

Memorial photos of kamikaze pilots, Yasukuni Shrine. Courtesy of the Yasukuni Museum at Yasukuni Shrine. Photograph by Michael Buchsteiner.



38 The Asia-Pacific War Sixty Years On



NEWSLETTER

Special issue
The Asia-Pacific War: history & memory
a sixty-year retrospective on a conflict that changed the world, pp. 1-23
> ICAS4 in Shanghai, pp. 24-25
> On the Institute's activities, pp. 26-40

Nations in the looking-glass: the war in changing retrospect, 1945-2005

Introduction

Ethan Mark
guest editor

In the beginning, it was simple. Or at least it seemed that way from so many different national vantages that it was hard to dispute. The war in Asia had been a war between 'good guys' and 'bad guys,' and while opinions in different places varied on who exactly to count among the good guys, in places as politically and socially diverse as China, Indonesia, the Soviet Union, India, the United States, Korea, and the Netherlands, there was strikingly little disagreement over who the bad guys had been, at least at the national level. Even as the fragile 'anti-fascist' alliance of the wartime Allies (and their colonial subjects) gave way to the stark global oppositions of the Cold War, even as bitter colonial wars flared up in Vietnam, Indonesia, and elsewhere, anti-colonial nationalist leaders, (former) imperialists, peasants, government officials, businessmen, capitalists and communists around the globe - including a substantial number of Japan's own citizens - could agree on this as few other things: Imperial Japan had been the villain of wartime Asia. Promising to lead Japan and Asia to a brighter future free of Western domination, but harbouring a hyper-imperialist and 'ultra-nationalist' sense of racial and cultural superiority and a brutal indifference to human life and dignity, the marauding Japanese - like their fascist allies in Europe - had brought only oppression, death and destruction to Asia and, ultimately, to themselves. Against these enemies of civilization, free-

dom, and progress, war with the Western Allies and resistance from the peoples of Asia had been the only possible recourse.

There were, of course, from the beginning, major differences in how the war was narrated, interpreted, and explained. The early, momentous decision of the American occupation authorities to retain the Japanese emperor, with a corresponding narrative that essentially included him as one of the war's 'good guys', provoked dissent worldwide, and - as noted by several of the contributors to this special issue - left a deeply ambiguous legacy on the question of Japanese war responsibility within Japan itself. Another area of immediate disagreement involved characterizations of Japan's Western opponents. In such venues as the Tokyo war crimes trials, spokesmen for the victorious Western powers - carrying on in the vein of Allied wartime propaganda - comfortably cast the Asia-Pacific War in the black and white terms of a struggle of 'civilization' versus 'barbarism', of 'democracy' versus 'fascism', of 'freedom' versus 'tyranny'. But while they largely agreed with Allied characterizations of wartime Japan, many outside the West, as well as those to the left of the political spectrum the world over, were more skeptical regarding the West's own aims and motives in Asia before, during, and after the war. Missing from this story, for them, was an acknowledgement of the fundamentally imperialist identity of the combatants on both sides, and the fundamental nature of the

continued on page 4 >

Contents #38

The Asia-Pacific War: history & memory

- 1, 4, 5 **Nations in the looking-glass: the war in changing retrospect, 1945-2005** / Ethan Mark
- 3 **The politics of memory** / Takeo David Hymans
- 6 **War and the colonial legacy in recent South Korean scholarship** / Kyu Hyun Kim
- 7 **Between the national and the transnational: Li Xianglan/Yamaguchi Yoshiko and pan-Asianism** / Yiman Wang
- 8 **On occupied China** / Poshek Fu
- 9 **The lament of progressivism: voicing war responsibility in postwar Japan** / Rikki Kersten
- 10 **Workers at war: class formation in wartime Chongqing** / Joshua H. Howard
- 11 **Neither victors nor victims: transplanted/suppressed memories of the Sino-Japanese War in postwar Taiwan** / Mike Shi-chi Lan
- 12 **Memorializing the Tokyo air raids** / Cary Karacas
- 13 **The memory wars: Japan, China and Asia's future** / Peter King
- 14 **A slow remembering: China's memory of the war against Japan** / Rana Mitter
- 15 **Militarization of nutrition in wartime Japan** / Katarzyna J. Cwiertka
- 16 **The nation's path interrupted: the Pacific War in Philippine history textbooks** / Portia L. Reyes
- 17 **Catastrophe on Peleliu: islanders' memories of the Pacific War** / Stephen C. Murray
- 18 **A nightmare in the making: war, nation and children's media in Japan, 1891-1945** / Owen Griffiths
- 19 **Anatomy of the Yūshūkan war museum: educating Japanese youth?** / Takashi Yoshida
- 20 **Negotiating colonialism: Taiwan literature during the Japanese occupation** / Lin Pei-Yin
- 21 **Connecting the experiences of the Sino-Japanese and Asia-Pacific Wars** / Ethan Mark
- 22 **Borneo constituencies: Japanese rule and its legitimation** / Remco Raben
- 23 **'If the self is cultivated, ...' - some remarks on philosophy and politics in wartime Japan** / Christian Uhl

International Institute for Asian Studies

- 24 - 25 **International Convention of Asia Scholars 4 in Shanghai**
- 24 - 25 **The future of Asia: cross-cultural conversations in history** / Barabara Watson Andaya
- 26 - 27 **IIAS fellows**
- 28 **IIAS research programmes, networks & initiatives**
- 28 **Energy Programme Asia** / Mehdi Parvizi Amineh
- 29 **Socio-Genetic Marginalization in Asia** / Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner
- 30 **Seeking knowledge unto Qum: the education of Indonesian Shi'i ustadh's** / Zulkifli
- 31 **The heart of Borneo: a challenge for social scientists** / Manon Osseweijer and Gerard A. Persoon
- 31 **Towards social stability and democratic governance in Central Eurasia: challenges to regional security** / Irina Morozova
- 32 **Illegal but licit: transnational flows and permissive polities in Asia** / Willem van Schendel
- 33 **Books received**
- 34 **The future of rural income and rice production in China** / Marrit van den Berg, Huib Hengsdijk, Wang Guanghuo, Joost Wolf, Martin van Istersum, Reimund Roetter
- 35 **European Alliance for Asian Studies**
- 36 - 37 **Announcements**
- 38 - 39 **International conference agenda**

IIAS Newsletter

The *IIAS Newsletter* is a forum for authors from around the world to share commentary and opinion; short research essays; book, journal, film and website reviews; fiction and artwork; and announcements of events, projects and conferences with colleagues in academia and beyond. As the gap grows between specialist knowledge and public discourse, we hope this newsletter will fill a science journalism niche within Asian studies.

We welcome contributions from our readers. Please send your copy and queries to the editors at: iiasnews@let.leidenuniv.nl

Become one of our 24,000 readers worldwide and have the IIAS Newsletter arrive in your mailbox, four times a year, free of charge: iias.subscribe@let.leidenuniv.nl

To advertise in this newsletter: attn.Natasja.Kershof,iiasnews@let.leidenuniv.nl

Our guideline for contributors, advertisement specifications, upcoming deadlines, and current and previous issues can be seen at: www.iias.nl

Asia scholars as intermediaries between East and West

Director's note

Until very recently, many scholars had the idea that Asian Studies was a western endeavour. However, looking at the origin of the participants at ICAS we see that half of them were from Asia and the other half from the rest of the world, living proof that Asian Studies is and will increasingly become an Asian exercise.

One of the most important effects of the return of Asian Studies to its source is that several research traditions which have strong regional anchoring, the Anglo-Saxon, the South Asian, Chinese and continental European, will meet in Asia on a level playing field. The founding of an agile and mobile Asian Institute for Advanced Studies in Beijing could lead to a platform in which new ideas emanating from the fusing of these rich research traditions can blossom. To give a higher profile to Asian Studies in Asia, I hope that the initiative of CASS to form an Asian Alliance for Asian Studies will materialize in the course of next year.


Looking at the situation in Europe, a complicated picture presents itself. Recently, Potocnik, the Euro-Commissioner of Research, pleaded for a European approach and cooperation in all fields of study. Some representatives from Asian Studies in Europe have tried hard in the past decade to make this come true, but if we look at the reality, we see the crumbling of Asian Studies at universities all over Europe. There is still not enough willingness to view Asian Studies at a European, let alone global, level.

What we see, just as in the US and Australia, is a mad scramble for Asian students who are shortsightedly considered as means to prop up the budgets of universities. Actually, the number of students from Asia in the western world has reached its zenith and their numbers are dropping. Within one or two decades Asia will be more than self-sufficient in educating not only its own intelligentsia, but also many other students from the rest of the world who will find the high quality and low cost of education in Asia most attractive.

We, as Asia scholars, never had to be convinced of the importance of Asia. Our role will be to act as intermediaries between East and West amidst converging research traditions in the emerging global research space of the 21st century, which will encompass all disciplines. In that way, Asia scholars can be considered *avant garde*. The mainstream will doubtlessly catch up in the not too distant future. ◀

Wim Stokhof
Director, IIAS

www.iias.nl



IIAS values dynamism and versatility in its research programmes. Post-doctoral research fellows are temporarily employed by or affiliated to IIAS, either within the framework of a collaborative research programme or on an individual basis. In its aim to disseminate broad, in-depth knowledge of Asia, the institute organizes seminars, workshops and conferences, and publishes the *IIAS Newsletter* with a circulation of 24,000.

IIAS runs a database for Asian Studies with information on researchers and research-related institutes worldwide. As an international mediator and a clearing-house for knowledge and information, IIAS is active in creating international networks and launching international cooperative projects and research programmes. In this way, the institute functions as a window on Europe for non-European scholars and contributes to the cultural rapprochement between Asia and Europe.

IIAS also administers the secretariat of the European Alliance for Asian Studies (Asia Alliance: www.asia-alliance.org) and the Secretariat General of the International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS: www.icassecretariat.org). Updates on the activities of the Asia Alliance and ICAS are published in the *IIAS Newsletter*. ◀

The politics of memory

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.

– Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 1651

Editorial

Sixty years after the collapse of the Japanese New Order in East Asia, the ghosts of empire and war continue to haunt the region. As Tokyo lobbies for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, demands for apology, compensation and the forthright teaching of history simmer in the media, courts, civil societies and legislatures of affected nations. With the region's future once again uncertain, the conflict of six decades ago is assuming greater significance in its international relations.

Much of the current acrimony has its roots in the imperious nature of the post-war settlement. As the authors in this sixty-year retrospective point out, those wishing to reopen the book on wartime history and post-war official memory must first dig through successive layers of political imperative: super-power confrontation, civil war, decolonisation, nation-building. Suffice to note here that many Asian grievances went unheard at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, dubbed by one critic 'a white man's tribunal'; that western governments waived their citizens' rights to compensation in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, where Japan emerged as the essential Asian ally in containing communism; and that the reestablishment of official ties between Japan and the Republic of Korea (1965) and the People's Republic of China (1972) focused on diplomatic recognition (exit Taiwan) and what Japan could do to aid economic development – the less said of the 'unfortunate period' the

better. Thus all seemed well, at least at the level of official diplomacy.

Silence on the war did not extend to Japanese domestic politics, especially following rapprochement with the PRC and the escalation of the US war in Vietnam. The post-war battle over remembering and forgetting the war pit the Japan Teachers Union against the Ministry of Education; pacifists in the Socialist and Communist parties against proponents of big power status in the Liberal Democratic Party; students' and citizens' groups and much of the intelligentsia against the established centre of political power. What was contested – as always – was contemporary: the security alliance with the United States, rearmament, revision of the constitution's war-renouncing Article IX, control over education, political careers that reached back into wartime. Recalling the history of Japanese aggression in Asia aided neither the LDP government's legitimacy nor its cause of rearming Japan in the Cold War – a point not lost on the left opposition.

Beijing entered this heated debate in 1982, precipitating the first in a long series of diplomatic incidents between Japan and its East Asian neighbours over 'the correct interpretation of history'. At issue in 1982 was a Ministry of Education 'recommendation' to replace 'invasion' with 'advance' (into China) in a high-school history textbook; textbooks have been central to the controversy ever since. 'Why does our nation stray from the world stage during big events?' asks

Fujioka Nobukatsu of the private but officially well-connected Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform: 'Our history education is wrong. Since the end of World War II, we have been taught that our country was a villain in the war. The Japanese have lost confidence in their ability to determine what direction the country should take'. The Ministry's approval of the Society's text for school use led to South Korea recalling its ambassador and placing an embargo on Japanese pop culture in 2001. History textbooks 'offensive to Chinese feelings' were at the core of the petition signed by over twenty million Chinese to deny Japan a seat on the UN Security Council in 2005.

Why is a war that ended sixty years ago so prominent on the international stage? We're back to Hobbes.

Gain. In staking its claims for future regional leadership, Beijing has found in the legacy of invasion and atrocity a moral club to beat down its rival. Around the region, competing versions of the war buttress claims to territory and energy reserves disputed by Japan, Russia, the PRC and South Korea. One also suspects indigenous competitors to Hello Kitty to be active in any boycotts.

Safety. The war's use as domestic political foil extends well beyond Japan. Caroline Rose presents evidence in *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations* that Deng Xiaoping raised the stakes on Japan's whitewashing of history in 1982

to bolster legitimacy for himself and his reform agenda because the 'old guard' in the People's Liberation Army – still in position to block Deng's final consolidation of power – were blasting his pragmatism as harmful to ideology, discipline, and morale, and the foreign policy that accompanied the four modernizations as subservient. 'By taking tough positions, Chinese leaders demonstrate their nationalist credentials and win vitally important domestic political support.... No Chinese politician can afford to appear soft on "hegemony" or "imperialism" and expect to stay in power' (David Shambaugh on PRC succession politics, *International Security*, 21-2).

Reputation. Moral authority is essential to political power; governments want historiography to foster pride in the nation and loyalty to the state. Nor is it simply a matter of top-down manipulation. As Ernest Renan observed: 'Getting history wrong is an essential part of being a nation'. The problem for international events such as war is that more than one nation will get the shared history wrong, while narratives for domestic consumption rarely please audiences abroad. Here theorists of globalisation overlook an important border-crossing commodity: offence. With the media's interest in sensationalism and the political utility of enemies real or imagined, it bodes ill for the future. ◀

Takeo David Hymans
Managing editor, IIAS
t.d.hymans@let.leidenuniv.nl

[advertisement]

8-10 December 2005 – Leiden, the Netherlands

IIAS Masterclass on Modern Research Techniques in Asian Archaeology:

Sciences and Technology in Asian Bio-archaeological Research

Led by:

Prof. Rethy Chhem (Departments of Radiology and Anthropology, University of Western Ontario, Canada)

Rapid progress in the life sciences and medical technology over the past decades have revolutionized ancient skeletal studies. These include the extraction of ancient DNA, the use of medical imaging tools like CT scans and isotope studies, and newly available scientific and bio-archaeological tests. This masterclass will explore the role of science and technology in the investigation of the human past, emphasizing the necessity for collaboration between archaeologists, physical anthropologists and experts from the physical and life sciences.

Also presenting:

Prof. Anne Katzenberg (Dept. of Archaeology, University of Calgary, Canada)

Prof. El Molto (Dept. of Anthropology, University of Western Ontario, Canada)

Prof. Don Brothwell (Dept. of Archaeology, University of York, UK)

Deadline for registration:

1 October 2005

Registration and Information:

International Institute for Asian Studies
Marloes Rozing
PO Box 9515
2300 RA Leiden
T +31-(0)71-527 2227
F +31-(0)71-527 4162
m.rozing@let.leidenuniv.nl
www.iias.nl



war in Asia, as such, as a showdown *between imperialists* over territories and peoples that neither side in fact had a right to claim.

This difference in perspective reflected stark divisions between the worldviews of (former) Western colonizers – who preferred to treat imperial Japan as a purely exceptional case, thus maintaining a healthy distance between its aggressive history and their own colonial pasts and presents – versus (former) Asian colonized, who could not help noting the ironies of such an exercise. It was also a reflection of the gap between the worldviews of liberal capitalism dominant in the Anglo-American metropolises, versus those of Marxism-Leninism (in particular its critique of imperialism) more influential elsewhere, including much of the colonized world.

In the aftermath of the war, there were also profound differences between societies' relative emphases on the war experience and its meanings. In places such as Indonesia and Vietnam, armed conflicts with returning Western colonizers and the priority on national unity very quickly made the Japanese occupation period seem yesterday's news, relegating its historical significance to that of a mere interlude or preliminary to what now came assuredly (back) into focus as the 'main story' in national terms: the ongoing, ultimately triumphant, struggle for independence against Western domination. Portia Reyes' contribution to this issue reveals how the Japanese occupation period was soon represented as an 'interruption' in the dominant Philippine national story, and as Rana Mitter observes in his essay, a similar process of narrative backgrounding occurred in postwar China, albeit with largely internal causes: the great domes-

the war in Asia was a showdown between imperialists over territories and peoples that neither side had a right to claim

tic showdown between the communist and nationalist forces that followed on the heels of the Japanese occupation quickly pushed the events of the Sino-Japanese war period to the sidelines of historical narrative. This does not mean that the Japanese period was forgotten, but rather that its narratives and meanings were subordinated, reduced and compressed into a national history whose main thrust and climax lay elsewhere. In Japan itself, in contrast, the war remained 'the' inevitable turning point in narratives of identity and history, perennially marking the boundary between past and present in national as well as individual terms. This is not to say that stories of the war in Japan were any less simplified, reshaped, suppressed, or otherwise subordinated to postwar political considerations, but rather simply to highlight the relatively heightened degree of narrative and political weight attached to such retellings.

Postwar pathologies

Amidst these and other local variations, around the globe there remained certain striking formulaic similarities in how the story of the Asia-Pacific War was told in the postwar, spanning every manner of political and cultural boundary.

Probing Western weakness: a racy Japanese propaganda leaflet attempts to undermine Allied soldiers' will to fight

The first of these was a general tendency to explain Japanese wartime actions in terms of Japan's presumed 'exceptional' nature and/or cultural and institutional 'immaturity'. Even among the most thoughtful and informed observers in different parts of the world – at different ends of the political spectrum – there was a common assumption that Japan's behavior in Asia had been, first, unusual in its oppressive-

nationalist elites seeking to throw off colonial domination and consolidate their political hegemony favoured stark, heroic narratives

ness and brutality; and second, that this had been fostered by a certain 'incompleteness' in Japan's development as a modern nation-state and society, a situation that had allowed, even encouraged, the persistence of certain 'pre-modern' or 'semi-feudal' cultural peculiarities distinctive to Japan. Qualities frequently mentioned in this context included blind obedience to authority, racism, xenophobia, provincialism, conformism, anti-individualism, readiness for self-sacrifice, and a tendency to violence.

Within this general interpretive pattern, dominant around the globe at least through the 1970s, there were, of course, great differences of emphasis. Most scholars of Japan agreed, for example, that the imperial state had been a major culprit in determining Japan's disastrous course, monopolizing and dictating the terms of national loyalty, militarizing Japan's masses, and inhibiting the development of independent institutions of bourgeois civil society and independent thinking as seen in more advanced parts of the world – assisted in this aim, again, by the persistence of 'feudalistic' attitudes among the Japanese people. Japanese scholars generally saw the war as an inevitable consequence of fundamental social deficiencies dating back to the nature of the 1868 Meiji Restoration, and indeed continuing into the postwar present. Reflecting a dominant Marxian bent, most of these did not stop at the villainy of the state or the military as such, but attempted to explain Japan's disastrous imperial course by focusing on the specific needs of an expanding but immature Japanese capitalism and its interdependent relationship with 'semi-feudal' landed and military interests from the time of the Meiji settlement onwards. They saw the military showdown with the Western powers in the Pacific as a reactionary attempt to shore up this 'emperor system' (*tennōsei*) in crisis, in the context of a global crisis of capitalism. In contrast, mainstream Anglo-American scholars of the 1950s-70s such as Edwin O. Reischauer were more sanguine, arguing that Japan's prewar development had shown signs of promise in a healthy, democratic, liberal capitalist direction, only to be hijacked by militarist thugs who took advantage of a subservient public, social instability due to the growing pains of economic development, and as-yet insufficiently autonomous public institutions.

Whatever the great differences between these dominant Japanese and Anglo-American storylines, one ironic correspondence between them was that by placing the onus of the war on Japan's 'ruling classes' (variously defined) in combination with a certain general social and cultural underdevelopment, both narratives in their own ways carried on in the vein of the Tokyo war crimes trials in casting the Japanese people as victims of a sinister state, effectively absolving the mass of the Japanese people from direct responsibility for the war. The war remained not so much something that ordinary Japanese had done to others, but rather something that had been done to, or happened to, ordinary Japanese. Throughout the postwar period, this problem of what Carol Gluck has called 'history in the passive voice' helped undergird a pervasive Japanese reticence regarding questions of war responsibility. The fact that Japan's citizenry remained the only people of the world subjected to the unspeakable horror of two atomic bombings added ammunition to a sense of general victimhood.

Further to the political right, the tendency to reticence on Japan's own war culpability was also fueled by conservative domestic interests including politicians and bureaucrats as well as veteran's and 'bereaved family' groups – important constituencies of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party – who maintained that the vilification of wartime Japan at the hands of historians, social activists, and governments the world over represented a distortion of history, little more than 'victor's justice', propaganda spread by Japan's enemies both internal and external. As Peter King's essay here further explores, the combined result has been a Japanese state and society that has had notorious problems in coming to terms

with the war in any unambiguous sense, problems that continue to dog Japan's relations with its immediate Asian neighbours in particular.

Yet as Rikki Kersten also observes in this issue, the distressing dominance of this official conservative line should not be allowed to obscure the longstanding existence of less visible domestic voices of opposition on the war responsibility front, including progressive intellectuals who sought, from as early as the 1950s, to transcend the troubling passivity common to both right and left-wing historical paradigms and seek the way forward to a more responsible and autonomous public life through a discourse of individual subjectivity. Still, until more recently, the main subjects of these debates on subjectivity remained Japan's intellectual elite, with the implied immaturity and passive victimhood of the Japanese masses in the war period remaining an inevitable byproduct.

Loaded narratives

Whatever their shared shortcomings and omissions, these competing historical narratives were invested with an energy and urgency that betrayed them as much more than a simple academic exercise. Indeed it can be argued that where the Asia-Pacific War was concerned, the difficulty in moving beyond starkly opposed, simplistic narratives of villains and victims – or, in the case of state-approved textbooks, beyond a deafening silence on the whole subject – was testimony *not* to any characteristic Japanese inability to deal in a sophisticated way with the past, but rather to the continuing, profoundly contentious *political implications* carried by these narratives in the making of postwar Japan and its national identity. In sum, how you characterized the prewar order – who your victims and villains were, what aspects of the system you identified as the true culprits of the war – was also, inevitably, a commentary on the postwar order, on where Japan should go from here.

All the more so in a cold war world in which stark national choices had to be made. If the global capitalist system in general and Japanese capitalism in particular had been at the heart of the wartime fiasco, for example, then it hardly made sense to maintain a close postwar alliance with the capitalist U.S., or to be content with the relatively cosmetic changes the U.S. had made to the Japanese capitalist system during its occupation – all the while continuing to maintain a dangerous distance between Japan and its Asian neighbours, most importantly China. And vice versa. Thus were postwar politics and historical narrative inexorably intertwined, leaving very little room for nuance or ambiguity, a situation in which the state and its representatives often took the easiest path by saying little or nothing at all. Cary Karacas' essay here, sketching the convoluted history of a monument to the victims of the 1945 Tokyo firebombing, is a vivid illustration of the tortured, contested nature of such attempts at representation in postwar Japan.

While fingers thus remained for the most part deservedly pointed at Japanese for failing to take an objective reckoning of their wartime past, however, it was also difficult to see the global postwar landscape of history and memory as an entirely level playing field where 'coming clean' was concerned. For while many eyes focused on Japan, distortion, manipulation and simplification of the wartime experience for political purposes – albeit with varying levels of devotion to scholarly 'objectivity' – was in fact globally endemic in a postwar, cold war world of nation-states attempting to (re-) establish legitimacy and superpowers battling for new influence. The Tokyo war crimes trials offered a blatant early example – even now providing ammunition to Japan's revisionist right wing – by insisting, against most of the historical evidence, on the existence of a long-term prewar Japanese plot to take over Asia and ultimately the world, while refusing to acknowledge any wrongdoing or culpability for the war on the side of the Western powers.

But there were more subtle transgressions as well. As historian John Dower revealed in a feisty 1975 critique of the postwar American Japan studies establishment, for example, it was more than coincidental that American scholars such as Reischauer had offered a narrative of Japan's war as a mistaken detour on an otherwise steadily ascending path towards a successful, democratic modernity. For, as Dower showed, these scholars were convinced of the merits of the American (liberal capitalist) social model, eager to see it fostered in Japan, and thus determined not to leave the writing of Japan's modern history to 'ideological', 'biased' left-wing Japanese scholars who, they believed, sought to employ history to undermine the U.S.-sponsored postwar order, the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and, ultimately, the American position in Asia.



Courtesy of Hans Moonen's collection of propaganda leaflets of the second world war at <http://members.home.nl/jwvzpropaganda/translat.htm>

Meanwhile, in the many new Asian nations emerging from the wartime wreckage, the subordination of historical narratives of the war period to political considerations and the 'national interest' was, if anything, more pronounced. For nationalist elites seeking to throw off colonial domination and consolidate their political hegemony in societies in which the colonial period, the war, and its aftermath had left socially divisive legacies along lines of class, culture, ethnicity, and politics, there was a high premium on stark, heroic 'us' versus 'them' accounts of Japanese 'oppression' versus national 'resistance'. The heady optimism of independence – along with the near universal postwar equation of anti-colonial nationalism with the world-historical forces of human liberation and progress – only provided further ammunition to the creation of black-and-white narratives, with the emergent anti-colonial nation as their heroic subject.

Within this uncompromising framework, there was little room to contemplate the war's more ambiguous, multiple experiences, meanings, and legacies. In places such as Indonesia, scholars and popular interpreters alike incorporated the Japanese occupation period into the new national mythology as a sort of divinely ordained national trial-by-fire, from which the nation was destined to emerge like a boomerang against the returning Western imperialists, stronger and more united than ever. Prominent people who had openly supported the Japanese and were politically expendable, like Jorge Vargas in

the overall trend has been a slow but steady de-mythologizing of the nation as historical subject

the Philippines, faced condemnation as 'traitors' and 'collaborators'. But as Kyu Hyun Kim observes in this issue in the case of South Korea, the compromisingly close wartime association of many members of now dominant social classes with the Japanese 'enemy' – including subsequent national leaders such as Suharto and Park – was a subject that most contemporary students of history preferred to shy away from. Where the nationalist interaction with the Japanese had been too prominent to be ignored – as in the case of Sukarno and Hatta in Indonesia – nationalist interpreters often sought to turn this sort of potentially divisive historical legacy into another nation-building strength, by presenting wartime association with the Japanese as a purely *strategic* and ultimately fruitful maneuver, proof of the infallible political and historical sense of the nation's leadership. The narrow, unforgiving parameters of 'collaboration' and 'resistance' allowed little room for anything in-between.

But how to contain the problem of 'collaboration' and secure nation-building lessons from the war experience when, at least from the standpoint of the postwar rulers, the entire nation itself had been on the 'wrong side' in the war? As Mike Lanshih Chi demonstrates here in the case of Taiwan, the answer was to import a nationalist mythology from the mainland, effectively erasing the Taiwanese people from their own wartime history in the process. Ironically, the exigencies of nation-building seeped into wartime narratives across the geographical and political divide of the Taiwan Straights as well: As Joshua Howard observes in his contribution to this issue, even in the ostensible 'workers state' of the People's Republic of China, narratives of unified national resistance against the Japanese served to obscure a dynamic wartime history of class struggle and contestation in the urban areas under nationalist control.

The war in the post-postwar

In more recent times, as the standpoint of Chi, Kim, and other contributions to this special issue illustrate for different national contexts, the passage of the wartime generation from the political stage, the end of the Cold War and concomitant weakening of political orthodoxies, and the transition from postwar to 'post-postwar' national orders in more general political, economic, social, and cultural terms, has brought a new openness to re-interpretations of ourselves, societies, and the world, inevitably opening up new angles and vantages on history as well. Across the globe, rising demands for social and political inclusion among newly assertive groups traditionally left out of the nation-building game, such as women and minorities, have prompted the construction of more inclusive and heterogeneous histories. While varying widely from place to place, the overall trend has been a slow but steady de-mythologizing of the nation as historical subject, and the pursuit of alternative historical narratives, processes and actors

formerly excluded from view. This has included increased attention to cross-border, 'transnational' historical processes and interactions, to the lives of ordinary people, to moral ambiguity, and to identity as shifting, multiple, negotiated, interdependent, and contingent.

Nationalism remains, of course, a profoundly powerful force in a world of competing nation-states, no more so than in the postcolonial world. But even here, postcolonial nationalism's failure to fulfill its early transcendent, unifying promise and the passing of the old guard has encouraged a new willingness to critique and transgress the rigid, static boundaries and categories of orthodox nationalist thinking, and nationalist histories. Indeed, given the special vantage of postcolonial social contexts on the colonial relationship and its ambiguous transnational legacies, it is perhaps not surprising that the expanding field of postcolonial studies, pioneered and spearheaded by scholars of the South Asian subcontinent, has been at the cutting edge of many of these historiographical innovations.

These developments have had important implications for the study of modern Asian history, including the Asia-Pacific War period. One result has been the highlighting of interactive, transnational workings of social and cultural formation in Japan's colonial encounters, moving beyond stark categories of oppression, resistance, and 'collaboration' to discover interests and processes that embraced people and institutions on both sides of the line dividing nation from nation and colonizer and colonized. In the case of modern Japan specifically, growing scholarly skepticism regarding nation-centered narratives generally has been expressed in a growing identification of, and assault on, 'Orientalist', exceptionalist assumptions about modern Japan that were, as noted above, near-universal to the discipline through the early postwar period.


Studies such as Louise Young's path-breaking *Japan's Total Empire*, for example, offered an exploration of Japan's 1930s and 40s colonization of Manchuria, not as a result of Japan's inherently exceptional, aggressive, underdeveloped qualities as a 'late modernizer', but rather as a result of Japan's very modernity. Manchukuo thus appears as an illuminating local inflection of the modern processes and inter-workings of industrial capitalist development, the state, mass society, and empire-building - in sum, as a site of *modern global history* in the making. Here, as in Yoshimi Yoshiaki's path-breaking *Grass-Roots Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese People* (*Kusa no ne no fashizumu: Nihon minshū no sensō taiken*), the history of the war is told from the social 'bottom up' as well as from the 'top down,' revealing Japanese from all walks of life not only as passive victims, but also as active participants in the war effort, thus treading a field of moral and political ambiguity previously off-limits on both right and left in Japan.

Whether focusing on the war experience itself, or on ways in which that history has been narrated in the postwar, many of the essays collected in this special issue reflect the contemporary trend of strategically focusing on history's hidden 'grey areas', 'margins', 'intersections' and 'border crossings'. In their own ways, Owen Griffith's consideration of prewar Japanese children's literature, Yiman Wang's essay on the actress Li Guo Ren/Yamaguchi Yoshiko, Katarzyna Cwiertka's discussion of the war's legacy to Japanese eating habits, Remco

many of the essays collected here reflect the contemporary trend of focusing on history's grey areas, margins, intersections and border crossings

Raben's assessment of Japanese attempts to establish legitimacy in Borneo, Christian Uhl's considerations on the 'Kyoto School', Steven Murray's analysis of Pelilieu residents' memories of the Asia-Pacific War, and Pei Yin-Lin's treatment of unheralded Taiwanese wartime literature, highlight the logic of this shift in emphasis. Each represents an attempt not simply to illuminate areas and linkages excluded from view in conventional, nation-centered narratives, but to offer, in so doing, new angles on, and constructions of, the 'main story' of the war and its aftermath in the Asia-Pacific.

Sixty years on - with the arrival of the post-postwar order, and the consequent, inevitable loosening of the postwar order's political and cultural hold over our view of the world - it might not perhaps be overly optimistic or self-absorbed to argue that these are encouraging times for the fashioning of new, more



Courtesy of Hans Meenen's collection of propaganda leaflets of the second world war at <http://members.home.nl/wz2propaganda/translat.htm>

'Shock and awe' circa 1945: a chilling American propaganda leaflet ticks off islands already captured and warns Japanese on the mainland that 'the time is nigh'.

nuanced and sophisticated perspectives on the Asia-Pacific War and its legacies. But around the globe, contemporary politics and worldviews have always intervened, and will inevitably continue to intervene, in shaping depictions of this most profound of modern conflicts. The ratcheting contemporary tensions between Japan and China over the wartime past indicate that Chinese and Japanese neo-nationalist sentiments may be at a postwar peak. Of course this development says much more about changing contemporary domestic and regional power balances than about the war experience itself. And indeed, if there is any clear 'take home' message to be learned from examining the changing, varied, but also sometimes similar ways of telling the story of the war around the globe over the last six decades, it is to confirm Benedetto Croce's timeless maxim: All history is, in the end, a history of the present. <

Ethan Mark (Ph.D. Columbia University 2003) is Netherlands Institute for War Documentation/Ailion Foundation Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Department of Korean and Japanese Studies, Leiden University. He is author of 'Suharto's New Order Remembers Japan's New Order' in Remco Raben, ed., *Representing the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia* (full cite below). His monograph *The Limits of Liberation: Negotiating a New Asian Order in Occupied Java, 1942-1945* is forthcoming, as is "Asia's" Transwar Lineage: Nationalism, Marxism, and "Greater Asia" in an Indonesian Inflection' in the *Journal of Asian Studies*.
e.mark@let.leidenuniv.nl

For further reading:

- Brook, Timothy. 2001. 'The Tokyo Judgment and the Rape of Nanking'. *Journal of Asian Studies* 60:3, pp. 673-701.
- Dower, John. 1987. *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*. New York: Pantheon.
- _____. 1999. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War Two*. New York: W.W. Norton Co.
- Fogel, Joshua A., ed. 2000. *The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gluck, Carol and Stephen Graubard, eds. 1991. *Shōwa: The Japan of Hirohito*. New York: W. W. Norton Co.
- Raben, Remco, ed. 1999. *Representing the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia*. Zwolle, Netherlands: Waanders Publishers.
- Yoshiaki Yoshimi. 1987. *Kusa no ne no fashizumu: Nihon minshū no sensō taiken*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- Young, Louise. 1998. *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

War and the colonial legacy in recent South Korean scholarship

For much of post-1945 or post-liberation history, Koreans have religiously celebrated August 15, commemorating the spontaneous outburst of joy that greeted the Showa Emperor's declaration of surrender. And yet, remembrance of the liberation and its unfulfilled promise has engendered its own kind of selective amnesia, not unlike that among Japanese regarding their own war experience.

Kyu Hyun Kim

In the mainstream Korean narrative of the wartime period (1941-1945, or more accurately 1937-1945, dated from the outbreak of the continental war against China), Koreans are relegated to the position of victims. It was during this period that Japanese exploitation of Korean socio-economic resources, both material and human, reached its height. It was also during this period, according to most Korean scholars, that the Japanese colonizers tried to eradicate Korean culture by forcing Koreans to worship at Shinto shrines, by banning the Korean language from official use and designating Japanese as the 'national language' (*kokugo*), and by adapting Korean family lineages into the Japanese household system, compelling the latter to choose Japanese-style names. Koreans have come to refer to this set of policies, promoted under the ideological campaign of *naisen ittai* 内鮮一体 (Japan and Korea as One) as 'ethnocidal policies' (*minjok malsal chŏngch'aek* 民族抹殺政策) through which the Japanese colonizers sought to eradicate Korean identity altogether, absorbing it into the ontological category of the Japanese imperial subject (*kōkoku shinmin*).

Era of darkness

The wartime period was characterized as a pitch-black vacuum (*amhŭggi* 暗黒期, the 'era of darkness') in which only certain elite members, the 'pro-Japanese' traitors (*ch'inilp'a* 親日派), were allowed to profit and flourish at the expense of the majority of Koreans. However, this characterization of the wartime period has also suppressed frank, open-minded investigation of the actual circumstances involving Japanese colonialism's infiltration into Korean culture and society. Studying the colonial-period 'collaboration' between Japanese and Koreans was anathema for many years, especially under the dictatorial regimes of Syngman Rhee (1946-1960) and Park Chung-hee (1961-1979). Indeed, President Park, who seized presidential power through a military *coup d'état*, was a direct progeny of Japanese wartime militarism, a graduate of the Manchurian Military Academy.

Democratization and rehabilitation of the South Korean public sphere in the late 1980s and early 1990s, following monumental protest and resistance against Park's junta successors, finally opened the space to examine the collaborationist activities of the Korean colonial elite. 'Progressive' scholars and critics, riding the surf of democratization and liberalization and embracing hitherto-forbidden Marxist and radical-populist perspectives, challenged the whitewashing and exposed the lacunae found in historiography, literary collections and the biographical data of 'collaborators'. Scholars excavated shrill pronouncements written by prominent writers, intellectuals, educators and government leaders of post-liberation South

Korea, inculcating Korean youth to throw away their lives for the glory of the Japanese empire, or fictional works enveloped in a sheen of patriotic fervor and serene acceptance of the Holy War, looking to a future when Japan would emerge triumphant in the titanic struggle against the venal white races.¹

By the mid-1990s, this newfound freedom in exposing the past sins of the fathers and the scholarship it engendered moved into a new phase. While the democratically elected regimes of Kim Dae-jung (1997-2002) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-present) have continued to struggle with 'the dark legacy' of the colonial period, South Korean scholars, now relatively unencumbered by the desire to subordinate such reflections to the political objective of overthrowing military dictatorship, have begun a long and arduous process of parsing through the legacy of the colonial period, engaging in long-overdue reflection on the possibility of post-colonial identity for Koreans.

The process, however, turned out to be anything but easy. It alerted many Korean scholars in a variety of fields including history, literature, political science and women's studies, to the complex and intertwined relationships between colonialism, nationalism and modernity. Some scholars have questioned, at the risk of disrupting one of the most deep-seated and unquestioned assumptions shared by both North and South Koreans, the ways in which the relentless focus on *ethnos/nation* (*minjok* 民族) has suppressed subaltern narratives and the identity formations of women, local-

colonialism and anti-colonial nationalism mirror each other in a disturbingly complementary relationship

ities, ethnic and other minorities in modern Korean history, as well as the ways in which colonialism and anti-colonial nationalism – the teleological unfolding of which constitute the foundational narratives of both North and South Korea as they stand today – mirror each other in a disturbingly complementary relationship. Indeed, these scholars point out, the North and South Korean regimes have independently of one another employed war mobilization strategies, first imparted on Koreans by the Japanese colonial empire, to push forward their respective programs of state-led modernization.

Nationalism as treason

Im Chi-hyŏn, a former student of Eastern European history, was among the first Korean scholars to present far-reaching criticism of Korean nationalist historiography. In his groundbreaking and controversial book *Nationalism Is Treason* (1999), Im criticized what he saw as submission of historical perspectives and interpretations to the teleology of creating a single ethnic nation-

state. Scholarly interpretations of Silla's unification (668 A.D.) of the three ancient kingdoms (Koguryŏ, Paekche and Silla), for instance, have always assumed that unification was a desirable goal, opening the way for ethnic consolidation of the Korean peoples. Im asks whether any student of ancient Greece would adopt a similar logic and criticize the leaders of Athens, Sparta and Thebes for not creating a 'unified Greek empire.'² He finds similar ethnocentrism and teleological drive towards reifying a proto-nation-state in much of the academic discourse on early modern and modern Korean history. And yet, Im's book argued that nationalism in the Korean historical understanding could be rehabilitated as critical discourse. Korean nationalism could be reformulated as 'civic nationalism' (in his English usage), decoupled from its racist, chauvinistic and ethnocentric features, dynamic and constantly forward-looking towards active participation in democratic citizenship.³

In his more recent essays, however, Im has moved further in his critical reflection on the variegated features of Korean nationalism and has come to see significant problems and antinomies in the latter's legitimacy as an ideology of resistance, for instance, against the colonial regime. Im asks, 'Is it not possible that, even for the nationalism of resistance itself, the discourse of power had already been its component, camouflaged under the discourse of liberation?'⁴ Here Im turns toward the significance of the ideologies and discourses of mobilization employed by the North and South Kore-

an regimes, and how they in fact shared epistemological grounds in claiming themselves legitimate heirs of the Korean *ethnos/nation*, which has always been a historical fiction.

We can observe a similar engagement with the problematique of ethnic nationalism in the literary studies of Sin Hyŏng-gi, originally a specialist in North Korean literature. Sin points out that the master narrative of *ethnos/nation* in both North and South Korea has never been free from the influence of the 'grammar' of total war mobilization inscribed by the Japanese empire in the 1930s and 1940s. Despite the evocation of the supposedly inclusive language of 'unification', he argues, nationalist rhetoric constantly re-introduces and recreates internal 'enemies' to be discriminated against and censured from within. In the process, the Korean 'people' are rendered faceless and anonymous: the language of moral judgment becomes all-powerful, and creates the state of communal resonance that paradoxically compels Koreans toward unending

vigilance and neurosis about their own moral uprightness. Moreover, this dynamic of mass mobilization via moral vigilance and constant differentiation is, Sin suggests, in essence indistinguishable from Japanese wartime practices and discourses that Koreans have been educated and conditioned to negate and reject, at least on the surface, as alien and evil. In Sin's view, even the discovery of 'the people' (*minjung* 民衆) by progressive scholars and intellectuals did not fundamentally challenge the entrenched discursive system of total mobilization.⁵ Those who fell outside the master narrative of *ethnos/nation* were at best ignored, at worst oppressed and regarded as 'enemies', again parallel to the way the Japanese empire designated critics of the state as 'non-nationals' (*hikokumin* 非国民).

Nationalism as phantasm

Yun Hae-dong, a historian of modern Korea and author of the provocatively titled book *The Colonial Grey Zone* (2003), is even more skeptical than Im Chi-hyŏn on the possibility of rehabilitating Korean nationalism into a democratic, civic form. Yun implicitly rejects the premise of many progressive nationalist intellectuals that until the unification of North and South Korea is achieved, the objective of Korean nationalism remains unfulfilled. He suggests that in the post-liberation period Korean nationalism has fallen into a state of perpetual implosion (*naep'a* 内破), unable to overcome the tendencies toward hierarchy and exclusion inscribed on it during the colonial period. Korean nationalism has become a phantasm, a projection of the nationalism of resistance, which in turn has undermined possibilities for open-minded understandings of the colonial experience's complexities.⁶ Can Syngman Rhee's hypocritical use of virulent anti-Japanese sentiments among the Korean populace, while staffing his government with unreconstructed 'collaborators' from the Japanese colonial government, be swept under the category of 'false nationalism?' Has 'good' nationalism, rejecting practices and discourses of exclusion and differentiation based on bloodline, ethnic purity and *Volksgeist*, really existed in modern Korean history?

