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IIAS NEWSLETTER
International Institute for Asian Studies

From the Year of the White Horse to the Year of the Black Horse
Mongolia After Twelve Years of Transition

Following the collapse of communism, Mongolia embarked upon an ambitious path of political and economic reform. The ensuing transition brought new opportunities to the country and its people: an end to international isolation, the introduction of political freedoms and a nascent private sector after many decades of centralized planning. Economic liberalization, however, has yet to deliver benefits to the Mongolian majority. At the beginning of the 1990s, many believed that the market economy would bring unprecedented prosperity within a decade. Instead, it brought unprecedented poverty. In many respects, life for most people is more precarious today than during the communist era.

Forum >
Central Asia

By Sanjaasuren Oyun

Before the 1990s poverty as such was not a problem in Mongolia. With the advent of transition and the sudden collapse of economic structures, the economy contracted and unemployment soared. Surveys undertaken over the last seven years indicate that one in three Mongolians live below the poverty line, earning less than a dollar a day. During the period 1995-2002, the Gini coefficient of inequality increased from 0.31 to 0.37.* Despite the recent return of moderate economic growth, the number of those living in poverty has not decreased.

Mongolia did not recover its 1989 pre-transition GDP of just over USD 1 billion until 2000. Like many post-communist countries, Mongolia began the 1990s with negative growth and extreme inflation (up to 350 per cent). The mid-1990s witnessed economic stabilization and inflation around 10 per cent; growth and single-digit inflation had to await the end of the decade. Unfortunately, Mongolia is still struggling to achieve growth rates necessary for poverty reduction and job creation. According to a 1999 World Bank study of poor developing countries, poverty reduction requires economic growth rates at least twice the rate of population growth. That is for countries with good governance. Without good governance, when the distribution of wealth is unequal and corruption thrives, economic growth needs to be at least three times the rate of population increase. Its population currently

growing at 1.5 per cent and good governance lacking, Mongolia needs a minimum annual growth rate of 4-5 per cent in order to raise general living standards. Yet, over the last several years, Mongolia's growth has been insufficient, averaging 1-3 per cent.

Foreigners are easily impressed by the many jeeps in the streets of Ulaanbaatar and the expensive houses that are being built in the capital's suburbs. In a country with a per capita GDP of USD 450, however, these are not signs of a healthy but of a sick economy. So what went wrong? Mongolia has been, in the words of *The Economist*, 'the star pupil of Western liberal economics', 'the darling of ultraliberals in the West'. Meticulously following the instructions of international financial institutions, the country liberalized its currency, trade and economy, privatized most of its state assets, and brought down inflation. Below are some examples of how these reforms were undertaken.

Tight monetary policies dictated by the IMF and implemented by the Central Bank of Mongolia aimed to reduce inflation; bank rates, however, were kept too high for local businesses to be profitable. Foreign aid (ODA) brought benefits to tens of thousands of Mongolians, but the overall amount is reaching dangerous levels. Over the past twelve years, Mongolia received ODA averaging 20 per cent of GDP. In addition the old (communist-era) debt to Russia has not yet been negotiated or

Editorial

For a few years now, the illusory safe haven for humanities and social sciences in general and of Asian Studies in particular appears severely challenged by substantial budget cuts in many countries across the globe. How could this happen? As Asia's prominence and international role is increasing, wouldn't it make more sense that Asian Studies achieves a higher profile? In the previous issue, I voiced some personal concern that the scientific community has created a separate niche for itself and neglects one of its core responsibilities towards society at large, namely critically examining politics and power. One could imagine that if Asian Studies takes up this responsibility of informing the public and involves itself more in broader political, economic, and cultural public debates and events, policy makers will be more likely to appreciate its intrinsic value. These brief thoughts fit in well with Jan Annerstedt's article on this page, which emphasizes the relevance of academic involvement in the Asia-Europe Meetings and Business Forums. It also links to the front-page article, in which Mongolian parliamentarian Sanjaasuren Oyun addresses the dark side of globalization and expounds the ways in which Mongolia's post-communist economic development has been going awry.

Economic globalization has an equally marked (but surely not necessarily negative) impact on Asian cities and ranks high among the causes for their lasting attraction to the rural poor, to (foreign) investors, and to various layers of government. The current and expanding global and regional importance of Asian cities warrants an extensive (11-page) theme section on 'Mega-Urbanization in Asia'. Theme editor, Dr Peter Nas, has edited a wonderful collection of articles on a number of urban areas, in which both universal and city-specific aspects of mega-urbanization are addressed. Due to the sheer size and rapid expansion of these cities, the Asian landscape steadily becomes more urban. In due course this changed geographical reality will no doubt prompt research fields such as anthropology, sociology, urban planning, socio-economy, cultural studies, but also history, to adjust their approach. Whether this rapid urbanization is lamentable or not, Asian cities bear witness of a waning importance of rural in favour of urban areas and deliver another blow to Orientalist images of an unchanging rural Asia. At the same time, by conveying some specific forms of urbanization in the non-Western context, the universal concept of urbanization is being redressed. We hope that you agree that this issue's theme proves a promising step in the above direction.

To conclude, Yasser Tabbaa's article 'Lessons from Looting' deserves a short remark. The much-debated unreliability of the figures on looted material that the Iraqi National Museum's director presented some two months ago, no doubt add to the controversial nature of this topic, for which reason we open the floor for your reactions to this article in particular. As always we also warmly welcome your comments and suggestions to other parts of the newsletter. Enjoy reading. < *Maurice Sistermans*

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Growing Together

The Academic Invigoration of the Asia Europe Business Forum

Whereas political and business circles recognize the importance of the biannual Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM), the significance of these deliberations and the possibility to influence them seems to escape many in academia. Alongside the ASEM political summits in the media spotlight, the Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF) gatherings provide researchers the opportunity to constructively influence the process of business cooperation, facilitating and invigorating the AEBF deliberations and ultimately the ASEM agenda as such.

By Jan Annerstedt

Coinciding with the September 2002 ASEM Economic Ministers' Meeting in Copenhagen, the seventh annual Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF 7) conference was held just ahead of the ASEM IV summit. Well in advance, academic researchers and other specialists from East Asia and Western Europe met to discuss strategic issues identified at the previous meeting in Singapore.

In Singapore in 2001, it was decided that three strategic issues cutting across the AEBF working groups would be brought to the fore to bring momentum to the deliberations: (1) dynamic regions, metropolitan hubs, and modern governance in the globalizing economy; (2) strengthening the economic fabric through the growth of small and medium-sized business enterprises; and (3) the global challenge to corporate governance and business participation in socio-economic development.

These themes were discussed in meetings among Asian and European specialists, and evaluated in a workshop that brought together academics and other specialists from Asia, Europe, and North America three months ahead of the Copenhagen AEBF. The resulting 30-page Briefing Paper presented a comprehensive set of suggestions for the eight working groups and for deliberations in the plenary sessions. The working groups then used this content to develop their platforms for advice to the ministers and other top policy-makers involved in the ASEM process.

To deliver tangibles, much of the work in the AEBF conferences is conducted in the aforementioned working groups, each co-chaired by an Asian and a European business representative. The two chairs prepare the deliberations and help in the follow-up to the conference. Over the past years, the 'Trade' and 'Investment' working groups have been instrumental in identifying obstacles to trade and investment and in proposing specific actions by governments, the WTO, and similar international and regional organizations. Last year, with the Doha development agenda at the centre of discussions, business representatives urged governments to liberalize intercontinental trade and to simplify and make more transparent rules for foreign direct investment.*

As in Singapore, the conference in Copenhagen hosted working groups for Financial Services, Information and Communications Technology, Infrastructure, and Life Sciences and Health Care. Two new working groups, 'Environment' and 'Food', discussed the food processing, biotechnology, and environmental technology industries and implementation strategies for sustainable economic growth that allows for social as well as environmental improvement. While the private role in initiating and facilitating trade and cross-continental investment was emphasized, so were the issues of corporate citizenship and social responsibility.

Research and urgent policy issues

For many AEBF 7 participants, the discussions in Copenhagen were useful and intellectually inspiring. For the 30-odd researchers involved in preparing the AEBF Briefing Paper, AEBF 7 was a challenging set of encounters, where research results were confronted with urgent policy issues as expressed by top business representatives and public officials.

Areas for improvement were also identified. The lack of a permanent ASEM secretariat and the annual shifting of AEBF conference responsibilities render continuity in deliberations and the implementation of follow-up recommendations more difficult. As a result of the transfer of responsibilities between Europe and Asia, specialized knowledge is unfortunately lost. Therefore, the installation of a 'lean, yet effective' ASEM secretariat was recommended on behalf of ASEM leaders. With the expansion of the European Union, these proposals are more urgent. They also fit well with Wim Stokhof's emphasis in his 'Director's Note on ASEM' (IIASN 30, p.2): The ASEM process, of which AEBF remains an important part, is in need of a 'long-term internally driven strategic vision, which can be translated into clear and concrete objectives'.

Deliberations among business representatives, academics, and other specialists need to continue to invigorate the next AEBF planned in Seoul for October 2003. <

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* The November 2001 declaration of the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, provides the mandate for negotiations and other work including issues concerning the implementation of current WTO Agreements, i.e. the agreements arising from the Uruguay Round negotiations. In Doha, ministers agreed to adopt around 50 decisions clarifying the obligations of developing country member governments with respect to issues including agriculture, subsidies, textiles and clothing, technical barriers to trade, trade-related investment measures and rules of origin.

IIAS

The International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) is a postdoctoral research centre based in Leiden and Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Its main objective is to encourage the study of Asia and to promote national and international cooperation in this field. The institute focuses on the humanities and social sciences and, where relevant, at the interface between these disciplines and sciences like medicine, economy, politics, technology, law, and environmental studies.

The IIAS endeavours to adopt a dynamic and versatile approach in its research programmes. Research fellows at post-PhD level are temporarily employed by or affiliated to the institute, either within the framework of a collaborative research programme, or on an individual basis. Always ready to anticipate new developments, the IIAS aims to achieve and continue to build on a broad, high-quality level of knowledge of Asia. The institute organizes seminars, workshops, and conferences, and publishes a newsletter with a circulation of approximately 21,500 copies. Moreover, the IIAS has established a database for Asian Studies, which contains information on researchers and research-related institutes worldwide.

The IIAS acts as an international mediator, bringing various parties together. In keeping with the Dutch tradition of transferring goods and ideas, the institute works as a clearing-house for knowledge and information. This entails activities such as providing information services, constructing international networks, and setting up international cooperative projects and research programmes. In this way, the IIAS functions as a window on Europe for non-European scholars and contributes to the cultural rapprochement between Asia and Europe.

The IIAS administers the daily secretariat of the European Alliance for Asian Studies (Asia-Alliance: www.asia-alliance.org) as well as the Secretariat General of the International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS: www.icassecretariat.org). Regular updates on the Asia-Alliance and ICAS activities can be found in the *IIAS Newsletter*. <

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settled. Thus the accumulated debt over the last twelve years nearly equals GDP.

Compared to Southeast Asia, where Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) averages 15 per cent of GDP, or China where the figure varies from 20 to 30 per cent, Mongolia attracts FDI amounting to only 3-5 per cent of its GDP. Obviously, Mongolia must strive harder towards creating a more attractive investment climate. It has only been in the last two years that mining investors have expressed greater interest, due to the discovery of a seemingly world-class deposit of copper and gold (Oyu Tolgoi) in South Gobi. Despite ten years of efforts to build a favourable economic and investment climate, Mongolia is still failing to attract investors, both for eign and domestic. Current business taxation rates are prohibitively high and resemble those of developed Western countries, not those of developing transition countries.

WTO and trade tariffs

The wealthy countries controlling the international financial institutions have demanded that poor countries, including Mongolia, eliminate their trade barriers. This Mongolia did in 1997, shortly after joining the WTO. As Mongolia was remote, far away from markets, and highly dependent on imports – so the rationale went – there was no point in retaining import tariffs. Almost overnight, these tariffs were slashed from 15 to 0 per cent. With borders suddenly open and tariffs instantly non-existent, fledgling domestic industries were severely undercut. As a result many domestic manufacturers had to close shop. Given the weak social safety net, the unemployed rapidly fell into poverty.

For products Mongolia cannot produce, eliminating import tariffs makes sense. Meanwhile, those few industries, such as wool, leather, and some agricultural products (flower and milk and the like), in which Mongolia can compete with its neighbours, should be protected until they are strong enough to be competitive. So-called blanket protectionism deserves no praise, but one cannot expect infant domestic industries to compete with their more advanced counterparts in neighbouring China and Russia, let alone the rest of the world, if the government does not initially support them.

Many Western countries built up their economies by protecting key industries until they were strong enough to compete internationally. Even now, the developed and supposedly free-market West annually spends USD 350 billion on agricultural subsidies (by comparison, annual ODA to developing countries totals USD 50 billion). Ironically, the very countries that push developing countries to open up markets themselves maintain trade barriers and import quotas when it suits them.

Over the last decade small and medium-sized state enterprises have been privatized; the selling off of the larger firms is now under way. As a result the private sector today constitutes over 70 per cent of GDP. In total, 440 state owned enterprises were privatized, out of which 330 shareholding companies were created. Currently, no more than 1,500 individuals, representing 0.5 per cent of the population, own over 70 per cent of the shares of these 330 companies.

Despite certain notable achievements, many things have gone wrong with Mongolia's transition. Paralleling the experiences of other badly managed transitions from communism to a market economy, poverty in Mongolia has soared and inequality has increased. At present, 40 per cent of the population can be categorized as poor or very poor. It is time to start remedying these problems. Mongolia is at a crossroads: will its government come up with home-grown policies for economic development and introduce new, higher standards in the way it leads political, economic and social processes, or will it continue to slide on the path of imprudent policies and the weak rule of law? <

Ulan Bator 2001

Irina Morozova

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Note >

* The Gini coefficient is an indicator of inequality in income distribution with a scale ranging from 0 to 1: 0 means total equality of income, 1 signifies that one person owns everything. By comparison: Indonesia scores 0.35 on this scale, while the Netherlands comes in around 0.15.

Hating Americans: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Bali Bombings

Forum >
General

Late on the night of 12 October 2002, Ali Imron walked into the al-Khurobah mosque in Denpasar and performed a prayer of thanks. Shortly beforehand he had heard the massive bomb blast at the Sari Club and felt the ground shake beneath his feet. He had played a key role in assembling the bomb and knew that many people at the crowded club must have been killed or injured in the explosion. He would later say that he was 'pleased and proud that the device he had built had exploded horrifyingly with its blaze reaching into the sky' and that 'the bomb … was truly the great work of Indonesia's sons'.[1]

Courtesy of the Police of the Republic of Indonesia (POLRI)

By Greg Fealy

The attitude and motivation of Ali Imron and his fellow accused 'Bali bombers' deserves close attention, not only to enable scholars of Islam and terrorism to understand the specific dynamics of Southeast Asian extremism but also to provide governments with a basis for designing effective anti-terrorism policies. Most scholars of terrorism agree that context is critical to understanding extremist activity. Factors which drive terrorism in one time or place may not be present in other periods or locations. While much is now known about al-Qaeda's thinking, we should be wary of assuming that the Bali bombers were acting from precisely the same motivations.

The bomb at the Sari Club, along with a smaller preceding explosive at the nearby Paddy's Bar, killed 202 people and seriously injured another 350, making it the deadliest terrorist attack since 9/11. Most of those killed were Western tourists, including eighty-eight Australians, twenty-three Britons, nine Swedes and seven Americans. There is now sufficient material available from police testimony and media interviews to enable a preliminary analysis of the bombers' mindset. The evidence would suggest that an extreme hostility towards the West, and the US in particular, was a critical factor.

Within a month of the bombing, the joint Indonesian and foreign police investigation began arresting key suspects, almost all of whom were members of the clandestine Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) movement. JI is at the extreme fringe of the region's small radical Islam communities and is the only genuine transnational terrorist organization in Southeast Asia. Although most of its leadership and the majority of its operatives were Indonesian, it had active cells in at least four countries and had held planning meetings and training programmes across the region. There is strong evidence of JI involvement in terrorist attacks since 2000, including the 'Christmas Eve 2000' church bombings in Indonesia, which killed nineteen people, and the Metro Manila attacks of the same month, which left twenty-one dead. Jemaah Islamiyah was established by the Arab-Indonesian preacher, Abdullah Sungkar, in the mid-1990s but another Indonesian of Yemeni extraction, Abubakar Ba'asyir, took over leadership of the organization following Sungkar's death in 1999. Estimates of the organization's current membership vary from about 500 to several thousand. At the time of writing, Indonesian police have either charged or intend to charge at least thirty-three people in connection with the bombings.

Public attention has been focussed on four of the accused bombers: Amrozi, Ali Imron, Mukhlas, and Imam Samudra. The first three are brothers. Amrozi purchased the explosives and minivan into which the Sari Club bomb was placed. Ali Imron and Mukhlas were both veterans of the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s; the former helped to design and assemble the bombs and the latter, as JI's operational head, had oversight for the attack. Imam Samudra, another former mujahidin, was the JI field commander leading the bombing.

Anti-American hostility

Police interrogation and media interviews soon established that a deep animus towards the West, the United States in particular, was a primary motivating factor for the bombers. The US was seen as embodying the anti-Islamic struggle of the Christian- and Jewish-dominated Western world. When investigators asked Amrozi why he wanted to bomb the Sari Club he repeatedly told them he 'hated Americans'. Similarly, Imam Samudra made it clear that his main target was the US. He said: 'I hate America because it is the real centre of international terrorism, which has already repeatedly tyrannised Islam'. 'I carry out jihad', he declared, 'because it's the duty of a Muslim to avenge, so [that] the American terrorists and their allies understand that the blood of the Muslim community is not shed for nothing'. He went on to say that he had chosen the Sari Club and Paddy's Bar as targets because he knew they were 'often visited by Americans and even Mossad people'. Later, when informed that many of the victims were Australian tourists, Imam was said to be 'shocked' and 'quite regretful' because they were 'not the right target'. Mukhlas was quoted as saying: '[We wanted] to terrorise the government of America'.[2]

Arguably, the most complete public statement of the bombers' position appeared on the Istimata (Absolute Struggle) webpage, which Imam Samudra said 'sets out the essence of my struggle'.[3] It declared: 'Let it be acknowledged that every single drop of Muslim blood, be it from any nationality and from any place will be remembered and accounted for.' The site referred to thousands of Muslims who perished in Afghanistan, Sudan, Palestine, Bosnia, Kashmir, and Iraq, stating: 'The heinous crime and international conspiracy of the Christians also extends to the Philippines and Indonesia. This has resulted in Muslim cleansing in Moro [southern Philippines], Ambon, Poso and surrounding areas. It is clearly evident the crusade is continuing and will not stop...Every blow will be repaid. Blood will be redeemed by blood. A life for a life. One Muslim to another is like a single body. If one part is in pain, the other part will also feel it'.

It continued: 'To all you Christian unbelievers, if you define this act [i.e., the Bali bombings] on your civilians as heinous and cruel, you yourself have committed crimes which are more heinous. The cries of the babies and Muslim women ...has [sic] never succeeded in stopping your brutality. Well, here we are the Muslim men! We will harness the pain of the death of our brothers and sisters. You will bear the consequences of your actions wherever you are.' It concludes by saying: 'We are responsible for the incident in Legian, Kuta, Bali.'

The sense of avenging past brutality towards Muslims, of smiting the infidel hegemon, is common to many of the accused bombers' explanations. The Istimata declaration and testimony from police interviews suggest that the bombers saw themselves as fighting a heroic war against evil. The Christian (and Jewish) West is vilified and dehumanized and the bombers portray themselves as high-minded warriors acting according to the demands of their faith. Indeed, many JI members have stated that they are engaged in a holy struggle and are happy to die as martyrs for the cause. Imam Samudra, for example, told a journalist: 'I have

not done anything barbaric that is prohibited by God. The precise path I have taken is God's path. Have faith that the soldiers of Muhammad will win. However, that victory will certainly have victims. Be certain that I am on the road of *istiqomah* (sincerity), the road of *jihad*. Even if I die, I'll die a martyr. I await the enemy's bullet or spear piercing my breast so that I die a martyr.'[4]

Numerous scholars of the psychology of terrorism have observed that religion can impart a powerful sense of mission and purpose, which is often an important aspect of the terrorist mindset. Juergensmeyer, in his insightful study of religiously motivated terrorism, concluded that many terrorists see themselves as involved in a conflict of cosmic proportions, something that transcends ordinary human experience. Images of divine struggle between good and evil are frequently found in terrorist rhetoric. This phenomenon is not unique to Muslim extremists and can be found among violent militants of all faiths.[5]

Ba'asyir's dualism

A good example of this dichotomized, absolutist view of the world is the preaching of JI's *amir* (commander), Abubakar Ba'asyir. He told his followers that: 'Allah has divided humanity into two segments, namely the followers of Allah and those who follow Satan. God's group [Hizbullah], and Satan's group. For Hizbullah, one must be prepared to forfeit one's life for the Shariah (Islamic law). [Hizbullah] do not embrace non-believers and would rather free themselves of life than be lost in the world of non-believers. We [i.e., Hizbullah] would rather die than follow that which you [infidels] worship. We reject all your beliefs and all your teachings. Between you and us there will forever be a ravine of hate and we will be enemies until you follow Allah's law.' He spoke of non-believers as posing an inherent threat to Islam. 'There is no non-believer who allows the development of Islam, who will allow Islam to be free; non-believers must work hard to threaten Islam and the laws thereof. Non-believers will expend large sums to destroy Islam. This is the character of non-believers.' He told his followers that *jihad* against non-believers was 'the highest form of struggle. To win in eternal terms and to lose one's life is holy. This is the character of Hizbullah.'[6]

Although Ba'asyir's sermon does not explicitly enjoin violence, it clearly conveys a sense of monumental spiritual confrontation, of a simplified 'good versus evil' and 'us versus them' world, that may attract alienated and angry young Muslims to terrorism. Moreover, the satanization of non-Muslims and concomitant endorsement of martyrdom in the Islamic cause offer a potent sanction to those seeking to justify the use of extreme violence.

Empowerment through terrorism

Most of the bombers appear to have found their involvement in the Sari Club attack empowering and exhilarating. Both Amrozi and Ali Imron, for example, were boastful that they, as poor village boys, could have struck such a blow against powerful Western nations. The more ideologically driven Imam Samudra and Mukhlas viewed the bombing in a broader setting of global Islam fighting back against its oppressors. All had a strong sense of Islam under siege from 'mortal enemies' such as the United States and regarded terrorism as the best, if not the only, way of protecting the faith.

Events subsequent to the Bali bombings suggest that many JI members remain committed to pursuing their goals through terrorism. When asked by reporters for his reaction to the US-led Iraq war, Amrozi replied: 'It goes to show that I was not wrong to bomb [the Bali nightclubs]'. Imam Samudra responded to the same question by calling the United States a 'monster' which 'will inevitably soon be destroyed' and urged Saddam Hussein to be 'patient'.[7] Western and Indonesian intelligence agencies reportedly have credible evidence of continuing JI planning for future terrorist attacks.

Southeast Asian terrorist groups are probably the least studied of any in the Islamic world. The approaching trials of the accused bombers will no doubt reveal new material about their thinking and hopefully the perpetrators will be subjected to intensive psychological examination in order to gain a more complete picture of their motivations and outlook. Disentangling international factors from local elements would seem a particular priority of this research. While it is clear that the ideology and rhetoric of al-Qaeda and other international terrorist groups has had a powerful influence on Southeast Asian extremists, the work of analysts such as Sidney Jones indicate that several factors peculiar to the region have greatly shaped the dynamics of JI. These include the historical, familial, and intellectual links with Indonesia's Darul Islam rebellion of the 1940s and 1950s, as well as the role that the Suharto regime's intelligence services played in manipulating and harshly repressing militant Islamist groups. [8]

A good deal of the existing literature on JI relies heavily upon intelligence reports and briefings. A prominent example of this is the work of Rohan Gunaratna. His much-cited book, *Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (Columbia University Press, 2002), and his many press articles offer useful material on the operations of JI and other groups but pay scant attention to local factors. While JI is part of a global terrorist phenomenon, it also has region-specific traits that are important to comprehending its aims and activities. Southeast Asia is home to more than 200 million Muslims, of whom only a small fraction is inclined towards violent Islamist struggle. Without a solid understanding of the local context, scholars will have trouble identifying factors that push non-violent radicals to become terrorists. We need only consider the 'confessions' of the Bali bombers to appreciate the satisfaction which terrorism afforded at least some of JI's members. <

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
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Mega-Urbanization in Asia

PhotoDisc

Ecumenopolis in Asia

Picture a grid connecting existing urban centres, avoiding the areas that are considered uninhabitable due to altitude, lack of water, extreme climatic conditions, and some other factors. In his effort to map the future of the city and urbanization, the famous Greek urbanist C.A. Doxiadis, who published the journal *Ekistics*, projected this world city and called it Ecumenopolis (Doxiadis 1972). Then and now many feel horrified by the thought of a completely integrated settlement structure covering the earth's crust with tentacles on all continents. This article introduces this issue's theme 'Mega-Urbanization in Asia'.

Introduction >
General

By Peter J.M. Nas (theme editor)

I t is estimated that in 2000 about 50 per cent of the world population was living in cities and that this percentage is constantly increasing. This figure applies not only to almost completely urbanized Western countries, where even farming is completely mechanized, industrialized, and market-driven, but also to Latin America and particularly to Asia and Africa. Their levels of urbanization may yet be substantially lower but these regions nowadays contain the world's largest cities, the magnitude of which completely ridicules earlier scientific debates on the optimum size of cities. Notwithstanding the great difficulties that can be envisaged in creating a sustainable Ecumenopolis that honours human needs

Railway used as a street in Pekojan neighbourhood, Jakarta.

Peter J.M. Nas, 2001

while respecting environmental capacity, I am convinced that this Ecumenopolis is positive in principle. The city figures prominently among great human inventions, such as the use of fire, the invention of the wheel, and the use of steam and electric energy in industry. Generally speaking, by means of high levels of population density cities create opportunities for increased human cooperation and specialization, potentially leading to high levels of production, diversity of life styles and subcultures, and openness to innovation, intercultural contact, and interethnic relations. So, whether we like it or not, less than half a century from now the Ecumenopolis will have become reality. The present airline, telephone, fax, and email network that connects all the centres, is nowadays conceived to consist of mega-urban areas of different levels, but should rather be appreciated as Ecumenopolis. The emerging Ecumenopolis and related forms of region-based urbanization with highly discontinuous patterns of land use cannot be explained by means of traditional concepts using, for example, an urban-rural dichotomy or delineating a continuum from village, via town, to city.

Variety of mega-urban growth

In their work on Southeast Asia, I. Robinson and T.G. McGee state that mega-cities are rapidly expanding beyond their boundaries. 'Metropolitan growth tends to sprawl along major expressways and railroad lines radiating out from the urban cores, and leapfrogs in all directions, putting down new towns and industrial estates. Regions of dense population and mixed land use are created, in which traditional agriculture is found side by side with modern factories, commercial activities, and suburban development.' (McGee and Robinson 1995: ix).

The concept of the extended metropolitan region or *desakota* zones (Bahasa Indonesia for village-town zones) has been coined for this amoebae-like spatial form of region-based urbanization, which seems diametrically opposed to the city-based urbanization to which we are accustomed. According to McGee, these urban regions have several components such as the city-core, the metropolitan area, and the extended metropolitan area, the latter constituting a patched area with mixed agricultural and non-agricultural activities. Pertinently, mega-urban regions may follow divergent patterns of spatial growth. The growth triangle of Singapore is an example of the expanding state model, also involving part of Malaysian Johor and Indonesian Riau. Surabaya is a case in point following the extended metropolitan region model, whereas Jakarta and Manila are examples of high-density extended metropolitan regions.

In this special issue we provide a wide-ranging picture of the tremendous and highly varied impacts of present-day Asian mega-urban growth and transformation, by highlighting a substantial number of cases (namely Tokyo, Beijing, Nanjing, Kunming, Hanoi, Manila, Singapore, Jakarta, Surabaya, Phnom Penh, Delhi, and Tehran) and specific aspects of the urban development process. Some of them describe the spatial development and related planning efforts, for instance those in accordance with the expanding state model in Singapore or the extended metropolitan region model in Surabaya. Others focus on the dynamics of modernization, for example the role of the ICT sector in Nanjing's urban economic development, or the transformation of the retail sector from the open, traditional marketplace to the modern, air-conditioned shopping mall in Jakarta and Kunming. Specific urban problems such as regular flooding in Manila, living and housing conditions of the poor in Delhi, and the change from a socialist to capitalist urban planning in Hanoi, are also important for the understanding of mega-urban transformations in Asia. Asian mega-urbanization as a component of the world informational society entails completely new morphological contexts for living, and fundamental changes in lifestyle, consumption behaviour and production conditions.

Region-based mega-urbanization has to be understood within a broader global and Asian context characterized by the emergence of new forms of international division of labour, global and regional competition, international networks, and development corridors, based on the spillover of development incentives from one mega-urban region into another.

These developments in urbanization are often exclusively described in terms of overwhelming and almost insoluble problems, pointing at excessive population density, deficient infrastructure, traffic congestion, poor housing and living conditions, and so on. These distorted images of immensity, unsustainability, parasitism, extreme poverty, and poor quality of life do not generate adequate and realistic perspectives. Without negating or underrating mega-urban problems the full-fledged urbanization of Asia and the world is quite near and will offer tremendous opportunities for the development of humankind. ‹

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The Declining Capital

From its origins as a small castle town until the end of the Edo era, Tokyo's urbanization followed an orthogenetic process. In the mid-seventeenth century Tokyo's population numbered one million, in a league with London and Paris. By the eve of the Meiji Restoration in 1868 Tokyo resembled a huge urban village. Twice destroyed in the twentieth century – by earthquake in 1923 and aerial bombardment in 1945 – Tokyo emerged as a speculator and builders' paradise, a true global city, in the 1980s. Today Tokyo proper counts over 12 million inhabitants while one-fourth of the Japanese population lives in the greater metropolitan area. The mega-city, warns the author, is awaiting another catastrophe.

By Shuji Funo

The politically powerful construction industry was one of the motors of rapid post-war economic growth. Relying heavily on the 'scrap and build' method, concrete and steel transformed the Japanese landscape. In the late 1960s, construction accounted for over 20 per cent of GDP. High growth gave way to a period of stable but lower growth in the wake of the 1973 energy crisis; heavy industries lost ground to light industries based on advanced science and technology. The focus of urban development shifted from outward expansion to the full development of already urbanized areas. Money generated by the speculative bubble of the 1980s transformed Tokyo into a global city, wired to the dynamic movements of the world capitalist economy.

The postmodern city: Tokyo at its zenith

The urban issues Tokyo faced in the mid-1980s were quite different from those it had faced in the past. The city had reached its limits for horizontal expansion. The 'Tokyo Problem' and 'Tokyo Reform' became pressing issues for debate: scholars and critics discussed the negative effects of Tokyo's political, economic, and cultural dominance, as well as possibilities for relocating the Japanese capital.

In the 1980s Tokyo's status as one of the world's financial centres attracted an unprecedented influx of foreign businessmen and workers. The resulting demand for centrally located office space and 24-hour facilities sparked a speculative building rush that dramatically transformed the cityscape. Western architects with postmodern designs were invited to give Tokyo a fashionable facelift, befitting its status as a global city.

Tokyo's bullit train's punctuality allows for commuters to set their personal alarms to the scheduled arrival times.

Further urban development necessitated the search for new frontiers. The first frontier was unused public land in the city centre. Investors snapped up properties in the city centre, while large real estate companies launched re-development projects. Many of these destroyed the fabric of existing central city communities. The second frontier was the sky: Tokyo still had more space in the air than New York. The Manhattan Project, revived after a long hiatus, is currently renewing the central business district around Tokyo Station. The third frontier was under the ground, the so-called geo front. A project to create an underground city of 500,000 inhabitants was seriously proposed. The fourth and final frontier was the Tokyo waterfront, hitherto the home to dockyards and factories. Under the title 'Urban frontier', the World City Exposition Tokyo '96 directed expansion towards Tokyo Bay.

New technologies, production systems, and building materials shaped Tokyo's urban transformation. Since the 1960s air-sealing aluminium sashes have become *de rigueur*, meaning that all dwelling units are now air-conditioned. So-called intelligent office buildings came into fashion in the 1980s.

Domed, climate-controlled stadiums allow football games to be played in the midst of storms. The daily lives of Tokyo's citizens have become completely divorced from nature; most space in Tokyo is artificially, i.e. computer, controlled. Electronic conglomerates enjoying symbiotic relations with government are prominent players in this development process. So are the large construction companies, still wielding considerable political power. Tokyo is a temporary metropolis that is constantly changing: in this repeated process of scrap and build, the city is losing its historical memory.

'The 2003 Problem'

Nobody controls a global city like Tokyo; nobody knows who is behind the constant change. Something invisible, which we might call the World Capitalist System, guides the transformation of the Japanese capital.

With the glory days of the bubble economy long gone and Tokyo suffering from economic stagnation and post-bubble debt, a curious phenomenon can be observed. Along the Tokyo waterfront many new office buildings and flats are under construction. The number of high-rise flats newly built in 2002 is said to be unprecedented. Now as before, this construction is driven by the speculative activities of real estate agents and investors. While rumour of 'The 2003 Problem' is spreading – companies will move to the waterfront leaving old inner city office buildings unoccupied – predictable oversupply is the result of individual realtors and developers pursuing their own short-term interests, even as they know they will later suffer.

Central government has tried to influence the fluctuating annual number of dwelling units built by reforming tax incentives. Its current key phrases are 'restructuring' and 'urban rebirth'. What is actually happening, however, is the hollowing out of the inner city. Ishihara Shintaro, governor of Tokyo Metropolitan Municipality, has declared 16 policy goals, the first of which is to 'create an urban city that facilitates a balance of jobs and residences'. It consists of two strategies: 'Promotion of inner city residence' and 'fundamental reform of the metropolitan housing system'. The former includes bringing workplaces and residential areas together in the suburban Tama area. The results have thus far been disappointing: the only change for most people has been their place of work. The remaining hope is that old inner city office buildings will be converted into homes.

The central government has established a special board called 'Urban Rebirth' and has opted to deregulate building codes and urban planning laws to stimulate building activity. Local governments can now rezone areas and make decisions on the restructuring of districts. Most local governments, however, are suffering from financial pressures and lack funds to realize new projects. And while policymakers believe promoting building activity through deregulation is the only way to economic recovery, the idea seems far-fetched.

Tokyo has its natural limits; the city cannot grow indefinitely. Obviously, the city needs powerful leadership and the participation of citizens to implement new ideas. Unfortunately, while formal procedures for citizen involvement have been proposed, they do not function effectively: people seem reluctant to participate when their private circumstances are not affected. Without citizen input, 'The 2003 Problem' seems here to stay. Though blackouts and drought already threaten the metropolitan area each summer, the current system of the production and consumption of spaces, however, is controlled by the profit motive, not social or ecological responsibility. Tokyo, on its current course, is awaiting catastrophe. <

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The rush of building activities on the Tokyo waterfront, 2003

Courtesy of Shuji Funo

The Sky is the Limit

The Economic Globalization of Beijing

Since opting for reform in the late 1970s, China has opened its doors to the opportunities and vicissitudes of the world economy. Opening up to foreign capital and technology impacted heavily on the development trajectories of China's cities, which in the last decades of the twentieth century grew at an unprecedented rate. In the 1990s Beijing's population increased from 10.8 to 13.6 million, its urban area from 395 to 490 square kilometres. Concurrently the city's economic base shifted from manufacturing to services, spawning a new division of labour and transformations in the use of urban space.

By Huang Shizheng

Following the creation of special economic zones along the coast, the Pudong area of Shanghai was declared open for development in April 1990, the first such area within the limits of a large city. This opening-up ran counter to the hitherto dominant planning imperative of limited urban growth. Since then, China's large cities have grown to compete with Singapore and Hong Kong as 'regional central cities' in the world urban hierarchy. Responding to the new opportunities, city governments revised their mid-term strategic plans. Beijing in its 1993 master plan announced its intentions of becoming 'a modern international city': planners unveiled visions of a metropolis with world-class infrastructure and important financial and economic functions in the Asia-Pacific region.

Industry to services

There were no modern industries in the court city of Beijing before 1949. By the end of the 1970s, large-scale industrial development had transformed Beijing into the centre of northern Chinese heavy industry and the country's leading economic centre. With the onset of market forces in the era of reform, the traditional sectors of the state-owned economy, especially manufacturing, fell into decay. In the 1990s, around 620,000 Beijing residents lost their jobs in the manufacturing sector.

The tertiary sector was the main beneficiary of the changing economy: its contribution to GDP in the Beijing urban area (excluding counties) reached 59.6 per cent in 2000. While Beijing's economic growth lagged behind Shanghai and Tianjin, sectoral shifts in the economy were more pronounced in the capital than in the coastal cities. During the period 1990-2000, the service sector – including social services, scientific research and technical services, real estate, banking, and insurance – spawned 500,000 new employment opportunities.

Contemporary Beijing developed on the foundations of the ancient city of the Ming-Qing Dynasty. Since 1949, the urban area has expanded around the old city following the 'ring upon ring' (concentric zones) model. Prior to the 1980s, the institute and college districts made up the north-western suburbs while the industrial areas comprised the south-eastern suburbs. Commercial institutions were mostly located in the old city. While a Central Business District as such did not exist, three historically important retail centres and a number of lesser ones became the nodal points for a growing network of roads around the Forbidden City. In the 1980s, new retail and business districts were built along the third ring road.

Top-down transformation

In the late 1980s Beijing launched a large-scale urban renewal programme extending to the outer suburbs. The business sector was the key beneficiary of this process. While new housing estates were built, poorer residents were forced to relocate to the suburbs. Retail, business and financial centres sprung up in concentric zones of the city. By the end of the 1980s, a wooded green belt and ten newly built regions along a planned fifth ring road encircled the central city.

In the 1990s, the newly constructed urban pattern was composed of the traditional central area, transformed into a service area; four sub-centres (the CBD, Zongguancun Core, Olympic Park, and Financial Zone); and two industrial belts (see diagram). Of the two industrial belts, one is a high technology belt along the fifth ring road, the other a modern manufacturing belt along the sixth. Manufacturing moved to the 'satellites' and now forms a new belt surrounding the central city. Zongguancun Science Park, China's 'silicon valley', expanded into 'one zone of five parks' surrounding the central city. In the outer-suburbs, nine development areas, including the seven square kilometre Beijing Economic Technology Development Zone, were set up along the sixth ring road in 2000.

Beijing's far-reaching spatial transformations are the result of government policies emanating from both the municipality and district or county levels of the administrative hierarchy. As the planned urban transformations mainly aimed to accommodate economic development and modernization, they gave rise to additional grave spatial adjustments elsewhere. The recession in the traditional manufacturing sector brought about rising unemployment and poverty. As manufacturing dwindled in the city centre, it relocated to the suburbs. As new sub-centres grew up on the outskirts of the city core, the urban area swelled, following the 'ring upon ring' model. Meanwhile in the old city, urban renewal efforts often impede or annul preservation efforts as economic concerns prevail over socio-cultural and historical ones. ‹

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Legend

● 1990's building subcenter	● 1990's building second-order RD or BD	○ CRD	● Satellite town
◉ Planning subcenter	◈ Planning Second-order RD or BD	● Development area	▢ The Forbidden city and Zhongnan hai

Figure: The structure of urban area in Beijing central city and suburbs in 1990's

Map by Mrs Yizhuo Xiao

Beijing: the city centre and its suburbs in the 1990s

From Muslim Street to Brilliant Plaza

Constructions of Urban Space in Kunming

China is in transition. During the past two decades a new urban landscape came into existence, which seems to have severe consequences on the character and function of public space. This article throws light on the Chinese city as a transitional object, presenting a short case study on the way processes of modernization and globalization affect the public domain of Kunming.

By Leeke Reinders

Throughout the past two decades, a remarkable process of urbanization has been taking place in parts of China, where regional centres are developing into global junctions. With the substantial scale and pace of these developments the local importance of these centres has become completely overshadowed by the repercussions of their new international orientation. Numerous animal metaphors are used to interpret current urban developments in China and other parts of the Pacific Rim. Analogies with dragons (the Chinese dragon), tigers (the four fast-growing Asian economies), and frogs (mega-urban sprawl development), somehow suggest the astonishment of the Western observer, who mainly sees the growth of Asian cities as a spontaneous and unbridled natural organic process. Indeed, many want us to believe that a whole new urban landscape of mega-cities and conurbations is taking shape, surpassing existing definitions of city and urbanity.

The recent urbanization of China is a continuing process, rapid and arbitrary, initiated and controlled by the Chinese state. For a long period the Communist Party actively slowed down the growth of cities, as the city was considered a threat to the sovereignty of the state for geo-political and military reasons. In 1978, however, a series of economic reforms were formulated, including the selection of four Special Economic Zones and, at a later stage, several 'open cities', 'open economic regions', and 'special economic and technological zones'. A phased transition from a socialist to a liberal economy was set in motion, drastically affecting the Chinese urban landscapes. Three interrelated processes of urbanization, modernization, and globalization, namely, a relentless urban population growth of 200 million people, the construction of 450 new cities, and rapidly growing flows of people, capital, ideas, and artefacts, had marked repercussions on the public space in Chinese cities in various ways.

Kunming, located on a plateau 1,920 metres above sea level, is a city of 3.5 million inhabitants in south-west China, near the border with Laos, Burma, and Vietnam. The city has a long history of intercultural encounters and confrontations. The city had been threatened by the armies of the Tang dynasty, was rebuilt by the Mongolian prince Kubilai, and was taken over by the Ming dynasty during the fourteenth century, and by the sultan of Dali in the nineteenth century. The French, who took control over Indochina, tried to capitalize on the copper, tin, and lumber resources in the region. The city also functioned as a gateway to the Silk Route. Since the Second World War, when the allied forces installed a base at Kunming, the city grew in size. Many industries were launched in and around the city, and it became home to a stream of immigrants fleeing from the Japanese. Today the city is marketed as a passageway for tourists, a 'city of eternal spring', set in clear blue skies, and the pristine natural scenery of parks and lakes.

Over the past few years, however, the most drastic changes have appeared. The city is in transition from communism to a 'New Era', as a recently realized hotel in Kunming is named.

1 Public space in a side street off of Zhengy Lu, Kunming.

An illuminating case in point is the area around Zhengy Lu, an amalgam of contrasting public places in the centre of the city. The side street, leading to the main square and roundabout (photo 1) is part of a Muslim district lined by two-storey shophouses on both sides. The upper floors are used as living space; the ground floors as a commercial area. A walk through these kinds of streets is a rich social, visual, and sensual experience: clouds of smoke escape from the drainage systems and sizzling frying pans fill the air with smells. There is a fluent transition between the inside and outside area of the shophouse. Outside space is used for the display and storage of eatables, and the preparation of meals. These meals and drinks can be had inside the shops and in part of their outer area. Multifunctional, hot and steamy; it is streets like these that satisfy notions of a 'typical', lively Asiatic urban realm.

2 Promenade in the shopping district on Zhengy Lu, Kunming

When you turn the corner a totally different world appears (see photo 2). Over the last ten years the state has initiated the construction of a whole new city centre, consisting of shopping malls, warehouses, luxury apartment buildings, offices, banks, hotels, billboards, and fast-food chains. These physical elements are designed on the basis of what might be called a Chinese version of modernistic architecture, comprising facades of blue plate glass, white-tiled exteriors, triangular-shaped mirrored buildings, and complexes topped with pagoda replicas. The roof of Brilliant Plaza, which is illuminated by fluorescent lights in the evening, resembles a nineteenth-century European passage. Widened and heightened roads and sidewalks paved with large marbleized panels traverse this area. In Kunming a new retail trend has been set in motion. Whole new shopping neighbourhoods have been created, including a Wal-Mart and a Price Smart, a members-only shopping mall. A new shopping mall, which will accommodate different European and American 'flavour zones', meant to guide the future tastes of new Chinese urbanites, is under construction in central Zhengyi Lu.

Notably, these drastic physical transformations bring about relatively small social changes. Young girls stroll along the wide boulevard on platform shoes, mobile phones within reach and young crowds hang out around Kentucky Fried Chicken, where fifteen servers welcome the guests. For most of the day, however, the employees in the shopping arcades outnumber the customers. The modern city is a state-sponsored project, in which few are able to participate. Amidst the changed material and symbolic decor, young Chinese are giving shape to their version of a Western-style metropolis. Inside the glass-panelled entrance of Brilliant Plaza a man pauses to expel his saliva into a gleaming new litter basket: a cultural habit adapted to new circumstances. <

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Zhujiang Electronic Road, Nanjing, China

In recent years China's main cities have developed 'electronic roads': places where computer related shops, workshops, and information technology (IT) offices are concentrated. The most famous of these are located in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. That Nanjing also ranks among the top IT cities in China is less well known. What is behind Nanjing's electronic road and how successfully does it compete with its rivals? Are electronic roads becoming dynamic drivers of urban development in China? Is innovation, an important source of urban economic dynamism, taking place in Nanjing's cluster of IT activity?

By Meine Pieter van Dijk

Nanjing, with roughly 5.3 million inhabitants, is the capital city of Jiangsu province and an important business centre in eastern China. Nanjing's per capita income was USD 1,998 in 1999, compared to the national average of USD 840 (World Development Report 2002). The city is home to several famous television manufacturers: Nanjing Huafei, Suzhou Philips Electronics, and Nanjing Panda Electronics Group. Jiangsu province provides a favourable environment for IT activities; the manufacturing of electronics is booming. Jiangsu exported 1.25 million TV sets worth USD 115 million in 2000, 135 per cent more than in 1999. This growth is attributed to three factors: technological innovation, research of world markets, and investment from overseas.

