.ac.uk

26 - 27 June 2008
Leiden, Netherlands
ISMIL12
conference
convenor(s): Dr Marian Klamer
organized by IIAS
contact: Martina van den Haak
m.van.den.haak@let.leidenuniv.nl
www.iias.nl

28 June 2008
Leiden, Netherlands
International Workshop on Minority Languages in the Malay/Indonesian Speaking World
workshop
convenor(s): Dr Marian Klamer
organized by IIAS
contact: Martina van den Haak
m.van.den.haak@let.leidenuniv.nl
www.iias.nl

July 2008

1 - 3 July 2008
Melbourne, Australia
17th Biennial Conference: Is this the Asian century
conference
convenor(s): Marika Vicziany
organized by ASAA/Monash University
http//www.secureregistration.com.Asia

August 2008

8 - 9 August 2008
Bandung, Indonesia
Creative communities and the making of place
conference
convenor(s): Organizing Committee, Arte-Polis2
organized by Institute of Technology Bandung (ITB)
contact: Dr. Woerjantari Soedarsono
artepolis@ar.itb.ac.id
www.ar.itb.id/artepolis2

15 - 18 August 2008
Hanoi, VietNam
The Harvard Project for HPAIR 2008 Academic Conference
conference
convenor(s): Harvard University Cambridge, MA
organized by Harvard University
help@hpair.org
http://www.hpair.org

21 - 24 August 2008
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
HPAIR Business Conference 2008
conference
convenor(s): Harvard University Cambridge, MA
organized by Harvard University
help@hpair.org
http://www.hpair.org

September 2008

1 - 5 September 2008
Leiden, Netherlands
The 12th International Conference of the European Association of Southeast Asian Archaeology (EurASEAA)
conference
convenor(s): Marijke Klokke
organized by IIAS
contact: Martina van den Haak
euraseaa12@let.leidenuniv.nl
www.iias.nl/euraseaa12

1 September - 1 November 2008
Bangkok, Thailand
The 10th International Conference on Thai Studies
conference
organized by Thai Khadi Research Institute, Thammasat University
contact: Anucha Thirakanont
thaiconference@gmail.com
www.thaiconference.tu.ac.th

October 2008

1 - 5 October 2008
Gangtok, Sikkim, India
Buddhist Himalaya: Studies in Religion, History and Culture'
conference
convenor(s): The Namgyal Institute of Tibetology
organized by NIT
Gangtok2008@gmail.com

November 2008

14 - 17 November 2008
New Delhi, India
International Association of Historians of Asia, 20th Conference
conference
convenor(s): prof. Deepak Kumar
organized by Jawal Nehru University
contact: prof. Deepak Kumar
iaha2008jnu@yahoo.co.in
www.jnu.ac.in/conference/IAHA

15 - 17 November 2008
Vancouver, Canada
Contemporary Monoglia-Transitions, Development and Social Transformations
conference
organized by Peter Wall Institute for Advanced Studies, UBC
contact: Dr. Julian Dierkes
mongolia@dierkes.net

16 - 19 November 2008
Boston, United States
Rebuilding Sustainable communities for children and their Families after Disasters
conference
convenor(s): College of Public and Community Service
organized by The University of Massachusetts Boston
contact: Adenrele Awotona
rsccfd@qube.cpcs.umb.edu
www.cpcs.umb.edu/rsccfd

December 2008

3 December 2008
Amsterdam, Netherlands
Criminal without borders: Beyond the Hype on Illegal Migration, Sexual Trafficking, Small Arms, Blood Diamonds, and othe
lecture
organized by IIAS
www.rodehoed.nl

> IIAS who & where

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'Ethnolinguistics with a focus on Southeast Asia'
1 September 1998 - 1 September 2008

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Frank Weeber (1965 – 2007)

It is with great sadness that we have to inform you that *IIAS Newsletter* designer Frank Weeber has died, aged 42. Frank, who worked for JB&A Raster, was a much-valued member of our team for more than five years. There is no question that *IIAS Newsletter* is what it is today because of his designs, his vision, but also his dedication and enthusiasm. Our thoughts are with his wife Karin, his family, friends and colleagues. He will be sorely missed.

> Colophon

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