Yun also acknowledges the extent to which war mobilization penetrated Korean society in the late 1930s and 1940s. Many Koreans, he points out, sincerely believed in the cause of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War. Can Koreans, he asks, be truly free from the question of 'war responsibility' that the Allied Powers have thrown down on the Japanese? How many Koreans 'actively' participated in the Pacific War? Does the fact that Korea was colonized by the Japanese in 1910 automatically exempt Koreans from the responsibility of active participation?⁷

Im Chi-hyŏn, Sin Hyŏng-gi and Yun Hae-dong's works reflect a new type of scholarship in Korean studies, still in the

minority, but growing in importance, which tackle the difficulties and problems of accessing memory of the colonial period. Critical of the 'nationalist' perspective that, in its extreme but by no means atypical form, has cast the colonial-period experience as a shameful legacy to be discarded from the master narrative of Korean *ethnos/nation*, these scholars have found anti-colonial nationalism to be 'implicated' in post-1945 North and South Korea's war mobilization programs, which have ironically shared important features with those implemented by the wartime Japanese government. These works suggest that both unreflective rejection of the colonial legacy in its entirety and whitewashing of the collaboration and wartime mobilization among colonized Koreans are inadequate for initiating the process of exploring postcolonial Korean identity. Together with honest and thorough re-examination by Japanese, Chinese and other East Asian scholars of the colonial experiences and wartime legacies of their respective peoples – as colonizers and colonized, aggressors and victims, 'collaborators' and resisters - we can hope, in the very near future, to encounter many challenging and illuminating works of scholarship on Korea between 1937 and 1945. <

Notes

1. Cf. Koen De Ceunster. 'The Nation Exorcised: The Historiography of Collaboration in South Korea,' *Korean Studies*, Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii, 25-2, 2001; Kyu Hyun Kim. 'Reflections on the Problems of Colonial Modernity and 'Collaboration' in Modern Korean History,' *Journal of International and Area Studies*, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, 11-3, Winter 2004.
2. Im Chi-hyŏn. *Minjok chu'ui nŭn panyŏgida*. Seoul: Sonamu, 1999. pp. 60-66.
3. Im Chi-hyŏn. *Ibid.* pp. 7-8.
4. Im Chi-hyŏn. 'Hanbando minjok chu'ui wa kwŏllyŏk tamnon: pigyosajŏk munje chegi.' *Tangdae pip'yŏng*. Spring 2000. Reprinted in *Inyŏm ūi soksal*. Seoul: Sam'in. 2001. p. 112.
5. Sin Hyŏng-gi. *Minjok iyagi rŭl nŏmŏsŏ*. Seoul: Sam'in, 2003.
6. Yun Hae-dong. 'Naep'a hanŭn minjok chu'ui.' In *Singminji ūi hoesaek chidae: Hanguggŭi kŭndaesŏng kwa singminju'ui pip'an*. Seoul: Yŏksa Pip'yŏngsa, 2003.
7. Cf. Yun Hae-dong. 'Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan kwa t'alsingmin ūi kwaje.' *Tangdae pip'yŏng*. 10. March 2000.

Kyu Hyun Kim

Associate Professor of Japanese History
University of California, Davis

Between the national and the transnational: Li Xianglan/Yamaguchi Yoshiko and pan-Asianism

Li Xianglan, nicknamed 'the Manchurian orchid', was actually a Japanese actress named Yamaguchi Yoshiko, who had several names at different stages in her life. Her shape-shifting names are symptomatic and constitutive of her legendary and controversial life shaped by her tumultuous times: here I examine Yamaguchi/Li's wartime double identity as a Japanese national born and raised in 1920s northeast China and a Chinese starring in a number of Japanese films, as well as her postwar 'afterlife'.

Yiman Wang

The lingering controversy over Li Xianglan for over half a century signals our unaccomplished task of coming to terms with her ambivalent historical legacy. My task here is to reassess the ramifications of her 'theater of identity' (Robinson 1994:716) and to emphasize the dialectical relationship between national affiliations and transnational mobility, both during and after the period of Japanese colonialism.

In her most intriguing essay, Shelley Stephenson argues that Yamaguchi failed to continue her wartime success as Li Xianglan after 1945 because she became reified as a Japanese. '...Yamaguchi's movement re-inscribes the boundaries between screen, off-screen, nation, and race, as firmly as these boundaries were once blurred in the elusive career of Li Xianglan' (Stephenson 2002:12). Stephenson is correct to point out that the concept of nation was in flux during wartime. This, however, does not mean that concern with nation was lacking - both Japan and China in the 1930s and 40s vigorously championed nation-building projects, albeit with very different motivations and stakes. It is therefore crucial to politicize and historicize Li Xianglan's pan-East-Asian mobility within the context of nation/empire-building. I argue that Li's wartime success was premised upon her performative suturing into variant national, ethnic imaginaries, as much as it suggested her pan-East Asian mobility; that is, the national and the transnational are mutually constitutive, not contradictory.

Wartime 'Manchurian Orchid'

The rise of Li Xianglan as a star in the mid-late 1930s was directly linked to Japan's colonial policy in Manchukuo, China, Taiwan and other East and Southeast Asian countries. The colonial climax, the expansionist project of the 'Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere' between 1940 and 1945, coincided with Li's pan-East Asian stardom. Li became 'a representative worthy of the name 'Happy Asia' (xing ya)' (Stephenson 1999:241).

Li's Manchukuo-Japan films, or the 'Chinese continental friendship films' include *The Song of White Orchid* (dir. Kuio Watanabe 1939), *China Night* (Osamu Fushmitzu 1940), *Suzhou Night* (Hiromasa Nomura 1941) and *Winter Jasmine* (Yasushi Sasaki 1942). In these melodramatic narratives, Li routinely plays a young Chinese woman falling in love with a Japanese man (a doctor, clerk, or soldier). The new emotional allegiance parallels her linguistic shift from Chinese to Japanese, in speaking and singing. The political agenda of expansionism and assimilationism was packaged in the form of depoliticized, sentimentalized romance which, combined with Li's musical interludes, won her pan-East Asian appeal. Such films structurally excluded national borders by naturalizing political and gender hierarchies; the hierarchies nonetheless remained indelible. Li's border-crossing trajectories on and off screen are thus rifted and problematic, as much as they are made out to be smooth and successful in publicity writings and film diegeses. The importance of the national divide is illustrated in an incident that Li narrated in her autobiography.

When studying at a Beijing high school under the Chinese name Pan Shuhua, Li once attended a students' meeting where each had to express how he/she would fight the invading Japanese army. Her contribution, Li said, would be to stand on the Great Wall and be shot by either side. The image of standing on the Great Wall, which the ancient Chinese empire erected to ward off the Other, functions as a powerful trope for the ambivalent valences of border-crossing. While it may contain a de-territorializing, utopic vision, it also entails the risk of being disowned and victimized by both sides. Li's transnational position thus assumes the persistence of borders as well as political and cultural investment in them, made more significant as

nation-states were still in the making in wartime China, Japan, and other parts of East and Southeast Asia.

The Chinese audience's reconstruction of Li as Manchurian/Chinese suggests their awareness of the importance of the national divide. By refusing to acknowledge her Japanese nationality (Yamaguchi and Sakuya 1989:232), thus disavowing her 'enemy' quality, the audience tried to keep the popular star on their side. By cultivating the star's 'fictive ethnicity' (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991:49), the Chinese audience sought to construct an imaginary nationhood. The sign of 'Li Xianglan' did not simply facilitate Japanese cultural propaganda, but enabled the Chinese audience to stake their cultural-political claims.

Postwar 'cultural traitor', diplomat

Efforts to mobilize and code 'Li Xianglan' continued beyond her repatriation in 1945 and 1946. As she was able to prove her Japanese nationality - thus evading the label of *hanjian* which by definition referred to *Chinese* (Han) collaborators -

Encore Li Xianglan

Li's political and entertainment value underwent further re-signification during the 1980s and 90s, when her wartime love songs were re-released as part of the nostalgic reconstruction of pre-1949 Republican Shanghai that swept post-socialist China and post-colonial Hong Kong alike. Two major works rehearsed Li's legendary life: the musical *Li Xianglan* and the four-episode TV show *Sayonara Ri Ko-ran* (*Bie'le, Li Xianglan*), both appearing in the early 1990s and adapted from her autobiography. The Japanese musical was staged fifteen times in Beijing, Changchun, Shenyang, and Dalian to a Chinese audience of twenty thousand. The musical attributed Li's repatriation not simply to her Japanese nationality, but to the Oriental virtue of repaying hatred with benevolence (*Yide baoyuan*), the same virtue said to underlie the restoration of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relationship.

Deviating from the political gloss, the China-Japan co-produced TV show *Sayonara Ri Ko-ran* ends in a most ironic moment: the Japanese ship is slowly pulling away from Shanghai with Li and other repatriated Japanese on board, when Li's famous song 'Yelai xiang' (Night fragrance) is aired by the Shanghai People's Radio Station. Swayed by her own voice, an emotional Li bids farewell to China and to 'my Li Xianglan'. The title 'Sayonara Ri Ko-ran' thus shifts from the Chinese audience's perspective (bidding farewell to one of its favorite wartime stars) to hers (bidding farewell to her now former self). The irreversible change from past glory to present guilt and humiliation, from Li Xianglan to Yamaguchi Yoshiko, however, is compromised by the persistence of her singing that supposedly belongs to the past. The return of her voice uncannily suggests her omnipresence in ordinary Chinese urbanites' lives - so much so that the disavowal of her complicity is hardly sufficient to dispel her 'cultural capital'.

My analysis demonstrates that Li's transnational mobility ultimately hinges upon the national divide. Given her built-in dual identity and the historical moment when she began her singing and acting career, Li served and continues to serve as a privileged embodiment of national politics as well as transnational fantasy. With trans-nationalism and globalization becoming our contemporary catchphrases, national politics that ultimately weighed down Li's transnational mobility are, perhaps, escaping our radar. My goal, therefore, is to reassess the role national politics plays in both producing and constraining trans-nationality - a dialectic Li has lived out her entire life. <

Works cited

- Balibar, Étienne and Immanuel Wallerstein. 1991. *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*. Trans. Chris Turner. London: Verso.
- Robinson, Amy. 1994. 'It Takes One to Know One: Passing and Communities of Common Interest'. *Critical Inquiry* 20: 715 - 36.
- Stephenson, Shelley. 1999. 'Her Traces Are Found Everywhere: Shanghai, Li Xianglan, and the 'Greater East Asia Film Sphere''. Zhang, Yingjin ed. *Cinema and Urban Culture in Shanghai: 1922 - 1943*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford UP.
- ————. 2002. 'A Star by Any Other Name: The (After) Lives of Li Xianglan'. *Quarterly Review of Film & Video* 19: 1 - 13
- Yamaguchi, Yoshiko and Fujiwara Sakuya, eds. 1989. *My Days in China - Li Xianglan: My Half Life* (Zai Zhongguo de rizi). Translated by Jin Ruoqing from *Ri Koran - Watashi no hansei*. Hong Kong: Baixing wenhua shiye youxian gongsi.

Yiman Wang is currently a Global Fellow and Visiting Assistant Professor at International Institute, UCLA. Her research and teaching interests include early cinema, transnational Chinese cinemas, and film remakes.

yw3@alumni.duke.edu



Yamaguchi Yoshiko playing a Japanese girl, the adopted daughter of a male Russian opera singer, singing 'My Nightingale' in Russian. The still is from the Toho-Man'ei production *My Nightingale* (directed by Shimazu Yasujiro, 1943).

Li was chastised as a cultural traitor, a living embodiment of guilt and remorse. The postwar suppression of *hanjian* launched by the Chiang Kai-shek-led Kuomintang (KMT) government aimed to isolate and cleanse the Other, to reclaim territorial control and reinforce the boundary between victorious China and defeated Japan. If Li Xianglan's wartime pan-East Asian appeal ostensibly erased national conflicts, her postwar repatriation and degradation brought ever-existent national boundaries back to the foreground.

After more than three decades' hiatus, the sign of 'Li Xianglan' re-entered the spotlight in the theater of the Sino-Japanese relationship. Her visit to China in 1978 allowed Chinese people to witness her deep-felt guilt for 'deceiving' them during the war, and to accept her profuse apologies. Once again 'Li Xianglan', the name and the body, had to bear the crimes that Japan's militarist government committed in East and Southeast Asia, and to convey the sincere apology that 'her' government owed to its ex-colonies. Only this time, her apology served to facilitate the establishment of Sino-Japanese diplomacy. The cultural 'traitor' thus became a cultural 'diplomat', yet another figure who traverses borders to better serve nation-oriented interests.

On occupied China*

The Japanese occupation of China during World War II had a lasting legacy on the subsequent development of modern China and the Sino-Japanese relationship. Historians in the English-speaking world have recently begun to re-examine the history and meanings of Japanese-occupied China. Works such as John Boyle's *China and Japan at War, 1937-1945* (1972), Frederic Wakeman's *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime* (1996), Parks Coble's *Chinese Capitalists in Japan's New Order: The Occupied Lower Yangzi* (2003) and Christian Henriot and Wen-hsin Yeh's *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai Under Japanese Occupation* (2004) challenge the nationalist paradigm of moral dichotomy (resistance vs. collaboration, patriotism vs. betrayal) that has dominated the historiography. These works present to us, in different ways, a complex world of political intrigue, urban terrorism, and ambiguous business strategies.

Poshek Fu

The new scholarship both changes and complicates the ways we understand the occupied territories of wartime China, which included all the major cities and cultural and commercial centres along the eastern seaboard - Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing and Guangzhou. We now know that occupied China was a colonial world ruled by brute force and propaganda, a dehumanizing world racked by hunger, violence, and corruption. But even as the Japanese army tried to impose a Manichean world upon the people under its domination, responses to Japanese rule were far from Manichean. There were few resisters or traitors; most people fell in-between these polar opposites. They tried to make the best of the situation, struggling to survive the difficult times with as much dignity as possible.

Surviving involved everyday negotiations with the occupying force which brought with it wrenching moral conflicts and life-and-death consequences. In the occupied cities along the eastern seaboard, for example, Chinese were required to bow to Japanese sentries posted at every street corner. If they did not bow 'properly' they would be slapped in the face, hit with a rifle butt, or forced to kneel for the day. To bow 'properly' to the enemy was a symbol of absolute submission. Should Chinese have allowed themselves to be humiliated every time they walked to work or to the grocery store, or should they have refused to leave their houses to avoid humiliation? What should they have done if Japanese called them dogs and kicked them in the groin when they bowed 'improperly'? These kinds of banal, daily negotiations with the enemy involved various degrees of complicity and accommodation that put enormous psychological strain on people in occupied China.

We also know that we should not confuse the space in which individuals and organizations were situated in occupied areas with the location of their political loyalties. Indeed there were various spaces in occupied China that existed both within and outside the Japanese war machine. For example, Shanghai cinema was an organizational part of the Nanjing regime, yet it produced popular entertainment that was irrelevant to the legitimization efforts of the occupying force. At the same time, we know that the boundaries between occupied and unoccupied (Chinese-ruled) areas and those between occupied China and Chinese communities beyond the border (especially Hong Kong and Macau) were more porous and fluid than we thought. People, ideas, goods and capital traversed these borders throughout the war. This boundary-crossing traffic had an enormous impact on occupied

Japanese sentry on guard on Nanjing Road in occupied Shanghai



The XXth Century, Shanghai

China's cultural, social and economic life. For example, the economic prosperity of wartime Shanghai was inseparable from its access to technology and capital from Hong Kong and Singapore, while Cantonese opera troupes traveled constantly around the Pearl River delta for performances that helped sustain the consumer economy of the region.

How much more do we need to learn in order to have a deeper, more nuanced and multi-faceted view of Japanese-occupied China? I want to suggest three areas for further research.

First, most of the research on occupied China has been focused on the mainland. Understandable as this is, the focus carries with it limitations and deficiencies. How can we make sense of the blossoming of wartime Shanghai popular culture and its entertainment economy without exploring their connections with, for example, Southeast Asian

Chinese capital, the exchange of people and technology with Hong Kong, and the structural changes of the global pan-Chinese market? These connections in turn helped shape the forms and content of occupied popular culture. Or how do we map Chinese literary culture during the war if we do not know its intricate interconnections with exiled Chinese communities and publishing industries in, for example, Hong Kong and Singapore-Malaya? This was also the case in manufacturing and financial industries, as many factories and banks (both state-run and private) moved parts of their operations to areas outside the mainland during the war, in part to spread investment risk. So we need to expand our research focus by situating the history of occupied China in the larger, more complex context of greater China.

Second, excepting recent work by Timothy Brook and Keith Schoppa, our research on occupied China has been

decidedly urban (and focusing especially on Shanghai). This tendency is important as well as understandable as occupied China was made up of all the major cities that had played significant roles in China's harrowing negotiation with colonialism and modernity in the last century, and many of these cities had been subjected to massacre, terrorism, and all kinds of atrocity by the Japanese army. Also, archival materials on the histories of these occupied cities are more easily available. However, we know that only part of occupied China was urban. An urban focus occludes the vast territories made up of small cities, townships and villages under Japanese control. How did landownership patterns and local leadership structures change? In what specific ways did the occupying forces squeeze local resources and control the circulation of goods? Was there resistance by local communities and how was it organized and mobilized? How did the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party operate there?

How did the Japanese organization of intelligence information and oppression in villages differ from the cities? In what ways did the experiences of occupation in rural China differ from urban experiences? These questions point to the need for more studies on the histories of the Japanese-ruled countryside and its multi-levelled connections with the cities.

Third, research on occupied China has tended to focus largely on men, public life, and elite culture. These are important subjects, but equally important are the subjects of women, domestic life, gender relationships, and popular cultures. New studies by, for example, Norman Smith, Susan Glosser and Allison Rottmann open new perspectives on the ways in which literary discourses in occupied China were shaped and redefined by women (e.g., Zhang Ailing and Su Qing), and on the changing functions and cultural meanings of cinema in the everyday life of Chinese living under occupation. But we still know little, for example, about any changes in the roles of women (e.g., the idea of 'new woman') and the ways in which domestic life was organized in occupied cities, or in what ways the struggle of ordinary people, men and women, to create normality in the midst of Japanese terror changed the discourses and practices of urban popular cultures. We need to expand into these important subjects in order to push our understanding of occupied China to another level of complexity and multiplicity. ◀

* My thanks to Mark Leff and Wen-hsin Yeh for their helpful comments.

Poshek Fu, born and raised in Hong Kong, is Professor of History and Cinema Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is the author of *Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration: Intellectual Choices in Occupied Shanghai and Between Shanghai and Hong Kong: The Politics of Chinese Cinemas*.

[advertisement]

Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire
Paul H. Kratoska (ed.)
HISTORY
440 pp | PAPERBACK |
ISBN 9971-69-333-X

British Malaya & Singapore during the Japanese Occupation
Yoji Aksamshi (ed.)
HISTORY
320 pp | PAPERBACK |
ISBN 9971-69-289-6

GUNS OF FEBRUARY
Ordinary Japanese Soldiers' View of the Malayan Campaign 1941-42
Henry Frei
HISTORY
224 pp | PAPERBACK |
ISBN 9971-69-273-2

Sixty years after the end of World War II, some stories remain untold...

Singapore University Press
AS3-01-02, 3, Arts Link, Singapore 117569.
E-mail: nusbooks@nus.edu.sg
Website: <http://www.nus.edu.sg/npu>

The lament of progressivism: voicing war responsibility in postwar Japan

Every decade since August 1945, the world has scrutinized anew the manner in which Japan chooses to remember WWII. Invariably, microscopic attention is paid to semantics: does the word 'sorry' appear at all in official statements, and if so, is it qualified by self-congratulatory statements about how Japan 'liberated' Asia? Is the horror of the Nanjing Massacre relativised by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Are Japan's war dead - including designated war criminals - acknowledged through visits by serving Cabinet members to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo?

Rikki Kersten

For the past sixty years international interrogation of Japanese war guilt has assumed the worst: Japan, taken as a moral monolith, is consistently found to be wanting in its historical memory and political commitment to denouncing past wrongs. While obfuscation and inconsistency have typified official government statements on the war (and individual conservative politicians have provoked outrage through their episodic revisionist statements), official statements do not represent the full range of feeling in Japan concerning WWII. This is even more marked when the topic becomes Japanese atrocities in that war, and how these atrocities should be remembered.

Beneath the hail of international accusation, the past sixty years have also featured the dogged persistence of a countervailing voice within Japan. Collectively known as 'progressive thinkers', these individuals have campaigned on the margins of political relevance since 1945. Their voices have barely been audible in the angry cacophony that dominates those countries touched by atrocities, while the international anonymity of Japanese war responsibility discourse further suffers from the lack of translation into more accessible languages. Borrowing the words of one significant progressive thinker and activist, Tsurumi Shunsuke, the voices of guilt, acknowledgment and memory have become the 'voiceless voices' of postwar Japan.¹

Marginal yet relevant

Seen from the standpoint of 2005, we could be forgiven for declaring that this strain of opinion in Japan has been ineffectual. Yet, it would be facile to argue that marginality equals irrelevance. Operating on the political periphery has been both a historical necessity and a deliberate ethical choice on the part of progressives. As we can see from the fate of the Social Democratic Party of Japan (formerly the Japan Socialist Party), occupying the pinnacle of political power can be fatal for progressive forces. Soon after Murayama's prime ministership in 1995, his party almost fell off the political spectrum. And while Murayama provided subsequent Japanese governments with a linguistic formula for war apology (repeated again in 2005), it came at a high price. To position their man within the governing coalition in that crucial war memory year of 1995, the socialists effectively ditched every other progressive policy position they had held since 1955. They lost moral suasion as a result.

Marginality has thus been historically essential for those promoting discussion of Japanese war guilt. In 1945, 'progressive' meant being on the Left, and in 1945, this carried moral force. A hand-

ful of communists had been the last to hold out against the wartime state, and the liberation of surviving communists from Japan's jails in September 1945 ushered in an era where socialism and communism flowed seamlessly into the promotion of democracy. The reality of the Cold War descended onto this liberal intellectual scene as early as 1947, leaving us with one of the great ironies of postwar Japanese discourse on WWII: U.S. occupation policies stigmatised and marginalised the very flag-bearers of war responsibility debate. Similarly, the retention of the emperor in postwar political life (as a symbol of the unity of the nation) and his exclusion from indictment as a war criminal led to a selective narrative on Japanese war guilt.

Guilt allocation also omitted the majority of the Japanese population. With responsibility for the war pinned on military leaders and those in official wartime positions (the July 1945 Potsdam Declaration had declared the Japanese people 'deceived and misled' by 'self-willed militaristic advisors') war guilt discourse was marginalized on the project of postwar democratization. While the U.S.-led occupation's censorship, education and propaganda wings tried to correct this disassociation of democracy and war guilt, there is little doubt that war responsibility discourse was ethically distorted thereafter.

This ethical twisting even flowed into the minds of postwar 'progressives'. In the postwar period, Japan's progressive thinkers positioned themselves against the conservative-led state and occupation as well as the war-time state. Fol-

For progressive thinkers, the normative association between constructing postwar democracy and defending individual subjectivity was crucial. Within the rubric of democracy and pacifism, thinkers such as Tsurumi Shunsuke, Maruyama Masao, Hidaka Rokuro, Kuno Osamu and Shimizu Ikutaro (amongst many others) constructed the foundation of war responsibility discourse. In the process, they shaped the very contours of postwar politics.

Postwar Japanese politics, and war responsibility discourse, is in large measure a product of discord between disparate forces, not the monopoly of a conservative regime – the longevity of postwar conservative political leadership does not represent the dynamism and breadth of the struggle for political ideas and ethics, but the outcome of the struggle for power.

Collaboration and enlightenment

In January 1956 Tsurumi Shunsuke provoked a turn in the discourse on blame and guilt in his essay 'The war responsibility of intellectuals'.² Progressive intellectuals had, according to Tsurumi, failed to identify the actual nature of collaboration and their own complicity. He argued that through their own efforts, neither compelled by force nor convinced by love of country, thinkers had divested themselves of the power to dispel myths, thus facilitating deception by the state: '[intellectuals] actually decided to distort the functioning of their own minds while facing the forces that they knew in their minds to be wrong'.³ Intellectuals should now 'confess that in the past they did not personally resist', and

ity' by highlighting the great disparity between the objective promotion and facilitation of war and fascism, and the subjective awareness of having done so. Yet the 'duty' of progressive thinkers was to render visible and comprehensible the 'mechanism that led the ruling class to perpetrate the war even though they were wailing all the while about how awful it all was'.⁴

for the past sixty years international interrogation of Japanese war guilt has assumed the worst

In Tsurumi and Maruyama, we see in cameo the dilemma that confronted postwar progressive thinkers on responsibility for the war. Confronting the personal failure to resist the wartime state and its ideology was stark and unflinching, but it was inner-directed, almost quarantined, from the postwar present. If there was any continuity between war and postwar, it was the implicit acknowledgement that intellectuals had an enlightenment mission within society. After 1956, war responsibility discourse became focused on postwar responsibility, on intellectual leadership of anti-state and pacifist movements.

Tsurumi stood at the forefront of a major study of war-time intellectual collaboration, the three-volume *Kyodo Kenkyu Tenko* study, convinced that exposing the structure of war-era intellectual weakness would bolster progressive thinkers in the postwar world. Tsurumi's approach infuriated other thinkers such as Yoshimoto Takaaki, who would become the nemesis of progressive thinkers in the 1960s. The elitism implicit in the enlightenment motive seemed to Yoshimoto a transwar phenomenon, with intellectuals continuing their belief in enlightened leadership of the people without realizing how alienated they were from them.

Yoshimoto referred to postwar progressive discourse on the war as 'the flip-side of a counterfeit coin', where both sides shared the fatal flaw of an experiential gap between theory and reality, between perception of reality and actual reality. He maintains that intellectuals facilitated the state's deception of the nation during the war: 'if we examine the history of revolutionary movements in Japan, we can say that the absolutist authorities utilized this dark zone that existed between the parallel layers of vanguard consciousness and popular consciousness, and absorbed it'.⁵ While progressive thinkers were focused on preserving society from the clutches of the postwar state, their critics were focused on what they saw as the yawning gap between thinkers and ordinary people.

Heroic periphery, ethical core

The legacy of the postwar progressive movement is ever-present in contemporary Japan. The tireless history text-

book campaigners (such as Net 21) insist on detailing the facts of Japan's war atrocities in high school textbooks, and continue to sustain citizen's movements against textbook censorship. Japan's courts are bursting with former victims of wartime Japan demanding compensation, supported by citizens groups and teams of pro-bono Japanese lawyers. Committees of intellectuals form bilat-

eral research groups with counterparts in Korea and China, digging ever deeper into the history of Japanese atrocities in those countries. And they have had some successes. So-called 'comfort women' were finally acknowledged by the Japanese government in the early 1990s when a progressive thinker, Yoshimi Yoshiaki, exposed documentary evidence of official complicity.

All of these movements feature thinkers and activists of a progressive bent, in that they are self-consciously anti-state, engaged in active resistance, putting their ideas to the people. It is an intellectual life on the periphery, far from the bowels of power in the Diet. Yet it is inherently, necessarily a peripheral existence, where ideas of accountability and subjectivity exalt in their marginality from the conservative mainstream. The pulse of progressivism is its normative commitment to opposition and resistance, placing progressives heroically on the periphery of political efficacy, where they represent the ethical core upon which meaningful war responsibility discourse ultimately depends. The lament of postwar progressivism is that its ethics ensure continued political marginality, in a setting where the conservatives in power show little inclination to absorb and own the progressive agenda of war responsibility discourse. ◀

Notes

1. The 'voiceless voices' (Koe Naki Koe no Kai) was a citizens' movement that arose in 1960 during the protests against the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Tsurumi Shunsuke was a key figure in this movement, and a major proponent of its activities.
2. Tsurumi Shunsuke, 'Chishikijin no senso sekinin', *Chuo Koron* No. 71, January 1956, pp 57-63.
3. Tsurumi, 'Chishikijin', 61.
4. Maruyama Masao, 'Senso sekinin ni tsuite', *Shiso no Kagaku* No. 16 (part 1 of three parts), 1956, p 3.
5. Yoshimoto Takaaki, 'Geijutsuteki teiko to zasetsu' (Artistic resistance and disillusionment), *Yoshimoto Takaaki Zenchosakushu* Vol. 4 (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1969), p. 165.

Rikki Kersten

Professor of Modern Japan Studies
University of Leiden



Students of the new left

lowing the logic of deception and victimhood, progressive thinkers engaged with war guilt by allocating responsibility to the imperial state and its emperor-system ideology. The state had deceived the people in war-time; intellectuals had been unable to resist the apparatus of police terror and blind patriotism; thus accepting war responsibility in the early postwar years meant engaging in active opposition to the state.

place their energy instead into the postwar peace movement.

Tsurumi's essay unleashed a fury of recriminations exposing the complexities that festered beneath the vibrant intellectual culture of the postwar era. The explosion of debate saw Maruyama Masao, a leading progressive thinker, follow up with 'The blindspots of war responsibility' and 'On war responsibil-

Workers at war: class formation in wartime Chongqing

War, as historian Gabriel Kolko notes, has had profound social and revolutionary effects. 'More than any other single factor, the overwhelming and direct consequences of war have shaped the human and political experiences of our century and have become the motor of change within it, creating political and ideological upheavals - revolutions being the most important of them - that otherwise had scant possibility of occurring'.¹

Joshua H. Howard

The War of Resistance against Japan unleashed social changes that set the stage for both civil war and socialist revolution in China. Since the revolution was primarily rurally based, historians have duly explained how the Communists mobilized the peasantry during the pivotal 1937-45 period. This focus has, however, impeded our understanding of social change and conflict in the Nationalist-controlled urban territories, most prominently Chongqing, Chiang Kai-shek's wartime capital between 1938 and 1946. Not even a handful of studies in English exists on the social and political history of Chongqing. With their focus on government elites and institutions, the standard explanations for the Nationalist collapse - government factionalism, hyperinflation, military blunders, and malfeasance - have rendered invisible the role of urban social classes as agents of historical change.

In part, the marginalization of social class and the absence of class analysis derive from the Nationalist government's efforts to exclude class from its language to maintain social order and stifle political dissent. Fearing its subversive quality, Guomindang officials censored any word that resonated with the labour movement. Even the word 'labour' became politically suspect. By 1940, General Yu Dawei, director and architect of the Nationalist arms industry, the largest wartime employer in Nationalist territory, banned the term describing offices dealing with production because, as he warned, 'The word "labour" is a term used to connote conflictual labour-capitalist class [relations]'.² In place of a class-based language, officials substituted a discourse based on patriotism and anti-imperialism. According to Guomindang labour leaders, China's predominantly agricultural economy precluded the formation of distinct social classes, and the country thus did not share the injustices associated with the 'abnormalities' of Western capitalism. Imperialism was the real culprit behind whatever oppression and suffering workers endured. And once the union formed between workers and their employers helped defeat the Japanese, the 'labour problem' would dissipate.

Ironically, Chinese historians have accepted at face value the wartime Nationalist official discourse, according to which the United Front - a multi-class, multi-party alliance committed to resisting Japanese imperialism - rendered issues of class subsidiary to patriotic goals. Labour historians have widely adopted the view that nationalist sentiment subsumed class tensions during the Anti-Japanese War. In the most authoritative work to date on wartime labour, the historian Qi Wu argues that social contradictions did not emerge during the war because of the relative unity between labour and capital in resisting Japan.³ Such an approach

affirms Benedetto Croce's maxim 'All history is contemporary'. China's ongoing market reforms, efforts at rapprochement with Taiwan, and repudiation of the Maoist emphasis on class struggle have reinforced a revisionist trend in mainland Chinese scholarship that has emphasized the Nationalist regime's contributions to the war effort against Japan, the importance of united front work, and the patriotic unity of the Chinese people.

On an experiential level, the devastating air raids on Chongqing no doubt fostered workers' visceral hatred of the 'Japanese devils'. Management capitalized on these sentiments by using patriotic slogans to spur production over the course of gruelling twelve- to sixteen-hour shifts. Qi Wu premises his argument, however, on the relative quiescence of labour during the Anti-Japanese War, compared with the surge in labour militancy during the immediate postwar years. Although persuasive in a general way, this interpretation uncritically takes the ideas supporting the CCP-GMD alliance and the United Front as historical reality and ignores the social dislocation, grievances, and tensions

standard explanations for Nationalist collapse – factionalism, hyperinflation, military blunders, malfeasance – have rendered invisible the role of urban social classes as agents of change

created between workers and managers by the war. Demanding greater human dignity and improved social status, workers also engaged in strikes and sit-downs during the Anti-Japanese War. As many as 300 labour disputes occurred during 1944.

Wartime proletarianization

Several factors facilitated working-class formation in wartime Chongqing. By late 1937, the brutal occupation of the industrial and commercial centres of coastal China by Japanese troops had forced an unprecedented mass migration. Several million migrants fled to the hinterland of southwestern China alongside the relocation of industrial plants. The rapid and forced industrialization of Chongqing during the late 1930s changed the river port entrepôt into southwestern China's centre of heavy industry. Large-scale modern factories depended on the labour of thousands of Sichuanese assembly workers and labourers working alongside a core of skilled workers from China's central and coastal provinces. At the same time, mass production and the pressing wartime demand for labour accelerated the process of proletarianization, by which numerous workers without resources entered a class relationship by selling their labour power to survive. This process forged increasingly common industrial conditions and experiences for skilled workers and labourers.

War created a work regime that emphasized discipline, strenuous work, and productivity. Production increases over the 1940s were not simply the result of technological and managerial reforms introduced a decade before, but built on the backs of labour. Sheer exhaustion was one reason so many workers succumbed to disease and injury. 'You ate on the job so that the machines kept running,' one factory director recalled. 'You did not sleep until late at night, or volunteered to extend [your] working hours to over fourteen hours with no rest at all.... Exhaustion spread among those relying on this death-defying, sweat-drenched spirit of dedication to our country'.⁴ Respiratory disease was the most common sickness. Workers grinding and buffing mortar shells on lathes inhaled particles of dust and ran the risk of being hit in the face by metal shavings. Packing cartridges and shells exposed workers to noxious fumes. Accumulation of dust in the lungs caused scarring and increased susceptibility to trachoma and respiratory infections. Tuberculosis, induced by dust, torrid heat, and sudden changes in temperature, caused the greatest number of fatalities in the steel mills.

In response to low wages, oppressive work conditions and the exodus of thousands of employees, wartime factories instituted elaborate social welfare measures to secure their workers' loyalty. Promotion of industrial welfare - compensation plans, savings schemes, subsidized housing, medical care, rationing of staple goods and low-priced food, cultural and athletic programs - reached new heights during the war period. The distribution of these services and benefits to factory employees, however, privileged management. Intended as a form of social control, welfare programs backfired by polarizing the factory community. These provisions reinforced the social divisions between staff personnel (*zhiyuan*) and production workers (*gongren*), a social gulf premised on the division of mental and manual labour. Daily reminders of their subjugation and segregation brought production workers from different skill levels into the labour movement. The extreme range of material and symbolic disparities heightened workers' sense of injustice and united workers against their social superiors. Workers in large-scale industries, where staff members were a substantial minority and social welfare practices were more extensive, frequently voiced grievances over unequal access to reading rooms, rationing, housing, consumer cooperatives, and entertainment; separate use of canteens and latrines; and disparities in salaries

and bonuses, all of which pitted the two groups against each other.

Class consciousness, demanding dignity

For certain workers, moral injustices translated into consciousness of class. Workers expressed their grievances in terms of a producer consciousness, stressing the moral value of labour and using the language of rights and class. One anonymous worker questioned the monthly rationing of sugar after being informed that only staff members could purchase a catty. 'I'm also human and also Chinese. Why does even the appreciation of food have to be divided by class? Is it possible that workers are constitutionally different from staff officers?... The lack of workers' rights to purchase white sugar is only one [form of] inequality between staff and workers. There are countless others...'⁵

Paradoxically, non-class relations served to heighten workers' sense of class polarization between themselves and staff members. Although ethnicity has usually been viewed as a barrier to class formation, regional rivalries between extra-provincials (often referred to as 'downriver people') and Sichuanese shaped workers' perceptions of class. Throughout much of the 1940s, 'downriver people' played the dominant role in Sichuan society, anticipating the quasi-colonial relationship between mainland Chinese and Taiwanese during the late 1940s and 1950s, when mainlanders occupied elite positions in Taiwan's economy and political system.

Repression in the form of severe military discipline, the intensity of the Nationalist political program (workers in the defence industry were subject to factory cell meetings), and its total separation from the reality of workers' daily life struggles further alienated workers from Nationalist ideologues. While the Guomindang lost support among workers, both underground Communist Party members and non-Communist working-class activists consciously pursued and shaped workers' class consciousness. Communists moved from mobilizing workers en masse during the National Salvation Movement, a patriotic movement that swept urban China during the mid to late 1930s, to developing a clandestine force. By the early 1940s, underground networks, reading societies, and the Communist press had become crucial links between workers and the CCP. The Communist daily, *Xinhua ribao*, in particular, served as an important forum in which to criticize social relations within the factory and to question the legitimacy of the Nationalist government. Workers' grievances and demands for better treatment, or *daiyu* - a term implying higher pay and social status - stemmed from their own work experiences and the prevalent social stigma associated with manual labour. As a former labourer in the

telecommunications bureau recalled, 'I was ridiculed, and this hurt me both physically and psychologically. I often wondered, was I not a person? I also wanted to enjoy people's rights. Why did I have to do corvée labour like a beast of burden and be yelled at to work?'⁶

Arguably, only a militant minority, those who envisioned a radical restructuring of society, promoted the Communist press in wartime Chongqing. But the popularity of *Xinhua ribao* among workers indicates that their ideas did resonate with many workers' sense of injustice and desire for equal treatment. By the mid 1940s, the impulse toward a class movement and class organization among Chongqing workers underlay this process. Through the dynamic of the labour movement, workers' view of the world increasingly made class their point of reference. This was most evident in the concentrated, violent, and often coordinated struggles of workers in the aftermath of the Anti-Japanese War. It was also apparent in workers' increasing demands for unionization and the leftward push of corporatist labour organizations, most notably the Chinese Association of Labour.

At the very least, bringing class back in may cause us to rethink our view of politics in wartime Chongqing, and by extension Nationalist China. From the very first press reports issued from the hilly city, journalists described the Nationalist regime's inexorable decline as a result of its own endemic sicknesses - corruption, bungled fiscal policies, and factionalism. Conversely, while historians continue to debate how the Communists mobilized peasant support in their ascent to power, they have unwittingly minimized the CCP's popular appeals in urban China prior to 1949. To be sure, Chongqing was not 'Red Chongqing,' but its political colours were undoubtedly more vivid than its infamous grey fog. ◀

Notes

1. Kolko, Gabriel. 1994. *Century of War: Politics, Conflicts, and Society Since 1914*. New York: New Press, 220.
2. Howard, Joshua H. 2004. *Workers at War: Labor in China's Arsenal, 1937-1953*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2. Most of the following discussion is based on my research of labour in China's wartime defense industry, which was representative of Chongqing's heavy industry.
3. Qi Wu. 1986. *Kang Ri Zhangzheng shiqi Zhongguo gongren yundong shigao* [A draft history of the Chinese labour movement during the War of Resistance against Japan]. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.
4. Howard, *Workers at War*, 134.
5. *Ibid.*, 160.
6. *Ibid.*, 244.

Joshua Howard
Croft Institute for International Studies
University of Mississippi

Neither victors nor victims: transplanted/suppressed memories of the Sino-Japanese War in postwar Taiwan

Taiwan was a Japanese colony between 1895 and 1945. During the 1937-1945 Sino-Japanese War, the people of Taiwan, as subjects of the Japanese Empire, fought alongside the Japanese against China and the Allied forces. At the end of the war, Taiwan was turned over to its wartime enemy, the Chinese Nationalist (KMT) government. Overnight, wartime enemies became postwar compatriots and fellow citizens. How did the Taiwanese, transformed from Japanese colonial subjects to Chinese citizens, remember the war after 1945?

Mike Shi-chi Lan

In the study of historiography, it is well-argued that a common flaw of history writing is anachronism - writing history based on the present day view instead of what actually happened in the past. If anachronism represents a temporal issue in historiography, the transplantation and suppression of wartime memories in postwar Taiwan points to a neglected spatial dimension in history writing.

Transplanted memories

Under KMT rule between 1945 and 2000, the people of Taiwan were taught a war history transplanted from mainland China while having their own and their ancestors' war histories suppressed from public memory. Immediately after the war, Taiwanese who had worked with the Japanese were indiscriminately accused of collaboration and/or prosecuted as *Hanjian* or Chinese traitors. Even leading anti-Japanese figures such as Lin Xiantang were once considered by the KMT government as *Hanjian* (Qiu 1962:317). The KMT view of Taiwan's wartime experience not only conflated voluntary and forced cooperation with the Japanese; more significantly, it projected the postwar condition of Taiwanese being Chinese nationals backwards into wartime and asserted, anachronistically, that Taiwanese were Chinese nationals during the war.

This transplantation of a mainland Chi-

nese view of recent history was intensified as the KMT government retreated and consolidated itself on Taiwan in 1949. To mold patriotic Chinese out of former colonial subjects, KMT government policy propagated as orthodoxy its own view of the war. In history textbooks and official accounts, the war only consisted of events that did not take place in Taiwan: the 9/18 or September 18 Incident (*jiuyiba shibian*) in Shenyang (Mukden) of 1931, the 7/7 or July 7 Incident (*qiqi shibian*) or Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident of 1937, and others. The war as a whole was known as the 'Eight-year War of Resistance (against the Japanese) (*banian kangzhan*)'. Memory of the war based on these events did not take into account what happened in Taiwan and to Taiwanese, and subsequently contributed to a view of the war that was entirely China-centered. As a result, postwar Taiwanese absorbed the transplanted perspective of the victors, which was the opposite of the true wartime experiences of Taiwanese.

Suppressed memories

As the KMT government transplanted the mainland Chinese view of the war to postwar Taiwan, it suppressed memory of what did happen in Taiwan. Before 1945, China was at war with Japan; as subjects of Japan, the people of Taiwan were at war with the people of China. However, memory of this experience was largely suppressed. For example, the history of more than 200,000 Taiwanese-native Japanese soldiers and military per-

sonnel (*taiji ribenbing*) who had fought against the Chinese and Allied forces, and the resulting Chinese hostility towards Taiwanese, was nowhere to be found between 1945 and 1990.

Stories of Taiwanese casualties and suffering in the war against the Allied forces, such as the aborigines who perished as Japanese military conscripts and who were subsequently enshrined in Japan's Yasukuni Shrine, did not fit the history of the 'War of Resistance'. Thus, stories of Taiwanese being wartime victims were rarely included in postwar accounts. It was not until the 1990s that oral history by Taiwanese vet-

China's takeover of Taiwan was depicted as a glorious recovery, discounting the sense of loss, fear and uncertainty that many Taiwanese felt when they learned of Japan's defeat

erans (Zhou 1997) and films like Hou Hsiao-hsien's 1995 *Good Man Good Woman* (*haonan haonu*) - which briefly touched upon Chinese wartime hostility towards Taiwanese who went to the mainland to join the 'war of resistance' - began to rescue Taiwanese wartime experiences from postwar Chinese Nationalist representations.

Whose memories?

This transplantation of memory from mainland China and the suppression of memory from within Taiwan complemented and reinforced one another to construct a *false memory* of the war. For example, the people of Taiwan were represented as patriotic Chinese fighting the Japanese, most bluntly in government-sponsored publications or movies such as *Victory* (or *Meihua*, plum blossom, 1976) in the 1970s. Contradicting historical facts, all respectable Taiwanese in *Victory* spoke Mandarin and fought China's 'war of resistance' - against Japanese rule in Taiwan, and against Japanese military invasion in China.

Similar processes of transplantation/suppression of historical memory and constructions of false memory informed representations of Taiwan's wartime international relations. As a part of the Japanese war machine, Taiwanese were mobilized to support and consequently suffered dearly from Japan's war against the Allies. Toward the end of the war, Taiwan was heavily bombed by the Allied air force. However, this part of wartime history was rarely found in postwar accounts as it contradicted the transplanted KMT government's view where the Allies were the saviors of Taiwan and friends of China. As a result, these episodes, too, were suppressed from public memory. Instead, what was emphasized in postwar accounts of Taiwan's wartime international relations

was the benevolence of the Allies. Most notably, the 1943 meeting between Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo and the resulting joint statement (known as the 'Cairo Declaration' in postwar accounts) was featured and highly celebrated.

The most notable example of false memory was the account of China's commitment to recover Taiwan. Between 1895 and 1942, Chinese authorities never challenged the status of Taiwan as prescribed in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. It was not until 3 November 1942 that the then Chinese Foreign Minister Song Ziwen (T.V. Soong) stated China should 'retrieve

ous recovery' continues to prevail in Taiwan today.