In 1989 Nanjing municipality decided to construct an electronic road in the city centre. Upon gaining greater autonomy in 1992, the municipal government began to implement economic policies favourable to small and medium-sized enterprises. In due course over 1,000 IT and IT-related enterprises found an address on Zhujiang Road and its adjacent streets. Local government encouraged this concentration by building and reserving 'enterprise buildings' for IT companies and related service providers such as accountants, cleaners, and security guards.

The total industrial product of the firms clustered along Zhujiang Electronic Road was a modest USD 321 million in 1998, comprising just over 3 per cent of Nanjing's total product of USD 10.6 billion. This figure, and the contribution of IT companies to Nanjing's economy, grew by 40 per cent in 1999 (Nanjing Science Committee, 1999). With active support from different levels of government – including the establishment of technology industry zones around the city – the upward trend seems set to continue.

The nature of the firms clustered on Zhujiang Road is mixed. One can find regular sellers of specific software and hardware, specialized firms providing hospital information systems and software for systems integration, companies repairing monitors and computer systems. Due to the promotional efforts of municipal and district governments, about two-thirds of the enterprises are private; some are collective firms and 6 per cent are state owned. One out of every twenty is a joint venture, most commonly between a government-owned enterprise and a foreign partner supplying hard or software. There are also foreign joint ventures such as the one between Philips and a Korean firm producing TV screens. Many entrepreneurs along Zhujiang Road are ambi-

The Government Plans, the People Act

Changing lifestyles and increased needs have led to remarkable urban changes in Hanoi. The Doi Moi reformation, changing a socialist system to a market-oriented one, led to social stratification, to thinking in prestige terms, and towards social segregation in the city. As land developers and construction companies have success at changing people's lifestyles, housing has increasingly become a status symbol. Politics of equality, as reflected in the old cityscape, has clearly had its day.

By Harald Leisch

Urban planning, or the shaping of the city, is not a transparent process in Hanoi. Not even the planners themselves seem to know what is going on and changes in the city are often far from what the authorities planned. Although most higher government officials are graduates of foreign universities or have attended training courses abroad, their ideas for urban development seem very limited. Most of them seem stuck in the old system, which intended to provide equal and simple housing for all and was conservative rather than innovative. Other constraints are that '[...] urban planning and development in Vietnam is still at the stage of trial-and-error', as the director of the National Institute of Urban and Rural Planning puts it (Chinh 2001: 9), and that government's wishes differ remarkably from the realistic starting points. Some examples serve to illustrate this.

Land speculation and urban housing

All land in Vietnam belongs to the state. However, it can be allocated to organizations, households, or individuals. The revised Land Law of 1998 grants land users five rights: of conversion, transfer, inheritance, mortgage, and lease. Although at present the system of land registration is still not complete with about 85 per cent of the country's urban households lacking some or all required legal documents, land speculation is very high in urban areas. Between 1995 and 2001, land prices tripled in some districts of Hanoi, with a market price five to seven times the regulated price in the centre and about three times that price in the urban fringes (Toan 2001: 83).

Local individuals and investors are not the only ones active in land speculation. The Chinese-led Ciputra-Group from Indonesia, for example, already cheaply acquired about 360 ha of land close to the West Lake, one of the most attractive residential areas, many years ago and could later reap high profits from selling developed land and houses. As the Hanoi People's Committee was less patient, the Ciputra-Group has been forced to develop at least 200 ha before the year 2006, and to finish the project by 2010. State-owned construction companies like Vinaconex and the Hanoi Construction Corporation, both belonging to the Ministry of Construc-

tion, develop their own plans for big projects in Hanoi.

Arguably, the private sector is most important in housing development. As private land tenure, construction, and investment was made possible in the Doi Moi era, individuals and real estate developers exploited their opportunities more rapidly than for any administration to be able to follow or control. Already in the late 1980s, more than half of new housing was in the private sector. Collective housing units are being replaced by private houses, which allow a higher quality of life and change the monotonous architectural style (photo 1). 'On the other hand', Luan and Vinh (2001, p.63) state, 'newly built houses along main traffic lines, though modern and diversified, look like "vertical tube-houses" or "pole-like houses" as these houses are commonly built on a 50–60 square metres or even 20–30 square metres land area and hold four or five stories (photo 2). Their facades, normally three or four metres wide, are a mélange of different architectural styles which break up the city's architectural space and planning and reflect the social and physical disorder in the current transformation of Ha Noi.'

Housing development is outpacing

1 Public housing complexes from the socialist times often provide limited space.

2 Private housing offers convenient but expensive living conditions.

Both photos by Harald Leisch, 2003

the city's infrastructure. In many private developments roads have not been built, and drainage and other basic services are inadequate (Forbes and Ke 1996: 91f.). Most private constructors care little about the master plan or other regulations. Experts estimate that 80 per cent of all private construction in Hanoi is illegal. So far, the government has remained aloof, since it was evident that the government could neither provide the necessary houses nor effectively curtail illegal construction. However, the housing problems of the poor remain unsolved. They cannot afford to build their own houses and prohibitively high rents render rental houses affordable only for foreigners.

Planning vs market forces

Urban planners have clearly been overtaken by the dynamic development that started with Doi Moi and is characterized by a growing significance of market forces. 'Moving away from a socio-economic management system that was actually based on the principle of "equal distribution of poverty", associated with the taboos and prejudices against wealth which lead to wealth concealment, people are now striving toward new "values" characterized by mottos of "self-help first", "getting rich by legitimate means", "prosperous people and a strong country"' (Luan and Vinh 2001: 27).

Meanwhile, private individuals and investors, both local and foreign, are thrusting a modern (housing) lifestyle upon the population. As the influence of the middle class burgeons at the expense of the old bureaucratic state class '...different social impacts have brought about a "transitional" urban life style in which a chaotic mixture of norms and values of urban social-cultural life have been imported and spread' (Luan and Vinh 2001: 25).

Ideas for urban development, mostly from foreign consultants, are few and far between and lead to ubiquitous confusion. Social demands and market forces are stronger than planning policies. In fact, Hanoi is not developed by urban planners. Instead, the authorities mainly administer urban development, adjusting their plans according to whatever changes occur. Individuals, real estate developers, and even state-owned construction companies, whose work is now fully market-oriented, seem to be the real directors of urban change. They became active immediately after the introduction of Doi Moi, while the authorities were still thinking about how to become active. ‹

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tious young men, eager to copy ideas and software to develop and expand their businesses. With two Chinese students I interviewed about fifty such entrepreneurs.

Through our interviews we learned that entrepreneurs in Nanjing complain of the lack or very limited existence of relations with universities and research institutes. This was thought to hamper innovation. Many successful IT companies dream of floating shares in the stock market, but this is not easy. Entrepreneurs complain of petty corruption, such as the obligation to wine and dine officials. While taxes are low, they perceive the complex tax system to be a constraint on further development.

On the positive side, accountancy services offer advice on tax issues and help entrepreneurs with their paperwork. Local government may also help enterprises to gain access to bank loans. Municipal and district authorities play an important role in developing Nanjing's IT industry. According to the interviewees, the advantages of this inner city cluster include mutual proximity, easy exchange of ideas, ample choice for customers, positive local government policies, and supporting services in the business buildings.

Nation-wide competitiveness

Central government's aim to develop Chinese IT translates locally and regionally into severe competition between dynamic IT clusters and centres across China. Many entrepreneurs stated that Nanjing's network of enterprises lacks competitiveness compared to similar clusters in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. Underlying problems include attracting gifted personnel with current wages; potential employees consider Beijing, Shanghai, or Shenzhen more attractive. And while many companies feel the need to develop marketing strategies, many are unable to do so: owners tend to be technicians with limited skills in marketing and management. Relations with supporting institutions in the city – universities and research institutes – are another prob-

lem. There is a trend to involve them in research and to ask universities to supply employees; IT firms, however, later keep research institutes at arms-length. Local government, additionally, does little to bridge relations between the IT sector and research institutes (their business culture and organization vary greatly) in a systematic way. In short, Nanjing's lack of competitiveness at the regional, city, cluster, and enterprise levels are interrelated and the general lack of competitiveness at the regional and city levels can only partially be compensated for by the advantages provided by the Zhujiang Road IT cluster.

Almost every Chinese city and region aims to build up an IT centre. Some provincial or local governments provide substantial benefits to investors. The national government and those of the western provinces are actively promoting investment in western China. Zhujiang Road notwithstanding, new start-ups are easily lured by incentives provided elsewhere in the country.

The development of the IT sector is a nation-wide phenomenon. China desires information technology and considers foreign direct investment – with the attendant capital, technology, and modern management methods – the best way to obtain it. The logic is to conquer markets abroad and to assure economic growth at home.

Merciless competition at various levels notwithstanding, the IT sector is an important contributor to Nanjing's development. The city's IT sector, however, is currently not very innovative. Although the impact is still limited, the indirect effects of a booming IT sector on Nanjing's economy may be substantial in the near future. ‹

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Chicks and Chicken: Singapore's Expansion to Riau

The city-state Singapore has spilled over into its two neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore discovered in the Indonesian Riau Archipelago resources that are rarely found near the centre of mega-cities: cheap land and cheap labour. To what extent Singapore's presence offers reciprocal benefits to Riau is the question. For example, Singapore has not only moved the production of poultry for all Kentucky Fried Chicken outlets of the region to Riau, but also prostitution. This article will explore the consequences of Singapore's expansion for Riau.

By Freek Colombijn

Since the British founded Singapore in 1819 the city has been a transportation hub and communication centre. After Independence (1965), export-led industrialization and a high-technology service industry have diversified the economy. The ever-expanding economy and growing population (2.7 million people in 1990) of the limited island territory (roughly 600 square km) have demanded innovative measures. Land reclamation (taken up since the 1960s) and the construction of high-rise housing and skyscraper offices could reduce the pressure on land for only a limited amount of time.

Mega-urban development in the city-state took a decisive turn with the concept of the Singapore-Johor-Riau (SIJORI) Growth Triangle. Singaporean Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew launched this concept in 1989 at a time when the industrial development within the boundaries of the city-state reached its saturation point and when

A jet boat connecting Singapore with Batam

costs of land and labour were rising sharply. The basic idea was that the three regions pool their human and natural resources in order to attract new investors. Each corner of the triangle would put in its respective comparative advantage: Singapore its capital, technical skills, and management; the Malaysian state of Johor its land and semi-skilled labour; and the Indonesian province of Riau also its land and cheap labour. In reality, SIJORI does not represent a tripartite partnership but an arrangement by which Singapore's mega-urban growth can freely spill over into the territories of its neighbours (Macleod and McGee 1996: 425). Sin-

gapore was, and is, clearly in control: it took the initiative, and it provided the capital and management.

Fatal attraction?

The encroachment of Singapore's mega-urban region into Riau started on Batam, the island just south of Singapore. A series of bridges connects Batam to six other islands, which lie in a string to the south of Batam. Every half-hour a speedboat leaves Singapore for the thirty-minute ride to Batam, which has evolved as an industrial centre and a tourist resort. The rise in the number of tourists in Batam is impressive: from none in 1983, via 60,000 in

1985, to 606,000 in 1991, 78 per cent of whom Singaporeans and 10 per cent Malaysians. In 1999, 1.14 million foreigners arrived at Batam airport, thus surpassing Sukarno-Hatta airport in Jakarta.

The island of Bintan is a freshwater reservoir for Singapore; an undersea pipe brings the water to the city. Bintan has also been developed as a tourist resort with 20 hotels, ten golf courses, and ten condominiums. Industrial estates can also be found on Bintan.

The other islands have more specialized functions. The island of Bulan is a centre of agricultural production. It was expected to have about 400,000 pigs by 2000, enough to provide 50 per cent of Singapore's demand for pork. A crocodile farm of 55,000 reptiles provides leather and meat. Chicken production serves all the Kentucky Fried Chicken outlets of the region. Bulan will, surely, also become the world's largest supplier of orchids. Karimun is used for oil storage and shipyards, two pre-eminently space-consuming activities. Singkep will be developed into a centre for ship-breaking yards. Over a hundred permits for sand quarries have been issued, spread over several islands, large and small, and more quarries operate illegally (Grundy-Warr and Perry 1996; Macleod and McGee 1996; Nur 2000).

The Indonesian government has lured foreign investors to the Batam Economic Zone with inducements such as duty-free import of capital equipment and duty free export of export-oriented production. Another attraction is that the Indonesian government has nullified environmental impact laws for the island, so that Singapore uses Batam as a depository for the by-products of polluting industries, which are no longer allowed in the city-state itself, and a dump for dredged soil of dubious quality. Indonesia also accepts the kind of entertainment that Singapore prefers not to have under its own roof: 5,000 prostitutes work on Batam. Hundreds of them are underage girls, smuggled to Riau against their will. The average tourist stay on Batam is 1.3 days, a typical weekend away from Singapore complete with sex, drugs, and rock 'n' roll (Lindquist 2002).

The Indonesian government thrust all these changes down the local people's throats. Batam was placed under the custodianship of the Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA), which remained outside the power of regular local legislative bodies, and had gained control of land through presidential decree. The Head of BIDA was the then Minister of Technology, J.B. Habibie, the most trusted favourite of former President Suharto. In most cases the Indonesian counterpart of the Singaporean investors was the Salim Group, which again had very close connections with the Suharto presidency. The connection between the Salim Group and the highest Indonesian authorities helped them to acquire land: villagers were often pressed to decamp from their land with very little compensation. For instance, on Bintan

six villages consisting of 2,200 families were relocated to make way for the freshwater reservoirs (Anwar 1994: 27–28, 31; Macleod and McGee 1996: 429).

People's response

Since Suharto resigned, the people have felt free to rake over old coals. In January 2000, demonstrators cut off the energy supply to an industrial estate on Bintan. Police reinforcements were immediately flown in from Batam: one occupant of the powerhouse was shot dead. Immediately afterwards 40 companies contemplated leaving Bintan. Other demonstrators occupied a tourist resort on Bintan, demanding that the 1991 compensation of 100 rupiah per square metre for their land, paid by the Salim Group, would after all be increased to 10,000 rupiah per square metre. In 1991 the landowners concerned had grudgingly accepted the compensation after pressure exerted by the state: it was now revealed that the Singaporean investors had offered a far higher price and there were questions about who had pocketed the price difference. After the loss of the political protection offered by the former President, the Salim Group had come into dire financial straits and was less willing than ever to pay extra money. After a week in which tourist visits declined by 85 per cent, the demonstrators were chased away from the resort. Environmental NGOs that express their worries about the sand quarries first and foremost point to the Indonesian authorities that give out too many concessions or do not stop illegal quarries. Singapore's influential role yet remains in the background. ◀

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colombijn@kitlv.nl

Vulnerability and Flooding in Metro Manila

Research >
Southeast Asia

Rather than regarding floods as purely physical occurrences that require largely technological solutions, such events can also be viewed as the result of human actions. Critical to discerning the nature of flooding is an appreciation of the ways in which human systems place people at risk in relation to the environment and to each other, a causal relationship that is now mainly understood in terms of vulnerability. Only through a perspective that pays due attention to changes in topography, demographic growth, and urban development over time can the measure of flooding in Metro Manila truly be gauged. It is the interplay between three factors – history, nature, and society – that determines how the vulnerability of the city's inhabitants is constructed.

Metro Manila Development Authority

LOCATION MAP

LEGEND:
- BAY/LAKE
- WATERCOURSE
- MAJOR ARTERIAL ROAD
- MUNICIPALITY/CITY
- FLOODED AREAS

By Greg Bankoff

Flood prone areas in Metro Manila.

The National Capital Region (NCR) is situated in a semi-alluvial floodplain encompassing a land area of 636 square kilometres, open to Manila Bay on the west and to a large lake, Laguna de Bay, on the south-east. As such, it now constitutes a vast urbanized drainage basin that experiences frequent inundations from overflowing rivers and stormwaters, rendering the existing system of *esteros*, modified natural channels constructed during the colonial period, inadequate. Despite its vulnerability, however, rapid urbanization continues unabated. Solutions are difficult to realize as the metropolitan area is currently divided into twelve cities and five towns with a total population of 10,491,000 and a density of 16,495 persons per square kilometre.

Any appreciation of flooding in the metropolitan area first necessitates an understanding of the role the twenty or so typhoons that cross the Philippine 'Area of Responsibility' each year have on the archipelago's climate. The sudden and heavy rainfall that accompanies them is often associated with extensive flooding. While inundations affect all of the NCR, some areas are more vulnerable than others. About 20 per cent of the capital is designated as flood-prone, with areas to the east, south-east, and south, especially those adjacent to Laguna de Bay, acutely susceptible. In some particularly exposed cities such as Muntinlupa and Taguig, all *barangays* (the basic unit of local government) are regularly inundated and there is frequently a positive correlation between flood-prone areas and those cities and municipalities that have larger proportions of low-income residents.

Flooding has been a feature of daily life in Manila since at least the nineteenth century, but the first recorded instance of serious flooding dates to 1942. Major floods subsequently occurred in 1948, 1966, 1967, 1970, 1972, 1977, 1986, and 1988. The flooding caused by Typhoon Miding in 1986 inflicted the most serious damage in recent years, with floodwaters extending to over 16 per cent of the total area of Metro Manila. Matters have not improved much of late: thousands of Metro Manila residents were stranded on the streets or trapped in vehicles all night after heavy rains on 28 July 1995,

and major flooding incidents happened again on 28 May 1996 and 18 August 1997. Over the past half-century, these floods have become both more extensive and more severe. Regularly inundated areas have spread from the low-lying coastal or riverine *barangays* to encompass the more suburban hinterland neighbourhoods, the newer urban developments, and the shores of Laguna de Bay. Moreover, water depths have also steadily risen, making flooding a major hazard and prompting a recent newspaper article to quip that: 'Though the deluge mentioned in the Bible may be argued as allegorical, the flooding that occurs in Metro Manila streets after a downpour is definitely not.'*

The extent of flooding has also been considerably aggravated in recent decades by land subsidence. Sediments that underlie river deltas have a high water content that is 'squeezed' by the weight of succeeding deposits, a process that is greatly accelerated when groundwater is extracted faster than it can be replenished by natural recharge from rain seeping back into the ground. Records taken at Manila's South Harbour show that mean sea levels rose about 2 millimetres a year between 1902 and 1960, but that the subsequent rate was about ten times faster. Such an increase cannot be explained as solely a consequence of global warming and bears a marked correlation to the rise in groundwater extraction. As the land around Manila Bay sinks and the level of the sea rises, flooding has become more prevalent not only in the city but also in the surrounding provinces.

These climatic and environmental factors interrelate in complex ways with the changes brought about as a result of human activities to make Metro Manila flood-prone. Principal among such developments is the size, density, and growth of the population. Since 1939, the number of people living in the metropolitan area has risen from 993,889 inhabitants to 10,491,000 (2000), an increase of over 10-fold. The sheer weight of numbers creates considerable pressure on resources and this, in turn, has substantial consequences on the environment and intensifies both the severity and duration of floods. Much of this population increase is attributable to massive urban migration since the Second World War, as rural folk are attracted to Manila by higher incomes and greater livelihood opportunities. Most of these people are poor and cannot afford the rapidly increasing costs of land, housing materials, and construction. As a consequence, most migrants have to find accommodation in the informal housing sector in neighbourhoods often situated on the urban fringes of cities.

In Metro Manila, the banks of rivers, canals, and *esteros* frequently serve in this capacity. The resultant makeshift housing often encroaches onto available waterways, blocking the access of maintenance personnel and equipment and, by a gradual process of accretion, narrowing their capacity to handle discharge. It is estimated that squatters along the banks of the metropolis' waterways now number some 164,000 people, though the urban poor are not the only ones responsible for such encroachments as governmental, commercial, and industrial concerns also play a significant role. Nor is construction the only environmental problem related to the gradual infilling of the *esteros*: Metro Manila inhabitants dispose of about 6,050 tons of garbage daily (1995), of which only 71 per cent is collected and taken to landfills. The remaining 1,750 or so tons are simply left on street corners, dumped on vacant lots, or thrown into waterways. Altogether, this represents an amount of from 55 to 157 tons of solid waste each day that clogs the network of drainage canals, poses a considerable risk to health, and greatly increases the likelihood of flood.

After the widespread inundations of 1972, a major flood mitigation programme was undertaken that resulted in the erection of the first seven pumping stations, two floodgates, and four drainage mains between 1974 and 1978. In 1980, excavation of the 10-kilometre long Mangahan Floodway diversion channel was begun, linking the Marikina River to Laguna de Bay so as to use the lake as a temporary catchment basin in times of intense rainfall. Subsequently, the flow of water out of Laguna de Bay has been regulated by the construction of locks (Napindan Hydraulic Control Structure) to control the reverse overflow into the lake through the rein-

forced channel of the Napindan River and alleviate flooding along its shoreline.

There are three aspects of flooding in Metro Manila that this brief overview illustrates: firstly, the importance of an historical approach in understanding how hazard is generated; secondly, the degree of interplay between environment and society in creating risk; and finally, the manner in which vulnerability is a complex construction. The notion that hazards are simply physical phenomena needs to be replaced by one that recognizes human agency as a major contributing factor. The root causes of vulnerability lie in a variety of relational exchanges; it is the dynamics between stakeholders (human agency and animal behaviour), the ecosystem (specifics of the environment), and nature (extreme physical phenomena) that determine the increasing complexity of such events. The construction of vulnerability to flood in Metro Manila, therefore, shows how societies and destructive agents are very much mutually constituted and embedded in natural and social systems as unfolding processes over time. ◄

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Note >

* Afuang, B., 'Floods and the City', *Philippine Star*, 15 (2001), p. 290 (16 May: B4)

Markets and Malls in Jakarta

Research >
Southeast Asia

Jakarta, the largest metropolis in Southeast Asia and a province in itself, is divided into five municipalities and headed by a governor. The city is a metaphor for modernity for the 200 million people in the Indonesian archipelago. Its urban area has sprawled past its boundaries, incorporating smaller towns in the city's outskirts, consisting of Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi. Many workers living in these areas commute to the centre hence the number of people in Jakarta varies from over ten million in the evening to over twelve million during the day. Both massive movement and rapid expansion are characteristic of Jakarta's mega-urbanization. One aspect that has recently become contentious is the conversion of trade centres to shopping centres, or 'new style of markets', throughout the city.

By Pratiwo

Two questions are prompted by Jakarta's expansion and the role markets play in it. Firstly, is it possible to build a new theory of urban design based on this phenomenon in Jakarta? Or, secondly, is the city simply a modern attainment of Le Corbusier's Radian City or Ludwig Hilberseimer's Ideal City, unplanned and unintended?

In the seventeenth century, Jakarta was established as a market place when cloves from the Moluccas and surrounding areas were brought there for sale. The city developed a reputation as a marketplace for selling and exporting crops to the whole archipelago: during the colonial era the markets, which were scattered all over the city and outside its walls, were under Chinese control and were allowed to be open on only one day of the week.

Today, Jakarta is a true shoppers' paradise. Cheap goods can be found in Glodok, Tanah Abang, and Mangga Dua markets, Roxy Mas sells cellphones, and both Dusit and Mangga Dua Mall became specialized in computer hardware and software. Indeed, almost every neighbourhood in Jakarta has its malls where computers are sold and cheap illegal software can easily be obtained. Whereas some of the city's 80 shopping centres have specialized, other malls, such as Taman Anggrek Mall supply a wide variety of products and entertainment.

The old markets, Pasar Senen and Pasar Tanah Abang, are now probably the largest wholesale markets for electronic wares, clothes, and other goods in Southeast Asia, attracting merchants from every part of the archipelago who, in turn, generate other economic activities. Their economic importance is illustrated by the fact that, as a result of the fire at Pasar Tanah Abang in mid-February 2003, many clothes-related economic activities came to a halt throughout Indonesia. More than 5,000 kiosks, of which each was for rent for 50 million rupiah, or EUR 5,000, each year, were turned to ash. Probably as many as one million people – shopkeepers, coolies, salesmen, traders, and others who worked in the textile industry – lost their jobs. A total of 4 trillion rupiahs, or EUR 400 million, was lost with the fire (see *Kompas* 22, February 2003, p. 1).

Above and beyond a classification on grounds of sector, the markets can also be characterized according to their customers' economic status. Taman Anggrek, for example, is a mall mainly for those with middle- and high incomes, who by and large come by car. This mall holds more floors for cars than for shops and parking is one of its main sources of income. As opposed to specialized malls, customers of various incomes visit the Roxy Mas and Mangga Dua Mall. The malls of Jakarta can also be classified according to the ethnicity of its customers, correlating with the respective neighbourhoods' ethnic compositions. Whereas Taman Anggrek, Mall Kelapa Gading, ITC Mangga Dua, and Pluit Mall mainly have Chinese customers, it is mostly non-Chinese who frequent Block M Mall.

In addition to the present supply of shopping centres and malls another 20 shopping centres will soon be opened across the city in the near future. At present, crowded market places have caused transportation problems. Not only is the bus-dominated urban transport system far from effective, the train network connecting Jakarta to suburban areas, which is used by the low-income group is already overloaded in the peak hours. People increasingly use their private car to get to work and the 'three-in-one-car' scheme does little to curb traffic congestion. In the Thamrin-Sudirman area, covered by this scheme, drivers with less than three passengers found a loophole by offering a couple of thousand rupiahs (less than a euro) for the ride. Many poor serve as passengers several times a day as the city government has recently taken harsh action against some other forms of informal employment. Mega-urbanization and failure of the government to create sufficient formal sector employment have forced people to peddle goods. Unfortunately, in the Javanese New Year (Idulfitri), when the peddlers returned to their villages, Sutiyoso, the governor of Jakarta, had their stalls raided and the peddlers lost their chance to earn a living.

The aforementioned development projects have radically changed public space. Since many outdoor spaces have been made unpleasant due to parked cars and traffic jams, a walk in a mall has become the new Indonesian recreational activity. Many shopping centres are guarded by *satpam* (special guardians) in order to make shoppers feel secure on their mall strolls. Shopping has become the focus of Jakarta, and has developed as part of a long-existing 'hedonistic' lifestyle.

In the past decades many strategies have been formulated for the development of Jakarta, yet every plan to establish some kind of city order and control has failed. Only through proper law enforcement can the city's chaos and disorder be changed and a working urban plan, which will control the city's development, be put into place. At present Jakarta is yet a place of negotiation, bargaining, and corruption, hence an urban plan to provide a liveable environment for the city dweller remains a distant goal. ◂

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Greater Surabaya:
The Formation of a Planning Region

Research >
Southeast Asia

After the abortive coup in 1965 and as Indonesia started to rebuild itself, cities such as Surabaya reformulated development plans to accommodate the need for growth beyond the administrative boundaries. Great constraints in spatial management necessitated the inclusion of neighbouring areas far beyond the city limits. Hence the planning region of GERBANGKERTOSUSILA (Gersik, Bangkalan, Mojokerto, Surabaya, Sidoarjo, and Lamongan) was formed. Moreover, by means of local government law no. 22/1999 and the law on the balanced redistribution of national resources (no. 25/1999), local government has now acquired greater autonomy in drafting and approving local development plans without intervention by central authorities.

By Johan Silas

It seems expedient to discuss different models of urbanization in order to gauge the specific situation in Greater Surabaya. An overriding element applying to all models is the interrelation between the host-city and neighbouring towns and cities. Those seeking employment in the cities drive intensification ('in-urbanization'), whereas investors from the city, seeking to reap profits from cheaper land and labour, drive expansion ('ex-urbanization'). In-urbanization takes place when under-used areas or wastelands are put into use. New migrants often transform these areas with their squatter constructions and by introducing hawking in public places. Clearly, city governments despise this type of urbanization, which so often creeps upon them. Ex-urbanization results when economic growth reaches beyond the city limits. Large investors play an important role in it, creating new suburbs and towns, while investments by lower-income migrants generate an urbanization process of different quality and at a different scale.

Studies into ex-urbanization in Surabaya have revealed three types of mega-urbanization around this city. Southward 'self-contained urbanization', which can be found near the airport, depends on local support and involvement. In the second and most common type of ex-urbanization, which has a 'strong link with and depends on the city', the suburban area serves as part of the host-city. The third type, 'centred mega-urbanization', basically occurs in small towns around the main city that are independent but maintain strong links with the host-city's centre.

Both in-urbanization and ex-urbanization are crucial for the future development of Surabaya, yet only when the local administrative authority creates the right conditions will mutually beneficial economic cooperation result.

Laboratory for Housing and Human Settlements ITS. Courtesy of the author

The contrasting urban landscape of Surabaya.

As Greater Surabaya's growth has been mainly realized through local investment with little central government involvement, a network of cities and towns has developed in which different land-uses can be observed. With this situation there is only limited urban problems such as traffic congestion, flooding, and pollution.

Economic interest generates different types and forms of development and, as such, is a dominant factor in forcing the urbanization process far beyond the city boundaries. Meanwhile, non-economic intervention has also been transformed into profitable economic ventures, such as the construction of very low-cost housing in order to stimulate development on the periphery. New economic potential, such as the rising demand for shrimps and prawns in East Asia and Europe, stimulates urban expansion to the rural coastal areas. If communication in surface transport can be provided further expansion will doubtlessly follow. The combination of road and ferry services between Surabaya to the adjacent islands has shifted the mega-urban frontiers as far outward as Sumbawa and East Kalimantan. Simpler and cheaper movement of people, goods, and services than ever before has allowed medium-size enterprises to do business in the outer areas.

As goods and services from the city easily penetrate deep into the rural area, there are strong ecological repercussions (Reese 1992). People from rural areas also move to urban areas to seek better jobs and incomes. Some arrive well prepared, but most do not. Some stay for a limited time, most end-up staying longer and become permanent residents. Complemented by the reformation and 'democracy in learning', urban life is deteriorating at such a rate that only harsh and uncompromising actions by city government can keep the situation normal. Pressured by unrest and conflict in many areas, more people are pushed to the cities with a laissez-faire policy, which makes the situation difficult to resolve. Would a better understanding of mega-urbanization enable city governments to deal with the issue more adequately? Is it possible to maximize the positive and reduce the negative impacts of mega-urbanization without eliminating the favourable options for the underprivileged to improve their future livelihood?

We may conclude that in Surabaya the processes of intensification and expansion have led to different types of mega-urbanization. Local authorities have to create the optimal conditions for these processes to take a sustainable course. Mutually beneficial economic cooperation of the urban parts and integral consideration of the ecological footprint of town and hinterland are crucial for further solid mega-urban development in general and in the region of Surabaya in particular. ◂

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Phnom Penh:
Beautification and Corruption

In the last week of January 2003, the ASEAN Tourism Forum saw 1,200 delegates converging upon the scrubbed and beautified city of Phnom Penh. In the same week anti-Thai rioting culminated in the sacking of the Thai embassy and the destruction of Thai businesses. These two events reflect two apparently contradictory faces of Phnom Penh. The city appears at the same time to be an emerging and orderly model of authoritarian developmentalism, and the arena of an ongoing struggle on the part of the poor and destitute to claim recognition and resources from a venal and unregulated state.

By Caroline Hughes

The strategies used by state officials to deal with the urban poor reflect these two faces of the city. An overarching policy of infrastructural redevelopment for the city, known as the Beautification Plan, envisages clean, wide boulevards, restored colonial mansions, parks, fresh air, and exercise. It also encompasses official corruption, and the dispossession of the urban poor. The twin practices of beautification and corruption, pursued by the city authorities, serve a complementary purpose: the strengthening of the state, and the disruption of efforts by the poor to gain official recognition as citizens of the city.

The treatment of squatters within Phnom Penh clearly brings out the entanglement of these apparently distinct strategies. The emergence of 'anarchic' *(anatepetey)* development by the urban poor, from 1991 onwards, offered a sharp contrast to the strict controls on urban residence that pertained in the socialist era. In 1975, the Democratic Kampuchea regime infamously evacuated the city. The People's Republic of Kampuchea resettled Phnom Penh, by allocating free housing to state officials, but maintained state ownership of all property. In 1989, reforms offered rights of ownership of city properties to their occupiers, thus an inflationary land market, in which large fortunes could be made, was created overnight.

However, the complexity of the new land registration process and a lack of regulation of the subsequent property market permitted uncontrolled land appropriation by anyone with the means to take it, during the early 1990s. A lack of demarcation between privatized and public land meant that towns of squatters' shacks mushroomed, without legal sanction, on usurped plots of land in public parks or on river banks and dykes, and were subsequently bought and sold freely.

Many of the poorer residents of these anarchic developments made attempts to gain recognition of their right to ownership of the plots they purchased and inhabited. Often, the lodging of an application for the issue of an ownership title was beyond their means, as it involved the payment of fees and bribes to officials at five different levels of government. However, since registration of residence with local authorities was required, many considered that by paying a bribe and gaining a stamp in their family identification book, they had succeeded in gaining an officially-sanctioned right to illegally appropriated or purchased land. Such rights, however, were highly reliant upon the continued status and favour of the official in question. When powerful outside actors, such as property developers or visionary mayors, intervened, the brittle shelters of right and recognition constructed by the urban poor became mere matchwood.

Sometimes literally. In May 2001, a large squatter area built on a patch of land by the Tonle Bassac river was burned to the ground. Persistent rumours suggested that the fires had

been started deliberately and that fire fighters were under orders not to save the burning homes. What is unequivocally the case is that the following morning, bulldozers, under orders from City Hall, came to clear the remaining houses that had escaped the fire. Squatters protested briefly but were evicted by police. Within weeks the area had been grassed over and re-designated as a public park. Resistance was also quelled by the offer of land in a new village to be built just outside Phnom Penh.

Squatters, interviewed in 2001, recounted their experiences of the corruption of local officials and their exploitation of the poor. One squatter family commented: 'A group of villagers whose houses were burned... haven't got a house yet because they don't know anyone working in the government. So they've got no land yet... But those who have relatives working in the government have no difficulty getting land.' Another villager went further: 'Those who have relatives working in the government got two or three plots of land, so they could sell some and make money.' Donations of materials to the squatters, by international agencies, were subject to the imposition of 'transport fees' by local officials. Interviewees commented that any attempt to complain about unfair treatment would be disadvantageous – 'We don't want to be thought of as rebellious. We are afraid that if we are thought of as rebellious, there'll be some problem.'

The experience of the Tonle Bassac squatters illustrates the twin strategies of corruption and beautification, and the way these combine to strengthen the state at the expense of the poor. This was achieved through confiscation and destruction of the resources the poor had appropriated, and the disruption of the strategies they had pursued to protect these meagre accumulations from the arbitrary intervention of the powerful. Such strategies comprised the hundreds of private negotiations, connections, and recognitions that the poor had pursued over the years, through the cultivation of personal relationships with, and the bribing of, local officials.

Equally, the eviction strengthened the cohesion of the state, in line with the drive to modernization that the Cambodian government pursued since the economic reforms of the late 1980s. The reforms of 1989 awarded officials at all levels of the state apparatus opportunities to accumulate wealth through corruption and rent seeking, and by this means strengthened their loyalty. From the late 1990s onwards, the erratic but profitable everyday operations of the state apparatus, in this respect, were increasingly overlaid by grand modernizing schemes such as the Beautification Plan.

The two strategies are symbiotic. Schemes such as the Beautification Plan could not be implemented without the strengthened cohesion of the state. At the same time, these schemes offer rent seeking bonanzas for officials. They heighten the uncertainty which the poor must negotiate through the pursuit of official connections; they weaken solidarities within the ranks of the poor; and they increase the possibility of state surveillance. Together, these twin strategies undermine the capacity of the poor to develop coping strategies that, over time, could coalesce into customary rights, and into collective action to defend these.

At a time when a growing mood of protest amongst the poor is discernible, beautification also offers a welcome opportunity to gain control of the city's landscape, and to stamp it with the imprint of the ruling party. The period surrounding the 1998 elections saw unprecedented public demonstrations in the city. Trade unions, whose members populated squatter housing areas, organized prominent protests in Cambodia's new garment industry. Responses to such protests have been violent. A protest in March 1997 outside the National Assembly Building was the target of three hand grenades, allegedly thrown by a member of the military, killing twenty and injuring up to 100 demonstrators. Post-election protests in 1998 were broken up by armed riot police, with some deaths. Attempts by the Sam Rainsy Party to raise a memorial to those killed by the 1997 grenade attack were violently resisted by police in 2000. In late 2002 and early 2003, violence against strikers on picket lines in the city was widely reported.

However, via the Beautification Plan, the nascent politicization of the main protest site – a park outside the National Assembly Building known by opposition activists as 'Democracy Square' – has been quashed through a redesign of city space. The National Assembly is to be moved to a new purpose-built building on a site opposite the Hun Sen Park down the road. A new city square, purpose-built for the holding of officially sanctioned demonstrations, is currently under construction – on a small peninsular of land across the Tonle Sap River, which is being developed as a tourist site and convention centre, far away from the centre of government.

Whereas the early, deregulated, and voracious privatization of property in Phnom Penh put the urban poor at the mercy of corrupt local officials, it also allowed the poor to appropriate limited resources and recognition, in return for a stream of small payments to those with locally relevant powers. Beautification swings the initiative back towards the state, by permitting the arbitrary and unpredictable disruption of such strategies, in a manner which continues to benefit corrupt local officials, but which renders the poor ever more helpless.

From Slum to Park: Grassing over the site of the Tonle Bassac squatter settlement, following the fire of May 2001.

At the same time, Beautification offers a respectable face to the outside world and to middle class city-dwellers, helping to legitimize a state much criticized for its venality. The chief architect of Beautification, Phnom Penh's erstwhile mayor, Chea Sophara, portrayed the plan as an effort to make the city safer and healthier, characterizing squatter areas as stinking, filthy, and crime-ridden – playing to middle class fears of a criminal class and an influx of 'Vietnamese' prostitutes. Indeed, the rhetoric of the plan awards no space to the poor at all – Chea Sophara, interviewed in 2001, commented: 'We want to keep a high standard of living by not encouraging the poor to live in the city.' This attitude was exemplified by the removal of street-side hawkers and the threat to round up and deport street children to the provinces, before the ASEAN Tourism Forum. Yet the rhetoric relies, arguably, on the knowledge that rural-urban migration continues, and that those sporadically deported from the city must, of necessity, find a way to return. A year after the deportation of the Tonle Bassac squatters, a dearth of jobs near their new village meant that many of the poor abandoned it, and returned to the city.

Beautification offers a vision of a healthy, crime-free city created through the regulation of space, the exclusion of misfits, the disruption of personal links with the state, and the disconcerting reorganization of places that had acquired, however briefly, political resonance as sites of resistance. It undermines the strategies used by the urban poor – private negotiation and public protest – to attempt to claim resources and rights for themselves in the city. Yet, it depends upon an ongoing relationship of corruption, exploitation, and abuse between state and society. The violence of the anti-Thai rioting that broke out in January 2003 was arguably a displacement into patriotic anger of the ugly side of Beautification – the ongoing problems of poverty and personal insecurity. Phnom Penh's cosmopolitan and beautified facade conceals a troubled and frightened soul. ‹

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Marginal Suburbs, 2002

Due to specific migration patterns out of Central Delhi, segregated urban and peripheral urban zones emerged.

Both photos: Gerda Theuns-de Boer, Instituut Kern

Hans Schenk

Migrants, Squatters, and Evictions

Delhi's phenomenal growth rate of around 50 per cent per decade since India's independence (1947) is indicative of its lasting appeal to new migrants. The city has become one of the most populous cities in Asia, its urban agglomeration counting almost 13 million inhabitants in 2001. It is striking that up until 1980 the largest growth spurts occurred in the central parts of the city, while from then onwards a substantially greater population increase has been recorded in the fringe areas. Which internal population movements have taken place; which policies have been pursued in this respect; and which new socio-spatial order has emerged?

By Hans Schenk

The first wave of immigration to Delhi followed Partition when no less than 500,000 Sikh and Hindu refugees fled to Delhi, then home to one million inhabitants. The refugee camps that were then set up in the city's centre and on its periphery gradually developed into housing colonies. From the 1950s onwards an increasing number of rural migrants followed, mostly from the densely populated and poor states of North India. Most of them sought jobs in small industrial and service enterprises in central parts of the city, and naturally tried to find shelter in squatter settlements close to their places of work. By the late 1950s, almost 300,000 people lived in such settlements.

Against the background of the large refugee population and the swelling stream of impoverished migrants, a 20-year master plan for Delhi's future land use and development was initiated and implemented from 1962 onwards. This master plan included the resettlement of central city squatters in arranged colonies, not very far from the city core and places of work. The aim was to relieve the centre and provide better infrastructural amenities. Lack of funds, due to the cost of land, amenities, and housing, led to the scheme's failure, and the number of squatter settlements rose from about 300 in 1961 to over 1,100 in 1973. During the Emergency (1975-1977), when democratic and legal rights were suspended in India, over 700,000 central city squatters were forcibly evicted from the centre and removed from the city to the urban periphery. Few of the evicted squatters were actually resettled; many were simply dumped outside the urban limits.

At the end of the Emergency, the number of squatter settlements had significantly decreased to 70 in 1977. The subsequent long period of inactivity regarding city squatters led to a gradual increase of the number of illegal dwelling complexes: by the early 1990s there were, again, over 1,000 of them, in which 20 to 25 per cent of the urban population lived. This increase was mainly due to the reluctance to enforce the reckless Emergency-style evictions, which had caused massive unrest; vague and inconsistent policy had encouraged the urban squatters to settle back in the centre of Delhi.

Squatters and the New Economic Policy

From the 1990s onwards a new wave of evictions took place, marking a change of policy that can be explained by the macro changes in the political economy of India. In the face of international pressure, India was forced to reduce its budget deficits and structurally adjust its economy. Many existing protective measures, favouring Indian industries but discouraging foreign investors, were partially or completely withdrawn. India's New Economic Policy included invitations to foreign companies to invest in the Indian economy, either alone or under a joint venture with an Indian entrepreneur.

Foreign investors were attracted to India's major cities, initially in particular to Mumbai (Bombay) and then shifting to Delhi. Company headquarters and expatriate staff established themselves in (central) Delhi, as proximity to various ministries proved useful when dealing with lengthy bureaucratic procedures. The factories proper were often opened in new industrial estates in neighbouring states, thus trading off cheap land and poor infrastructure. Local authorities in Delhi decided that foreign investors would prefer a 'clean and orderly' environment, at least in the relevant parts of the centre of the city.

This explains the renewed focus on the eviction of squatters. The wish to clean up and beautify the central city was based on the perception that squatter settlements were an unhealthy eyesore and a nuisance, as were the many thousands of workshops, informal small-scale industrial and service units, and pavement encroachments.

A growing rift

The resettlement activities of the 1960s-1970s and those of the 1990s show some similarities. In both periods squatters were forced to leave the central parts of the city and settle on the periphery, away from work sites. Differences prevail, however. In the 1960s-1970s, Delhi was a rather small city: its periphery at a modest distance from workplaces. In the 1990s, some resettlement colonies could only be reached after a two-to-three-hour bus ride at the cost of half-a-day's urban earnings. Thus, the impact of the more recent forced resettlement to the urban periphery was much more severe.

In many of the new colonies jobs cannot be found at a reasonable distance. In some others, local jobs, for example in the factories of foreign companies, are mostly for skilled workers and not for the urban poor who had previously survived in informal sector jobs. For women, employment is even harder to get; many were employed in the households of the city's middle and upper class, and can no longer reach their workplace. Whereas the geographical scale of segregation in the 1960s-1970s allowed the urban poor to earn a living in the city centre and remain connected with it, life on the modern-day periphery paints a cruel picture of the realities of geographical segregation.

Spatial segregation is enforced by another process. Between the 1960s and the 1990s, the city's middle and upper class tended to move out of the centre to the south and south-west. Resettlement colonies were almost all located to the south-east, east, and north-west. Attempts to house the middle classes north of the city have completely failed. Today it is said that any developer intending to develop a housing estate for the urban affluent in the west, north, and east is committing commercial suicide, and that any non-governmental organization or other concerned agency wanting to protect the few remaining squatter settlements in the south will be silenced by brutal force: the south is for the elites, the other areas for the poor. (see map).

In spite of plans and intentions, the level of services in resettlement colonies is poor, even poorer than in the remaining inner-city squatter settlements. The water and electricity supply, and the provision of communal toilets, are limited, and improvements can hardly be expected under the structural adjustment regime of the New Economic Policy. Social provisions relating to health and education are lacking for the same reasons, while even security of tenure is not guaranteed. Hence, one can specifically speak of a north-western, eastern, and south-eastern degenerated periphery in Delhi. Those landless labourers and marginal farmers from northern India, who could no longer survive in their villages and fled to Delhi, have ultimately become trapped there. The urban authorities dumped them once more, into a no-man's land between the city and the countryside. Evidently, they are neither wanted nor needed in either part of India. ◄

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Street scene, 2002

Tehran: Paradox City

Over two hundred years, decreasing mortality rates and an influx of migrants transformed Tehran from a 7.5 square kilometre city of 15,000 inhabitants into a mega-city of ten million sprawling over 600 square kilometres. Having subsumed flatlands to the east and west and seventy villages on its adjacent mountain slopes, today's Tehran varies 800 metres in elevation from south to north. The city's topographical variation is paralleled by the marked differences in class and life-style of its inhabitants. All of Iran's urban and pastoral nomadic areas are represented in Tehran's population, as are the country's religious minorities: Zoroastrians, Jews, Armenians, and Assyrian Christians.

By Soheila Shahshahani

To the differences in culture and geographical origin of Tehran's inhabitants, we can add political tensions: modernization, nationalism, monarchy and religion collided in the modern city. Tehranis have witnessed two revolutions, the toppling of two monarchies, and a number of assassinations. Urban life has thus come to be associated with hope for progress, but also with fear of tension and chaos.

The same can be said about Tehran's history of urban development. While early changes included the destruction of the old city's gates and fortifications, these were replaced with the new symbols of modern governance, massive ministerial and military buildings. Universities, banks, boulevards and huge statued squares were built, the squares and the universities containing elements of opposition to religious authority. Architects were either brought in from Europe and the United States, or they were Iranians who had studied abroad or had graduated from Dar al-Fonun (Polytechnic of Iran, established 1851).