As a result of the aforementioned processes of transplantation and suppression of historical memory, Taiwanese largely forgot their own wartime history of fighting and suffering as part of the Japanese wartime empire. What the Taiwanese remembered about the war was, instead, mainland China's wartime history. But while remembering the transplanted Other's war history of glory and triumph, Taiwanese were continuously reminded that they did not win the war. It was often asserted in history textbooks and official accounts that it was the Chinese, contrary to the Taiwanese who sided with Japan, who fought the 'national war of resistance (*minzu kangzhan*)'. As a result, the Taiwanese hardly recognized themselves, or were recognized by others, as victors of the war. At the same time, since Taiwan's own wartime history of fighting and suffering was largely suppressed in public memory, Taiwanese hardly recognized themselves, or were recognized by others, as victims of the war.

Taiwanese postwar memories of being neither victors nor victims challenge the conventional epistemological paradigm that categorically identifies victors and victims in wartime history. Furthermore, the transplantation and suppression of Taiwanese wartime memories, as discussed in this paper, point to a spatial dimension in history writing that deserves more scholarly attention. ◀

References

- Qiu Niantai. 1962. *Wode fendou shi* [history of my struggle]. Taipei: Zhonghua ribaoshe.
- Wang Qingjia (Q. Edward Wang). 2002. *Taiwan shixue wushi nian (1950-2000): chuancheng, fangfa, quxiang* (original English title: *Writing History in Taiwan: Tradition and Transformation, 1950-2000*). Taipei: Maitian chuban.
- Zhang Ruicheng, ed. 1990. *Selected Important Documents on Recovering Taiwan, 1937-1945*. Taipei: Historical Commission, Central Committee of the Kuomintang.
- Zhou Wanyao (Chou Wan-yao), ed. 1997. *Taiji ribenbing zuotanhui jilu bing xiangguan ziliao* (record from the roundtable discussion by Taiwanese-native Japanese soldiers and related materials). Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History Preparatory Office, Academia Sinica.

Mike Shi-chi Lan is Assistant Professor in the Division of Chinese and Coordinator of the Master of Arts in Contemporary China programme at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research addresses modern Chinese history - particularly Chinese nationalism and China-Taiwan relations - and the intellectual and social history of modern East Asia. He is currently working on the production and intersection of national identities, historical knowledge and memory in China and Taiwan.

[advertisement]

BOOKS FROM ISEAS
http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg

NATION BUILDING
Five Southeast Asian Histories
Wang Gungwu, editor
981-230-317-0 Soft cover US\$25.90
981-230-320-9 Hand cover US\$39.90


SINGAPORE AND THE INDONESIAN REVOLUTION 1945-50
Suryono Darusman
981-230-17-5 US\$12.55

ORAL HISTORY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Theory and Method
Patricia Lim Pui Huen, James H. Morrison and Kwa Chong Guan, editors
981-230-027-9 US\$27.90

CHINA AND TAIWAN
Cross-Strait Relations Under
Chen Shui-bian
Sheng Lijun
981-230-110-0 Soft cover US\$21.90
981-230-097-X Hand cover US\$43.90

WAR AND MEMORY IN MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE
P. Lim Pui Huen and Diana Wong, editors
981-230-037-6 US\$27.40

INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES
30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang, Singapore 119614
Tel: 65 6870 2447 Fax: 65 6775 6259 E-mail: pubsub@iseas.edu.sg



photograph by author, 2003

The 'Dwelling of Remembrance' monument dedicated to victims of the Tokyo air raids

Memorializing the Tokyo air raids

Tokyo occupies a peculiar place in Japan's landscape of war memory. As capital city and host to Yasukuni Shrine and other national sites of memory, it figures prominently. Yet as a city lived and experienced by its residents, it seems a place where history holds little sway. Where are the memorials and museums that remember the dead and try to make sense of the 100,000 civilians who perished in the air raid of 10 March 1945, which initiated the US government's embrace of urban terror bombing as a legitimate form of warfare? Where are the places through which Tokyoites have attempted to understand and convey the violence that the Japanese government allowed to be inflicted upon the city's inhabitants in the closing months of the war?

Cary Karacas

Unlike many places in Japan - most notably Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Okinawa - Tokyo to date has not erected a prominent memorial space to serve as a vital if imperfect reminder of the tragedies inflicted by the war. Indeed, markers of Tokyo being laid waste by incendiary bombs in 1945 are so peripheral that most Tokyoites would be hard pressed to locate them. There is, however, a public air raid memorial in a small park just north of the popular Edo-Tokyo Museum. Constructed by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and dedicated in 2001, the semi-circular, flower-covered granite monument, according to its dedication plaque, is meant 'to mourn and remember the over 100,000 civilians killed in the air raids, as well as promote the pursuit of peace by acting as a permanent reminder of the tragedy that occurred'. Examining how this particular structure came into being gives us a sense of the determinants that have contributed to how the Tokyo air raids have and haven't been publicly remembered.

Let's begin with where the memorial is located, in Sumida ward's Yokoami Park. On 1 September 1923, after a major earthquake struck the metropolis, tens of thousands of people from a working class quarter of the city took refuge from the spreading fires by fleeing to the two hectare park, only to lose their lives as a firestorm swept upon them. Tokyoites came to identify the park with this catastrophe and turned it into a sacred space of sorts: the city government and citizens erected Earthquake Memorial Hall and a charnel house to hold the victims' remains, as well as a museum and numerous memorials to remember the disaster and its human toll. Just fifteen years after the celebration of the capital's reconstruction and Yokoami Park's inauguration in 1930, catastrophe re-visited the city, as incendiary bombs made refugees of millions and reduced half the metropolis to a wasteland filled with charred corpses.

The metropolitan government quickly buried most of the air raid victims in mass graves located in parks, temple precincts, and on private land, where they remained for several years. Dissension between interest groups on where victims' remains should permanently be stored caused the Occupation's General Headquarters to order the metropolitan government to use the charnel house in Yokoami Park. The government did so, putting the cremated remains of 105,000 air raid victims next to the ashes of the 58,000 victims of the 1923 disaster. Since 1950, the city has sponsored Buddhist memorial services for both groups every 1 September and 10 March. Besides these services, few public remembrances of the Tokyo air raids occurred for 25 years. Censorship during the occupation, the exclusive focus on the suffering in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Tokyo's first postwar governor's desire to reconstruct a 'light' or *akarui* Tokyo, and the fact that women, children, and the elderly in a working class part of the city bore the brunt of the catastrophe all contributed to this relative silence.

Remembering catastrophe in Tokyo and Asia

In an important shift in 1970, Tokyo governor Minobe Ryōkichi - a self-described 'flexible utopian socialist' - offered to fund the newly formed Society for Recording the Tokyo Air Raids to publish a multi-volume account of the raids. The

project was significant in allowing survivors to recover memories of the horrific events, and stimulated others throughout the country to write histories of their own cities' destruction. In 1973, a nationwide Society for Recording Air Raids decided to build resource centres throughout Japan as a way of transmitting the experience to future generations. While some cities made progress toward realizing this goal, Tokyo's fiscal crisis prevented governor Minobe from building what came to be called the Tokyo Peace Museum.

The election of Suzuki Shun'ichi as governor in 1979 further complicated the task. Suzuki's conservative leanings and his global city vision for Tokyo did not match the evolving approach of those who continued to lobby for the Tokyo Peace Museum. The Society to Build Peace Museums, in part an outgrowth of the Society for Recording Air Raids, took the position that any museum meant to transmit the experience of air raids on Japan's cities had to be situated within a broader narrative about the war's causes and effects, and that discussion of Japan's aggression in Asia and its war responsibility must play a key role in any museum meant to promote 'peace consciousness'.



Remains of woman and infant after the March 1945 Tokyo air raid

Governor Suzuki chafed at this approach and refused to build the structure. When a coalition led by the Socialist Party assumed control of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly in the early 1990s, it forced the governor, now in his fourth and final term, to issue a directive to proceed with the Tokyo Peace Museum. In 1993, a committee returned the design for a 5,000 square meter structure, secured a site for it near the mouth of the Sumida River, and came up with a guiding philosophy for 'Tokyo's twenty-first century symbol of peace'. While mourning the dead and conveying the experience of the air raids was its main purpose, the committee asserted it should also relate the wartime suffering Japan had caused by incorporating an exhibit on Japan's air raids on Chinese cities and creating a memorial dedicated to both Tokyo firebombing victims and 'worldwide victims of the war'.

Battles over the place of memory

Suzuki, instead of building the structure, allowed his successor to inherit the commitment. Controversy erupted when the governor's office announced that the site of the museum would be moved to Yokoami Park, and again when it was declared that the museum would be built *underground* to preserve an early Showa era structure housing exhibits from the 1923 earthquake. Many protested that building the peace museum in Yokoami Park and anchoring Tokyo air raid mem-

ories there would infringe on its role as a commemoration space for those killed in the 1923 disaster. Others argued that placing the structure underground was not fitting for Tokyo's twenty-first century symbol of peace.

As protests against the planned construction of the peace museum in Yokoami Park continued, another form of opposition arose, this time against the contents of the proposed exhibit. Leading the charge was neo-nationalist Fujioka Nobukatsu, founder of the Advancement of a Liberal View of History Study Group, whose purpose was to combat the 'masochistic historical perspective' of school textbooks that included mention of Japanese atrocities committed in Asia. Fujioka also took a strong position against the conciliatory messages of Japan's peace museums. To prevent the Tokyo Peace Museum from being built, he formed the oddly-named Citizens Concerned about Peace in Tokyo, organized protests in Yokoami Park, and wrote many opinion pieces attacking the exhibit proposals.

Exhibits that mentioned such things as Japanese air raids in China, Fujioka argued, would lead visitors to conclude that the Tokyo air raids directly resulted from Japan's activities in Asia, and would accordingly 'trample on the hearts of children and exert mind control over them'. Tokyo, Fujioka insisted, should build a memorial to the air raid victims without delay; the museum could wait until a consensus had been reached on what ought to be included in the exhibits.

In 1999, Fujioka's protests and his alliance with a local politician resulted in a Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly decision to prohibit the construction of the museum and to have the monument built in Yokoami Park. Contrary to the original plan, the monument was not to mention 'worldwide victims of the war', but refer only to the air raid victims, mourning, and peace.

In March 2001, Governor Ishihara Shintarō presided over the dedication of the 'Dwelling of Remembrance' monument, which eerily resembles the air raid shelters that dotted Tokyo during the war. Some bereaved relatives were consoled that, after more than half a century, Tokyo had publicly remembered those who died in the fire bombings. Other air raid survivors were less impressed, charging that it can never achieve the goals assigned to it. The monument, they argued, because it was built in Yokoami Park and without the peace museum, can never adequately pay tribute to the dead or promote the pursuit of peace. Given the ongoing controversies over the appropriate place to situate the Tokyo air raids, both in the city's landscape and that of Japan's war memory, we may recall a line from Robert Lowell's poem 'For the Union Dead':

*Their monument sticks like
a fishbone
in the city's throat*

Cary Karacas is a PhD candidate in Geography at the University of California, Berkeley. His dissertation examines how war, occupation, and reconstruction affected and shaped Tokyo. ckaracas@berkeley.edu

The memory wars: Japan, China and Asia's future

In the post-surrender but pre-occupation Japan of August 1945, Japan's still military-dominated and emperor-led government decreed a new history teaching policy for schools. It became known as *suminuru*: the 'blackening over' of 'passages deemed to be militaristic, nationalistic, or in some manner undemocratic' in schoolbooks concerned with modern Japan. The blackening was done by the students themselves with brush and ink, in class - and often several coats of *sumi* (ink) were required.¹

Peter King

Ever since the occupation ended in 1952, an ostensibly purged and progressive education ministry (*Monbusho*) has regularly carried out a comparable 'whitening over' exercise (a mixture of both outright censorship and nationalistic whitewash) on the textbooks of the day. For instance, having conceded in 1997 the existence of the *ianfu* ('comfort woman') system of forced prostitution run by the imperial army in China and the Pacific theatre of war from 1937-45, the latest history textbooks approved in April this year have been obliged to erase the whole topic once again. This immediately created yet another crisis for Japan in relations with Korea and China, whose women were the chief victims of the system. And for the first time, too, some of these textbooks also endorse the official Japanese claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea which is hotly disputed by Beijing.

Whitening over

Contemporary whitening over is not done by children with brush and ink, of course, but by censorship panels at *Monbusho* under relentless pressure from the reigning bureaucrats at the ministry and the ascendant politicians of *Jiminto*, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). So one has to suspect that the whitening out of the comfort women may be followed by similar treatment of the forced labour system which saw thousands of abducted Koreans and Chinese slaving in the mines and factories of wartime Japan. Even the more famous wartime atrocities, such as the Nanjing massacre of 1937 and the ghastly human experiments and chemical and bacterial attacks orchestrated by Unit 731 in Manchuria, may be slated for this treatment.

Already the deficiencies of Japan's educational system seem to have had a determinable and deadly impact on the attitudes of Japanese youth: 'In a 1982 NHK [the national broadcaster] poll of 2,623 people, 10 per cent of those aged 16 to 19, and 11 per cent of those in their 20s, replied that "they can't tell" whether Japan waged a war of aggression [in China and the Pacific]. Those ratios grew to 29 per cent and 37 percent, respectively, in [a] 2000 poll'.²

Japanese widely regard themselves as among the principal victims in World War Two - not so much, unfortunately, as victims of their own government, but as victims of discriminatory American policies in the lead-up to war, and of blockade, indiscriminate fire bombing and nuclear holocaust towards war's end. They have a point here, of course, but so far the US has passed up the chance to set Japan a good example. Apparently superpowers need never say sorry, even to close allies, for inflicting needless death, suffering and destruction.

The suffering and damage inflicted by Japan's armies have never been adequately acknowledged in official quarters. But if Japan is to gain acceptance as a good regional neighbour and 'normal' country in the 21st century, it seems to have become imperative to rectify a flawed and failed process of apology. Because the politics of apology have been so excruciating - always hostage to the electoral and other priorities of the core nationalist support base of *Jiminto* - the apologies themselves have been largely vitiated by euphemism, half-heartedness, insincerity and conspicuous lack of follow-up.

At the heart of this failure is the preceding American failure to set Japan, as it did Germany, on a truly new course in 1945. This was above all the result of General MacArthur's decision to preserve the emperor system and ruthlessly shield the Showa emperor Hirohito himself from being held responsible as commander in chief for Japan's aggressions and atrocities. Supposing that a

claims, Japan's rearmament and its deepening strategic ties with the United States. It has brought the Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship to a postwar nadir.

There are now two competing visions of a 'normal' Japan. One is a repentant Japan still committed to peace, a serious apology process and good neighbourly relations in Asia. The other is a Japan which would do away with the restrictions of the US-imposed 'Peace Constitution' of 1947, in particular its war-renouncing Article 9, and free Japanese diplomacy to adopt a complete repertoire of *realpolitik* instruments and policy approaches. These would range from uninhibited armed international peace-keeping to active prosecution of Japan's maritime territorial/resource disputes with China and South Korea, and possibly also a nuclear spear to complement or replace the US nuclear umbrella in dealing with a nuclear North Korea. There is potential for friction with Japan's so far indispensable hyperpow-

731, the Nanjing killings, etc., remain largely a closed book. The government's reflexive habit is to come clean, albeit reluctantly and partially, only under pressure, including the pressure of scholars and journalists stumbling across explosive secret material.

3) Compensation of war victims

A proper legal framework for compensation would bring to an end the stultifying and inconsistent treatment of the whole issue by the Japanese courts. Victims could be reached out to rather than subject to years of costly and (usually) fruitless litigation - and regular public relations disasters for the Japanese government avoided.

All of this would make for an acceptably 'normal' Japan in China and elsewhere. At present, prime ministerial references to the pain and suffering of Japan's wartime victims are negated by persisting bureaucratic cover-up and judicial stone-walling, and also by widespread political 'denialism', symbolised above all by regular prime ministerial visits to honour (among other war dead) the Class A (and B and C) war criminals memorialised at the notorious Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo.

A sincere policy of apology would make for an easier transition to a more diplomatically and strategically self-reliant, less Washington-dependent Japan. A permanent UN Security Council seat could ensue, together with an opportunity to negotiate a lasting settlement of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands/resources dispute with China free of mutually aggravating nationalistic eruptions. As things stand, there is little possibility of clearing the increasingly toxic atmosphere between Beijing and Tokyo. Yet some kind of strategic understanding is essential to face the inevitable reconstruction of the bilateral relationship as Japan strives to be 'normal' and China to gain acceptance as a global great power. The huge continuing flow of trade and investment between the two is clearly now a vulnerable hostage to a dysfunctional relationship. In addition, Tokyo can look forward to more populist but officially condoned attacks on Japanese property and even persons in China when textbook revision and Yasukuni visit times come around.

It takes two

But of course it takes two to settle, and the Chinese government role in recent eruptions of nationalist resentment directed at Japan is not encouraging. China muddied the whole issue of compensation for Japan's war crimes and occupation during the 1970s by setting them aside in favour of receiving a large Japanese aid program immediately. It also, for many years, gave no aid and comfort to individual Chinese victims of imperial Japan. Now all is greatly changed and the government is riding a

nationalist tiger in a more prosperous and internationally oriented China.

Whether the authoritarian legates of Mao can ride this tiger or will be thrown off or even eaten by it remains to be seen. In any case, Beijing would do well to avoid the kinds of pitfalls which the Japanese government has already succumbed to, including a dogmatic defence of dubious historical positions and heedless hypocrisy in demanding history-based apology. For instance, the widely accepted but increasingly discredited victim tally of the Nanjing massacre (300,000) is literally inscribed in stone at the Nanjing Memorial Hall, making any serious Chinese - or, better still, joint Sino-Japanese - scholarly exploration of the 1937 atrocities that much more difficult.³

As for the Chinese government's own role in China's self-inflicted post-1949 disasters, the more said in sincerity the better. But so far we - and the Chinese people - have heard very little from those currently responsible for coming to terms with those disasters.

In a word, Japanese and Chinese governments and civil societies in various combinations must work together to ease the drift into entrenched hostility and conflict in the bilateral relationship. But there is little doubt where the prime onus for initiating this process should fall. Sixty years of prevarication and evasion in Tokyo on its catastrophic Asian adventure in *lebensraum* have been enough. ◀

Notes

1. Dower, John. 1999. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York: WW Norton, p 247
2. Reiji Yoshida, 'Doubts over Tokyo Tribunal's linger', *Japan Times*, 4 August 2005
3. Depending on decisions about duration, geographical scope, definition of 'victims', etc for the massacre, a new consensus among responsible professional historians is emerging which sets the victim tally at around 100,000. See David Askew, 'New Research on the Nanjing Incident', *Japan-Focus*, No 109, 2004

Peter King is an affiliated fellow at IIAS and a research associate in Government and International Relations at Sydney University, where he was founding president, later director, of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. From 1993-96 he was Professor of Australian Studies at Tokyo University. His most recent book is West Papua and Indonesia since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or Chaos? UNSW Press, Sydney, 2004.

'we deeply regret to have caused him [the emperor] so much anxiety'

— Prime Minister Higashikuni, 4 September 1945

whitewashed emperor system was essential to ensure an easy occupation, the US passed up the chance to propel the Japanese towards profound reflection on their fateful adventure of 'escape from Asia', while Washington was soon keenly collaborating with most of the surviving wartime elite in the local and global anti-Communist struggle.

With the war criminal in chief on the imperial throne and the surviving wartime elite exonerated, it was always going to be hard for the Japanese people themselves to contribute to the expiation of national guilt. But Japan's civil society has been struggling valiantly with this burden ever since, even while Japan's democratization remains problematical. There is no longer (yet) a military caste, but the bureaucracy and political class have never managed to shed the Showa legacy, even though its toxic mixture of outright racism on the part of the 'children of the sun god' and impunity and reckless expansionism on the part of the military have little resonance in contemporary Japan. But the shades of Showa - denying wartime atrocity - keep punishing its victims and the victims keep fighting back.

Politics of apology

China, for instance, is well prepared to use its UN veto and block Japan from achieving long-desired permanent membership of the Security Council on the grounds that the war issue remains unresolved. The nationalist eruptions in China over the history textbook issue in April 2005 are now fatefully entangled with the issue of disputed maritime

erally in both kinds of 'normality', but its militarised version on the whole seems to entail more active strategic cooperation with the US than ever before, including potentially a role in the defence of Taiwan.

Ironically, this kind of normalisation will further antagonise and intensify disputes with the very countries that were the victims of Japan's first 'normalisation' - as a would-be Western-style imperialist. In other words, Japan will continue to be regarded as abnormal by its close East Asian neighbours, and the power-political option will be just as fraught with burdens and dangers as the post-1931 (or post-1894, if you will) misadventure in China. The road not taken - a genuine purge of all the major protagonists of imperial militarism, and a policy of sincere 'in-depth' apology complemented by an opening of archives and compensation of victims - would have made a vast difference to Japan's contemporary regional standing.

It's worth spelling out in detail what 'sincerity' could or should entail in the politics of apology for Japan:

- 1) Apology wide and deep
So far the lawmakers of the Diet have been absent from the process. Ad hoc, often euphemistic interventions by emperors and liberal-minded (Murayama, Hosokawa) or under-pressure (Koizumi) prime ministers have proved inadequate.
- 2) Coming clean
Japanese government archives on forced labour, the *ianfu* system, Unit

A slow remembering: China's memory of the war against Japan

Sparked by accusations that the Japanese Ministry of Education had authorized textbooks that whitewash atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers during the war, China's public was allowed to vent its rage in April 2005. The Japanese consulate in Shanghai was attacked with stones and bottles, while the authorities warned foreigners of all nationalities to stay away from the demonstrations. Sixty years after the end of the Sino-Japanese war, the history of that period is becoming more, not less prominent in the contemporary politics of both societies.

Rana Mitter

At the start of the twenty-first century, Japan would like to be seen as a nation-state looking to the future. Even in recession, it remains an economic superpower, its popular culture (whether in the shape of *anime*, Hello Kitty or Beat Takeshi) globally significant. In many ways the country's recent attempt to seek a permanent seat on the UN Security Council reflects a justified belief that Japan has earned a place at the top table. Yet, the continuing divide in the way Japan sees its postwar identity (primarily as victim), and the way other Asian nations see Japan (largely as an aggressor), shows no sign of fading. The Chinese decision to bring its war against Japan back to the centre of its nationalism is not a temporary phenomenon, and reflects a determination to force Japan to define its present in terms of its past.

The disappearing war

In one sense, China's new awareness of its anti-Japanese conflict is part of a process by which its attitude toward its own history is becoming more normal. For all other major powers involved in the Second World War, victorious or defeated, engagement with their war experience was a crucial part of creating postwar identity, whether it was Britain coming to terms with the loss of its

ists were corrupt fools who cared only for themselves and little for China; the collaborators were worse, traitors beyond redemption. While the Japanese themselves were not forgotten, and the Cultural Revolution in particular gave rise to writings and cartoons that portrayed them in savage caricature, much of the Chinese historical discussion of the war seemed to regard the enemies within as more important than the dangerous neighbours who had come across the sea of Japan.

A new war history

The 1980s marked a turning point in the Chinese treatment of the war. A combination of factors led to a change in the way both academic and public historians dealt with the conflict. In the early Cold War period, one of the motivations for the People's Republic to soft-pedal the Japanese war record was a desire to detach Japan from the Cold War embrace of the US, and achieve diplomatic recognition. With the opening of full relations between China and Japan in 1972, this was no longer an issue. Then, the deaths of implacable enemies Mao and Chiang stimulated the reformist Chinese government to find ways to woo Taiwan into reunification. Finally, the CCP's domestic legitimacy came under serious pressure in the reform era as old Maoist economic certainties were abandoned.

tions, and civic associations can be seen as part of 'civil society' when their agendas remain constrained by state and party. Nevertheless, the state has been unable wholly to control the consequences of its decision to allow public expression of anger against the war. Opinion polls have shown that the younger generation is, if anything, more inclined to harbour hostile feelings against Japan due to the war, while events exacerbating the wounds flare up regularly. In 2003, a public outcry was engineered because of an 'orgy' held by Japanese businessmen in Zhuhai on 18 September, supposedly a deliberate insult to the anniversary of September 18, 1931, the date of the invasion of Manchuria. In 2004, there was public condemnation of Japanese chemical and bacteriological warfare in the Northeast, sparked by the discovery of long-hidden bombs from the war years. And, spring 2005 saw permission granted for demonstrations against any Japanese attempt to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. But it seems unlikely that the government was enthusiastic about the sheer violence of the demonstrators in Beijing, who brought bottles and stones to shower the embassy, or by the repeat

performance with the Japanese consulate in Shanghai.

Prospects

It is clear that sixty years after the end of World War II, positions in China and Japan over the meaning of the war have hardened. While there are entrenched positions on both sides, the space for public discussion of the wartime experience remains more multifaceted in Japan. There, polemicists of the far right take ludicrous negationist positions, arguing that atrocities such as the Nanjing massacre never took place, or else were wildly exaggerated. A quick glance at, for instance, diaries and letters from third-country missionaries suggests that this is historically untenable. Then again, a significant proportion of the mainstream of Japanese historians as well as public discussion acknowledges Japanese wartime guilt, and regards it as a reason why the country should not seek full rearmament. Indeed, it was leftwing Japanese journalists who were instrumental in drawing attention to the Nanjing massacre in the early 1970s when the subject was hardly discussed in China itself.

In China, there has been a genuine and undeniable opening up of discussion about the war years. Yet much of it is still tied to an explicitly political, rather than historical agenda: the signs outside the museums in Nanjing and Beijing proclaim proudly and honestly that they are 'sites for the encouragement of patriotic education.' This approach has meant that the changes in history still, sixty years on, look monolithic rather than nuanced; for instance, Chiang Kaishek's record of patriotism has been reassessed more positively (just as he has fallen from favour in Taiwan), but collaboration still remains a difficult subject to broach. The contrast with Taiwan is evident, where democratization and liberalization have led to much more complex and ambivalent responses to the period of Japanese rule. As long as the CCP remains unwilling to allow similarly nuanced discussions of China's own war experience, it will continue to provide fuel for the most unsavoury elements of the right in Japan. <

Rana Mitter

Institute for Chinese Studies
University of Oxford

[advertisement]

the younger generation is, if anything, more inclined to harbour hostile feelings against Japan due to the war

empire, France and Germany seeking a new type of European union, or Japan turning from strong-armed empire to demilitarized economic powerhouse. Of all the major powers, only China failed as a society to engage with the meaning of its anti-Japanese conflict. This was in large part due to the way China moved from world war to Cold War. The Nationalists and Communists were at war by 1946, while the eventual victory of the Communists in 1949 meant that a balanced consideration of the earlier war was impossible, even though it had ended less than four years previously. Through most of the Cold War, the aspects of the War of Resistance to Japan discussed and féted in China mostly related to the experience of the Communist base areas, in particular the Shaan-GanNing base with its capital at Yan'an.

This concentration meant other issues were absent from discussion: there was little engaged analysis of the role of the Nationalist government, Chinese collaboration in occupied areas, or activities in Communist base areas outside the Mao-dominated Northwest. Where the first two were discussed, it was generally in the monochrome terms of a classic Confucian history: the National-

New sources of legitimacy were needed, and among the sources of that legitimacy was the restoration of official interest in the war against Japan. Officially-endorsed versions of the new historiography appeared in many media: films, books, and perhaps most concretely (in all senses of the term), three massive museums in Nanjing, Beijing, and Shenyang, respectively on the sites of the Nanjing Massacre, the Marco Polo Bridge incident that marked the outbreak of all-out war, and the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. There was also a marked growth in scholarly interest in the period, the most notable example being the journal *KangRi zhanzheng yanjiu* (Research on the War of Resistance to Japan), published since 1991 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which deals with topics on the period that could only have been dreamed of a decade or two earlier.

Public responses

The war also provides some of the more worrying phenomena which stem from the new space for discussion and argument in Chinese society. One of the most contentious discussions in the field of contemporary Chinese politics is the extent to which the media, demonstra-

神州展望

china perspectives

Benefit from an original and in-depth analysis of Greater China's fast evolution

A bimonthly journal on contemporary China published in Hong Kong, by the CEFC (French Centre for Research on Contemporary China), **china perspectives** offers insightful commentary on all the issues — political, economic, anthropological or cultural — through in-depth analysis of all the latest key developments, background articles on a wide range of subjects and reviews of the latest publications

| ONE YEAR (6 ISSUES) | PERSONAL | INSTITUTIONAL | STUDENTS |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Hong Kong & Macau | <input type="checkbox"/> HK\$ 450 | <input type="checkbox"/> HK\$700 | <input type="checkbox"/> HK\$350 |
| Europe | <input type="checkbox"/> € 70 | <input type="checkbox"/> €110 | <input type="checkbox"/> €55 |
| Other countries | <input type="checkbox"/> US\$ 80 | <input type="checkbox"/> US\$120 | <input type="checkbox"/> US\$60 |

You can subscribe online at
<http://www.cefc.com.hk>

Information: Tel: (852) 2815 1728 Fax: (852) 2815 3211 E-mail: cefc@cefc.com.hk



I am most grateful to Prof. Ayako Ehara for providing the illustration.

Wartime issue of the magazine *Katei to Ryōri* (Home and Cooking)

Katarzyna J. Cwiertka

Alongside the industrialization of production and the commercialisation of consumption of food, many societies over the past hundred years have seen increased government intervention in their diets. The dissemination of nutritional science through state institutions denoted newly-emerging connections between power, welfare and knowledge within the workings of the nation-state. The most direct interventions by the state were seen in times of war, when accountants and dieticians determined the diets of hundreds of thousands of drafted individuals, and when civilian consumption was restricted by food shortage and policy-making (Bentley 1998, Helstosky 2004). This was also the case in wartime Japan, where the involvement of the state in public nutrition became particularly pronounced after 1937. In line with the new doctrine of 'total war' emphasizing the total mobilization of the civilian population, nutritional knowledge was rapidly transformed from a scientific domain of specialists into practical advice for the people. State institutions singled out diet as an important home-front weapon essential for preserving order and productivity, and actively participated in popularising nutritional knowledge.

This claim stands in sharp contrast with the image of wartime Japanese society sketched by Ruth Benedict in her best-seller *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, where she argues that 'the Japanese do not recognize the one-to-one correspondence which Americans postulate between body nourishment and body strength' (Benedict 1990:182-183). Sound nutritional policies of the wartime government were also overshadowed by the patriotic symbolism of the 'Rising Sun Lunch Box' (*hinomaru bentō*), whose nutritional value can easily be questioned. *Hinomaru bentō* consisted of plain boiled rice and plum pickle (*umeboshi*) placed in the centre of a rectangular lunch box, which together resembled the Japanese flag. The origin of the *hinomaru bentō* is attributed to a 1937 initiative of a girls' school in Hiroshima prefecture, where this patriotic lunch box was consumed by pupils each Monday as

a token of solidarity with the troops fighting in China. By 1939, the idea was adopted by schools all over the country, and during subsequent years the 'flag lunch' rose to a symbol of national unity (Kosuge 1997:169, 178).

Yet, despite its symbolic potential, *hinomaru bentō* was by no means representative of the general approach to nutrition in wartime Japan. Knowledge of how to make maximum use of limited resources was seen as essential for national security, and therefore the authorities propagated science-based practical advice on nutrition. Like other projects undertaken after 1937 for the sake of improving the health and welfare of the populace, military initiative was responsible for placing nutrition high on the agenda of policy makers.

Feeding the troops

Efforts to improve the army diet could be observed since the turn of the twentieth century, but thorough reforms began after World War I. The objective behind these reforms was to maintain soldiers' bodies and morale in the best possible

drafted peasants' sons became acquainted with multicultural military menus drawn on pre-war urban gastronomy

condition at minimum cost. In other words, food served to the troops needed to be nourishing, tasty and cheap. Innovations to achieve this goal involved a wide-ranging educational program for army cooks, as well as the introduction of modern cooking equipment to economize on human labour (meat grinders, vegetable cutters, dish washers) and ingredients with long shelf life (dehydrated vegetables, powdered fish stock, tinned food). In 1929, further reforms were implemented at the organizational level – the assignment of kitchen personnel was changed from a shift-based to a permanent system, and the delivery of provisions was extended to include all ingredients. Thus far, only staple foods (rice, barley, wheat) had been delivered by the depot while remaining provisions were purchased locally by each unit (Yasuhara and Imai 2002:9).

By the 1930s, army catering turned into a model of efficient mass catering, with specialized equipment, motivated and well-educated personnel, and exciting menus that included Japanese-Western and Japanese-Chinese eclectic dishes. Japanese authorities had three important reasons for incorporating foreign dishes into their menu. First of all, the Japanese cooking repertoire did not include meat dishes, while meat was considered essential for the strength of the troops. Second, foreign cooking techniques such as stewing, pan-frying and deep-frying used fat – another foodstuff that was lacking in Japanese cuisine – and provided a cheap source of calories. Strong flavouring agents, such as curry powder, helped to hide the smell/taste of stale ingredients. Third, stews, stir-fries, curries and croquettes were not only hearty, relatively inexpensive and convenient to make, but also unknown, and therefore equally uncontroversial to all soldiers regardless of their regional taste preferences. By the time the Sino-Japanese war broke out, these dishes had become soldiers' favourites and had acquired a clear military connotation (Cwiertka 2002).

The home front

The Army Provisions' Depot was from the late 1920s also increasingly involved in reforming civilian mass catering. Its influence was channelled through the umbrella organization of *Ryōyūkai* (Provisions Friends Society). Officially, *Ryōyūkai* was not part of the military. However, its headquarters were established at the Central Army Provisions Depot in Tokyo, its projects were supervised by the depot's people, and its board included high-ranking officials of the army.

The major activities of *Ryōyūkai* was publishing of the monthly magazine *Ryōyū* (Provisions Friend), which included practical advice on civilian mass catering and accounts of various activities coordinated by *Ryōyūkai*, such as educational courses for caterers at hospitals, schools and factories. After more than a decade's experience in training its own personnel, in 1939 *Ryōyūkai* opened the School of Provisions (*Shokuryō gakkō*), which provided practical education in nutrition and cookery for approximately 500 civilians yearly. Graduates of the school were offered employment in institutions related to mass catering, food processing, food rationing and public nutrition, as well as *Ryōyūkai*'s own infrastructure throughout the empire.

At first, activities coordinated by

Ryōyūkai aimed at persuading the general public to embrace the military model of efficient nourishment represented by hearty stews and curries and industrially processed provisions. However, as the war progressed, nutritional advice for civilians inevitably shifted towards relief food. The severe food shortage was caused by the disruption of food imports from the colonies, on which the home islands were heavily dependent, and the build-up of manpower for the Japanese army and navy. As provisioning the troops was considered the priority, the home front had to make do with what was left. For example, between 1940/41 and 1944/45, the amount of rice supplied to the armed forces rose from 161 to 744 thousand tons, making it impossible to retain rationing standards for civilians (Johnston 1953:152).

Yet, the government's confidence in a scientific solution for food shortages remained strong until its very end. Special campaigns advocating methods to economize on rice through careful chewing, and mixing it with vegetables and other grains, were carried out through posters and pamphlets. Consumption of more efficient staples that contained more calories and were cheaper to produce, such as sweet potatoes and squash, were propagated as well. As the moment of capitulation approached, public campaigns shifted to instructions on maintaining vegetable gardens and brewing soy sauce out of fish bones.

Food shortages remained a major problem in Japan after 1945 despite US food relief programmes. On the top of millions of hungry Japanese in the homeland, over six million military men and civilians who were by 1948 repatriated from the colonies and occupied territories had to be fed. This situation led to several hundred victims of starvation and widespread malnutrition during the second half of the 1940s (Dower 1999:54, 89-97).

However, long-term consequences of the food shortage on the Japanese diet went beyond hunger and deprivation. The wartime experience wrapped up the construction of the Japanese national diet – a process that replaced the diversified, class and community-tied practices of the pre-modern era with homogeneous consumption practices that the overwhelming majority of postwar Japanese could identify with (Cwiertka 2005). The austere diet that had continued for more than a decade bridged the gap between urban and rural areas so characteristic of the pre-war period. While city dwellers experienced the hand-to-mouth existence of farmers, a great number of drafted peasants' sons enjoyed the luxury of having rice three times a day and became acquainted with multicultural military menus drawn on

pre-war urban gastronomy. Furthermore, the militarization of nutrition, and the chronic shortage of rice, set the stage for the post-war transformation of the Japanese diet, represented by the diminishing quantitative importance of rice and increased consumption of bread, noodles and industrially-processed food.

Most importantly, however, the work initiated by the Army Provision's Depot and supported by the wartime government continued. Military menus were reproduced in restaurants, canteens, schools and hospitals where cooks and dieticians educated during wartime found employment. Gradually, the militaristic connotation of the innovations implemented by the armed forces disappeared, amalgamated into the mainstream civilian culture of the post-war era. Nutritional research was carried on in the institutes that had been established during wartime, and military experts on nutrition continued to educate the public. In February 1946, the popular magazine *Shufu no Tomo*, (Housewife's Friend) began publishing a series of articles dealing with scientific aspects of cookery by the former member of staff of the Army Provision's Depot, ex-Major-general Kawashima Shirō. <

Bibliography

- Benedict, Ruth. 1990 (1946). *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company.
- Bentley, Amy. 1998. *Eating for Victory: Food Rationing and the Politics of Domesticity*. Urbana/Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Coveney, John. 2000. *Food, Morals and Meaning: The Pleasure and Anxiety of Eating*. London: Routledge.
- Cwiertka, Katarzyna J. 2002. 'Popularizing a Military Diet in Wartime and Postwar Japan'. *Asian Anthropology* 1: 1-30.
- Cwiertka, Katarzyna J. 2005. 'Culinary Culture and the Making of a National Cuisine'. Jennifer Robertson, ed. *A Companion to the Anthropology of Japan*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Dower, John W. 1999. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York: Norton/The New Press.
- Helstosky, Carol. 2004. *Garlic and Oil: Food and Politics in Italy*. Oxford/New York: Berg.
- Johnston, Bruce F. 1953. *Japanese Food Management in World War II*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Kosuge, Keiko. 1997. *Kindai nihon shokubunka nenpyō*. Tokyo: Yūzankaku.
- Yasuhara, Miho and Miki Imai. 2002. 'Zasshi "Ryōyū" ni miru kindai nihon no heishoku no hatten: Rikugun to shu to suru dantai sui-ji no henshen'. *Kyōdō kenkyū joseikin kenkyū seika hōkokusho*. Tokyo: Ajinomoto Shoku no Bunka Center.

Katarzyna J. Cwiertka
Research School CNWS
Leiden University
K.J.Cwiertka@let.leidenuniv.nl

The nation's interrupted path: the Pacific War in Philippine history textbooks

For Filipinos, the Pacific War is the Japanese Occupation. Bayonet-bearing Japanese soldiers, traitorous local spies, heroic Filipino guerillas, victory 'Joes' (Americans), and the triumphant return of General McArthur are the dominant historical memories associated with this horrific war. Popularized by the mass media, these images in part originate from history textbooks, and are primary sources of people's war-time imagination.

Portia L. Reyes

Here we examine three better-known texts: *History of the Filipino People* (Agoncillo 1960), *The Philippines: the Continuing Past* (Constantino and Constantino 1978) and *The Pageant of Philippine History* (Zaide 1979). These have been required readings for fourth year high school and first year college students for decades, and have simplified the complex realities of war-time Philippines by depicting Filipinos as either war heroes or victims. In either conception, Filipinos are denied an independent agency in their own history.

Despite years of scholarly criticism and ridicule, textbooks remain vital for both teachers and students in educational environments. The Philippines is no different, where texts play critical roles in constructing what Anderson famously calls an 'imagined' national community (Anderson 1991). Indeed we could link the nation's historical consciousness with the production and reception of history texts (Rüsen 1998: 3-16). This essay concentrates on the former, contextualizing the creation of historical knowledge and the messages and meanings it strives to convey.

An intrusion

Agoncillo, the Constantinos and Zaide contributed to the entrenchment of positivism in historical scholarship in the Philippines. They relied heavily on written sources to shape their arguments and interpretations, including memoirs of American soldiers, a handful of accounts of select Filipino leaders, English-language compilations of documents, monographs and newspaper reports on the Pacific War. Invariably, military personnel and politicians were the main actors in their narratives.

Zaide saw the war as a distant European drama that almost accidentally disrupted the lives of idyllic Filipinos, who were then preparing for independence as promised by their American colonizers. Within hours of the attack on Pearl Harbor, however, Japanese air squadrons began bombing the Philippines. In Zaide's eyes, surprised and overwhelmed Filipino and American forces put up a gallant fight, but were forced to surrender following a last stand on Corregidor Island. On the subsequent five-day 'Death March', more than a quarter of the 76,000 US soldiers perished due to hunger, illness and fatigue. Still, for Zaide, defeat was in name only, as surviving Filipino soldiers and other civilians formed guerilla units to wage a people's war against the *Hapon* ('Japs').

Like Zaide, Agoncillo saw the war as an intrusion upon preparations for Philippine self-rule. Yet Agoncillo shifted the theatre from a European-dominant context to one zeroed in on home. Quoting Filipino and American leaders to emphasize their agency and simulate action in

the narrative, Agoncillo interspersed his text with colorful stories about the harshness of the occupation, anecdotes to provide glimpses of how the poor sought to get by. Agoncillo subscribed to the philosophy of historians Becker and Beard, who campaigned for a 'subjectivist-pragmatist-presentism' (Strout 1958: 28-29) to counter the then dominant 'objectivist' approach in the discipline.

Agoncillo's writing moved succeeding historians, not least the husband and wife team of Letizia and Renato Constantino. Opting for a political economy perspective on the occupation, the Constantinos saw economics as the driving force behind Japan's conquest of the Pacific. Like Zaide and Agoncillo, they conceived the occupation as an experience that shattered the comfort of the Filipinos' tranquil colonial world, disrupting the path to American-engineered 'independence'. Four decades of American colonial rule had conditioned Filipinos to be loyal to their American masters; as the Constantinos pointed out, Filipinos even forgave McArthur in December 26, 1941 for declaring Manila an 'open city', which in effect handed the nation's capital to the Japanese. Filipinos continually resisted the Japanese for their American colonial masters, even as these colonizers abandoned the Philippines during the war.

The dark years

These texts use darkness as the primary metaphor to describe the situation Filipinos found themselves in from December 1941 to February 1945. Zaide lays bare the brutality of Japanese rule: thousands who refused to cooperate

Filipino men detested the frequent slapping by Japanese soldiers. For Filipinos, only women could (be) slap(ped); they would rather be hit than slapped by another man

were tortured and killed. Meanwhile, the regime coerced Filipino leaders to collaborate in a puppet government that brainwashed Filipinos with Japanese wartime propaganda. Unlike scholars and politicians who depict this elite as traitorous leeches duplicitous with Japanese rule, Zaide paints them as faithful servants carrying out the wishes of the Commonwealth President in exile, Manuel Quezon, who urged officials to soften the blow of the occupation on ordinary Filipinos.

The Constantinos characterized the occupation as 'martial law: Japanese style'. With the assistance of the remaining Filipino elite, General Masaharu Homma and his army (*kempeitai*) repressed all freedoms, detained Filipino men arbitrarily, mercilessly quelled revolt, and severely punished those cooperating with Americans. Alongside a determined propaganda campaign against the US, the Japanese

also set up neighborhood associations where Filipinos had to police Filipinos. Most importantly, the military regime ruthlessly extracted war needs and supplies from the archipelago in the hopes of forming what the Japanese euphemistically called the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

For Agoncillo, darkness prevailed not only because of the regime's atrocities, but also because of the loss of social and moral balance among Filipinos. Physicians denied suffering patients treatment; graves were desecrated for corpses' gold fillings; and crimes against persons and properties multiplied. More ashamedly, a new economic elite arose and prospered amidst widespread immiseration. As Agoncillo saw it, this collaborating bourgeoisie amassed its wealth through graft and corruption. A particularly lucrative racket was mismanaging the distribution of relief goods, which continued until the disposition of equipment and materials upon the Americans' return.

A new beginning?

These authors differ on what the immediate post-war situations in the Philippines stood for. Zaide considered the occupation as a mere interlude in the country's inevitable march towards independence, where 'liberation' by US forces restored the Filipino commonwealth government. In Zaide's account, bitter in-fighting amongst Filipino leaders for the spoils of profitable political posts went unnoticed, as did the continued American air raids that levelled Manila although the Japanese had already surrendered.

In Agoncillo's eyes, Japanese rule meant heroic resistance of ordinary Filipinos, whose guerilla units incapacitated Japanese war efforts. For example, reports on the *kempeitai* that guerillas collected and submitted to McArthur's headquarters in Australia greatly assisted his returning forces in 1944. In all, Agoncillo sought to enliven the ways in which Filipinos struggled to purge the Japanese from the homeland. Lost in Agoncillo's populist zeal, however, are the burning questions of rivalry, competition, and deceit amongst guerilla fighters that burst onto the scene after the war. Agoncillo brooked no ambiguity and contradiction for his valiant guerillas.

It was left to the Constantinos to cast shadows across the guerillas' bow, although in this case perhaps overly so. The Constantinos indubitably stamped the underground fighters collaborators, those who preferred American colonial masters over the Japanese, and who -

with McArthur's help - sought political or economic gain upon their favored colonizers' return by exploiting the issue of collaboration to rid the post-war government of unwanted (read: left-leaning) leaders. All told, for the Constantinos, Filipinos let the opportunity provided by the war to attain a truly independent Philippines pass by. Instead, they basked in the glow of post-war American influence, leaving the independence granted in 1946 a hollow shell.

Projected nation

Characteristically, these texts figured the Pacific War as a stepping stone on the path towards shaping the archipelago into an ideal nation. Heeding historicist von Ranke's philosophy of telling history as it really was, Zaide brought a mechanical approach to narrating the war, featuring names, dates and places, while clumsily seeking to relate the indefatigability of the Filipino spirit. In its wake, regular folks were either swept aside or characterized with platitudes. And instead of inviting readers to recognize and understand a painful part of their past, Zaide enjoined them to concentrate on the larger project of (their leaders in) building a nation, thereby acting as a hand of the state, campaigning for its pathway to order and modernity.

Agoncillo's text took no part in this nationalist charade. Having experienced the war as a boy, he well understood the daily lives of those toughing out the occupation, and thus strove to bring forth the nuances of local culture in a war-time context. For example, he related why Filipino men detested the frequent slapping by Japanese soldiers. For Filipinos, only women could (be) slap(ped); they would rather be hit than slapped by another man. Although such stories gave colour to an otherwise terrifying account of the Pacific War, it also led to simplifications. Agoncillo characterized Filipinos as consumed by either unreasonable volatility or treachery, thereby stripping them of human depth and complexity. To be sure, Filipinos were afforded historical agency in Agoncillo's account, but one trapped in the good/evil binary.

A similar duality confounds the Constantinos' work. Polemically, they featured Japanese, Filipino, and American elites as the occupation's true adversaries. Meanwhile, poor Filipinos were depicted as either fighters or victims, anonymous 'masses' that perpetually struggle to be. For the Constantinos, these struggles constituted the driving forces of change in a nation's history, from which empowered masses would emerge to claim and build a nation in their terms. What the Constantinos hoped for was a people's revolution a la Russia or China; the Philippine scenario was interpreted not on its own terms, but forced into an ideal, linear progression towards enlightenment/ maturity, which long ago had been achieved in Europe.

In such a context, Filipinos fit awkwardly at best. Left largely under-explored, the Filipino experience is tailored to reinforce the centrality and universality of European thought and history.

For Agoncillo, the Constantinos and Zaide, the outbreak of the Pacific War interrupted an American imperial project to transform the Philippines into a self-governing polity. Deserted by their colonizers, Filipinos succumbed to a dark Japanese rule characterized by arbitrary arrests, torture and killings from 1941 to 1945, only to be 'liberated' by the bravery of McArthur's American forces with assistance by Filipino guerillas. Agoncillo, the Constantinos and Zaide regarded the war as a military exercise, a venue for social denigration, a missed opportunity towards an ideal polity - all told, another trying episode in the country's march towards nationhood.

Ample space for re-interpretation exists. The heavy use of American or English-language sources has left Filipino sources under-utilized. Comparisons of memoirs of Filipino soldiers, which started coming out in the 1990s with other military accounts, would be illuminating, as would narratives and monographs on forced prostitution to shed light on the state of women during the war. Now mostly declassified, Japanese documents might provide clues about Filipino children, Chinese, Muslims, indigenous communities and others whose historical agencies have been left wanting. Oral history, through interviewing survivors and their descendents, would go a long way in accounting for these 'missing' Filipinos. Their incorporation would provide a historian wider access to a people's personhood under desperate conditions, bringing life to a people's history of the war in their own terms. ◀

Works cited

- Agoncillo, Teodoro. 1965. *The Fateful Years. Japan's Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-45*. 2 vols, Quezon City: R.P. Garcia Publishing Co.
- 1990. *History of the Filipino People*. Quezon City: Garotech Publishing, 1960.
- Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities*, 2nd ed. London; New York: Verso.
- Constantino, Renato and Letizia Constantino. 1997. *The Philippines: the Continuing Past*. Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978.
- Rüsen, Jörn. 1998. 'Historical Consciousness as a Matter of Research on History Textbooks'. Chang Yuan and Liang-Kai Chou, eds. *Proceedings of the International Conference on Methodologies: Historical Consciousness and History-Textbook Research*. Taiwan: Tsing Hua University.
- Strout, Cushing. 1958. *The Pragmatic Revolt in American History: Carl Becker and Charles Beard*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Zaide, Gregorio. 1979. *The Pageant of Philippine History*. Manila: Philippine Education Company.

Portia L. Reyes

International Institute for Asian Studies
p.reyes@let.leidenuniv.nl

Catastrophe on Peleliu: Islanders' memories of the Pacific War

The American invasion of Peleliu in September 1944 was one of the bloodiest and hardest-fought battles of the Pacific War. The 11,000 Japanese defenders dug over 500 caves into the island's mountains and forced U.S. forces to spend 73 days blasting them out. In the end, only 300 Japanese survived and the island lay shattered and burned. The 850 native inhabitants had been evacuated before the fighting, but were devastated to find upon their return that their homeland had been churned into a wasteland.

Stephen C. Murray

Japanese and American perspectives on the Pacific War and the Peleliu campaign have been recounted exhaustively, but the calamity the war visited on the *'ad ra Beliliou*, the people of Peleliu - eviction from their homeland, their struggle to survive the war, their efforts to rebuild and their painful postwar memories - has largely been ignored. My research in 2002-03 thus sought to document the experiences of the generation of Peleliu residents who survived the war, and to understand how they remember that era and interpret its historical meanings.

To do so one must first appreciate that the people of Peleliu conceive of history differently from Japanese and Americans, and use different methods to retain and transmit it. Second, because land is such a vital element in the culture, people's conceptions of land and the ways it was affected by the war provide the primary framework through which they structure their memories of war and consider its aftermath. Their memories contrast markedly with those brought to the island today by tourists from the two former belligerents.

Peleliu is one of the traditional political divisions of the Palau archipelago, which lies in the Pacific Ocean just north of the equator and 550 miles east of the Philippines. Palau is a sovereign nation that in 1994 signed a 50-year compact of free association with the U.S. Sixty years after the invasion, evidence of the conflict on Peleliu remains more visible than on any comparable site in the Central Pacific. Today's 575 residents are clustered in a single village (an equal number live in Palau's urban centre, Koror), and to an outsider's eye the rest of the island appears to be largely unused. Beneath the re-grown forests dotted with small gardens and taro paddies lie guns, fortifications, caves filled with weaponry (and in some, the unburied dead), and tons of unexploded ordnance. It is this seemingly 'pristine' quality of the battlefield that draws history-minded travellers.

History and land

In the kin-based society of Palau, knowledge of the past centres on histories of families and clans, especially on how they came to hold power or own certain lands. These histories are kept very private, and stories maintained by other kin groups are granted respect. People accept that differing, competing versions of stories are tenuous, designed to promote the interests of the group holding the story. Although Palau is now a fully literate society, these stories continue to be transmitted orally, while more public tales may be related in song, dance, chants, or the visual arts. Kin relations are organized around con-

trol of land, the scarcest and most valuable resource on any island. Kin groups are identified with particular parcels, most of which are still held communally, all of which are named and have stories behind them: how they were acquired and who lived on them. One's identity and history are inextricably connected to place, to land, and to the tales of that land. The landscape itself serves as the repository of a group's history, through its named parcels and beaches, landmarks, and *olang'*. These are natural or man-made features - stones, trees, stone burial platforms, a garden - that serve as mnemonic devices to recall important stories. It's not surprising, then, that the war memories of the *'ad ra Beliliou* are strongly coloured by their perspectives on what happened to their lands as productive resources, as the foundation of their social organization, and as bearer of their past.

War and survival

For most of the 30 years that Japan ruled Palau and Micronesia (1914-44), its interest in the colony was the exploitation of local resources. But as war approached, Japan made the fateful decision to locate Palau's main airfield on Peleliu. Authorities uprooted two of the island's five villages and seized their lands for the facility. Two other villages accepted these refugees, whose way of life had so abruptly been wrenched from them. Clans gave home sites and garden plots to the newcomers, and everybody made awkward accommodation amidst this unprecedented misfortune.

Nobody anticipated the same fate would befall the whole island, but as American air attacks mounted in intensity in mid-1944, the entire population of Peleliu was evacuated. They were taken in by the people of Ngarard, a village on a large island to the north that escaped invasion. For the next 12 months the *'ad ra Beliliou* hid in the jungles to escape American air patrols that attacked all visible targets; gardening, gathering, and fishing at night kept them one step ahead of starvation. Some trekked to other villages seeking relatives and food. This dark year is remembered as a phantasmagoria of fear, hunger, illness, and occasional sudden death, made all the worse by the uncertainty over what had happened to their homeland in battle.

The succour they received from other communities in Palau is not forgotten. The women of Peleliu still perform a dance in which they name and thank the villages that aided their kin. Before departing Ngarard in 1945 the refugees erected a stone *olang'* to commemorate their bond, one maintained and taught to the young through periodic great feasts hosted alternately by the two villages.

When they returned to Peleliu in early 1946, the islanders were stunned by what they encountered: uniformly they describe desolation, an island of glaring


white coral deforested by fire and explosives, so barren and altered by military construction that many refused to believe it was truly their island. 'We cried and cried' one woman recalls. Their five villages and nearly all the tangible reminders of their former lives - homes, council houses, burial platforms, *olang'*, piers, farms, even parcel boundary markers - had been demolished. Within the caves in the mountains lay thousands of unburied Japanese, whose spirits, Palauans believed, could harm the living. With so much of Peleliu's past residing in the human and natural landscapes, their destruction meant that the war was not just one more stratum of history laid down on the previous 3,000 years' worth. Instead, it abraded much of the history that had come before; it obliterated everything except what survivors carried in their memories.

The American forces provided the returnees with quonset huts and food in a new settlement, gestures much appreciated after the year of hardship. But the Americans abandoned the airbase in 1947, leaving the people to fend for themselves on an island whose fishing grounds had lost productivity and whose meager soil had been paved over, poisoned, and washed away. Gardening was confined to taro swamps, and fish were less plentiful than before the war.

Postwar memories

Much of postwar life on Peleliu is comprehended in residents' vexations over land tenure systems disrupted by colonialism and war. Japan and the succeeding U.S. administration both claimed half of Peleliu as government land. The U.S. effort to relinquish this land to the public was done in a manner blamed for creating endless disputes among clans, lineages, and individuals. This Gordian knot is slowly being untangled by Western-style Palauan courts that are now the sole source of legal title. People complain that deeply private family histories have to be revealed in public court proceedings to bolster land claims.

The five ancient villages have never been rebuilt, a source of great distress to the elders as time removes the last people who can remember the way of life and the all-important physical features of the communities. The reasons for delay are many, lack of capital for reconstruction (war reparations from both combatants were niggardly) and despoliation of farmlands commonly cited. But residents acknowledge that the underlying explanation is the risk of building a home without secure title to land. Every *'ad ra Beliliou* still identifies himself as coming from one of the five villages, whose sites are proudly shown on the map given to tourists. Chiefly titles continue to be passed down, and oral histories and parcel names are taught to the young. The way of life of the 1930s is gone forever: Palau's is a monetized,



globalized economy today. Yet only the actual return to place will provide the opportunity to renew ties to the one site each person considers his true home, the repository of his family's history, and source of his identity.

After the United States opened Micronesia to tourism in the 1960s, Peleliu quickly attracted Japanese veterans and bereaved families, who were particularly anxious to cremate the thousands of remains in the caves. The island also became a magnet for right-wing nationalists, who erected a Shinto shrine and monuments praising their fallen heroes. Ever sensitive to matters affecting families, the islanders express great sympathy toward those who lost kin there. Nonetheless, off and on since the late 1960s they have prohibited the collection of remains out of fear that once all had been taken away, Japanese tourism, and the vital income it produced, would stop. When Japanese Diet officials pressed to reverse the prohibition, the magistrate Saburo seized the chance to voice Peleliu's resentment at the cavalier treatment its citizens had endured from the two nations that had so afflicted them. In fluent Japanese he demanded, 'Did you Japanese and Americans get an invitation from us to come fight on our island of Peleliu? You destroyed everything and then went away and left us with nothing'.

Few Americans reach Peleliu today, and many of those who do, particularly veterans and their families, share with their Japanese counterparts a sense of personal quest. Other tourists have succumbed to our prurient fascination with

war, curious about a site where its scars remain so evident, an island once deemed worthy of great sacrifice but now insignificant to 'history'. The native inhabitants and what the war meant to them are superfluous to these pilgrimages, an attitude the islanders are well aware of: 'We're invisible to outsiders', one chief put it.

Japan and the United States have raised monuments honouring their dead and declaring commitments to peace. The *'ad ra Beliliou* describe them as the *olang'* of the foreigners, stones that encode their memories of the war, their versions of the past. The islanders respect those memories and grasp well their essence - what the Imperial Army and the U.S. Marines did to each other, and to Peleliu, in the autumn of 1944. Travellers to the island, by contrast, understand little of what happened to the native population engulfed by that catastrophe. Addressing the ignorance of such visitors, another chief, Obakle'ol, noted that 'they are only here for a short time'. This gentle, considerate comment reveals Palauans' particular conception of history and its transmission. He was saying this: 'To be understood, our histories depend on the prior creation of personal relations because the stories are private, about our families and our lives. They can only be shared with, and become meaningful to, those who have learned who we are and have grown to care about us'. <

Stephen C. Murray
Department of Anthropology
University of California at Santa Barbara
stevemurray1966@yahoo.com

A nightmare in the making: war, nation and children's media in Japan, 1891-1945

Those in the field of Japanese and Asian studies are undoubtedly familiar with Japan's wartime propaganda of 'human bullets' (*nikudan*), group suicide (*shūdan gyokusai*), and the ubiquitous 'one hundred million' (*ichioku*), but readers may be surprised to learn that none of these tropes of national unity through sacrificial death were unique to the war years themselves. Nor were they primarily directed at adults.

Owen Griffiths

From the earliest beginnings of modern Japanese children's media in the 1890s, war and heroic, sacrificial death occupied a central place in the stories and imagery children consumed as entertainment. These representations collectively formed one of the most enduring themes in Japanese children's media throughout the first half of the 20th century. Decades before publishers of the 1930s and 1940s were compelled to represent war as a sacred undertaking of national survival and Asian liberation, children's media producers had been creating adventure stories and morality tales based on the heroic and selfless patriotism of men in battle, dying, not for themselves, but for the greater good of the emperor/nation or for the liberation of the 'lesser peoples' of Asia. Thus, the increasingly single-minded glorification of manly, sacrificial death in war – what I have called the 'culture of death' – we see building from 1937 to 1945 must be understood in this broader context of children's media constructions of gendered nationalism that date back to the Meiji years (Griffiths 2002).

The anniversary of Japan's defeat in the Pacific War gives us pause to reflect on the incredible human suffering generated by that conflict and to examine once again the mechanisms by which people can be socialized to kill and die in the name of sovereign, nation or god. Sadly, such an assessment holds profound relevance to our contemporary world when national and religious leaders continue to enjoin their followers to slaughter others for allegedly moral causes. I am particularly interested in analyzing the formation and role of mass print media and its use of war and remembrance as tools in the socialization and education of Japanese boys and girls until the end of the Pacific War.

Together with the formal education of the classroom and the non-formal education of the home, informal education offered through children's print media was the principle means by which young Japanese were simultaneously educated and entertained until the advent of the electronic age. Thus, its analysis as the product of new commercial and technological forces provides insight into the process by which gendered identities are created and maintained within a larger national discourse. It also allows us to examine how the adult producers, as members of the new middle class, constructed the world of modern children and by what rationale they transmitted their fears and aspirations to them.

My purpose here is two-fold. First, I maintain that much of the gendered rhetoric of manly, sacrificial death we see emerging during Japan's years of total war (1937-1945) can be traced back to the earliest days of children's print

media in the 1890s. Second, I argue this development was not particular to Japan. Without question, the process by which Japanese children were enjoined to glorify and eventually prepare for their own sacrificial deaths during the Pacific War was rooted in historical and contemporary practices specific to Japan's own development. However, the utilization of war as a tool of nation building was not. War and its remembrances are central to the identities of all modern nations and the media produced by a rising new middle class has been a key player in this process.

The birth of children's print media

Historians generally identify the early 1890s as the birth of modern Japanese children's media, the very moment that the Meiji government embarked on its first expansionist war against China in 1894 (Hasegawa 1999; Futagami 1978). Although not arising in direct response to the Sino-Japanese War, early Japanese children's media readily embraced war, as did most members of Japanese society, and represented it to children as a masculine, heroic, and patriotic undertaking. The Sino-Japanese War presented the first opportunity for war and emergent nationalism to be 'textualized' specifically for children (Hasegawa 1999: 9) and provided much of the language and imagery with which adult producers created Japan's first truly 'child-centred' media. The pioneer in all of this was Iwaya Sazanami who wrote the first modern children's story *Kogane maru* in 1891 and began Japan's first modern children's magazine *Shōnen sekai* (*Children's World*) in 1895. As an elite product of the new Meiji state, Iwaya saw war as an appropriate theme with which to entertain young boys while simultaneously instilling in them a sense of loyalty and devotion to their new nation.

In the hands of Iwaya and those who followed him, particularly the founder of Kodansha Publishing Noma Seiji, we see the development of a number of martial, manly themes that would endure well into Japan's years of total war. Among the most prominent was

adults, as they always do, transferred their aspirations, fears, and biases directly to children through the narratives they created for entertainment

the excavation of Japan's past for the great martial heroes from history and myth. From the first Emperor Jimmū and Yamato Takeru to Minamoto Yoshitune and Kusunoki Masashige, all of Japan's great military heroes regularly galloped across the pages of children's magazines as paragons of loyalty and sacrifice. As Japan's modern wars were fought and simultaneously historicized, new heroes like Captain Matsuzaki Naomi, said to be the first commis-



Momotaro, the peach boy

sioned officer to die in the Sino-Japanese War, the resolute Mitsushima Kan, and the indomitable bugler Kikuchi Kōhei joined this pantheon of selfless patriots (Kuboi 1997; Kuwahara 1987). Their lives, or rather deaths, and the cause for which they fought became the templates for innumerable other characters whose exploits were reborn in the pages of children's magazines throughout Japan's age of imperial expansion and war.

Underlying all of these stories lay another consistent theme of 'rewarding good and punishing evil' (*kanzen chōaku*), now reworked in modern form with the emperor/nation at its heart. This concept had been rooted in Japanese folktales for centuries, but its most immediate influence on the early producers of modern children's media can be traced to the *gesaku* (playful composition) tradition of Takizawa Bakin and other famous Edo-era writers. Even Momotaro, one the most beloved Japanese fairy tales, was subject to this modern process of reinvention. (Namekawa 1981) Beginning with his thorough 'Japanization' in the Meiji era, Momotaro was by the 1930s transformed into a military patriot fighting, not for a pot of gold or the old couple who raised him, but to rid the world of 'evil-doers' in the name of the emperor.

This seamless blending of contemporary, historical, and mythical figures was another enduring theme in modern children's stories from the Sino-Japanese War onward. Grounded in the context of contemporary war and conflict, the stories adults created for children blurred the line between fantasy and reality by appropriating history and

sacrificial death was often portrayed through futuristic stories of mass annihilation in the context of Japan at war with other great powers. Painfully prophetic, these tales reflected a genuine adult dissatisfaction with the outcome of the naval treaties Japan had signed in the wake of WWI. Between the early 1920s and the early 1930s numerous stories appeared in which Japan's military was pitted against one or more of the great powers in a fight to the death. The storylines were remarkably consistent. Japan's military would first 'reluctantly' engage the enemy and be annihilated due to their foe's superior technology. Then, at the end, a mysterious piece of new technology would appear, usually commanded by child or adolescent warriors, to destroy the enemy and save the nation. Drawing on the 'adventure novel' genre (*bōken shosetsu*) pioneered by Oishikawa Shunrō in the post-Russo-Japanese War era, these stories were frequently first serialized in magazines like *Shōnen sekai* (*Children's World*) and *Shōnen kurabu* (*Boys' Club*) and then published in book form (Kuwahara 1987; Katō 1968).

Collectively, these tales of adventures, heroism, and death provided young boys, and some girls, with powerful didactic models with which children could imagine their future roles in the Japanese empire. And children's magazines were the perfect medium through which these stories could be transmitted. Due to their low cost and portability, children's magazines transcended geography and class and therefore performed an important mediatory function linking home, school and playground. Moreover, because children consumed this media by choice rather than by fiat, magazines reflected children's subjective preferences to a degree that purely educational materials did not. Thus, the power of children's media, even when not overtly didactic, stemmed from its uniquely commercial impulse, its function as entertainment and its interplay with other forms of socialization and education.

Media, modernity and nation

Throughout this golden age of children's print media we see the reciprocal interaction of art and life, fact and fiction, and politics and entertainment. Here I have offered only a small sampling from an amazingly rich and diverse body of material to argue that the 'culture of death' so prevalent in the years of Japan's total war was in fact a work in progress, rooted in the earliest days of modern children's magazines. Adults, as they always do, transferred their aspirations, fears, and biases directly to children through the narratives they created for entertainment. In doing so, they provide us with a different view of Japan's modern history, centring on war, as it might have been seen through the eyes of children.

The culpability of adults in creating a manly world of sacrificial death and unquestioning loyalty is clear. Their motives are less so. Until the late 1930s no writer or publisher was compelled to produce these kinds of stories. Even during the worst years of censorship from 1941 onward, children's media contributors retained a degree of relative freedom not enjoyed by those who produced media for adults. Perhaps we can say with the great Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun that they were as much a product of their times as they were of their fathers.

The last half of the 19th century through the interwar years were times of nation-building, based in part on reinventing traditions from a usable past. War and its remembrances were integral to this process, driven by a social Darwinesque worldview of struggle and conflict. In Japan, as elsewhere, this world was almost exclusively a masculine one. With very few exceptions, men have initiated and prosecuted war. They have also developed the tools of war from which nations and empires have been forged. From the stirrup and the long bow to napalm and the atomic bomb, men have been the principal agents in creating the technologies of war. In the modern world these technologies, to borrow Marx's phrase, 'weigh like a nightmare on the brain of the living'.

Men also created the print media technologies that enabled generations of Japanese children to consume a fifty-year diet of vicarious war and sacrificial death as an always noble, always male, and oft-times glorious adventure. We cannot say for sure exactly what impact this diet had on the young men who fought and died while brutalizing the peoples of Asia during the Pacific War. Sixty years after the fact, answers to these questions still remain elusive. Further analysis of those who created it, however, may bring us closer to understanding the relationship between the consumption of war as education and entertainment and the prosecution of war as political policy. Analyzing Japan as a case study will provide a deeper and perhaps new understanding of its modern history and the development of its own nationalist ethos. I hope it will also serve as a mirror in which we can see our own reflection as we memorialize and remember the great tragedy of six decades past, while we struggle with yet another kind of war in the young 21st century. ◀

Owen Griffiths teaches Japanese and Asian History at Mount Allison University in Sackville, New Brunswick, Canada. His interests include the history of the black market, the problem of forgetting in historical writing, and the centrality of war and its remembrances in national discourse. Please see the online version at www.iias.nl for full source citation.
ogriffit@mta.ca

Anatomy of the Yūshūkan war museum: educating Japanese youth?

In celebration of its 130th anniversary, the Yasukuni Shrine renovated its war museum Yūshūkan. Reopened to the public in July 2002, the new museum features an exhibition space twice its previous size. The shrine hopes that the museum will play a central role in educating Japanese youth, as it did during wartime. But can it?

Takashi Yoshida

During the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, members of the Japanese nobility donated approximately 30,000 yen to the military for the care of wounded soldiers. Some money was left over, and the nobles agreed to allocate the remainder to build an Exhibition Hall of Weapons. Giovanni Vincenzo Cappelletti (1843-87), an architect employed by the Japanese government during the early Meiji period, designed a two-story Romanesque-style exhibition hall. It was named the Yūshūkan, or the hall in which one may study under and commune with a noble-minded soul. The medieval Italian castle-like the Yūshūkan, a symbol of modernization, coexisted alongside the traditional Shinto-style Yasukuni Shrine.

In 1923 the Great Kantō Earthquake destroyed much of the building, and the government decided to build a new exhibition hall of weapons. The design of the hall was no longer European, but was instead crafted in 'a modern Asian style' (Yasukuni Jinja 1983:70-72). In 1931, the new Yūshūkan was opened, and, in 1934, the annexed Kokubōkan (National Defense Hall) was added.

The focus of the new museum was no longer limited to the wars against Qing China and Russia. In the 1938 arrangement, visitors were first conducted upstairs to see artifacts from pre-history through to the late Tokugawa period (1600-1868). They were then guided to the first floor, where they saw materials related to the Meiji Restoration (1868), the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), the armed conflict in north China (1928), and the Manchurian Incident (1931). At the end of tour, the visitors saw cannons, shells, paintings, and fighter planes placed in a large exhibition hall.

In contrast, the annexed Kokubōkan was exclusively dedicated to modern warfare. One of its objectives was to enable visitors to experience modern warfare. It not only exhibited high-tech weapons of the time, such as radio, radar, fighter-mounted machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, and chemical agents; visitors were able to shoot air rifles at small tanks, fighters, and enemy combatants. These were real rifles modified to use compressed air instead of gun powder. Elsewhere, patrons were invited to don gas masks before being subjected to an actual tear gas assault. The Tōkyō Gas Co. was in charge of building the room, while the Institute for Science supplied the necessary equipment (Yūshūkan, 1938:161, 183, 306, 308).

The Kokubōkan's emphasis on entertainment and hands-on experience was maintained in other sections. Visitors, operating a control stick, were able to drop virtual bombs from a heavy bomber. Once they had selected a target and pushed a button, a flashing light appeared to indicate where the bomb had hit. The model bomber also had a seat for a gunner, who was able to operate a mounted revolving machine-gun and shoot enemy fighters. In sum, by the late 1930s, both the Yūshūkan and Kokubōkan had taken on the function of reinforcing nationhood, explaining the technology of modern warfare, and inspiring visitors to join the military. The shrine continued to perform these functions until Japan's defeat in 1945.

During the Occupation, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers closed the museum. In 1961, however, the administrators of the Yasukuni Shrine began to display a limited number of artifacts from the museum, though it remained trivial in scale compared to its predecessor. In 1986, the restored Yūshūkan and Kokubōkan were opened to the public as the Yūshūkan museum. In 1999, the Yasukuni Shrine, celebrating its 130th anniversary, decided to renovate and expand the antiquated museum, leading to the opening of a new and larger museum in 2002 featuring visual libraries and devices more attractive to young visitors, trying to entertain them as it once did during the pre-war period.

The current Yūshūkan has two major goals. First, it is designed to honor and comfort the souls of the 'enshrined gods'. Second, it is designed to convey the 'true' history of

modern Japan (Yasukuni Jinja 2003:2). The lobby contains symbolic artifacts of the Pacific War, such as a zero fighter. The panel that explains the fighter reads: 'With its excellent maneuverability and long range, the Zero was the best carrier-based fighter in the world'. The panel fails to mention a major reason why the Zero was so light and maneuverable: the designers had reduced the plane's defensive armor, leaving pilots highly vulnerable to enemy gunfire.

As typified by the laudatory description of the Zero, the museum is filled with erroneous and manipulative representations of Japanese history. Near the entrance of the exhibition halls, a theater continually runs a fifty-minute film entitled 'We Will Never Forget: To Thank, To Pray, and To Be Proud'. The female narrator condemns the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946-48) which found Japan guilty of 'crimes against humanity' and 'crimes against peace' and claims the empire acted justly in seeking to liberate Asia from Western aggression.

Rightwing nationalists outside Yasukuni Shrine



The new Yūshūkan has 20 exhibition halls, starting with 'Spirit of the Samurai' on the second floor. Artifacts suggest that the nation was created by Emperor Jinmu in 660 BCE and that many samurai had fought against foreign enemies to defend the nation since then. The second floor covers the passage of time from the Stone Age up to the full-scale war against China that started in 1937. Nearly the entire ground floor is dedicated to the 'Greater East Asian War', including 3,000 individual photographs of the 'enshrined gods'. All of them are said to have fought and died for the empire, and their letters and wills are exhibited. The large hall featuring kamikaze pilots and human torpedoes remains virtually unchanged from its predecessor. In general, the Yūshūkan's version of true Japanese history is a three-dimensional rendering of the views expressed in Kobayashi Yoshinori's *On War* (Sensōron) and Nishio Kanji's *History of the Nation* (Kokumin no rekishi), both of which argue that Imperial Japan liberated Asia from Western aggression. These volumes are available in the museum shop.

Can the Yūshūkan accomplish its mission?

The popularity of the Yūshūkan museum rose on several occasions prior to Japan's defeat, particularly in periods of war and imperial expansion. After the museum began to exhibit confiscated weapons from the Qing military, visitors skyrocketed from 50,000 to 250,000 a year. In 1905, the year that the Russo-Japanese War ended, more than 480,000 people visited the museum. After the war began with China in July 1937, visitors again increased significantly, with more than 910,000 visiting the museum that year (Yūshūkan 1938:477-89).

Particularly after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the Yūshūkan museum became popular among children. The average annual number of juvenile visitors between 1894 and 1930 was 21,474, while in 1937 more than 110,000 children passed through. Young visitors especially liked the participatory features of the Kokubōkan (*Ibid.*: 484-89). For example,

the June 1934 issue of *Boys' Club* (Shōnen kurabu) informed its readers of the opening of the hall and its popularity among the visitors. Indeed, the wartime years were the heyday of these facilities, which enjoyed a substantial number of visitors and played a significant role in educating youth.

The Yūshūkan never recovered its prewar popularity. Although the current museum seems to attract more visitors than the preceded one, from its opening in July 2002 till May 31, 2003, 226,000 individuals visited the museum, while both the Hiroshima Peace Museum and the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum have received more than one million visitors every year for over two decades. A leaflet available at the entrance of the Yūshūkan urges visitors to encourage their children and grandchildren to join a club called the Friends of the Yūshūkan. According to the leaflet, schools in Japan do not teach the 'true' history of modern Japan and often dispense a masochistic view of history that demonizes Imperial Japan.

Can the Yūshūkan play as powerful a role in conveying its view of modern Japanese history to young Japanese as it once did? It seems that the Yūshūkan's influence will remain limited, mainly due to its extremely negative, nationalistic image and the association that exists in the public mind between the shrine and right-wing extremists. Indeed, the Yūshūkan continues to serve as a Mecca for ultra-nationalist groups, who arrive at the shrine in trucks armed with loud speakers and who rarely hesitate to resort to violence and intimidation in pursuit of their political goals.

As the editor of the conservative journal *Seiron* regretfully pointed out, many Japanese are allergic to the Yasukuni Shrine, and few teachers would advocate including the Shrine as a part of a school excursion. Indeed, Japanese high schools now often choose overseas destinations for field trips. In 2002, for example, more than 38,000 students visited South Korea. Although exact figures are unknown, some schools have visited such places as the House of Sharing and the Seodaemun Prison History Hall, both of which condemn Japanese colonialism in Korea.

It seems unlikely that, at least for the present, the Yūshūkan will be able to play as significant a role as it did during the war in spreading a heroic and ethnocentric narrative of the war among Japanese youth. Japanese peace education has often been criticized for focusing on Japan's own victimhood rather than the destruction and atrocities inflicted by Japan on other nations. Nevertheless, Nikkyōso (Japan Teachers Union) teachers and anti-war activists deserve credit for inspiring Japanese citizens with a sentimental aversion to war and right-wing extremism. Conservative politicians, including prime ministers and senior politicians, visit Yasukuni Shrine and try to imbue the site with a more positive image. However, the public relations problems of the Yūshūkan are unlikely to be neutralized by such appearances. So long as the public continues to identify the Yūshūkan with the groups of violent reactionaries, the shrine stands little chance of appealing to the Japanese mainstream. Nor are the new Yūshūkan's attempts to attract youth with pre-war like hands-on attractions likely to have much impact in furthering its interpretation of Imperial Japan. ◀

Works cited

- Yasukuni jinja. 1983. *Yasukuni jinja hakunen shi* (One Hundred-Years of the Yasukuni Shrine). Vol. 2. Tokyo: Harashobo.
- _____. 2003. *Yūshūkan zuroku* (Pictorial Records of the Yūshūkan Museum). Tokyo: Yasukuni jinja.
- Yushukan. 1938. *Yūshūkanshi* (The History of Yūshūkan). Tokyo: Yushukan.

Takashi Yoshida is assistant professor in the Department of History at Western Michigan University. His research has focused on war and memory in East Asia and the United States. His book *The Making of the Rape of Nanking: The History and Memory of the Nanjing Massacre in Japan, China, and the United States* will be published by Oxford University Press in October 2006.

Negotiating colonialism: Taiwanese literature during the Japanese occupation

Research on the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan (1895-1945) has been booming in recent years, especially since the lifting of martial law in 1987. Scholarship on the period's literary production, however, focuses on works containing explicit anti-colonial stances to such an extent that writings in other styles and those less critical of colonial rule have been disregarded.

Lin Pei-Yin

The first two decades of Taiwan's Japanese period were marked by armed anti-colonial movements that ultimately failed. The Japanese colonisers' brutal suppression made the Taiwanese intelligentsia turn to cultural movements to remodel the nation's thinking as an alternative way to flight against colonialism. In 1921, the Taiwan Cultural Association (Taiwan bunka kyōkai) was established, launching an island-wide cultural reform programme to educate people. To accommodate this call for cultural enlightenment, a new strand of literature written in the style of vernacular Chinese emerged in the early 1920s. Usually referred to as the Taiwan New Literature movement, it played a vital part in Taiwanese people's anti-colonial resistance.

Taiwan New Literature

Owing to the colonial context, the Taiwan new literature movement was from the very beginning multi-lingual and socio-politically engaged. In addition to works written in Chinese, there were works written in Japanese and Taiwanese. The key figures in the first stage of the movement, such as Lai He, hailed as the 'father of Taiwan New Literature', Chen Xugu, and Cai Qitong, were all active members of the Association. With left-wing ideas ascendant in the 1920s, writers in this early stage of Taiwan New Literature produced works containing strong nationalistic sentiments and humanitarian concerns. Lai He's short story *A Scale* (1926) for instance portrays colonial exploitation and the longing for a fair society. Qin Decan, the protagonist of *A Scale*, is a farmer who maintains himself by selling vegetables. To please his customer, a Japanese police officer, Qin deliberately underestimates their weight. Unfortunately, the police officer does not feel grateful at all, and Qin is charged for violating the rules of weights and measures. Unable to pay bail, Qin kills the policeman and then commits

suicide, highlighting the predicament of the proletariat in colonial Taiwan.

In 1931, the left-leaning Taiwan People's Party was dismissed and its leader Jiang Weishui passed away; many leftwing Taiwanese intellectuals were apprehended. These factors led to the decline of socio-political movements in Taiwan; writers turned to literary movements and devoted themselves to writing. This ironically heralded a period of maturation for Taiwan New Literature. In this second stage, numerous literary societies were established, and literary journals launched. Writers began to explore new artistic trends and tackle a wider range of themes. Yang Kui's *Newspaper Boy* (1934), Weng Nao's *Remaining Snow* (1935) and Long Yingzong's *A Small Town with Papaya Trees* (1937) are three distinctive pieces written in Japanese from the second stage of Taiwan New Literature.

Inspired by Lai He's leftwing thinking, Yang Kui went further by bringing class analysis and internationalism to his writing. His award-winning *Newspaper Boy* is an account of a foreign student's exploitation by his boss, and his later support of unions as a means of fighting back. Set in a period of economic recession in Japan, the student leads a poverty-stricken life. When he is about to give up, a Japanese worker, Tanaka, offers his help. Contrasting the exploitative boss and the generous Tanaka, the story emphasises opposition between capitalists and labourers rather than between Japanese and Taiwanese. In fact, Yang does not divulge until the second half of the story that the student is from Taiwan. *Newspaper Boy* ends with the Taiwanese student identifying with Japanese labourers and joining the union movement, embracing a universal and humanitarian compassion for the proletariat instead of a provincial nationalism.

Written in the third person, *Remaining Snow* recounts Lin Chunsheng's fash-

ionable student life in 1930s Tokyo. Caught between his Japanese lover Kimiko and his old Taiwanese love Yuzhi, Lin ultimately realises that he is not in love with either and decides to stay in Tokyo to pursue his dream of becoming an actor. Lin's idle strolling into Shinjuku coffee shops, and his taste for western classical music and foreign plays conveys the modernist temperament of the work. Lin's ideas of love are likewise modern; he is a *flâneur* constantly seeking his next object of desire. Caught between two competing love relationships (cultural identities), Lin refuses a fixed identity and chooses an ever-changing aesthetic, urban lifestyle. The emphasis on individual perceptions opens new possibilities for Taiwanese literature, free of the tangled question of nationalism.

Long's *A Small Town with Papaya Trees* recounts the pessimism of Taiwanese intellectuals. Living in a suffocating small town, the protagonist resents Taiwanese-Japanese inequality and the arranged marriage into which his lover is forced. Its gloomy closing, where the protagonist abandons himself to alcohol, signifies the no-way-out plight of the colonised. In contrast to Lai He and Yang Kui's spirited resistance, and unlike Weng Nao's modernist disposition, Long's portrait of weak and hollow Taiwanese bourgeois intellectuals is in itself a sad caricature of Japanese colonialism.

Imperial subjects?

During the eight-year Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), the Japanese propagated the Imperial-Subject Movement (*kōminka undō*), a series of assimilation campaigns to mold Taiwanese people's unquestioning loyalty to Japan, which included the establishment of the Imperial-Subject Public Service Association (*kōmin hōkōkai*) in 1941. Taiwanese writers were requested to eulogise the Japanese national spirit and produce a masculine, optimistic literature to assist in the war

effort, leading to the so-called imperial-subject literature addressing Taiwanese people's spiritual distress throughout the process of imperialisation and the promotion of Japan-Taiwan amity. In the works of Chen Huoquan and Zhou Jinbo, prominent themes were the yearning for the modern, urban, progressive Japanese civilisation and the urgency to reform the vulgar Taiwanese culture through imperialisation.

The support of colonial policy and apparent pro-Japan stance in these works stirred controversies in post-1987 Taiwan. Scholars held different viewpoints towards the imperial-subject literature. Some were understanding: Zhang Liangze called for reading imperial-subject literature with 'a serious attitude of love and sympathy' (Zhang, 1998), while Ye Shitao declared 'there is no imperial-subject literature. All are protest literature'. (Ye, 1990: 112). Others moralised: Chen Yingzhen considered imperial-subject literature an accomplice of Japanese colonialism (Chen, 1998:13) while Lin Ruiming, though not as radical as Chen, firmly stressed that (imperial-subject) writers should not 'shirk their responsibility'. (Lin, 1996: 322). These debates showed nationalist and moralistic literary standards still being applied to the reception of imperial-subject works; the imperial-subject writers were so pressured that some of them felt the need to justify themselves. When invited to translate his *The Way* (1943) into Chinese, Chen Huoquan, for instance, not only made amendments to the work but also added a passage stating that he was forced by the times and circumstances to write pro-Japan messages. Yet in recent years, scholars have attempted to move away from the dichotomy of imperial-subject and protest literature. Their call for a contextual analysis indicates a more open attitude towards Taiwan's colonial past. This can be seen from the growing interests in Yang Chichang's surrealist poetics and popular literature, the two scarcely studied dimensions in Taiwanese literature under Japanese rule.

Similar to Weng Nao's cautionary attitude towards embracing national/cultural identity, Yang Chichang declared that Taiwanese literature should abandon its political stance as early as 1936. Rather than narrating external reality, Yang concentrated on the distorted internal violence brought by Japanese colonialism. His poems showed his attempt to disconnect himself from reality, and are full of non-linear ways of thinking, fragmentary images as well as symbolic lexicons - all of them skilfully capture the highly censored life the Taiwanese people suffered. As for the rich heritage of popular literature, it added an important contribution to the development of Chinese literature especially after the usage of Chinese was banned in 1937. These popular novels are extremely significant as they fill the gap left by the intellectual-centred call for a

new literature. Although these works are mainly love stories, the themes encouraging freedom of love reflect the thinking on male/female relationship of urbanites in the 1930s and 1940s. The quasi pro-Japan messages in some of these works expanded the horizons of imperial-subject literature which was no longer necessarily written in the coloniser's tongue.

With Japan's surrender and Taiwan's 'return' to China in 1945, the evolution of Taiwan New Literature was brought to an end. Some writers halted their creative activities, while others took pains to learn Chinese and continued to write; the legacy of literature under Japanese rule was marginalised with only few works such as Wu Zhouliu's *The Orphan of Asia* being published. Only in the nativist literary debate of the 1970s did attempts to excavate works of the Japanese colonial period begin.

With the lifting of martial law and the prevalence of nativist movements over the past three decades, the importance of literature from colonial Taiwan continues to grow. Begun as part of the anti-Japanese resistance, it departed from classical Chinese tradition and underwent its own development and maturation. This opulent literary legacy illustrates the painful process of these writers' constructions of selfhood and negotiation with the colonial condition, providing us with a complex picture of the workings of colonialism. <

References

- Chen Yingzhen 陳映真. 1998. 'Jingshen de huangfei - Zhang Liangze huangmin wenxue lun de piping' 精神的荒廢 - 張良澤皇民文學論的批評 (Spiritual desolation - Criticism of Zhang Liangze's notion on imperial-subject literature) in Zeng Jianmin 曾健民, ed. *Taiwan xiangtu wenxue, huangmin wenxue de qingli yu pipan* 台灣鄉土文學、皇民文學的清理與批判 (Clarifications and criticisms of the nativist literature and imperial-subject literature of Taiwan). Taipei: Renjian.
- Lin Ruiming 林瑞明. 1996. *Taiwan wenxue de lishi kaocha* 台灣文學的歷史考察 (A historical investigation of Taiwan literature). Taipei: Yunchen.
- Ye Shitao 葉石濤. 1990. *Taiwan wenxue de beiqing* 台灣文學的悲情 (The sadness of Taiwan literature). Kaohsiung: Paise wenhua.
- Zhang Liangze 張良澤. 1998. 'Zhengshi Taiwan wenxueshi shang de nanti - guanyu Taiwan 'huangmin wenxue' zuopin shiyi' 正視台灣文學史上的難題 - 關於台灣〈皇民文學〉作品拾遺 (Facing the tough problem in Taiwanese literary history - Addenda about 'imperial-subject literature' in Taiwan), supplement of the United Daily News (February 10).