Tehran was built to different architectural tastes without a cohesive urban plan. As the city outgrew its previous limits, land ownership emerged as a serious problem. In 1918 the first legal act regarding land registration was passed. The transition from traditional ownership following Shari'a or royal decree to modern legal ownership became the source of widespread corruption. The monarchy, military, various ministries, banks, the religious foundation of *owqaf*, and influential people registered millions of square meters of land under their names.[1]

In 1951 oil was nationalized. Following the defeat of the nationalist Prime Minister Dr Mohammad Mossadeq, the royal tendency was to channel oil wealth to the urban areas, particularly Tehran, at the expense of infrastructure for agriculture and industry. In 1968 Tehran's first urbanization plan, the Tehran Comprehensive Plan (TCP), was officially approved in parliament. A twenty-five year project proposed by Iranian and American firms, the TCP identified problems of density in the city centre, pollution, commercial activities, transportation, unemployment, and migration into the city. The solutions were ambitious: the TCP extended the city limits to reduce concentration in built-up spaces, and established ten districts of 500,000 people, each with its commercial, industrial and high-rise buildings. It further sub-divided areas into neighbourhoods of 15-30,000 people with their own schools and facilities.

Land speculation and construction, however, remained among the most profitable activities in the country. The legal system related to land continued to allow for its appropriation while its ambiguities encouraged corruption. The increase in the price of oil in the 1970s induced Mohammad Reza Shah to dream of a grand civilization for Iran's future. The project of Shahestan Pahlavi, with ministries, embassies, cultural and recreational centres, built on 554 hectares of land and employing 189,000 people, was to symbolize the future modern city in the heart of Tehran.[2]

Eleven years after the Tehran Comprehensive Plan, in 1979, the Islamic Revolution shook the city. Two measures were of prime importance in forming the face of the city in the years to come. One was an oral decree by Imam Khomeini that all Tehrani had the right to possess a house. This ignored the city limits set by the TCP and, overnight, small houses were built on the outskirts of the city. The second was the government's decree, in 1989, after the war with Iraq, that different sectors of the government had to become economically self-sufficient. This encouraged the municipality to allow, and then fine, illegal buildings. Fines thus became permits and buildings were constructed in ways that were not permitted by law.

Old gardens and mansions were destroyed to clear space for massive new apartment blocks. Fines for cutting trees or building high-rises brought colossal amounts of money to the municipality. In modernizing the city, the municipality was in the paradoxical situation of planting trees and flowers to make small parks while benefiting from the destruction of the

A non-religious building featuring a dome.

'lungs of Tehran', the gardened northern section of the city. Previously the gardens had brought cool weather down from the mountains, sweeping pollution into the lowlands beyond the city.

Pollution, traffic congestion and accidents thus became facts of daily life. Painting pedestrian crossings white, allowing advertisements to appear on buses and walls, placing billboards along highways and lining streets with lights and colourful flags for festivities added to the transformation of the city, but not necessarily in welcome ways. Hardly any street-names from before the revolution remained, making people recall previous names or ponder before giving directions. When transformation arrives with paradox, it becomes more incomprehensible: When new mosques lose their domes, and new high-rise buildings gain domes, one loses the bearings of identity. When Tehran University remains the site of Friday prayer 24 years after the Revolution, one wonders about the symbolic meaning of such displacement.

Perhaps these are matters of little importance when compared to what may happen with the next earthquake, which records show strike Tehran every 150 years. Should the epicentre of a major earthquake fall on the city, we can expect immediate casualties in the hundreds of thousands. In a matter of days, millions could die as a result of fire and lack of facilities. Who would bear responsibility for neglecting the necessary precautions for such an eventuality?

Every year, during the many holidays, particularly during the long New Year holiday which marks the beginning of spring, the Tehrani, like the inhabitants of all mega-cities, leave Tehran. The city breathes, its arteries cleared of congestion, and under the blue sky and at the foot of the magnificent Alborz mountains the city has time to reflect upon the two hundred years which have transformed it to hold what was then the entire population of Iran. ‹

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A modern mosque without the traditional dome.

Notes >

1 *Owqaf:* is money or property that wealthy citizens allocated to the poor and to religious students and dignitaries.
2 Shahestan Pahlavi was one of the most important urbanization projects of the Pahlavi period, using the investment funds for urbanism of the whole country for ten years. A British firm designed the project, which was to cover over 550 hectares of land on the hills of central Tehran.

Humour in Indonesian Politics

A Case Study of the Political Marketing of Gus Dur

Among the many astonishing aspects of Indonesian democracy in the early Reformasi era (1997–2001) are the rather unusual public appearances of several of Indonesia's top politicians. A prime example of this would be Abdurrahman Wahid's (Gus Dur's) first appearance on a variety show during his time as President of Indonesia (1999–2001). During the programme, broadcast on TPI *(Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia)* in 2000, the Indonesian President portrays himself as a jester, telling one humorous tale and/or joke after the other.

By Arndt Graf

Below is an example of the special character of these tales/jokes told during the programme.

Wahid: 'The funniest one is from the PR China. Once ... not in my times ... there was a military delegation lead by America. It was lead by the Joint Chief of Staff. Okay, they come. He talks very long, that Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Very looong.... But it is translated just in one very short sentence, and everybody is laughing. ... So he asks ..... You are an amazing translator, my looong speech you could translate in only one short sentence, and everybody laughed..... what is your secret? ... The answer is: well, that's easy. I just said that this person was telling a joke, so please everybody laugh' (translation: AG).

What makes the joke so funny for Indonesian audiences is that it plays on and reconfirms two stereotypes in one. The first is the stereotype of the militaristic and self-important American, illustrated by the evocation of military might (a Chief-of-Staff, or head of a delegation) and by emphasis on the very long speech, an indication of a self-

Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) joking during his visit to Iran.

Courtesy of www.gusdur.net

aggrandizing aspect. The other Indonesian stereotype reinforced in this joke is that of the witty Chinese who knows how to save himself work by not giving a long translation, and therefore treating a joke like any other economic activity. Does this mean that Abdurrahman Wahid, then acting President of Indonesia, is relentlessly reaffirming ethnic and national stereotypes? Initial impression of the joke might suggest such a reading.

Interestingly, there is also a printed version of the above humorous tale published in one of the many compilations of Gus Dur's jokes. Here, national stereotypes apparent in the televised joke are reversed. In the printed version the main figure is not a big-mouthed American general, but rather Gus Dur himself. The witty translator is not Chinese, but Arab; the scene now taking place in Qatar rather than China.[1]

My research departs from a close textual analysis of this and other of Gus Dur's jokes in the above mentioned television show, as well as in the printed joke collections. One observation from the variety show is that Gus Dur concentrates his jokes into the first third of the interview. It seems that, in rhetorical terms, his joking has an introductory function, bridging the social gap with the interviewer, while serving to ease possible tensions and gain public sympathy. In classical Latin rhetoric, one would call this strategy the *captatio benevolentiae* (getting the goodwill of the audience). In the interview, it is also reminiscent of a communicative strategy often employed in Indonesia and Malaysia in which the speaker humbles themselves in the introductory sentences by saying how unimportant their own contributions are, or by making fun of themselves. The interlocutor should, of course, not misunderstand these humorous passages as a sign of weakness: the opposite is the case.

For my research, these observations serve as a starting point for a deeper, culturally specific reading of Gus Dur's special kind of humour. A central notion in this is the popular Java scholar's interpretation of the humorous president as Semar, the clown-servant and half-god from the world of the Javanese shadow-theatre, *wayang kulit.* Apparently, the image and importance of Semar has shifted in Javanese and Sundanese society since the beginning of the New Order. This populist character did not just replace Gatotkaca – popular during Sukarno's presidency – as the main hero of the shadow-theatre. The servant Semar, according to some reports, now even sometimes exerts functions of power.[2]

The climax of the *wayang* is the *gara-gara* scene, when the earth undergoes great political, social, cultural, and cosmological turmoil. It is here that Semar, the joking clown-god-servant, usually appears in a central role. In these circumstances, Semar serves as a wise orientation figure whose joking wit helps to bring the audience safely through all kinds of dangers.

During Indonesia's early Reformasi era, with all its economic and political problems, many Javanese may have been reminded of the *gara-gara* in the *wayang.* Given his physical appearance and his continuous joking, as well as his high social and religious rank, Gus Dur appeared, for many, to be very similar to Semar. Seen in this perspective, the humorous performance of the Indonesian President in a variety show probably made sense to many viewers. In addition to the growing popularity of this image in popular culture, the notion of Gus-Dur-as-Semar was also popularized by certain intellectuals who might have had their own agenda

regarding the Javanese belief system, *kejawen.*[3]

However, Gus Dur's heightened public use of humour can also be explained in Islamic terms. Historically, humour has played an important role in Islam: probably a much more central role than it has played in the spreading and teaching of Christianity. This is especially true for the Sufi versions of Islam that strongly influenced Indonesia during the early period of Islamization in the archipelago. Even today, many religious leaders *(kyai)* in Gus Dur's home region of East Java are notorious for their use of humour in spreading Islamic messages. There seems to be even a special genre of *pesantren* humour, named after the religious boarding schools of the *kyai.* From this perspective, Gus Dur's humorous performance in a TV variety show is again not as unusual as it may seem in the first place.

Having said this, it is important to note that the clowning performances were also criticized by voices from other traditions within Indonesian Islam. Apparently, the understanding and perception of blending humour, Islam, and politics is a point of contestation and debate amongst, on the one side, reformist Islam and, on the other, more traditional Islam. This is in line with the findings of Peacock, who discovered something like a watershed-line between the Islamic currents of Indonesia regarding their particular sense of humour.

Finally, one should perhaps also take into account the marketing character and function of Gus Dur's humorous performance. There is some reported evidence that he was advised by his assistants (spin doctors?) to emphasize the notion of a humorous president. This may have been part of a strategy to present him as an unconventional politician who would be the right representative of the people *(the rakyat)* in the partly chaotic turmoil of the (early) Reformasi era. ◄

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Notes >

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Islamization of the Sama Dilaut in Sabah, Malaysia

Nagatsu Kazufumi, 1998

The Sama Dilaut (lit: 'maritime' Sama), or the Bajau, are a subgroup of the Sama-speaking people. The Sama Dilaut of Kallong village, Semporna District, Sabah, Malaysia, are migrants from Sallang Island, Sulu Archipelago, the Philippines, approximately 100 km away. Until the 1960s-1970s, the Sama Dilaut in both countries were politically and religiously marginalized. In the late 1990s, the Sama Dilaut of Sallang remained marginalized, disregarded in local politics and considered impious Muslims, even *kafirs* (non-Muslims) despite the fact that most of them professed Islam. The Sama Dilaut in Kallong, however, had improved their status. They occupied village political posts and enjoyed their own district representatives; their status as Muslims was acknowledged by local society. This essay discusses the historical dynamics of the Sama Dilaut's Islamization, the process by which they gained acceptance as Muslims in post-colonial Malaysia. The discussion is based on historical and ethnographic data collected between 1997 and 1999 in Semporna District, Sabah.

By Nagatsu Kazufumi

Following independence, Islam increasingly became a pillar of identity for Malaysia's dominant Melayu population. With Islamic revivalism (*dakwah*) prevailing in the 1970s, the government began to directly involve itself in Islamic affairs; federal and state governments alike strengthened their commitment to the administration of Islam through religious institutions. Islam was thus made official throughout Malaysia.

Sabah gained independence as a state within Malaysia in 1963. Direct government involvement in Islamic affairs here started relatively late. It was not until 1971 that the first official Islamic institution, the Sabah Islamic Council, or MUIS (Majelis Ugama Islam Sabah), was established. Since it emulated the system already organized in Peninsular Malaysia, MUIS was able to institutionalize its administrative system effectively and rapidly. Through its branches it began to administer religious activities at district and village levels. MUIS also assumed the management of religious schools in the state.

Incorporation

At the end of the British colonial period in Sempora, local Muslims attributed Islamic legitimacy to the Sulu Muslim society, heirs to the once flourishing Islamic Sulu Sultanate. Muslim intellectuals of Sulu origin thus held prominence in local religious affairs. This situation changed dramatically in the post-colonial period. In 1960, a native political leader built the first religious school in Semporna. He appointed a Melayu from Negeri Sembilan, a state in peninsular Malaysia, as its headmaster and concurrently as chief imam of the district mosque. In the 1970s, the MUIS branch in Semporna

began to take charge of local Islamic affairs, appointing village religious leaders and integrating them into its religious bureaucracy. In running religious schools, it employed as teachers peninsular Melayu intellectuals and, later, local graduates of the state religious schools.

As Islam became increasingly officialized, Muslim society in Semporna was divorced from the Islamic order of Sulu and incorporated into that of the Malaysian state. Religious professionals of official standing and MUIS came to represent Islamic authority. The district socio-religious order was transformed: a dichotomous notion of Islam prevailed, where anything official was considered more legitimate, anything unofficial less legitimate. Traditional Muslim intellectuals of Sulu origin therefore became less and less influential, unless they were granted official standing.

Becoming Muslim

Until the 1950s, the Sama Dilaut believed in supernatural or ancestral spirits and held rituals for these spirits. In the mid-1950s, a government-appointed district *khatib* (Islamic preacher) invited a Sama Dilaut leader to convert to Islam. The leader accepted the *khatib's* invitation and, together with some Sama Dilaut youngsters, learned the prayers. This marked the beginning of their Islamization. In the late 1960s, he built a simple prayer house, a *surau*, in the village. Meanwhile, the youngsters studied Islam at the *khatib's* house. Although the Sama Dilaut were initially not accepted into the local Muslim community, this changed after the 1970s.

Here it is worth recalling the fate of the Sama Dilaut of Sulu in the Philippines. Although they began to embrace Islam in the 1940s, their neighbours still do not fully recognize them as Muslims. This is largely due to the persistence of the myth that Allah once cursed the Sama Dilaut, thus disqualifying them from the status of 'correct' Muslims. How, then, did the Sama Dilaut of Semporna gain their recognition as Muslims? Three phases of their Islamization – participation in public Islamic activities; acquisition of Muslim

A Sama Dilaut imam delivering *duwa'a*, or voluntary prayer, at the village mosque. He was the first Sama Dilaut in Semporna to study the Qur'an in the 1960s. As a devout imam, he leads religious practices in the village.

The research area

Nagatsu Kazufumi

community symbols; formation of a new class of Islamic intellectuals – are discussed below.

In the mid-1960s, some Sama Dilaut tried to enrol their children in the religious school. Parents of the other Muslim students expressed strong objections to this, as the above-mentioned myth still prevailed. The peninsular Melayu headmaster rejected their objections, claiming that such a myth was nowhere present in the Qur'an. None of the parents could challenge him on this point. In like manner, the Melayu chief imam criticized local Muslims for their exclusion of the Sama Dilaut from the district mosque. Soon after the Sama Dilaut were admitted into the religious school and the district mosque.

Sama Dilaut youngsters who studied Islam under the *kahtib* became imams in Kallong village in the early 1970s. In 1977 MUIS granted three of these imams a letter of authorization, certifying that they were 'correct' Islamic leaders. MUIS also permitted them to hold Friday congregational prayers at the village *surau*. The *surau* was then administratively re-categorized as a mosque. The Sama Dilaut thereby officially acquired symbols of a Muslim community, namely, religious leaders and a mosque.

From the late 1980s onwards, MUIS and its schools employed Sama Dilaut religious high school graduates, who formed a new generation of Islamic intellectuals commonly referred to as *ustaz*. Renowned for their Islamic knowledge, they were invited to deliver religious lectures and became part of a regional intellectual authority on Islam. The *ustazs* ensured the Sama Dilaut's status as Muslims; since they were teaching Islam in the village, the impression prevailed among local Muslims that the Sama Dilaut were practicing Islam 'correctly'.

The Sama Dilaut's Islamization was intrinsically linked to socio-religious change in Semporna, brought on by the 'officialization' of Islam in Malaysia. Essential to their Islamization was the separation of local Muslim society from the conventional Islamic order of Sulu, from which the Sama Dilaut had been stigmatized as outcasts. As official – state sanctioned – religious personnel and institutions came to represent Islamic authority, local Muslims had no choice but to accept as legitimate the Melayu teacher's claims and Islamic symbols that MUIS authorized. As the official-unofficial dichotomy of Islamic legitimacy reformed the district's socio-religious order, the presence of the *ustazs* was proof of the 'correctness' of the Sama Dilaut's religious practice.

Touching upon one final perspective, it is important to add that the Sama Dilaut imams sought the authorization of MUIS as part of their strategy to fight discrimination. Given their intentions, their Islamization was, at least in part, a vehicle for attaining social position within the new socio-religious order of post-colonial Malaysia. ◄

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Young Japanese Researchers on Southeast Asia - Series

Nagatsu Kazufumi wrote the third contribution to a series that aims to present current research of young Japanese scholars on Southeast Asia. Original Japanese research on Southeast Asia has a long tradition, is abundant and sometimes takes different routes from European or American research on the region. Moreover, many Japanese scholars publish in Japanese or in Southeast Asian languages and consequently the interaction between Japanese and non-Japanese scholars remains somewhat limited. By means of this series we draw attention to the original research of young Japanese scholars with research interests in Southeast Asian affairs. In case you would like to introduce your own research on Southeast Asia, please contact the editors of the *IIAS Newsletter* or the author of this introduction. ◄

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Elite Music and Nationalism in South and Southeast Asia

How Music Becomes Classical

Like related scholarly fields, ethnomusicology in the 1980s and 1990s began critically re-evaluating a series of concepts central to the field, from culture, tradition, and identity, to modernization and westernization. The disciplinary framework increasingly recognized the historical contingency and cultural construction of the very phenomena we hoped to understand. In the wake of abundant scholarship in a variety of related fields, it has become clear that ethnomusicology in fact embraced nationalism as one of its central theoretical concerns. The concepts of the canonic and the classical have been re-evaluated in recent years, in the European musical context as well as elsewhere, yet the term classical continues to be applied to certain music in Asia without a great deal of critical reflection. Whereas most contemporary ethnomusicologists would reject the notion that classical music is simply qualitatively superior to other repertories, attempts to define the classical with regard to South and Southeast Asian music range widely.

By Pamela Moro

Some authors have isolated certain features in socio-musical context (for example, structures of patronage, methods of musical transmission, presence of articulated theory), whilst others have engaged in highly particularistic analyses of discourse. Dichotomies have been particularly compelling, such as classical/folk, urban/rural, written tradition/oral tradition and, especially in the study of South Asian music, Great Tradition/Little Tradition. Most recent evaluations consider these dyads over-simplified, helpful to a certain extent but ultimately limiting as foundations for analysis.

In my own work, the theoretical works I have found most useful are those which favour constructivist approaches. Key among these are discourse-centred studies of music by Matthew Harp Allen on India (1998), Jennifer Lindsay on Java (1985) – both of which pay special attention to shifts in vocabulary and terminology – and Partha Chatterjee on the process of classicization in general, as a deliberate and negotiated process of national culture formation (1993). To Chatterjee, a classicized tradition has been reformed, reconstructed, fortified against charges of barbarism and irrationality, and hence made palatable for the tastes of middle class people...an appropriate content for a nationalized cultural identity (Chatterjee 1993:27). This kind of classicization is a form of sanitizing and systematizing, tied to the negotiation of history and a sense of the past, a past that, he argues, is integral to nationalism itself.

Reflecting my own interest in and familiarity with the music of Southeast and South Asia, my current work examines classicized music in India, Indonesia, and Thailand in the first half of the twentieth century during the period of emerging Asian nationalisms, or whenever the classicizing of music became prominent. My goal is to elucidate the process of classicization by comparing these three specific cases, isolating certain common factors which emerge in varying levels of intensity throughout: the rise of mass education and innovative forms of musical transmission, including the development of systems of written notation; the institutionalization of music theory and music scholarship; dynamic influences from hegemonic powers (leading to, for example, use of the Western term 'classical'); the tension between homogeneity and heterogeneity in constructions of national culture; the impact of print and electronic media, especially in relation to state power; and transformations in the roles of musician, patron, and audience. In all cases, the timing and nature of the growth of a middle class has had a tremendous impact on the position of classicized music within the nation.

High culture and the court

Since the late nineteenth century, India has offered the clearest and best-documented example of classicized music in the service of nationalism. Music that had been fostered by the princely courts (and, in southern India, the temples) was embraced by nationalists from the very beginning of the movement in the late nineteenth century. Court-fostered music – as well as new compositional forms intended specifically to arouse patriotism – was one among several aspects of culture which could contribute to a new identity, one in which a political movement towards nationalism could flourish. But the operative goals of such nationalism were to change over time, and the music had to be reshaped somewhat before it was suitable for such a project. A number of prominent music scholars and teachers of the late nineteenth century set out to revitalize what they felt had become a neglected and tarnished musical tradition. At fault were not the British – who were only marginally interested in South Asian music – but a growing sense of a Hindu classical past, a Hindu Golden Age of Spirituality, leading to negative valuation of Muslim contributions to music during the long period of Mogul patronage and support for the performing arts.

This revitalization took place through efforts to classicize, in Chatterjee's sense of the term, for example by founding schools, inventing systems of notation (a topic of great controversy), crafting modern music scholarship and historiography (based on the study of Sanskrit treatises, intended to establish norms for performance), organizing music conferences, and instituting the public concert. The classicization of music was one of a number of movements aimed at fostering Indian culture, both national and regional, by a new, self-aware, British-educated middle class.

Pamela Moro

College students in Chiangmai, northern Thailand, practice music from the Bangkok-derived classical tradition, 1992.

In Indonesia, as in India, music had a key place in the visions of nationalists, from the very beginnings of the movement towards independence in the early years of the twentieth century. However, in contrast to the solid embrace of classicized musical traditions by the Indian nationalist movement and middle class, court-associated forms of performance from the region that came to be Indonesia have been subjects of heated debate. Despite the profound musical diversity of the region, central Javanese music alone has been the subject of most intense classicization, as well as that of controversy regarding its place in twentieth century national culture. Java's centricity in conceptions of a national classical music is, of course, a microcosm of a much larger issue: the status of Javanese and other regional cultures within the nation. While Indian court music was to pass from the old ruling class to a new, urban middle class – with relatively little tinkering by the British – in Indonesia the transfer in question was from Java to the whole, new nation, with the Javanese elite at least attempting to hold on to its position as gatekeeper of the arts by opening schools and training academies for the arts. The strong interest of colonial scholars in documenting and promoting certain forms of music in the Dutch East Indies has played a role in the image of central Javanese gamelan after independence, as have attitudes towards the elite Javanese of the colonial period. Post-independence, the traditional performing arts have continued to be a focal point for top-down efforts at cultural engineering, from the extension of Java-focused arts curricula in the conservatories to New Order attempts to upgrade and normalize performance standards.

High culture and the bureaucracy

There is no doubt that the court tradition of music in Thailand has been classicized in the ways developed in Indonesia, through the establishment of training academies with centralized curricula, written musical notation, scientific analysis, and the development of prestigious, Sanskrit-based vocabulary separating classical music from other forms. But while the path to such status leads us to many of the same issues we have seen in India and Indonesia, it diverges in intriguing ways due to Thailand's atypical experience with nationalism in the Asian context. While Siam was not for-

mally colonized by a European power, it has nonetheless been intensely concerned with the construction of national identity and the extension of hegemony through a centralized culture. Yet, in striking contrast to our earlier examples, traditional court music was not initially embraced as an emblem of modern nationalism. It was, in fact, studiously set aside in favour of highly westernized musical forms until the last decades of the twentieth century, when it caught the attention of a nostalgic, identity-seeking urban middle class.

During the period when the Indian and Indonesian independence movements struggled over the place of court arts in modern society, Thailand wrestled not with tension between colonizer and colonized but between the monarchy and an increasingly powerful bureaucracy, culminating in the 1932 change to constitutional monarchy. In the era of cultural revolution under Phibun Songkhraam's first government, 1938-1944, westernized musical forms came under bureaucratic control. Since that time, the former court arts have retained strong associations with monarchy and past-oriented constructions of identity, which postulate a sort of High Culture of Old Siam. Today, this music figures prominently in government-generated presentations of culture such as official publications, websites, and tourist shows. It is supported by the national educational system, and since the 1970s and 1980s has been valued highly by the large and increasingly diasporic middle class.

What accounts for the similarities amongst our three cases? To note that the three share certain features, and that India was the earliest – and most representative – example in terms of the complete embrace of classicized music by the nationalist movement, is not to suggest that the phenomena spread from India across Southeast Asia, as earlier historical interpretations stated. Asian countries did not exist in geo-historical vacuums during the colonial period, and the various nationalist movements of the region were aware of and to some degree inspired by one another, but a better answer probably lies in the globalization of the late nineteenth century, which was, paradoxically, operating at the same time as the localizing visions of nationalism. Western-derived transnational trends such as capitalism, colonialism, ideological constructs (such as the idea of progress), and technological inventions (like photography) contributed to unifying a global cultural elite (Peleggi 2002). It is likely that the set of ideas and institutional changes we are calling classicization were part of this global flow, including the ironic mixing of western-derived phenomena with constructions of a classical Indic past, in India, Indonesia, and Thailand.

In a longer version of this work, I also consider factors, which might account for some of the differences in our three cases. Key amongst these are the nature and timing of the appearance of a sizeable urban middle class (early in India, much later in Thailand and Indonesia), and the position of colonial power-holders and/or old elites *vis-à-vis* emerging nationalism and twentieth-century national culture. <

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Shifting Identities in *Kali Salwaar*

Indian cinema, now widely recognized in the West, has attained a highly mainstream profile. Popular Hindi cinema, nicknamed Bollywood, is increasingly popular thanks to the many non-resident Indians in the US and UK stimulating the DVD market and organizing film-screenings in mainstream cinemas in major cities. The popularity of Indian films and film stars is growing so rapidly that British film officials recently travelled to Mumbai to discuss working on potential co-productions, fearing that they will soon lose too much ground to popular Hindi cinema. Ironically, popular Hindi cinema was until recently completely ignored by Western film scholars and journalists, who seemed to assume that it could have no relevance for a Western audience. In light of this new interest, we examine one of its main themes, and how its portrayal varies.

By Thomas Voorter & Marijke de Vos

One of Bollywood's main themes, seen and enjoyed by a (still mainly non-white) worldwide audience, is middle-class family life and its preoccupation with marriage, respect for the father, and the ambiguous position of sons and daughters stranded between Eastern and Western standards. The other concentrates on the forces trying to destroy the unity of Mother India. Cinema has had its fair share of battles between Good and Evil, and Evil has come to have many faces. With the perception of the enemy highly depending on the cultural and historical context, the enemy has naturally changed over the decades.

In Hindi popular cinema the image of the enemy has changed from the outsider (the British Empire) in the thirties, to the feudal landlord and the mean moneylender in the fifties, the corrupt big city businessman in the sixties, the equally corrupt police officer or member of the local government in the seventies, to the *bhai* (mafia) in the eighties and nineties. It had long been at the popular and official mainstay of Indian cinema that the enemy could never be one of India's own ethnic groups, i.e. Hindu-Muslim rivalry was never portrayed. Yet after the 1992 Bombay riots, following the demolition of the Babri Masjid mosque, this common agreement seems to have weakened and as underlying awareness of 'difference' has been increasingly brought into the open, the enemy image took on a different shape.

However 'subtly' done, there is a tendency to either romanticize the Muslim (as in *Bombay*, 1993) or to emphasize the cultural differences between Hindu and Muslim (as in *Gadar*, 2001). In a Hindu-dominated film industry, the (implicit) argument is that the Muslim is the other, has another homeland, and therefore has a split or even other loyalty. No longer unquestionably part of the larger Indian family, today's Bollywood Muslim must prove his loyalty towards India (*Sarfarosh*, 1999) and distance him- or herself from Pakistan.

Only a few films allow us a glance of the Muslim perspective, such as *Fiza* (Khalid Mohamed, 2001) and *Naseem* (Sayeed Mirza, 1995), both made by Muslim directors. Some Hindu directors, for example M.S. Satyu (*Garam Hawa*, 1973) and Shyam Benegal (*Mammo*, 1995), have also made Muslim-oriented films. Yet, on the whole, one could say that political correctness has recently been traded for an acceptance of the Muslim as the new Evil. The only mainstream exception to this rule, *Lagaan* (2001), a typical feel-good film, returned to the tried and tested formula of branding the former colonizer as the enemy so as to bring back together again Hindu, Muslim, and all other communities in this vast and tumultuous region.

Sultana (Sadiya Siddiqui) in *Kali Salwaar*

So, it may be argued that there is ample scope for subtlety and criticism in the depiction of class, gender, religion, community, and society at large – the Indian nation, if you will – in (inter)national blockbusters. Yet, it is mostly in less widely distributed and discussed crossover-, offbeat-, or art films in which a genuine attempt to comment on present-day society is made, and in which the mainstream tendency to stereotype the Muslim as evil is successfully countered, be it through social realism or intimate parables. Among them, Fareeda Mehta's debut film *Kali Salwaar* (The Black Garment, 2001) tries to approach major themes in a more philosophical way.

Centred on a Muslim prostitute coming from Muzzafarpur to Mumbai, *Kali Salwaar* is an almost abstract odyssey into migration, marginalization, and displacement. Fareeda, who was trained by Kumar Sahani, is an admirer of Ghatak and the French cinematographer Bresson, and follows in the footsteps of the famous cinematographer Ritwik Ghatak, who used cinema for social criticism as much as for contemplation and dialogue, like his students Kumar and Mani Kaul. Her film is based on a story by Saadat Hasan Manto, the leftist Urdu short story writer of the nineteenth century.

Almost the entire film was shot in her neighbourhood in Mumbai, focusing on a lively bazaar. Although the

main themes are displacement and the sense of loss in an anonymous metropolis, the setting breathes a striking intimacy. Sultana, the main character, together with her husband and pimp Kudabaksh, soon find out that life in Mumbai is often beyond their control. With nothing left to make ends meet, Kudabaksh is attracted to fakir mysticism, leaving behind his wife, alone with the desperate wish to find a black garment to wear during Moharram, the Islamic month of mourning. Manto himself, as the author of the story, appears in the film, together with some of the characters from his other short stories, such as the local gangster M'ahmmad Bhai, Babu Gopinath, and Sughandi. Some of the characters meet, while others do not. These separate life stories constitute a web of relations and interconnections, in which money and goods, gestures and glances, and desires and fulfilments are exchanged between people in the bustling bazaars of the city. We get a sense of an imagined community, in which the shared sorrowful memories and experiences of Partition still linger under the surface, occasion-

Sultana (Sadiya Siddiqui) and Shankar (Irfan Khan) in *Kali Salwaar*

ally shining through the dialogue.

This film is an intimate study of urban life, focusing on details in the way people are dressed, the decoration of the rooms, the colours, the smells, and takes time to consider the personal thoughts of people on the street. It is rich in symbolism, for example in the way in which Hindu art in placed in Muslim culture, such as the tree (Krishna's tree, the philosophical 'Self', which balances internal nature with the outside world) painted on the wall of Sultana's apartment. In a daring shot Sultana prepares herself for Moharram, slowly pouring warm water over her naked back and touching her face with the soft satin of the black scarf.

Fareeda captures the poetics of life, in which ornate Urdu and street slang alternate, friendship dispels loneliness, hope turns into despair, yet poverty is realistically harsh. Big Art is sold as small art, characterized by the picture of the Taj Mahal on postcards and the classical tune of Beethoven's *Für Elise* playing in a cheap cigarette lighter; the rich courtesan culture is perpetuated in a cheaply dressed prostitute without money or clients, and references to classical *ghazal* songs are sung in glossy films. According to Fareeda, *Kali Salwaar* does not have a message per se, but deals with exchange of energies. In a silent way it creates 'contemplative spaces' in which the audience can pause and let imagination, emotions, and memory roam free.

Fareeda succeeds in weaving genres and symbols into the texture of life in such a way that the film is not only about Indian Muslim culture, but about a community of people living around a Mumbai bazaar, who share to a certain extent their memories, symbols, emotions, and desires. This notion only once gets overt-

ly expressed, in a dialogue between Sultana and Shankar, a petty criminal who lives day by day. When she remarks to him that he, being a Hindu, cannot understand her concerns for the observance of Moharram, he replies: 'At least spare this hallowed place from communal issues. Your bazaar has the magical ability to bleach both saffron and green to pure white. Here all identities are forgotten.' Here, Sultana's body is an explicit metaphor for the market outside. Shankar's riddle, however, seems to contain some kind of message. The ethnic composition of individuals – governed by primordial principles – are not important, but identities, articulated under the pressures of ever-changing socio-economic forces of the market, are. Or as Fareeda poetically puts it: 'Bombay – a city where identities and icons are formed violently and broken graciously.' <

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Fareeda Mehta was in Amsterdam to lecture at the three-day masterclass on Hindi Popular Cinema, entitled 'Spicy Spectaculars', held at the Asian Studies department (University of Amsterdam), together with Marijke de Vos, programmer of Indian film-screenings at the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam (KIT).
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Modernization, Medicine, and Power in Nineteenth-Century Iran

Following the interregnum and anarchy of the eighteenth century, Iran was politically re-united under the Qajar dynasty (1794-1925). The Qajar period marked Iran's long and at times bloody transition from a traditional kingdom – where the existence of semi-independent magnates limited political unity – to a socially and politically integrated nation-state. The centralization of power during the Qajar period was the major impetus for the modernization of the military, the administration, education, and medicine. In this article the author argues that medical modernization in nineteenth-century Iran is (1) best understood within the framework of the evolving power structure of the Qajar state; and (2) was underpinned by transformations in traditional medicine, which paved the way for the radical integration of the modern sciences in Iran.

By Hormoz Ebrahimnejad

A mong the events that aggravated the political crisis linked to the succession of Fath'Ali-Shah in 1833-34 were plague and cholera epidemics that broke out in 1829. Their outbreak led to a greater role of physicians in the state, theoretical discussions among Persian physicians on the nature and causes of epidemics, and changes to the prevailing medical discourse.

The changing description and understanding of epidemics can be seen in the works of Shirâzi, a traditional court physician of the time.[1] Breaking from his predecessors, Shirâzi put forward an argument based on his clinical observations, using humoral theories to distinguish cholera from cholerin, and to prove that, despite their similar symptoms, cholera was an epidemic while cholerin was not. When Shirâzi wrote his treatise on the difference between cholera and cholerin in 1835, most physicians in Europe and Iran could not clinically discern these two diseases. While Shirâzi's work was hardly a breakthrough in the description or treatment of cholera, it shows that traditional medicine was undergoing theoretical transition.

Shirâzi was not an isolated case. Nineteenth-century Persian medical literature bears witness to a traditional medicine in transition, including changes prompted by the introduction of Western ideas and practices. Contrary to what has usually been assumed, modernization did not occur through the straightforward replacement of traditional by modern European medicine. Rather, the integration of modern medicine went through a long process that included both the reinterpretation of traditional theories by traditional physicians and the assimilation of modern theories through the prism of traditional medicine. The theory of replacement, as proposed by Dr Tholozan, the French personal physician to Naser al-Din-Shah (1848-96), owes much to the fact that medical modernization in non-European countries has generally been studied in the colonial context.

Medical reform and state power

The study of traditional medical institutions and their transformation illustrates the linkage between the evolving structure of state power and medical organization. The growing number of physicians employed by the state is a case in point: as Qajar administrative structures expanded, the number of court physicians multiplied. This prompted the creation of dozens of medical titles besides that of the traditional chief physician: *malek al-atebbâ* (prince of physicians) *sehat al-dowla* ([keeper of the] health of the state), *hakim al-mulk*

Doctor and his patient, painted by Hosein Sheikh

Honar va Mardom (Art and People) No. 164, 1965, Tehran, Iran. Courtesy of the author

(physician of the kingdom), *ra'is al-atebbâ* (chief of the physicians), *nâzem al-atebbâ* (supervisor of the physicians) and so forth. In an era predating hospitals and medical schools, the proliferation of court physicians enjoying regular income, prestige and titles was a major step in the institutionalisation of medicine.

Some Persian medical manuscripts of the time advocated institutional reform. One author saw state hospitals as institutional centres for various branches of medicine where physicians, surgeons, and pharmacists would collaborate under the control of the government. As such they provided the solution for improving medical knowledge by means of the educational role that they had in addition to their disciplining role.[2] Court patronage, moreover, was extended to European physicians. While Western physicians in India worked in the colonial medical service, their counterparts in nineteenth-century Iran worked alongside traditional physicians in the court's medical organization.[3]

Such was the institutional context in which modern medicine was introduced in Iran. Clearly, there was no social or political impediment to intellectual contact between traditional and modern medicine. In stark contrast to the situation in India, Western medicine was not seen as an instrument of colonial domination but as a modern science worthy of study. In both countries traditionally educated physicians played an important role in the transmission of modern medical theories. Nevertheless, due to political and institutional differences, in Iran the traditional medical system integrated and transformed itself into modern medicine, while in India traditional medicine maintained its institutional and theoretical fortresses.[4]

In both the political and medical spheres, modernization involved: (1) re-organizing existing institutions; and (2) locally adapting and justifying new ideas and institutions by referring to tradition. Straightforward modernization – the substitution of traditional institutions and knowledge by European ones – has always faced problems of impracticality due to the traditional system if not outright resistance from traditional forces in Iran. To the extent that reformists aimed to modify and not replace, their efforts generally resulted in internal change.

The modernization of medicine, when compared to modernization in the social and political spheres, remains a special case. While attempts to modernize the country by invoking traditional values and institutions resulted in the social and political reinforcement of traditional forces, in the scientific domain internal change paved the way for the radical integration of the modern sciences. The internal transformation of traditional medicine as the underpinning process of Iranian medical modernization illustrates how the modern sciences, which originated and developed in Europe, were epistemologically transmitted to nineteenth-century Iran. ◀

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Notes >

1 Cf. Hormoz Ebrahimnejad, 'La médecine d'observation en Iran du XIXe siècle', *Gesnerus*, 55 (1998), pp. 33-57.
2 Anonymous manuscript on the establishment of a public hospital, Library Majles, Tehran, no. 505. Translated into English in: Hormoz Ebrahimnejad, *Medicine, Public Health and the Qajar State: Patterns of Medical Modernization in Nineteenth-century Iran* (forthcoming)
3 Notably, in this article nineteenth-century Iranian medicine is neither limited to the court nor to the colonial institution. In Iran, as in India, the vast majority of the population was not covered by court or colonial medicine. But as opposed to India, in Iran, it was court medicine that played a major role in medical modernization.
4 In addition to socio-political factors, cultural, economic, and demographic factors in India favoured the survival and reinforcement of Ayurvedic and Yunani medicine.

Indian Medical Thought
on the Eve of Colonialism

Wellcome Library, London

British colonial power decisively established itself on the Indian subcontinent between 1770 and 1830. This period and the century following it have become the subjects of much creative and insightful research on medical history: the use of medical institutions and personnel as tools for political leverage and power; Anglicist/Orientalist debates surrounding medical education in Calcutta; the birth of so-called Tropical Medicine. Despite much propaganda to the contrary, European medicine did not offer its services in a vacuum. Long-established and sophisticated medical systems already existed in India, developing in new and interesting ways in the period just before the mid-eighteenth century.

By Dominik Wujastyk

In recent years my research has focused on the Sanskrit texts of classical Indian medicine (Sanskrit: *āyurveda*, 'the science of longevity'). Systematic medical ideas, embodied in *ayurveda*, began to be formulated at the time of the Buddha (d. ca. 400). The Buddha was the first to explicitly state that disease arises from an imbalance of three humoral substances (wind, bile, and phlegm), an idea that would become a cornerstone in Indian medical theory. After a lacuna of several hundred years, medical encyclopaedias were compiled, edited, and re-edited. Two of these compendia are relatively well known today as the *Suśruta* and *Caraka*. A third work, named *Heart of Medicine* (*Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasaṃ-hitā*) and composed by the Sindhi author Vāgbhaṭa shortly after 600, brilliantly synthesized earlier compendia. Due to its many translations and adaptations, and its wide adoption as a medical school text, it ranks among the most important medical treatises in Asia

Like other medical historians trained in Sanskrit, I have been mesmerized by these early and important works on medicine filled with extraordinary ideas. They seem to represent the interests and values of a section of Indian society that was Sanskritic and yet free from orthodox Brahmin values such as vegetarianism, even caste. Many questions surround these works; the history of medicine that we can recover from these treatises is necessarily conditioned by the sources themselves – doctor's manuals – and can only be partial. There also remain other under-researched medical topics worth investigating, such as the social history of medicine, non-Sanskritic medical practice, religious and folk healing, barber-surgeon traditions (including the history of the Ambastha caste), the history of healing halls, clinics and hospitals recoverable from epigraphic records, and the continuing search for patient records and narratives of disease and healing.

A rich medical tradition

Two recent developments have taken my own research in a different direction. First, between 1999 and 2002, Dr G. Jan Meulenbeld's gargantuan *A History of Indian Medical Literature* was published. Its five thick tomes are a detailed survey of the body of Sanskrit medical literature, born of a scholarly lifetime of reading the original texts and noting the important features of their contents, their intellectual and medical innovations, the biographical details of their authors, and much else besides. Volumes IIa and IIb are of special interest as they survey thousands of Sanskrit medical works from 600 up

to the present, laying bare for the first time the sheer volume and diversity of the scientific production of the post-classical period. Production in no way diminished in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which spawned rich and vitally important medical treatises of all kinds.

The late sixteenth century saw the composition of such critically influential medical works as Bhāvamiśra's encyclopaedic *Bhāvaprakāśa*, the even larger *Ṭodarānanda*, produced for Ṭodaramalla at the Mughal court, the *Rājanighaṇṭu* (the largest extant lexicon of Indian *materia medica*), Lolimbarāja's incredibly popular *Vaidyajīvana*, and Harṣakīrti's *Yogacintāmaṇi*. A cursory examination of any manuscript library in India reveals hundreds of copies of these works, which were energetically copied, distributed, and studied throughout the subcontinent. Printed editions of some of these works are in wide circulation and use in India even today, in traditional medicine colleges and clinics.

The seventeenth century continued the rich production of medical texts, including those of Trimallabhaṭṭa, and several works commissioned by Mahārāja Anūpasiṃha of Bikaner. Other authors worthy of study include Bharatamallika, who wrote on the genealogy of the medical families of Bengal, and Praharāja who wrote a medical text in the novel form of a dramatized dialogue between husband and wife. Several medical works were also produced under the patronage of the Maratha dynasty of Thanjavur in South India.

The eighteenth century witnessed, apparently for the first time, the emergence of a linguistic situation in which medical authors began to develop literary discourses spanning languages. In this, so far as we can tell, medical writing seems to differ from other disciplines of Sanskrit intellectual life. For example, Diler Jang composed in both Sanskrit and Persian, while Mahādevadeva wrote two works, which contain Perso-Arabic terms and introduced Islamic medicine to a Sanskrit-reading audience. Vyāsa Keśavarāma composed a bilingual Gujarati-Sanskrit medical glossary, which referred to Persian medicine, and Mahārāja Pratāpasiṃha of Jaipur wrote in Marwari, and then translated his own work into Sanskrit verse and Hindi prose (incidentally distinguishing five new types of insanity). In Thanjavur the Mahārājas themselves began composing medical texts. This period is marked by a growing awareness of foreign medical traditions in India: Raṅgajyotirvid mentions English operations for piles, and refers to several contemporary foreign physicians. Govindadāsa introduced various foreign medical innovations, while refer-

ring to the views of contemporary physicians.

The second major influence on my research has been the recent work of Sheldon Pollock, professor of Sanskrit at Chicago, and the invitation to participate in his 'Indian Knowledge Systems on the Eve of Colonialism' project which has brought together a research group interested in similar social and intellectual issues in disciplines as diverse as astronomy *(jyotiṣa)*, logic *(nyāya)*, poetic theory *(alaṅkāra)*, liturgical hermeneutics *(mīmāṃsā)* and, of course, medicine.[1]

Pollock's recent research, published in articles such as 'Indian knowledge systems on the eve of colonialism' (*Intellectual History Newsletter*, 2000), 'The death of Sanskrit' (*Comparative Studies in History and Society*, 2001), and 'New intellectuals in seventeenth-century India' (*The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 2001), explores and develops ideas from his earlier work, for instance the meaning in the Indian context of such crucial concepts as modernity and novelty. Based on close readings of an unusually wide range of texts from Sanskrit and other languages, Pollock offers a grand narrative of social, literary, and linguistic change. In his more recent writings he identifies novel genres of literary production and the growth of certain types of potentially anti-traditionalist questioning that seem to have become acceptable, even fashionable, in more than one intellectual discipline.

While some of Pollock's arguments and evidence have been challenged by scholars such as Juergen Hanneder, nobody has plausibly replaced or displaced Pollock's overall argument about the forces at work within language and thought in second-millennium India.

Sanskrit systems of thought

An intriguing feature of Pollock's work is the status it grants to the intellectual history of Sanskrit South Asia as a formation of great, possibly uniquely great, importance in the global history of human thought. Pollock encourages us to adopt an approach to understanding Sanskrit systems of thought that place them on the world stage, as well as the application to India of sophisticated ideas and tools that have developed in studying pre-modern European thought. Additionally, the ideas and contributions of Sanskrit authors and scholars are discussed in a social as well as purely intellectual milieu. This is only possible when a reasonable amount of biographical information survives, as is the case with intellectuals from the last millennium, especially from the centuries preceding colonialism.

The medical authors of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries illustrate the

A physician and nurse attending a sick patient and her servant. Watercolour. seventeenth century.

possibilities for integrating the history of ideas with that of the social processes that shaped their production and transmission through this period of Indian intellectual history. Data on relationships connecting families and on lines of academic tutelage can be retrieved, and it now appears possible to begin exploring the social basis of 'knowledge making and knowledge holding' (Steve Shapin) and the social and intellectual links among thinkers

whose ideas have been passed down to later generations. <

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Notes >

1 See: http://dsal.uchicago.edu/sanskrit
2 See also: Randall Collins, *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (1998).