Lin Pei-Yin
National University of Singapore
chslpy@nus.edu.sg

[advertisement]



Leiden Traditional and Modern

One of the wonderful things about studying at Leiden University is the combination of a long tradition and venerable reputation with a youthful spirit that is completely modern. The student population has a strong voice and is carefully listened to at Leiden.

- Asian Studies
- Chinese, Japanese and Korean Studies
- Comparative Indo-European Linguistics
- Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology

- Islamic Studies
- Middle Eastern Studies
- Western and Asian Art History

www.leiden.edu



Universiteit Leiden
The Netherlands

Leiden University
International Office, PO Box 9500
2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands
P +31 (0)71 527 7287
F +31 (0)71 527 7288
study@io.leidenuniv.nl

Connecting the experiences of the Sino-Japanese and Asia-Pacific Wars

How were the Sino-Japanese and Asia-Pacific Wars related to one another? In terms of military strategy, competition for raw materials, diplomacy and the like, historians have long acknowledged connections between the conflicts, and how one prefigured the other. Yet, beyond the obvious military-strategic links, other kinds of inter-relationships between developments in the China theater and in other parts of Asia subsequently occupied by Japan have received much less attention, particularly in terms of transnational cultural history.

Ethan Mark

Conventional accounts of the two conflicts tend to lump Japanese and Asian experiences into one basket with the shared labels 'imperialism versus nationalism' and 'oppression versus resistance.' To a certain extent this remains accurate, but there were important differences between how Japan's occupation of China and its occupations in Southeast Asia were apprehended and experienced by occupier and occupied. At the same time, the two conflicts were related in complex ways.

Coming home

The case of Japanese-Indonesian relations in occupied Java and their relationship to the Sino-Japanese War serves as a brief example. When Japanese forces landed on Java in March 1942, they brought with them a stirring, revolutionary message: Japan's occupation of Indonesia represented neither imperialist aggression nor a local version of Western colonialism, but the realization of a world-historical mission to 'liberate' Japan's Asian brethren from Western capitalism and colonialism, and to build a harmoniously 'Asian' order transcending modernity's social ills. In ancient times, Asia had been a unified and powerful cultural whole; the success of Japan's new Asia-building project depended on a cultural return to the shared Asian values and unity that Western imperialism, capitalism, and individualism had undermined. Japan, alone among Asian societies in having maintained its political autonomy and Eastern cultural essence while mastering Western science and technology, was uniquely, 'naturally' qualified to lead this Asian renaissance.

Java's indigenous population had long been suffering under Dutch colonial domination, and many, particularly among its educated elite, were in search of a new post-colonial order. Many Indonesians thus welcomed the Japanese and were captivated by their promises, particularly given that beyond occasional contact with local Japanese shopkeepers – who had an overwhelmingly positive reputation – Indonesians had little direct experience of Japan and its empire. The demonstration of Japanese power represented by the rollback of the Americans, British, and Dutch in the Pacific between December 1941 and March 1942, unprecedented in speed and scope, was further incentive to follow Japan's lead. And while many Indonesians were aware that Japan had been waging war in China for several years, longstanding class and racial tensions between the indigenous population and local ethnic Chinese – who dominated the lower reaches of the economy and were widely perceived as capitalist-colonial henchmen of the Dutch rulers – offset the potential for anti-Japanese solidarity.

For their part, many Japanese who took part in the invasion were overwhelmed by the Indonesian welcome, and were quick to see in Indonesia proof of the world-historical righteousness of Japan's mission as Asia's leader and liberator. Many went so far as to interpret their comfort in Java – reinforced by what they saw as uncanny racial, linguistic and cultural similarities between Indonesians and Japanese – as confirmation of a 'fresh start' for Asia as well as a 'homecoming' to the long-lost Asian brethren described in Japan's own propaganda.

Northeast Asian roots

While Japan's message was new and appealing to many Indonesians, for Chinese, Koreans, and others who bore the brunt of Japanese expansionism in Northeast Asia, the language of 'liberation' and 'return to Asia' had a familiar and by now hollow ring. This was no coincidence, for while it was now directed at Southeast Asians, the message of 'Greater Asia' was originally meant for Northeast Asian consumption. And wittingly or not, Chinese resistance had played a critical role in its making, elaboration, and radicalization.

Up to the 1930s, Japanese justifications for imperial expansion and colonial rule had largely mirrored those of the Western powers: the protection of Japan's military-strategic 'spheres of interest', the securing of vital raw materials, land, and markets, and in more idealistic

fueled by fear of the Soviet Union and its commitment to exporting communist revolution, along with increasingly assertive Chinese nationalism. From 1931, the empire-building project in Manchuria became the focus of Japanese ambitions, and was billed as a model solution to Japan's domestic problems.

Imperial crisis

At the same time, the interwar period was a time of crisis in the legitimacy of imperialism itself. Chinese nationalist resistance to Japanese encroachment was a regional play on the global theme

the message of 'Greater Asia' was originally meant for Northeast Asian consumption. Wittingly or not, Chinese resistance played a critical role in its making, elaboration, and radicalization

of anti-colonialism, which was gaining the moral high ground as the 'trend of the times', articulated by such spokesmen as Mahatma Gandhi and encouraged by the Marxist-Leninist critique of imperialism and Woodrow Wilson's acknowledgement of the 'right to national self-determination'. Just as the Great Depression and crisis of international capitalism made the securing of empire seem more important than ever to Japan – and to Britain, Holland, and France – empire as such was becoming harder to justify, internationally as well as domestically.

many Japanese, something much more noble and profound. This Chinese resistance came as a shock to most Japanese, who expected to deliver a quick, decisive blow to the 'renegade' forces of Chiang Kai-shek when the conflict began in mid-1937. But as months turned into years, the Japanese found themselves in a military and moral quagmire; continued mobilization of a tired populace and 'pacification' of the 'inscrutably' resistant Chinese demanded a cause that transcended the old justifications for empire – ideally, a cause that could transcend empire itself.

Yet, despite increasingly sophisticated elaboration, Japanese attempts to justify the war as a holy mission to establish a 'Greater East Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere' and 'liberate Asia' from Western colonial domination – ideas that resonated profoundly in Japanese society – largely failed to strike a chord among Chinese. The shocking brutality of the conflict, continued Japanese racism and arrogance, the complex structure of Chinese domestic social and political relations, and, if this were not enough, the accumulated weight of history in the form of a common perception of Japan and the Japanese as scheming, self-aggrandizing 'imperialists' – in tandem with longstanding assumptions of Chinese cultural superiority over their geographically smaller, 'peripheral' neighbour – inhibited local receptivity to Japanese claims of acting as 'Asia's liberator', let alone any legitimacy as 'Asia's leader'.

It is only against this highly charged and contested Northeast Asian formative background that Japanese ideology and propaganda in Southeast Asia – with its revolutionary evocation of an empire that could transcend imperialism, an Asian brotherhood that could transcend capitalism, an Asian modernity that could transcend Western modernity – can be understood. For reasons discussed briefly above, Java's population proved more open than their Chinese counterparts to ideas of a Japanese-sponsored 'Asian' alternative to Western rule and modernity. For their part, Japanese responses to this situation – in many ways almost a sense of religious redemption for themselves, their nation, and its imperial project – must be understood in the context of frustrations built up in the course of the China conflict. They reflect the degree to which Chinese resistance had threatened to undermine the legitimacy of Japan's empire – and how much Japanese had invested in the imperial project.

Recalling the earlier struggles and frustrations of a Japanese propaganda unit in China in a mid-1942 column, newspaper editor Shimizu Nobuo articulated the sense of relief and newfound confidence among Japanese in Java – as well as the continuing fixation on resolving Japan's 'China problem' which prefigured the Japanese experience in Indonesia and elsewhere. Where Chinese resistance had previously left Japan's imperial spokesmen 'wordless', the warm Southeast Asian reception now seemed to provide Japan with a long-sought 'reply.'

There is a story of the China Pacification Unit (Shina senbuhun).

They argued that Japan and China have the same script and are of the same race (dōbun dōshu), they are brothers, and they should proceed with hands joined. Someone in the audience replied - Alright, but China is the older brother.

It is said the members of the pacification unit had no words to answer this for some time.

How wonderful if they had been able to reply immediately.

It is a problem of history – when you are properly aware of Japan's history, the answer is extremely simple.

Japan has always been leader of the Asia-Pacific sphere from ancient times – if you know this history, that is enough.

Japan has always been constructing China - if you know this history, that is enough.

We are now seeing this truth with our own eyes in the Greater East Asia War.

We must be aware that this truth before our eyes has been continuously repeated in China since ancient times.

What is true in China is, again, true in the southern regions. Japanese people, take great pride!

It is an irony of history that Shimizu's closing assertions were eventually to prove correct, albeit hardly in the way that Shimizu, and the many Japanese whose views he represented, might have hoped. As Indonesians who lived through Japan's increasingly exploitative and brutal three and a half-year occupation will attest – and despite Japanese claims and Indonesian hopes to the contrary – it was inevitable that the imperial chickens Japan had raised in China would eventually come home to roost in Southeast Asia. For all its idealism, the promise of 'Greater Asia' was no match for the inexorably imperial political, economic, and cultural logic of Japan's wartime regime. But more than this: in its very contradictions, 'Greater Asia' was not only a vivid sign of its late-imperial times – it was also, in itself, an expression of Japan's late-imperial logic. ◀

Ethan Mark

NIOD/Ailion Foundation Postdoctoral Fellow

Dept. of Japanese and Korean Studies, Leiden University

e.mark@let.leidenuniv.nl



Mirror image? Cartoonist Ono Saseo's 1942 depiction of Japanese-Indonesian cultural resemblances also seems to suggest a more 'civilized' Japan.

terms, the bringing of 'civilization and enlightenment' to 'backward peoples', the 'suppression of disorder', 'banditry' and the like. From around the late 1920s, however – alongside increasing calls for domestic social renovation – a more aggressive expansionism came to the fore. The push for internal reform and external expansion emerged against the backdrop of socio-economic dislocation in the wake of the Great Depression, which brought suffering domestically and heightened protectionism and competition between the imperial powers internationally. The shift was further

The Japanese ideology of 'Greater Asia' that took shape in the 1930s arose in, and reflected, this specific 'late imperial' context. The nominal political 'independence' of Manchukuo, along with its rhetoric of 'racial harmony and brotherhood' – in what was little more than a Japanese puppet-state – were expressions of its contradictions. Above all, tenacious Chinese resistance in the subsequent full-scale war in the Chinese heartland produced the social and ideological conditions whereby what had started as a relatively straightforward imperialist mission had to become, in the eyes of

Source: Ono Saseo, in *Undbara shimbun*, published by Jawa sendahan, 1942

Borneo constituencies: Japanese rule and its legitimation

Thinking of wartime occupations, we tend to picture suppression, looting, and violent and arbitrary rule. For the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, the prevailing image is one of a brutal regime ruling Indonesian society at gunpoint and spoiling the lives of thousands, while incompetent administrators ruined the country. Or was the Japanese period a prelude to revolution and the harbinger of independence?

Remco Raben

It was, of course, both. Trying to avoid generalisations which judge a period by its outcomes, it might be useful to look at the *zaman Jepang* (Japanese period) differently, by assessing the workings of the Japanese state in Indonesia. Instead of looking at the effects of occupation for different peoples or classes, one might examine how Japanese rule operated as a state, more specifically the way it produced or tried to produce a certain legitimacy.

I am not concerned here with legitimacy according to international law, but with the inner workings of the Japanese state in Indonesia. Recent thinking on rulers' legitimacy stresses the mechanisms by which rulers legitimate their power and through which they influence their subjects to accept their authority - it is the process of legitimation that is considered crucial to the workings of the state.¹ Borneo poses an interesting case. Few historians have given attention to this large island, which was of crucial importance to the Japanese. Sources are relatively scarce, but Allied intelligence reports and Malay-Japanese newspapers provide us with a fascinating window on the workings and rituals of Japanese rule.

In colonial states, the legitimacy of rule is often translated as the loyalty of colonial subjects. The Dutch, for instance, were almost obsessively concerned with the issue. Japanese authorities showed a similar preoccupation with the issue of loyalty, understandably exacerbated by the wartime situation. But their interest in the population went further than obedience and subservience to the Japanese war cause. Whatever their practical reasons for conquering the Dutch East Indies (oil, for one), they came with a message (to free Asia from the bonds of the western powers) and an aim (to create a new Asian society under Japanese guidance). An extended period of rule and exploitation would be impossible

without a full measure of legitimation; the build-up of a constituency was thus essential to the immediate restoration of Borneo's industrial output, but also to the longer-term objective of a pro-Japanese Indonesia.

A new Borneo

Borneo fell under the command of the Japanese navy as did all Indonesian islands except Java and Sumatra. At the outset, it was unknown how long the Japanese would stay. As related in his memoirs by Okada Fumihide, minseifu soka or chief of the Naval Administration Government in East Indonesia based in Makassar, the occupation was to be permanent (*eikyū senryō*). This is an interesting remark, as whatever the short-term needs of an empire at war, in the longer term Japanese rule had to concern itself with the legitimacy question. It did so in all sorts of ways, ranging from the ideological to the simple exercise of authority. Drawing mainly on newspapers, we might distinguish several strategies of legitimisation.²

A first, obvious method was the identification of a common enemy: the Dutch, Americans and British. Linked to this were Japanese appeals to form a block against the West and to join the Asian forces under Japanese guidance. A second source of legitimation was in some ways more tangible: the old colonial power had been defeated and its formal presence removed - Indonesia was entering a new era. The fact of victory was accompanied by the profession of Japanese liberation ideology: according to the newspaper *Borneo Shimbun*, Borneo had been *terlepas dari perboedakannya* (freed from its slavery) and was entering a new phase in history. 'New' was the word which, in various forms, loomed large in the newspapers. *Masjarakat baroe* (new society) became the miracle word, as it did on Java and elsewhere. Interestingly, there was also *Borneo baroe* (new Borneo), which was thought to inspire inhabitants with regional patriotism. It seems the Japanese wanted to

foster regional identity on the island, as they did on other islands, the result of the Japanese wish to avoid premature development of a truly national Indonesian movement, and which also mirrored administrative and economic division into autarkic provinces. The new Borneo was even celebrated by a song of that title, while youth recruits in Banjarmasin wore insignia in the shape of Borneo on their breast pockets.

Whatever the claims and aspirations, both anti-Allied propaganda and the message of liberation were insufficient to inspire Indonesian men and women to embrace the Japanese state in Indonesia. Areas under navy command were less exposed to the Japanizing efforts of the new rulers; propaganda means were much more limited in Borneo than on Java. Public loudspeakers relaying broadcasts from Banjarmasin, Batavia and Tokyo were only put up in the big towns. Borneo newspapers such as *Kalimantan Raya* and *Borneo Shimbun*, however, seem to have been fairly widely read, as Allied interrogation reports of local inhabitants suggest.

Another channel of legitimation was the bureaucracy. The Japanese had initially proclaimed the continuation of Dutch structures of government, and Dutch administrative labels and terms were often retained, such as 'resident' and 'keur' (statute), even 'ambtenaar' (civil servant). Taxes remained unchanged from prewar days; only the obligatory *corvée* labour, abolished by the Dutch, was re-instituted. An important change, however, was the employment of local personnel in administration, with the double aim of efficiency in the use of Japanese manpower and 'gaining confidence of the local peoples'.³ Only slowly were changes made in the structure of government. By December 1943, municipal governments were instituted in Banjarmasin and Pontianak, and residency and municipal councils erected, with the aim of 'normalizing' the administra-

tion and to attach local elites to Japanese rule. Of the maximum total of fifteen members, about half were elected and the others appointed. Their task was purely advisory, but their inauguration was widely publicized.

Limits to legitimacy

It remains difficult to assess the precise effects of Japanese legitimation efforts, but avoiding the common branding of these efforts as sheer 'propaganda', it appears that the Japanese employed a wide range of tactics. Compared to Java, some peculiarities catch the eye: one is the marked difference between urban and rural areas. Organisations of youth militia and volunteers existed only in the big towns, where displays of Japanization were strongest. Mass-mobilization movements such as the Three-A movement and *Poetera* on Java had no equivalents on Borneo. This was also due to the absence of a large intelligentsia to lead these movements. Only on a much less intensive level, and restricted to more densely populated coastal zones, were similar policies of mobilization tried on Borneo.

During the latter part of the occupation the limits of Japanese legitimation became clearly visible, and political credibility crumbled. Without doubt, this had to do with intensifying pressures on the people and economy, and panicky and ruthless reactions to disobedience and anti-Japanese activities. In late 1943, the Japanese discovered a 'conspiracy' in Banjarmasin, allegedly led by ex-Governor B.J. Haga, which was quelled by arresting several hundred suspects and convicting and executing 26 'leaders' and secretly killing many others. In its wake, the *Tokkei* or naval police discovered other plots and cases of disobedience in western Borneo (Pontianak), which resulted in the arrest and killing of probably several thousand people, including most of the local 'Malay' sultans and intelligentsia. The motives for the mass executions are not entirely clear, but seem to have been triggered by fears of local powerholders.⁴ The combination of a low-intensity occupation (the garrison in western Borneo consisted only of about 500 men), the complex political dynamics of the region (with Chinese *kongsis* and semi-autonomous sultans), and the economic value of the island to the war effort made Japanese rule tense and suspicious. A side-effect of the cleansing operation was the Japanese administration increasingly appointing outsiders from South Borneo (Banjarmasin) as officials. Problems were not only limited to coastal areas: in early 1945, upriver Dayak communities in western Borneo rose against the Japanese, staging one of the few large-scale armed actions against the Japanese in the archipelago.

While these 'incidents' instilled fear among the population, Japanese-led newspapers and bulletins had little

more to offer than the continued trumpeting of freedom and Borneo entering a new era. Government performance is a convincing source of legitimacy, especially in a colonised country where political identities had yet to fully crystallize. With the absence of a large elite holding strong nationalist feelings, administrative practice was of crucial importance. Japanese administration, however, proved to be ineffective and harmful, with increasing demands on labour and a break-down of local trade and infrastructure. Evidence abounds of the quality of life in the coastal areas being seriously affected by the occupation: food and textiles were already scarce by late 1943, while plantations and gardens were neglected and unmaintained roads were overgrown by jungle.


Nothing is more delegitimizing than a failing government. The Japanese state in Borneo suffered from serious defects and failed to institute or maintain a stable and reliable civil administration. The mass arrests probably created an impression of arbitrariness and a widespread atmosphere of fear. It is interesting to see that the newspapers changed their tone and subject in the last year of the occupation. While they had previously given much attention to the old aristocracies, in particular the sultans, by 1945, under pressure from the deteriorating war situation, they had shifted to preparation for independence. As a result, when Mohammad Hatta visited Banjarmasin in May 1945, his speech drew a large and mesmerized crowd. The success of Japanese nationalists was not just consciously created by the Japanese, as many Dutchmen assumed after the war, but was part and parcel of the same legitimation process that had promised a new Borneo in 1942. It was indeed a last resort of the Japanese in their attempt at legitimation. ◀

Notes

1. See Rodney Barker. 2001. *Legitimizing identities. The self-presentations of rulers and subjects*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Most of the following has been drawn from the *Kalimantan Raya* (5 March 1942-7 Dec. 1942) and *Borneo Shimbun* (8 Dec. 1942-15 Sept. 1945), and interrogation reports of the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS), held by Netherlands Institute for War Documentation.
3. Benda, Harry J., James K. Irikura and Kōichi Kishi, eds. 1965. *Japanese military administration in Indonesia: Selected documents*. n.p.: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 207.
4. Maekawa, Kaori. 2002. 'The Pontianak Incidents and the Ethnic Chinese in Wartime Western Borneo'. Paul Kratoska, ed. *Southeast Asian minorities in the wartime Japanese empire*. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 153-169.

Remco Raben
Netherlands Institute for War
Documentation
r.raben@niod.nl

[advertisement]




THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN SOUTHEAST ASIA
A New History
Edited by Norman G. Owen

HAWAII READER IN TRADITIONAL CHINESE CULTURE
Edited by Victor H. Mair
Nancy S. Steinhardt & Paul R. Goldin

HOUSE HOME FAMILY: Living and Being Chinese
Edited by Ronald G. Knapp & Kai-Yin Lo
Spatial Habitus: Making and Meaning in Asia's Vernacular Architecture

MURŌJI: Rearranging Art and History at a Japanese Buddhist Temple
Sherry Fowler

TALES FROM A CHARMED LIFE
A Balinese Painter Reminisces
Hildred Geertz & Ida Bagus Madé Togog

 **UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII PRESS**
WWW.UHPRESS.HAWAII.EDU

'If the self is cultivated, ...' - some remarks on philosophy and politics in wartime Japan

'And if I were not afraid you would think me drunk, I would have sworn as well as spoken about the effect that [this man's words] have always had and still have on me.... This Marsyas ... has often brought me to such a pass, that I feel life isn't worth living, as long as I stay as I am. And you can't say that isn't true, Socrates.... For he makes me confess that I have a lot of flaws, but nevertheless I neglect to attend to myself, busying myself with the concerns of the Athenians. So I plug my ears and fly away from him...'.¹

Christian Uhl

This was how Alcibiades spoke to Socrates and other guests gathered in Agathon's house for that dinner party known to us as the 'Symposium'. One laughs at the performance of the drunken politician, but Alcibiades is in truth more a tragic figure. As a boy, he had told Socrates that he intended to govern the polis one day. Socrates wanted to know what that meant. Alcibiades had to concede that he did not know – and that, until then, he had not even been embarrassed about not knowing – to which Socrates put to him that before he set about minding the business of others, he should first 'attend to himself'.² During the 'Symposium', Alcibiades admitted that he had failed in the face of philosophy. And in the end, after a life governed by selfishness and lust for power, the Athenian politician and general died in disgrace at the hands of a murderer.

Socrates' end was tragic as well. It was the fulfilling of what Socrates saw as the philosopher's primary task - to approach young people all over the city and tell them that in order to live a life in light of godly truth, they should first 'take care of themselves' and 'know themselves' - for which his prosecutors attacked him.

'Every epoch organizes the censorship of philosophy in its own way. Socrates had to give his life. Descartes was persecuted by the Sorbonne' – thus Hadrien France-Lanord's disparaging reaction to Emmanuel Faye's recent entry to the debate on the entanglement of the influential German philosopher Martin Heidegger with national socialism.³ The unceasing debate on Heidegger's politics frequently appears even on the feature pages, and needs no comment here. Less known is that in Japan too, ever since the end of the Asia-Pacific War, a similar debate about philosophy's contamination by politics has smouldered. This debate was sparked by a series of publications in which the 'father of Japanese philosophy', Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945), and thinkers affiliated with him – the so-called Kyōto School - got involved in the political business of 'Holy War' waged for a 'Greater East-Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere'.

The debate on Nishida and the Kyōto School has been overshadowed by the debate on Heidegger. One reason for this 'Heidegger-factor' in the debate on the Kyōto School rests with merely strategic considerations of some of the debate's participants. But philosophical parallels can indeed be drawn between Nishida and Heidegger, and there are also direct links passing through some

of Nishida's disciples, who studied in Germany. One of these parallels might be a common concern with – or a certain resentment against – what we may call the 'ordinary self', which, as it is, is incapable of knowing the truth, and has to be 'overcome', so to speak. It was this concern, or resentment, which nourished Heidegger's understanding of the national socialist movement as a 'national revolution' against the 'hopeless frenzy of technology'. And it was out of the same concern that philosophers of the Kyōto School embraced the war as the most effective means to what was propagated in war-time Japan as the 'overcoming of modernity'. Moreover, for them – as for Socrates – the problem of the 'self' was closely linked with the problem of knowing how to govern others, and might therefore help to illuminate the relationship between philosophy and politics in war-time Japan.

Japan's officially declared war objective was the establishment of a 'New Order in East Asia' and the defeat of the old world order as represented by the League of Nations. The philosophers of the Kyōto School assessed these objectives positively. The League of Nations, they argued, had been established to ensure world peace based upon the 'abstract idea' of a unity of autonomous peoples, upon capitalism and liberalism. In the Anglophone world however, freedom, was just another word for 'free competition', meaning 'repression of the weak', and it was this inner contradiction that had finally resulted in the destruction and defeat of that world order.⁴ The West no longer represented the world; it had fallen into crisis, and in awareness of this, had pulled together defensively to form a particular world, thus facilitating the growing self-confidence of the East. The latter was no longer simply an object of world history. It had woken up to 'subjectivity' and came forth as a self-aware 'world-historical subject'. Like those of Europe, the peoples of Asia were joining together into a 'Family of Peoples', with Japan as its avantgarde. The fulfilment of this 'world-historical mission' of Japan, however, hinged on a profound self-overcoming of what Japan itself had been so far.

For, they noted, the modernisation and industrialisation of Japan under the motto of 'Civilisation and Enlightenment' had brought the ailments of modern industrial societies to Japan as well. Opposing the power of capitalist world civilisation was synonymous with opposing individualism, democracy, and liberalism, i.e. the system of values of modern civilisation. A deep rift separated the 'atomized' individual from state and society, the 'private' from the 'pub-

lic'. The modern state lacked a centre of gravity, a centripetal force counteracting the centrifugal forces exercised by selfish, private interests. 'The entrepreneur', maintained a member of the Kyōto School, 'thinks about the economy, the lawyer about law, and so on, but thinking about things in such isolated realms has now reached its limits'. A 'real renewal', he continued, had to put an end to the 'rampant spreading of such narrow subjectivity' and it was the 'breaking down of these borders' that was the task of philosophy. The 'total war', therefore, was 'precisely a 'philosophical war'. Because by compelling the concentration of forces, the conversion of the modern state into a 'nation-

'total war' was 'the total destruction of the modern state, society, economy, culture and philosophy', i.e. the ultimate 'overcoming of modernity' itself

al defence state', and teaching the individual 'asceticism' and the subordination of his or her private interests to the public weal, the war excelled in answering this very demand for the breakdown of borders, the merging together of the disintegrating areas of the military, art, economy, politics, and thinking etc., and the transformation of the modern 'homo oeconomicus' (*keizai-jin*) back into an 'original human' (*honrai no ningen*). In a nutshell: the 'total war' was more than just a struggle for a new society and a new world order in political terms. It was, at the same time, 'the total destruction of the modern state, society, economy, culture and philosophy', i.e. the ultimate 'overcoming of modernity' itself.

Leaving further consideration of these ideas to the reader, I shall limit my remarks here to the significance of the word 'asceticism'. Referring to a specific religious exercise or practice of self-overcoming – i.e. the overcoming of vices and desires – the word imparts an explicitly religious connotation to the definition of the war as the 'overcoming of modernity' per se. This religious dimension also manifests itself in the wording of the following statement of one of Nishida Kitarō's disciples, Kōsaka Masaaki:

'By the way, how should we view the attitude that regards the salvation of the small human being as something separated from the salvation of humankind as a whole? Nishida too recently said that world history is the purgatory of the soul of humankind, and that war too probably has this meaning.... In this way the soul of humankind becomes purified. Therefore all turning points of world history have been

decided by war. For this reason world history is the purgatory of humankind'.⁵

The understanding of history as a purge and purification of the sins of the past, the idea of war as an ascetic exercise, or the Kyōto school philosopher Tanabe Hajime's conviction, that unceasing 'penitence' is the true principle of history – all this elevates the political philosophising of the Kyōto School into the realm of the religious, and, moreover, directly links it with the demand for a transformation or overcoming of the 'ordinary self'. The question of religion, Nishida Kitarō writes, 'is neither limited to the problem of objective knowledge, nor to the question of morals, which concern the Ought

of our willing ego. The questions are rather: What are we? Where are we? What is the essence of ourselves?... What makes the self-being the true self?...'.⁶ Only against this background can the call of Nishida's disciples for a re-transformation of the modern 'homo oeconomicus' back into an 'original human being' reveal its significance and pathos.

Nishida's metaphysics also explain why for his disciple Kōsaka the salvation of the 'small human being' is linked with the salvation of humankind as a whole. Within the limited frame of my remarks, however, I shall restrict myself to a simple illustration of the link between what we may call the 'cultivation of the self' and the 'salvation of humankind' by quoting some lines from the Chinese classic *The Great Learning (Daxue)*. These lines may also shed light on a certain understanding of the relation between philosophy and politics, which one may recognize in Nishida and his disciples too:

If the things are understood, then understanding is complete.

If understanding is complete, then the thoughts are true.

If the thoughts are true, then the mind is in order.

If the mind is in order, then the self is cultivated.

If the self is cultivated, then the house in order.

If the house is put in order, then the state is governed properly.

If the state is governed properly, then there is peace in the world.⁷

Christopher S. Goto-Jones has recently highlighted the significance of indigenous Japanese, non-Western traditions

of political thought to a proper understanding of Nishida's political philosophy, stressing in particular the critical potentials of a Buddhist 'politics of awakening'.⁸ Indeed, the call for an overcoming of the ordinary, selfish self as a pre-condition for good government implies a criticism of the state of mind of ordinary men such as the imperialist political and military leaders of war-time Japan. Some have identified a similar kind of criticism in the call of Nishida's disciples for an 'overcoming of modernity'. Still, ambiguity remains. For before the establishment of peace in the world, the salvation of humankind, or the emergence of a Buddhist state envisioned by Nishida at the end of his life, there was the purgatory of world history, the affirmation of the war as an ascetic exercise. And so in the Kyōto School's concern with the overcoming of the 'ordinary self' we may also find an answer to the question asked by the Heidegger expert Otto Pöggeler, 'how could the Kyōto School get so close to the war parties'?⁹ The historical significance of this question, however, must not be overestimated: neither Alcibiades, nor the Japanese 'war parties' ever really listened to the philosophers' advice: 'You have to attend to yourself first!' ◀

Notes

1. Platon, *Symposion*, 215 d - 216 a, modified by author.
2. Platon, *Alcibiades 1*, especially 128 d
3. Lanord in an interview in *Le Monde*, quoted from Jürg Altwegg, 'Wirkt sein Gift noch immer? Frankreich debattiert über Heidegger als Hitlers Philosoph', in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Samstag*, 21. 5. 2005, Nr. 116, p. 31.
4. The following quotes are from a series of three round-table-discussions ('Sekai-shiteki tachiba to Nihon', Tōa kyōeiken no rinrisei to rekishisei', and 'Sōryokusen no tetsugagu'), held by four philosophers of the Kyōto School (Nishitani Keiji, Kōyama Iwao, Kōsaka Masaaki, Suzuki Shigetaka). These symposia were published in the popular journal *Chōō Kōron* in January 1942, April 1942 and January 1943.
5. *Chōō Kōron*, January 1942, p.192
6. Nishida Kitarō, 'Bashoteki ronri to shōkyōteki sekaikan', in *Nishida Kitarō zenshō*, 19 vols., Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1978-80, vol XI, p. 412.
7. Quoted from Peter Pörtner, *Jens Heise, Die Philosophie Japans – Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, Stuttgart: Kröner, 1995, p. 335-338 (English mine).
8. Christopher S. Goto-Jones, *Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-Prosperty*, London and New York: Routledge, 2005. This book inspired my remarks.
9. Otto Pöggeler, *Neue Wege mit Martin Heidegger*, Freiburg i. B./ München, 1992, p. 88.

Christian Uhl
Dept. of Japanese and Korean Studies
Leiden University



The fourth International Convention of Asia Scholars was held in Shanghai at the impressive and historical Shanghai Exhibition Center. Previous meetings were held in Leiden (1998), Berlin (2001) and Singapore (2003). ICAS is a platform for Asian, Australasian, American, African and European Asianists to study issues pertaining to Asia and find solutions of interest to all.

The ICAS panels transcended the boundaries between disciplines, between nations and regions studied, and especially between the geographic origins of the presenters. The list of institutions participating clearly illustrates the convention's driving force. There were 1200 participants from 52 countries. More than 450 universities and many more institutes, departments, schools, programmes, and organizations were represented. This year for the first time, Asia scholars from Africa and the Middle East were at ICAS. All this guaranteed the boundary-crossing discussions the Selection Committee and ICAS had in mind.

The convention's focus is on panels. Only 10 per cent of which were institutional and organized top down. We thank all participating institutions and hope that more institutions will follow suit to use ICAS as a platform. Likewise we thank the scholars who organized 30 per cent of the panels. The remaining panels were put together by the Selection Committee on the basis of individual abstracts. These were grouped under the 13 general themes of ICAS 4 such as Global Asia, Identity, Economy and Knowledge.

The 280 panels ranged from Urbanization, Megalopolis and Regional Development to Investigating Law and from the Impact of ASEAN to Bad Girl Writers. On average a panel consisted of four papers but there were also panels exceeding 10 speakers. In all more than 1200 papers were presented. Out of the sheer number of abstracts the idea was born to put all information pertaining to ICAS 4 on a USB-stick. This made for a portable programme book and all information readily accessible.

We were happy to welcome about twenty key publishers in the field of Asian Studies who showcased their latest state of the art publications in the exhibition space. We thank them for the more than forty books contesting for the ICAS Book Prizes.

The ICAS secretariat hopes all participants enjoyed an inspiring and stimulating convention in Shanghai and invites you to join ICAS 5 in Kuala Lumpur in 2007! <

Based on the opening remarks by the Secretary General of ICAS Prof. Wim Stokhof during the opening session of ICAS 4 in the Central Hall of the Shanghai Exhibition Center in Shanghai on 20 August, 2005.



The future of Asia: cross-cultural conversations

Scholars who have devoted their academic lives to the study of Asia can play important roles in furthering the vision of universality, partly as researchers whose work can contribute to cross-cultural understanding, but more specifically as teachers of future generations and sponsors and facilitators of student exchanges.

Barbara Watson Andaya

Most of us, and particularly historians, are committed to the idea that the past has something to say about the future. Individuals have always played a key role as linguistic and cultural mediators, with far-reaching influence - both positive and negative - exercised by the written interpretations they produced. People who are well acquainted with cultures that are not their own will be as important in shaping the global relationships underpinning Asia's future as they have been in the past.

From early times Southeast Asia, being at the cross roads between India and China, offers a multitude of examples of visitors who recorded their impressions, sometimes simply as an official report, sometimes intended for wider dissemination. Few college textbooks on Southeast Asia, for instance, would fail to mention the description of Angkor left by Zhou Daguan, a member of a Chinese embassy who spent a year in Cambodia at the end of the 13th century. In a very different time, and in a very different place, we can consult the report of a Persian scribe included in a mission to the Siamese capital of Ayutthaya in 1685 who remarked on the willingness of the Thai ruler "to learn about the kings of the inhabited world, their behavior, customs and principles.... He sent everywhere for pictures depicting the mode of living and the courts of foreign kings."

It is important to recognize that this was a conversation, not a monologue. Over time, individuals from Southeast Asia traveled to distant lands, and detailed their experiences for posterity. In the early nineteenth century, for instance, the Riau scholar Raja Ahmad and his young son Raja Ali made the pilgrimage, not only meeting some of the most eminent Muslim leaders in Mecca but going to Medina with a caravan of two thousand camels. One can only imagine the enthralled audiences who listened to Raja Ahmad's stories following his safe return. Although mental adjustments are impossible to quantify, it is not difficult to imagine that such experiences could reshape an individual's views of his or her own society. Many of us can attest the subtle attitudinal shifts that travel and overseas living has brought about in our own lives. Cross-cultural conversations among ordinary people, most notably the young, lie at the heart of international education.

There has been a proliferation of programs that allow students to spend time in another country, as students or for an extended visit. The bulk of exchanges have been between the West and Asian societies, while a significant and growing number of young people from Asia spend time in other Asian countries. The knowledge they acquire reaches far beyond the acquisition of language skills; what is important is learning "how things are done" in another culture. Ultimately this kind of knowledge demands an awareness and non-judgmental acceptance of difference, and these values can never be learnt too early. If we accept that the future of Asia, with all its promise, will ultimately rest with its youth, then the education of a globally perceptive generation is a matter of the highest priority.

Historians of premodern Southeast Asia have learned to distinguish between observers with only a passing knowledge of "the other" and those with much greater experience in the region. Two examples of early "exchange students" whose experiences continue to speak to us across the years illustrate the kind of person I have in mind. The first is a young Chinese man, Wang Dahai, who spent ten years in Java between about 1783 and 1793, and whose account of Java written in 1791, reprinted at least seven times, was first translated into English in 1849. Having apparently failed the examinations, and anxious to help his debt-ridden family, Wang followed the path of numerous other young Chinese, and left for the "southern seas." He traveled in Java, entered service as a tutor with a wealthy Batavian Chinese family, and married before eventually returning to China.

Despite sometimes caustic comments, Wang Dahai obviously enjoyed living in Java. He appears to have been comfortable speaking Malay, and his account, Claudine Salmon tells us, introduces 89 Malay words in Chinese characters. He also knew something of other societies in the region, noting as many as 17 different ethnic groups, and commenting on distinctions between the Malay, Bugis and Javanese language and writing systems. He spoke of attending shadow plays and poetry recitations; his account of household interiors and the ways guests were received speaks to his personal relationships, and presumably his own marriage to a local woman. Wang's primary interests revolved around trade, but he seems to have developed a passion for tropical vegetation, and collected the names of many plants. The same interest apparently led him

ICAS Book Prizes 2005

The idea behind ICAS Book Prizes, awarded for the first time this year, is to create international attention and increasing visibility for publications on Asia through a global competition.

All scientific books on topics pertaining to Asia published in 2003 and 2004 were eligible. Three prizes were awarded: best study in the Social Sciences, best study in the Humanities and best PhD study in Asian Studies. The award consists of EURO 2500 for the first and second category while the best PhD study will be published in the ICAS/Brill Series.

The Reading Committee reviewed 38 books (23 Humanities and 15 Social Sciences). In each category three books were nominated as were two dissertations. Thanks goes to the Reading Committee: Anand Yang (President Elect of the Association for Asian Studies), chair; David Hill (professor at Murdoch University), Krishna Sen (vice-president of the Association of Asian Studies of Australia); Dr Guita Winkel (Leiden University) and Dr Mehdi Amineh, (fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies) and Dr Paul van der Velde (ICAS Secretary).

Citations

The best book in the Social Sciences category is

Elizabeth C. Economy
The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future.

(Ithaca NY: Cornell U Press: 2004).

The Chinese people have transformed their country from a developing nation to economic powerhouse. Equally striking, however, has been the price that China's environment has paid for this transformation. Elizabeth C. Economy captures extraordinarily well the complex historical, systemic, political, economic, and international forces that are shaping China's environment. No other volume on this enormously important issue is as comprehensive, balanced, and incisive. The style is direct, factual, uncluttered by jargon and accessible to the non-specialist. The book concludes with scenarios for China's future. Economy has written a well-researched analysis of the environmental degradation that happened in China and its implications for the rest of the world.

The best book in the Humanities category is

Christopher Reed
Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876-1937

(Vancouver/ Toronto: UBC Press. 2003)

Christopher Reed knits together cultural and technological histories, in a simultaneously readable and erudite text. It is based extensively on Chinese language documents and is a response to the 'western' historiography of print technology and its consequences in late 19th and early twentieth century China. Reed describes the existing print culture of China prior to the arrival of Gutenberg's moving letter press machine and shows how the new technologies had to be embedded into an existing print culture and technology with its own pre-existing norms. He also shows that the print-led socio-economic transformations were equally in the hands of the machinists, who moved the locus of Chinese publishing from Canton and Hong Kong to Shanghai within the space of about a generation and a half. It is a wonderfully detailed history of the press. It will appeal to a wide range of scholars of China and theorists of culture and technology.

The best book dissertation is

Samuel Kwok-Fu Wong
Community participation of Mainland Chinese migrants in Hong Kong - rethinking agency, institutions and authority in social capital theory
(University of Sheffield, 2004)

Wong reviews the concept of social capital to question common assumptions underlying policy prescriptions in pro-social capital programs. His research is based on fieldwork conducted in 2001-2 among poor, newly arrived mainland Chinese immigrants to Hong Kong. His well-written thesis is an original contribution that aims not so much to cast 'social capital' away as a theoretical concept as to soften its rigid use in current development strategies. His study is of wider impact than for Hong Kong immigrants alone and calls for a reconsideration of conventional understandings of development programs. <



in history

to compile considerable detail about the collection of certain rare commodities like bêche de mer, swallows' nests, birds of paradise, bezoar stones, and tortoise shell. His readers would have been reminded that such activities were never purely an economic matter. Those collecting birds' nests, Wang tells us, must select an auspicious day and success can only be guaranteed through the propitiation of spirits in songs and dance. The special nature of Wang's observations lies in the fact that he was what we would now call a participant observer, and one can sense his personal enjoyment of Java. Much of his pleasure he attributed to the emphasis his host cultures placed on food and rest. "Even if there is an urgent affair, they do not attend to it immediately." He paid Java the greatest compliment of all: even the rice was superior to that of China! It could certainly be argued that Wang's gratitude to his rich merchant hosts encouraged him to offer an especially positive picture. On the other hand, it is also likely that Wang emphasized the appealing features of a non-Chinese to encourage his compatriots to think more deeply about their own.

My second example of the "inquiring mind" concerns John Adolphus Pope, a fifteen-year-old apprentice born in 1771 in Plymouth employed on an English country ship from 1785 to 1788. His time in Southeast Asia thus coincides with that of Wang Dahai, and again what struck me when I read his letters to a friend in Bengal was his intellectual curiosity and his genuine interest in his surroundings. The crews of the country ships not only had to be first class seaman, but also needed working understanding of local societies so that they could trade. In this sense, John Pope was an orientalist of the best type. In the Malay port of Kedah, for instance, he met Dul Bad-dul, the son of the Royal Merchant; they became good friends, even discussing matters like religious differences. Describing various ports from Yangon to Aceh, Pope's letters reveal a genuine pleasure in meeting new acquaintances and in re-visiting places where he could have already made friends. "Those who say the Malays have no virtues," he wrote, "have never lived among them. I have been received by them as a child and domesticated, I may say in their families as far as the prejudices of religion would allow, universally treated with kindness and generosity. . . I shall always think of the inhabitants of this spot with complacency and pleasure." Pope went on to become a captain in his own right, and had a long career trading in India, China and other parts of Asia.

These contemporaries, Wang Dahai and John Pope, seem to me to be prime examples of the expanded outlook that that can come about when young people are given the opportunity to live for some time in a culture which is not their own. It may be difficult at times, and certainly the writings of both Pope and Wang show that they were by no means immune from feelings of frustration, and that they themselves sometimes were targets of hostility. But both youths learned that appropriate interactions with others are always culturally contingent and that appreciation of the good in another society enables one to view one's own more clearly.

The 21st century offers unprecedented opportunities of communicating with other societies on many different levels and via many different media. At no point in world history has it been more important to educate global citizens who have the capacity to approach each other as potential friends, regardless of differences in religion, language, ethnicity and culture. Central to the future of Asia must be a renewed commitment to sustain meaningful cross-cultural conversations informed by the universal and human values of intellectual curiosity, empathy and simple kindness. <

Based on the keynote speech of ICAS 4 Shanghai on 20 August, 2005.

References:

- Bulley, Anne, ed. 1992. *Free Mariner*. Adlestone, Surrey: British Association of Cemeteries in South Asia.
- Chou Ta-Kuan. 1967. *Notes on the Customs of Cambodia*. Translated from the French Version of Paul Pelliot by J. Gilman D'Arcy Paul. Bangkok: Social Science Association Press.
- Graves, Elizabeth, and Charnvit Kaset-siri. 1969. "A Nineteenth-Century Siamese Account of Bali: With Introduction and Notes." *Indonesia* 7, 77-122.
- O'Kane, John, trans. and ed. 1972. *The Ship of Sulaiman*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Raja, Ali Haji. 1982. *Tuhfat al-Nafis (The Precious Gift)*. Edited and annotated by Virginia Matheson and Barbara Watson Andaya. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- Salmon, Claudine. Fall 1994. "Wang Dahai et sa vision des contrées insulaires (1791)." *Etudes Chinoises* 13, 1-2. 221-257.

1 September 2005 - 31 December 2005
 IIAS hosts several categories of post doctoral researchers (fellows) in Asian Studies. Sponsorship of these fellows contributes to the institute's aim of enhancing expertise and encouraging the exploration of underdeveloped fields of study. One of the main objectives of IIAS is to mediate in establishing contacts in the field of Asian Studies and to stimulate cooperation between national and international scholars and institutes. IIAS consequently offers universities and research institutes the opportunity to benefit from the knowledge of its resident fellows. In terms of their scholarly contribution to IIAS, fellows are invited to present lectures, participate in seminars, and cooperate in research programmes. IIAS fellows' applications can be submitted at any time (no application deadline).
 More information and IIAS fellowship application forms are available at:

www.iias.nl/iias/fellowships.html

For specific information, please contact:
iasfellowships@let.leidenuniv.nl

IIAS distinguishes between five fellowship categories:

1. Affiliated fellows

Affiliated fellowships are offered to excellent postdoctoral scholars who have arranged for their own funding (via their own institute, one of the international exchange programs, or a funding organization). In addition, IIAS also offers to mediate in finding external financial support for highly qualified scholars.

Regulations:

- selection by the international exchange institute and/or IIAS, upon receipt of the fellowship application form.

2. Research fellows

Research fellows are postdoctoral scholars or PhD students attached to IIAS research programmes, initiatives and networks: 'ABIA South and Southeast Asian Art and Archaeology Index' (ABIA)

'Care of the Aged'

'Changing Labour Relations in Asia' (CLARA)
 'Development of Space Technology in Asia'
 'Energy Programme Asia' (EPA)

'Economics in Asia: Socio-Genetic Marginalization' (SMAP)

'Indonesianisasi and nationalization'

'Islam in Indonesia'

'Piracy and Robbery in the Asian Seas'

'Syntax of the Languages of Southern China'

'Trans-Himalayan database development'

'Transnational Society, Media, and Citizenship'

Regulations:

- upon vacancy only.

3. Senior fellows

IIAS offers excellent senior scholars the opportunity to do research in the Netherlands. In addition to scholars, senior fellowships are also granted to renowned figures in non-scholarly fields such as journalism and diplomacy.

Regulations:

- upon invitation by IIAS only;
- minimum level (for scholars): assistant professor

4. IIAS Professors

IIAS Professors are attached to IIAS to teach, do research, and organize seminars in the Netherlands and other European countries.

National IIAS professors

Regulations:

- upon vacancy only;
- selected by the Stichting ter Bevordering van de Azië Studies;
- based at a Dutch university.

International IIAS professors

Regulations:

- nominated by home country / institute;
- selected by special selection committee in the Netherlands;
- Minimum assistant professor level;
- (co-)financed by home country / own institute;
- based at IIAS.

5. Artists in Residence

IIAS offers artists from Asia or artists working on Asia the opportunity to visit the Netherlands to work and to establish or expand a European network.

Regulations:

- Selection by IIAS upon receipt of fellowship application form.

IIAS fellows can choose to be based in Leiden or at the Branch Office Amsterdam.

All fellows currently engaged at IIAS are listed below selected by region of specialty and in alphabetical order.

General

Dr Sebastian Bersick (Germany)

Affiliated fellow

Towards ASEM 6

1 - 31 December 2005

Dr Katia Chirkova (Russia)

Programme coordinator 'Trans-Himalayan database development: China and the subcontinent', sponsored by CASS and KNAW

1 September 2005 - 1 September 2006

Dr Rick Dolphijn (the Netherlands)

Affiliated fellow

The time-city: The rise of the megalopolis and its consequences for the everyday life

1 August 2005 - 31 January 2006

Central Asia

Dr Mehdi Parvizi Amineh (the Netherlands)

Stationed at Leiden and the Branch Office Amsterdam

Programme Director 'Energy Programme Asia' (IIAS/Clingendael)

1 July 2002 - 15 April 2007

Dr Yael Bentor (Israel)

Affiliated fellow

Interpretation and polemic: The generation process according to the Gelugpa school of Tibetan Buddhism

1 - 31 August 2005

Dr Alex McKay (New Zealand)

Affiliated fellow

The history of Tibet and the Indian Himalayas

1 October 2000 - 1 October 2008

Dr Rieke Leenders (the Netherlands)

Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam

Affiliated fellow

Interethnic relations in Siberia

1 March 2005 - 1 March 2006

Dr Dan Martin (Israel)

Affiliated fellow

The histories of the Tibetan Bon religion

19 July - 31 August 2005

Dr Irina Morozova (Russia)

Stationed at Leiden and the Branch Office Amsterdam

Affiliated fellow

Conflict, security and development in the post-Soviet era: toward regional economic cooperation in the Central Asian region

24 April 2003 - 31 December 2005

Liesbet Nyssen, MA (the Netherlands)

Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam

Affiliated fellow

Interethnic relations in Siberia

1 March 2005 - 1 March 2006

Dr Cecilia Odé (the Netherlands)

Affiliated fellow

Voices from the tundra and taiga

1 July 2002 - 1 July 2006

South Asia

Dr Bhaswati Bhattacharya (the Netherlands)

Affiliated fellow

The Armenian diaspora in India, 1500-1950

1 May 2005 - 31 December 2005

Dr Alexandra van der Geer (the Netherlands)

Affiliated fellow, sponsored by Gonda Foundation

Animals in stone, Indian fauna sculptured through time

1 January 2003 - 31 December 2005

Gerda Theuns-de Boer, MA (the Netherlands)

Research fellow in IIAS network 'South and Southeast Asia Art and Archaeology Index (ABIA)'

1 November 2002 - 1 November 2005

Dr Jyotsna Agnihotri Gupta (the Netherlands)

Research fellow, within the ASSR/IIAS/NWO programme 'Socio-Genetic Marginalization in Asia'

Reproductive genetics and counselling in India: Decision-making regarding genetic screening and prenatal diagnosis

1 September 2004 - 31 August 2007

Dr Kengo Harimoto (Japan)

Affiliated fellow, sponsored by Gonda Foundation

A critical edition of the first chapter of the Pāṇjajalayaśāstravivaraṇa

1 November 2005 - 31 March 2006

Dr Rully Marianti (Indonesia)

Affiliated fellow

Elderly women in Pakistan and Indonesia

1 June 2004 - 31 December 2005

Dr Shoma Munshi (India)

Affiliated fellow and IIAS representative

The new world of Indian satellite television: Transnational networks and society

1 November 2004 - 1 November 2006

Dr Kim Plofker (USA)

Affiliated fellow, sponsored by NWO

Mathematics in India, 500 BCE - 1800 CE, with special emphasis on its relationship with Islamic mathematics (750 - 1800 CE)

9 September 2004 - 9 September 2006

Dr Saraju Rath (India)

Affiliated fellow, sponsored by Gonda Foundation

Catalogue collection Sanskrit texts

5 January 2004 - 5 June 2006

Dr Satya Shrestha-Schipper (Nepal)

Affiliated fellow

Migrating from the hills in the Himalayas: The impacts on the social organization of the Jumli (Western Nepal)

1 March 2004 - 31 December 2005

Southeast Asia

Supaporn Ariyasajisikul, MA (Thailand)

Affiliated fellow, sponsored by CNWS

Late Ayutthaya's foreign trade policy: A study in its regional and international context with an emphasis on the reign of King Boromakot (1733-1738)

1 September 2003 - 1 September 2007

Dr Greg Bankoff (UK)

Affiliated fellow

Cultures of coping: Community and natural hazard in the Philippines

1 September 2004 - 31 August 2007

Dr Jean Berlie (France)

Affiliated fellow

Muslims of Myanmar

1 December 2005 - 31 January 2006

Jajat Burhanudin, MA (Indonesia)

Research fellow within the programme 'Islam in Indonesia'

The making of Islamic modernism. The trans-

mission of Islamic reformism from the Middle East to the Malay-Indonesian archipelago in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century

18 September 2001 - 18 September 2005

Dr CHIN Yee Whah (Malaysia)

Affiliated fellow

Chinese entrepreneurship in Malaysia

1 November 2005 - 31 January 2006

Dr Djaswadin (Indonesia)

Affiliated fellow

A study of law: public regulations and the development of Science and Technology

1 September - 30 November 2005

Dr Wil Dijk (the Netherlands)

Affiliated fellow

The VOC's trade in Asian Slaves

1 October 2004 - 31 December 2005

Prof. Gregory Forth (UK)

Senior fellow

Southeast Asian anthropology

1 September 2005 - 1 May 2006

Dr Hans Hägerdal (Sweden)

Affiliated fellow, sponsored by the Swedish Vetenskapsrådet

Early modern Timor: The meeting between indigenous groups and colonial interests

20 July 2005 - 20 July 2006

Dr Dadit Herdikiagung (Indonesia)

Affiliated fellow

A study of law: public regulations and the development of Science and technology

1 September - 30 November 2005

Jasper van de Kerkhof, MA (the Netherlands)

Research fellow in IIAS programme 'Indonesianisasi and nationalization'

15 October 2002 - 31 December 2005

Dr Peter King (Australia)

Affiliated fellow

Disintegrasi in Indonesia

28 February 2005 - 1 March 2006

Dr Thomas Lindblad (the Netherlands)

Research fellow in IIAS programme 'Indonesianisasi and nationalization'

1 October 2002 - 1 October 2006

Dr Charles MacDonald (France)

Senior fellow

A study of personal names in Southeast Asia. An investigation on systems of identity.

15 September - 14 December 2005

- WONG Leo, MA (China)**
Research fellow within the joint NWO/Leiden University/IIAS research programme 'The Syntax of the Languages of Southern China' *Cantonese syntax*
13 September 2004 - 13 September 2006
- Dr YIP Mingmei (USA)**
Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam
Affiliated fellow
The Qin and its music in Chinese culture
4 September - 30 October 2005
- IIAS partners and fellow sponsors:**
ASSR: Amsterdam School for Social Science Research, the Netherlands
www2.fmg.uva.nl/assr/
BDK: Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai, Society for the Promotion of Buddhism, Japan
www.bdkamerica.org/default.aspx?MPID=52
CASS: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
www.cass.net.cn
CNWS: School of Asian, African, and Amerindian Studies, the Netherlands
www.leidenuniv.nl/interfac/cnws/
IDPAD: Indo-Dutch Programme on Alternatives in Development
www.idpad.org
KNAW: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences
www.knaw.nl
KRF: Korea Research Foundation, Korea
www.krf.or.kr
NIOD: Netherlands Institute for War Documentation
www.niod.nl
NSC: National Science Council, Taiwan
www.nsc.gov.tw
NWO: Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research
www.nwo.nl
SSAAPS: Swedish School of Advanced Asia-Pacific Studies
www.ssaaps.stint.se
SASS: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences
www.sass.org.cn
WOTRO: Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research
www.nwo.nl/nwohome.nsf/pages/NWOP_65PD44
- Prof. Md. Salleh Yaapar (Malaysia)**
IIAS Professor, European Chair of Malay Studies
Pantun and Pantoun: A study in Malay-European literary relations
5 February 2003 - 5 February 2005
Malay-Dutch Literary Relations: Hang Tuah in the Netherlands
5 February 2005 - 5 February 2006
- East Asia**
Dr HUANG Chris Chu Cheng (Taiwan)
Affiliated fellow, sponsored by NSC
Asian space: A comparative study of policy issues
10 May 2005 - 3 November 2005
- Dr KATO Masae (Japan)**
Research fellow within the ASSR/IIAS/NWO programme 'Socio-Genetic Marginalization in Asia'
A comparative study on socio-genetic marginalization: Japan in "Asia" in relation to the "West" as a reference group
1 April 2005 - 1 April 2008
- Dr LAN Pei-Chia (Taiwan)**
Affiliated fellow, sponsored by NSC
The employment of Filipina and Indonesian migrant domestic workers in Taiwan
24 June - 22 September 2005
- Jan-Eerik Leppänen MA (Finland)**
Research fellow within the ASSR/IIAS/NWO programme 'Socio-Genetic Marginalization in Asia'
Socio-genetic marginalisation and vulnerable ethnic groups in Southwest China
1 February 2005 - 1 February 2009
- LI Boya, BA (China)**
Research fellow within the joint NWO/Leiden University/IIAS Research Programme 'The Syntax of the Languages of Southern China'
1 January 2001 - 31 December 2005
- Dr David Odo (USA)**
Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam
Affiliated fellow
Ethnographic study of Japanese photography
3 August - 3 November 2005
- SIO Joanna, BA (China)**
Research fellow within the joint NWO/Leiden University/IIAS Research Programme 'The Syntax of the Languages of Southern China'
1 January 2001 - 31 December 2005
- WANG Ping, MA (China)**
Affiliated fellow
The Euro-Sino relations after September 11 and its prospects
15 September 2004 - 30 August 2005
- Dr Julia Martinez (Australia)**
Affiliated fellow
Labour migration from the Netherlands East Indies to northern Australia
6 - 18 June 2005 and 15 May - 17 June 2006
- Prof. NAKAGAWA Satoshi (Japan)**
Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam
Affiliated fellow
Resource management and ritual exchange in Ende (Indonesia): A historical survey
4 April 2005 - 4 February 2006
- Dr Portia Reyes (Philippines)**
Affiliated fellow
The Filipinization of history: An exploration into the contemporary indigenization of Southeast Asian historiography
10 August 2004 - 10 April 2006
- Muhammad Haji Salleh (Malaysia)**
Artist in residence
Pantun manuscripts
1 October - 31 December 2005
- Dr Elisabeth Schröder-Butterfill (UK)**
Affiliated fellow
Old-age vulnerability and social networks in Southeast Asia
1 May 2004 - 31 December 2005
- Dr Pujo Semedi (Indonesia)**
Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam
Affiliated fellow
Tea for Europe. Social structure and economic organization of a Javanese plantation community, 1870s - 2000s
1 September 2004 - 1 September 2005
- Dr William Southworth (UK)**
Affiliated fellow, sponsored by NWO
Huanwang and Panduranga: The coastal states of Champa in central Vietnam c. 750-875 AD
5 October 2004 - 5 October 2005
- Prof. Hein Steinhauer (the Netherlands)**
IIAS Professor
Special Chair 'Ethnolinguistics of East Indonesia' at the Radboud University Nijmegen
1 September 1998 - 1 September 2006
- Prof. Michael Vickery (USA)**
Senior fellow
A critical review of the sources for the history of Angkor and Champa
1 September - 30 November 2005
- Putu Wijaya (Indonesia)**
Artist in residence
Mutual collaboration in theatre
1 September - 1 December 2005

[advertisement]

ROUTLEDGE ASIAN STUDIES

ROUTLEDGE TEXTBOOKS AND SUPPLEMENTARY READING 2005

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/Routledge Series
Edited by **Glenn D. Hook**, University of Sheffield, UK

This well-established series with one of the pre-eminent institutions for Japanese Studies in Europe publishes cutting-edge research and authoritative introductory texts on modern Japan and the Japanese. Editorial policy encourages leading and promising younger scholars to contribute especially social scientific analyses on a wide range of Japan-related subjects.

Japan's International Relations
Politics, economics and security
Edited by **Glenn D. Hook**, University of Sheffield, UK, **Julie Gilson**, University of Birmingham, UK, **Christopher W. Hughes**, University of Warwick, UK and **Hugo Dobson**, University of Sheffield, UK
'... Japan's relations with Iraq, Okinawa, North Korea and China have all been moving at an explosive pace and the authors do a wonderful job of analyzing the most important of these activities and distilling just what is really changing and what has remained the same.' - Professor T.J. Pempel, *Il Han New Chair in Asian Studies and IEAS Director, University of California Berkeley, USA.*
August 2005: 246x174: 576pp: illus. 2 line drawings, 18 b+w photos and 14 tables
Hb: 0-415-33637-6: **£75.00**
Pb: 0-415-33638-4: **£22.99**
eB: 0-203-42157-4: **£22.99**
•AVAILABLE AS AN INSPECTION COPY

Contested Governance in Japan
Sites and Issues
Edited by **Glenn Hook**, University of Sheffield, UK
This book extends the analysis of governance in contemporary Japan by exploring both the sites and issues of governance above and below the state as well as within it.
February 2005: 234x156: 268pp: illus. 3 line drawings and 16 tables
Hb: 0-415-36419-1: **£65.00**
Pb: 0-415-36498-1: **£21.99**

Economic Development in Pacific Asia
Hafiz Akhand, University of Regina, Canada and **Kanhaya Gupta**, University of Alberta, Canada
This book introduces students to the economics of east Asia from a development perspective.
June 2005: 234x156: 256pp: illus. 10 tables
Hb: 0-415-28867-3: **£75.00**
Pb: 0-415-28868-1: **£20.99**
•AVAILABLE AS AN INSPECTION COPY

Human Rights in Asia
Values and Legal Systems, with Comparisons to France and the United States
Randal Peerenboom, UCLA School of Law, USA
This book considers how human rights are viewed and implemented in Asia. It covers not just civil and political rights, but also social and economic rights, and cultural rights.
Routledge Law in Asia
July 2006: 234x156: 504pp
Hb: 0-415-36002-1: **£95.00**
Pb: 0-415-36003-X: **£29.99**

Rethinking Modern Japan
Politics, Economics, Identity
Terry Naramore, University of Tasmania, Australia
This book is a basic introduction to Japanese politics and society which combines both political and cultural studies approaches to understanding Japan.
Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies
May 2006: 234x156: 224pp: illus. 5 tables
Hb: 0-415-28865-7: **£60.00**
Pb: 0-415-28866-5: **£17.99**
•AVAILABLE AS AN INSPECTION COPY

Politics and Culture South North Korea
Dennis Hart, Kent State University, Ohio
This book provides an introduction to the rival politics, ideologies and political cultures of South and North Korea.
Routledge Advances in Korean Studies
January 2006: 234x156: 272pp: 10 tables
Hb: 0-415-36816-2: **£65.00**
Pb: 0-415-37284-4: **£19.99**

China in War and Revolution, 1895-1949
Peter Zarrow, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taipei
Providing historical insights essential to the understanding of contemporary China, this text explores the events that led to the rise of communism and a strong central state during the early twentieth century.
May 2005: 234x156: 352pp: illus. 10 maps
Hb: 0-415-36447-7: **£70.00**
Pb: 0-415-36448-5: **£21.99**
•AVAILABLE AS AN INSPECTION COPY

Geopolitics of East Asia
The Search for Equilibrium
Robyn Lim, Nanzan University, Japan
This book focuses on the way geographical and historical forces continue to play a key role in shaping international relations in East Asia.
June 2005: 234x156: 208pp
Pb: 0-415-36030-7: **£17.99**
Hb: 0-415-29717-6: **£65.00**
eB: 0-203-00840-5: **£65.00**

Understanding Central Asia
Sally Cummings, University of Edinburgh, UK
An introductory text to the history, politics and international relations of Central Asia. The book explores domestic and foreign politics and all key issues facing the region, and assumes very little prior knowledge.
April 2006: 234x156: 224pp
Hb: 0-415-29702-8: **£60.00**
Pb: 0-415-29703-6: **£16.99**
•AVAILABLE AS AN INSPECTION COPY

Asia's Transformations/Asia's Great Cities
Edited by **Mark Selden**, Cornell University and SUNY Binghamton, USA

Each volume aims to capture the heartbeat of the contemporary city from multiple perspectives emblematic of the authors own deep familiarity with the distinctive faces of the city, its history, society, culture, politics and economics, and its evolving position in national, regional and global frameworks. While most volumes emphasise urban developments since the Second World War, some pay close attention to the legacy of the longue duree in shaping the contemporary. Thematic and comparative volumes address such themes as urbanization, economic and financial linkages, architecture and space, wealth and power, gendered relationships, planning and anarchy, and ethnographics in national and regional perspective.

Hong Kong
The Global City
Stephen Chiu and **Tai-Lok Lui**, both at Chinese University of Hong Kong
Hong Kong: The Global City examines the developmental history of Hong Kong, focusing on its rise to the status of a Chinese global city in the world economy, and its social and political correlates between the 1970s to the 1990s
January 2006: 234x156: 224pp: illus. 16 b+w photos
Hb: 0-415-22011-4: **£65.00**
Pb: 0-415-22010-6: **£17.99**

Shanghai
Jeff Wasserstrom, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA
This book concentrates on the modern history of this urban center and analyses the major periods of globalization that the city has encountered.
December 2005: 234x156: 224pp
Hb: 0-415-21327-4: **£65.00**
Pb: 0-415-21328-2: **£17.99**
eB: 0-203-38032-0: **£17.99**

Chinese Society
Change, Conflict and Resistance
Edited by **Elizabeth J. Perry**, Harvard University, USA and **Mark Selden**, Cornell University, USA
'...this edited volume gives a good overview of the hotspots of Chinese society ... it would make an excellent textbook for courses on modern China, social movements and popular protest.' - *The China Quarterly*
July 2003: 234x156: 336pp: illus. 2 line drawings and 9 tables
Hb: 0-415-30170-X: **£65.00**
Pb: 0-415-30169-6: **£20.99**
•AVAILABLE AS AN INSPECTION COPY

Singapore
Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control
Carl Trocki, Queensland University of Technology, Australia
Based on the latest research, the book addresses the question of control in one of the most prosperous and dynamic economies in the world, providing a compelling history of post-colonial Singapore.
September 2005: 234x156: 208pp
Hb: 0-415-26385-9: **£55.00**
Pb: 0-415-26386-7: **£17.99**

Visit www.tandf.co.uk/eupdates to sign-up for email alerts

www.routledge.co.uk/asianstudies

To order any of these titles call **+44 (0)1264 343071** or email book.orders@routledge.co.uk

Email info.asian@routledge.co.uk for your free copy of any of the following catalogues:

- Japanese Studies - New!
- Southeast Asian Studies - New!
- Forthcoming Asian Culture & Society
- Asian Studies New titles - New!
- Forthcoming South Asian Studies
- Forthcoming South Asian Studies
- Forthcoming Asian Business Studies

IIAS Research Programmes, Networks & Initiatives

> Programmes

Socio-Genetic Marginalization in Asia

The development and application of new biomedical and genetic technologies have important socio-political implications. This NWO/ASSR/IIAS research programme aims to gain insight into the ways in which the use of and monopoly over genetic information shape and influence population policies, environmental ethics and biomedical and agricultural practices in various Asian religious and secular cultures and across national boundaries.

Coordinator: Margaret Sleebloom-Faulkner

Energy Programme Asia (EPA)

This programme focuses on the impact of East and South East Asian Energy Supply strategies on the Caspian region (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Russia) and the Persian Gulf. The objective is to study the effects of the global geopolitics of energy security supply on the main energy consuming countries of East and Southeast Asia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea, and their national strategies of securing supply from the Caspian region and the Persian Gulf. The programme is institutionally supported by IIAS and the Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP), The Hague.

Coordinator: Mehdi Parvizi Amineh

The Syntax of the Languages of Southern China

This project aims to achieve a detailed description and in depth analysis of a limited number of syntactic phenomena in six languages, both Sinitic and non-Sinitic, spoken in the area south of the Yangtze River. The project will systematically com-

pare these descriptions and analyses to contribute to the development of the theory of language and human language capacity, through the study of non-Western languages.

Coordinator: Rint Sybesma

Islam in Indonesia: The Dissemination of Religious Authority in the Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries

Forms and transformations of religious authority among the Indonesian Muslim community are the focus of this research programme. The term authority relates both to persons and books as well as various other forms of written and non-written references. Special attention is paid to the production, reproduction, and dissemination of religious authority in the fields of four sub-programmes: *ulama* (religious scholars) and *fatwas*; *tarekat* (mystical orders); *dakwah* (propagation of the faith); and education.

Coordinator: Nico Kaptein

Indonesianisasi and Nationalization

From the 1930s to the early 1960s, the Indonesian economy transformed from a 'colonial' economy, dominated by the Dutch, to a 'national' one in which indigenous business assumed control. Shifts in command and management of the economy are closely related to economic structure and political alignment. This NIOD project explores this transformation, studying the late-colonial era as well as the Japanese occupation, the Revolution and the Sukarno period. Two issues are given special attention: *Indonesianisasi* (increased opportunities for indigenous Indonesians in the economy) and nationalization, in particular the expropriation of Dutch cor-

porate assets in Indonesia in 1957-58.

Coordinator: J. Thomas Lindblad

Trans-Himalayan database development: China and the Subcontinent (Phase I)

The project's main goal is to combine the database of cognate words in Tibeto-Burman languages, maintained by the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) since 1998 with language data of the George van Driem Himalayan Languages Project (Leiden University) in order to create a joint, online database of Tibeto-Burman languages with a mirror-site in Leiden. The second objective of the project is to continue documentation of endangered Tibeto-Burman languages in China in cooperation with the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology.

Coordinator: Katia Chirkova

> Networks

ABIA South and Southeast Asian Art and Archaeology Index

The ABIA Index online database covers publications on prehistory, archaeology, and art history, material culture, epigraphy, paleography, numismatics, and sigillography of South and Southeast Asia. IIAS is the centre for regions outside Asia, with support from the Gonda Foundation. Between 2002 and 2006 the project is coordinated by PGIAR, Colombo, with support from the Central Cultural Fund. Offices have also been opened at the IGNCA, New Delhi, and the Research Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta. *ABIA Index* volume 1 is available at IIAS. Volume 2 is available at www.brill.nl

Coordinator: Ellen Raven
www.abia.net

Changing Labour Relations in Asia (CLARA)

Labour relations in different parts of Asia are undergoing diverse historical processes and experiences in terms of their national economies, their links with international markets and the nature of state intervention. This programme aims to understand these changes comparatively and historically, focusing on five overlapping themes: the labour process, labour mobility, labour consciousness, gendered labour and labour laws and labour movements.

Coordinator: Ratna Saptari

Transnational Society, Media, and Citizenship

This multidisciplinary network studies the complex nature of contemporary cultural identities and the impact of the globalization of information and communication technologies (ICTs) on the (re)construction of these identities. Although the programme is based in the Netherlands, the projects are carried out at numerous fieldwork sites.

Coordinator: Peter van der Veer

> IIAS Initiatives

The Development of Space Technology in Asia

The space age has dramatically impacted on all nations. In Asia, the 'space-faring nations' - India, China and Japan - have achieved considerable success in building indigenous space technologies and applications. Other Asian nations have readily adopted these applications, including satellites for telecommunications, for gathering data on the weather, and environmental and earth resources. IIAS is launching this new research initiative and

has initiated a series of workshops on the topic (see announcement p.36).

Coordinator: David Soo

Piracy and Robbery on the Asian Seas

Acts of piracy loom particularly large in Asian waters, with the bulk of all officially reported incidents of maritime piracy occurring in Southeast Asia during the 1990s. This is of serious concern to international shipping, as the sea-lanes between East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe pass through Southeast Asia. IIAS and the Centre for Maritime Research (MARE) are currently identifying issues and concerns, and are delineating core elements of an interdisciplinary research programme on piracy and robbery at sea in Asia.

Coordinators: Wim Stokhof (IIAS) and John Kleinen (MARE)

Care of the Aged: Gender, Institutional Provisions and Social Security in India, Netherlands and Sri Lanka

This IDPAD/IIAS research project addresses the implications of population aging for the social security and health care of elderly people. As the experience of ageing is highly gendered and can vary according to class, caste, and religion, the project seeks to capture the dimensions, characteristics and trends related to aging among different social and economic groups, with an emphasis on women. This comparative study of the Netherlands, Sri Lanka, and India draws on diverse experiences of development to contextualize the aging process.

Coordinator: Carla Risseuw

For more information on IIAS Research:
www.iias.nl



Energy Programme Asia (EPA)

Global energy consumption depends largely on fossil fuels: coal, oil and natural gas. Growing consumption in rapidly industrializing East and Southeast Asia and industrializing countries elsewhere causes a steep increase in demand while large scale oil consumption in industrialized countries continues (the US consumes 25 percent of the world's oil production).

Mehdi Parvizi Amineh

According to the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) global oil consumption will rise from 82 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2004 to 100 million bbl/d in 2015, further increasing to 120 million bbl/d by 2025. Resources of operating oil fields are decreasing while resources in newly discovered oil and gas fields are disappointing and the price for a barrel of oil goes up. Global oil production will not be able to meet this rapidly rising demand. Major oil consumers will have to follow more aggressive policies to satisfy their oil needs, and military intervention to safeguard oil production and export will become more likely, as has been the case in Iraq as part and parcel of the US' larger strategy to democratise the 'Greater Middle East.'

In 2004 IIAS initiated Energy Program Asia (EPA) in cooperation with Prof. Dr. Coby van der Linde from the Clingendael International Energy Program (CIEP), Prof. Dr. Kurt Radtke from Waseda University, Tokyo, Prof. Dr. Yu

Shibutani at Energy Geopolitics Ltd. of Japan, and Dr. Shi Dan of the Energy Economic Research Centre of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. EPA analyses the impact of energy supply strategies of East and Southeast Asia's main consuming countries (China, India, Japan and South Korea) as well as the European Union (EU) on the Caspian Region (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Russia) and the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait).

The research will shed new light on the urgency to develop new policies and strategies to promote international cooperation in energy issues and avoid conflict scenarios. Additionally, the program's research contributes to the ongoing debate about environmental sustainability and energy efficiency policies (in both consumer and producer countries).

In the mid-term future China and India particularly will become major competitors of the EU and the US for scarce resources. The fact that oil production in China and India has peaked or is

about to peak will lead to increased reliance on oil imports from a limited number of exporting countries and regions. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2001 some 57.9% of oil consumed in the East and Southeast Asian region was imported, 62.2% from the Persian Gulf. In 2020 it is expected East and Southeast Asian countries will import 73.3% of their oil needs, 76.5% from Persian Gulf countries. This region, as well as the Caspian region, is politically and economically fragile, and suffers from increasing instability due to regional and domestic tensions. Political stability in these regions is therefore a top priority for consuming countries and consequently part and parcel of their foreign policy strategies.

The mere survival of a country and its society, economic dynamisms and technological innovation depends on oil and gas. The traditional approach to energy security focuses on the ability to employ domestic energy assets, technical and operational factors, transportation and import facilities, the investment climate

and the availability of foreign oil and gas supplies. Future global energy consumption, particularly growing energy import dependency, will increasingly politicize energy relations and escalate competition and cooperation among consumer regions and countries. This calls for a shift in traditional thinking about energy policies, and a need to place foreign and security policies at the center of the debate.

In addition to examining geopolitical issues, EPA studies the effects of national energy efficiency situations in both producer and consumer countries. For example, Iran (as one of the main producer countries) is troubled with increasing inefficiency in its domestic energy use. If this continues, there is a fair chance Iran will export considerably less oil (instead of considerably more) in 2015 as it does today. This will have great effects not only on the oil export dependent economy of Iran, but also on oil and gas consumer countries who will have to find alternative resources. Another example is the response of China and India to international environmental claims (Kyoto). If China and India gradually turn from coal-driven to oil-driven economies, efficiency is increased, but their already assertive oil and gas supply strategies will further intensify.

EPA addresses the following main questions:

- What are the effects of geopolitical competition between and among enterprises and governments of consuming countries for access to fossil energy supplies?
- What energy efficiency policies are in place in the four East and Southeast Asian consuming countries under study, the US, the European Union and producing countries?
- In addition to the ongoing debate about environmental sustainability, how urgent is the quest for alternative energy resources for global energy supply in the next two decades?

The researchers of the institutions mentioned above will draft individual sections of the study by working closely with small international and multidisciplinary teams of experts. For details on the project's past and future activities, see: www.iias.nl.

Mehdi Parvizi Amineh is Senior Research Fellow at IIAS and manages Energy Programme Asia. He is leading researcher in the areas of security of energy supply and geopolitics; additionally energy efficiency and sustainable development in the regions / countries under study.

The Socio-Genetic Marginalization in Asia Programme (SMAP)



SMAP, the Socio-genetic Marginalization in Asia Programme, which started off in August 2004, is a research programme set up with the support of the Netherlands Science Organisation (NWO), IIAS, and the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research (ASSR). Exploring cultural, social and economic aspects of the role of genetic technologies played in the area of state organisation, population policies, health care systems and research regulation in China, India and Japan, SMAP is expected to shed light on how differences in the application of modern genetic technologies generate different practices. The programme focuses on: (I) the ways in which (universal) regulation for genetic sampling by international companies and universities leads to disputable research practices among vulnerable populations; (II) how bioethical differences between healthcare systems are expressed in the different meanings allocated to concepts, such as informed consent, health, and family values; and, (III) the consequences of development priorities and practices of genetic screening for the livelihood and identities of diverging social groups.

Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner

Asia boasts the main economic players of the 21st century. China, India and Japan especially will play main roles in the field of science, particularly in applied modern technologies. The concept of socio-genetic marginalization, which is central to SMAP, draws attention to the consequences of the practice of relating the social to the (assumed) genetic make-up of people, regardless of the relevance of such connections. Central are the socio-cultural and financial consequences of the use of genetic information. The projects of SMAP are conceptualised through three empirical research projects outlined below.

Genomics, population-policies and local traditions

Governments in China, India, Japan and Europe treat issues of population planning with various levels of importance and apply different political strategies. In China the issue of the new eugenics, the quality of the population and one-child birth policy are of great political and human significance. The one-child policy, widely practised since the late-1970s, in combination with a preference for males, has led to a lopsided growth of the population. By legal prohibition the state has tried to interfere against these practices, but as yet not successfully. In India, too, sterilisation, infanticide and prenatal gender discrimination followed by abortion have led to a population imbalance, in which the state tries to interfere. Japan and Europe, on the other hand, struggle with the problem of ageing population and falling levels of fertility.

Thus, a variety of genetic technologies are available to the state in policies aimed at raising the quality of the population. Such population policies are part of an attempt to 'improve' the genetic composition of individuals or entire peoples. The 1995 introduction of the new eugenic legislation in China, for example, supports the systematic 'implementation of premarital medical check-ups' on hereditary, venereal or reproductive disorders as well as mental disorders so as to prevent 'inferior births' (Ministry of Public Health, 1994). A different tendency can be found in the Netherlands, where members of the medical profession observe that the state is obstructing their duty of providing all possible information and alternative treatment to patients by not allowing them to practice pre-embryo-screening and prenatal genetic research.

There is a need for the comparison of clashes of state population policies with local traditions in India, China, and Japan. Modern technologies of genetic engineering increasingly allow the government to intervene and regulate the personal lives of individuals in the name of public health, religion and national good. Concomitantly, concepts of health and human values in society are likely to be influenced. However, in some cultural environments, such as in India, it is the state that tries to put a brake onto the prenatal gender selection of its population.

Genetic sampling and vulnerable groupings in genetic sampling sites

The twofold aims of this project are, first, to understand the socioeconomic and cultural conditions of genetic sampling and banking in isolated areas and among ethnic minorities in different national contexts and, second, to the ways in which research populations are defined and mapped by researchers. The DNA of these socially defined groups is the subject of research in evolutionary genetics, the study of human reactions to various pharmaceutical products (pharmacogenetics), and the study of single nucleotide polymorphism (SNPs). Two kinds of issues are central to this research. The first involves the bioethical aspects of sampling and storing DNA. Current bioethical protocols still fail to deal adequately with the spe-

cific conditions raised by population-based research, in particular regarding procedures for group decision-making and cultural divergence (MST & MPH 1998; ICMR 2000). The second involves problems inherent in the ways geneticists define sample populations in genetic research. Before the sampling of populations begins, estimates are made about the genetic nature of target populations. The contents of these estimates are intimately related to historical processes of ethnic group formation, the intricacies of cultural perception and political interests.

In India, China and Taiwan, the DNA of various minority groups with suspect unique DNA are exploited commercially by research groups abroad and at home. This has caused considerable local, national and international strain. In Yunnan in Southwest China, ethnic DNA of over 25 so-called national minorities is stored in the world's largest ethnic databank in Kunming (*People's Daily*, 22/11/00). Such research is used to support claims on ethnic and national identity and to resolve conflict over national territory. Bio-anthropological research from South India served to provide genetic evidence for the similarity between high caste Indians and Europeans (Bamshad 2001). In Japan and China similar population research attempts to 'scientifically' root the modern nation into venerable historical origins.

Genomics, sociogenetic identities and health strategies in China, India and Japan

Though increased genetic information means a step forward in predicting and curing genetic diseases, policy-makers also attempt to use it strategically to improve human populations and eliminate 'defective' phenotypes. In the private sphere parallel developments are taking place: early prenatal testing has motivated couples with an increased risk of affected offspring to have children, but the diagnosis of disorders has also led to a steep increase of selective abortion. A central question here is if and when we can speak of a link between national health care policy, public debate and the private sphere. For instance, in China the government started a one-child family-planning programme in the 1970s to ensure sufficient nutrition for all new-borns, which resulted in a substantially decreased birth rate. At the same time, this policy limits individual freedom and autonomy. On the other hand, infant mortality in China by the 1990s had become considerably lower than in India. The criteria for the cost-effectiveness of clinical genetics in developing countries are not the same as in wealthy countries, such as Japan, Singapore and Taiwan. In developing countries the severely handicapped do not usually survive and, if they do, they are not provided with expensive medical care. Consequently, the targets of genetics services are reached on the basis of a different balance sheet. Thus, in developing countries family planning, carrier testing, genetic counselling and prenatal diagnosis may have a different rationale.

Currently six researchers are working on SMAP. Focusing on reproductive genetic technologies (RGT's) and genetic counselling in Delhi and Mumbai in India, Dr Jyotsna Gupta studies how genetic screening affects the perception of genetic risk. To understand these processes, Gupta conducts fieldwork in hospital locations of diverging religious and socio-economic status. In her analysis, Gupta uses the categories of gender, religion, education and socio-economic status to understand the parental decisions made to abort or to carry the embryo to full term. At the same time, she relates her observations in these clinics to state-regulation, developments in the pharmaceutical industry and international bioethical guidelines and NGOs.

The application of RGTs in Japan and its effect on genetic selection after prenatal diagnosis and during pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) are central in the work of Dr Masae Kato. Her fieldwork focuses on the way parents make

decisions about their offspring in genetic counselling sessions, and the way government guidelines, medical institutions, the family and cultural-medical practices affect these decisions. Kato relates her findings to political and public debates on the socio-cultural value of the embryo, so as to understand processes of validating humans. Initially, Kato will compare the application of RGTs in Japan with those in the Netherlands, extending the comparison to the PRC next.

Interested in genetic sampling, screening and biobanking in India, Prasanna Patra studies medical policies on three tribes with high levels of sickle cell anaemia, whose socio-economic circumstances differ starkly, and investigates how screening affects the identity and health of the community. In general, Patra looks at what happens to genetic data and asks the following questions: who does the sampling and under what conditions? Where are the data stored and who has access to them? Patra aims to make sense of the various behaviours and motives of various interest groups, including academic researchers, pharmaceutical companies, state agencies, sampled communities and NGOs.

Two research students will start to work with us in September 2005. Suli Sui will conduct comparative research into the regulation of new genetic technologies regarding vulnerable populations. She reviews existing Chinese law in relation to gender, ethnic, and socio-economic status, after which she will compare similar issues in the context of regulation of genomics and society in India. Apart from weighing arguments in favour and against the universal regulation of biotechnology, she will offer recommendations on regulation that harm the interests of identified vulnerable populations.

The second research student, Jan-Eerik Leppanen, aims to understand the role of Chinese ethnic minorities in biobanking and hopes to gain a better understanding of the effects of the knowledge generated through genetic sampling. Apart from exploring how biobanking activities alter relations between ethnic groups and the state, and what commercial stakes are involved, this research tries to understand the social and cultural effects of these activities on the ethnic groups in question. ◀

Note

1 Single nucleotide polymorphisms or SNPs (pronounced 'snips') are DNA sequence variations that occur when a single nucleotide (A,T,C, or G) in the genome sequence is altered.

References

- Bamshad, M. et al. (2001) 'Genetic evidence on the origins of Indian caste populations', *Genome Research* 11/6, 994-1004.
- ICMR (2000) 'Ethical guidelines for biomedical research on human subjects', *ICMR Bulletin*, 30, no. 10: 107-116.
- Ministry of Public Health (1994) *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Muying Baodianfa* (Law of the People's Republic of China on Maternal and Infant Health Care). Ministry of Public Health of the PRC, Beijing.
- Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Public Health (MST & MPH 1998) (*Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo kexue jishubu, weishengbu*) (1998) *Renlei yichuan ziyuan guanli zhanxing banfa* (interim measures for the administration of human genetic resources). Beijing: MPH.

Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner (University of Amsterdam), who leads the programme, conducts research mainly in the areas of biobanking, stem cell research and genetic counselling in China and Japan.

Seeking knowledge unto Qum: The education of Indonesian Shi'i ustadhhs

Much attention has been paid to Malay-Indonesian students studying at Al-Azhar in Cairo, which has become an important centre of Islamic learning for Sunnis throughout the world. Indonesia's minority Shi'i, meanwhile, have flocked to the so-called *hawza 'ilmiyya* (colleges of Islamic learning) of Qum, Iran.

Zulkifli

Since the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979, Indonesia's Shi'i minority has grown. An increasing number of Indonesian students pursue their Islamic studies in the *hawza 'ilmiyya* of Qum, the most prominent centre of Shi'i Islamic education in the world. A Qum education enhances the reputations of Indonesian Shi'i *ustadhhs* (religious teachers) within their Shi'i community. They play an important role in *da'wa* (Islamic propagation), educational and cultural activities.

Increase of Indonesian students in Qum

It is unclear exactly when Indonesian students began to pursue Islamic education in Qum, but it is known that some did so several years before the Iranian revolution. Ali Ridho Al-Habsyi, son of Muhammad Al-Habsyi and grandson of Habib Ali Kwitang of Jakarta, studied in Qum in 1974. Six graduates of the Pesantren Al-Khairat of Palu, Central Sulawesi, followed over the next two years. In September 1976, Umar Shahab, an Arab descendant from Palembang, South Sumatra, and today a famous Shi'i *ustadh*, came to Qum and, he says, studied alongside seven other Indonesian students (Umar Shahab, *interview* 9/1/2003). In his fieldwork in 1975, Fischer also noted the presence of Indonesian students in Qum; among foreign students, including those from Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Lebanon, Tanzania, Turkey, Nigeria and Kashmir, Indonesians numbered the fewest. (Fischer 1980: 78).

Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, interaction between its government and Indonesian Shi'i ulama has intensified. The victory of ayatollahs inspired Indonesian intellectuals and ulama to study the ideological foundation of the Iranian revolution: Shi'ism. At the same time, an 'export of revolution' occurred, as Iranian leaders and ulama aimed to spread Shi'ism in Indonesia and to attract Indonesian students to study Shi'ism in Iran. In 1982 the Iranian government sent its repre-

sentatives Ayatollah Ibrahim Amini, Ayatollah Masduqi, and Hujjat al-Islam Mahmudi to Indonesia. Among their activities was a visit to YAPI (*Yayasan Pesantren Islam*, the Foundation of Islamic Education) of Bangil, East Java, where they met with its leader, Husein Al-Habsyi (1921-1994), who became the most important confidant of Iranian leaders and ulama in Indonesia. At the time, Husein Al-Habsyi was probably one of the most prominent Shi'i ulama in Indonesia and played a major role in the development of Islamic *da'wa* and education. As a result of the meeting, Qum's *hawza 'ilmiyya* agreed to accept ten Indonesian students selected by Husein Al-Habsyi. From then on till his death in 1994, Husein Al-Habsyi was responsible for selecting candidates for study at *hawza 'ilmiyya* in Qum and other cities in Iran. Many were graduates of YAPI and other educational institutions and most have become important Shi'i *ustadhhs* in Indonesia.

Thus the number of Indonesian students studying in Qum has increased significantly. By 1990, fifty Indonesian students had reportedly completed their studies or were still studying in Qum. Ten years later the number of Qum graduates in Indonesia was more than a hundred. In 2001, fifty Indonesian students were selected to continue their studies in Qum (Ali 2002: 201-204), and in 2004, I was informed, ninety more students were selected.