Adam Stainton's Cultural Observations
A Plant Hunter in the Himalayas

The early field botanists working in the Himalayas, such as Frank Kingdon-Ward, George Forrest, Major George Sherriff and Frank Ludlow, were respected for their thoroughness as collectors of little-known flora. Less well-documented is the attention that these 'plant hunters' gave to the cultural details of the communities whose villages and pasture lands they entered. Unlike many early anthropologists working in Nepal, who chose to focus on one region or ethnic group, the botanical collectors roamed across the country, often covering a number of districts and climatic zones in a matter of weeks. Where they may have missed the depth of rich ethnographic detail, they made up for this in regional breadth, and were both sufficiently informed and well-positioned to compare the agricultural patterns or housing styles of the different communities they encountered. One such explorer was J.D.A. Stainton, whose field note manuscripts from journeys to Nepal in the 1960s, I came across in the Botany Library of the Natural History Museum, London.

Villagers from the
alpine zone of Nepal

One of Adam Stain-
ton's Nepali helpers
pressing specimens
of a minute *primula*

By Mark Turin

Adam Stainton, born in 1921, was one of the second wave of botanists to work in the Himalayas. The first recorded botanical explorations of Nepal date to the early 1800s, but extensive exploration of the Kingdom of Nepal only became possible with the opening of the country to foreign visitors in 1950. Stainton first visited Nepal in 1954 as part of an expeditionary team alongside Leonard How, John Williams, and William Sykes. Their stated objective was to gather a comprehensive collection of pressed specimens and thus to build a lasting record of the flora of the region. Stainton came from a family of lawyers and whisky distillers, a background that provided him with enough financial security to pursue his interest in botanical exploration without being dependent on funding from scholarly institutions.

He made a great contribution to Himalayan botany, despite being virtually self-taught. Stainton was also an accomplished photographer, taking more than 4,000 slides on his travels. On his later field trips to Nepal in the 1960s, he took a number of 16 mm cine reels illustrating the plants and people he encountered.* He remained, however, a most private man, and his *Memoirs*, published in 1988, three years before his death, reveal little about his character or personal ambitions. It was a pleasant surprise to discover that his field notes bear witness of both a developed sense of humour and an eye for social observation. This short article offers a few culturally and historically revealing citations from his expedition notes from Nepal in the 1960s.

Stainton was careful to subdivide his writings into different sections, and his accounts invariably commence with a reference to the porters he hired. In *General Notes on Travel* from his 1964 expedition, we learn that he 'used Sherpa porters almost exclusively, and paid them at the rate of 6 rupees Nepali per day. They were mostly friends or relatives of our respective Sherpa sirdars, and as a result we were entirely free from porter troubles throughout the trip. Occasionally delays due to the social importance of *chang*-drinking in Sherpa country were a small price to pay for freedom from any further transport problems'. This description offers an interesting contrast to an experience from the previous year, on a trip to West Nepal. In Dolpo, he writes, while 'porters were not difficult to obtain, and were very cheerful and willing: a European visitor who had preceded me a short time before had paid a rate of 8 rupees, so that there was no prospect of getting any porters for less'. This Dolpo expedition was not without tensions, one of which he describes in detail: 'From Tarakot to Tukucha I paid a rate of 10 rupees per day. Porters from Mukut crossing the high pass into the Kali valley attempted to increase this rate when at the top of the pass by giving me the alternatives either of paying more or of being abandoned there. They were surprised to find that in such circumstances I preferred abandonment, and in the end they completed the journey at the agreed rate.'

His interest in, and respect for, the Sherpa communities he encountered deepened over time. In 1964 he noted that throughout eastern Nepal, there was 'no doubt that the Sherpa areas are very much richer than most other parts', while of Rolwaling he wrote that 'the people are Sherpas, and compared to the Sherpas of Khumbu who have become somewhat sated with mountaineering expeditions they are an unsophisticated and very cheerful community'. 'Since 1949', he continued,

'Khumbu has been visited by so many mountaineering expeditions that its people show a considerable degree of sophistication. They possess a wealth of climbing equipment, and it is not unusual to be addressed in English by persons dressed in European style'. Describing the porters they hired in Kathmandu for a journey to West Nepal the following year, Stainton noted that 'these Sherpas viewed the ways of the local people with some surprise. Having myself travelled in Sherpa country the previous year it was very evident to me that the Sherpa people are a much more progressive community than these inhabitants of West Nepal'. While interested in the cultures and languages of the people he met on his travels, Stainton did not present himself as an expert. His one-time travelling companion, Tirtha Bahadur Shrestha, a well-respected botanist from Nepal, wrote in an obituary: 'Adam never spoke Nepali nor did he make any attempt to do so.'

While languages may not have been his forte, Stainton's interest in the morphology of plants also manifested itself in his attention to architectural structures. He wrote: 'One of the pleasant features of Dolpo, and a great contrast to other Buddhist areas in Nepal is the excellent state of repair in which all religious buildings and monuments are kept. The red, grey, orange, and white wash with which they paint their *gompas* and *chortens* adds much colour to the scene. Some of these *gompas* are orthodox ones and some of the Pon-po [sic] sect; they alternate with a frequency confusing to all except an expert Tibetologist.' Stainton remained, however, wary of reductive logic: 'It is tempting to assume that these flat roofs indicate a drier climate here, but one is hardly justified in doing so without further knowledge of the cultural background of the villagers.'

Stainton recorded a number of the socio-cultural changes affecting the communities he met on his journeys. In the late 1960s, established Himalayan anthropologists were beginning to talk of cultural transformations and of Sanskritization, a process which the botanist also noted: 'Any traveller to Nepal soon appreciates the tendency of people to upgrade themselves in reply to questions about their caste. I suspect that some of the people who for the benefit of the inquisitive say that they are Chetri, Borah, and the like have in fact in the recent past had very close relationships with the Bhotea [sic] peoples to the north.' On occasion, Stainton buried entertaining asides in his otherwise serious field notes, as illustrated by his thoughts on the Tharu inhabitants on Dang, who '...live in long spacious one-storeyed houses with reed-thatched roofs, and they decorate them with symbols and pictures drawn in wash or carved in wood in a distinctive style. These decorations have an antique appearance, but amongst birds and beasts carved on a wooden well-head at Tulsipur which seemed to be of great age I observed a stylised but perfectly recognisable carving of a DC 3. The airstrip on which the aeroplane from Katmandu [sic] lands is close by'. ‹

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Information >

Digital Himalaya is a pilot project to develop digital collection, archiving, and distribution strategies for multimedia anthropological information from the Himalayan region. Based at Cornell and Cambridge universities, the project began in December 2000. The initial phase involves digitizing a set of existing ethnographic archives comprised of photographs, films, sound recordings, field-notes, and texts collected by anthropologists and travellers in Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Indian Himalayas from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present. Please take a look at www.digitalhimalaya.com

Note >

* The Digital Himalaya Project recently digitized an hour of Stainton's 16 mm cine footage.

Digital Himalaya

As I walked up the Kali Gandaki river valley from the Mustang district headquarters of Jomsom to the ethnically Tibetan village of Lubra, located in a remote side canyon, the portable Panasonic DVD player and its extra 12-hour battery weighed heavy in my backpack. On my mind were equally weighty questions about how the digitized 16mm film shot in Lubra by anthropologist Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf in 1962, which I was planning to show during my visit, would be received. I had been coming to Lubra regularly for the last eight years and was close to many of the village residents, but nevertheless I was anxious about this first experiment in returning cultural property through the Digital Himalaya Project. Would people be interested in the film? Would the cultural taboo of displaying images of the deceased make the showing of old film offensive? Would villagers be angry that they had not seen the film until now?

By Sara Shneiderman

After arriving in the small village of fifteen houses, I sent around word calling the villagers to a community film showing in the village *gompa* (Buddhist temple) for the next afternoon. 'You don't have to worry, everyone will show up – perhaps even early!' reassured a local friend when I expressed my concern that people would not be interested. 'They've never seen a film in their own village before, and certainly not one of the village itself. It will be the most exciting thing happening all winter.' Lubra remains without electricity or phone access, and although many of its young and able-bodied residents spend the cold months of the year as traders elsewhere, children and the elderly are left behind to weather the bitter Himalayan winter.

It was in fact this latter group, the village elders, whom I sought most eagerly for my audience. They were most likely to remember the individual characters and events shown in the 1962 film. To my satisfaction, as the time for the film-showing approached, a group of around 25 people, including five over the age of sixty, gathered in the *gompa* courtyard. I set up the portable DVD player on a ledge inside, where the wooden windows could be closed to create a temporary cinema atmosphere. Upon giving a brief introduction to our project and noting the date of the film from Lubra, 1962, I chose not to provide any additional contextual information about the silent footage, hoping instead to elicit viewers' comments about both the content and form of the film.

As I pressed 'play', a hush fell over the group and they crowded closer around the small screen. Fade-in to a group of local women dancing in a circle wearing their ritual finery. No response from the audience. A few village scenes, everyday activities like goat-herding and hair-combing flashed across the screen. Not a word. Two minutes of the five-minute film clip gone, and I was beginning to worry. Cut to an image of what appears to be an argument, with a group of villagers silently shouting at each other in black and white.

Suddenly a deep belly laugh erupted from the senior lama of the village, a jovial man of around sixty-two. 'That was the argument about my cousin's wedding! I know those people! Look, look!' he commanded the other villagers, pointing a dirty finger right up against the faces on the small screen. With the silence broken by such a respected community member, everyone began chattering excitedly. 'That's my grandmother Chimi Dolkar!' shouted one old woman. 'No, it's not, it's my husband's aunt Palsang!' After the initial disorientation of seeing moving film of the village for the first time, it all began to fall into place for the viewers, and the race was on to identify each individual appearing in the film.

'I can't believe it, it's as if our lifespan is doubled,' exclaimed Rinchen Lhamo, a sixty-five-year-old woman who had been present during the events that Haimendorf filmed. 'Now that we have this machine we can meet people we never thought we'd see again.' I asked whether this contravened the taboo on displaying images of the deceased. 'Not at all,'

A still from the 1962 cine reel taken by professor Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf showing local women dancing in their finery.

she chuckled, 'this is different from a photograph, which only reminds us of death. Here they are alive, so there is no problem.' An interesting indigenous summary of the power of moving image.

As the afternoon wore on, we watched the five-minute film clip again and again. Each time, we paused on different sections, and the villagers debated the identity of each individual. Many people there could find an aunt or an uncle, and a few older villagers even recognized their own parents. Small children were called in to 'meet' the grandparents they had never known. After extensive discussion, the details of the argument at the wedding captured in the film emerged, as did other important information that expanded upon Haimendorf's own field notes from that day. In particular, it

became clear that several of the early scenes in the film were not actually from Lubra, but from the neighbouring district of Dolpo. Apparently Haimendorf had spliced these scenes together without making a note of their different sources. In addition, the four villagers who could actually recall Haimendorf's visit all concurred that the women's dance early in the film was not in fact a natural part of the wedding ritual, but rather a feat of anthropological engineering: Haimendorf had asked all of the village women to put on their finest clothes and dance so he could film them.

By twilight we had watched the film at least thirty times, and people began to drift away to do their evening work. Exhausted but happy, I packed up the DVD player and returned to my host family's house. As I was enjoying a glass of warm local spirit, two of the older women who had been at the film showing all afternoon walked through the door and asked for a personal showing. Clearly the film held more than a passing fascination for the villagers, and could be usefully integrated into the existing structure of cultural memory. We spent the evening talking further about the film and its possibilities. Late in the evening, as the fire was dying low, Rinchen Wangmo asked whether I could leave the DVD and the magical 'machine' in the village with them. 'Not until the village gets electricity. As it is, the battery will last only a few more hours, and then it will be over.' She nodded and set off for home with a pensive look on her face.

The next morning, as I was preparing to leave, her son offered to accompany me on the two-hour walk to the district headquarters. In his hand was a petition to the Chief District Officer to re-examine the possibilities for electrifying the village – among the twenty or so villages in the immediate region, Lubra is the only one that remains dark. 'We asked before,' he said, 'but the effort was half-hearted. This film has given us a new reason to try.' <

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Sara Shneiderman introducing the Digital Himalaya project to the villagers of Lubra, December 2002.

Revolutionary Mongols, Lamas and Buddhism (1921-1941)

Research >
Central Asia

The history of Buddhism in Mongolia dates back to the thirteenth century when Kublai Khan established ties with the influential hierarchs of the Mahayana sect, Sakya, in Tibet. It was not until the sixteenth century when Altan Kan of the Tumet devoted himself to the then leading school, Gelug (the yellow faith), that this strand of Buddhism had been actively spreading across Mongolia. By the beginning of the twentieth century Geluk had become the official and dominant religion regulating all areas of everyday life. Yet in contemporary Outer Mongolia, Buddhism no longer plays its former great political, social, and cultural role. The Buddhist *sangha* of Outer Mongolia had been the main obstacle for the Mongolian People's Party (MPP) and the People's Government to maintain and enhance their power.[1] Therefore, the revolutionary and socialist changes in the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) partly sought to dismantle the religious institutions causing them to vanish almost entirely. What happened to the Buddhist *sangha* and the Buddhists in Outer Mongolia in the early twentieth century? For 70 years the original sources which could provide the answer to this question were inaccessible to the West. However, the recent opening of Mongolian and Russian archives has allowed the author to reconstruct the facts and shed light on historical events.

By Irina Morozova

In the 1920s, lamas accounted for one third of the population and the Buddhist monasteries, which functioned as political, economic, educational, and cultural centres, had established a network in Mongolia as well as abroad. The clergy had its own administrative district, Shabinar, and consolidated more than 30 per cent of the national livestock. The monastic administration worked closely with the local secular authorities in matters such as taxation (involving payments in both money and in kind and even corvée labour). Thus strong monastic corporations preserved the local system of social and economic redistribution for centuries. In addition the monasteries held a monopoly on education. In short, any significant event in the life of a Mongolian always involved the presence of a lama.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Outer Mongolia was associated with the head of its Buddhist *sangha* and Shabinar, Bogdo-Gegen. The eighth Bogdo-Gegen, Jebtsundamba Khutagt, the Living Buddha, was a charismatic political leader, who was highly popular with the Mongols. As a result of the national revolution against the Qing rule in 1911 he became the first and last theocratic monarch of Mongolia.

The authority of Bogdo-Gegen, his theocratic government and influential *khutagts*, the Shabinar and monastic corporations, formed the main opposition to the Mongolian revolutionaries, the Soviet Bolsheviks and the agents of the Comintern, who had diversified their activities in East Asia during the 1920-1930s.[2] The Mongolian revolutionaries, instructed by their Soviet advisers, had to work out the general strategy and tactics. The aim of their policy was the elimination of Buddhist clergy as a political and social institution and the secularization of education in Mongolia. This process went through five main periods.

The anti-Chinese alliance

The period from 1921 to 1924 witnessed the tactical alliance of revolutionaries and lamas. The revolutionaries promised to liberate Mongolia from the Qing administration and Chinese colonialists and to declare Bogdo-Gegen the constitutional monarch. In return, the court of Bogdo-Gegen guaranteed the MPP full support in the 'liquidation of hereditary nobles and popularization of revolutionary ideas into the masses'.[3] On 1 November 1921, the People's Government and Bogdo-Gegen signed the 'Treaty on Oath', according to which the Jebtsundamba Khutagt remained the nominal leader of the Mongols and the symbol of the Mongolian State, but with the real power passing into the hands of the revolutionaries. Subsequently, the People's Government placed restrictions on the rights of Bogdo-Gegen and gradually implemented the administrative reforms of the Shabinar, according it the same status as other administrative districts.

During this period the MPP was weak and insignificant; its members were concentrated in the capital, Urga and large parts of the population living in distant regions were even unaware of the existence of the party. At that time, the revolutionaries could not operate without the lamas' administrative experience and their support in popular campaigns. Many lamas occupied key government positions and some even became members of the Central Committee of the MPP.

The new government was able to maintain its power in Urga thanks to the tolerant attitude of many high-ranking *khutagts* and nobles. Despite the events in Urga, the monastic lamas, continued busying themselves with local and internal affairs, as they perceived the MPP as a temporary political ally and remained fully unawares that they would soon become the victims of the revolution.

The death of Bogdo-Gegen and the declaration of the Mongolian People's Republic in 1924 seriously affected the political rights of the *sangha*, marking the end of the first period. The lamas concern became tangible and they now searched for ways to reach political consolidation, however in vain as between 1925 and 1928 the revolutionaries had politically neutralized them.

Meanwhile the MPP (since 1925 the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP)) had been successfully recruiting new members and raising new cadres. The new left-wing Party deviators (the Leftists) proposed drastic measures against the *sangha* and even against Buddhist religion. As their implementation could easily result in mass protests among the Mongols, the Comintern instructors recommended to the MPRP that they employ the tactics of 'social stratification of the lamas', that is instigating revolutionary agitation among the lower lamas against the high-ranking ones. The strategy failed because Buddhist ethics and the traditional respect for the elderly in nomadic society did not match with the mood of rebellion, which the Comintern agents tried to spread.

Crackdown on the lamas

At the fourth Congress, the MPRP openly declared the struggle against the high-ranking lamas and confessed to have accepted their assistance only under difficult circumstances. Soon after the law separating religion and state was passed in 1926, the Shabinar was abolished and its population was integrated into the other districts according to territorial principles.

In 1928 the revolutionaries placed a ban on seeking reincarnations, thus refusing the demands of the *sangha* for the ninth reincarnation of Bogdo-Gegen. Since that time, no other Living Buddha has been allowed to appear and perform as political and spiritual symbol of Outer Mongolia.

By refusing political authority to the *sangha*, the MPRP did not solve the 'lama question'. The majority of the population kept on worshipping Buddha's disciples and sending children to the monasteries to study and the monastic livestock and property also continued to expand. The former an eye-sore, the latter was most threatening and challenging to the power of the MPRP, which decided to confiscate the property of nobles and lamas at its Seventh Congress at the end of 1928. This event marked the beginning of a new period in revolutionary politics and proved fatal to the lamas.

From 1929-1932 the economic foundation of monasteries was eliminated. The confiscation of monastic property during the *jas* campaign formed part of forced mass collectivization between 1930 and 1932.[4] It is interesting to note that the Comintern and Soviet advisers warned the MPRP against launching this campaign, considering it to be too risky.[5] This time, however, the Mongolian Leftists acted on their own initiative. Local party authorities confiscated monastic livestock by force and transferred it to collective pastures. Leftist enthusiasts violently overturned the social and economic relations of the nomads that had evolved over cen-

turies, instigated compulsory measures against the lamas and furthermore, profane Buddhist objects of worship. It is no wonder that such a campaign resulted in lama-led mass revolts in which 70 per cent of the population participated. The rebellions started in March 1930 and were suppressed only with the help of Soviet military by October 1932, resulting in around 10,000 deaths.

The main goals of the *jas* campaign were to destroy the corporate monastic system and in its place to develop local party structures. Although these aims were achieved to a certain extent, the cultural influence of lamas remained strong. Even in 1932, Mongolian nomads regarded them as respectable teachers, doctors, and skilled craftsmen.

The years 1933-1935 provided a short and relative economic relief after the mass collectivization. For the *sangha* it was a period of slight restoration, during which the lamas briefly increased their numbers, built new temples, had their titles restored, and continued to use the population as labour force. The revolutionary government, on its part, increased the tax on monasteries and even interfered in internal monastic life, attempting to control appointments of Buddhist hierarchs. The impossibility of the two systems coexisting, the MPRP

Gandan Monastery in Ulaanbaatar (founded in 1838), the central and largest monastery in Mongolia, is one of a few Buddhist temples that survived the socialist period.

and the Buddhist *sangha*, became more obvious than ever.

The newest (and the latest) stage of 'lama policy' started in 1936, when H. Choibalsan consolidated power and promoted repressive organizations that introduced the reign of terror in the MPR. At that time, not only high-ranking *khutagts*, but all lamas were labelled 'number one contra-revolutionary elements', 'enemies of the Mongolian nation', and 'agents of Japanese imperialism'. From 1937 to 1940 the Buddhist *sangha* of Outer Mongolia was liquidated. According to most Mongolian historians, around 35,000 lamas suffered some form of repression; ranging from mental torture to execution. Some researchers suggest the numbers of up to 90,000 (out of a total 100,000).

In 1937 many Mongols wanting to become Buddhist monks were prohibited from doing so, and those lamas who were ready to give up their religious status gained social benefits from the government. In 1938 alone, 760 monasteries out of a total 771 had been closed and the expropriation of all monastic property was completed in the next year. These events meant the end of a former socio-economic and political elite in Mongolia – the lamas.

The last assault was made on the cultural front. The Tibetan and Mongolian writing systems, which were the basic means of Buddhist teaching, were to be eliminated. As long as people continued to read and write in these languages, which, as the revolutionaries believed could not express modern concepts, they would remain deaf to the cultural achievements of the revolution. Thus, in March 1941, the Central Committee of the MPRP announced the adoption of Cyrillic as the new Mongolian alphabet. This step was crucial in the formation of a secular, Soviet-style educational system. It had taken the revolutionaries about 20 years (1921-1941) to liquidate the great and powerful Buddhist *sangha* of Outer Mongolia. <

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Notes >

1 The *sangha* is the community of Buddhist monks, linked together by internal structure, hierarchies and regulations. The Mongolian *sangha* is represented by different types of lamas and high-ranking lamas, called *khutagts*.
2 The politics of the Third Communist International in Mongolia is described in: Morozova, Irina Y., *The Comintern and Revolution in Mongolia.* Cambridge: White Horse Press (2002).
3 Russian State Archive of Social-Political History (RSASPH). F. 495. Sch. 152. D. 3, l.2.
4 *Jas* (Mong.) are monastic households.
5 RSASPH. F. 495. Sch. 3. D. 55, l. 16; D. 72, l. 31; Sch. 154. D. 391, l. 56; Sch. 4. D. 73, l. 8, 9.

The Gift of a Daughter

Subhadra Butalia's father was determined to marry her to a husband who would not expect or demand a dowry. At the time she married, soon after the independence of India in 1947, a bride might be nagged or grumbled at for little or no dowry, but there were no threats of violence. However, many families 'taking' a bride had begun to expect, hint, demand, solicit, and finally threaten a woman and her parents for not giving expensive presents. By 1961, the Indian government recognized the custom had become an opportunity for extortion and passed a law to prohibit it. But a bride's wedding gifts had turned into a husband's entitlement, and Hindu, Sikh, Muslim, and Christian families increasingly began taking recourse to violence to obtain it.

By Shauna Singh Baldwin

In the 1970s, Subhadra Butalia found herself among a crowd watching in horror as the bride next door, Hardeep Kaur, became a human torch and was taken to hospital on a stretcher. With 70 per cent burns, Hardeep Kaur became yet another 'bride-burning' statistic, murdered by her in-laws for not bringing enough in cash and kind. Hardeep had been sent back to her parents with a list of her husband's dowry demands, but her parents decided she should be returned to her husband and in-laws. The blackmail continued until the parents could pay no more, and then Hardeep was murdered. Why did Hardeep's parents send her back, Butalia wondered? And she questioned why the newspapers had failed to carry a single report about Hardeep's murder. Of all the neighbours who had stood before the spectacle of a burning woman, only Subhadra Butalia agreed to testify. Thus began her 35-year struggle to help victims of dowry-related violence.

Now 81 years old, Subhadra Butalia has written a succinct volume that she describes as 'neither a memoir, nor a book about dowry'. Yet it has elements of both. Using names and stories of victims of dowry death and disagreement, the author explores this deeply embedded tradition and shows us the prob-

lems of social organizations and workers dealing with domestic violence in the extended family.

The memory of a childhood friend, Madhu, moved me to read *The Gift of a Daughter*. Madhu, a lovely young Punjabi woman, came from a wealthy, professional class family. She was head girl of my school, studied French and sociology at college and dreamed of travelling the world. She married for love in the early 1980s, and was shunned for it by her family. By 1983, she was gone. Poisoned, it was rumoured, by her in-laws. And the reaction from people in Delhi: 'What did she expect, marrying against her parents wishes? Her in-laws should have known there would be no dowry given to her, no matter what their demands. This is what happens to a disobedient girl.'

Madhu's story is not unique. The dowry tradition is now practised by Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims, and Christians alike. Moreover, dowry demands have made their way overseas, so that wedding season for brides of Indian origin in the North American diaspora of Indians, is also dowry season. For all its sensational appeal when mentioned in the Western press, bride-burning and the dowry system are Indian expressions of 'domestic violence' in materially developed countries, spanning classes and education levels. A 1997

estimate by UNICEF placed the annual number of reported dowry deaths in India at 5,377, a 12 per cent increase on the previous year. While men living in North America who believe women to be non-persons, might verbally abuse, beat or eventually shoot them (with no statistics available as to whether economic demands were made to relatives), men and mothers-in-law without access to handguns might, in India, douse a woman in kerosene and light a match.

Subhadra Butalia and the organizations she has founded, Stree Sangarsh and Karmika, have intervened hundreds of times in India to prevent a dowry killing, or have sought to bring murderers to justice. In a tone of sadness, she describes the elusiveness of justice. Yet her outrage must have been strong enough to carry her through many rescue missions over the years, and to prompt her to write.

The perennial question arises: how can any parent value his or her respectability higher than the life of his or her daughter? As in Hardeep Kaur's case, an Indian daughter facing dowry demands is highly likely to be sent back to her in-laws to 'adjust', facing abuse, violence, and even death. Butalia offers two explanations, the first mythological – an unwed Hindu woman becomes a ghost – the second economic. Eco-

nomic reasons outweigh any myths in the stories she presents, for the list of explanations begins with the underground cash economy and the ostentatious display by the *nouveaux riches*. And the book's ever-present backdrop is the large-scale dependence of Indian women on husbands, and atavistic ideas of women as property.

Having introduced the problem of dowry by displaying the faces and names of its victims over her years of activism, Butalia leaves us with many open questions for further research, such as: why do women (sisters and mothers-in-law) participate in dowry demands? How can we penetrate the wilful denial of parents of married daughters that dowry demands are illegal and dangerous to their daughters' physical safety? How is the practice of bride-endowment (*mehar*) changing to dowry in the Indian Muslim community? How does the implementation of Hindu inheritance law underpin dowry demands experienced by women subject to Hindu personal law?

By the end of this little gem of a book, you feel the author's ruminating voice fill with wonder and delight in the stories of young women who, in the past few years, have thrown feminine respectability to the wind, and called off or walked out of weddings when a dowry demand was made. Subhadra

Butalia's father would have been proud of his courageous daughter's many arduous years of helping victims, and of agitating for changes in the law and its enforcement. Though too late for many like Hardeep and my friend Madhu, social workers like Butalia have raised our consciousness and made it conceivable for young women to question and protest at this pernicious institution. ‹

- Butalia, Subhadra, *The Gift of a Daughter. Encounters with Victims of Dowry*, Delhi: Penguin Books India (2002), pp. 170, ISBN 0143028715

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Preserving Tibetan Cultural Heritage

As the situation deteriorated in Tibet, the odds for Akong Tulku's refugee party looked more unfavourable each day of their perilous journey to India. Leaving behind the familiar and accommodating world of Eastern Tibet, which they had enjoyed and cherished for as long as their memories reached, they now found themselves displaced and lost in the freezing winter of the southern mountain ranges of Tibet, all of a sudden fugitives in their own land. After many months of arduous hardships, their group, which included the 11th Trungpa Tulku, the leader of the party, had dwindled from several hundreds to just a little more than a dozen. Too hungry and exhausted to move, they huddled together in a Himalayan cave, waiting for death to take them one by one. Fortunately, local hunters chanced upon them and took pity. Having thus escaped certain death through the kindness of strangers, Akong Tulku resolved to dedicate his remaining life to providing aid and refuge to people in distress, in Tibet and elsewhere.

By Pim Willems

It was with this defining experience in mind that Akong Tulku Rinpoche founded, in 1980, the humanitarian aid organization Rokpa, which in Tibetan signifies 'help'. Headed by Rokpa International in Switzerland, 17 branches in 16 countries raise funds for projects in education, healthcare, environment, culture, and social economy. At present, there are 135 projects in Tibet alone. Through publication of rare Tibetan texts, many of which are on the verge of being lost forever, preservation of Tibetan cultural heritage is actively sought. These efforts have so far resulted in two multi-volume collections: Tibetan medical texts and Kagyupa college texts. These collections will be entrusted to the care of libraries all over the world, in the hope to better preserve Tibetan heritage, which has proven to be so vulnerable to the vicissitudes of history.

Since 1998, members of Rokpa have actively searched many regions of Tibet for rare medical texts, while also trying to locate commentaries on the basic texts and documents identifying crucial medicinal herbs. The collected texts are electronically edited and arranged into volumes, while prefaces, illustrations, and footnotes are added. Ultimately, Rokpa Tibet and the Sichuan Minority Printing House will print some twenty-seven 600-page volumes of Tibetan medical texts.

Of the four main schools of Tibetan Buddhism: the Gel-

ugpa, Sakyapa, Nyingmapa, and Kagyupa, the first three have their own college texts. To ensure that in Kagyupa college students can be taught from their own textbooks, and to save Kagyupa traditional knowledge from being lost, Rokpa International has decided to locate and collect all texts of the Kagyupa system of instruction in the ten traditional sciences or areas of learning. In a joint venture with the Xining Printing Press, 2,000 copies of the twenty-volume Kagyupa textbook collection will be printed for Tibetan colleges, universities, and libraries all over the world. The contents include:

poetry and modes of expression, dramatic and creative arts, the healing arts, valid cognition, graduated path, *abhidharma, madhyamika, prajnaparamita*, treatises relating sutra and tantra, commonalities of tantra, and commentaries on tantra.

The first copies were formally presented to the Kern Institute Library at Leiden University during the IIAS-initiated cultural event 'Appreciating Tibet in the West', held in November 2002 at the occasion of the official presentation of the proceedings of the ninth seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies. ‹

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Tibetological Collections & Archives Series

Pim Willem's article on 'Preserving Tibetan Cultural Heritage' is the tenth contribution to the Tibetological Collections & Archives Series, which is devoted to important projects on cataloguing, 'computerization' (inputting and scanning), editing, and translation of important Tibetan language text-collections and archives. In this series various colleagues briefly present their initiatives to a larger public, or update the scholarly world on the progress of their already well-established projects. Some are high-profile projects, of which at least Tibetologists will generally be aware, yet some may also be less well known. Nevertheless, I trust that it will be useful to be informed or updated on all these initiatives and I also hope that the projects presented will profit from the exposure and the response that this coverage will engender. If you are interested in any of the projects described, feel free to contact the author of the article. In case you would like to introduce your own (planned) work in the field, please contact the editors of the *IIAS Newsletter* or the author of this introduction. We should very much like to encourage our contributors to keep us informed on the progress of their projects by means of regular updates. ‹

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Utopian Identities, Real Selves

Whereas most of the voluminous critical discussion of 'postcolonialism' and literature has concentrated on issues of 'writing back' in colonial situations and in European languages to empires past and present, the focus of the IIAS workshop 'Chewing the West' was on indigenous literatures and the broader issue of the multiple ways in which not only Western literary genres, but also non-Western modern identities have been configured in literature outside the West.*

Report >
General

5-7 December 2002
Leiden,
the Netherlands

By Tony Day

The workshop's very conceptualization promised a shift from a narrow concern with the legacies of colonialism, which, as many commentators have observed, has tended to reinforce the very dominance of European languages and literatures that indigenous authors and post-colonial scholars are contesting. If the presenters effectively 'provincialized' and localized the dominant West, they also indicated that much remains to be done, through the study of literary forms themselves, before we understand how the worldwide processes of literary creation occur and lead to the emergence of 'world literature'. Particularly fascinating were the hints of a tension between utopian possibilities for identity conveyed through literary forms, whether 'Western' or 'indigenous', and the 'real' selves, whether in the guise of characters or authorial personae, conveyed by the literary text. The tension between idealized past or future identities and real selfhood in the present has less to do with the formation of the nation state than with the creation of literary selves. Readers around the world can recognize the latter in their own actual everyday, modern contexts (for several stimulating definitions of realism and the self in literature, see Karatani 1993, Makdisi 2000 and Zhao 1995).

Thus, according to Daniela Merolla (Leiden University), a real self emerges in modern Berber Kabyle literature that is distinct from those portrayed in either French ethnographic, Berber folkloric, or official (classical) Arabic linguistic terms. According to Thomas de Bruijn (Leiden University), Premcand's Hindi short story, *Kafan*, effectively presents India's economic and social realities in the 1930s not through Western techniques of narrative and psychological realism,

but by using older, indigenous rhetorical forms. Madhava and Ghisu acquire a selfhood which late-colonial Hindi readers could recognize as similar to their own through forms of characterization that derive from traditional ideas about possibilities for individuality and freedom. One such possibility occurs in the last stage of human existence, the 'sphere of renunciation', which is governed by the dominant emotional state (rasa) of 'the gruesome'. Another is embodied in the archetype of the saintly drunk. The self thus brought to life in the story is poised between the utopian promise of social customs and beliefs that offer an all-encompassing meaning to and release from life's suffering, and the paradoxical realization that, as Ghisu observes, 'someone who did not get a rag to cover her body when she was alive, needs a new shroud when she dies'. The story argues against any realistic hope of either a utopian modern future or a return to an idealized traditional past by means of a rhetoric saturated with Hindu religious idealism.

Merolla and De Bruijn, as well Kwadwo Osei-Nyame, Jr (University of London), Evan Mwangi (University of Nairobi), and Said A.M. Khamis (University of Bayreuth) in their essays on African literatures, do not present national identities as unitary but, rather, as multiple, layered, and gendered. The complex reality of war in Vietnam as portrayed in Duong Thu Huong's *Novel Without a Name* (1991) cannot be reduced to the heroic, ideal male stereotypes of Communist Party slogans, as Ursula Lies (University of Potsdam) demonstrates in her analysis. Yet that novel also conjures up a timeless, utopian kind of national identity that transcends the limits imposed by national boundaries, state doctrines, or gender differences. The role of the Sherlock Holmes-like detectives in the 1930s Sumatran novels discussed by Doris Jedamski (workshop convenor) is similarly utopian, not only as an idealized 'manifestation of modern rationality and subjectivity', as she puts it, or as a representation of the quintessential Javanese nobleman brought back to life in the late colonial Dutch East Indies, but also as an endorsement of a desired, future state of absolute law and order. As represented in the

Indonesian detective figure, the 'real' self is concealed behind the mysterious masks of a paternalistic superman who only ambiguously represents either the independent modern self or the national citizen. This is reminiscent of Franco Moretti's and Umberto Eco's claims that the detective fiction genre in the West negates individualism and freedom in the interest of promoting a paternalistic kind of social order (Moretti 1983; Eco 1979). As Moretti notes, detective fiction invokes science for defensive rather than developmental purposes, for it reinstates 'an idea of *status society* that is externalized, traditionalist, and easily controllable' (Moretti 1983: 145, italics in the original). The fetishist preoccupation with outward appearances and the hyperphysical details of the modernized colonial world, as noted by both Matthew Cohen (University of Glasgow) and Keith Foulcher (University of Sydney) in their papers on theatre and the novel in early twentieth-century Java respectively, may also convey a similarly ambiguous message: the tension between a 'real' national or modern self in the colonial present and a protean world of hypothetical, utopian identities without limit or possibility of attainment. ◁

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Note >

* Foulcher and Day, *Clearing a Space: Postcolonial Readings of Modern Indonesian Literature*, Leiden: KITLV Press (2002), p. 2, n.1

Anthropological Futures

Report >
Southeast Asia

27-28 November 2002
Leiden,
the Netherlands

Following 32 years of Suharto's New Order rule in Indonesia, the startling, occasionally marvellous, and all too often frightening developments of the last four years of Reformasi and its aftermath challenge us as scholars to consider the political-historical conjunctures in which we work and to think anew the ethnographic contexts of which we write. The nagging sense of crisis across the archipelago (with varied manifestations in different places), the recurrent political turmoil and communal violence, the novel experiments with democracy, civil institutions, and forms of publicity, the stubborn persistence of powerful forces opposed to change, the processes and by-products of decentralization, and, last but not least, the diverse negotiations by Indonesians of their positions within a post-9/11 global world order, all demand our urgent attention. The exploratory conference 'Anthropological futures for twenty-first-century Indonesia' was convened with these interrelated purposes in mind.

By Patricia Spyer

Among other issues raised, the conference convener addressed the need for new research agendas that can better address the complex social dynamics and political processes characterizing Indonesia since Suharto's step-down. Are the same intellectual paradigms employed in research carried out under New Order conditions equally valid today, or did 'the appearance of order' – in John Pemberton's felicitous formulation (Pemberton 1994) – put in place by the Suharto regime cause us to look in some directions and not others? Has a new set of complex problems emerged which have only now become accessible?

Along with the refiguring of unfolding circumstances, the legacy of the Suharto era and, equally important, that

of the scholarship of the New Order can be explored from new perspectives. Amongst other issues, conference participants were invited to consider, in retrospect, the ramifications of legal restrictions and policies of the New

Order with respect to media and labour as well as the impact of the regime's cultural politics *vis-à-vis* religion, ethnicity, and gender. The bankruptcy of the former regime's historiography, the silences covering the massacres of

1965-66 and the New Order's human rights record, and the relative paucity of scholarship regarding Islam and the country's ethnic Chinese, seem especially worthy of reconsideration. Issues of globalization and the nation state's redeployment within an increasingly heterogeneous world are matters of concern together with, more specifically, current revisions of the nation state project and related issues of sovereignty, regional autonomy, and historical and political revisionisms. Amongst these more volatile issues, participants were asked to consider the kinds of imaginings, experiences, and ordinary and extraordinary events that have come to characterize the everyday across Indonesia since 1998.

Two films were screened at the conference. *Maiden of the Morning Star*, an episode on Papua from the TV docudrama series *Library of the Children of the Archipelago*, focuses on expectations for the future in this frontier of the Indonesia nation state as seen through the eyes of a young Papuan schoolgirl. *Viva Indonesia: Letters to God*, a compilation of four produced as part of the 'Visual House of Papua' project, addresses the pervasive Indonesian stereotyping of Papuans, ethnic tensions, local ambitions of independence, and the Indonesian school curriculum, specifically the teaching of national history. The film features five children across the archipelago who, confronted with crisis in their post-New Order lives, each write to God asking him to intervene in their own particular troubling circumstances.

Presentations were given by Webb Keane, P.M. Laksono, Wim Manuhutu, Ratna Saptari, Henk Schulte Nordholt, and Mary Steedly. Discussants were Kees van Dijk, Frans Hüsken, Nico Schulte Nordholt, Fridus Steijlen, Heather Sutherland, and Leontine Visser. The CNWS Research School and the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences at Leiden University, the KITLV Vereniging, IIAS, the Royal Dutch Academy funded project 'Indonesian Mediations,' the National Museum of Ethnology, and WOTRO/NWO all provided valuable conference support.

Besides an afternoon of film-screenings by Garin Nugroho and Arjo Danusiri, introduced by the latter, an ethnographic filmmaker from Jakarta, the conference featured six speakers who engaged the issue of Indonesian and anthropological 'futures' in a range of compelling ways. Thinking about and imagining the future involved a detour through the past (Keane, Steedly), an engagement with the shifting temporalities woven through women's life cycles of work as well as with the subjective narrative of this variable experience (Saptari), a consideration of the conditions as well as possible outcomes to be pursued in the aftermath of violence (Laksono, Manuhutu), and the problem of 'making the future' through a process of 'decolonizing' the disavowed national historiography of the New Order (Henk Schulte Nordholt).

A focus of discussion was how thinking about the future necessarily implies a vantage point with respect to which not only the future – or a range of possible or alternative futures – come into view but also particular perspectives on the present and past as well. Imagining the future, in Indonesia – as elsewhere – means being cognizant of the possibilities alive at any given moment, compels the exploration of the different temporalities and positions that people

Gay Literature from China:
In Search of a Happy Ending

Gay literature in the People's Republic of China (PRC) is still 'underground', but it reflects the growing self-awareness of a subculture. What lies ahead? The texts themselves — some have already been made into films — provide no easy answer. Be that as it may, Chinese gay literature is thriving.

Research >
China

By Remy Cristini

In December of 2001, the Film Association at Beijing University organized 'China's First Gay Film Festival'. Posters went up on campus, but most of the advertising for the event was done on the university's homepage. Chinese and foreign gay films were to be shown at different locations on and around the campus for ten days. Students sold tickets in their dormitories. The major attraction was *Lanyu*, by Hong Kong film director Stanley Kwan, recently released in Hong Kong and Taiwan and boasting five Golden Horse Awards (the 'Taiwanese Oscars'). Before long, all tickets for all screenings of *Lanyu* were sold out.

The fact that PRC students were allowed to organize an event like this is remarkable in itself, as none of the other movies on the programme had ever had a public screening before. On top of that, a lot of discussion had been going on about *Lanyu* because the film had been shot in Beijing without first consulting Chinese authorities, which would normally make permission for its distribution or public screening extremely unlikely. The fact that this festival has taken place, with permission of university officials, might be an indication that the official attitude towards homosexuality within

may inhabit at different points in their lives, and an engagement with their own imaginings and narratives of these processes. If this conference did not plot the anthropological futures for twenty-first-century Indonesia (which was hardly its intent) it did bring home the importance of attending to the specificities of particular historical and political junctures imagined and conceived in some sense as 'beginnings.' For scholars of Indonesia, this may be the real challenge of the moment: to track the complex processes through which the wide range of possibilities attendant on 'beginnings' such as national independence or Reformasi are subsequently narrowed down with some options foreclosed while others remain to guide the making of new Indonesian futures, presents, and pasts. ‹

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Chinese society is changing. In itself, the plot of *Lanyu* is not shocking. It is the tragic love story of a poor student (Lanyu) and a wealthy businessman (Handong). Lanyu is a country boy who goes to university in Beijing. When he becomes short of money, his only way out is to prostitute himself. Handong is his first customer and also the first person with whom he has sex. Lanyu falls in love with Handong who takes good care of the young student, but although Handong shows affection in a material way, he does not allow himself to get emotionally involved. He hurts Lanyu badly by having sexual relationships with other boys as well, and nearly breaks his heart when he announces that he is to marry a lady from the office. After a lot of dramatic twists and turns, Handong finally acknowledges that he is gay and truly in love with Lanyu. Just when they seem to have overcome all difficulties and can be together at last, Lanyu dies in a car accident.

The movie *Lanyu* is based on a Chinese gay novel, *A Story From Beijing*, which has circulated on the web since 1996. For the film, the plot was not really altered, but the original text is full of explicit lovemaking scenes, pornographic rather than erotic. When the story first appeared on the web, it was truly shocking. Up until the early

1990s, gay men in Beijing had little choice but to hang around in parks to meet other gay men, and when they made love it was often in a public toilet. Though it may have been quite common in pre-modern China, prostitution, especially gay prostitution, has been officially designated as a vice from feudal times by the Communist Party, and in the 1980s (when the story of Lanyu and Handong begins) police would occasionally arrest gay men to maintain 'public order'. When in the 1990s people gained access to the Internet, this immediately became an alternative to the parks and toilets, and provided the gay population with a more secure meeting place, mostly beyond the control of law enforcement. *A Story From Beijing* was probably the first of its kind and is the best-known and most influential gay novel to date. Its socially controversial theme aside, *A Story From Beijing* is provocative in other respects as well: it contains pornography, prostitution, and a reference to the violent ending of the student demonstrations around Tiananmen Square in 1989. Protected by relative anonymity, made possible by the Internet, the author of *A Story From Beijing* – his or her identity remains unknown – paved the way to a genre known as 'Tongzhi (Comrade) Literature'. The word 'Comrade', widely used in communist discourse, literally means 'of the same intent' and was adopted in Chinese gay circles as a form of address. Though it was used ironically at first, it has now become a common word for 'gay', without any communist connotation.

Zheping is one of the author's close friends. Usually wearing women's clothes, he runs a small boutique in a Beijing department store.

Voices of comrades

One characteristic of the early Comrade novels is that they all tend to be rather unlikely love stories, very touching (or sentimental) at times, but invariably leading to catastrophic endings: the lovers are either separated by death or struck down by other cruel

Courtesy of Zheping

tricks of fate. Nevertheless, these stories depict an imaginary and often idealized world, a refuge from harsh reality, which would appeal to gay readers, especially young people with access to the Internet. Some of the early novels have become real Comrade classics. Though not very realistic, the stories do represent the lives of other gay people, and let readers imagine what it might be like to live openly as a gay instead of having to hide one's sexual preference. It is safe to say that the communicative function of Comrade novels has always been more important than their aesthetical aspects. Even an influential piece like *A Story From Beijing* shows little formal sophistication. This is partly explained by the nature of the media through which these stories circulate: the Internet. Anybody can publish anything on the Internet – and that is basically what happens. There are a lot of websites with gay discussion forums (even the homepage of Beijing University has its own!) and chat rooms.[1] Most of the novels start as feuilletons on one of these sites, with new chapters added every day, readers commenting on the story as it is being written. When a story becomes truly popular, it will end up on other sites that collect Comrade novels.[2]

Over the past few years, the stories have gradually become more realistic. Instead of just telling the story of two people who seem to live entirely in their own world, recent novels describe the lives of gay people in a world that is predominantly shaped by heterosexual vision. Stories about university life on campus are popular, because most of today's readers and authors are either students themselves or belong to the same age group. The stories feature issues such as coming out and the difficulty of finding a partner. In recent Comrade novels there is also room for subplots unrelated to homosexuality, and some authors pay more attention to form and style. As a result, pornography is completely absent in recent novels. Another important development is that the stories no longer necessarily end in misery, although the characters' future often remains uncertain.

Subculture and society

An important reason for these changes is that Chinese society has also changed a lot in the past ten years. After several decades of poverty and frugality, consumerism as a result of economic development now goes hand in hand with rapidly spreading individualism in urban China. Wearing trendy clothes and armed with fancy phones, young city people flamboyantly express their identities. This has led to increased diversification in art and literature, whereas until the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), state-enforced uniformity was the rule. Nowadays, gay people in the cities no longer need to hide in the dark, and

they go out in bars and clubs that are commonly known as gay places. It is not unusual to see elderly people sit down in front of a disco for a rest on their evening stroll, watching the colourful transvestites as they emerge from a taxi and make their way to the entrance. In this respect, the generation gap in China is huge and mutual understanding nearly impossible, but for many young people the 'live and let live' strategy is working well – for the time being.

The main problem that remains for Chinese homosexuals is traditional thinking about marriage and posterity. Young gay people are often forced into heterosexual marriage by their family. However, in recent years they have been getting support from Chinese scholars and scientists. More and more sociologists and psychologists are educating the public by stressing that homosexuality is not a disorder but a natural phenomenon, that forced marriage is harmful to all parties involved, and that denying the existence of a gay population will be harmful to society as a whole at a time when the AIDS epidemic is spreading in China. They advocate greater tolerance for and better understanding of homosexuality, to enable a fruitful debate on public health.

A happy ending?

Whether or not homosexuals will become an acknowledged part of Chinese society in the near future remains to be seen, and the prospects for today's young gay people are as open-ended as their stories. Up until a few years ago, authors of Comrade novels saw no future for gay couples in China and they let their heroes die an early death to spare them a destiny that would perhaps be even more painful. Today, their prospects seem less grim, both in the stories and in real life.

Needless to say, the film festival at Beijing University was a great success. Perhaps it was sheer chauvinism that led to the university officials' decision to allow the festival to go ahead, as *Lanyu* was, after all, shot in Beijing with PRC actors and was based on a Chinese novel. Journalists present at the premiere of *Lanyu* praised the film and the initiative of the students in local newspapers. Although the university officials were also the ones who ordered the students to terminate the festival prematurely, because of this unforeseen media attention, the event was a signal of change. One of the outcomes is that gay films are now for sale in the innumerable VCD shops throughout the country and it is only a matter of time before the first Comrade novel will appear in bookshops. ‹

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Notes >

1 Http://bbs.beida-online.com/bbsWeb/list.php?board=Homo
2 e.g. www.boysky.net/wencai/jingxuan

Human Cargo

Human smuggling organizations are currently held responsible for the transport of refugees, bounty hunters, and other migrants to the West. The Dutch Public Prosecutor's Office works on the assumption that the movement of asylum seekers to the Netherlands is to a large extent 'regulated' by the activities of human smugglers. Although the nationalities of both the smugglers and the people transported vary greatly, as do the methods used, it is generally assumed by both the public and criminologists that the pursuit of profit is an important, and probably the most important, motive for human smuggling organizations. A turnover of billions of euros worldwide is attributed to these organizations.

By Melvin Soudijn

Within the spectrum of human smuggling, the smuggling of Chinese nationals provokes a lot of interest, not only among the media, but also in the world of international investigation. There are various possible reasons for this. In the first place, a series of well-publicized incidents have caused the commotion. There is virtually no study, investigation or publication concerning human smuggling from China which does not refer to the Golden Venture incident of 1993 and/or the Dover tragedy of 2000, two extremely dramatic events involving Chinese victims. Furthermore, human smuggling from China, whether rightly or wrongly, is generally believed to present several unique characteristics. The sums of money involved are higher than those paid by any other nationality, abuses, such as slavery, exploitation, and prostitution is rife, the level of organization is extremely high and there (presumably) is associated crime involved (directed by Triads). Finally, in the West there seems to be a fascination for, and simultaneously a fear of, the exotic. To this one could add the enormity of China's population, presenting a huge potential market for smuggling, and the many references in publications on Chinese communities to a 'culture of secrecy'. All this leads to the impression that the authorities cannot seem to get a grip on the community.

Human smuggling from China is not a recent phenomenon. In his study *Chineesche immigranten in Nederland* (Chinese Immigrants in the Netherlands), published in 1936, F. van Heek notes that various countries have drawn up immigration laws to halt Chinese migration. As a result, attempts were made (and this is still the case today) to circumvent these immigration laws, and human smuggling thrived. Van Heek would not state exactly how many people came into the Netherlands as stowaways, but he suspected that the numbers were very large. Rotterdam, 'as an important shipping centre [...], and with its hundreds of Chinese inhabitants [would constitute] an ideal temporary refuge from which the Chinese emigrant could try to reach the place where he now wishes to live' (p. 82) (translation: MS).

Van Heek also discusses the ways in which these people enter the Netherlands. They may enter with a valid passport, by ship's discharge, as a stowaway, as a deserter from a ship, or clandestinely over a land border. The method of stowing away was not, however, wholly without its dangers. For example, people hid in empty water-tanks or boilers, where the temperature could soar if the ship was sailing in the tropics. This sometimes led to fatalities (p. 82).

Furthermore, Van Heek notes that in the past, staff from the Dutch consulates sometimes issued visas too easily, without ascertaining whether the traveller had sufficient means of support. Several pedlars from Zhejiang, for instance, had indeed entered the Netherlands with valid passports, but ones to which they were not actually entitled. 'In Europe, too, the Chinese happily make use of such consular benevolence. They let one another know where an "easy" consul is stationed, and send their friends who live in the country in question to the consulate to apply for a visa. The consulate sometimes neglects carefully comparing the passport-photo with the applicant's face, and the visa is issued. The applicant sends it back to his friend who wishes to travel to the Netherlands, and soon afterwards our yellow brother enters our country in a completely legal way' (p. 90) (translation: MS).

In their research report *Chinese ouderen in Amsterdam: verslag van een onderzoek naar de leefsituatie van Chinese ouderen in Amsterdam* (Elderly Chinese people in Amsterdam: research report on the living conditions of elderly Chinese people in Amsterdam), Sciortino et al. discuss the case of a Chinese man, 83 years old in 1993, who recalls how he was persuaded by a former neighbour to come to Europe in 1936 (p. 12). He had to pay what was then the enormous sum of 300 Chinese guilders for the journey. He eventually set out with four others from his village. His wife and young son remained behind. He travelled to Marseilles on a German cargo ship and secretly went ashore. From there he travelled overland to Germany and then to the Netherlands.

Today, would we view the above cases as the result of criminal human smuggling organizations? The answer is probably 'yes'. My doctoral research aims to clarify the structures underlying human smuggling. When should one view 'a little bit of help from your friends' as smuggling? That leads me to the question of what 'smuggling' or 'illegal migration' really is, and whether everything is as closely organized as is generally supposed. The inclusion of a historical perspective might provide us with a better understanding. <

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Malay Contacts with Sri Lanka

The Malays have always been intrepid sailors, travelling westwards as far as Madagascar. Sailing westward from a port in the Malay Peninsula or from Western Sumatra, one was likely to disembark on the eastern and southern coasts of Sri Lanka (Paranavitana, 1959): it is therefore not surprising that the Malays made contact with Sri Lankans. Evidence of early contact between Sri Lankans and Malays lies in Sinhala literary works from the Polonnaruwa Period (1098-1234) and the Dambadeniya Period (1220-1293).

By Shihan de Silva Jayasuriya

Historical evidence also confirms that there was a Malay presence in Sri Lanka in the thirteenth century. In 1247, Chandrabhanu, the Buddhist Malay King in the Malay Peninsula, attempted to invade Sri Lanka. Sinhala literary works record that Chandrabhanu's mission was supported by Malay (*Javaka* or *Malala*) soldiers. He was determined to possess the Buddha's tooth relics, which were sacrosanct to the Sinhalese, and which were in the possession of the Sinhalese monarch.

In contemporary Sri Lanka, there are about 46,000 Sri Lankan Malays. They form 0.31 per cent of the population. Their ancestry can be traced back to the Dutch Era (1656–1796) and the British Era (1796-1948). The Dutch referred to the Sri Lankan Malays as 'Javanese' because they were recruited in Batavia (the Dutch appellation for Jakarta). The British referred to the Sri Lankan Malays as 'Malays' as they spoke Batavian Malay, known today as Betawi or Jakarta Malay. The British also transported Indonesians from the Malay Peninsula (Penang, Malacca, Singapore, Pahang, Trengganu, Kelantan), Java, Madura, and North Borneo to Sri Lanka. The Indonesian soldiers in Sri Lanka were recruited from Jakarta in Java and therefore had a common 'geographical identity'. Though ethnic groups from various parts of the Indonesian Archipelago lived in distinct parts of Jakarta, they spoke a common *lingua franca*, either Batavian Malay (Omong Jakarta, a creole) or Low Malay/Trade Malay/Bazaar Malay (a pidgin). The Sinhalese have given the appellation *Jaminissu* (people from Java) to all Sri Lankan Malays, regardless of whether they are from Indonesian or Malay descent.

Some of the earliest Malay political exiles came to Sri Lanka from the Moluccas and the Lesser Sunda Islands. From 1708 onwards, Javanese princes were exiled to Sri Lanka. According to Dutch documents, these Indonesian aristocrats were mainly from Java, but others came from Bacan, Sumatra, Macassar, Tidore, and Timor. The Dutch also exiled the King of Java, Susana Mangkurat Mas, to Sri Lanka, together with his retinue: in 1723, he was followed by 44 Javanese princes and noblemen who had surrendered at the battle of Batavia. At the other end of the social spectrum, there was a steady influx of Indonesian convicts, who came from all walks of life. However, no specific information is known about their ethnic background. The Dutch also brought Javanese men to be employed in several capacities in Sri Lanka, but the largest group of Indonesians were the soldiers who served in the Dutch garrison in Sri Lanka. They came from the Ambon, Banda, Bali, Java, Madura, Buginese, and Malay areas. Most Malay slaves sent to Sri Lanka originated from the Moluccas and the Lesser Sunda Islands.

During the Dutch period and in the early British period, the Malays formed most of the Sri Lankan army, enlisted in the Ceylon Rifle regiments. The last regiment was disbanded in 1873 and the Malay soldiers joined the Police force. Malays were, thereafter, employed in the Sri Lankan military, police, fire brigade, prisons, plantation sector, and in salterns. Sri Lankan Malays have blended into multi-ethnic Sri Lanka but have retained their 'Malay' ethnic consciousness, their mother tongue, Sri Lankan Malay Creole, uniting, binding, and defining them. Sri Lankan Malay Creole is a contact language. When people who do not speak a common language come into prolonged contact with one another, a verbal means of communication becomes necessary, and contact lan-

The Illicit Trade in Chinese Antiquities

Judging by reports in the Chinese media and by remarks in general studies on the illicit antiquities trade, there is large-scale looting of and trafficking in antiquities taking place in China. According to He Shuzhong, the director of Cultural Heritage Watch (CHW), a non-governmental Chinese organization for the protection of cultural heritage, the problems of illicit excavation and trade have reached dramatic proportions. Government sources suggest that, in the past, the bulk of illicit antiquities resurfaced in foreign museums, while these days much of it ends up in foreign markets. According to Chinese experts, there are at least one million items of Chinese art that should be returned from 200 foreign museums spanning 47 countries. Yet, most Western museums are unwilling to return their collections. A major reason being the idea that most acquisitions were legal at the time they were made, for example under colonial rule. Nonetheless, China has experienced some success in reclaiming stolen artefacts.

Research >
China

By Melvin Soudijn & Edgar Tijhuis

In March 2000, CHW raised the issue of a stolen statue of a Bodhisattva in the collection of the Miho Museum in Japan. The statue was stolen from a museum in Boxing county, Shandong Province, in July 1994. In 1996, the Miho Museum bought the statue from a London dealer, who claimed to have bought the item from another dealer in good faith. After more than a year, an agreement on the return of the statue was signed between the Chinese National Administration on Cultural Heritage and the Miho Museum. In 2001 the National Gallery of Canada voluntarily returned to China a stolen 1,300 year old Buddhist limestone carving, which had been surreptitiously chiselled from the wall of a temple cave some time during the last century. The object was only known in China from a picture of the temple taken at the beginning of the twentieth century.

As well as foreign museums, the international arts market is also implicated. Apparently, there is a large market for Chinese antiquities, the most notable in Hong Kong, London, and New York. Some antiquities dealers purport to handle only 'old' items, that is, items that come from existing collections and are supposed to have been outside China since pre-1970. However, these assertions seem to be at odds with the continuous appearance of dubious items on the art market. In addition, there are plenty of smaller markets in numerous countries, Asian and Western. Nowadays, illicit excavations meet most of this large-scale demand, resulting in the irreversible destruction of valuable archaeological information and pointless damage to sites.

Although the Chinese government formally takes a serious stance on combating illegal excavation and export of Chinese antiquities, many questions can be asked about the sincerity and efficiency of their policies. Since 1978 numerous legislative measures have been taken to tackle the problem. The Law on the Protection of Cultural Heritage was adopted in 1982 and twice amended in 1988 and 1991. Nowadays,

looting and smuggling of antiquities is categorized as organized crime and cross-border crime in the Chinese Penal Code. Furthermore, specific articles were drafted to cover the destruction of antiquities and the theft of precious cultural relics. Severe sentences can be given to those committing such crimes: reports of local excavators receiving the death penalty can be found in the media. National legislation aside, China is a signatory to several international treaties on the protection of cultural heritage.* However, both national laws and treaties are ineffective if they are not adequately enforced.

China does not seem to act against the liberal regulations governing the Hong Kong art trade. Hong Kong plays a pivotal role: almost all antiquities pass through the Hong Kong market and once antiquities reach Hong Kong, they can be freely exported (as long as they are not stolen).

Over and above Hong Kong's highly significant role in the licit and illicit trade in Chinese antiquities, auctioning within China must also be considered. During the 1990s more than 150 auction houses were established in China. Although turnover is still modest compared to Hong Kong, this is likely to change in the future. The two largest auction houses are China Guardian and Beijing Hanhai. China Guardian was set up as a joint venture between the Ministry of Internal Trade and the Bureau of Cultural Relics, Beijing Hanhai is owned by the city's municipal government. A wide range of items is sold at these and other auctions, including items more than 200 years old, which may not, officially, be exported. Thus, according to this rule foreigners are not allowed to buy older items, but it can hardly be expected that this alone will be a serious barrier to their export.

There is also the problem of corruption. Though corruption is a universal phenomenon, its sheer scale and pervasiveness in China is a matter of concern. Large-scale campaigns against corruption may have been initiated, yet it would be rather optimistic to expect these to solve the problem shortly. Furthermore, central government directives have to be carried out by the provincial, down to the local governments, thus easily leading to further corruption. At the local level, administrators often turn a blind eye if money can be made through selling cultural objects. On the other hand, simple neglect of ancient sites and the destruction of sites due to large real estate projects, agricultural development, and infrastructure projects pose a threat. The Three Gorges Dam project, for example, is likely to inundate a large number of antiquities. Brave attempts to save material from individual sites concern only a small part of the total area. Meanwhile smugglers have found it easy to negotiate with local officials, and large amounts of material from the upper Yangtze have found their way overseas.

Furthermore, the policies of the Chinese government are weakened by the ineffective registration of cultural heritage. The fact that the government lacks a database on stolen art and antiquities inhibits an effective policy against illicit trade and can lead to awkward situations. In the Miho Case, Cultural Heritage Watch and the Chinese authorities argued that the Miho should return the statue and should have been informed of it being stolen because it belonged to a Chinese museum and was published as such. However, the fact that the theft was not properly registered seemed to escape both their attention. The lack of effective registration also hinders all fruitful cooperation with international agencies like Interpol and the International Council of Museums (ICOM), rendering the aforementioned treaties inapplicable (see note).

With ineffective registration, the real scale of the problem can hardly be reliably represented by statistics on the number of items intercepted by Chinese customs officials. Any attempt to quantify the problem of illicit excavations and trade by looking up statistics and figures from a number of different sources only reveals how incomplete they are: records only exist for 1986, 1991–1995, 1997, the first five months of 1998, and the period from 1999 to September 2001. Additionally, the numbers cannot be compared because they measure different things and usually only refer to tourists. For example, according to figures from Chinese customs, 110,000 items were seized, from tourists, between 1991 and 1995 alone.

Although much can be said about China's shortcomings with regard to its anti-trafficking of antiquities policy, there are other factors to consider. Wherever people are prepared to sell (even if this means the Chinese government itself), there are those prepared to buy. Many independent buyers are individual travellers interested in Asia and the like, in contrast to large retailers or auction houses, most likely to purchase small items. Of course, one also needs to consider the quality of the items they acquire. All the experts we spoke to highlighted the fact that most material coming from China seems to be of sub-masterpiece quality, apart from a huge number of fakes. Nevertheless, many among the *IIAS Newsletter* readers will have some sort of Chinese artefact at home. Call it an argument from a Chinese perspective. It does not make it any less valid.◄

Note >

* China is a party to the 'Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage', the 'Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property', 'UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects', and 'Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict'. In addition, a total of 1,480 museums have been established at national and provincial level. Furthermore, China is working on a bilateral anti-smuggling agreement with the US, to halt the flow of antiquities to the US.

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guages (pidgins and creoles) evolve to fill this need. A creole, unlike a pidgin, is the mother tongue of a speech community. Most of the vocabulary of Sri Lankan Malay Creole originates in the base language, Malay, as is typical of contact languages.

Many linguistic constructions (see examples in the sidebar) illustrate Sinhala influence on Sri Lankan Malay Creole. With Sinhala as the language for inter-ethnic communication in multi-ethnic Sri Lanka, bilingualism among the Sri Lankan Malays must have introduced Sinhala grammatical features into Sri Lankan Malay Creole. Sri Lanka Portuguese Creole, the Portuguese-based contact language, has also been influenced by Sinhala (De Silva Jayasuriya, 1999). Malay, in all its diverse forms, is the most important native language of Southeast Asia. Malay in Sri Lanka is distinct from all the other Malay languages. The part

played by Sinhala (the language of 74 per cent of Sri Lankans today) in influencing Sri Lankan Malay Creole is a fruitful avenue for further research. ◄

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Sri Lankan Malay Creole Constructions

Saldin (1996) states that some SLMC constructions are amusing to Indonesians and Malaysians. I have added in the Sinhala (SIN) equivalents of these sentences:

SLMC	Se	buk	baca	baca	kapan	duduk		seppe	temanya	datang	
SIN	Mama	pothak	bala	bala		inna-kote		mage	yahaluva	av-	a
	I	book	read	read	when	sit	when	my	friend	come	TNS
Literally:	While I was reading the book and sitting my friend came!										
Meaning:	While I was reading the book my friend came										

In **Standard Malay** it would be:

	Kawan	saya	datang	se masa	saya	membaca	buku
	Friend	I	come	while	I	read	book

SLMC	Se	lari	lari	kapan	duduk		ujang	su	datang	
SIN	Mama	duwa	duwa		inna-kote		vessa		av-	a
	I	run	run	when	sit	when	rain	TNS	come	TNS
Literally:	While I was running and sitting the rain came down!									
Meaning:	While I was running it rained.									

In **Standard Malay** it would be:

	Se masa	saya	berlari	kujan	turun
	While	I	run	rain	come down

Cited from Valentijn, F., *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien*, Joannes van Braam, 1724.

Not until the seventeenth century, when the VOC takes it as an Entrepot in East Asia would Taiwan's strategic position become well known outside East Asia.

The VOC Trade in Taiwan

Did the VOC (De Verenigde Oost Indische Compagnie) influence the traditional trading style of Asian merchants, or did the VOC suppress traditional Asian native merchants? This question has received considerable scholarly attention. Following the Dutch historian Van Leur, some maintain that the roots of Asian merchants' trade were so strong that Europeans hardly made any impact on it, argueing that the early seventeenth-century European trade system was not fundamentally different from that of Asia before the age of modern capitalism. Others, among whom M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, believe that scholars such as Van Leur attribute too many new elements to the Dutch as opposed to the Portuguese, yet claim that even Europeans as a whole did not change the traditional Asian system.

Research >
East Asia

By Wei-sheng Lin

In contrast, Danish historian Niels Steengaard suggests that the VOC significantly suppressed the traditional Asian native merchants. According to Steengaard, the trade policy of the VOC included protection costs, which, in combination with monopolistic trading privileges, made it possible to establish a transparent pricing policy. This allowed the Dutch to manipulate the sales price of commodities in Europe and, therefore, to create profits. As a result, the VOC was able to keep the fluctuating price at the lowest possible level and, thus, beat the traditional Asian caravan trade.

Given the conflicting views held by scholars, the question of whether the VOC and its trade network suppressed the traditional native trade networks in Asia requires further explanation. Taiwan serves as a unique research subject in answering this question. Below, will be explained how the VOC functioned in Asia, and why Taiwan is so significant in understanding the role of the VOC in traditional Asian trade.

The VOC set up a foothold in Taiwan to trade with China, in order to support its grand scheme of launching a Batavia-China-Japan trade route and to fend off Portuguese and Spanish rivals with a privateering strategy. Yet, there were certain intrinsic drawbacks in making Taiwan a trans-shipment hub for trade with China, Japan, and Batavia. Firstly, as the VOC operated from Taiwan instead of from the coast of China, its trade with China was curtailed by the Chinese prohibition of trade with foreigners. This policy did not alter much over time, despite some limited deregulation in the late Ming period. Although it is true that Chinese merchants managed to engage in illegal overseas trade, foreigners were never allowed to trade in Chinese ports. This meant that all Chinese goods had to pass through the hands of Chinese middlemen: they were able to procure bulk goods at low wholesale prices, but the Dutch had to rely solely on them to get their hands on the goods. This manner of trade had both positive and negative aspects for the Dutch, while the middlemen thrived on the situation. Through regular contact with them, the Dutch merchants were guaranteed ample supply of goods as long as the Chinese delivered the goods in Taiwan at the designated time, a system that allowed overall shipping information to be under VOC control. Yet, if the goods were so profitable, why did the Chinese not take over the entire operation? In the late Ming period, when the power of the Chinese regime was weakening and its laws and regulations were increasingly being ignored, the Chinese did take initiative. By the 1650s, when the Ming government was crumbling and the Manchu government could not prohibit Chinese middlemen from prevailing on the open seas, the Chinese did challenge the VOC head-on.

As a result, while making Taiwan a trans-shipment hub, the Dutch were forced to compete with Chinese seafaring merchants and, as the Chinese government continued to stick to a seclusion policy, the Chinese middlemen began to monopolize the sale of Chinese goods. Foreigners could not possibly crack open this monopoly without using force and prior to the Industrial Revolution, European force hardly held a lead over that of the Chinese.

What came next in terms of cargo supply? The European traders who came to Asia neither possessed an absolute superiority in arms, nor imported any European merchandize, except bullion, that could compete with oriental goods. European objects such as telescopes and chiming timepieces were often imported as gifts and playthings for the royal and imperial courts, and were hardly commodities to be traded on the general market. As a result, an imbalance in supply and demand emerged. The Dutch longed for Asian goods, while Asians, excepting Japanese, had little interest in Dutch goods. It seemed that the Dutch would have to export precious metals, such as gold and silver, from the Netherlands in order to do business with Asia. Nevertheless, as they did not want to rely indefinitely on shipping precious metals to the East, the Dutch had to find an alternative way to conduct business with the Asians, and discovered they could achieve their aim by getting involved in intra-Asian trade.

Dutch involvement in intra-Asian trade began in the 1610s, when Jan Pietersz Coen was appointed Governor-General of the East Indies. Coen developed trade objectives designed to integrate entire Asian markets into the shipping network of the VOC fleet, believing that the competition and valuable trade information provided by Dutch trade posts all over Asia would enable the VOC to launch its own efficient trade network. The plan was to trade spices and silver for pepper and gold along the Sumatran coast. Chinese commodities and gold were traded for textiles from Coromandel, and then exchanged for pepper from Bantam; sandalwood and silver were traded for Chinese gold and silk. The same principal was applied to Japanese silver, which was also traded for Chinese goods, this trading practice allowing the Dutch to establish a self-sufficient Asian trade network. Coen hoped that 'the large volume of silver brought from Japan could be used for purchasing Chinese cargoes of silk and porcelain to ship back to Europe. If this plan would succeed, no capital from the Netherlands would be necessary'.

The Dutch trade network was built up over time, eventually operating between more than 20 trade posts across Asia. Instead of benefiting from any one particular post, VOC profits were generated from the intricate operations of the network that linked the Indian Ocean to the China Sea, encompassing Persia, India, and Ceylon to the west, and Japan and China to the east.

While acquiring goods for trade and establishing a trade network, the Dutch had to compete with the existing networks of traditional local merchants. Conditioned by seasonal winds and regional geographies, each area in the region had a distinctive trading circle controlled by a certain trade group: prior to the westerners' arrival, Asia already had several such independently formed, yet interrelated, trade networks.

To map out their own large, all-embracing trade network, the VOC had to infiltrate existing networks of conventional merchants and to compete with them head-on. For example, in attaining their objective with regard to the trade with Japan and China, Chinese merchants, who once were thriving along the Chinese south-eastern navigation routes, were diverted by the VOC to Batavia: moreover, they were barred from reaching production centres of spices and pepper, having to purchase these commodities in Batavia. Infiltration of Chinese sailing routes was also attempted by the location of trading posts in coastal China, which was intended to block the traditional sailing routes from Fujian to Manila. Another navigation route from Fujian to Japan was envisioned, with the intention of replacing that between Macao and Japan. Yet, the Dutch never succeeded in setting up an outpost on the Chinese coast and had to install one on Taiwan.

Taiwan thus emerged as a Dutch trans-shipment point in East Asia and as a supply station of silver, raw silk, and gold in the Dutch trade network, its position intended to afford the smooth development of a profitable trading system: any development that might impair the trade balance in Taiwan would compel the Dutch to readjust. Yet, the efficiency of the Chinese merchants continued to prevent the Dutch from building a truly effective trade network. Thus, an examination of Dutch trade manoeuvres in Taiwan helps shed light on the role the VOC played in the traditional native trade network in Asia. ‹

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*linws@ncnu.edu.tw*

Budi as the Malay Mind

The word 'budi' originated from the Sanskrit word 'buddhi', which means wisdom, understanding, or intellect. A Sanskrit-English Dictionary defines the meaning of budhi as 'the power of forming and retaining conceptions and general notions, intelligence, reason, intellect, mind, discernment, judgment…' (Monier-Williams 1956:733). However, once this word was accepted as part of the Malay vocabulary, its meaning was extended to cover ethics as well as intellect and reason, in order to accommodate the culture and thinking of the Malays.

By Lim Kim-Hui

Budi now carries many nuances of meanings in the Malay world view and plays a pivotal role in every aspect of Malay life. It can mean intellect, as shown by the phrase *akal budi*, meaning 'common sense' or 'healthy mind'. It can also carry the meaning of kindness or virtue, as shown in the last two lines of the famous *pantun*: *Pisang emas bawa belayar/ masak sebiji di atas peti/ hutang emas dapat dibayar/ hutang budi dibawa mati* ('Sail away with a bunch of bananas/ one ripe fruit remains on the box/ Debts of money we can repay/ Debts of kindness, we take to the grave' (Sim 1987:30)). Commonly, however, it can be denoted as 'moral behaviour' or 'moral character/action', like *budi pekerti*. It can also be understood as 'discretion' or 'good judgement with flexibility', when used in conjunction with *akal* (mind) and *hati* (feelings) and as reflected in *budi bicara*. *Budi* should also contribute to the practical aspect, in the form of *budi daya*. Overall, when we deal with the mind of the Malay, it is the 'budi and its networks' that determine their thinking (judgement), their moral attitudes, their goodness, and how an argument should be presented. Pure *budi* can be led astray if not guided by the ethical aspect of *budi*. It should be noted that *budi* can also mean *akal* (mind) *(dl arti kecerdikan menipu atau tipu daya)* (*Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia* 1991:150), as in *bermain budi*, 'to deceive' by using the intelligence of mind, which is rather rhetorical in terms of argumentation. Rhetorical, in this context, refers to the common and popular meaning of rhetoric, which is normally considered as empty and abstract, flowery without content. The Malay mind develops through a spectrum of *akal budi* and *hati-budi*, which encompass 'mind-emotion-moral-goodness-practicality' in their scales of decision-making. A wise person, *budiman*, should be thoughtful, considerate *(berhati perut*, literally means 'has liver and stomach', normally means 'not cruel in decision'), and of good conduct, and his decision should be an enlightened and practical one that helps society towards prosperity. In order to understand the Malays' thinking and their argumentation, we should, therefore, bear in mind that their purpose of argumentation is to ultimately search for truth, goodness, and beauty.

The goodness of the good

In order to resolve conflicts between various civilizations and tolerate the differences that arise in this cultural and political setting, the Malay-Indonesian world has indeed tried to synthesize various positive values (*akal budi, hati budi, budi pekerti* etc.), these values later being crystalized into a greater molecular ideal of *budi* (fig. 1). At this stage, we can perhaps call the Malay philosophy eclecticism. *Budi*, to the Malay mind, is not an atomistic component but rather a molecule. It can be

Molecularization of the Budi

observed but cannot be fully broken down, as these components are always interconnected and intertwined, even if we were to present them in a scientific laboratory under the study of logical or emotional chemistry. This molecule of *budi* and the concept of *budiman* (wise person/sage) reminded me of what we can see in the *Confucian Analects* as interpreted by Fung Yu-lan (1976:42-43), in which Confucius sometimes used the word *jen* (*ren* in Pinyin, normally translated as 'human-heartedness') not only to denote a special kind of virtue, but also to denote all the virtues in combination, so that the term 'man with *jen*' becomes synonymous with the man with all-round virtues. It is in this sense we can see that *budiman* is the man with all-round *budi* (virtue) or, as I have coined it, 'budi and its networks'. If *jen* can be translated as 'perfect virtue' in such contexts, then the Malay *budi* can be constructed in the same manner as 'perfect virtue' of the Malays.

Rationality should not be worshipped in all dimensions of life. There should be time for rationality, expression of emotion, and the combination of both or more (*budi*). It is the demand of history that these elements (reason, emotion, *budi*) become explicit in certain communities and hidden in others. To conclude that there is only one 'rational' way of resolving disagreement is to totally deny the need for space and time throughout history. The results that I have obtained prove that the strength of the Malay mind lies in the application of *budi*, and as such, that the man of culture should be based on *budi* as well. The highest stage of a man of culture is for him or her to achieve the status of *budiman* or 'the man of *budi*', where the word *budi* should be treated as a synthetic connotation between the acuity of reason and the gentleness of feeling, or what we feel through *hati*.

Dialectical thinking, which puts stress on who will be the champion in the battle of the mind, is not important

in the Malay world and, as such, is not fully developed. It is considered more important to allow various dimensions of the human mind (i.e. reason, emotion) to adjust to the diversification of cultural values and religions. The fact that the dialectical mind is not developed in this part of the world is understandable. Biologically, if certain parts of our human body are not being used, it will be weakened in much the same way our muscles will get smaller and weaker if we do not exercise them.

The non-dialectical aspect of budi

Despite the usefulness of positive *budi* that we have already discussed, we must not forget that *budi* also has its negative dimension. In Malay, *bermain budi* (literally, 'to play with *budi*') means to cheat or to deceive (*menipu* or *tipudaya*), *memperbudikan* also meaning the same thing (*Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia* 1991:150). This negative connotation reminds us that we should not be too extreme in whatever stand we take, as anything that is pushed to

extremity will engender the opposite result: *rendah diri* (humbleness) will become *hina diri* (self-denigration); too much *berbudi* will become what the Malays call *mengada-ngada* (over-acting). As early as 1891 Clifford, in his article 'A New Collection of Malay Proverbs', observed an interesting trend in Malay rhetoric: 'In discussions among Malays, too, it is the man who can quote, and not he who can reasons, that bears away the palm' (Clifford 1891:88). Clifford had a point in terms of dialectical argumentation. The Malays must have their reasons as to why they choose not to reason. As usual, reasons demand argumentation in return, which will perhaps bring the two parties (rhetor and opponent) into a state of confrontation. Compared to reason, quotations bring the opponents into a state of agreement, in terms of their cultural memory and the *budi* of their ancestors and cultural wisdom.

Budi is an entity which is non-dialectical and, therefore, hinders the true spirit of dialectical argumentation. It is the lack of dialectical argumentation that distinguishes the Malays from the Greeks. No doubt the application of *budi* in human affairs and human relationships is more humane, as we have seen earlier, but *budi* is something situational. Compared to rationality, which is more confrontational, competitive, forceful, aggressive, and hostile, where attaining 'truth' and 'winning' is the purpose, *budi* encourages the opposite, which is non-confrontational, non-competitive, gentle, friendly, and succumbing (in the sense of giving in or giving way), because its final goal is consensus and compromise. Hence, I believe that it should be our responsibility to have a real understanding of rationality, *budi*, or even emotion, and their employment in our everydays affairs.

The culture of *budi*, as I see it, should be adjustable to two different spheres, *viz.* rational-public sphere versus emotional-personal sphere. Since the concept of *budi* has taken root as the middle path of argumentation, it is rather hard to fit it into the rational-public sphere, where the purpose of argumentation is the achievement of truth through rational persuasion and the search for knowledge is based on the concept of truth or falsehood, white or black. It cannot accommodate a syn-

thesistic nature of both truth and falsehood, both black and white at the same time, or a positioning between these two polarities, or something which we could call a spectrum of truth. *Budi*, however, is something synthesistic and a-rational, which tends to compromise between both polarities as long as consensus and compromise can be achieved. Nonetheless, there are many realms of human communication which are a-rational. A-rational is used to differentiate it from irrational: whereas something which is non-rational may either be irrational or something that cannot be explained from the perspective of rationality (i.e. a-rational).

In order to handle this irrational sphere, we should not be carried away by pure emotions. The champion of truth through rationality might accuse the Malay *budi* of being two-faced, hypocritical, deceitful, or insincere in telling the truth. This claim is valid in one sense, but in another sense, we perhaps need more philosophical scrutiny and argumentation. For example, in the heat of the moment of a conflict, dialectical forcefulness will bring harm (that is, claim a life), and therefore one should 'lie' in order to preserve harmony. But this 'lie' should be untangled when the heat is over. This is the true spirit of 'budi and its networks'. ◀

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Sex and Chanel:
Young Female Writers in China

Research >
China

Contemporary female-authored literary discourse from the People's Republic of China is fraught with confession, the portrayal of privacy, and writing about the female body. Conventionally subversive topics (e.g. nudity, menstruation, sexual intercourse, abortion, and miscarriage) have gained new ground in Chinese texts by women since the mid-1980s, when various social taboos and gender stereotypes were subjected to revision and subversion. These phenomena signalled the emergence of a new women's poetics, celebrating female sexuality and subjectivity, *vis-à-vis* the politically oriented writing of the early 1980s. Anti-political stances, manifest in the work of Shu Ting, Lin Zi, and the earlier Wang Anyi, switched to radical critiques of superficial societal views of gender. This gendered mode of writing has been characterized as 'body poetics' or 'gender politics'. From my point of view, the rise of body poetics articulates a twofold meaning. Firstly, the female body offers a new avenue for probing gender-specific experiences and literary alternatives. Secondly, it indicates an area of resistance against accepted gender values in the pursuit of a new gender identity.

By Zhang Xiaohong

Introspection sets the tone of contemporary Chinese women's literature produced between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. For women authors, writing is meant to address the complexity and ambiguity of their gendered selves, and most well-known texts are endowed with both social and psychological significance. Women's consciousness is often explored from a psychosexual perspective, as in Wang Anyi's love trilogy, Chen Ran's *Toast to the Past*, Zhai Yongming's poem-series *Woman*, and Tang Yaping's poem-series *Black Desert*.

Inward perspectives turn outward in the work of newly emerging women novelists like Wei Hui, Mian Mian, Jiu Dan, An Dun, and Chun Shu. These labelled, or self-labelled, 'beauty' or 'alternative' writers strip off any delicate cover of privacy and expose private details to the public with little concern for major issues or the complication of mundane matters. An alternative lifestyle is highly celebrated: casual sex, drugs, homosexual practice, and violence. Fictional settings switch from bar to café, from disco to mall, and from bedroom to bathroom. Through literary metamorphosis day-to-day life feels like a dazzling shopping mall, which is too good to be true. The real become ultra-real or surreal, when the aforesaid authors exploit reality and play with it. The female body is turned into a trademark, a signpost, and a fashion label: gender politics transforms into commercialized exhibitionism.

Just like their male colleagues, contemporary Chinese women authors turned to the West for role models to imitate and emulate. This has led to the huge popularity of women authors from Western cultures. Sylvia Plath has been a particularly empowering role model for Chinese women poets. Her work propelled the phenomenon of 'black hurricane' after the official publication of Zhai Yongming's poem-series '*Woman*' (*Nüren*) in 1986. Under the speculative spell of Plath, dense black imagery and representations of death developed into a shared mode of expression in Chinese women's poetry. In another instance, Wei Hui's scandalous quotation of Plath's '*Daddy*' was believed to be one of the triggers of the official ban on her novel *Shanghai Baby* (1999). The line 'Every woman adores a fascist' is recycled from '*Daddy*' to dramatize the lovemaking scene. *Shanghai Baby* contains abundant references to Woolf's *A Room of One's Own* and Duras's *The Lover*. Each new chapter begins with one or more epigraphs by canonized foreign authors, such as Henry Miller, D. H. Lawrence, Allen Ginsberg, and Milan Kundera. Yet, references to foreign literature and culture add no more significance to *Shanghai Baby* than do fashion and exoticism. All foreign literary and cultural elements are dealt with on a superficial level and ask for little interpretative effort. Foreign authors read no different than foreign brands like IKEA, Esprit, Calvin Klein, Christian Dior, and Chanel. The discourse of contemporary Chi-

nese women's writing is loaded with gendered perspectives and private preoccupations. This inward orientation is countered by an opening-up to literature from distant cultures and to commercial trends, which this author would like to call 'an outward orientation'. This double orientation makes women's writing a fascinating area to explore such debatable hermeneutic issues as literary authenticity and originality.

Literary authenticity has much to do with the issue of originality. The notion of intertextuality originates from the common knowledge that originality does not exist in the abstract. A text is always related to other texts, intraculturally or interculturally. The notion of intertextuality calls into focus the discourse, the writing process, and the limited reservoir of literary and linguistic options. To apply intertextual readings to women's writing helps us to analyse its distinctive features: its texts, intertexts, contexts, and metatexts. In particular, intertextual phenomena can illustrate how the selection of specific role models by women authors affects the typology of the discourse.

The notion of intertextuality suggests that there is no fixed hierarchy between texts. No text is intrinsically better than other texts. A text is just one possible form of verbal expression, and is authentic or original only in the sense that it is created by individual beings out of their own experiences, memories, and imagination, in relation to those of other individuals documented in earlier texts. The value a text is supposed to have is fully attributed to external agents and conditions, and results from individual judgment in a particular context and on the basis of particular criteria. Meanwhile, an individual's reading cannot be detached from the prevailing literary convention to which he or she is related. Literary convention, together with individualized readership, determines how and why certain texts are successful among a certain reading community. The success of female-authored Chinese texts must be measured against this background. Women authors' portrayal of private experience caters to the common taste of a Chinese readership that is sick of revolutionary and historical allegories. ‹

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Surabaya, City of Work

Howard Dick has written a very interesting, easy to read, and scholarly book on Surabaya, the capital city of the province of East Java. Introducing the reader to various viewpoints, he presents a wealth of information on a wide variety of topics, providing a detailed description of the historical changes in the city during the twentieth century. This serves to corroborate three general conjectures, thus solving a historical puzzle. The conjectures are: (1) 'the city is the frontier of modern Asian society'; (2) 'nowhere was urbanization more dramatic than in Indonesia under the New Order (1966–98)'; and (3) 'the modern history of Indonesia – especially of Java – can be read as a tale of two cities, Jakarta (colonial Batavia) and Surabaya' (p. xvii). The 'historical puzzle is not the sudden and sustained vitality of the period after the 1970s but the long hiatus between the 1930s and 1970s' (p. xx), partly explained by the '[c]ollapse of the sugar exports during the 1930s depression, followed by the Japanese occupation, revolution, and independence, [which] brought on a long period of stagnation and retreat from the international economy', as Dick states on the back cover. Yet, what is presented in the book actually goes further than its limited purpose suggests.

By Jan Wuisman

Howard Dick's study is an elaborate and detailed analysis of one case, the city of Surabaya. Dick presents a wide variety of contextual information within which to understand the various processes that took place in twentieth-century Surabaya. The study is, perhaps aptly, described as a historical 'urbano-graphical' case study. It clearly indicates its aim: an in-depth, systematic, and comprehensive analysis of the unit of analysis as a complex, dynamic, open system in terms of a wide variety of constitutive dimensions such as: the relationships between the local and global (space); the temporal dimension of past, present, and future (time); the relationship between nature reserves and rural areas in the hinterland and overseas cities and countries (ecology); and the social relationships between men and women (gender), young and old (generations), ethnic affiliation (cultural identity), employers and employees (social class), work, leisure, and consumption (status), inhabitants and bureaucrats (governance), citizens and politicians (polity), national and foreigner (nationality), as well as those between ethnic groups and peoples (hegemony). By covering most of these dimensions this study not only reveals to the reader the complexity of urban life in the city of Surabaya, but also illustrates its pivotal role in the economic development and modernization of the eastern parts of Java and Indonesia.

What makes Surabaya's history?

Nevertheless, Dick's study has its own limitations. There is a rather sharp difference between his descriptive and analytic analysis. At the descriptive level, Dick claims to present a 'loosely structured and idiosyncratic twentieth-century economic history of Surabaya' by exploring a variety of 'key themes by taking several cross-sections of the historical experience' (p. xxiii). By contrast, the structure of the analytic analysis is much more rigid. The seven chapters of the book are grouped into three rather tightly related clusters or parts.

The first three chapters describe Surabaya as the unit of analysis, and deal with the question: 'What is it that makes Surabaya an entity in the first place?' In chapter 1 the city is introduced to the reader: its geographical locations, appearance to inhabitants and visitors, and the daily cycle of urban life. In the next chapter, a variety of economic and political events that have shaped the city's economic history are described. The implicit idea is that these common experiences have contributed to an emerging awareness of common identity and historical relatedness. Chapter 3 presents a statistical picture of Surabaya and explains how all sorts of external factors, processes, and influences have moulded Surabaya and its identity. Employing these three perspectives, Dick suggests that Surabaya indeed represents a proper unit of historical sociological analysis; that it is an entity with a sufficiently distinct geographical, demographic, economic, institutional, administrative, and cultural identity.

In the second part, Dick outlines three processes of change: the changing structure and role of government in public health, education, and housing (chapter 4), industrialization (chapter 5), and the spread of the city and conflicts in the evolution of land use (chapter 6). The detailed and interesting treatment of these topics is based on a large variety of documentary sources and other sorts of information. What is missing, however, is their systematic treatment within a broader perspective: that is, as examples of specific social processes taking place within and directly contributing to the constitution and transformation of a distinct entity, namely Surabaya. What is more, it is not at all Dick's purpose to reveal the core of the city of Surabaya as a distinct social, cultural, and historical entity. In fact, he acknowledges having chosen Surabaya as a methodological means of studying various nationwide historical processes of growth and decline during the twentieth century. This aspect becomes blatantly clear in the conclusion in the third cluster, which is in the style of a moral discussion on the New Order, as reflected in the ups and downs that Surabaya has experienced during that period, and expectations for the post-Suharto period. The following analogy with a seventeenth-century portrait by the Dutch painter Frans Hals probably best illustrates my point.

From a distance of 50 centimetres, the sleeve of a painted jacket will appear to the observer as tiny strokes of white paint representing geometric figures on a dark grey or black background. Though one may then justly marvel at the painter's incredible attention for detail and fabulous technical craftsmanship, it is utterly impossible to make sense of what is actually being represented. From a distance of three or four metres, however, these tiny strokes of white paint on a dark background appear to be shining sleeves made of openwork silk lace, reflecting the soft light falling through a window. The same applies to this study of Surabaya. Dick's approach to data, using a low-level of classification and analysis, presents very detailed information on numerous interesting aspects and facets, but, unfortunately, the big picture escapes the attention of the reader.

The metaphor of the painting is also useful to draw attention to a fundamental aspect of today's social scientific understanding of human social life. Social life is no longer considered to be the sum of a myriad of individual acts and relations among a collective of people that need all be represented in minute detail. Instead, social life in all its varied forms and patterns is increasingly seen as the outcome of processes of social construction and cultural creation (Smith 1998). Unfortunately, the idea that Surabaya is such a construction or creation, a distinct entity that may through time evolve and devolve, remains implicit and is nowhere systematically elaborated.

'Work' as a label or a metaphor

A final consideration concerns the specific role attributed to 'work'. The concept of 'work' seems to have been chosen primarily to indicate a supposedly typical characteristic of this city, in contrast to other cities, rather than as a metaphor expressing what is typical about Surabaya and makes it what it is in the first place. The concept of 'work' is too general to be of much use to differentiate between Surabaya and other cities in Indonesia that are also based on a work culture.

Notwithstanding the above criticism this book is an eye-opener, especially for those who are not closely acquainted with Indonesia's culture and society: it reveals the existing historical diversity, richness of social experience, and the enormous cultural variation that goes with this second largest city of Indonesia. ◀

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Situating Social History Orissa

Orissa as a state remains on the periphery of popular discourse, though catastrophes, cyclones, and famines ensure that the region receives intermittent media coverage. While some regions like Bengal and Maharashtra have occupied centre stage in writings on the social history of South Asia, regions like Orissa remain in obscurity. *Situating Social History Orissa (1800–1997)* is a much-needed collection of essays that may help to change this. Drawing upon a variety of sources, ranging from archival records to tribal folklore and songs, literary works, popular memory, and interviews, Biswamoy Pati covers themes as diverse as the social history of medicine, the creation of an Oriya identity, and peasant movements in Orissa, questioning the whole process of colonial and post-colonial under-development through Kalahandi, a tract that 'has virtually emerged as a metaphor for famine' (p. ix).

By Namrata Ganneri

The six essays and field notes (some of which have previously been published) are not linked by any overarching theme. This is already evident from the preface in which Pati traces no common thread. However, what runs through this work is the author's sustained interest in exploring different facets of the social history of Orissa and the tribal world, so as to write a 'history from below'. The opening essay examines hitherto marginalized aspects of the health and medicine of indigenous tribes and demonstrates that colonial health practices and belief systems met with an oscillation between acceptance and opposition. Even the Oriya middle classes, which were deeply influenced by Western scientific discourse, opted for a system based on compromise between their own indigenous methods and those introduced from the West. Thus, colonial influence on health practice can be assessed in terms of close, constant interaction and affinity between the tribal, non-tribal, and Western systems.