In addition to the growing interest of Indonesian students to study in Iran, the Iranian government, through its International Center for Islamic Studies (*Markaze Jahani-e Ulume Islami*: ICIS), has stepped up efforts to attract international students. Since 1994 ICIS has been under the supervision of the office of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution headed by the Grand Ayatollah 'Ali Khamene'i, who also appointed its director.

The educational system of hawza 'ilmiyya

There are two educational systems at the *hawza 'ilmiyya* in Qum: the traditional system, which is the most famous and

influential, and the modern system. The traditional system's curriculum includes both transmitted and intellectual religious sciences. Each subject has its own standard texts (Nasr 1987: 165-182), which are studied in *halaqat* (study circles) under an ayatollah's supervision. The educational programme is composed of three levels: *muqaddamat* (preliminary), *sutuh* (external) and *dars al-kharaj* (graduation class) or *bahth al-kharaj* (graduation research) (Momen 1985). The three levels have to be completed by every *mujtahid*, a religious scholar who has achieved the level of competence necessary to make religious decisions based on reason from the principal sources of Islam. When a student receives the *ijaza* (license) that makes him a *mujtahid*, the honorific title *ayatollah* (*ayat Allah*, 'sign of God') is usually bestowed upon him. An ayatollah recognised as a *marja' al-taqlid*, meaning an authoritative source in matters of Islamic law, usually receives the title *ayatollah al-'uzma* (grand ayatollah). The common title of an aspiring *mujtahid* is *hujjat al-Islam* (proof of Islam). The structure of Shi'i ulama is pyramidal; those of the highest level, the grand ayatollah, are the fewest in number. The traditional system of education is extremely important in Shi'i society, given the major role of *marja' al-taqlid* throughout history.

The modern madrasa system is a transformation of the classical system, adopting the modern system of education in terms of gradation, curriculum, classroom learning and rules. Non-traditional madrasas 'are set up to serve needs not supplied by the traditional system' (Fischer 1980: 81). The curriculum consists of religious and secular sciences presented through a slightly simplified version of traditional study courses. Unlike the traditional system, this modern madrasa system is not intended to train students to become *mujtahids*, but rather to become Islamic scholars and missionaries. This innovative type of education has provided an alternative for students who, for whatever reason, cannot follow the traditional system in the *hawza 'ilmiyya*. International students, including

Indonesians, are provided with this modern type of programme.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has made educational innovations in Qum's *hawza 'ilmiyya* through the above-mentioned ICIS, which coordinates programmes for foreign students, assigns students to madrasas, and monitors their needs within the framework of disseminating Islamic knowledge and teachings globally. ICIS has organised innovative programmes based on the modern madrasa system for international students. The Madrasa Imam Khomeini, for example, offers programmes based on grade systems that include undergraduate and graduate levels equivalent to the tertiary education of the modern educational system. Such innovation takes Qum's *hawza 'ilmiyya* a step close to becoming a leading international centre of Islamic learning.

Every year an ICIS representative conducts a selection process at such Islamic institutions as the Islamic Cultural Center of Jakarta and the Muthahhari Foundation in Bandung. In addition to academic achievement, Arabic is requisite, as it is an international language for Islamic learning and the language of instruction at certain madrasas in Qum. At the same time, upon their arrival in Iran, students are also required to follow a six-month training programme in Persian, the language of instruction at most Qum's Islamic educational institutions.

Educational institutions attended by Indonesian students

Both educational systems have been attended by Indonesian students. The first group of Indonesian students were enrolled at Dar al-Tabligh al-Islami, a modern Shi'i institution founded in 1965 by Ayatollah Muhammad Kazim Shar'i'atmadari (1904-1987). As an institution of Islamic learning, Dar al-Tabligh was known for its foreign students and for arranging their visas and residence permits. It organised a five-year programme with a credit system (Fischer 1980: 84) and a curriculum that included both religious knowledge and secular sciences such as psychology, philosophy, sociology, mathematics and English. The language of instruction was Arabic. Thus, its educational system was modern; it did not follow the traditional system of learning even though it was strongly entrenched in the traditional *hawza* system (Umar Shahab, *interview* 9/1/2003).

After the dissolution of Dar al-Tabligh in 1981, owing to its leader's opposition to the concept of *wilayat al-faqih* ('mandate of the jurist') implemented by Khomeini, Madrasa Hujjatiyya began to provide the same programme for foreign students. Since 1982 nearly all

Indonesian students who have come to Iran attended Madrasa Hujjatiyya, including the presently prominent Shi'i *ustadh* Husein Shahab, who was transferred to this madrasa after he had studied for two years at the Dar al-Tabligh. Unlike Dar al-Tabligh, the Madrasa Hujjatiyya follows the traditional system of education generally used in the *hawza 'ilmiyya*. The majority of Indonesian students who become Shi'i *ustadhhs* only completed the preliminary level.

Recently, along with the educational reform in Qum, a large number of Indonesian students have registered at the Madrasa Imam Khomeini, which provides a modern system of education in which they can pursue undergraduate or graduate programmes and choose a specialisation.

Early Qum alumni, such as Umar Shahab and Husein Shahab, have become very prominent Shi'i figures and have contributed to the development of Islamic *da'wa*, education and culture in Indonesia. Given ongoing educational innovations in Qum and Indonesians' growing interest in them, Qum alumni might very well influence the future development of Islamic discourse in Indonesia. <

Notes

- 1 Habib Ali Al-Habsyi (1870-1968) known as Ali Kwitang was the founder of the famous Majlis Ta'lim (meeting place of education and *da'wa*) of Kwitang located in Jakarta. He was regarded as *Wali* (friend of God) and his grave became a pilgrimage site for the people of Jakarta. After its founder died, the Majlis Ta'lim was led by his son Muhammad (1911-1993) who was close to the then President Suharto and GOLKAR political circles. Today it is under the leadership of Muhammad's son, Abdurrahman, Ali Ridho's brother. Ali Ridho's sister, Farida Al-Habsyi is a famous Shi'i figure who runs some Islamic foundations in Jakarta, including Al-Batul.

References

- Ali, Syamsuri. 2002. 'Alumni Hawzah Ilmiyah Qum: Pewacanaan Intelektualitas dan Relasi Sosialnya dalam Transmisi Syiah di Indonesia'. PhD thesis draft prepared for promotion in the Graduate Programme at UIN, Jakarta.
- Fischer, Michael, M.J. 1980. *Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Momen, Mojan. 1985. *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. 1987. *Traditional Islam in the Modern World*. London: Kegan Paul International.

Zulkifli is a PhD student within the framework of Indonesian-Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS), Leiden University.

[advertisement]

NEW FROM IDC PUBLISHERS

Delineating British Burma, c. 1826-1949

British Confidential and Official Print

Editor: A.J. Farrington, Former Deputy Director, Oriental & India Office Collections (OIOC), British Library

Much of the print reflects preparations and operations, before and during the Second World War. The materials have been arranged in five chronological groups:


- BIB-1 The British Conquest, 1827-1905
- BIB-2 Gazetteers and Handbooks, 1879-1944
- BIB-3 Military Reports and Route books 1903-1945
- BIB-4 Boundaries, Reports and Examinations, 1892-1936
- BIB-5 Reports on Districts and States, 1868-1936

- 426 microfiche OR 41 microfilm reels
- Including online EAD guide at www.idc.nl



For more information please contact

IDC Publishers | 2301 EE Leiden | Phone +31 (0)71 514 27 00 | Internet www.idc.nl
P.O. Box 11205 | The Netherlands | Fax +31 (0)71 513 17 21 | E-mail info@idc.nl



This text is based on a paper presented at the workshop on The Education of Southeast Asian Islamic Leadership jointly organised by the Institute of Southeast Asia (ISEAS), Singapore, and IAS, held in Singapore, 19-20 May 2005.

The Heart of Borneo: a challenge for social scientists

Nature conservation projects must contend with (illegal) logging, poaching, encroaching farmers, the trans-border trade of wildlife and timber and local communities that question the protected status of areas. Anthropologists' professional code of ethics states that the studied group must never suffer from the research when there are conflicts of interest – the people must come first. Does this imply that anthropologists cannot contribute to nature conservation because their science serves a social purpose?

Manon Osseweijer and Gerard A. Persoon

From the conservation point of view the protection of a large area has advantages. Such areas harbour a multitude of ecosystems containing a high degree of biodiversity. This variety makes it possible to acquire a high political profile, offering an attractive option for potential donors including those from the private sector. The recently launched WWF campaign for the Heart of Borneo is one of the major conservation initiatives to protect large areas with high biodiversity. The proposed area covers about 220,000 square kilometres in Indonesia, the Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah, and a small part of Brunei. Other large-scale examples are the Guyana Shield in the northern part of South America, the massive rainforest area in the Congo Basin in Central Africa and the Sulu-Sulawesi Marine Ecoregion between Indonesia, the Philippines and Sabah. All of them occupy large transnational areas and try to connect a number of smaller protected areas.

The success of such conservation areas depends largely on the heads of states of the involved countries to engage in such large multinational protected areas, but

equally important is the willingness of lower level governments to live up to the aspirations. Former encounters of local communities with external organisations aiming to conserve biodiversity are also relevant. These encounters often lead to frustrations about unfulfilled promises, inadequate compensation for income losses and diminishing interest of conservation organizations after a limited number of years.

Social scientists studying nature conservation emphasize the human element. Anthropologists focus on the social and cultural complexity of an area. They describe, from a political ecological point of view, stakeholders' interests in a particular natural resource or a particular part of a forest or sea, and shed light on the tensions (ethnic, social, political, economic) that arise from the power play over control of natural resources. In most cases, the anthropologist's main informants are local people. It is their land that conservationists are in business to protect. Granting that there are challenges to the rhetoric of the indigenous peoples' movement (see Kuper 2003), the conclusions of many social science studies on conservation practices are clear: conservation organizations have been

'increasingly excluding, from full involvement in their programmes, the indigenous and traditional peoples living in the territories the conservationists were trying to protect' (Chapin 2004:17). Organizations such as World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Conservation International (CI) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC), build their projects on the basis of cooperation with local communities. However, in the last decade or so it became clear, that the so-called 'ecological noble savage' does not exist. These local communities often turn out not to be sustainable users of the environment, sometimes due to circumstances beyond their control.

According to the anthropologists' professional ethical code, the group under research is not to suffer by the research, especially not through information passed on to third parties, and when there is a conflict of interest, these individuals must come first. Because of this, anthropologists encountering local practices that are harmful to the environment can find themselves in a dilemma when the local community is told by outsiders (government representatives, conservationists) to change its ways. However, this does not imply that it is impossible for anthropologists to play a

role in research supporting nature conservation projects, as became clear during the Heart of Borneo conference last April. Many anthropologists and other social scientists have been involved in research among people living in the Heart of Borneo. The high turnout of social scientists and the dedication shown in their work gives hope for the future. Contributions could be made by bridging the gap between the local population (their way of life, their perceptions towards nature, their projected futures) and the world of conservationists (their aims, their perceptions and their time perspectives). And, as one presenter put it, environmental conservation should not just be about the environment. It should be about what alternative sources of income, law enforcement, compensation payments, and campaigns will bring to these communities, not just at the height of the campaign, but over a more extended

period of time. For this, the knowledge and experience of the social sciences is indispensable. ◀

References

- Chapin, Mac. 2004. 'A Challenge to Conservationists'. *World Watch*. November/December Issue: 17-31.
- Kuper, Adam. 2003. 'The Return of the Native'. *Current Anthropology*. 44 - 3:389-402.
- Milton, Kay. 2002. *Loving nature. Towards an ecology of emotion*. London: Routledge.

Manon Osseweijer is Coordinator of Academic Affairs at IIAS.

Gerard Persoon is Head of the Department of Environment and Development of the Institute of Environmental Studies (Leiden University) and member of the Board of Trustees of the World Wide Fund for Nature in the Netherlands. Both authors are anthropologists by training.

The Heart of Borneo Conference

At the end of 2004 WWF launched its campaign for the Heart of Borneo to protect one of the largest intact rainforest areas in the world with extremely rich biodiversity. Two conferences were held in early 2005, the first in Brunei, which had largely political and diplomatic goals, and the second in Leiden and The Hague with more scientific aims. The latter was organized by WWF, the Institute of Environmental Sciences (CML, Leiden University), and IIAS. A selection of conference papers will be published by Tropenbos International.

Book announcement

Towards social stability and democratic governance in Central Eurasia: challenges to regional security

In the current world system Central Eurasia may seem peripheral with its poor socio-economic indicators, particularistic tendencies in politics and intensified ethnic conflicts. However, its geo-strategic location and natural resources – among them the large hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian Sea – may return its historical centrality to the region. This new 'centrality' of Central Eurasia brings new threats. Repressive political regimes and marginalisation of whole groups of population inflame conflicts that spill across national borders. Migration to Europe, both legal and illegal, is the direct outcome of social-economic destabilization in the region.

Irina Morozova

The end of the Cold War and current globalization have opened the doors to the region for various international actors: the USA, international monetary organizations, strategic alliances, TNCs, NGOs, regional blocks, as well as criminal groups and ethno-religious movements. The illicit production and trade of drugs add to the complexity of security problems in the region. As a direct neighbour to the turbulent Middle East, it is a potential playground for extremist movements - marginalized sections of the population serve for recruitment by radical Islamic groups and terrorist organizations.

To resist the rapid penetration of these groups and to prevent the newly established states from falling apart along ethnic lines, the current governments have launched nation-building policies. Nation-building in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus has a complex and controversial history that goes back to the late period of the Russian Empire

and the Soviet creation of nations. Together with the historical legacy, old ethnic conflicts resurfaced and have shaped concepts of the nation-centric state. The nationalistic nature of these concepts creates a serious obstacle to regional integration processes and security. Border conflicts and competition for water and other resources along ethnic lines have become an unfortunate reality. Territorial disputes, especially in the Southern Caucasus, leave much doubt that the wealth accumulated by the realization of the international oil contracts will be used for peaceful solutions to these conflicts.

The book, consisting of a number of reviewed and edited papers resulting from the workshop, provides an analysis of existing knowledge and discussions in the field of security studies on Central Eurasia for professional scholars, students and all intellectuals outside academia, who are interested in the rapidly changing geopolitical arrangements, economic and socio-political realities in Central Eurasia.

It consists of four parts respectively, covering general discussions on the historical development of Central Eurasia in the *longue durée* perspective and its socio-cultural legacies; Soviet and contemporary state and communal structures, administration, nation-building processes and unofficial clan politics in Central Asia; the current economic conditions as a precursor to social stability and development; and the correlation between economics and domestic and international politics in the region and prospects for future regional development, including democratization. The book features historical political-administrative maps of Central Asia and the Caucasus and a bibliography on the topics discussed.

Social stability as an integral component of human security is *a priori* viewed by the contributors of *Towards social stability and democratic governance in Central Eurasia: challenges to regional security* as an indisputable value, while discussions on democracy and democratic governance do not produce any commonly accepted conclusion. The views and approaches of the authors can

be diametrically opposed. The Kyrgyz so-called 'tulip revolution' in March 2005 and the unrests in Uzbekistan (Andijan) two months later proved to be some kind of 'checking point' for the views and prospects set up by the authors. ◀

- Morozova, I., ed. 2005. *Towards Social Stability and Democratic Governance in Central Eurasia: challenges to regional security*. NATO Science Series, IOS Press, Amsterdam.

Contributors: Andrey Fursov, Jacques Legrand, Catherine Poujol, Irina Morozova, Alisher Ilkhamov, Paul Geiss, Robert Cutler, Michael Kaser, Leonid Friedman, Martin Spechler, Elena Sadovskaya, Nazim Imanov, Nina Dzulgerova, Farkhod Tolipov.

Irina Morozova is IIAS affiliated fellow working on the modern history of Central and Inner Asia, communist societies in Asia, and comparative studies on the post-Cold War transformation of Central Eurasia.

The announced publication is the result of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) *Towards social stability and democratic governance in Central Eurasia: challenges to regional security* which took place in Leiden, 8-11 September 2004.

Scholars of many backgrounds from different theoretical and interdisciplinary perspectives addressed the historical and social legacy of Central Eurasian societies and current risks such as socio-economic collapse, under- and unemployment and marginalisation, and the ability of regional governments and elites to deal with these threats.

The workshop was organized by co-directors Wim Stokhof and Irina Morozova (IIAS) and funded by the NATO Science Programme, NWO, Leiden University, CNWS, KNAW and IIAS. For further info www.iias.nl/iias/show/id=40997

Illegal but licit: transnational flows and permissive polities in Asia

Some transnational practices are considered acceptable (licit) by participants while they are illegal in a formal sense. A new research programme focusses on flows of poor people and goods across international borders in Asia - movements that are not allowed by states but are not 'organised crime' either. States declare these practices illegal and yet states themselves are often involved.

Willem van Schendel

The programme argues that methodologically the social sciences have been more adept at studying fixity than movement and it seeks to develop new tools to understand transnational movements. Taking a comparative perspective, the programme is built around four projects examining transnational flows across Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Israel and Dubai), focusing on participants' identities and notions of (il)legality and (il)licitness. It seeks to develop a comparative and interdisciplinary approach and to produce new methods for studying transnational practices.

Globalization and transnationalism, although certainly not new phenomena, have become more prominent over the past few decades, resulting in worldwide movements of capital, goods and people. Most studies of these international flows have been framed in the conceptual and material context of the modern nation state. Consciously and unconsciously, most social science focuses on state territories as its natural units of study, and we are accustomed to academic specializations such as the sociology of India or the history of China. It is no surprise that the field of knowledge that seeks to understand the world beyond the state, international relations, nonetheless focuses on the state as its foundational unit of analysis. By highlighting the importance of movement across state boundaries in understanding transnational flows, we are alerted to the gap between our reliance on analytical categories that presuppose social fixity and the mobile practices and phenomena we are observing.

This research programme explores the limitations of 'seeing like a state'. It adopts a perspective that privileges participants in international activities, leading us to different understandings of transnational movement. It focuses especially on a theme rarely highlighted in the study of transnational practices: the interface of legality and illegality. In the absence of a global sovereign authority it is impossible to distinguish, in an objective and timeless way, between the illegal and the legal in flows of people and commodities across international borders. What passes for 'international crime' is so closely intertwined with the domestic-legal that for analytical purposes 'criminal' and 'not-criminal' systems form a coherent whole - sometimes legal, sometimes illegal. Determining thresholds of distinction between the legal and illegal will always come by appeal either to powerful state interests or international social mores rather than by an ability to 'know' in some objective fashion where the dividing line between the two lies.

Furthermore, it is important in a discussion of 'legal' and 'illegal' to introduce the distinction between 'licit' and

'illicit'.¹ Since there is no legitimate and sovereign legal authority at the global level, the law almost always refers to the domestic sphere: to states. But when we shift our nomenclature to the distinction between 'licit' and 'illicit', we refer less to state law than to social perceptions of activities defined as criminal. It is this confrontation between perspectives that forms the core of the research programme: multiple legal perspectives interact with various perceptions of licitness in all transnational practices. Rather than merely positing the complexity of such confrontations, this research programme explores them empirically in order to develop new methodologies for studying movement. The aim is to contribute to a more sophisticated historical sociology and anthropology of the transnational.

Collective scholarly understanding of the nature, pattern, scale, forms and meanings of illicit transnational activities remains far from adequate. Among the reasons are the difficulty of conducting research on individuals and groups who pay a premium to keep their affairs from attracting public attention, and that scholars of smuggling, trafficking and money laundering have no common forum to share their insights. In addition, there is a problem endemic to the social sciences: the difficulty of thinking outside the conceptual grasp of the modern state. What we are particularly concerned with is the question of movement across state borders and how movement is considered in the social sciences. This is in turn linked to the relation of states to territory, borders and frontiers. As David Ludden puts it: 'Modernity consigned human mobility to the dusty dark corners of archives that document the hegemonic space of national territorialism. As a result, we imagine that mobility is border crossing, as though borders came first and mobility second'.² In general, movement is difficult for the social sciences to fully understand, for reasons of both evidence and conception. The evidence question has to do with the comparative weights of the archives of the sedentary and the archives of movement. As for conception, moving people are typically categorized in relation to fixed social formations. The fact that mobile people are less visible to social scientists guarantees that they often appear in social theory as obscure, fleeting figures, as peripheral social actors with a lowly status in the world order, and as faceless outsiders who fit imperfectly into professionals' neat representations of social reality. In general, mobile groups are of interest primarily as moving between the units that count. As such, they are often perceived as defiant, dangerous and out of control.

Today, policy makers are deeply concerned about certain aspects of transnational networking. When globalization is seen as dismantling barriers of protection around nations and states, when

it promotes the free flow of threats to human security, from terrorists to drugs to contagious diseases, a nationalist backlash is common and inevitable. To many policy makers, such deadly understandings of the contemporary world leave only one option: to make their polities less permissive, to develop more intrusive, authoritarian and muscular forms of law enforcement that at their worst become forms of pre-emptive international violence. Many policy makers, law enforcement officials, media personnel and average citizens of industrialized countries see their darkest fears confirmed: the intersection of the power of globalization with the threat of international crime, an alarmist interpretation of the current phase of global transactions, which, luckily, is flawed. This research programme focuses on new ways of understanding transnational flows of people and goods that are illegal but licit and their relationship with policy-making and states.

Four cases

The projects within the research programme share a regional focus on Asia, home to most of humanity and a long history of complex transnational connectivity. Building on academic contacts of long standing between colleagues in the Netherlands, South Asia, West Asia and China, they bring together a team of researchers whose four case studies allow for purposeful comparison.

Unauthorized mass migration from Bangladesh to India.

According to Indian state officials, more than 20 million Bangladeshis are now living illegally in India. This huge diaspora of mostly extremely poor labour migrants has created political problems (anti-foreigner movements and pogroms, mass deportations, conflicts between India and Bangladesh) as well as economic benefits for both the Indian and Bangladeshi economies. In fact, it is hard to speak of national economies when there is a constant movement of people and remittances across open borders. This project looks at the changing patterns of legality and licitness in these flows. Migration was legal until 1952, although India and Bangladesh disregarded illegal migration until 1971. Since then, a discourse has developed in India in which migrants are depicted as infiltrators, even foot soldiers of a 'demographic attack' from Bangladesh. Meanwhile, Bangladesh officials maintain that there are no illegal Bangladeshis in India at all. This legal conflict stands in sharp contrast with a discourse of licitness, in which labour migrants, their Indian employers and many others maintain that a cross-border labour supply is good for development. They hold that de-legitimizing migration is counterproductive and they reject the 'coerced identity' of infiltrators. Co-supervised by Meghna Guhathakurta (Bangladesh), Sanjib Baruah (India) and Willem van Schendel (The Netherlands), this project focuses on networks of poor

Bangladeshi migrants in India, their labour strategies in situations of extreme insecurity, their changing notions of licitness, and the transnational identities they have constructed.

De-legitimizing borderland practices in Pakistan

The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is notoriously porous because the borderlands are so-called 'tribal areas' where the Pakistani state has delegated much of its authority to 'tribal' institutions. Today international bodies fighting transnational militancy and smuggling consider this porosity a problem because it makes these areas difficult to control. And yet since the Afghan wars of the 1980s the absence of state responsibility has been convenient for many: refugees, Islamic missionary movements, foreign states supporting the Afghan resistance, journalists, relief agencies, labour migrants and entrepreneurs in a war economy based on the illegal trade in arms, drugs, electronics and other commodities. Many of these activities, although 'illegal' according to Pakistani law, have been allowed as licit 'tribal' practices and traditions. In the current situation, however, Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as international organizations, prefer more efficient state control. Practices that used to be permitted as 'tribal' are now discouraged and/or disputed as illegal. This project is co-supervised by Sarfraz Khan (Pakistan) and Oskar Verkaaik (The Netherlands).

Labour migration between China and Israel: Playing the system

This project, co-supervised by Li Minghuan (China), Yitzhak Shichor (Israel) and Leo Douw (The Netherlands), focuses on Chinese migrants recruited to work in Israel under legal contracts. Upon arrival, migrants often find that the contracts are not adhered to and they are immediately faced with a situation of illegality. Many whose contracts are honored seek to transfer to other employers anyway, as many better-paying illegal jobs are on offer in Israel. Despite their illegal status, they are usually allowed to continue working, even for long periods of time. The main purpose of this project is to find out under which regimes of illegality/licitness the migrants find themselves at various stages of their migration, what dangers and risks these regimes imply, how these regimes are maintained and how the migrants play the system. Our hypothesis is that the migrants as well as their labour brokers, employers and the Israeli and Chinese states benefit from maintaining illegal employment, and that it is the permissiveness of Israeli labour policy and Chinese official discourse on labour exports that allow this particular combination of the legal, the illegal and

the licit to persist in transnational state-sponsored labour migration.

Moving between legal systems: South Indian women as domestic workers in Dubai

Domestic workers who cross national boundaries in search of employment form a category of transnational migrants of special interest in the study of (il)legal-(il)licit linkages. They have to deal with sometimes contradictory legal systems and also occupy an ambivalent position as non-family members working in households. Usually they are not covered by labour law, and their identities, labour relations and social insecurity are all framed in highly personal relations in the domestic sphere. Migrant domestic labour is also a sensitive issue as it concerns women whose employment is a source of tension and ambivalence in both sending and receiving countries. Indian women working as domestics in Dubai (United Arab Emirates) deal with multiple legal perspectives and normative perceptions. The project focuses on their trajectory from home to work and back, investigating in particular how they move in and out of legality/illegality, both during their life cycle and over time because India's and Dubai's legislation on labour migration varies; making certain illegal activities legal and vice versa. Research will be conducted in South India (Kerala) and Dubai, which has long-standing trade relations with Kerala. Dubai now has a labour force that is over 90 percent foreign (Indians are the largest group), and Indian domestics work for compatriots, Dubai families and other foreigners. Co-supervised by Rima Sabban (United Arab Emirates), Praveena Kodoth (India), Annelies Moors (The Netherlands) and Mario Rutten (The Netherlands), the project investigates the living strategies of poor Keralite women in transnational movement in order to understand (il)legal-(il)licit linkages in transnational life cycles. <

Notes

- 1 Abraham, Cf. Itty and Willem van Schendel. 2005. 'Introduction: The Making of Illicitness,' in: Willem van Schendel and Itty Abraham, eds. *Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization*. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press.
- 2 Ludden David. 2003. 'Presidential Address: Maps in the Mind and the Mobility of Asia'. *The Journal of Asian Studies* 62-4: 1057-1078, at 1062.

Willem van Schendel is Professor in Modern Asian History at the University of Amsterdam and at the International Institute of Social History. He has done extensive research in Bangladesh, Northeast India and Burma. For more information on the programme 'Illegal but Licit': h.w.vanschendel@uva.nl

The programme was initiated by Li Minghuan (Xiamen University) and Willem van Schendel (University of Amsterdam). Supported by IIAS and the Amsterdam School of Social Science Research (ASSR), the four-year programme has secured funding from the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO).

> Books received

General

Lee, W.O., David L. Grossman, Kerry J. Kennedy, and Gregory P. Fairbrother eds. 2004

Citizenship education in Asia and the Pacific: concepts and issues

Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, University of Hong Kong.

pp. 313, tables, ISBN 962-8093-59-2

Öztiirk, Balkiz. 2005.

Case, referentiality and phrase structure

Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. pp. 268, ISBN 90 272 2801 9

Tseng, Wen-Shing, Suk Choo Chang, and Masahisa Nishizono eds. 2005

Asian culture and psychotherapy: implications for East and West

Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

pp. 313, maps & tables, ISBN 0-8248-2133-5

East Asia

Asano Tamanoi, Mariko. 2005

Crossed histories: Manchuria in the age of empire

Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

pp. 213, ill., ISBN 0-8248-2872-0

Katsuei, Yuasa. 2005

Kannani and Document of Flames; two Japanese colonial novels translated and with an introduction and critical afterword by Mark Driscoll

Durham: Duke University Press. pp. 193, ISBN 0-8223-3517-4

Pollard, Vincent Kelly. 2004

Globalization, democratization, and Asian leadership: power sharing, foreign policy and society in the Philippines and Japan

Burlington: Ashgate, pp. 203, tables, ISBN 0 7546 1539 1

Rowe, Peter G. 2005

East Asia modern: shaping the contemporary city

London: Reaktion Books.

pp. 224, ill., ISBN 1-86189-249-7-2133-5

China

Bai Limin. 2005

Shaping the ideal child: children and their primers in late imperial China

Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.

pp. 311, ill., ISBN 962-996-114-8

Japan

Carpenter, John T. 2005

Hokusai and his age

Amsterdam: Hotel Publishing, pp. 357, colour ill., ISBN 90-74822-57-6

Formanek, Susanne and Sepp Linhart eds. 2005

Written texts - visual texts: woodblock-printed media in early modern Japan

Amsterdam: Hotel Publishing, pp. 368, ill., ISBN 90-74822-58-4

Reader, Ian. 2005

Making pilgrimages: meaning and practice in shikoku

Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

pp. 350, ill., ISBN 0-8248-2876-3

Qiu, Peipei. 2005

Basho and the Dao: the Zhuangzi and the transformation of Haikai

Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

pp. 248, ISBN 0-8248-2845-3

Quinn, Shelley Fenno. 2005.

Developing Zeami: the noh actor's attainment in practice

Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

pp. 479, ill., ISBN 0-8248-2968-9

Rosati, Riccardo. 2005

Perdendo il Giappone: identita occidentale nella letteratura contemporanea nipponica

Roma: Armando Editore.

pp. 63, ill., Italian, ISBN 8883587529

Wargo, Robert J.J. 2005

The logic of nothingness: a study of Nishida Kitaro

Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

pp. 240, ISBN 0-8248-2969-7

Williams, David. 2004

Defending Japan's Pacific war: the Kyoto school philosophers and post-White power

London: Routledge.

pp. 238, ISBN 0-415-32315-0

Korea

Portal, Jane. 2005

Art under control in North Korea

London: Reaktion Books.

pp. 192, colour ill., ISBN 1-86189-236-5

Udenwood, Elizabeth. 2004

Challenged identities: North American missionaries in Korea, 1884-1934

Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society - Korea.

pp. 327, ill., ISBN 89-954424-0-9-02200

South Asia

Bhargava, Rajeev and Helmut Reifeld. 2005

Civil society, public sphere and citizenship: dialogues and perceptions

New Delhi: Sage Publications.

pp. 420, ISBN 0-7619 9832-2

Dasgupta, Biplob. 2005

Globalisation: India's adjustment experience

New Delhi: Sage Publications.

pp. 282, tables, ISBN 0-7619-3306-9

Dossani, Rafiq and Henry S. Rowen eds. 2005

Prospects for peace in South Asia

Stanford: Stanford University Press.

pp. 424, ISBN 0-8047-5085-8

Gabriel, Karen. 2005

Imaging a nation: The sexual economies of the contemporary mainstream Bombay cinema

Maastricht: Shaker Publishing BV.

pp. 451, ISBN 90-423-0266-6

Ganguly, Debjani. 2005

Caste, colonialism and counter-hermeneutics of caste

London: Routledge.

pp. 287, ISBN 0-415-34294-5

van den Hoek, A.W. 2005

Caturmasa: celebrations of death in Kathmandu, Nepal

Leiden: CNWS, Universiteit Leiden.

pp. 187, ill., ISBN 90-5789-098-4

Johnson, Rob. 2005

A region in turmoil: South Asian conflicts since 1947

London: Reaktion Books.

pp. 268, ill., ISBN 1-86189-257-8

Juluri, Vamsee. 2003

Becoming a global audience: longing and belonging in Indian music television

New Delhi: Orient Longman Private Limited.

pp. 155, ill., ISBN 81-250-2741-6

Manschoot, Johan and Marijke de Vos. 2005

Behind the scenes of Hindi cinema: a visual journey through the heart of Bollywood

Amsterdam: KIT Publishers.

pp. 159, colour ill., ISBN 90 6832 186 2

Mujtaba, Syed Ali. 2005

Soundings on South Asia

New Delhi: New Dawn Press.

pp. 225, ISBN 1-932705-40-6

South East Asia

Patel, Tulsii. 2005

The family in India: structure and practice

New Delhi: Sage Publications.

pp. 310, ISBN 0-7619-3389-1

Antweiler, Christoph. 2004

Southeast Asia: a bibliography on societies and cultures

Singapore: ISEAS.

pp. 111, ISBN 9-873825-877062

Koh, Tommy and Chang Li Lin eds. 2005

The little red dot: reflections by Singapore's diplomats

London: World Scientific Publishing.

pp. 450, ill., ISBN 981-256-414-4

Santos, Maria Deanna P. 2005

Human rights and migrant domestic work

Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

pp. 243, tables, ISBN 90-04-14527-3

South West Asia

Saw Swee-Hock. 2005

Population policies and programmes in Singapore

Singapore: ISEAS.

pp. 302, tables, ISBN 981-230-318-9

Skidmore, Monique ed. 2005.

Burma at the turn of the 21st century

Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

pp. 304, ill., ISBN 0-8248-2897-6

Indonesia

Brückler, Birgit. 2005

Cyberidentities at war: der Molukkenkonflikt im Internet

Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.

pp. 386, ill., German, ISBN 3-89942-287-2

Interested in reviewing one of our Books Received? Request a copy from the editors at: iasnews@let.leidenuniv.nl

> Books received

[advertisement]



ASIAN FOLKLORE STUDIES

A semi-annual journal dedicated to the study and preservation of Asian traditions

This year's issues include articles on:

- *Silkworms and Consorts in Nara Japan
- *Bridal Laments in Rural Hong Kong
- *Urban Adaption of Paharia in Rajshahi
- *Hmong-American Oral Culture Traditions
- *Cross-dressing, Gender, and Sex

Subscription rates for two issues/year: Institutions US \$40.00, Individuals US \$22.00

Contact address: Editor, Asian Folklore Studies, Nanzan University
18 Yamazato-cho, Showa-ku, 466-8673 Nagoya, Japan
e-mail: nuai@ic.nanzan-u.ac.jp

The future of rural income and rice production in China

Economic growth in China's agricultural sector lags behind growth in industry and services, creating an ever widening rural-urban income gap. Yet growth beyond the farm offers new opportunities for farmers in China's more advanced provinces: markets for new crops and increasing farm size. At present, the dual government objectives of increasing rural incomes and increasing rice production are clearly in conflict. Farmers can obtain incomes comparable to non-farm wages only when they stop rice cultivation and switch to more profitable crops. Otherwise, mechanization is necessary to allow large enough increases in farm size to raise household income and maintain national rice production levels.

Marrit van den Berg, Huib Hengsdijk,
Wang Guanghuo, Joost Wolf,
Martin van Ittersum, Reimund Roetter

Globalization and market integration have contributed to unprecedented economic growth in many parts of East and Southeast Asia, especially in Eastern China. Macro-economic developments have resulted in strong growth of the industry and service sectors, providing employment opportunities at wage rates several times higher than those for agricultural labour. Currently, almost 85 percent of rural households in China have at least one family member working in the non-agricultural sector. Yet agriculture still employs roughly half the labour force and rural incomes are just 30 percent of the urban average.

China's spectacular urban growth offers new opportunities for farmers. Rural-urban migration exerts pressure on farms to expand in size, as migrating farmers rent their land to those who stay behind. This could require changes in the management and performance of farming systems and improve the welfare of the remaining farmers. Farms have been managed mainly by using manual labour and animal traction, but current developments might facilitate, or even require, an increase in mechanization. At the same time, increased urban income creates markets for more expensive products, such as vegetables, fruits and meat. Diversification of agriculture from rice to these high-value products is considered an important means to increase farmers' income and thereby prevent further widening of the rural-urban income gap. However, diversification might jeopardize national rice supply, which remains a concern of the government.

Calibrating the farm household

The study uses a farm household model to examine the potential of urbanization to spur the development of rice-based farming systems. Taking into account the dual government objective of

increasing farm income and rice production, it also assesses the effects of the expansion of land holdings, crop diversification, and technology. The socio-economic, institutional and natural environments determine the direction and pace of change for farm households and, hence, overall agricultural development. To account for these diverse influences on land use, the farm household model integrates knowledge from economics, soil science and crop science.

Our case-study area is Pujiang county in Zhejiang province. The province has a well-developed non-agricultural economy and is home to China's most active land rental market. Fertile soils and abundant water make Zhejiang and the rest of China's greater Yangtze River Delta one of the world's most productive rice growing regions. In 2002, we carried out an extensive survey among 107 farm households, most of which were small rice farms, vegetable farms and somewhat larger rice-vegetable farms.

We developed a stylized model that covers the core characteristics of these households and maximizes income from crop production, subject to the availability of land, family labour and capital, agricultural technology and market prices. The model can accommodate five different crop activities. We include three prevailing rice systems: one annual harvest of rice using hybrid seed rice; two rice harvests a year, the first an inbred rice variety and the second hybrid seed; two rice harvests a year with hybrid seed rice. All rice crops are transplanted, except early rice with non-hybrid seeds. In addition to rice, we include two frequently observed triple vegetable systems: celery-greens-radish and celery-hot pepper-radish.

Initially, we assume that all operations are performed manually, as was common practice among farmers surveyed. Later, we introduce mechanization in order to meet peak labour demands, a practice that is becoming increasingly popular. For vegetable production, the

main labour peak occurs during the harvest, which unfortunately cannot be mechanized in the short or medium term since there is no machinery that can harvest vegetables on such a small plot without damaging the crop. For rice production, the main peak occurs during transplanting. Secondary peaks for all crops occur during land preparation and for rice an additional peak occurs during the harvest. We introduce mechanized land preparation and harvesting and direct seeding for rice production, and mechanized land preparation for vegetable production.

The farm household when farm size increases

We first used the model solely for rice production (Table 1) and according to the average resource endowments of rice-farmers in the survey sample: 0.3 hectares (ha) of land and 2.5 workers. The household grows double rice (with hybrid seed for both rice crops). Total rice production for the model household is 3.4 t (mega grams) and income is 2,626 Yuan. Whereas the simulated income is close to the survey average for rice-cultivating households, rice production is significantly higher. The model household grows double rice only. Survey households, on the other hand, grow single rice as well, which has a somewhat lower income but requires less labour and less strict timing - a factor not accounted for by the model. Labour requirements are low and no hired labour is needed.

Next, we allow for vegetable as well as rice cultivation. We first adapt resource endowments to reflect the averages for the vegetable farms. The resulting model farmer grows a rotation of celery, leafy vegetables and garden radish on his entire 0.2 ha. While his farm is only two-thirds the size of the model rice farmer, his capital requirements are about triple and his labour requirements more than double. This results in an income of more than 16,000 Yuan, significantly higher than the surprisingly low income our survey found for pure vegetable farmers.

When we triple farm size to 0.6 ha, the survey average for rice-vegetable farms, the cropping pattern changes. Vegetable labour requirements in peak periods are simply too high to allow vegetable cultivation on more than 0.39 ha. On the remaining 0.21 ha, the farmer grows rice. This general pattern coincides with the survey averages. Moreover, income from vegetable production is about the same for the model household and the average survey household. There is, however, an expected difference in rice cultivation. All of the survey's mixed farms grow single rice, whereas the model farmer grows double rice. Capital requirements are high




Figure 1
Simulation of increasing farm size from 0 to 12 ha with steps of 0.6 ha for the two reference farms allowing for mechanization

compared even to the vegetable farm. In summary, the model accurately simulates the shift from pure vegetable production to a combination of vegetable and rice production when farm size increases. The reason behind this shift is limited labour availability during peak periods.

Mechanization scenario

When we allow mechanization and direct seeding, the farm size that a single household can manage becomes as large as 12 ha (Figure 1). Even with mechanization, labour constraints limit vegetable cultivation to a maximum of almost 0.5 ha. When farm size increases slowly to free up labour for increasingly labour-intensive rice cultivation, until virtually all 12 ha is used for directly seeded, mechanized single rice. A similar pattern can be observed for a rice farmer who starts with non-mechanized double rice cultivation and beyond one hectare shifts to less labour-intensive rice crops until he ends up with 12 ha of single rice of which most is mechanized and directly seeded. Hence, from two or three hectares onwards, both farms become very similar. The main difference is that up to 12 ha, the mixed farm maintains a small vegetable plot, which leads to somewhat lower per hectare rice production but significantly higher income. Mechanization is already preferred for vegetable production at a farm size of 0.6 ha, but rice cultivation is mechanized only slowly beyond 1.8 ha on the rice farm and 2.4 ha on the mixed farm.

Mechanization: good for rice, irrelevant to vegetables

The spectacular growth of China's non-farm economy offers new opportunities for farmers in China's more advanced provinces. Increased income in the urban sector creates markets for new products, and migrating farmers rent their land to those staying behind. Using a simulation model covering important characteristics of the farmer and his con-

text, we analyse the effects of potential increases in farm size given the farmer's choice to grow rice only or a combination of rice and vegetables. The methodology employed allows exploration of the impacts of expected future developments on agricultural production and rural livelihoods.

Our results show that at the present scale of farming, the dual government objectives of increasing rural incomes and increasing rice production are clearly conflicting. At the present land to labour ratio, rice production renders a per capita income that is less than a quarter of the non-farm wage. Vegetable production, however, obtains five times the rice income and thus can more than compete with the non-farm sector. Specialized training and development of product markets can help farmers currently growing rice to switch to these more profitable crops.

If, as expected, farm size increases in the near future, rising rural incomes and rice production might go hand in hand. Even with mechanization, farmers can only manage relatively small plots of vegetables. Our results indicate that household labour and the limited amount of available hired labour is just enough to specialize in vegetable production at the current land to labour ratio. Simulations show that when farm size increases, labour constraints during vegetable harvests force households to grow rice on the additional land. Mechanization will help farmers to cultivate larger land areas and thus generate more income, but it does not greatly increase land area for vegetables, as the main labour peak of the vegetable harvest cannot be mechanized. <

Marrit van den Berg, Wageningen University and Research Centre; Huib Hengsdijk, Wageningen University and Research Centre; Wang Guanghuo, Zhejiang University; Joost Wolf, Wageningen University and Research Centre; Martin van Ittersum, Wageningen University and Research Centre; Reimund Roetter, Wageningen University and Research Centre

Table 1
Simulation results at average farm and family size for the three major farm types.

| Data | Rice farm | Vegetable farm | Mixed farm |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|----------------|------------|
| Crops allowed | only rice | all crops | all crops |
| Farm size (ha) | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.6 |
| Family labour (full-time labourers) | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.5 |
| Results (annual basis) | | | |
| Income (Yuan) | 2,626 | 16,139 | 31,339 |
| Vegetable income (Yuan) | 0 | 16,139 | 29,531 |
| Labour (days) | 87 | 194 | 441 |
| Working capital (Yuan) | 554 | 1,622 | 3,190 |
| Rice production (kg) | 3,390 | 0 | 2,334 |
| Rice area (ha) | 0.30 | 0.00 | 0.21 |
| Vegetable area (ha) | 0.00 | 0.20 | 0.39 |

This article is a short version of a full paper presented at the First Asia-Europe Workshop on Sustainable Resource Management and Policy Options for Rice Ecosystems (SUMAPOL 2005) held from 11 to 14 May 2005 in Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China. The full paper is considered for publication in an Agricultural Systems special issue on technology and policy options for rice ecosystems in a rapidly changing global environment.