The influence of the colonial period had far-reaching ramifications, from the alteration of the agrarian structure to the very crystallization of an Oriya identity by means of public debates. In fact, as the author argues, any attempt to construct Oriya history begins after its conquest: the story of Orissa typically reads as that of the successive Hindu, Muslim, Maratha, and British conquests. The British did not want to upset the apple cart in terms of social structure, and therefore continued to enforce upper-caste class domination. Hence, in this volume, the question of exploitation and domination is investigated, particularly in relation to British nineteenth-century colonialism.

One of the most fascinating essays, 'The Murder of Banamali', returns to themes that invariably crop up in all the essays: the nexus between feudal and colonial agrarian systems, the social and cultural practices adopted by the people, peasant protests, the question of popular memory, and so on. Employing typical 'people's history' methods, Pati's in-depth micro-level investigation takes us into the world of Balanga, a district in Orissa imaginatively employing court testimonies given in relation to the gruesome murder of an exploitative tyrant Banamali. It reveals Banamali's iron grip, and how this *naib* (estate manager) extended his ruthless control over the entire rural society through his entrenchment in practically all the village activities and his abuse of caste and class privileges. Interestingly, the testimonies only gradually shift focus from the hitherto much-maligned absentee Bengali landlord to his representative, Banamali, who was really the key figure. As is shown clearly and quite contrary to popular perception, which usually identifies evil with the outsider – for the tribe in the coastal area of Orissa, this would be the Bengali landlord – the real exploiter was a 'local'. The murder itself is perpetuated in popular memory as it transgressed all codes of peasant protest: the enduring images are of the murderers hacking Banamali into pieces, garlanding themselves with his intestines, and thus celebrating an end to their exploitation. Though the perpetrators were all oppressed by Banamali, the *naib* being a universally hated figure, the author's teleological perception of the murder as an act of peasant protest appears problematic. Sometimes, testimonies tell us more about the act than the act itself: and maybe more can be understood of the dynamics of a time through a more rigorous reading of the sources. The fate of Banamali is echoed in the story of the feudal lord Mangaraj.

Perhaps it is not a mere coincidence that they, and other stories like them, are associated in popular memory with how oppressors meet their doom. Encouraged by the British example, traditional syncretic elements in stories from Oriyan popular memory were replaced with the stereotypical Muslim fanatic, enemy of Hinduism and destroyer of idols. In view of such a development, and as hinted at above, the historical context in which such selective memories are created should itself be investigated by social historians, as it may well reveal the ambivalences inherent in the process of creating popular memory.

An area that could have been delved deeper into is the 'Hinduisation of tribals'. Arguably, the debate began with G. S. Ghurye's classification of tribals as 'backward Hindus'.* If anything, this issue became even more complicated and delicate with the aggressive posturing of today's government in India over conversions. To my mind, the theme 'Hinduisation' itself requires some explanation. For instance, does 'Hinduisation' always involve 'high' Hinduism? In addition, this term is also used in reference to the rise of the Brahamanical order in the fifth century AD and with regard to the current curriculum in schools using Hindu prayers. Using this term sloppily for processes vastly separated by time and context tends to obscure its real meaning. Pati himself justly observes, 'After all, it is impossible to locate the original Hindu pantheon' (p. 14).

The most impressive aspect of this work is Pati's desire to understand, amongst other things, the ways in which people remember and relate to the past. There are many instances in which the author narrates how popular memory has retained or obliterated certain events. The historians' task is not only to create history, but also to document the processes involved in its construction: Pati's work is a valuable contribution to an understanding of this construction process. This is what makes history in general and this work in particular important outside the ranks of historians and imparts an enduring value to the work. <

- Biswamoy Pati, *Situating Social History Orissa (1800–1997)*, Hyderabad: Orient Longman (2001), pp. xiv + 182, ISBN 81 250 2007 1.

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Literary Cultures in History

With the volume *Literary Cultures in History* (edited by Sheldon Pollock), the study of Indian literature and South Asian culture and history takes a leap forward. The book is the result of over a decade's collaboration between scholars, most of whom are based at the Department of South Asian Languages and Civilizations at the University of Chicago. The basis of this leap forward over previous works in this field is the book's pervasive critical reflection on the conceptualizations underlying any history of Indian literature, and the profound consequences of any theoretical preference for specific conceptualizations. This reflection is best indicated in the form of questions: (1) What is literature? (2) What is India or what is South Asia? Or, asked in a more general way: What is the (linguistic) community defined by a literature? From a different perspective this further implies: Which language does an author, or a community, choose for the purpose of literature? (3) What is history?

By Jan Houben

In earlier works on the history of Indian literature, these questions have either been perfunctory dealt with, or they were not even asked. In his *History of Indian Literature*, for instance, S.K. Das simply states that literature comprises 'all major texts': in part 'fairy tales and tales of adventures, songs of various types and nursery rhymes' – in short, 'all memorable utterances' (cited after Pollock, p. 7). In the Literary Cultures in History project the literary is seen as 'a functional rather than an ontological category'; hence it refers to what 'people do with a text rather than something a text truly and everlastingly is' (Pollock, p. 9). However, what people do with a text varies according to the historical context. Hence, the focus came to be on the history of ('indigenous' or 'emic') definitions and views of literature. Delineating a community or area whose literature and language one wants to study poses specific problems: 'Boundaries of languages, cultures, societies, and polities that were created after the fact and in some cases very recently – boundaries that literary and linguistic processes in large part helped to create – have been taken as the condition of emergence and understanding of

these processes themselves' (p. 12). It became clear to the contributors that in South Asia '[b]orders of place and borders of language were as messy as they were elsewhere, until literature began its work of purification' (p. 17). The arrangement of the volume in five parts illustrates the pragmatic side of the response to this problem of delineation:

Part one, Globalizing Literary Cultures, consists of three chapters respectively on Sanskrit (Sheldon Pollock), Persian (Muzaffar Alam), and Indian-English literature (Vinay Dharwadker).

Part two, Literature in Southern Locales, consists of four chapters on Tamil (Norman Cutler), Kannada (D.R. Nagaraj), Telugu (Velcheru Narayana Rao), and Malayala literary culture (Rich Freeman).

Part three, The Centrality of Borderlands, consists of three chapters on the two histories (pre-colonial and colonial) of literary culture in Bengal (Sudipta Kaviraj), and on Gujarati (Sitamshu Yashaschandra) and Sindhi (Ali S. Asani) literary cultures.

Part four, Buddhist Cultures and South Asian Literatures, consists of three chapters on 'What is literature in Pali?' (Steven Collins), on Sinhala literary culture (Charles

Kamikaze, Cherry Blossom, and Nationalism

Human self-sacrifice, such as that of Allied soldiers in Iraq and Palestinian suicide bombers, obtains a new dimension in Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney's theme of patriotic suicide as an aesthetic ideal. Her study of the role of symbolism and aesthetics in totalitarian ideology shows how the state manipulated the symbol of the cherry blossom, a Japanese ideal of evanescent beauty. To persuade people that it was their honour to 'die like beautiful falling cherry petals' for the emperor, soldiers were promised that their souls would be honoured in eternity in the, now, politically controversial Yasukuni Shrine.

Plate 6, taken from the book under review.

Umezawa Kazuyo, *tokkotai* pilot, with branches of cherry blossoms on his uniform. Courtesy of his brother, Dr Umezawa Shōzō.

By Margaret Sleeboom

Drawing on diaries, unpublished in English, Ohnuki-Tierney provides a lucid discussion of the views and motives of the kamikaze pilots (*tokkotai*, or 'special attack corps'). She presents them as idealist romantics who sacrificed their confused lives for the country they held dear. Ohnuki-Tierney describes their patriotism convincingly as a product of a complex interpenetration between global intellectual tides, political and military threats from the West, and their own Japanese intellectual traditions, which were themselves also the products of interactions between the local and the global (p. 240).

The book is divided into four parts. Part one focuses on the meaning and symbolism of the cherry blossom, part two on the militarization of the masses since the nineteenth century up to World War Two, and part three on the way in which young men 'volunteered' to 'defend their country against American invasion'. Part four examines how the state managed to change the conceptions of emperor and cherry blossom, the latter being a Japanese master trope of imperial nationalism at the beginning of the Meiji period. Ohnuki-Tierney locates the power of (national) symbols and rituals in *méconnaissance*, a term borrowed from Jacques Lacan, referring to the communication absence occurring when people do not share a meaning but derive different meanings from the same symbols and rituals.

Japanese cherry blossom and the West

One aim of the book is to examine the power of aesthetics for political purposes, using the state's manipulation of cherry blossom symbolism as a case. According to Ohnuki-Tierney notions of the state and various ideologies, which motivated *tokkotai* to fly for their country, were both imported from the West. Thus, the pilots were tricked by the state into sacrificing their lives: 'When the "general will", transformed by the Nazi and Japanese states, was

seen as the general will of Rousseau and Kant, they were disarmed and did not suspect the wicked hand of manipulation' (p.17). The soldiers also borrowed Christianity from Europe to provide them with a model of sacrifice for others and the notion of life after death. The only model of sacrifice in Japan drew on the Confucian notion of loyalty to one's parents and lord (p.18–19). State manipulation of the young intellectual *tokkotai* imposed Western concepts of the nation and modernity on Japanese culture: thus, Western philosophies and ideologies explain and carry the main responsibility for their behaviour.

The sharp distinctions between state and country, nationalism and patriotism, and official kill and romantic self-sacrifice, make Japanese patriotic *tokkotai* victims of the West. Indeed the Western state, Western concepts of nationalism, Western ideologies and philosophies during, and Western censorship and prejudices after, the Pacific War, seem to have rather too much to answer for. It seems the book lacks data on *tokkotai* attitudes toward Asia, on the views of non-intellectual *tokkotai* about 'sacrificing' their lives, on the conditions under which the diaries were written, and on the intellectuals responsible for state policies. Thus, in describing the minds of the student-pilots, Ohnuki-Tierney argues that the Japanese philosopher Tanabe Hajime (a devout Christian) was influential, and most extensively read. But she does

not refer to his *Logic of Species*, which is still cursed today by Chinese intellectuals as a racist basis for Japanese imperialism (Bian Chongdao 1989:8). Neither does she refer to the role of the extreme right, which, in the 1980s and 1990s, converted former *tokkotai* bases on the southern island of Kyuushu (Chiran and Bansei) into popular tourist spots. The Yasukuni Shrine is presented as the resting-place of the souls of the *tokkotai*, separate from the neighbouring souls of class-A war criminals, still celebrated by the far right. Moreover, no mention is made of the post-war role of 'victim consciousness' of pacifist national identity in Japan (Orr 2001).

Ulterior motives

The *tokkotai* diaries have been much discussed in Japan of the 1990s, but only sporadically in English (cf. Sasaki 1997). Though it aims to alter the current image of kamikaze, it does so by focusing on the intellectual elite who represent only one-sixth of all Okinawa *tokkotai* (Sasaki 1997:15). Furthermore, Ohnuki-Tierney ascribes the truly amazing number of lengthy diaries left by *tokkotai* pilots to the importance of 'writing' as a mode of communication in Japanese culture (p.189), not to their academic background. More seriously, the behaviour of the romantic pilots remains mysterious due to a lack of contextual analysis. The meaning of 'voluntary' recruitment, the influence of state and self-censorship, social pressure, state propaganda, and education are insufficiently linked to the reading of the diaries. Finally, I doubt whether Ohnuki-Tierney has done the image of the kamikaze any favours. Whereas we may sympathize with soldiers following state orders to fight a war they believe to be unjust, the soldiers here

described, who believe their war to be justified for reasons (rooted in religious, philosophical, and utopian ideologies) at variance with those of the state, are not likely to receive any sympathy. <

- Ohnuki-Tierney, Emiko, *Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms. The Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese History*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press (2002), pp. xvii + 411, ISBN 0-226-62091-3

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Hallisey), and on the Indian literary identity in Tibet (Matthew T. Kapstein).

The final part is devoted to the twinned histories of Urdu and Hindi, with Shamsur Rahman Faruqi and Frances W. Pritchett writing on Urdu, and Stuart McGregor and Harish Trivedi writing on Hindi.

As can be seen, the volume clearly breaks away from earlier histories in not starting from a monolithic dominant Sanskrit literature but from the plurality of literatures in globalizing and vernacularizing languages.

In order to deal with the historical dimension, the authors decided to explore 'how people have done things with the past' and to take 'seriously how different modes of temporality may have worked to structure South Asian literary cultures for the participants themselves' (pp. 18–19).

The authors' basic attitude consists of 'listening to the questions the texts themselves raise ... rather than, like inquisitors, placing the texts in the dock and demanding that they answer the questions we bring to them.' Adopting this fundamental openness made them enter a 'zone of freedom' when they 'escaped literary history for the history of literary culture, committing [them]selves to taking South Asian people and their ideas seriously, and allowing for (potentially radical) South Asian difference' (p. 13).

Pollock's argument in his chapter 'Sanskrit Literary Culture From The Inside Out' (p. 55) that the dividing line between classical literature and ancient Vedic texts is 'untranscendable' is not entirely convincing. Apart from the continuities that can be perceived, the boundaries between the two have through the ages been frequently crossed by South Asian Sanskrit poets as well as by Vedic exegetes and grammarians.

While the authors are to be lauded for their effort to avoid 'naturalizing categories – of time, place, language and community' (p. 34), the volume fortunately contains a number of maps of South and Central Asia that are very helpful. What is missing is a synoptic table of authors and approximate dates. It would have increased the accessibility of the complex material for students, for whom this volume will otherwise be an excellent textbook it. After all, there must have been some historical time when the paths of the authors and main actors in the various 'literary cultures' of the South Asian subcontinent occasionally crossed.

This volume is the result of individual contributors' efforts and throughout shows their 'fascination with the quest for learning how to listen' (p. xix).

The novel presentation of information on literatures – which, like Sanskrit, Hindi, and Urdu, have been extensively explored, or, like Malayalam, have scarcely been researched to date – is surely laudable in itself. Nonetheless, the real plus value lies in the opening up of critical literary, social, and historical research questions, and in the stimulation of new, unexpectedly rich perceptions of South Asia through its literary cultures. <

- Pollock, Sheldon (ed.), *Literary Cultures in History*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press (2003), pp. 1108, ISBN 0-5202-2821-9

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Kakunuri Appakavi (seventeenth century), *Appakaviyamu*, edited with a preface by Ravuri Dorasami Sarma, Madras: Vavilla Ramaswamy Sastrulu and Sons (1932). Picture is given on p. 576.

Poem picture in the form of a coiled snake in a seventeenth-century work on Telugu poetics, discussed by V. Narayana Rao in his chapter *Literary Cultures in History*. The poem is a prayer to Krishna and contains a large number of his names.

Making Merit, Making Art:
A Thai Temple in Wimbledon

Review >
England

Wat Buddhapadipa in Wimbledon is the most prestigious Thai Buddhist temple outside of Thailand. The initiative to build a temple in England came from a group of Thai nationals in 1964 and received sanction and substantial supports from the Thai government, elites, influential patrons, and even royalty. The temple's prestige is also enhanced by the long-standing cordial relations between the royal houses of Thailand and England, and by the persistent Thai view of London as the main centre of Western civilization. Sandra Cate's *Making Merit, Making Art* is based on the story and ideas behind this temple.

By Nandana Chutiwongs

For Thailand today, Wat Buddhapadipa in London represents an officially sanctioned version of Thai identity, conforming to the National Cultural Policy to maintain 'the good image, fame and dignity of Thai culture in the world community'. For well-to-do Thais, it is almost a place of pilgrimage, a legitimate goal for fund-raising, travelling, and merit-making. For others, it has become a highly recommended stop on tourist itineraries. The most celebrated feature of Wimbledon's temple is its Thai-style *bot* or *ubosot/uposatha* (ordination hall), which holds mural paintings depicting the life of the Buddha in an unusual style that may be classified as 'neo-traditional', one of the many trends of contemporary art in Thailand.

From the records of various interviews Cate has conducted with founding members, supporters, and patrons of the temple, we can glean an idea of its actual functions. These tally, in gen-

The defeat of Mara and the Enlightenment.

Taken from the book under review. Photo by Andy Whale.

eral outline, with what has been known in Thailand since ancient times. As a rule, Cate wisely refrains from judgement, thus letting interviews and interviewees speak for themselves. The temple's murals, in particular, generate much animated discussion and controversy as to their suitability as media to disseminate the true message of the Buddha, their legitimacy as representations of Thai cultural identity, and their debatable aesthetic values.

The paintings still follow established conventions in theme and basic design, reflecting styles of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But the intensity of the new palette and the 'radical' mode of representation unsettle the average audience. The incorporation of contemporary elements, such as portraits or caricatures of living persons, generates disapproval, not because of their presence, but more on account of the hybrid Western styles employed to depict them.

For many long years 27 Thai painters, trained in both Thai and Western art history and history, worked together on these murals. As volunteers they only received free board and simple lodging from the temple, yet subsequently gained substantial renown from working on this prestigious project. This process may be viewed in conformity with the Thai ingrained belief in karma. Merit-making, besides bene-

fiting others and the world in general, also enhances one's own current and future prospects. Success, generally measured in terms of fame and finance, indeed elevated the painters' own career, and consequently had a far-reaching effect on the trends and development of the country's contemporary art on the whole.

Cate explores the characteristics and significance of these paintings from anthropological and art historical points of view, addressing the complex relationships between art and religion, and society and power. The motivations of the artists and their sponsors, public response, and the diverse views of the critics, are all presented against the lively and changing backdrop of contemporary Thailand. The author's summary of first-hand information on the Thai system of art education and training is highly relevant to understanding the background, ideologies, and work processes of artists in Thailand today. Debates on the multiple roles of art, as an act of selfless devotion, a medium of moral instruction, an expression of ideas and convictions, and/or as a purely aesthetic revelation, are still going on in full force in contemporary Thailand. Fortunately, the author's analytical remarks, often short and to the point, usually bear marks of sincerity that take most of the sting out of many of these sensitive issues.

Making Merit, Making Art
A Thai Temple in Wimbledon
Sandra Cate

'Thainess', predominate in the murals. On the contrary, the intensity of the new palette, of cool but clear and ethereal translucent greens, blues, and pinks, evokes a striking contrast to the familiar dark but warm red and gold palette of the old murals.

'Modern' elements, bearing stylistic qualities of Western surrealism, realism, fantastic realism, and even pop art, appear in the detailed Buddha scenes. These include portraits and caricatures of important and notorious political figures and popular TV phenomena, such as the action heroes Superman and Ninja Turtles, all shown in their characteristic poses and dispositions. In these trivial details, the neo-traditional artists make use of the traditional poetic/artistic licence that permits events of everyday life, including those of unrefined humour and of human faults and failings, to appear in the periphery of religious scenes.

The author also notes the significance of the Buddhapadipa temple paintings as a mode of 'social portraiture' in multiple dimensions. She argues that they transport a contemporary vision of Thai society beyond the boundaries of Thailand, and carry the message of Thai Buddhism into the contemporary world. The painters unfold the story of the Buddha's life as told in their own culture and in hybrid styles reflective of the various conceptions and art phenomena as known in contemporary Thailand. Depictions of persons and places representative of contemporary political powers and the diversity of global cultures are interwoven into the imaginary and fantastic setting of the Buddha story. Hybrid in style, evocative and controversial in expression and artistic valuation, Cate is convincing in her argument that the murals at the Wat Buddhapadipa Temple undeniably embody a spirit of universality, portraying the world as one large community that shares the same fate, confusion, disharmony, and troubles. There is a sense that wholesale sufferings can be eliminated by a clear understanding and by the subtle but brilliant spectrum of light emanating from the revered figure of the Buddha, the teacher of peace and tolerance. ◄

- Sandra Cate, *Making Merit, Making Art, a Thai Temple in Wimbledon*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, (2003), pp. 218, 48 colour plates, ISBN 0-8248-23575

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The *ubosot* at Wat Buddhapadipa, Wimbledon, England.

Taken from the book under review. Photo by Sandra Cate.

The book gives a short but adequate overview of the nature and function of mural painting in Thailand, assigning its shift of place from religious space to secular environments to the agencies of modernity and commercialization. Although this is not a new theory, the many examples provided in the book emphasize the author's point. In spite of a slight weakness in her knowledge of the early history of art in Thailand, the unique nature of the Buddhapadipa murals and their highlights are adequately underlined. As she explains, they form part of two large designs conceived by two leaders of the working group. The conventional composition and distribution of scenes relating the life of the Buddha are substantially retained, as well as the two-dimensional and multi-perspective style of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the murals also incorporate details that belong to the modern world, presented in strikingly non-conventional styles.

The delicate, elegant lines, enriched by profuse and detailed ornamentation, originally found in traditional art and generally considered representative of

Rule of Law in East and Southeast Asia?

In the wake of the Asian financial meltdown, numerous analysts focused on the lack of regulation and transparency as factors precipitating the 1997 crisis. Partly as a result of pressure from international financial institutions, countries have started to improve the legal frameworks in which businesses operate. Christoph Antons' *Rule of Law in East and Southeast Asia* brings together a variety of perspectives from legal scholars on the reforms now underway. Traditional Asian understandings of law as an instrument of state power notwithstanding, do we see signs of a greater regional importance attached to the rule of law?

By Willem Visser 't Hooft

This highly readable collection of 14 different papers is the result of an IIAS workshop held in January 1998. In examining prospects for legal reform in Asia, the book addresses diverse fields of commercial law: intellectual property law, competition law, and financial market regulation, among others. The book is divided into five parts. In the first theoretical section, the authors focus on perceptions of the role of law in economic development. Of particular note are the articles by Bernard Bishop and John Ohnesorge. Bishop points to economic deregulation in many East Asian countries and the resulting separation of business from government. Governments increasingly focus on policies promoting competition, such as increased enforcement of laws on cartel formation; this will inevitably lead to a stronger emphasis on the rule of law. Ohnesorge, however, questions the necessity for a strong rule of law in all areas of the economy. It is important to develop an understanding of the rule of law, he argues, that can effectively be distinguished from the simple legalization of society or the suppression of government discretion in economic governance.

Part two focuses on Japan as a model for law and development in East Asia and specifically treats the influence of administrative decision-making on Japanese commercial law. Harald Baum, critical of the simple 'West vs. Asia' mental framework, explores important forces of change at work in Japan. In particular, strong bureaucratic interference is regarded as an impediment to economic growth. He cites the example of the Japanese financial industry and the challenges of globalization, and concludes that courts and lawyers will become more important in ex post monitoring instead of the traditional ex ante monitoring manifested through administrative guidance.

Richard Boyd stresses that, when looking at the significance of law in the management of economic change in Japan, the rule of law and safeguarding of competition appear less significant than legal instrumentality and informality. He points, however, to the increasing influence of the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) which implements the Anti-Monopoly Law, an important institution anticipated by rule of law rhetoric. Boyd is right to focus on strong bureaucratic sectionalism in Japan, such as the continuous rivalry between the FTC and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in issuing laws and guidelines relating to competition policy. Christopher Heath likewise focuses on the rivalry between the FTC and METI in his chapter on industrial property legislation.

Christoph Antons points to a fundamental characteristic which Japan shares with other countries in East Asia. This is the primacy of public over private law. Many countries instrumentalized their imported commercial laws for development purposes, yet never encouraged litigation for individual goals. The classical distinction between private and public law has usually been blurred. The relative shortage of attorneys and judges and a lack of specialized courts in East Asian countries may therefore be no coincidence.

The book could have been improved by placing more emphasis on the question whether the current (commercial) legal reforms will lead to a more autonomous private realm where private citizens can more easily go to court. To what extent will the inevitable increase in private trade disputes lead to a greater emphasis on the rule of law? The book leaves the question unanswered. The article by Robert Lutz on resolving trade disputes and on Asian dispute resolution fora, however, is interesting. He retains an optimistic outlook on the emerging international dispute resolution culture, although he draws attention to remaining enforcement problems in some countries.

Part three of the book deals with the role of law in China. Chen Jianfu concludes that although in China 'rule by law' is still strong, the strengthening of legal discourse and the involvement of legal experts in lawmaking are important steps in the right direction towards a greater emphasis on the rule of law. Part four deals with Southeast Asia and discusses industrial relations and technology transfer, two issues that have been central to the debate on economic development in Southeast Asia. Concluding the volume, Roman Tomasic discusses some recent examples of socio-legal scholarship on Asian commercial law, and encourages further empirical research in the field.

To sum up, this book is a useful guide for understanding law and development in East Asia and the place of the rule of law in various East Asian countries. Differences and similarities between countries are examined, as are practices and understandings that can be expected to resist pressures to reform. For example, government bureaucracies responsible for implementing new commercial laws will be hesitant to give up their power to courts and lawyers.

The book's main merit lies in its diversity and its emphasis on factors other than cultural ones. Although cultural factors are not to be neglected, recent socio-legal research points to the fact that institutional and procedural aspects of national legal systems matter and may be resistant to transnational harmonization. ❮

- Antons, Christoph (ed.), *Law and Development in East and Southeast Asia* (IIAS Asian Studies Series), London: RoutledgeCurzon (2003), pp. 387, ISBN 0-7007-1321-2

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Madrigals, Mandarins, and Budgetary Politics

For a long time in the United Kingdom the Treasury was 'off limits' to scholars. Strange, because there was little doubt that this was the hard core of government, the central citadel of Whitehall where the Treasury men not only taxed the public, but defended the national purse 'like inverted Micawbers, waiting for something to turn down' (Winston Churchill). Since few acts of government have no financial repercussions, and since public finance is the purlieu of the Treasury, how could it escape the attention of political and other social scientists? There was no ban, but serious study of the Treasury seemed or was deemed impossible and best left to journalists. How could this be?

By Richard Boyd

The root of the problem was the cult, the culture, the mystique of the Treasury itself. These were mandarins among mandarins, an intellectual elite, the pick of the civil service, the cream of recruits, members of a chosen race, a race apart. A musical race at that! There was always a Treasury choir and even, at one time, a quartet of madrigal-singing Treasury knights (the UK's equivalent to Japan's administrative vice-ministers). In the Treasury, as Sampson famously observed, the literary, Oxbridge character of Whitehall had its quintessence. This was all a bit too much for the unchosen, the poor cousins of the mandarinate, cloistered in their university departments, and so the Treasury remained substantially off limits until about 1970. At which time two American academics presented themselves, unabashed and unashamed, made appointments, prepared their questions, switched on their tape recorders, and asked their questions as the tapes rolled. The academics were Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, their questions were answered in full, and the result was the classic 1974 study, *The Private Government of Public Money*.

The parallels with Japan and its Ministry of Finance (MOF) and, no less, between Maurice Wright and these distinguished Americans, are irresistible. The MOF is the centre of Japan's government (say what you will about the importance of the ministry formerly known as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry or (MITI), its initiatives, if and when they have financial repercussions, intrude the MOF's bailiwick and trigger its prerogatives), and its officials are no less the crème de la crème, the pick of the bureaucratic crop, than their Treasury counterparts. The response of the poor cousins has not been so different either: Japanese scholarship has been at arm's length, to put it mildly. Budgeting is treated not so much as a substantial political process (with the exception of Campbell's pioneering study, *Contemporary Japanese Budgeting*, 1977) but rather in formal, constitutional, legal, and institutional terms. Journalists in Japan, as in England, are made of sterner stuff and are left to deal with the facts of the matter. Wright himself has co-authored a highly regarded study of the UK Treasury. His work on the MOF draws upon techniques and insights derived from that study, and consciously echoes a broad theoretical stance that refers back to Wildavsky. His 'tape recorder' was no less active than that of Heclo and Wildavsky – the book is fed on a rich diet of more than 150 interviews with senior officials and politicians.

There is another parallel at once intriguing and provocative. Heclo and Wildavsky were 'outsiders', removed at the outset from the inhibition and self-censorship that marked local observers. That distance facilitated enquiry, while expertise and experience derived elsewhere enabled research. This is troubling stuff for at least one group of professional students of Japan, for whom (to play on the colonial idiom) 'learning to dance like the natives' is a virtue not a vice, and is even an indispensable means to knowledge. The dance demands (Japanese) linguistic competence and a depth of cultural knowledge. We students of the dance see no disadvantage in this. Wright, perhaps, does, and he might be right – in this case at least. Certainly there has been no adequate account of budgeting in Japan in Japanese or English for decades. The pussyfooting around the MOF rivals that around the Treasury. Wright's interviews were conducted in English and he is unapologetic: 'most senior officials have acquired proficiency in the language from time abroad in academic study as part of their earlier formal training, and through career postings to Japanese embassies or international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank'. Was this a disadvantage? No. Not a bit of it. In fact, 'interviewing in English had the advantage that it was normally unconstrained by those social conventions and contexts customarily observed in Japanese discourse'. Is this music to the ears of a Japan scholar? About as much as fingernails scraping on a blackboard are. As for the literature used, Wright knows and draws upon the major literatures in both languages. This is conventional enough: indeed, careers have been made out of synthesizing the best of published Japanese sources. This is emphatically not the case here. Wright depends little on Japanese literature, the limitations of which he understands. As for the results, Wright has written the only major text on the MOF and the Japanese budgetary process to have appeared in the last 25 years; it is a substantial, comprehensive, theoretically informed, analytically acute, and empirically rich, culturally sensitive, historico-institutional account of one of the key agencies in Japanese government and of one of the key processes in Japanese politics. Its importance is considerable. Not least for area studies. Read it. ❮

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Is Tibet (really) Chinese?

Already for some time, Tibet appears to be of substantial interest and concern both to the West and to the Chinese government. Their concern may be substantially different, yet, as many questions are the same, *Le Tibet est-il Chinois? Réponses à cent questions chinoises*, in which Blondeau and Buffetrille and other Tibet specialists take on one hundred existing Chinese questions regarding Tibet would appear a fascinating undertaking.

By Antonio Terrone

Since the annexation of Tibet in 1951, the PRC has faced a continuous series of challenges in its attempt to convince the world of its claim on Tibet. Human rights organizations and Tibet support groups often portray the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) policy towards Tibet, and also towards other ethnic groups, as one of crackdowns, intimidation and questionable modernization, involving a continuous influx of Han Chinese workers. The primary fear of the international community is that the increasing commercialization of Tibet that has accompanied the extensive programme of Chinese investment in the region will simultaneously weaken the attraction of traditional Tibetan culture for Tibetans, while strengthening their loyalty to the economic opportunities that China can increasingly offer. The religious and ethnic cause of Tibetans has been the main reason for anti-CCP dissent among Tibetans, and has received much international attention in recent decades. In the late 1980s, a booklet in various languages was available at Chinese embassies around the world: *Le Tibet, cent questions et réponses (A Hundred Questions and Answers about Tibet,* henceforth *Cent Questions)* summarized the official Chinese stance on the status of Tibet.[1] Now, 14 years on, a team of 15 leading Tibetologists provide their own answers to those questions in *Le Tibet est-il Chinois? Réponses à cent questions chinoises (Is Tibet Chinese? Answers to A Hundred Chinese Questions,* henceforth *Réponses).*

Edited by Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, *Réponses* provides the reader with the necessary background to understand PRC claims and the current comments of Western academics on sensitive issues that span centuries of Sino-Tibetan history, Tibet's economy, religion, culture, human rights situation, demography, and living conditions. The authors of *Réponses* succeed in refuting China's standard historical justification for Tibet's inclusion within the PRC. This is based on the belief that Tibet's theocratic rule and imperial exploitation over the centuries caused great harm and suffering to Tibetans until the People's Liberation Army (PLA) finally 'peacefully liberated' them in 1950. The Chinese argument also suggests that the annexation prevented the total collapse of 'backward' Tibet and set it on the road to modernization, transforming it for the better under CCP rule. *Réponses* is valuable, therefore, in its attempt to clarify the current situation concerning Tibet and Tibetans in the PRC, particularly as a reaction to an overt propagandistic publication such as *Cent Questions*. The book clearly demonstrates how Beijing quickly loses ground with its various historical claims over Tibet. An oversight of *Réponses*, however, paradoxically mirrors a failure of *Cent Questions*.

As government propaganda, *Cent Questions*, not surprisingly, avoids highlighting any weakness in CCP policy in Tibet. Yet *Réponses* not only fails to point this out, but the authors also avoid discussing some of the CCP's shocking policy failures. For example, the harm wrought on Tibet during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), could have been mentioned more than just occasionally in the book and is somewhat overlooked. This point is paramount, because it strikes at the heart of the PRC's position that Beijing's rule has been nothing but beneficial for Tibetans.

Investigating the economic situation, *Réponses* provides a lengthy analysis of the shortcomings of the PRC's policy concerning the development of China's western regions, denouncing the neglect of infrastructure and the massive exploitation of Tibet's natural resources (pp. 300-337). However, little mention is made of the current Golmud-Lhasa railroad project (2001-2007) and its impact on Tibet's environment and economy.[2] Such improvements in infrastructure and development strategies are mainly intended to reinforce national unity under the CCP flag. As *Réponses* clearly emphasizes, the fundamental preoccupation of the Chinese government (widely stressed in *Cent Questions*) is the protection of the territorial integrity of the country and the unity of the many ethnic communities of the PRC (pp.171-191).

Indeed, over the past four decades, the official position of the Chinese government on Tibet-related issues has not substantially changed. For the government, the integration of Tibet was fulfilled in 1965 following the creation of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Tibetan nationalist dissent is thus considered to be a threat to the PRC's territorial integrity, rather than a direct threat to CCP leadership over China. It should be remembered, however, that any attempt to reshape China's borders would seriously undermine the legitimacy of the ruling party.

Religion, together with language and culture, are nationalistic elements that the Chinese government is trying hard to keep under tight control. The return of capital punishment for Tibetan political prisoners this January, reminds us that as the Tibetan movement for religious freedom and self-determination gains impetus, the Chinese authorities do not hesitate to apply harsh measures to suppress the Tibetan resistance movement. However, the question remains to what extent the Western powers will be prepared to confront Beijing as Tibet moves up the international agenda. ◄

- Blondeau, Anne-Marie and Katia Buffetrille (eds.), *Le Tibet est-il Chinois? Réponse à cent questions chinoises*, Paris: Albin Michel (2002), pp.468, ISBN 9-782226-134264

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Notes >

1 The authors refer to the French edition.
For an online version see www.tibetinfor.com.cn/tibetzt-en/question_e/index.htm
Official Chinese information on Tibet, ethnic groups, religious affairs, and Tibet-related issues can be obtained at the authorized government portal site to China www.china.org.cn/english and at the China Tibet Information Centre website www.tibetinfor.com.cn/english
2 Office of the Leading Group for Western Region Development of the State Council: www.chinawest.gov.cn/english
The State Development and Planning Commission: www.sdpc.gov.cn

Im Kwon-Taek

The Making of a Korean National Cinema

For over a decade the success of Korean films on the domestic and international scene has generated an increasing readership of Korean film studies and reviews. There are, however, still only a handful of related works available in English. David E. James and Kyung Hyun Kim's *Im Kwon-Taek: The Making of a Korean National Cinema* should help to fill the gap.

By Roald H. Maliangkay

What sets this work apart from other books on Korean film that have recently come out in Western languages is the fact that it explores the work of Korea's foremost director, Im Kwon-Taek, head-on, without first trying to explain every single detail about Korean culture. It looks into the ideas behind Im's films and sheds light on the director's unique position in Korean cinema. The book consists of nine articles, an interview with the director, a filmography, a handy list of important political and cultural events, a useful three-page bibliography of related sources in English, and an index. Twenty-odd black-and-white photographs that allow us to envisage the scenes are also discussed.

The first chapter recounts Im's role in the history of Korean cinema. Kyung Hyun Kim talks of the significance of Im's family background, the grim working environments under the military dictatorships, and the international film festivals. The working conditions are again described in the analysis of two of Im's films on Buddhism,

Mandala (1981) and *Come, Come, Come Upward* (1989) respectively. Here, David James argues that Im's partiality towards Sŏn Buddhism may explain why he dichotomizes a sacred yet socially indifferent landscape and a disgraced but socially involving city. He finds his use of landscapes and female bodies to allegorize the Korean nation or the working classes contradictory, as it risks exploiting the women visually. Eunsu Cho further explores Im's use of women as metaphors, this time in *Adada* (1988) and *Surrogate Mother* (1986). In both films, the protagonists are mute; their inner suffering, *han*, is implied, but not articulated. When they denounce the ineffective patriarchal authority, they do so in a language of their own. Both James and Cho find that although the women allegorize the Korean nation, the focus on their beauty risks their visual debasement. Chungmoo Choi examines the role played by colonialism, cultural imperialism and nationalism, and nostalgia in *Sopyonje* (1993) and *The Genealogy* (1978). Her analysis of how Im's use of, for example, a particular gendering or landscape often supports a counter-

hegemonic imagery is fascinating. Unfortunately, interpretations of what may or may not have been conscious decisions on Im's part are too often given as fact, without any supporting comments from the director. As a result, the studies tell us more about the authors than the director.

In chapter five, Cho Hae Joang once more recounts the success of *Sopyonje*, this time focusing on its reception in Korea. She relates how people from all generations explained the success in terms of its nationalist importance, implying that not every one enjoyed the film as much as the attention it received suggests, and points out the danger of excessive traditionalism. Julian Stringer looks at the reasons behind the film's failure to attract foreign audiences. Contrary to Cho Hae Joang, he favours the depiction of traditions when they can be used to counter the hegemony of Western cinema, even if their effect will rely upon exoticism and orientalism. He argues that Im's film, paradoxically, invents traditions for the purpose of increasing their appeal to modern society. In addition to these studies of Im's arguably apolitical

nationalism and traditionalism, Yi Hyoin looks into the director's political views. He contends that, like other films, *Fly High, Run Far: Kaebyŏk* (1991) shows that Im has not been the socio-political conscience he could have been. The fact that in this film, again, a violent antithesis is eschewed may, Yi argues, be related to the difficulties faced by Im's family during the Korean War and the many international political crises around the time he made it.

Im's belief in humanism, tradition, and liberal democracy as a means for progress is the subject of the last two studies of this collection. Kyung Hyun Kim's second article on the sexual victimization of male protagonists in Im's 1994 *The Taebaek Mountains* forms a welcome contrast with the studies of Im's feminine allegories. Kim analyses why and how this victimization signals the need for patriarchal authority. He explains why in this epic of the Korean War, Im once again leaves out simplistic depictions of war violence, focusing instead on social tensions and political violence among locals. Han Ju Kwak's study looks into how Im's 1996 *Festival* argues the possibility of a synthesis between 1990s modernity and tradition. He demonstrates that, while the film underscores Im's belief in the reunifying power of traditions, it also warns against their ruthless execution.

Im Kwon-Taek: The Making of a Korean National Cinema is a very welcome addition to the volume of studies on Korean film in general. I should, however, caution novices to Korean film. One reason is that this work does

not argue the importance of Im Kwon-taek's oeuvre. Another is that, although the writing is meticulously edited, if arguably a little turgid, the romanization is very inconsistent, leaving many Korean names and references unreliable. Those primarily interested in what has been going on in Korean cinema since the mid-1990s will find another cause for frustration in the fact that, due to a six-year delay between the initial submission of the papers and publication, it contains many outdated comments regarding the current status of films in Korea. This collection does, nevertheless, offer many novel insights and fascinating observations regarding the work of Im Kwon-Taek. It shows Im to be a modest, hard-working individual, as well as a Korean and a talented director. Although some of the contributors have a tendency to interpret scenes without sufficient back-up, they all provide excellent material for further discussion. I am convinced, therefore, that it will prove to be a great resource to those involved in world cinema or Korean cultural studies. <

- James, David E., and Kyung Hyun Kim (eds.), *Im Kwon-Taek: The Making of a Korean National Cinema*, Detroit: Wayne State University Press (2002), pp.294, ISBN 0-8143-2868-7

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Memories of the Future

Corcuff's *Memories of the Future* links a variety of perspectives characteristic of the new direction Taiwan Studies has taken in recent years. Based on papers presented in the mid-1990s annual conferences organized under the auspices of the North American Taiwan Studies Association (NATSA), this collection of essays is aimed at Taiwan researchers in particular, and scholars working on East Asia interested in the complexity of nationalism, identity, and ethnicity in general.

By Ann Heylen

Inspired by theories of collective and national identity, the editor and contributors demonstrate the pluralistic nature of identities in Taiwan. The work is divided in three parts: 'Historical Roots', 'The Transition of National Identity', and 'Perspectives on Ethnicity and Taiwanese Nationalism'. Particularly innovative is the manner in which the linear unfolding of the book allows the reader to discern various aspects of state-society relations in Taiwanese identity politics hitherto neglected or obscured.

Andrew Morris portrays the formation of the 1895 Taiwan Republic against the background of Western presence and economic role in northern Taiwan. Morris shows that late nineteenth-century Taiwanese gentry were predisposed to Western assistance, and draws attention to the complexity of anti-imperialist policies of the Qing dynasty in the international political arena. Robert Edmondson does not give us a new narrative of the 2.28 Incident, but concentrates on the politically charged process of its historical interpretation in the post-Japanese colonial socio-historical context.[1] Stéphane Corcuff further underscores the fact that identity is not static but a dynamic process that remains highly volatile in the never-ending process of nation building. In analyzing changes in four national-identity-related symbols under former president Lee Teng-hui, i.e. state doctrine, official commemorations, textbooks, and banknotes, Corcuff convincingly demonstrates that these were not the result of radical reform, but illustrate a negotiated process between the defunct state-party state ensemble and social movements, opposition politicians, the press, and scholars (p. 97).

Shu Wei-der, Lin Tsong-jyi, and Robert Marsh deal with the identity issue seen from the perspective of social movements. Shu investigates the membership and activities of the clandestine political overseas Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM).[2] In his data analysis of 14 North American-based TIM members, Shu takes issue with two competing sociological theses

on political activism; the marginality and privilege theses (p. 50). Lin and Marsh complement our understanding on the interaction between elite manipulations and mass opinions in the 1990s. Whereas Lin concentrates on political party identification (Kuo Min-Tang (KMT), Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), New Party (NP), and non-partisan), Marsh's survey research focuses on ethnic self-identification, using the *bensheng* and *waisheng* jargon.[3] Both articles reach the same conclusion, that is, that there is an increasing sense of Taiwanese identity and a decreasing Chinese identity. In so concluding, Marsh also confirms Lin's thesis that the mass-elite interaction was a reciprocal one, whereby the changing stances of political parties were mainly influenced by public opinion, which had responded to shifting environments (p.134). This latter issue is quite well explained in Marsh's section on the geopolitical constraints on Taiwan's independence (pp. 154–158).

It is clear that the major strength of this book is its attention to the Mainlanders, a rather ignored research topic in Taiwan Studies. Both Li Kuang-chün and Stéphane Corcuff find this social group an important player in the discourse on identity and politics. Corcuff does a fine job in explaining what Mainlanders (*waishengren*) are about and conceptualizes them as a new ethnic category (pp. 164-171). His contribution is definitely worth reading and solidifies Li's conclusion that the political and cultural ascendancy of the Taiwanese (*benshengren*) has not only perplexed the first generation Mainlanders' collective memory, but has also brought second-generation Mainlanders an identity dilemma which carries profound socio-economic consequences (p. 121).

In the closing chapters, two progressive Taiwanese intellectuals, Wu Rwei-Ren and Lin Chia-lung, defend a new perception of nationalism following Taiwan's political democratization (1988-2000). Wu's leading argument coalesces around the concept of a pragmatic nationalism. Inspired by Gramsci, Wu develops the thesis of a passive revolution and argues that the struggle for democracy in Taiwan took the stance of an anti-colonial national

movement (p. 200). Lin's pointed analysis of the term 'Taiwanese' draws our attention to the distinction between ethnic and national identity. He convincingly shows that identity politics in the last decade of political transition indicate a shift away from an ethnic term for 'native Taiwanese' to a civic term for 'citizens of Taiwan' (pp. 224-227). His thesis supports a sudden growth of civic national identity that does not necessarily negate or object to its Chinese roots.

The relevance of this book is that it reflects anew on Lee Teng-hui's 1994 expression 'the misery of being a Taiwanese' (p. 233). By acknowledging Taiwan's sense of national belonging to combine a Taiwanese political identity with a Chinese cultural identity it perpetuates the challenge to China's irredentist stance on nationalism and highlights the thorny issues of nationhood and a dated belief in nationalism demanding one nation, one state. Perhaps a suitable follow-up would be a study that focuses on the perspective of the aboriginals and the several Taiwan diaspora communities worldwide. A small draw-

back may lie in the fact that many references in the texts are not included in the bibliography, yet this book is definitely a worthwhile purchase. ‹

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The Haunting Fetus: Abortion, Sexuality, and the Spirit World in Taiwan

It is common belief in contemporary Taiwan that an aborted fetus may come back to haunt its family, and the ritual practices to appease it. According to this belief, the aborted fetus appears in the world of the living as a fetus-ghost (*yingling*) or as a fetus-demon (*xiaogui*). Fetus-ghosts provoke disorder affecting the family concerned, such as disease, injury, or death, while fetus-demons seek vengeance through evil acts: to appease the fetus-ghost, the family performs a ritual. While fetus-ghosts are associated with guilt and redemption, fetus-demons are concerned with evil: fetus-demons' sorcery means sorcery performed by a sorcerer master with the help of a fetus-demon. Haunting fetus-ghosts generate disorders in the same way as most Chinese and Taiwanese spirits.

By Evelyne Micollier

In *The Haunting Fetus*, Moskowitz endeavours to explore the ghosts' (*yingling*) distinctiveness, particularly their nature as children. A cultural continuum links the abortion cult, child spirits, and Daoism, providing a framework of local ideas and practices in which this newly imported cult can thrive. In traditional Chinese culture, age is calculated from the date of conception, while representations of early or 'unborn' childhood involve ambiguity, incompleteness, and a liminal state that gives access to secrets of the cosmic world. All of this is significant in Daoism. Moreover, the ultimate goal of the Daoist practice 'Guarding the One' was to return to such a liminal state through concentrative meditation, in which the technique of 'embryo breathing' was used to regress to the '*enfançon*' state (Schipper 1982:206).

The treatment of the subject is fascinating, as the moral, psychological, and symbolic aspects of abortion are addressed in the context of a modernizing Taiwan. Against this background Moskowitz discusses gender-related power struggles and the emotional manipulation of women. Moreover, the topic is original in the way it addresses religion in the context of Chinese and Taiwanese culture: the author conceptualizes the subject as being at the crossroads of religion and gender studies in a context of societies in social, political, and economic transition.

His analysis is based on ethnographic material such as case studies, urban mythology, people's own accounts given through interviews, newspaper articles, morality tracts, and visual media and literature about the ghosts. Moskowitz collected written documents and conducted interviews in Mandarin Chinese, primarily amongst urban Taibei residents, during the mid-1990s.

Fetus-ghost appeasement practice seems to be rooted in Japanese culture from where it spread out across Taiwan during the 1970s. The influence of Japanese belief and practice is noticeable in Taiwan in the development of new religions in general and in fetus belief and practice as a new religious component in particular (chapter 3). The legalization of abortion in 1985 may partly explain the development of such a controversial ritual practice in Taiwanese society. For the first time, abortion was discussed in the public sphere along with a range of highly emotionally charged related issues such as teenage pregnancy, sexuality, and family planning. These issues provoke tensions between the person as a whole and her inner self, the individual and society, and within society as a whole. Fetus-ghost appeasement helps to reduce those tensions, while fetus-demon sorcery reinforces them.

Though the study focuses on specific religious belief and practice, the scope of the research is so broad that it also contributes to understanding new concerns in the context of an

Asian society in the process of modernization, including moral values, control of sexuality, and the family as a traditional social structure in transition. In his analysis, Moskowitz takes into account the historical and political background. His research is innovative as no systematic ethnographic study of fetus-ghosts (*yingling*) and little ghosts (*xiaogui*) (called 'fetus-demons' in the book) had previously been conducted. Indeed, a better knowledge of Chinese and Taiwanese perceptions and conceptions of the spirit world contributes to our anthropological knowledge of daily acts and ideas, actions pragmatically connected to people's world views and systems of representations.

Moskowitz concludes: '...fetus-ghost appeasement is part of a larger body of religious practice and belief that might be called a commodification of sin, in which one can atone for one's wrongs through financial sacrifice in one form or another' (p. 168). But he also notes that 'religious masters could not market this belief if there were not a demand' (p. 169).

The book offers an insight into the process of reshaping the religious sphere through a pragmatic adaptation to the social issues raised in a society in transition, such as abortion and its meaning, women's changing roles, and other gender issues: all these issues are analysed in connection with economic transition. It opens up a number of avenues for further research related to gender, religion, and globalization related issues. Although the author does not sufficiently clarify his theoretical stands or his epistemological choices, the book is definitely a valuable work for any specialist and inquisitive reader as well as those interested in contemporary anthropology. Moskowitz empathically covers a whole range of issues from the most intimate aspects of the human condition to the most external aspects of life in society. He also shows that a 'globalized' process of commodification is subtly pervading each of these aspects, even through the manipulation of emotions generated by distressing events. The book is a welcome addition to a body of anthropological works about women and contemporary religious culture in Taiwan. ‹

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Notes >

1 On the evening of 27 February 1947, six agents of the Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Monopoly Bureau assaulted a female street peddler selling contraband cigarettes and killed a man running out of his house to flee the scene. The incident led to weeks of violence throughout the island and implacable repression by the KMT nationalist forces. In the decades to come, public discussion of the incident was outlawed and became an ethnically divisive memory on the part of the Han-Taiwanese islanders.

2 TIM includes several pro-independence organizations active in North America, Canada, Europe, and Japan. Its membership comprises of Han-Taiwanese islanders who have been blacklisted or exiled by KMT policies from the late 1940s onwards.

3 *Bensheng* refers to the Han-Taiwanese islanders while *waisheng* refers to the Mainlander population that came to Taiwan following the retrocession (between 1945 and 1949). The usage of the two terms shows the distinction between those born in Taiwan province (*bensheng*, lit. this province) and those born in other Chinese provinces (*waisheng*, lit. outer province) and is politically loaded.

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Articulating the Modern
Neo-Tantrism and the Art of P.T. Reddy

Asian Art >
South Asia

The recent narrative of twentieth-century art in India, resting upon a new interpretation of the mid-century, post-Independence growth of Indian modern art, traces a large arc from the nationalists at Santiniketan in Bengal to the diasporic concerns of the 1990s. This article presents a case study of a particular artist, P. T. Reddy (1915-1996), whose role within that story of modernism is explored so as to understand Indian art of the mid- and late twentieth century as India grappled with Independence, Partition, and the defining of a new 'India'.

By Rebecca M. Brown

Struggling with the questions of the 'Indian essence' in art versus an international modernism, as did many of his contemporaries, in his Tantric-inspired work Reddy presents his location for modernism. Art historian and critic Jaya Appasamy aptly termed him, a 'transitional modern', working across the 1947 politico-temporal marker (Appasamy 1972:6-9). If modernism in India is a struggle with and against the norms of a hegemonic Western pattern of modernity, then it is not surprising that artists of this period 'have seemed to be stuck at the crossing-over', for 'they are living out the actual material transition' (Kapur 2000:302). Reddy's work allows us to see that transition clearly and to put some detail to the broad narrative of Indian modernist struggles.

After training at the Sir J.J. School of Art in Bombay during the late 1930s and early 1940s, Reddy stopped painting to join the Quit India movement, only to return to art in the mid-1950s. This hiatus separates him from his famous contemporaries of the Bombay Progressive group such as M.F. Husain and F.N. Souza. Soon after Reddy returned to art, artists such as Biren De (b. 1926) and G. R. Santosh (1929-1997), began working in tantric modes. The so-called 'neo-tantric' art movement looked to Buddhist and Hindu tantrism for its esoteric, abstract symbols and re-made this tantric language into a contemporary Indian modernism. Neo-tantrism appealed not only to Indian contemporaries but also to Western audiences, as it represented an 'authentic' art form that escaped purely formalistic aspects of 1960s Western art.

In tantric art artists conceived a space for something deemed impossible: a truly Indian modernism. The question that arises is: how do a group of cultures that have 'not yet' arrived at a modern stage achieve modernity? (Chakrabarty 2000:49-50) In the case of art history, the gap between the modern and the 'not yet' is reinforced by the romanticization and valorization of the native, primitive, indigenous Other as a source for artistic inspiration. Indian modern artists saw in tantra the possibility of an Other that was seen as authentic, spiritual, and universal, just as Picasso saw that authenticity in Malian culture. While an Indian modern was not achievable if pursued along the same lines as Western modernism, Reddy found that the hidden nature of tantric imagery fit perfectly with the elusive modernism he sought.

Two of Reddy's yantra-inspired images may serve as an introduction to his works. Rather than drawing on full-blown Tibetan mandala imagery, it is simpler yantra forms that provide Reddy with the framework for his symbolic language.

P. T. Reddy,
Beginning Sound,
n.d.

P. T. Reddy,
Srec Chekre, 1971.

Both images courtesy of the Teaching Collection at St. Mary's College of Maryland, St. Mary's City, Maryland.

In *Srec Chekre* (1971, fig. 1), Reddy sets out from the traditional Sri Yantra form: an architectonic square frame housing a series of circular lotus forms, culminating in the centre with the overlapping triangles of the yantra itself. He adds to this foundation a Devanagari 'sri' in the centre, re-emphasizing both his title and the form of the yantra. Finally, two figures overlay the Sri Yantra, their heads opposite one another at top and bottom, their bodies joined in sexual union in the centre. Reddy arranged their arms in a circular fashion reinforcing the lotus form, but their legs are not symmetrical: the legs of the bottom figure form a 'V' with the feet flanking the head of the top figure while the legs of the upper figure bend at the knees and splay outward, echoing the two directions of the triangle of the Sri Yantra.

In tantric symbolism, a female triangle points downward and a male one points up. Their overlap indicates the sexual and spiritual union articulated more directly in Reddy's piece. Likewise, the 'sri' spelled out in the centre of the image would be unnecessary in a tantric context, where the iconography of the Sri Yantra is known. Reddy articulates the geometric forms and architectonic elements of the Sri Yantra more fully for a wider audience, clarifying the abstract symbolism of union for the uninitiated viewer. At the same time, he undermines the neat geometry of the Sri Yantra, for the human form cannot conform precisely to the circle of the lotus or the symmetry of the triangle. Reddy's work acknowledges messiness in the translation of tantric form to contemporary contexts.

While these types of images within Reddy's oeuvre are directly related to existing yantra forms, Reddy also moves away from given iconographies to create his own. Interestingly, it is when Reddy experiments with some of the conceptual aspects of tantric philosophy that his work moves toward a freer combination of symbols.

In *Beginning Sound* (n.d., fig. 2). Reddy works with the relationship between sound, particularly the mantra, and form. (This concept is discussed in: Mookerjee 1966:15-20). The overarching form eludes the shape of the yantra, instead filling an organic yet symmetrical shape reminiscent of micro-

scopic cell imagery. A central, reflected devanagari 'om' anchors the composition, and supports an eye or lotus form. Penetrating this eye is a vertical, blue phallic swath, re-making that central 'eye' into a vaginal yoni form. The phallus-lingam with the yoni echoes Reddy's focus on ultimate union of Purusha (male) and Prakriti (female) energies. Two eyes flank this symbolic representation of the lingam-yoni, so that the phallic form bisects a face, illustrating both union and the deep connection to the human body. Reddy demonstrates the centrality of the body for tantrism, both in its gross form and in its subtle form.

This image thus attempts to capture the way sound works in the context of tantra through both its symbolic language and its shape. Eschewing both the yantra and lotus framing, Reddy offers a fluid mapping of the edges, giving an impression of an acoustic wave. The symmetry of the image echoes sound vibrations, and the curvatures generate both an organic quality and an all-encompassing element of growth. Reddy takes tantric thought as his guide, thus using symbols in a new way and remaking the yantra form.

For both neo-tantric artists and Western modernists, the tension between the spiritual and the material found expression through symbols that defied particular iconographic or culturally-grounded systems and instead evoked broader universal expressions of spirituality, patterns in the universe, and sense perception. Reddy's use of symbols, connection to a spiritual system in tantra, and interpretation of sound all play into similar ideas. Articulating the relationship between spiritualism and materialism forms one major part of the modernist struggle; this relationship is in many ways resolved by tantric thought, one reason that it held such appeal for both Western and Indian culture of the 1960s and 1970s.

Reddy still treads the problematic knife-edge of the modern, teetering between the pattern of looking to a native tradition (tantra) while creating an abstracted, personal symbolic vision. He does not escape the problematic position of mimicking the moves of Western modernity – he looks to the 'primitive' or in this case a 'hidden' culture in order to build the modern. Reddy was not afraid to delve into the problematic modern despite his difficult position as an Indian artist on the margins, or his position as an artist of transition, following Appasamy. Reddy bases his modernism on a thoughtful appropriation of tantrism in order to bridge existing dualities: the abstract and the figurative, the microcosm and the macrocosm, the secular and the sacred, the otherworldly and the mundane, and not least, the Indian and the modern. Thus, it is a modernity situated within rather than outside the mainstream. Producing art within this paradox of circularity, Reddy's tantric works succeed in developing one Indian modernist aesthetic, revealing an Indian modernism out of something formerly 'hidden'. ‹

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Art, Globalism, and New Modes of Curatorial Practice
How Do Latitudes Become Forms?

Since Edward Said published his seminal book *Orientalism* in 1978, many scholars of art history have been challenging time-honoured maxims, examining foundations, and re-framing their gaze. While particular strides have been made in the study of non-Western art, parallels in the museum world are less readily apparent. Strictures from acquisition policies to museum collections, decades in the making, have limited the speed of institutional change. How does, for example, a contemporary art museum in Europe or the United States begin to collect and display work that falls outside its conventional purview? Where does a curator begin to look for new talent in countries (s)he has never visited? And, once talent is found, will there be an audience for the museum's venture? These are just some of the questions that confronted Walker Art Center director, Kathy Halbreich, curator, Philippe Vergne, and a team of advisors as they sought to challenge paradigms and transform curatorial practice through an exhibition of global proportions.

Installation view with Yin Xiuzhen's *Suitcase Series* (centre).

By Alisa Eimen

Following three years of planning, the exhibition *How latitudes become forms: Art in a global age* began its international tour this past February at the Walker Art Center in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Featuring artists from seven different countries, Brazil, China, India, Japan, South Africa, Turkey, and the Walker's home, the United States, the curators of this exhibition were cautious to avoid the well-trodden paths of their forebears. Exhibition models established by nineteenth-century international expositions have engendered, in part, the more recent regional exhibitions that bring 'African,' 'Asian,' or 'Chinese' art to the Euro-American world. Although many curators of these exhibitions intend to challenge the dominant paradigm rooted in the colonial order, the effect is often that they reify the very constructs they hope to obliterate. Rather than challenge categories based on difference, ethnicity, religion, or location, an exhibition of 'Chinese' art, for example, maintains its distinction, yet only nominally subverts the larger hegemonic structures informing categorization, collecting, display, and interpretation. The work in these regionally organized exhibitions remains on the periphery of contemporary art and only slowly makes its way into European and American galleries, auction houses, and museum collections. *How latitudes become forms* confronts these structures through a series of case studies that focus on transforming contemporary curatorial practice through a very intentional blurring of boundaries.

From the beginning, this exhibition was conceived to challenge curatorial conventions. Not only did the curators intend to broaden their notions of the contemporary arts. They also were interested in restructuring curatorial practices within their home institution. Indeed, diversity and multidisciplinarity have been important buzzwords for over a decade, often being tacked on to grant proposals, mission statements, and acquisition policies. The curatorial team, comprised of curators from all programming departments at the Walker, was interested in pursuing these goals in more substantial ways. Wary of becoming global art predators, they developed a multidisciplinary 'global advisory committee' comprised of seven international scholars and curators who could guide them through the art scenes in various countries. Working with local specialists proved a useful strategy not only to engage the community of artists directly, but also to have access to histories and cultural specificities that otherwise would have been lost in translation. Thus, the curators of this exhibition offer a working method that dispels these obstacles of access and interpretation. By making their curatorial practice transparent, this exhibition demystifies the process of selection, opens up a discursive space within museums, and perhaps, most importantly, admits incomplete knowledge, thereby creating room for less familiar stories and imagery. Crossing boundaries is synonymous with the operations of the contemporary world, as this exhibition reveals.

How latitudes become forms features more than forty artists, many of whom – like the curators – transgress a range of boundaries. Through her *Suitcase Series* (2002), Chinese sculptor Yin Xiuzhen examines constructs from the socio-political to the environmental, to those we put on ourselves. Using unconventional materials, Yin creates models of various cities in old suitcases from second-hand clothing of residents of those cities. For the artist, these transportable cities evoke the human body that is often overlooked in rapid urban development and a growing global economy, or, in her own words, 'people in our contemporary setting have moved from residing in a static environment to becoming souls in a constantly shifting transience ... the suitcase becomes the life support container of modern living.' Her work, like the work of many other artists in the exhibition, invites active participation from the viewer. Japanese artist Tsuyoshi Ozawa invites the exhibition-goer to enter a museum within the museum. His *Museum of Soy Sauce Art* (1998-2000) recreates masterworks from Japanese art history in soy sauce and, with accompanying texts, traces a fictitious history of soy sauce art. As the visitor wanders through Ozawa's museum, (s)he participates in a light-hearted yet poignant transgression of the authority of both the canon of art history and the museum. Numerous other artists in the exhibition, variously working with film, animation, performance, tinfoil, and chalk, challenge conventions, boundaries, and even object-hood in a myriad of ways. Interested in disrupting hegemonic authority and its counterpart, the global economy, artists and curators alike transform display into activation, objects into events, and contemplation into direct experience. ❮

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Installation view with Hüseyin Bahri Alptekin, *Heimat/ Toprak* (2001), on the wall.

Both images courtesy of Walker Art Center/Cameron Wittig

Lessons from Looting:
The Place of Museums in Iraq

Early trepidation at the potential destruction of Iraqi archaeological sites has long given way to anger and profound sadness about the looting and sacking of Iraqi museums and libraries. The unexpected scale and intensity of the looting has produced various reactions, initially dominated by blame and recrimination of the United States' mishandling of the post-war situation but now focused on ameliorating the damage by tracking down stolen antiquities and controlling their traffic across international borders.

By Yasser Tabbaa

The International Council of Museums (ICOM) has just finalized a Red List of Iraqi Antiquities at Risk to be distributed to all relevant border crossings. While almost everyone agrees that the US – the authority legally responsible for maintaining law and order in Iraq – was woefully negligent in protecting Iraqi national treasures, very few have attempted to understand why some Iraqis looted their own cultural institutions. This is a difficult and still quite unpopular line of questioning. Over three days of meetings in Lyon, France with INTERPOL and ICOM officers, the question was hardly discussed, only muttered in passing with total incomprehension and a measure of disdain.

As an Arab-American, a frequent visitor to Iraq and an art historian, I am especially troubled by this question: why did some Iraqis take advantage of the breakdown of order to loot and even sack their own museums, libraries, and universities? Rather than fixing blame, in this essay I would like to use my knowledge of Iraqi history, museums, and institutions of culture to address a question that may haunt us for a long time, in Iraq and in other countries that may face similar upheavals in the future. Silence on this matter, I think, is dangerous.

While some might attribute Iraq's current state of lawlessness and disregard for historical patrimony to underdevelopment, my long-term association with the country tells me otherwise. Until quite recently, when wars and sanctions took their inevitable toll, Iraq was ahead of most of the Arab world in cultural matters, including archaeology, museology, art, architecture, and music.

So what may have led to this tragic situation? First, we now know that the recent looting of Iraqi museums was in some respects the sad culmination of a process that had already gained considerable momentum in the aftermath of the first Gulf War. There are confirmed reports, in the most recent issue of Smithsonian, for example, of extensive illegal excavations in such Sumerian and Babyonian sites as Uruk, Ur, Isin, and Larsa, digs often conducted by underworld groups under the protection of armed men. The current efforts of ICOM, the British Museum, and the College Art Association to control the trade in Iraqi antiquities are equally directed at the looting of Iraqi museums and the more intractable problems of illicit excavations and the illegal art trade.

Second, whereas cultural heritage has often been co-opted for nationalist purposes, Baathist Iraq turned it into an instrument for the aggrandizement of the party and especially of Saddam himself. By appropriating the antiquity of the land,

Warrior from Hatra, 200 BC, Iraq Museum Baghdad

Yasser Tabbaa

Saddam linked himself with Assyrian, Babylonian, and Abbasid rulers, substituting his humble origins with false genealogies. Bricks used in his megalomaniacal restoration of Babylon are stamped with his name, and a large inscription states that the city was begun by Nebuchanezzar and completed by Saddam. Close identification with a single ruler can easily backfire once the ruler is removed.

The third factor that seems to have contributed to the looting of museums has to do with their origins under colonial rule and their persisting state of alienation in Iraq and other Arab countries. Most Arab museums still operate within an outmoded orientalist framework, displaying artifacts with little regard for local general audience or even specialists. My Danish colleague, Ingolf Thuesen, who conducted a survey of visitors to a regional museum in Hama, Syria, noted that the museum was primarily visited by foreign tourists and government officials and rarely by the adult Syrian population. Interestingly, precisely this museum suffered severe damage from looting in the aftermath of the 1982 bombardment of the city. By and large seen as symbols of the government, signs of privilege, and as 'foreign' institutions, one can understand why some Iraqis were willing to loot their museums and cultural institutions.

View of the Ziggurat at Ur, ca. 2100 BCE

Yasser Tabbaa

The Laws of Antiquities governing the excavation, possession, and transaction of antiquities in Iraq and other Arab countries seem to foster this rupture between society and artistic culture, in two main ways. First, the overly stringent policies in these laws virtually ignore the existence of an art market or the age-old desire of some people, Iraqis included, to collect ancient objects. Whereas such policies prescribe an ideal situation, in reality they have contributed to the proliferation of an illegal art market. Second, by defining a protected cultural artifact as 200 years or older, these laws valorize the ancient over the more recent and cheapen the still palpable memory of the population.

Finally, I agree that a few well-placed tanks in front of Iraqi museums and libraries would have prevented or at least minimized their looting. But in the end such security measures, whether by US or Iraqi forces, only serve to deepen the rupture and further disengage culture from the population. Rather, I would like us to look a little more proactively towards a future when cultural institutions are not only better protected but also better integrated within their own societies. It is time, I think, to turn alienation into outreach, to develop the public and educational components of these museums, following the example of European and especially American museums. Once Iraqis feel included in their own cultural patrimony, I suspect they will have second thoughts before looting it. ‹

Professor Yasser Tabbaa specializes in the art, architecture, and institutions of the Islamic world, with special emphasis on the Arab world before the Ottomans. He has taught at MIT, University of Michigan, and Oberlin College. His most recent book is The Transformation of Islamic Art during the Sunni Revival, *Seattle and London: University of Washington Press (2001, 2002).*
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Kazari

Tsuji Nobuo introduced *kazari* as a central concept in the study of Japanese art about fifteen years ago and has been developing the idea ever since. The basic meaning of the verb *kazaru* is 'to decorate, to adorn'. It can also be used in the sense of 'to exhibit', 'to put on show'. Finally, *kazaru* involves the idea of 'being affected', as in *kazarike*, 'affectation or showiness'. Thus, *kazari* stands for decor, decoration, the decorated and the decorative, and for the proper way of handling and appreciating it all. In pre-modern Japan, *kazari* has led to objects and ensembles of objects being used for purposes of play and display.

By Anna Beerens

Kazari is also the title of the catalogue accompanying an exhibition of the same name organized by the British Museum and the Japan Society of New York in association with the Suntory Museum of Art in Tokyo. Some two hundred exquisitely beautiful objects were on display at the Japan Society in New York (autumn 2002) and at the British Museum (spring 2003). Nicole Coolidge Rousmaniere, director of the Sainsbury Institute for the Study of Japanese Arts and Cultures, and Tsuji Nobuo, Professor Emeritus of Tokyo University and currently president of Tama Art University, were co-curators. Both contributed introductory articles to the catalogue: Tsuji's article centres on the role of *kazari* within the history of Japanese art, whilst Rousmaniere's concentrates on conceptual aspects.

In stressing the conceptual complexity of *kazari*, both exhibition and catalogue make an attempt to challenge the conventions of current art-historical discourse which, as Rousmaniere says, 'has tended to categorise the arts arbitrarily', as is evident from terms like 'visual arts' or 'applied arts'. This exhibition seeks to break down such conventional boundaries between artistic forms, even between arts as apparently different as painting and music, with the aim of presenting the 'social life' of artefacts, and to show them in the context of what Rousmaniere calls 'a larger artistic programme' (p. 21). For example, the exhibition not only included high-quality hanging scrolls and painted screens, which would traditionally be classified as high art, but also spectacularly shaped parade helmets and skilfully decorated musical instruments, objects that would usually be considered applied art.

The exhibition is arranged in six thematic sections, each centring on what are considered to be the six highpoints of *kazari*. The first section deals with display in the reception rooms of the fif-

teenth- and sixteenth-century elite; the second with the exuberant style of the early seventeenth-century samurai; the third introduces the taste for finery and splendour of late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century merchants; the fourth presents the fashions of high-ranking women of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; the fifth takes us to the pleasure quarters of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; and the last section explores festivals of the pre-modern period, with their colourful floats and costumes.

The question to be answered is whether the exhibition is successful in changing the way we look at Japanese art, as its organizers claim it will be. It goes without saying that the exhibits are immensely engaging, but are they shown in such a way that we do indeed see the objects as part of 'a larger artistic programme', and get a notion of their usage in every sense – what Rousmaniere claims the exhibition is all about?

In fact, it is only in the first section that the visitor can experience something of 'kazari' in action'. In large showcases, reconstructions are made of the decorative arrangements in Muromachi period reception rooms. Hanging scrolls, screens, and small decorative objects are put together as they might have been in a sixteenth-century interior. The result is striking. However, hardly any other attempts are made to present an ensemble in this manner. Contemporary etiquette manuals, pattern books, and illustrations are called upon to provide a context, but kimonos, sashes, accessories, screens, small articles of furniture, and ceramics are still mostly displayed in separate cases, and are treated individually in the catalogue. There are no clashes of textures and materials, no three-dimensional confrontations. There may well have been practical reasons (such as conflicting conservation requirements) for not putting objects together, but after the promise of the first section one does expect more of an attempt to show items in ensembles.

The catalogue follows the layout of the exhibition. Articles accompanying the first five sections were written by Kawai Masatomo, John Carpenter, Yasumura Toshinobu, Nagasaki Iwao, and Timothy Clark respectively. The section on festivals has no accompanying essay: there is instead an article on the vocabulary of 'decoration' in early modern Japan by Tamamushi Satoko. Each contribution shows fine scholarship, and the descriptions of the individual exhibits, provided by a range of contributors, are highly informative. Much information is brought together here that cannot be found in any other English-language publication. It is the catalogue, more than the exhibition itself, which draws our attention not only to the beauty of the design and the quality of the workmanship, but also to an object's use, its place within the discourse of ornament and good taste, and

Taken from the book under review

Helmet in the shape of a peach with attached bison horns. Early seventeenth century.

the many allusions to the canon of art and literature, which brings in the element of play and parody. Despite the careful labelling of exhibits, the uninitiated visitor who does not read the catalogue will have little appreciation of the supposedly revolutionary nature ('entirely fresh interpretation' or 'new thinking') of the exhibition, and will only be aware of having seen a series of showcases displaying very appealing objects. This is an exhibition that needs the catalogue to make its point.

In spite of these misgivings this exhibition is of innovative value: both exhibition and catalogue are representative of a perceptible trend in the study of art history (and also in other areas) that encourages scholars to move away from exclusive thinking, break down boundaries, and be more aware of interrelatedness, multifariousness, ambiguity, and ambivalence. Objects really are presented in context, even if one has to read the catalogue to fully appreciate this point, and traditional boundaries are negated. Even a few 'ephemeral objects', as Rousmaniere calls them, such as a wrapping cloth, a decorated lantern, or an incense wrapper are included. This integrative impulse comes from application of the concept of *kazari*. When ideas are represented on such an impressive scale and at such a high level of scholarship, as is the case with the *Kazari* exhibition, they are sure to have an impact, even if it takes time for partition walls to fall and long-standing art-historical considerations to be challenged. Perhaps in a few years' time we will be able to see all the finery of fashionable eighteenth-century ladies presented in one showcase, together with elements of the interiors in which they lived their lives. ‹

- Rousmaniere, Nicole Coolidge (ed.), *Kazari, decoration and display in Japan, 15th–19th centuries*, London: The British Museum Press/The Japan Society (2002), pp. 304, ill., ISBN 0-7141-2636-5

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Taken from the book under review

Campaign coat (*jinbaori*) with saw-tooth pattern at hem and nine-circle crest. Early seventeenth century. Private Collection, Japan. Yasukuni Jinja, Yushukan Museum, Tokyo.

> Art Agenda

Australia

Powerhouse Museum, Sydney
500 Harris Street
Ultimo NSW
T +61-2 9217 0111
www.phm.gov.au

14 March – October 2003
Golden Threats: The Chinese in regional New South Wales 1850-1950 and *My Chinatown*
Drawn from local museum collections in regional New South Wales, *Golden Threats: the Chinese in regional New South Wales 1850-1950* looks at the lives and contributions of Chinese-Australians in rural areas and country towns between 1850 and 1950. With the use of objects, historical photographs, documents and people's stories, the exhibition and accompanying website (http://amol.org.au/goldenthreads) show the diversity and depth of Chinese history and heritage in New South Wales.
A focal point of *My Chinatown* is the annual Chinese Dragon ball, a major social event and fundraiser for Sydney's Chinese community through most of the twentieth century. A collage of photographs shows the ball in its heyday with the crowning of the Dragon Princess and the Debutantes who danced the night away at the Trocedero, a grand ballroom in Sydney's George Street.

National Gallery Australia
Parkes Place,
Canberra ACT 2601
T +61-2 6240 6502
www.nga.gov.au

11 July – 6 October
Sari to Sarong: 500 years of Indian and Indonesian textile exchange
This exhibition will display over 250 textiles drawn from the National Gallery's renowned Asian textile collection. Rare Indian silk and cotton cloth traded to the Indonesian archipelago from as early as the fourteenth century will be displayed, alongside textiles from across the many societies and language groups of Indonesia, including Bali, Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Borneo, and the remote communities of the eastern islands.

Belgium

Musées royaux d'Art et d'Histoire
10, parc du Cinquantenaire
1000 Bruxelles
T +32-2 741 7303
www.kmkg-mrah.be

17 September 2003 – 29 February 2004
Vietnam: Art and cultures from prehistoric times to the present day
For the first time ever, more than 300 works of art and ethnographic objects will be leaving Vietnam for an exhibition offering a comprehensive retrospective of the country's rich past and present. Included in the exhibition will be bronzes from the Dongson culture (sixth century BC – second century AD), sculptures from monuments from the period of the Champa Kingdom (second-nineteenth century), ancient wooden Buddhist sculptures and scroll paintings. Textiles, traditional prints, typical ceramics and furniture, jewelry and utensils of the everyday life from throughout Vietnam will also be on display.

Czech Republic

Náprstek Museum of Asian, African and American Cultures
Betlémské nám. 1,
Prague 1, 110 00 Prague
asiat.npm@aconet.cz
www.aconet.cz/npm

16 April 2003 – 10 August 2003
Ancient bronzes of the Asian grasslands from the Arthur M. Sackler Foundation
The exhibition presents a major sampling of steppe art from the renowned collections of the late Arthur M. Sackler, MD. Eighty-five objects illustrate the personal decorations and equipment of the horse-riding steppe dwellers of the late second and first millennia BC. The bronze belt-buckles, plaques and weapons of these ancient horsemen are ornate, technically sophisticated, and richly patterned. Animal motifs including antlered stags, wild boars, and birds of prey are symbolic artistic themes. The exhibition reveals how steppe cultures used the animal world as a source of symbols to indicate tribe, social rank and connection to the spirit world.

Acc. no. V-3135 (Exhibit no. 43). Finial for funeral canopy. Southwestern Inner Mongolia (fifth-fourth century BC)

Náprstek Museum

China

Hong Kong Museum of Art
10 Salisbury Road, Tsimshatsui Kowloon, Hong Kong
T +852-2721 0116
F +852-2723 7666
enquiries@lcsd.gov.hk
www.lcsd.gov.hk/CE/Museum/Arts

From 13 June 2003
Painting and Calligraphy of Sun Xingge Exhibition
Featuring about 40 representative works from Sun Xingge (1897-1996), which he executed from his mid-1970s until into his 1990s, including images of flowers, birds, and landscapes.

Red Gate Gallery
Levels 1&4
Dongbianmen Watchtower
Chongwenmen Beijing
T +86-10 6525 1005
www.redgategallery.com

23 August – 10 September
Red Gate Gallery has work on display by contemporary Chinese painters *Yuan Yaomin, Lin Liping, Pan Ying* and *Liu Liyan*.

Courtyard Gallery
95 Donghuamen Dajie
Beijing 100006
T +86-10 6526 8882
courtart@cinet.com.cn
www.courtyard-gallery.com

21 September – end 2003
Sublime: New works by Ling Jian
First one-man exhibition in China of Berlin-based mixed-media artist Ling Jian

zhong, and Zheng Guogu, *Utopia station* with Yang Fudong, Liu Jianhua, and Zhan Wang in the China Pavillion.

France

Musée Guimet
6, place d'Iéna
75116 Paris
T +33-1 5652 5339
www.museeguimet.fr

19 March – 14 July 2003
Ming: The Chinese Golden Age
This exhibition features about a hundred extremely rare artifacts from the Lu Mingh Shi Collection of Ming furniture collection which offers an elaborate vision of the golden age of Chinese cabinetwork (i.e. sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). The furniture is showcased in three separate galleries illustrating cabinet work technique and craftsmanship; typology; and the role of nature in inspiring the furniture's aesthetic forms.

Centre national d'art et de culture Georges Pompidou
Place Georges Pompidou
75004 Paris
www.cnac-gp.fr/Pompidou/Home.nsf/docs/fhome

25 June – 13 October 2003
Alors, la Chine?
To celebrate the opening of the China-France year, the Centre Pompidou presents an exhibition of Chinese modern art featuring mixed-media artist Geng Jianyi, sculptor Liu Jianhua, photo artists Yang Fudong and Zhou Tiehai, and painter Zhou Chunya

Germany

Kunst- und Ausstellungshalle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland GmbH
Museumsmeile Bonn
Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 4
53113 Bonn
T +49-2 289 1710
www.kah-bonn.de

29 August 2003 – 26 October 2003
The great collections: The National Museum Tokyo – Art from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century
Drawing on important objects from the collection of the Tokyo National Museum, this exhibition presents the 'golden age' of Japanese art from the fifteenth to the early seventeenth centuries. Highlighting artistic developments during the Muromachi and Momoyama periods, the exhibition features reconstructions of intimate traditional tearooms and a *shoin*

study room, together with the accoutrements of public splendour and noble symbols of status and power.

21 November 2003 – 15 February 2004
Treasures of the Sons of Heaven
Objects in this exhibition range from famous paintings to collection cabinets made from various precious materials. They do not only reflect the diversity and creativity of Chinese art, but also the intellectual and political developments of Chinese history. The exhibition focuses on human beings and their relationship to nature and society through objects. It documents the magnificence of art from the Chinese Imperial court and brings to view masterworks from the symbolically rich tradition of Chinese scholars.

18 July 2003 – 12 October 2003
Altes Museum
Bodestrasse 1-3 (Entrance Lustgarten)
D-10178 Berlin-Mitte
T +49-30 2090 5254
www.smb.spk-berlin.de/ant.

Kunst- und Ausstellungshalle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland GmbH

House of World Cultures
John-Forster-Dulles-Allee 10
10557 Berlin
T +49-30 397 870
info@hkw.de
www.hkw.de

Autumn 2003, starting 19 September
Body.city – new perspectives from India
This programme will break new grounds as the first contemporary Indian art event in Germany. Two exhibitions will take the visitor into the world of popular visual culture and its development and into the contemporary art scene of Indian megacities like Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, and Chennai.

Indonesia

British Council
S Widjojo 1st floor
Jalan Jenderal Sudirman 71
Jakarta 12190
T +62-21 252 4115
www2.britishcouncil.org/indonesia

22 July – 22 September
Minority life
This photo exhibition featuring Indonesian and UK artists, is organized as part of the JakArt Festival and will subsequently travel to Yogyakarta and Makasar.

Cemeti Art House
Jl.DI. Panjaitan 41
Yogyakarta 55143
T +62-2 7437 1015
www.cemetiarthouse.com

August 2003
Yustoni Volunteero
Featuring recent work by artist Yustoni Volunteero whose work includes painting, installation, and performance art.

Italy

Giardini della Biennale
Ca' Giustinian San Marco 1364
30124 Venice
www.labiennale.org

14 June – 2 November 2003
50th Biennale di Venezia: Dreams and conflicts: The dictatorship of the viewer
The previous Visual Arts Exhibition of La Biennale di Venezia featured 'The End of the Twentieth Century' by Joseph Beuys. This work signalled the end of the cycle of large-scale thematic exhibitions, which began in the late 1960s. As a result, the omnipresent curator was forced to acknowledge the broad and fragmented field of contemporary art. It became clear that any notion of the 'global', could no longer be framed by the sole vision of the curator.
The 50th Visual Arts Exhibition of La Biennale di Venezia considers this its starting point from which to reflect on the very idea of the 'large scale international exhibition', questioning the validity of this form as representative of the current status of contemporary art, addressing its multiplicity of languages, and the inevitable autonomy of new geographic, political, and cultural contexts.
Among many others: Zone of urgency with Sha Yeya, Yang Yong, Yang Zhen-

Ireland

Chester Beatty Library
Dublin Castle
Caislean Atha Cliath
Dublin 2
T +353-1 407 0760
www.cbl.ie

25 June – 30 September 2003
The Art of Hokusai: Masterpieces of Japanese Woodblock Print
This exhibition of the work of the Japanese woodblock print designer, Katsushika Hokusai (1760-1848) displays his renowned prints of beautiful women, landscapes, flowers, and animals, as well as illustrated books and artists' manuals. He was the first Japanese artist to become popular in the West in the late nineteenth century where images like 'The Great Wave' influenced European artists such as Manet, Van Gogh, and Toulouse-Lautrec. The exhibition features 75 of Hokusai's finest prints and printed books.

Japan

Tokyo National Museum
13-9 Ueno Park
Taito-ku, Tokyo
www.tnm.jp

3 July 2003 – 13 July 2003
Kamakura – The Art of Zen Buddhism
In commemoration of the 750 anniversary of the founding of Kenchōji, the oldest Zen temple in Japan, this exhibition will display designated National Treasures and some objects never before seen outside of the temple walls. Objects will include sculptures, paintings, calligraphy and ceramics highlighting the complexity and wide-ranging aesthetics of Zen culture.

Adachi Museum
320 Furukawa-cho
Yasugi-city Shimane 692-0064
T +81-854 28 7111
www.lares.dti.ne.jp/~nakane/works_06.htm

1 June 2003 – 30 August 2003
Taikan Yokoyama and Maestros of Japanese-style Paintings
Featuring Taikan's masterpieces, includ-

ing *Innocence, Mt. Fuji*, and *Mountain after a Shower*. The Adachi Museum of Art is known for having one of the largest collections of Japanese-style paintings in Japan. Its collection of 130 works by Taikan Yokoyama, spanning from the early to the later years of his career, is the best in the country both in terms of quality and quantity.

Hara Museum of Contemporary Art
4-7-25 Kitashinagawa Shinagawa-ku,
Tokyo 140 0001
T +81-3 3445 0651
www.haramuseum.or.jp

26 April – 21 July 2003
Yohji Yamamoto: May I help you?
The exhibition provides a chance to look back on Yamamoto's artwork through the lens of eight photographers, all of whom have produced 'visual' photographs for the *Yohji Yamamoto* catalogue and other materials related to the designer from 1984 to the present. Approximately 70 works are featured by the following photographers: Max Vadukul, Inez van Lamsweerde & Vinoodh Matadin, David Sims, Nick Knight, Craig Mc Dean, Sarah Moon, Peter Lindbergh, and Paolo Roversi.

Netherlands
Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde
Steenstraat 1
2312 BS Leiden
T +31-71 516 8800
www.rmv.nl

Until 31 August 2003
The Kamoro
The Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde presents a wide-ranging picture of the Kamoro culture on the south-west coast of Papua (New Guinea). This exhibition characterizes the life of the Kamoro through extensive cycles of feasts and rituals that mark important phases in life and features objects such as drums, masks, clothing, jewellery, finely carved wooden panels and statues, often of spectacular dimensions.

Singapore
Singapore Art Museum
71 Bras Basah Road, Singapore 189555
Republic of Singapore
T +65- 332 3222
F +65- 334 7919
www.nhb.gov.sg/SAM

30 April 2003 – 29 February 2004
Curatorial readings of works from the permanent collection
This exhibition highlights significant artworks drawn from the Singapore Art Museum permanent collection.

Sculpture Square
155 Middle Road, Singapore
T +65- 6333 1055
www.sculpturesq.com

17 June – 24 August 2003
Subverted Boundaries features the latest works by some of the region's most cutting-edge artists, including: Ho Tzu Nyen, Yvonne Lam, and Lim Shing Ee from Singapore, Vasan Sitthiket, Saravudh Duangjumpa, and Araya Rasdjarmrearnsook from Thailand and Dinh Gia Le, Nguyen Minh Thanh, and Vu Dan Tan from Vietnam Their art includes interactive installation sculptures, mixed media constructions with whirling mechanical devices, video installations, and site-specific works.

Switzerland
Museum der Kulturen, Basel
Augustinergasse 2, Basel
T +41-61 266 5500
www.mkb.ch

28 March 2003 – 18 January 2004
Korewori: Magic Art from the Rainforest
Forty years ago, fascinating wood sculptures of creator-beings and demons from the area of the Korewori River in Papua New Guinea first became widely known to the Western world. Even when they were found, protected by protruding rocks, these carved wooden figures were considered the "last witnesses of a lost culture". In 1971, the Museum der Kulturen succeeded in acquiring 86 of these figures with the support of a spectacular fund-raising charity. Today the museum owns more than half of the 200 existing figures worldwide and for the first time, this unique cultural heritage will be on display for the public.

United Kingdom
Asian Art in London
32 Dover Street
London W1S 4NE
T +44-20 7499 2215
www.asianartinlondon.com

6 – 14 November 2003
The best of Asian works of art on display
London's major dealers and auction houses unite for their sixth annual presentation of exhibitions and sales displaying the very best of art from across Asia, spanning many centuries and cultures. In addition, a programme of events will be held at museums and institutions around the capital.

Institute of International Visual Arts (INIVA)
6-8 Standard Place, Rivington Street
London EC2A 3BE
T +44-20 7729 9616
F +44-20 7729 9509
institute@iniva.org
www.iniva.org

Veil
Veil is a major touring exhibition organized by the Institute of International Visual Arts that is intended to evoke international dialogue across cultures. This exhibition features the work of 20 international artists and filmmakers who address the contested and complex nature of the veil in contemporary societies. Particularly salient in light of changing world events and ambiguities associated with globalization, artists will include: Faisal Abdu'Allah, Kouroush Adim, AES art group, Jananne Al-Ani, Ghada Amer, Farah Bajull, Samta Benyahia, Shadafarin Ghadirian, Ghazel, Emily Jacir, Ramesh Kalkur, Majida Khattari, Shirin Neshat, Harold Offeh, Zineb Sedira, Elin Strand, and Mitra Tabrizian.

5 July 2003 – 16 August 2003
Bluecoat Gallery & Open Eye Gallery, Liverpool

22 November 2003 – 26 January 2004
Modern Art Oxford

United States
The Metropolitan Museum of Art
1000 Fifth Avenue at 82nd Street
New York, 10028-0198
T +1-212 535 7710
www.metmuseum.org

Until 13 July 2003
Chinese Export Porcelain at The Metropolitan Museum of Art
Presents 65 objects from the Museum's collection of Chinese export art, primarily highlighting porcelain made in China for American and European markets. Objects date from the early sixteenth century to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, including bowls and vases, services and tureens, reverse glass paintings, and an ivory pagoda.

Until 17 August 2003
Great Waves: Chinese Themes in the Arts of Korea and Japan
The exhibition explores how Chinese pictorial themes of Buddhist iconography, landscape imagery, flower and bird subjects, and figural narratives were selectively adopted and interpreted by native artists in Korea and Japan.

P.S.1 Contemporary Art Center
22-25 Jackson Ave.,
Long Island City, NY 11101
T +1-718 784 2084
mail@ps1.org
www.ps1.org

16 February – 10 August 2003
Chen Zhen: A Tribute
This retrospective exhibition illustrates how Chen Zhen poetically articulated his knowledge of traditional Chinese culture and Western avant-garde art through sculpture, drawing, and installations.

Rama puppet

More than 200 colourful Indonesian rod puppets representing mythical kings and queens, heroes and heroines, gods, monsters, and servants are presented in this installation exploring wayang golek, a complex and entertaining form of theatre based on Hundy and Islamic texts.

18 October 2003 – 11 January 2004
Goryeo Dynasty: Korea's Age of Enlightenment (918-1392)
This groundbreaking exhibition – the first of its kind outside of Asia – offers a comprehensive examination of Korea's prolific Goryeo dynasty, a period recognized for its exceptional artistic refinement. Featuring more than 100 superb artworks including rare celadon ceramics, Buddhist paintings and sculptures, illustrated sutras, manuscripts, ritual implements, metal crafts, and lacquer wares.

Los Angeles County Museum of Art
5905 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90036
T +1-323 857 6000
www.lacma.org/lacma.asp

13 April 2003 – 27 July 2003
The legacy of Genghis Khan: Courtly art and culture in western Asia, 1256–1353
Illustrates the impact of Ilkhanid (Mongol) rule in West Asia on art and culture between the mid-thirteenth to the mid-fourteenth century. This exhibition features examples of the decorative arts and architectural decoration demonstrating the convergence of local artistic expression with Far Eastern art forms of the Yuan dynasty.

Asian Art Museum of San Francisco
200 Larkin Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
T +1-415 581 3500

5 June 2003 – 31 August 2003
Warrior Kings and Divine Jesters: Indonesian Puppets from the Herbert Collection

Smithsonian Freer and Sackler Galleries of Art
National Mall
Washington, DC
T +1-202 357 4880
www.asia.si.edu

21 June 2003 – 4 January 2004
Freer Gallery of Art
Tales and Legends in Japanese Art
Stories for elite and popular audiences based on religious literature, biography, history, and legend, were the subjects of Japanese painting from the earliest historical times to the present day. This exhibit presents Japanese paintings in a wide variety of formats, ranging from small fan-shaped illustrations and albums to hanging scrolls and long narrative hand scrolls alternating text and illustration.

30 August 2003 – 22 February 2004
Arthur M. Sackler Gallery
Love and yearning: Mystical and moral themes in Persian painting
Poetry has long been an inspiration for painters and calligraphers throughout the Persian world. This exhibit will include some 25 illustrated manuscripts, detached paintings, and several textiles demonstrating the inspiration of poetry, dating from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century.

27 September 2003 – 8 February 2004
Arthur M. Sackler Gallery
Faith and form: Selected calligraphy and painting from Japanese religious traditions
This is the first in a planned series of exhibitions showcasing important American private collections of Japanese art. Included are richly illuminated sutras, boldly expressive Aen Buddhist aphorisms rendered in ink monochrome, portraits of Zen masters and mandala paintings. Ranging in date from the eighth through to the nineteenth century, the works on view illustrate the intimate relationships between calligraphy, painting and faith transmitted within the Japanese Buddhist tradition.