Asia Alliance

The European Alliance for Asian Studies is a cooperative framework of European institutes specializing in Asian Studies. Its partners are:

NIAS - Nordic Institute of Asian Studies

Director: *Dr Jørgen Delman*
Leifsgade 33 DK 2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark
T +45-35-32 9500
F +45-35-32 9549
sec@nias.ku.dk
www.nias.ku.dk



IFA

Institut für Asienkunde

Director: *Prof. Monika Schaedler*
Rothenbaumchaussee 32,
D-20148 Hamburg, Germany
T +49-40-428 8740
F +49-40-410 7945
ifahh@uni-hamburg.de
www.duei.de/ifa



EIAS

European Institute for Asian Studies

Director: *Dr Willem van der Geest*
35 Rue des Deux Eglises,
1000 Brussels, Belgium
T +32-2-230 8122
F +32-2-230 5402
eias@eias.org
www.eias.org



CERI - Sciences Po

Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques

Director: *Prof. Christophe Jaffrelot*
56 rue Jacob, 75006 Paris, France
T +33-1-58717000
F +33-1-58717090
info@ceri-sciences-po.org
www.ceri-sciencespo.com



CEAO

Centro de Estudios de Asia Oriental

Director: *Prof. Taciana Fisac*
Autonomous University of Madrid
Calle Francisco Tomás y Valiente, 3
Módulo III, 28049 Madrid, Spain
T +34-91-397 4695
F +34-91-397 5278
ceao@uam.es
www.uam.es/otroscentros/
asiaoriental/especifica/



SOAS

School of Oriental and African Studies

Director: *Prof. Colin Bundy*
University of London
Thornhaugh Street / Russel Square,
London, WC1H 0XG, United Kingdom
T +44-20-7637 2388
F +44-20-7436 3844
study@soas.ac.uk
www.soas.ac.uk



SSAAPS

The Swedish School of Advanced Asia Pacific Studies

Director: *Thommy Svensson*
The STINT Foundation, Skeppargatan
8, 114 52 Stockholm, Sweden
T +46-70-6355160
F +46-8-6619210
thommy.svensson@telia.com
www.ssaaps.stint.se



IIAS

(secretariat Asia Alliance)

More information:
www.asia-alliance.org

Alliance update

In November 2004 the members of the European Alliance for Asian Studies in close co-operation with the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) in Singapore, issued a call for workshops for the *Annual Asia-Europe Workshop Series* to take place in the academic year 2005/2006.

The objective of the Workshop Series is to stimulate researchers from Asia and Europe to work together on themes of common interest to Asia and Europe. The criteria are: 1. the quality of the proposal. 2. joint organization of the workshop by an institute from Asia and Europe 3. participants should be selected from at least eight different ASEM member countries.

In this fourth tranche of the *Annual Asia-Europe Workshop Series*, 37 proposals have been received and refereed by the Asia-Europe Selections Committee. The following six have been selected for implementation:

1-3 September 2005

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Asian and European Foreign Direct Investment in the Chinese and Southeast Asian Automobile and Electronics Industries

Yuri Sadoi, Faculty of Economics, Meijo University, Japan
R.B.P.M. Busser, Faculty of Arts, Leiden University, the Netherlands

30 November - 2 December 2005

Centre for Khmer Studies, Cambodia

Water in Mainland Southeast Asia

Philippe Peycam, Centre for Khmer Studies, Cambodia
Barend Jan Terwiel, Hamburg University, Germany

5-7 January 2006

National University of Singapore, Singapore

Pensioners on the move: Social security and trans-border retirement migration in Asia and Europe

Mika Toyota, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore
Anita Böcker, Institute for the Sociology of Law, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, the Netherlands

12-14 January 2006

Walailak University, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Thailand

Voices of Islam in Europe and Southeast Asia

Uthai Dulyakasem, Institute of Liberal Arts, Walailak University
Cynthia Chou, Institute of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, Head of Southeast Asian Studies, University of Copenhagen

27-28 January 2006

National University of Singapore, Singapore

Industrialization in Europe and Asia - Historical Patterns of Economic Development

Jang-Sup SHIN, Department of Economics, National University of Singapore
William Lazonick, Development Studies, university of Cambridge, United Kingdom

June 2006

Buon Ma Thuot, Vietnam

Locating the Communal in Asian Land Tenure

Thomas Sikor, Institute of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany
Nguyen Tan Vui, Tay Nguyen university, Vietnam

WS

CALL FOR PROPOSALS

The Annual Asia-Europe Workshop Series 2006/2007

The European Alliance for Asian Studies and the Asia-Europe Foundation welcome proposals for workshops on themes of common interest to Asia and Europe, to take place in 2006/2007.

The deadline is 1 February 2006. Proposals will be refereed by an Asia-Europe Selection Committee; six will be selected for realisation. Applicants will be informed of the Committee's decision by June 2006.

Financial support, up to a maximum of € 12,500 per workshop, consists of contribution towards travel and accommodation.

CRITERIA

- Three day expert workshop, to be held between September 2006 and September 2007 in an ASEM member country.*
- Jointly organised by an Asian and a European institute from ASEM member countries.
- Participants: coming from at least eight different ASEM countries (Asia and Europe equally); male/female parity; balance between senior experts and promising junior researchers
- Participants are invited primarily from academia - though contributions from

politicians, journalists and representatives of industry are welcome.

- The topic should be innovative and interdisciplinary, address shared interests between Asia and Europe, be of interregional/multilateral importance, and stimulate interregional dialogue.
- Workshops initiated by young postdocs aimed at creating an academic network are favoured.

THE PROPOSAL

Maximum eight pages, in English.

The proposal should contain:

- Title of the workshop, proposed dates and venue, names of initiators and organising institutions in Europe and Asia (include at least two signed letters of intent), and one contact address (p. 1)
- Introduction to the topic and scientific objectives (p.2-4)
- List of confirmed participants, with institutional affiliations and disciplinary

competence in relation to the workshop's topic (p.5)

- Detailed programme including paper titles (p.6)
- Itemised, detailed budget showing expenses and expected income (p.7)
- Envisaged follow-up including publication(s) (p.8)

DEADLINE AND ADDRESS

Proposals should be received (by regular mail) before 1 February 2006.

SECRETARIAT ASIA-EUROPE WORKSHOP SERIES

c/o International Institute for Asian Studies
P.O. Box 9515
2300 RA Leiden
The Netherlands



Address for hand delivery or private courier service: IIAS, Nonnensteeg 1-3, 2311 VJ Leiden, The Netherlands



ASIA-EUROPE FOUNDATION



European Alliance for Asian Studies

The ASIA-EUROPE FOUNDATION (ASEF), Singapore, was established by members of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) on 15 February 1997. ASEF promotes engagement between the civil societies of Asia and Europe and the forging of mutual understanding.

The EUROPEAN ALLIANCE FOR ASIAN STUDIES is a co-operative framework of European institutes specializing in Asian Studies. Members include the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS); NIAS - the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies; the Institute for Asian Affairs (IFA); the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS); the Centre for International Studies and Research (CERI-Sciences Po); the Centro de Estudios de Asia Oriental (CEAO); the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS); and the Swedish School for Advanced Asia Pacific Studies (SSAAPS).

* ASEM COUNTRIES:

AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, BRUNEI, BURMA/MYANMAR, CAMBODIA, CHINA, CYPRUS, CZECH REPUBLIC, DENMARK, ESTONIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREECE, HUNGARY, INDONESIA, IRELAND, ITALY, JAPAN, KOREA, LAOS, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, LUXEMBURG, MALAYSIA, MALTA, NETHERLANDS, PHILIPPINES, POLAND, PORTUGAL, SINGAPORE, SLOVAKIA, SLOVENIA, SPAIN, SWEDEN, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM, VIETNAM.

**Navigating convention in new terrains:
The 18th, 19th, and early 20th century literary scene**

Poetry reading & seminar on Malay-Indonesian literature

20 October 2005
Leiden, the Netherlands
organized by IIAS

Putu Wijaya (Indonesian poet, writer and playwright), Muhammad Haji Salleh (one of Malaysia's leading poets) and Sitor

Situmorang (Indonesian critical writer of the generation of '45) will read their poetry. Putu Wijaya is IIAS Poet in residence until 30 November 2005. Muhammad Haji Salleh will be IIAS Poet in residence from 1 September until 30 November 2005.

convenor: Salleh Yaapar
information: Amis Boersma
a.boersma@let.leidenuniv.nl

*Jangan pikirkan yang buruk
Jangan pikirkan yang buruk, cukup hidup ini saja
yang terpuruk, pikirkan yang indah, mimpi pun boleh,
agar kita bertahan dan mampu mengubah*

Do not think of the bad things
Do not think of the bad things, this life is
already too dreadful, think of what is pretty, dream of it,
so we can stand strong and try to change



*Nasib pembantu
Ibunya pembantu, neneknya permbantu, ia tidak
Ingin nanti anaknya juga jadi pembantu, karena itu, ia
Banting stir tukar kerjaan menjadi seorang pelacur*

The fate of a maid
Her mother was a maid, her grandmother was a maid
She did not want her children to become maids as well
So she changed direction and became a hooker



Putu Wijaya, *Uap*. Benteng, 1999. Translated by Amis Boersma

[advertisement]

Postponed deadline

**Satellites, applications,
Socio-economics and
regulatory regimes**

Second Asian space conference
8-11 November 2005
Hanoi Vietnam

Deadline for paper submission:
15 October 2005
Authors who cannot meet this deadline are requested to bring five copies of their paper to the conference.

information: iias@let.leidenuniv.nl

**Skyscrapers and
sledgehammers: urban
renewal in China**

IIAS Annual Lecture 2005
18 November
Amsterdam, the Netherlands
'The Generic City is on its way from horizontality to verticality. The skyscraper looks as if it will be the final, definitive typology. It has swallowed everything else. It can exist anywhere: in a rice field, or downtown - it makes no difference anymore. The towers no longer stand together; they are spaced so that they don't interact. Density in isolation is the ideal.' - Rem Koolhaas in *S, M, L, XL*

Rem Koolhaas, Pritzker Architecture Prize-winner, is the main speaker for the IIAS Annual Lecture 2005. Koolhaas is a lead-

ing architect, theorist and writer. His ideas on the 'generic city', the general urban condition, are ever more applicable for contemporary Asian cities. The urban explosion in Asia has created cities that can hardly be distinguished; cities without identity, without history, without centre. But, as Koolhaas claims, 'if you look closely you can perform another reading - you can see, for instance, that these copies are dealing differently with layering and with problems of density.' In this lecture Rem Koolhaas will discuss these issues in relation to the urban condition in China, where he is currently working on his largest project to date: the new headquarters for China Central Television (CCTV).

After the lecture a panel of international specialists (Prof. Xing Ruan, Prof. Shiling Zheng and Dr Anne-Marie Broudehoux) will discuss contemporary urban developments in China.

information: Lena Scheen
l.scheen@let.leidenuniv.nl

**Visions of Hindu kingship in
the twilight of Mughal rule**

13th Gonda Lecture
Speaker: Monika Boehm-Tettelbach
25 November 2005
Amsterdam, the Netherlands

At the turn of the eighteenth century, following the decline of the Mughal Empire, Hindu states re-defined the foundations of their rule; the concept of Hindu dhar-

ma. Bhakti groups had, for some two centuries, been defining what, to them, were the content and societal implications of religion. They did this in ways that were often seen as threatening towards traditional concepts of proper religious and public demeanour. This was felt to erode the very basis of Hindu statecraft, and therefore needed to be redressed.

The state of Savāi Jaisingh (1700-1743) sought to define a Vaisnava sanātana dharma capable of sustaining Hindu rule at a juncture and is perceived to be the turn of an epoch. The lecture will focus on its objectives, especially on those individuals who master-minded these and represented the intellectual ecumene.

In conclusion, lines of contrast and continuity in the conceptions of the late pre-colonial sanātana dharma and those of the ensuing colonial period will be drawn. Monika Boehm-Tettelbach (author's name: Monika Horstmann) is Professor in Modern South Asian Studies (Languages and Literatures) at the South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg, and head of the department. She is interested in Bhakti religion in its literary as well as historical and political aspects, mainly in northern India. Her books include *Dādū. Lieder* (1991) and *In Favour of Govinddevji: Historical Documents Relating to a Deity of Vrindaban and Eastern Rajasthan* (1999). She is currently writing a book entitled *An der Wende der Zeit: Herrschaftskonzept und Religion bei Savāi Jaisingh*.

Information:voorlichting@bureau.knaw.nl

[advertisement]

NUMBER 8 NOW AVAILABLE

Moussons

Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
Recherche en sciences humaines sur l'Asie du Sud-Est

ARTICLES

Tending the Spirit's Shrine: Kanekes and Pajajaran in West Java
Robert Wessing & Bart Barendregt

L'Enchaînement des appartenances: dossier coordonné par Guillaume Rozenberg

Des gardiens des confins aux bâtisseurs des plaines: le parcours d'une population tibéto-birmane du Laos
Vanina Bouté

Le nouveau partage du monde. Pauvreté et dépendance dans les marges du Yunnan (Chine)
Stéphane Gros

Urang Banten Kidul (gens de Banten Sud): entre autorité coutumière et souveraineté nationale en Indonésie
Éric Bourderie

L'expression du particularisme arakanais dans la Birmanie contemporaine
Alexandra de Mersan

REVIEW ARTICLES

Women's War. An Update of the Literature on Iban Textiles
Michael Heppell

Around Balinese Music. Catherine Basset & Michael Tenzer

NOTE

Les missionnaires et la botanique: l'exemple du père Urbain Faurie en Extrême-Orient
Chantal Zheng & Zheng Shunde

SALES & SUBSCRIPTIONS

EDISUD, La Calade, RN 7, 13090 Aix-en-Provence, France
Ph.: 33-(0)4-42216144 - Fax: 33-(0)4-42215620 - www.edisud.com - E-mail: commercial@edisud.com

Subscription (nos. 7 & 8): 30.50 Euros
Price per issue: 18.30 Euros

MOUSSONS, c/o IRSEA, MAISON ASIE PACIFIQUE
Université de Provence, 3, place Victor-Hugo, 13003 Marseilles, France
Ph.: 33-(0)491106114 - Fax: 33-(0)491106115 - E-mail: moussons@newsup.univ-mrs.fr

Moussons is a joint publication of IRSEA and LASEMA

**Fellowships at
the International Institute
for Asian Studies**

IIAS invites postdoctoral researchers to apply for fellowships in Leiden or Amsterdam.

The institute focuses on the interdisciplinary and comparative study of Asia in the humanities and social sciences, and their interaction with other sciences. IIAS research covers South, East, Southeast and Central Asia. IIAS Fellows are offered office facilities, while the institute will mediate in gaining access to libraries, archives and other institutions in the Netherlands. Fellows may be asked to give a lecture or organise a workshop, remain in contact with European researchers, and make due reference to IIAS in (future) publications, (partly) made possible through research done during your stay.

IIAS has five categories of fellowships for researchers:

- Affiliated fellows
- Research fellows (upon vacancy only)
- Senior fellows
- IIAS professors (upon vacancy only)
- Artists in residence

IIAS fellowship applications can be submitted at any time. Vacancies are announced in the IIAS Newsletter and on the website.



For more information and an IIAS fellowship application form see the IIAS website at: www.iias.nl
For specific information, please contact Lena Scheen or Wouter Feldberg at: iiasfellowships@let.leidenuniv.nl

Call for papers

**CHINA aktuell,
JAPAN aktuell,
SÜDOSTASIEN aktuell**

With *CHINA aktuell*, *JAPAN aktuell* and *SÜDOSTASIEN aktuell* the Institute of Asian Affairs in Hamburg is publishing three well-established academic journals focusing on current developments in East Asia. Dedicated to further improving the scholarly standard, each journal has established an editorial board of internationally acknowledged academics and introduced new editorial formats. Focusing on both sound and up-to-date information and scholarly analysis of current affairs in Asia the reader now benefits from peer-reviewed articles, analytical commentaries and documentation of current affairs. The editors welcome contributions that are concerned with the fields of international relations, politics, economics, society education, environment or law.

www.duei.de/ifa

Call for papers

Youths and the global South: religion, politics and the making of youth in Africa, Asia and the Middle East

24 - 26 August 2006
Dakar, Senegal

The dramatic demographic shift in Africa,

the Middle East and Southeast Asia, has led to changes analysts are just beginning to understand. The 'young generation' has assumed a central, though frequently ambiguous, position in the global South. Within shifting political economies and globalization, youths have become *agents* and *subjects* in new ways in the interrelated spheres of religion, politics and culture. While many applaud youthful initiatives, others stigmatize or demonize the young as disruptive, prone to radicalism, violence or recklessness. This is particularly the case where there is sluggish economy, where the aims of this exponentially increasing generation have quite often been frustrated. Despite debates and discourses about 'youths at risk', there is a tendency to see youths as one of the principal risks for society, as evidenced in some of the moral panics surrounding their unconventional and sometimes violent or criminal behaviour.

The conference's main objective is to explore the young and their negotiation of the social, political, economic, and cultural constraints. How do various authorities construct youths? What strategies do youths deploy to realize their interests and aspirations? What kinds of religious and political ideologies, practices and cultural politics do they embrace? The conference is expected to analyse youth cultures, subcultures and subjectivities in the societies of the South and to engage with the conceptual debates on youth cultures, religion, politics, and violence, which have been until now largely formulated from research in Western Europe and North America.

Papers may focus on youth activities in social movements, economics (street children, laborers, etc.), politics, violence (riots, protests, civil strife, gangs, and vigilantism), religion (from religious radicalism to unorthodox or alternative religious activities), cultural politics (music, fashion, poetry, and performance) or other forms of youthful behavior.

Convened by: African Studies Centre (ASC), International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM), the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) and Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA).

Please send your abstract (max.250 words) and 2-page CV before 1 January 2006 to iias@let.leidenuniv.nl.

Call for papers

India and East Asia: paradigms for a new global order

7 - 9 February 2006,
New Delhi, India

India, China, Japan and South East Asia had intimate economic and cultural ties in the pre-colonial period. Religious and trade links had created a vibrant and synergetic cultural exchange during this period. Colonialism put an end to these multicultural exchanges and ushered in a period of immense change at the levels of culture, political systems and economic

ties. The end of colonialism changed the geo-politics of the region again: the cold war forcing the independent Asian countries to tie up with either the Soviet Union or the USA. Today, with Asia as the world's new economic power house, it is imperative to analyse and understand relations in this region.

Often, this region is analysed merely in terms of its growing economy or its security priorities. Yet, cultural, historical and strategic issues cannot be separated from trade. We hope to understand the dynamics of this region through examining how issues of culture, trade and security are interlinked and to create a new paradigm for regional security by focusing on the history of this region. We feel that only a comparative and wider perspective can help us arrive at an equitable relationship for the future.

Session I: The coexistence of civilizations: revisiting the past

This session will look at the ancient historical relationship that existed in the region and help establish a basis for contemporary friendly ties.

Session II: Enchantment and disenchantment: interactions with Western colonialism

How did emerging national identities help cement freedom movements and a new way of interacting with each other through mutual support and legitimacy for anti-colonial struggles.

Session III: Fractured solidarity: the cold war in Asia

This section will examine the limits placed by the cold war on bilateral and multilateral ties in Asia. It will look at how cold war politics shaped the geo-political alliances.

Session IV: Globalisation and a New Order: building relationships

This section will analyse the regional bilateral and multilateral trade organizations that have emerged and how they influence international relations in this region.

Session V: A new regional cooperative security paradigm

This session will look at the real politics of the region and how this can prove both an impediment and a boon for future relations. The role of China and India in Southeast Asia will be critically analysed.

Session VI: Cultural diplomacy and the promotion of Track Two Initiatives

This concluding session focusses on the role press, tourism and other cultural ties can play in terms of improving intra-regional relations.

contact: Ravni Thakur

ravthakur@vsnl.com

Shri Prakash

shriprakash_17@hotmail.com

[advertisement]

[advertisement]

CHINA aktuell

Call for Papers

China aktuell is a refereed academic journal published by the Institute of Asian Affairs, Hamburg that focuses on current developments in Greater China. The bi-monthly journal has a circulation of 1,200 copies, making it one of the world's most widely distributed periodicals on Asian affairs. *China aktuell* reaches a broad readership in the academia, administration and business circles. Articles to be published should be written in German or English and submitted exclusively to this publication.

China aktuell is devoted to the transfer of scholarly insights to a wide audience. The topics covered should therefore not only be orientated towards specialists in Chinese affairs, but should also be of relevance to readers with a practical interest in the region.

The editors welcome contributions on contemporary China including Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan that are concerned with the fields of international relations, politics, economics, society, education, environment or law. Articles should be theoretically grounded, empirically sound and reflect the state of the art in contemporary Chinese studies.

All manuscripts will be peer-reviewed for acceptance. The editors respond within three months.

Research articles should not exceed 10,000 words (incl. footnotes and references). Manuscripts should be submitted to the editors in electronic form (stylesheet: www.duei.de/ifa/stylesheet).

Recent articles:

- Identity Work on the Chinese Internet (in German)
- Culture, Economic Style and the Nature of the Chinese Economic System
- Cross-Strait Relations since 1949: From Radicalism to Conservatism and Back Again

For submission of articles please contact:

Institute of Asian Affairs
Rothenbaumchaussee 32
D-20148 Hamburg
Phone: +49 40 4288740, Fax: +49 40 4107945
E-mail: giese@ifa.duei.de, holbig@ifa.duei.de

Subscription and advertising info:

ifa@ifa.duei.de
Website: www.duei.de/ifa



Editors: Karsten Giese
Heike Holbig

Annual Subscription Rates:

Six issues per year, available in print and digital form

€ 82.00 per year *) incl. Data Supplement (Students € 40.00 *)

Data Supplement: € 40.00 per year *) (Students € 30.00 *)

Online edition: fee per article

*) plus postage

RENDITIONS 譯
your gateway to Chinese culture 叢

From *Renditions*, the journal that brings you the full range of Chinese literature:

Renditions No. 63 (Spring 2005)

Contemporary Fiction: Marginal Worlds


Featuring short stories by writers from mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, this issue takes a look at life lived on the margin and at the edge.



Renditions No. 64 (Autumn 2005)

Women of Traditional China

Were traditional Chinese women, as Liang Qichao claimed, men's dependents who never engaged in productive labour? This issue presents various aspects of women's lives, from education to literary accomplishments, and from service at court to widowhood.



Forthcoming from Renditions Paperbacks:



Bian Zhilin: *The Carving of Insects*

Edited by Mary M. Y. Fung

Translated by Mary M. Y. Fung and David Lunde

This unique collection contains almost the entire corpus of Bian Zhilin, a major poetic voice who helped to shape the form and style of 20th century modern Chinese poetry.

December 2005 ISBN 962-7255-33-5

visit our website to view other titles

website: www.renditions.org * e-mail: renditions@cuhk.edu.hk

October 2005

4 October 2005

Utrecht, the Netherlands

Teaching the Chinese learner

organized by Nuffic and Leiden University

contact: David Pho (Nuffic)

dpho@nuffic.nl

Henk Frencken (Leiden University)

Frencken@ICLON.leidenuniv.nl

5 - 8 October 2005

New Delhi, India

Fifth Generative Linguistics in the Old World

(GLOW) in Asia

www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~ucljara/glow05_index.htm

7 - 9 October 2005

Hanover, USA

Reading material: the production of narratives, genres and literary identities

fourteenth annual meeting

Association for Japanese Literary Studies

www.dartmouth.edu/~damell/ALS_2005

8 October 2005

Amsterdam, the Netherlands

How the balance swung: a hundred years after the Russo-Japanese war

organized by IAS

contact: Roald Maliangkay

onderzoeksgroepias@fmg.uva.nl

9 - 13 October 2005

Bonn, Germany

Integrating human dimensions and coastal zone management for aquaculture.

international session

organized by Institute for Sustainable Development and Research (ISDR) India, UNU, University of Bonn, IAPSO/IAHS

contact: Govind Bhole and Chaudhari.

clkp123@yahoo.com

6 - 9 October 2005

Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Exploring China's musical past

tenth international CHIME conference

European Foundation for Chinese Music Research - CHIME

chime@wxs.nl

http://home.wxs.nl/~chime

6 - 9 October 2005

San Francisco, USA

Branching out the Banyan tree: a changing Chinese America

organized by Chinese Historical Society of America/Asian American Studies

contact: Leonard Shek

conference2005@chsa.org

www.chsa.org

7 October 2005

Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Human rights in China

speaker: Harry Wu

organized by IAS

contact: Lena Scheen

iasfellowships@let.leidenuniv.nl

7 October 2005

Copenhagen, Denmark

The European security model viewed from Japan

IAS seminar

Takako Ueta, University of Tokyo

http://nias.ku.dk/activities/conferences/default.htm

7 - 8 October 2005

Denton, USA

SouthWest Conference on Asian Studies

34th annual meeting

www.trinity.edu/org/swcas/2005meeting.htm

7 - 9 October 2005

Hanover, USA

Reading material: the production of narratives, genres and literary identities

fourteenth annual meeting

Association for Japanese Literary Studies

www.dartmouth.edu/~damell/ALS_2005

8 October 2005

Amsterdam, the Netherlands

How the balance swung: a hundred years after the Russo-Japanese war

organized by IAS

contact: Roald Maliangkay

onderzoeksgroepias@fmg.uva.nl

9 - 13 October 2005

Bonn, Germany

Integrating human dimensions and coastal zone management for aquaculture.

international session

organized by Institute for Sustainable Development and Research (ISDR) India, UNU, University of Bonn, IAPSO/IAHS

contact: Govind Bhole and Chaudhari.

clkp123@yahoo.com

6 - 9 October 2005

Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Exploring China's musical past

tenth international CHIME conference

European Foundation for Chinese Music Research - CHIME

chime@wxs.nl

http://home.wxs.nl/~chime

6 - 9 October 2005

San Francisco, USA

Branching out the Banyan tree: a changing Chinese America

organized by Chinese Historical Society of America/Asian American Studies

contact: Leonard Shek

conference2005@chsa.org

www.chsa.org

7 October 2005

Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Human rights in China

speaker: Harry Wu

organized by IAS

contact: Lena Scheen

iasfellowships@let.leidenuniv.nl

14 - 29 October 2005

New Delhi, India

Sexual and reproductive health and rights for young people

training-workshop

Health Action Information Network (HAIN)

www.hain.org

17 October 2005

Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Nationalism in mainland Southeast Asia

IAS workshop

contact: Wouter Feldberg

w.feldberg@let.leidenuniv.nl

www.ias.nl

20 October

Leiden, the Netherlands

Poetry reading and seminar on Malay-Indonesian literature

organized by IAS

convenor: Salleh Yaapar

contact: Amis Boersma

a.boersma@let.leidenuniv.nl

20 - 22 October 2005

Yangzhou, China

Lifestyle and entertainment in Yangzhou

workshop

organized by the scholarly network Yangzhou Club

www.shuoshu.org

21 October 2005

The Hague, the Netherlands

Malay annual lecture

organized by IAS

convenor: Salleh Yaapar

contact: Amis Boersma

a.boersma@let.leidenuniv.nl

21 October 2005

Stanford, USA

Sunset requirements and the pace of reform in Korea

seminar series

convenor: Jiyang Baum

http://aparc.stanford.edu/events/4208/

21 - 23 October 2005

Berlin, Germany

Mural paintings of Goguryeo kingdom (37 BC - 668 AD)

international symposium

organized by Berlin Freie Universität

information: goguryeo_symp@yahoo.com

23 - 29 October 2005

Manila, Philippines

Making governance gender responsive (MGGR) training

organized by Center for Asia Pacific Women in Politics (CAPWIP)

www.capwip.org/

26 - 29 October 2005

Varberg, Sweden

Reconfiguring religion, power and moral order in Cambodia

organized by IAS and Göteborg University

contact: Alexandra Kent

alix.kent@swipnet.se

27 - 29 October 2005

Pittsburgh, USA

Comparative postcolonialities: aesthetics, history, locality

organized by University of Pittsburgh

www.english.pitt.edu/events/pococonf/index.html

27 - 30 October 2005

Bangkok, Thailand

How does change happen?

forum

organized by Association for Women's Rights in Development

information: awidforum@awid.org

http://nias.ku.dk/activities/conferences/default.htm

28 - 30 October 2005

Hong Kong, China

First East Asian SGdS-Colloquium on the history of linguistics

http://home.t-online.de/home/dutz.nodus/03c-rb.htm

31 October 2005

Leiden, the Netherlands

Europe and Asia: sustainable relations, sustainable growth

IIAS-NGIZ Asia-Europe lecture series on modern Asia

speaker: L.J. Brinkhorst, Minister of Economic Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, the Netherlands

contact: Amis Boersma

a.boersma@let.leidenuniv.nl

www.ias.nl

November 2005

3 - 5 November 2005

Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Law and order in the Japanese empire 1895-1945

organized by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation and Robert Cribb, Australian National University

contact: Project bureau Indonesia across Orders

indie-indonesie@niod.nl

www.indie-indonesie.nl

3 - 5 November 2005

Aarhus Denmark

Understanding India

organized by Aarhus School of Business

contact: Rajesh Kumar

rku@asb.dk

5 November 2005

Stanford, USA

Korean Studies in Social Science workshop

http://aparc.stanford.edu/events/4214/

7 - 9 November 2005

New Delhi, India

Consumerism and the emerging middle class: comparative perspectives from India and China

second conference of India and China comparisons

IIAS/CASS/ICSSR/CERI workshop series organized by IAS

convenors: Peter van der Veer & Shoma Munshi (IIAS) and Patricia Uberoi & Ravi Thakur (Institute for Chinese Studies, Delhi University)

ias@let.leidenuniv.nl

8 - 11 November 2005

Hanoi, Vietnam

2nd Asian space conference: satellites, applications, socio-economics and regulatory regimes

co-organized by IIAS, GISTDA, IIASL and ITC

held concurrently with the 26th Asian Conference on Remote Sensing (ACRS)

information: iias@let.leidenuniv.nl

9 - 12 November 2005

Shanghai, China

Ports, pirates and hinterlands in East and Southeast Asia: historical and contemporary perspectives

ASEF-Alliance workshop

convenors: Li Yihai (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, China) and John Kleinen (Centre for Maritime Research, the Netherlands)

ias@let.leidenuniv.nl

10 - 11 November 2005

Makati, Philippines

Agricultural and rural development in Asia: ideas, paradigms, and policies three decades after

organized by Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA)

contact: Arsenio M. Balisacan

ard_conference@agri.searca.org

http://web.searca.org/ard/

17 November 2005

Stanford, USA

Political reforms in Korea: personal reflections of a public prosecutor

seminar

http://aparc.stanford.edu/events/4224/

18 November 2005

Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Skyscrapers and sledgehammers: urban renewal in China

IIAS Annual Lecture

speaker: Rem Koolhaas

contact: Lena Scheen & Amis Boersma

iasfellowships@let.leidenuniv.nl

18 - 19 November 2005

Canberra, Australia

Indonesia: the New Order and its legacy

conference

Australian National University

information: Beverley.fraser@anu.edu.au

23 - 25 November 2005

Jakarta, Indonesia

1/3 of our planet: what can Asia and Europe do for sustainable development?

forum

organized by Asia-Europe Foundation, Hanns-Seidel Foundation Indonesia, Institute of Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) and the UN Environment Programme

information: www.asef.org

25 November 2005

Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Visions of Hindu kingship in the twilight of Mughal rule

13th Gonda Lecture

speaker: Monika Boehm-Tettelbach

organized by Gonda Foundation

voorlichting@bureau.knaw.nl

23 - 29 October 2005

Manila, Philippines

Making governance gender responsive (MGGR) training

organized by Center for Asia Pacific Women in Politics (CAPWIP)

www.capwip.org/

26 - 29 October 2005

28 - 30 November 2005

Bangkok, Thailand

Culture and development: celebrating diversity, achieving equity
second conference in the 'Culture and development' series.

organized by SEAMEO-SPAFA (Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization's Regional Centre for Archaeology and Fine Arts)
www.seameo-spafa.org/conference05.htm

30 November - 2 December 2005

Siem Riep, Cambodia

Water in mainland Southeast Asia
ASEF-Alliance workshop

convenors: Barend Terwiel (Hamburg University, Germany), Philippe Peycam (Centre for Khmer Studies, Cambodia) and Wil Dijk (IIAS, the Netherlands).
w.dijk@compaqnet.nl

30 November - 2 December 2005

Canberra, Australia

Moving masculinities: crossing regional and historical borders

Australian National University
Information: Richard.Eves@anu.edu.au
Jodi.Parvey@anu.edu.au

December 2005

1 December 2005

Stanford, USA

Talk with Coh Kun

Asian leaders forum

http://aparc.stanford.edu/events/#

1 - 2 December 2005

Bangkok, Thailand

Geoinformatics for combating emerging infectious diseases

Health GIS 2005

www.j-geoinfo.net.

1 - 3 December 2005

Macao, China

History and memory: present reflections on the past to build our future

symposium

Macao Ricci Institute

www.riccimac.org/

1 - 4 December 2005

Paris, France

Fourth biennial conference

International Water History Association

http://iwha.polaire.net/cgi-bin/2005/sub-

mit.cgi

2 - 5 December 2005

Melbourne, Australia

Kierkegaard and Asia

organized by Kierkegaard Society of Japan

contact: Ben Dornier

dornier@kansai.gaidai.ac.jp

www.kierkegaard.jp/conference2005.html.en

6 - 9 December 2005

Bangkok, Thailand

14th Himalayan languages symposium

convenor: Krisadawan Hongladarom

http://socialanthropology.org/hls11/

8 - 9 December 2005

Chiang Mai, Thailand

Southeast Asia, a global crossroads

Southeast Asian Studies regional exchange

program's 10th anniversary conference

www.conference.seasrepoundation.org/index.htm

8-10 December 2005

Leiden, the Netherlands

Bio-archaeology in Asia

second IIAS Masterclass on Modern research

techniques in Asian archaeology

convenor: Rethy Chhem

organized by IIAS

iias@let.leidenuniv.nl

12 - 15 December 2005

Bangkok, Thailand

Eighth international conference on Asian digital

libraries

www.icadl2005.ait.ac.th

16 - 18 December 2005

Bangkok, Thailand

Human securities in the Asia-Pacific region

7th conference of the Asia-Pacific Sociological

Association

www.asiapacificsociology.org

17 - 20 December 2005.

New Delhi, India

Religions and cultures in the Indic civilization

second international conference

organized by the Indic Studies Network

(IsNew) and Manushi - A Journal about Women

and Society

madhupurnima@indicstudies.org

19 December 2005

Hong Kong, China

The challenge of the Pearl River Delta: inter-

disciplinary approach for its global-local

dynamics

organized by the Division of Social Science

Hong Kong University of Science and

Technology

http://home.ust.hk/~demologo/

January 2006

January 2006

Copenhagen, Denmark

Responsibly made in China? Chinese develop-

ment & corporate social responsibility

workshop

organized by NIAS and Copenhagen Business

School

http://nias.ku.dk/activities/conferences/

default.htm

5 - 7 January 2006

Singapore

Pensioners on the move: social security and trans-

border retirement migration in Asia and Europe

ASEF-Alliance workshop

convenors: Mika (National University of Sin-

gapore) and Anita Böcker (Radboud Univer-

siteit Nijmegen, the Netherlands)

ariyeov@nus.edu.sg

9 - 10 January 2006

Siem Reap, Cambodia

First conference on history of medicine in

Southeast Asia

Center for Khmer Studies

www.khmerstudies.org

11 - 12 January 2006

Leiden, the Netherlands

Annual ABIA workshop

organized by IIAS

information:

iiasfellowships@let.leidenuniv.nl

www.abia.net

12 - 13 January 2006

Leiden, the Netherlands

From Asian earth: Ceramics of South and South-

east Asia

ABIA seminar

convenors: Ellen Raven and Gerda Theuns -

de Boer

organized by IIAS

information:

iiasfellowships@let.leidenuniv.nl

www.abia.net

12 - 14 January 2006

Nakhon Si Thammarat, Thailand

Voices of Islam in Europe and Southeast Asia

ASEF-Alliance workshop

convenors: Uthai Dulyakasem (Walailak Uni-

versity, Thailand) and Cynthia Chou (Universi-

ty of Copenhagen, Denmark)

cynchou@hum.ku.dk

12 - 14 January 2006

Leiden, the Netherlands

Is there a 'Dharma of History'?

convenors: Axel Schneider (Leiden University)

and Alexander L. Mayer (University of Illinois)

organized by IIAS

co-sponsored by the Chung-Hwa Institute of

Buddhist Studies

iias@let.leidenuniv.nl

27 - 28 January 2006

Singapore

Industrialization in Europe and Asia: historical

patterns of economic development

ASEF-Alliance workshop

convenor: Jang-Sup SHIN

(National University of Singapore)

ecssjs@nus.edu.sg

February 2006

3 - 5 February 2006

Calcutta, India

The Armenian diaspora: history, society, culture

and trading networks

international seminar

contact: Sushil Chaudhury, History Dept.,

Calcutta University

Sushil_c@rediffmail.com

7 - 9 February 2006

New Delhi, India

India and East Asia: paradigms for a new global

order

contact: Ravni Thakur

ravthakur@vsnl.com

Shri Prakash

shriprakash_17@hotmail.com

7 - 10 February 2006

Leiden, the Netherlands

Images of 'wild folk' in Southeast Asia

third IIAS masterclass on Modern research

techniques in Asian archaeology

convenor: Gregory Forth

organized by IIAS

iias@let.leidenuniv.nl

9 - 11 February 2006

Leiden, the Netherlands

Maoist insurgencies in Asia and Latin America

convenor: Satya Shrestha

organized by IIAS

information: m.rozing@let.leidenuniv.nl

20 - 24 February 2006

Buenos Aires, Argentina

International forum on the Social Science - poli-

cy nexus

organized by UNESCO and the Government

of Argentina

information: ifspworkshops@unesco.org

http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en

23 - 24 February 2006

Singapore

Naming in Asia: Local identities and global

change

international conference

organized by Asia Research Institute

contact: Charles Macdonald, Zheng Yangwen,

Anthony Reid

c.macdonald@wanadoo.fr

arizyw@nus.edu.sg

aridir@nus.edu.sg

www.ari.nus.edu.sg/conf2006/naming.htm

25 - 27 February 2006

Siem Reap, Cambodia

Rethinking mainland Southeast Asia: comparing

social and cultural challenges

international conference

Center for Khmer Studies

cheanmen@khmerstudies.org

March 2006

27 - 29 March 2006

Bonn, Germany

From concept to action

EWC III - third international conference on

early warning

contact: David Stevens

david.stevens@unvienna.org

April 2006

6 - 9 April 2006

San Francisco, USA

AAS annual meeting

www.asianst.org

27 - 30 April 2006

Austin, USA

Sense and substance in traditional Asian medicine

sixth international congress

organized by International association for the

study of traditional Asian medicine

www.iastam.org/conferences.htm

May 2006

May 2006

Leiden, the Netherlands

The generosity of artificial languages in an Asian

perspective

convenors: Johan van Benthem, Frits Staal

Martin Stokhof and Wim Stokhof

organized by IIAS

iias@let.leidenuniv.nl

12 - 13 May 2006

Singapore

Asian expansions: the historical processes of

polity expansion in Asia

workshop

organized by Asia Research Institute

www.ari.nus.edu.sg/conf2006/expansion.htm

29 - 30 May 2006

Leiden, the Netherlands

Empires and exact sciences in pre-modern Asia

convenors: Kim Plofker and Jan Hogendijk

organized by IIAS

iias@let.leidenuniv.nl

www.iias.nl

30 May - 2 June 2006

Leiden, the Netherlands

Intellectual history in pre-colonial Asia

IIAS masterclass

convenor: Sheldon Pollock

organized by IIAS

iias@let.leidenuniv.nl

June 2006

June 2006

Buon Ma Thuot, Vietnam

Locating the communal in Asian land tenure

ASEF-Alliance workshop

convenors: Thomas Sikor (Humboldt Univer-

sity, Germany) and Nguyen Tan Vui (Tay

Nguyen University, Vietnam)

Thomas.sikor@rz.hu-berlin.de

25 - 27 June 2006

Singapore

Chinese nation, Chinese state, 1850-2000

biannual conference of the Historical Society

for Twentieth Century China

organized by Asia Research Institute

contact: Thomas DuBois

histdd@nus.edu.sg

26 - 29 June 2006

Wollongong, Australia

Asia reconstructed: from critiques of develop-

ment to postcolonial studies

16th biennial conference of the ASAA

convenor: Adrian Vickers

asaa@uow.edu.au

http://coombs.anu.edu.au/ASAA/conference

27 - 30 June 2006

Leiden, the Netherlands

19th European conference on modern South

Staff

Wim Stokhof (Director)
 Ilko Bataklijev (WWW)
 Amis Boersma (Project Coordinator)
 Ines van Dijk (Secretary)
 Wouter Feldberg (Fellow Programme Coordinator)
 Winda Handajani (Database Assistant)
 Manuel Haneveld (IT-Manager)
 Takeo David Hymans (Managing Editor)
 Natasja Kershof (Editor)
 Roald Maliangkay (Coordinator, Branch Office Amsterdam)
 Heleen van der Minne (Secretary, Branch Office Amsterdam)
 Manon Osseweijer (Coordinator of Academic Affairs)
 Anne-Marie Petit (Secretary)
 Joost Postma (Database Programmer)
 Marloes Rozing (Financial Manager, Seminar Coordinator)
 Inge van Steijn (Secretary)
 Josine Stremmelaar (Executive Manager)
 Paul van der Velde (Senior Consultant)

Board

Prof. P. van der Veer - Chairman (University of Amsterdam)
 Prof. P. Spyer (Leiden University)
 Prof. B.J. ter Haar (Leiden University)
 Dr J. de Jong (Groningen University)
 Prof. R. Kersten (Leiden University)
 Prof. M. van der Linden (IISG/University of Amsterdam)
 Prof. M. Sparreboom (Erasmus University, Rotterdam)

Academic Committee

Prof. T. Atabaki (IISG/University of Amsterdam)
 Dr E.W. Ball (Free University, Amsterdam)
 Prof. H. Beukers (Leiden University)
 Prof. P.P.S. Ho (University of Groningen)
 Dr G. Persoon - Chairman (Leiden University)
 Prof. C.I. Risseuw (Leiden University)
 Prof. B.C.A. Walraven (Leiden University)

IIAS Extraordinary Chairs

Prof. H.G.C. Schulte Nordholt (the Netherlands)
 Special Chair at the Erasmus University Rotterdam
 'Asian History'
 1 October 1999 - 1 October 2007
 Prof. H. Steinhauer (the Netherlands)
 Special Chair at Nijmegen University
 'Ethnolinguistics with a focus on Southeast Asia'
 1 September 1998 - 1 September 2006

> Colophon



IIAS Newsletter #38
 Autumn 2005
 Special issue

International Institute for Asian Studies
 P.O. Box 9515, 2300 RA Leiden, the Netherlands
 T +31-71-527 2227
 F +31-71-527 4162
 iiasnews@let.leidenuniv.nl

Editors

Takeo David Hymans & Natasja Kershof

Guest editor

The Asia-Pacific War: history & memory
 Ethan Mark

Freelancers #38

Graphics: Iben Trino-Molenkamp
 Copyediting: Lee Gillette, Renata Jasaitis

Our agents in the field

Henk Blezer, Amis Boersma, Carol Brash,
 Ines van Dijk, Suzana Dudic, Wouter Feldberg,
 Dory Heilijgers, Jasper van der Kerkhof,
 Manon Osseweijer, Anne-Marie Petit,
 Gerard Persoon, Marloes Rozing, Lena Scheen,
 Inge van Steijn, Wim Stokhof,
 Josine Stremmelaar, Paul van de Velde, Tao Yue

Design

JB&A raster grafisch ontwerp, Delft

Printing

Wegener grafische groep, Apeldoorn

ISSN

0929-8738

Circulation

24,600

Next issue

20 December 2005

Advertisements

Submission: 15 October 2005

Subscriptions

The IIAS Newsletter is published four times a year and is available free of charge. To subscribe, please return a completed subscription form to the IIAS secretariat. Subscription forms are available from the secretariat or online. iias.subscribe@let.leidenuniv.nl www.iias.nl/iiasn/subscribe.html

Responsibility for copyrights and for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with authors. Their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views of the institute or its supporters.

[advertisement]



Become one of our 24,000 readers worldwide and have the IIAS Newsletter arrive in your mailbox, four times a year, free of charge.

iias.subscribe@let.leidenuniv.nl
 or read it online www.iias.nl



Website:
www.IIAS.nl