Seattle Asian Art Museum
Volunteer Park,
1400 East Prospect Street,
Seattle, Washington 98112-3303
T +1-204 654 3255
www.seattleartmuseum.org

Until 24 August 2003
Korean sensibilities: The evolution of form
Featuring Korean ceramic, metalwork, painting, and calligraphy from the fourth century to the present, from the permanent and private collections. Including objects from the Three Kingdom, Unified Shilla, Koryŏ, and Chŏson dynasties.

Until 19 October 2003
Glaze, pattern, and image: Decoration in Chinese ceramics
This exhibition illustrates changes in Chinese aesthetic taste through ceramics, highlighting the development of techniques and styles from the third century BC to the nineteenth century AD.

Art Institute of Chicago
111 South Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois
www.artic.edu

5 April 2003 – 27 July 2003
Himalayas: An Aesthetic Adventure
Displaying mostly religious art objects between the fifth and nineteenth centuries, this exhibition traces the artistic achievement and history of the Himalayas together with the theological practices of Hinduism and Buddhism.

Yerba Buena Center for the Arts
701 Mission St. at 3rd
San Francisco, California
comments@yerbabuenaarts.org
www.yerbabuenaarts.org

26 April – 13 July 2003
Time after time: Asia and our moment
This exhibition presents contemporary art from Asia that addresses concepts of time and considers the public discourse about progress, memory and tradition, transitional spaces, and the coexistence of multiple systems of time. Featuring painting, photography, sculpture and video by emerging and mid-career artists.

Vietnam
Museum of Vietnamese History
8 Nguyen Binh Khiem Street
District 1, Ho Chin Minh City

The Ca Mau Shipwreck
April – October 2003
Antiquities from the Ca Mau shipwreck
An exhibition of 500 artifacts from the Ca Mau shipwreck, a Chinese or Siamese boat which sank off the coast of southern Vietnam sometime between 1723-1735. The wreck contained more than 130,000 artifacts of export ceramics from the Yongsheng reign (1723-1735). The ship was part of the Asian porcelain trade which flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. ◄

Asian Art Museum San Francisco

The Egyptian Islamist Experience in Asia

The IIAS seminar 'Religion, Transnationalism and Radicalism' is built upon three basic assumptions: (1) Due to international migration and the accumulation of money and power, new diasporic religious communities have arisen. Increasingly creative, these communities are freer to express their ideas than in their places of origin. (2) This process has enhanced a tendency towards radicalization. The alien cultural and religious environment the diasporic communities live in has produced greater self-awareness and self-consciousness, which in turn has led to the simplification and radicalization of doctrine and religious practice. (3) As a result of modern means of transportation and new technologies of communication and mass media diasporic communities and their communities of origin have developed continuous relations with each other. The radicalization of diasporic communities has therefore also spilled over into the communities of origin.

By Roel Meijer

The transnationalization of the Egyptian Islamist movement confirms some of the above points. Al-Qa'ida and the foundation of the International Front for the Jihad against Jews and Crusaders in 1998 seems to form another, more extreme stage in the radicalization of the Egyptian Islamist movement and fits the idea that radical diasporic communities are more radical than radical groups in the home countries.

To be sure, radicalization within the Egyptian Islamist movements had already taken place before transnationalization of the more radical group in the 1960s. Even at this stage, however, the notion of migration – Prophet Muhammad's migration being a central theme for all Muslims – has always been a trope within the imagination of the radical Islamist movement.

Radical Egyptian Islamists came to demand mental or physical migration from a society that they do not consider Muslim, such as Egyptian society, because it does not apply the sharia. In the 1970s the notion of migration was applied by some groups by retreating partially from an impure and infidel society by forming religious communities in hired (expensive) furnished apartments in Cairo, or by 'migrating' to the desert in Upper Egypt to establish an ideal society of Muslims. Peaceful 'migration', however, proved difficult and the leaders of the movement were caught and imprisoned. The other option of direct violent confrontation with the state, without migration, was even less successful. Groups that advocated an overthrow of the state were rounded up after the assassination of president Sadat in 1981, and its leadership was hanged.

By the time most members of the radical groups were released from prison in the second half of the 1980s, the opportunities for internal migration were blocked, and many looked for means to escape from Egypt in order to build an ideal Muslim society elsewhere. The accelerated process of globalization allowed them to find a new external abode and build a new ideal society. Not only did the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the ensuing chaos in the Central Asian republics and Chechnya following the Soviet collapse in 1989 provide ideal circumstances to establish a new society, new means of communication allowed them to mobilize the human, financial, and ideological resources throughout the Islamic world. For a while Peshawar became the hub of the Islamist movement, where in true transnational fashion 'flows of people, money, images, ideas and objects circulate with growing speed, intensity and volume'. Informal transnational networks extended from the centres of struggle to the smallest towns in the outreaches of the Islamic world to support this migration.

Typical of this new, more extremist stage of the Islamist movement is the close connection between migration and the application of violence. Under cover of the jihad against the Soviets thousands of Egyptians, other Arabs, Pakistanis, Philippinos, and Indonesians were flown in to take part in the construction of a new pure Muslim society that was created and purified by force of arms. When the local war against the Soviets in Afghanistan ended in 1989, the mujahidin, internationalized their struggle by gradually turning against the United States. In addition, they promoted jihad in their countries of origin. As in the outlines of the seminar, the diasporic community had become the leading force in the radicalization of the Muslim world.

Ayman al-Zawahiri's memoirs 'Knights under the Prophet's Banner', smuggled out of the Afghan caves before the American invasion in 2002, provides a unique insight into the transnational, almost postmodern, ideology of the Egyptian radical Islamist movement in this transnational phase. Calling himself 'an emigrant fugitive, who gives his backing to other emigrants and *mujahidin*', he regards Afghanistan at this 'stage of global battle' the ideal place to 'fight the new crusade', because as he says, 'it is a pure battle between Muslims on the one hand and infidels on the other'. Conscious of the role media play in this war and the postmodern era, he expresses his fear of penetration by 'the Arab and Western media [who] are responsible for distorting the image of the Arab Afghans'. 'The external enemy' aside, al-Zawahiri played a major role in promoting violent confrontation with the 'internal enemy', the Egyptian authorities.

In other respects, however, the Egyptian movement does not fit the outlines of the seminar. Although al-Zawahiri and other members of the radical Egyptian Islamist movement were able to promote jihad from a safe transnational haven, were free to develop their ideas and communicate them to the rest of the world as well as plan the assault on the World Trade Center in New York, they did not succeed in further radicalizing the movement in Egypt itself. Indeed, the majority of the movement condemned violence and rejected the Front of Osama Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, even before 11 September. Since January 2002 the leaders of the Gama'at al-Islamiyya publicly rescinded many of their previous ideas regarding jihad, *takfir* (the condemnation of society as infidel), and *hisba*. In that sense the influence of the diasporic radical community of Egyptians is waning. What has changed, however, is that the debate on violence and the means of establishing an ideal Muslim Society have become transnational. Since 11 September the Egyptian debate on establishing an ideal Muslim society and the role of migration and violence has become a worldwide Muslim debate. The Asian experience of the Egyptian movement has played a key role in this process. ❮

Dr Roel Meijer is affiliated TCMO to the University of Nijmegen and is currently working on the debate on violence within the Islamist movement.
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The Expression of Tense in Chinese Languages

One of the research topics in the 'Syntax' project is concerned with the question of the expression of tense and finiteness in Chinese languages and the role played by sentence final particles.

By Rint Sybesma

Formulating an assumption that is widely held, Li and Thompson (1981:13) write: 'Mandarin has no markers for tense'. However, there exist minimal pairs like the following (cf. Li and Thompson 1981:589 (46a,b)):

(1) a. **tamen ba-dian-zhong kai-men**
     they   eight-o'clock   open-door
     they (will) open at eight o'clock

   b. **tamen ba-dian-zhong kai-men de**
     they   eight-o'clock   open-door prt
     they opened at eight o'clock

The linguistic terms used in the example above and the ones to follow are all explained in the note below.* The only formal difference between the above sentences lies in the presence of the element *de* in (1b). In terms of meaning, the difference is that the variant with *de* definitely has a past tense interpretation, while (1a) does not. We must, however, for several reasons, not jump to the conclusion that *de* is a past tense marker. One of these reasons is that the following minimal pair (based on Li and Thompson 1981:592 (55), (56)) does not show the same interpretational difference as we saw in (1):

(2) a. **women bu   hui   qifu   nimen**
     we   not   will   bully   you (plural)
     we are not going to bully you

   b. **women bu   hui   qifu   nimen   de**
     we   not   will   bully   you (plural) prt
     we are not going to bully you (believe us)

Here, the difference has nothing to do with tense. Whereas (2a) is a neutral statement of fact, (2b) is used in a situation in which 'you' may have reasons to fear that 'we' are going to bully 'you', or to explain other aspects of 'our' behaviour (cf. Li and Thompson 1981: 592). In Cantonese, another variety of Chinese, we have an element lei4, which, judging from the following minimal pair, also indicates past tense:

(3) a. **A3-Chan4 hai4 keoi5-lou5gung1**
     Ah Chan   be   3s-husband
     Ah Chan is her husband

   b. **A3-Chan4 hai4 keoi5-lou5gung1lei4**
     Ah Chan   be   (s)he-husband prt
     Ah Chan was her husband (for a while in the past; no longer is)

Like Mandarin de, *lei4* can also not be a pure tense-marker as we know it, since it only co-occurs with certain types of predicates; generally, past tense markers do not discriminate in that way. Despite these reasons for doubting the wisdom of calling *de* and *lei4* tense-markers, we must acknowledge the fact that Chinese languages do have (morphological) means to explicitly mark a sentence as [+past], as we just saw.

Li and Thompson's opening quotation is correct in the sense that one and the same sentence can be used to describe a past and a present or future event. The following Mandarin examples show this:

(4) a. **wo zuotian mai shu de-shihou, peng-shang Li Si**
     I   yesterday buy book when   bump-into Li Si
     when I was buying books yesterday, I bumped into Li Si

   b. **women xian chi-fan, hou   mai shu**
     we   first   eat   later   buy   book
     we'll first eat, then we'll buy books

The same verb phrase *mai shu* 'buy book' is used to describe a past event in (4a) and a future event in (4b). There is no marking of anything. Indeed, overt marking with *de* in (4a) would lead to ungrammaticality.

It must be noted, however, that in isolation predicates tend to have a strongly preferred temporal reading, which can hardly be overridden by pragmatic interference (cf. Matthewson 2002: see also Lin 2002). In (linguistic) isolation, the following Mandarin example is necessarily interpreted as present tense. If *Zhang San* refers to someone who is dead, the sentence is not felicitous (even if both hearer and speaker know):

(5) **Zhang San zhu zai zher**
   Zhang San live at   here
   Zhang San lives here

We can add an adverbial like *yiqian*, 'formerly', and get a past tense interpretation, as (6) shows. The same effect can be reached by embedding it in a linguistic context such that it will get a past tense interpretation:

(6) **Zhang San yiqian   zhu zai zher**
   Zhang San formerly   live at   here
   Zhang San lived/used to live here

The point is that (5), without such linguistic manipulations, only has a present tense interpretation; as noted, a deceased person as the subject is not enough to enforce a past tense interpretation. In other words, pragmatics alone is not enough. This can be taken as an indication that the Chinese sentence contains some tense element, the interpretation of which is fixed structurally.

In short, Chinese languages may have means to explicitly mark a sentence as [+past], that this marking is not always obligatory, and may in certain contexts even be ungrammatical. We also found reasons to assume that Chinese sentences may contain a temporal referential element; the reference of this element is determined by the structural context. We seek to interpret these findings, also in the light of general theories of tense, finiteness, and subject licensing. In the meantime, comments are welcome. ❮

References

- Li, C. N. and S. A. Thompson, *Mandarin Chinese. A functional reference grammar*, Berkeley: University of California Press (1981).
- Lin, J.W., 'Selectional restrictions of tenses and temporal reference of Chinese bare sentences', Lingua 113/3 (2002), pp. 271–302.
- Matthewson, L., *An underspecified tense in St'át'imcets*, (paper presented at WECOL, 2002).

Dr Rint Sybesma is programme director of the IIAS/Leiden University/NWO research programme 'The Syntax of the Languages of Southern China' (1 January 2001 – 31 December 2005).
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Note >

* In all examples 'prt' signifies 'particle'. In example 3 the numbers used in the expression 'A3-Chan4 hai4 keoi5-lou5gung1' refer to tones in Cantonese. For example: 'A3' signifies 'A' in the third tone.

> IIAS Fellows

1 July 2003 – 15 November 2003

The IIAS accommodates postdoctoral researchers in Asian Studies in a variety of categories. Sponsorship is a shared financial support and who would like to do research in the Netherlands for a certain period. The IIAS furthermore medi-ates in finding funding for those who have not yet secured means to cover their fellowship expenses (please also see the application form).

Categories of fellows

1. Research fellows

a. individual

b. attached to a thematic research pro-gramme, i.e.:
'Changing Labour Relations in Asia' (CLARA)
'Genomics in Asia'
'Indonesianisasi and Nationalization'
'Islam in Indonesia: The Dissemina-tion of Religious Authority in the Twen-tieth Century'
'Syntax of the Languages of Southern China'
'Transnational Society, Media and Citizenship'

2. Professorial fellows

Professorial fellows are attached to the IIAS to lecture at universities and insti-tutes in the Netherlands.

3. Senior visiting fellows

The IIAS can offer excellent senior schol-ars the opportunity to do research in the Netherlands.

4. Visiting exchange fellows

The IIAS has signed several Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with foreign research institutes, thus providing schol-ars with an opportunity to participate in international exchanges.

5. Affiliated fellows

The IIAS offers office facilities to excel-lent scholars who have found their own financial support and who would like to do research in the Netherlands for a cer-tain period. The IIAS offers the exploration of underdeveloped fields of Asian Studies in the Netherlands.

One of the most important goals of the IIAS is to share scholarly expertise by offering universities and other research institutes the opportunity to benefit from the knowledge of resident fellows. IIAS fellows are invited to lecture, participate in seminars, cooperate on research proj-ects etc. The IIAS is most willing to medi-ate in establishing contacts and consid-ers both national and international integration of Asian Studies to be very important objectives.

The IIAS wants to stress the coopera-tion between foreign researchers and the Dutch field. With regard to the affiliated fellowships, the IIAS therefore offers to mediate in finding external Dutch fund-ing, should the scholar have not yet found ways of financing his/her visit to the Netherlands. For more information, please refer to the IIAS fellowship appli-cation form, which can be obtained from the IIAS secretariat or can be found at **www.iias.nl/iias/applform.html**

6. Gonda fellows

Annually, the IIAS offers office facilities and living accommodation to five fellows selected and co-funded by the Stichting J. Gonda Fonds (KNAW). Please check the KNAW website for information and the application form at www.knaw.nl

7. Research guests

The IIAS can offer office facilities to excel-lent scholars who would like to visit the institute for a short period.

Both IIAS affiliated fellowship applica-tions and requests for IIAS mediation for funding post-PhD researchers can be submitted at any time (no application deadline).

Hereunder you will find, ordered by region of specialty and in alphabetical order, the names and research topics of all fellows currently engaged at the Inter-national Institute for Asian Studies. Men-tioned are further: country of origin, peri-od of affiliation, kind of fellowship, and if applicable funding source/co-sponsor.

General

Miriyam Aouragh, MA (Morocco)
Stationed at the ASSR
PhD student within the WOTRO/ASSR/IIAS programme 'Transnational Society, Media and Citizenship'
'The making of a collective Palestinian identity'
1 May 2001 – 1 May 2005

Dr CHEN Hsiu-Li (Taiwan)
Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam
Visiting exchange fellow, sponsored by the NSC
International product penetration
14 January 2003 – 14 July 2003

Dr Roel Meijer (the Netherlands)
Research fellow
Religion, transnationalism and radicalism
3 March 2003 – 3 July 2003

Dr Bert Remijsen (Belgium)

Affiliated fellow
Hybrid word prosodic systems
1 July 2002 – 1 July 2005

Dr Margaret Sleeboom (the Netherlands)
Research fellow within the programme 'Genomics in Asia'
Human genetics and its political, social, cultural, and ethical implications
17 September 2001 – 15 December 2005

Dr David N. Soo (United Kingdom)
Affiliated fellow
Globalisation: an investigation into the emerging Asian space industry. A new force in space?
4 October 2002 – 4 October 2003

Central Asia

Dr Mehdi Parvizi Amineh (the Netherlands)
Stationed in Leiden and at the Branch Office Amsterdam
Research fellow
Conflict, security and development in the post-Soviet era: toward regional economic cooperation in the Central Asian region
1 July 2002 – 31 December 2003

Dr Alex McKay (Australia)
Affiliated fellow
The history of Tibet and the Indian Himalayas
1 October 2000 – 1 October 2005

Dr Irina Morozova (Russia)
Affiliated fellow, sponsored by NWO
Conflict, security and development in the post-Soviet era: toward regional economic cooperation in the Central Asian region
24 April 2003 – 24 October 2003

Dr Cecilia Odé (the Netherlands)
Research fellow
Voices from the tundra and taiga
1 July 2002 – 1 July 2003

South Asia

Dr Audrius Beinorius (Lithuania)
Gonda fellow
The early sources and historical develop-ment of medieval Indian astrology
1 September 2003 – 31 January 2004

Dr Hanne de Bruin (the Netherlands)
Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam
Affiliated fellow
Kattaikkuttu and Natakam: South Indian Theatre Traditions in Regional Perspective
17 April 2003 – 10 June 2003

Dr Alexandra van der Geer (the Nether-lands)
Research fellow, sponsored by the Gonda Foundation
Animals in stone, Indian fauna sculptured

through time
1 January 2003 – 1 January 2005

Prof. Tri Ratna Manandhar (Nepal)
Senior visiting fellow
Capital punishment in Nepal: a historical perspective
7 May 2003 – 30 June 2003

Ilona Manevskaia, MA (Russia)
Gonda fellow
Characteristics of the commentarial genre in the Mahayana Buddhism
1 April 2003 – 30 August 2003

Dr Andi Faisal Bakti (Canada)
Research fellow within the project 'Islam in Indonesia'
Majlis taklim, pengajian and civil society: how do Indonesian majlis taklim and pen-gajian contribute to civil society in Indone-sia?
15 May 2002 – 15 November 2003

Jajat Burhanudin, MA (Indonesia)
PhD student within the project 'Islam in Indonesia'
The making of Islamic modernism. The transmission of Islamic reformism from the Middle East to the Malay-Indonesian archi-pelago in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
18 September 2001 – 18 September 2005

Muhammad Dahlan, MA (Indonesia)
PhD student within the project 'Islam in Indonesia'
The role of the Indonesian state institute for Islamic studies in the redistribution of Mus-lim authority
15 June 2001 – 15 June 2005

Dr Peter van Eeuwijk (Switzerland)
Affiliated fellow
Growing old in the city: health transition among elderly in North Sulawesi, Indonesia
15 July 2003 – 30 October 2003

Dr Arndt Graf (Germany)
Affiliated fellow
Political marketing
20 August 2003 – 7 October 2003

Dr Brett Warren Hough (Australia)

Affiliated fellow
Performing arts in Bali
Violence in Bali
8 March 2003 – 28 June 2003

Prof. Zohra Ibrahim (Malaysia)
Affiliated fellow
Information brokerage and knowledge shar-ing in Southeast Asia
6 January 2003 – 6 January 2004

Moch Nur Ichwan, MA (Indonesia)
PhD student within the project 'Islam in Indonesia'
Islam: state production of Islamic discourse in New Order Indonesia and afterwards
6 April 2001 – 6 April 2005

Jasper van de Kerkhof, MA (the Nether-lands)
Junior research fellow, sponsored by NIOD
Indonesianisasi and nationalism. The emancipation and reorientation of the economy and the world of industry and commerce
15 October 2002 – 15 October 2003

Dr Michael Laffan (Australia)
Research fellow within the research proj-ect 'Islam in Indonesia'
Sufis and salafis: a century of conflict and compromise in Indonesia
1 January 2002 – 31 December 2004

Dr Thomas Lindblad (the Netherlands)
Research fellow, sponsored by NIOD
Indonesianisasi and nationalism. The emancipation and reorientation of the economy and the world of industry and commerce
1 October 2002 – 1 October 2006

Dr Hotze Lont (the Netherlands)
Stationed at the Branch Office Amster-dam
Affiliated fellow within the KNAW pro-gramme: 'Indonesian Society in Transi-tion'
Coping with crises in Indonesia
5 November 2001 – December 2004

Dr Johan Meuleman (the Netherlands)
Research fellow within the programme 'Islam in Indonesia'
Dakwah in urban society in twentieth-cen-tury Indonesia
1 January 2001 – 31 December 2004

Ahmad Syafi'i Mufid, MA (Indonesia)
PhD student within the framework of the project 'Islam in Indonesia'
The place of sufi orders in the religious life

of contemporary Jakartans
18 September 2001 – 18 September 2005

Prof. NAKAMURA Kiyoshi (Japan)
Affiliated fellow, sponsored by the JSPS and NWO
Ethnography of Balinese adat in the context of post-colonial and post New-Order Indonesia
15 January 2003 - 31 August 2003

Noorhaidi, MA (Indonesia)
PhD student within the project 'Islam in Indonesia'
The jihad paramilitary force: Islam and identity in the era of transition in Indonesia
1 April 2001 – 1 April 2005

Dr Keat Gin Ooi (Malaysia)
Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam
Affiliated fellow, sponsored by the NWO
The Japanese occupation of Dutch Borneo 1942-1945
25 March 2004 – 26 May 2004

Dr Tilak Raj Sareen (India)
Affiliated fellow
The Japanese prisoners of war, 1942-1946
22 July 2003 – 21 August 2003

Dr George Bryan Souza (USA)
Affiliated fellow
The colonial port city and the maritime trade of Asia: Batavia and cinnamon, silver and opium, 1684-1792
1 April 2003 – 30 June 2003

Arief Subhan, MA (Indonesia)
PhD student within the project 'Islam in Indonesia'
The changing role of the Indonesian Madrasah and the dissemination of Mus-lim authority
15 June 2001 – 15 June 2005

Prof. Suhartono (Indonesia)
Senior visiting fellow
Sultan Hamnegku Buwono IX: his role in securing the Republic of Indonesia, 1945 – 1949
19 May 2003 – 18 June 2003

Prof. Ben White (the Netherlands, UK)
Stationed at the Branch Office Amsterdam
Affiliated fellow, KNAW programme: 'Indonesian Society in Transition'
Coping with crises in Indonesia
25 September 2001 – December 2004

Prof. Md Salleh Yaapar (Malaysia)

Professorial fellow, holder of the Euro-pean Chair of Malay Studies
Pantun and Pantoum: a study in Malay-European literary relations
5 February 2003 – 5 February 2005

East Asia

Prof. CHANG Mau-kuei Michael (Taiwan)
Visiting exchange fellow, sponsored by the NSC
The Politics of Privilege in Taiwan
1 September 2003 – 31 January 2004

Prof. Kenneth J. Hammond (USA)
Affiliated fellow
The life, death, and posthumous career of Yang Jisheng, 1516 – 1555
1 July 2002 – 1 July 2003

Dr HO Ming-Yu (Taiwan)
Visiting exchange fellow, sponsored by the NSC
Law, foreign direct investment and eco-nomic development in Taiwan 1992-2002
18 December 2002 – 18 June 2003

Dr HOU Yu (China)
Affiliated fellow, sponsored by NUFFIC
China's industrial structure and sustainable development after entering WTO
1 September 2002 – 30 June 2003

Li Boya, BA (China)
PhD student within the joint NWO/ Lei-den University/IIAS research programme 'The Syntax of the Languages of Southern China'
1 January 2001 – 31 December 2005

Dr SADOI Yuri (Japan)
Affiliated fellow, sponsored by the Mit-subishi Motors Corporation
The problems of the Japanese automobile production system in the different cultural setting: the case of the Netherlands
1 September 1999 – 1 September 2003

SIO Joanna, BA (Hong Kong)
PhD student within the joint NWO/ Leiden University /IIAS research programme 'The Syntax of the Languages of Southern China'
1 January 2001 – 31 December 2005

Juliëtte Van Wassenhove, MA (France)
Affiliated fellow
Discursive genealogies of civil society in Southeast Asia: the Malaysian case
16 May 2003 - 15 June 2003

Prof. TSAI Wei-Tien Dylan (Taiwan)
Visiting exchange fellow within the joint NWO/Leiden University/IIAS research programme 'The Syntax of the Languages of Southern China', sponsored by the NSC
Unselective Binding and Various Wide-Scope Effects in Chinese
1 October 2003 - 31 March 2004
1 May 2004 - 31 August 2004

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The Institute of Asian Affairs (Institut für Asienkunde, IFA) was founded in 1956 on the initiative of the German Parliament and the German Foreign Ministry. The Institute studies contemporary political, economic, and social developments in Asian countries, at the same time aiming to procure and broaden scientifically based knowledge of the region and its countries.

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The Centro de Estudios de Asia Oriental (Centre for East Asian Studies, CEAO) was established in 1992 at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (UAM). The centre's main aim is to train young researchers who originate from different areas of the humanities and the social sciences and specialize in East Asian Studies.

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IIAS (secretariat Asia Alliance)

www.asia-alliance.org

Centro de Estudios de Asia Oriental, Spain

From its beginning in 1992, the Centro de Estudios de Asia Oriental (CEAO, Centre for East Asian Studies) concentrated on two main goals. First, to train young researchers with different backgrounds within the humanities and social sciences, who specialize in East Asian Studies. Second, to obtain the official approval of an official degree in East Asian Studies. Considering that there was no significant academic tradition on Asian Studies in Spain, the task was a truly pioneer one and was certainly not very easy. Recently, the CEAO joined the Asia Alliance as its sixth European partner.

Report >
General

By Taciana Fisac

Offering sustained support to CEAO activities, the Universidad Autonoma de Madrid (UAM) was the first university in Spain to create permanent faculty positions in the area of East Asian languages and cultures. This university will also offer an interdisciplinary official degree on East Asian Studies in 2003/2004. Additionally, the CEAO strongly benefited from governmental and non-governmental research grants and teaching funds and has been endowed with editorial responsibility for the UNESCO East Asian literature series in Spanish.

Aiming to reinforce its research and teaching capabilities, the Centre for East Asian Studies has paid special attention to establishing international relations. At present, there are permanent links and collaborative exchange projects with institutions devoted to Asian Studies all over the world. The CEAO was one of the seven institution members of the European Union-China Academic Network (ECAN), which aimed to promote the collaboration between European institutions specialized in Contemporary China. It has become a prominent research institution in Spain, functioning as a centre of reference for Asian Studies. In addition to regular teaching and research work, CEAO organizes seminars and public lectures. It also provides documentation and consulting services to both public and private entities.

Our interdisciplinary and international research programme ranges from contemporary Chinese culture and gender studies; to Japanese linguistics; to labour studies and economics in both these countries and will soon participate in projects with Vietnam, Malaysia, and other Asian countries. The UAM faculty is currently developing research on science and technology in East Asia.

Every year the CEAO welcomes visiting lecturers and scholars. Apart from the areas of humanities and social sciences, the CEAO collaborates with other departments at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, providing support to joint research agreements between the Departments of Physics, Biology, Environmental Studies, and Medicine with equivalent Asian research groups. On a parallel basis, the CEAO is also engaged in the promotion of Spanish Studies in Asia. This academic year, it has coordinated a PhD programme on 'Contemporary Spain and Latin America', held at Beijing Foreign Studies University. ‹

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European Alliance for Asian Studies

Report >
General

The Alliance has just welcomed as a new partner the Centro de Estudios de Asia Oriental (CEAO) and expects the partnership to expand further in the near future. With this in mind, at a recent meeting the Alliance signed a Memorandum of Understanding to ensure a strong and lucid structure for an even larger Alliance in the future. One of its features is the change of name from Strategic Alliance for Asian Studies to European Alliance for Asian Studies. This does not mean that cooperation with our Asian partners is not still deemed vital. On the contrary, the Alliance feels that, apart from cooperation based on individual projects, it would like to work towards a strong cooperation with a yet-to-be-formed alliance of Asian institutes, a so-called Asian Alliance for Asian Studies. Asian institutes for Asian Studies who are interested in founding such an Asian Alliance are most welcome to contact us or visit our stand at the International Convention of Asian Studies 3 in Singapore. ‹

Asia-Europe Workshop Series 2003/2004

Report >
General

Encouraged by the second call for workshop proposals for the 2003/2004 Asia-Europe Workshop Series, which is sponsored by the Asia-Europe Foundation and the European Alliance for Asian Studies, academic researchers submitted workshop proposals on a variety of issues affecting both regions. The proposals were to have an inter-regional and multilateral importance and focus on a contemporary topic concerning both Asia and Europe in a comparative perspective. Importantly, the workshops had to be jointly organized by an Asian and European partner, so as to stimulate inter-regional dialogue.

Thirty-one proposals had been received by 1 March 2003, covering a wide range of topics. The Selection Committee, consisting of Amb. Delfin Colomé (ASEF), Prof. Jean-Luc Domenach (Tsinghua University), Prof. Chaibong Hahm (Yonsei University), Prof. Lily Kong (National University of Singapore), Prof. Hanns Maull (University of Trier), Prof. Shamsul A.B. (University Kebangsaan Malaysia), and Prof. Wim Stokhof (European Alliance for Asian Studies), met in Leiden, the Netherlands on 9 April.

Not only the overall quality of the proposals, but also the fact that the majority of the proposed workshops were to be held in Asia were pleasing to the committee. The six selected proposals excelled due to their clear-cut relevance to both Asia and Europe, stimulating dialogue between the two regions and creating a node between the scientific and 'practical' domains. ‹

The six selected proposals are:

Social and cultural effects of computer-mediated interactive communications technology in Europe and Asia
20–22 October 2003, Manila, the Philippines
Dr R. Pertierra (University of the Philippines)
Prof. Daniel Miller (University of London, UK)

Social science and AIDS in Southeast Asia
10–11 November 2003, Chiang Mai, Thailand
Dr Sophie Le Coeur (Chiang Mai University, Thailand)
Dr Evelyne Micollier (Université de Provence, France)

The Internet and elections in Asia and Europe
13–15 November 2003, Singapore
Dr R. Kluver (Nanyang Technological University, Singapore)
Dr Nicholas Jankowski (University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands)

The security paradox of open borders: surveillance and control of migrants
15–17 December 2003, Chiang Mai, Thailand
Dr Carl Grundy-Warr (National University of Singapore)
Prof. Didier Bigo (Sciences-Po, France)

Enabling role of the public sector in urban housing development
July 2004, Beijing, China
Prof. Anne Power (London School of Economics and Political Science, UK)
Prof. Tuan Yang (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China)

Old-age vulnerabilities: Asia and European perspectives
5–7 July 2004, Malang, Indonesia
Mr Warkum Sumitro (Universitas Brawijaya, Indonesia)
Dr Ruly Marianti (Belle van Zuylen Institute, the Netherlands)

For more information: **www.asia-alliance.org**

'Peranakan Legacy' at the Asian Civilisations Museum, Singapore

The permanent exhibition *Peranakan Legacy*, which was launched at the Asian Civilisations Museum's main wing in 2000, has received an overwhelmingly positive response from visitors and overseas institutions keen to borrow the collection. Its appeal is largely due to interest in the unique fusion of Chinese, Malay, and other cultures in the former Straits Settlements of Malaya and Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and other areas of the region during the colonial period. The exhibition adds an important dimension to the museum's mission of exploring Singapore's 'ancestral cultures' by demonstrating, in material culture terms, the value of such cross-cultural developments.

Report >
General

1 Portrait of Mrs Tan Beng Wan. Tempera on wood, late nineteenth century.

By Heidi Tan

The term 'Peranakan' is usually taken to mean 'local born' and is thought to have been used by the settled communities of Chinese, particularly during the late nineteenth century, to distinguish themselves from the new immigrants, whom they referred to as *sinkeh* (new guest) or, in Indonesia, as *totok* (migrant). The gender-specific terms 'Baba' and 'Nonya' are honorific, suggesting the high status of the respective male and female Peranakans.

The origins and history of the Peranakan phenomena in Southeast Asia remain contentious. It is not clear when Peranakan Chinese began to settle in the region – the earliest Chinese records of Chinese settlements date to the mid-fourteenth century, and Chinese communities lived in areas such as Melaka long before the founding of the Straits Settlements in 1826 (Rudolf 1998:196).

The assimilation of Malay cultural markers (a Baba patois, rituals and customs, food and fashion accessories) distinguished the Peranakan Chinese. Their knowledge of local matters enabled them to act as brokers between local and colonial businesses, giving them a distinct economic advantage. Many eventually underwent an English education (or Dutch, in the case of Indonesian Peranakans) and took up positions in the colonial administration, earning themselves the title of 'King's Chinese'.

The ways in which cross-cultural transformations occurred also remain unclear – through intermarriage between Chinese traders and indigenous women, or cultural adaptation? There are good reasons to suppose that both may have happened. Chinese traders reliant on seasonal monsoons for travel would have stayed in the region for long periods and eventually have married local women. The Confucian tradition of looking after the ancestors required that Chinese women stay in China to fulfil this role, and it was not until the mid- to late nineteenth century that social unrest induced increasing numbers of Chinese women to emigrate to Southeast Asia.

3 *Kerosang serong.* Gold, with rose- and brilliant-cut diamonds. Penang, nineteenth century.

The need to adopt local customs may have prevailed to a greater extent in certain areas, such as in Java, especially following ethnic conflicts such as the Batavia Massacre in the mid-eighteenth century, or in Siam and the Philippines, where the Chinese were more easily assimilated (Chin 1991:18).

That the adaptation of local Malay culture was transferred through the matriarch can be seen in early portraiture. These portraits were painted in the home of Mr and Mrs Tan Beng Wan during the late nineteenth century. They pose apparently surrounded by possessions suitably reflective of their social standing (photos 1 and 2). The educated upholder of Chinese culture and Confucian values, a role aspired to by the Babas, is apparent in Mr Tan's Chinese-style clothes, books, and porcelain accessories. Mr Tan was appointed to the Chinese Advisory Board for Singapore in 1890 and was also Municipal Commissioner until his death the following year.

Mrs Tan's portrait reflects the Malay cultural influence. She wears the early style of Peranakan dress, the Malay long tunic (*baju panjang*) with batik patterns, fastened by three brooches or *kerosang* over a woven cotton sarong (*kain chaylay*), a batik handkerchief in one hand and hair tightly pulled back in a bun secured by three hairpins (*chabang tiga*), as was customary of the Melakan and Singapore *nonyas*. She wears slippers (*kasut tongkang*) – *nonyas* did not observe the Chinese custom of bound feet – that she probably decorated with European glass beads herself. Wealth and status are further reflected in her accessories, including a betel (*sireh*) set with silver receptacles and the required spittoon, in this case of the imported Chinese porcelain variety. Betel-chewing was an important Southeast Asian custom, thought to have originated in the Malay world, and a wealthy Peranakan home would have elaborate *sireh* sets which were presented to guests on their arrival as a sign of hospitality. Interestingly, betel-chewing remained a female habit, while men usually preferred to smoke tobacco.

4 Beadwork panel with a pair of phoenix, bats, and insects amongst plants. Glass beads, metallic-wrapped threads, velvet. Indonesia, late nineteenth–early twentieth century.

Cross-cultural fertilization

The exhibition explores several themes with an underlying concern to unravel diverse sources of cultural influence. The displays are organized around themes and materials – social customs such as betel-chewing and weddings, the *nonyas*' own production of textile arts, stylistic developments in dress and jewellery fashions at the turn of the century, and the important legacies of silver and porcelain that were handed down as family heirlooms.

The cross-cultural fertilization of ideas, materials, and designs was often underpinned by the tastes of the *nonyas* who commissioned craftsmen from different ethnic groups. Although fashions changed, a distinct Peranakan aesthetic can be seen in their taste for elaborate designs executed with exquisite skill borne out of the Malay sense of refinement (*halus*). This is illustrated by nineteenth-century examples of the Malay-style brooch (*kerosang*) with Malay rose-cut diamonds (*intan*) and later examples with brilliant-cut diamonds (*berlian*) produced by Indian jewellers, whose new cutting and setting techniques improved their sparkling quality (photo 3).

Metalwork was another important aspect of material culture patronized by wealthy *nonyas*. They commissioned local Malay and Chinese silversmiths to produce a wide range of items, including pillow ends (*bantal*), ornamental vessels, tea sets for weddings, ritual water sprinklers, and hangings to decorate wedding beds. Perhaps some of the best examples demonstrate the blending of Malay metalworking techniques such as *repoussé* and filigree work, often stained a rich orange tone, with Chinese designs that include auspicious motifs such as the mythical *qilin* (signifying the birth of sons) and Buddhist emblems (photo 4).

Perhaps the best expressions of Peranakan taste are those that were produced by the *nonyas* themselves. Embroidery and beadwork using imported European glass beads were painstakingly undertaken by young unmarried *nonyas* to produce accessories for their wedding trousseau. These demonstrated the ideal feminine virtues of industriousness, patience, and artistic skill, as well as how much time the maker had free for such labour, and were indicators of a family's social standing and a woman's marriageability.

Contextualization and future developments

One of the curatorial challenges of the exhibition was to address the need for greater contextualization, despite limited collections. Small semi-contextual displays provide one solution. These include a display of an ancestral altar and a wedding bed, which, when fully dressed, becomes a focal point of the wedding chamber. Carved in *nam* wood in southern China, the ornate red-and-gold style bed with its embroidered silk curtains, canopy, cushions, and golden hanging flower baskets (*bakul bunga*), decorated profusely with every imaginable Chinese auspicious motif, is in effect a 'shrine to fertility and wealth' (Lee & Chen 1998:72).

Designs include Buddhist and Daoist motifs, cranes and peaches (emblems of longevity), plants in fruit (abundance), and the signature motif of the Peranakans, the phoenix and peony (symbols of beauty, wealth, and status). Continuation of the patriarchal family line through the birth of sons was of great concern. The ultimate rite to this end was the *ann ch'ng* ritual, in which a young boy rolled across the bed three times during preparations for the traditional twelve-day Chinese wedding. Anecdotal evidence informs us that the bed's owner travelled continuously over the course of her childbearing years between Singapore and her first home in Penang (where the bed was kept), in the belief that this particular bed would ensure the safe births of her children.

Peranakan culture holds great nostalgia and significance for local communities and is an attraction for overseas visitors who wish to uncover unique Southeast Asian cultures. The success of the exhibition has inspired the museum to develop its collections and undertake further research on less well-documented Peranakan communities, such as the Indian Peranakans (or Chitty Melakans), the Dutch Eurasians in Java, and smaller communities in Indonesia, Burma, and Thailand. The documentation of oral histories and living traditions practised by Peranakans today will be given greater priority when the exhibition is revamped as part of ambitious plans for a dedicated Peranakan museum. ‹

Agenda

The exhibition 'Peranakan Legacy' is on permanent display at the Museum's main wing in 39 Armenian Street, Singapore 179941.

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The Asian Civilisations Museum, Singapore is part of the Asia-Europe Museum network. More information on ASEMUS:
www.asemus.org

2 Portrait of Mr Tan Beng Wan. Tempera on wood, late nineteenth century.

All photos: Asian Civilisations Museum, Singapore

Civil Society, Religious Affiliation and Political Participation in East Asia

Alternative sources of legitimacy, such as the ones encompassed in civil society or religion, (re-) appear and interact with classical political mechanisms in local political fields, while democracies across the world face challenges regarding representation. The growing influence of civil society in the public sphere is widely held in positive regard, while religions provoke defiant reactions, especially when Islam is at stake. The ICAS3 panel this article means to introduce builds upon examples drawn from across East Asia to show that civil society is not a 'natural' way through which contemporary societies can eventually voice peaceful political discontent, nor is religion a univocal departure from politics. The relationship between civil or religious organizations and politics is a multi-faceted one and has not been given enough attention in the analyses of the East Asian context, which often focuses on economic modernization or the developmental state.

Agenda >
East Asia

19-22 August 2003
Singapore

Notes >

1. Extensively documented by Andrew Arato and Jean L. Cohen, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, Cambridge (Mass.), London: MIT Press (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought) (1992).
2. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (ed.), *Funding Virtue. Civil Society and Democracy Promotion*, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2000).
3. Marcel Gauchet, *Le Désenchantement du monde. Une histoire politique de la religion*, Paris: Gallimard (NRF) (1985); Talcott Parsons, *The Social System*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul (1951).

By Juliëtte Van Wassenhove

Today, civil society is quite a fashionable notion, as attested by its wide resurgence in the academic and political worlds since the dismantlement of the communist block.[1] Bi-and multilateral agencies, never tired of emphasizing civil society's discourse and organizations part in the 1980s-1990s political transitions, have turned civil society into a tool for democracy assistance programmes. Civil society has become a box to tick on the bureaucratic checklist of the righteous path to development. This evolution is noticeable in the growing discourse on civil society, which tends to be both normative and depoliticized – casting non-governmental organizations, and associations as the incarnation of the virtuous populace.[2]

Analyses of religion have been undergoing an opposite evolution. For decades social sciences held that religious practice mainly provided for social integration and harmony. While it may have made a modest contribution to consensus building and to supplying meaning and identity for individuals, it surely had no salient political implications. Religion's part was thus played down in the study of political configurations as a long-lasting consequence of the secularization theory and of functionalist structuralism.[3] The disruptive and highly political potential of religious systems of meaning and organizations was thus underestimated. Today however, religions are no longer regarded as neutral with respect to politics. This recent backlash is due to the importance of religious input in democratization processes particularly in Eastern Europe, but also in the increasing prominence of Islamic political projects, from the 1979 Iranian Revolution onwards. The somewhat excessive attention for Islam has concealed what other religions, including non-revealed, pantheistic ones, can contribute to our understanding of contemporary changes in the relationship between society, politics, and religion.

There is thus a theoretical need to further explore political implications of the increasing normativization of the notions of civil society and religion, especially outside the European and American cradle of modernity. The upcoming panel is unique in the way that it presents papers by young researchers (completing or having just completed their PhDs) working on these problems in East Asian situations. The panellists all shared the experience that the obverse point our fields imposed on us was the renegotiation of political participation, phrased in terms of civil society or religious affiliation.

In China for instance, state-society relations can be seen historically as the relationship between the official state religion and local cult associations – a relationship characterized by cooptation, mutual penetration, and repression of 'heterodox' cults. This model has been challenged with the relative opening of the public space and economic transformation. The possibility of speaking of a civil society in the Chinese situation will be debated in two papers, one paper assessing the extent to which political power and social organization in China remains defined in religious terms; the other documenting the growing public involvement among entrepreneurs, based on the case of the Zhejiang province.

Simultaneously, Cambodian Buddhism is being reinvented and used as a form of cultural capital for the re-creation of community and politics, after the violence of the Khmer Rouge era. In the Malay Muslim world, religion also appears instrumental in voicing discontent as well as shared ideals, in the context of claims for Reformasi (reform) in Malaysia and Indonesia. Though different both in their movements' sociology and projects, Malaysian and Indonesian Islamists are concerned with countering and/or co-opting concepts such as 'democracy', 'human rights' or 'civil society', by Islamizing them. As they increasingly influence the public debate, Malay Islamists sketch out cross-border discursive genealogies and a regional theory of Islamic political participation, as will be discussed in the fourth and fifth contributions. ‹

Juliëtte Van Wassenhove, MA is currently preparing a PhD in political science, on 'Civil Society in Malaysia and the Philippines: actors, discourses and practices', at the Centre of International Studies and Research at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Paris (IEP-CERI).
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Public Health Care Strategies and Socio-Genetic Marginalization

The increased public and political concern about developments of new genetic technologies has led to an increased scrutiny of the role played by medical experts and public health authorities in their introduction into the health care system. Public discussion, recommendations of professional organizations, legislation, and reliable technological assessment are relied upon to prevent any adverse effects on society. It is also important to organize discussions on an international level. The aim of this ICAS3 panel, confined to developments in China, Japan, India, and Taiwan, is to make a contribution to that effect.

Agenda >
General

19-22 August 2003
Singapore

By Margaret Sleeboom

The point of departure is the concept of socio-genetic marginalization in Asia. It draws attention to the consequences of the practice of relating the social to the (assumed) genetic make-up of people, even when the relevance of such a connection is doubtful. After all, it is from the cultural (including the spiritual), socio-economic, and political context that we derive the sources that endow our interpretations of genetic information with meaning. The concept of socio-genetic marginalization, first of all, refers to the isolation of social groups and individuals as a consequence of discrimination on the basis of genetic information. With this in mind, my paper discusses the vulnerable position of ethnic groups in China, India, and Taiwan, when facing decisions about revealing their genetic identity by contributing genetic samples to researchers, often under pressure or in exchange for promises of health care. Socio-genetic marginalization also refers to the 'special' position of socio-genetic risk groups that have to deal with the psychological burden of the knowledge, feelings of social ineptitude, and a sense of financial uncertainty. Drawing on a large multi-sited ethnographic research project, exploring infertility and medically-assisted conception in India's five major cities, Aditya Bharadwai (Cardiff University, Wales) examines how a biological inability to reproduce not only disrupts reprogenetic futures of the infertile but also results in bio-social marginalization. Finally, the socio-genetic marginalization also indicates forms of socio-economic marginalization when, for instance, health care becomes too costly for the socio-economically disadvantaged.

The development of priorities and practices of screening and testing for congenital diseases in different societies varies. A central question is, what are the health care needs and interests of different population groups with regards to genetic testing, and how are they reflected in health care policies? The health care strategies, priorities, and socio-psychological (de-)merits, and the economic rationale of preventive screening, will be central issues of debate. In this context, Jyotsna Gupta (Leiden University Medical Centre, the Netherlands) questions the practice in India of diverting vast sums of public sector health funds to studying the burden of genetic disease. A major part of perinatal morbidity and mortality, as well as infant mortality, may be ascribed to undernourishment and malnutrition of both mother and child, and a lack of antenatal and postnatal services. Her paper offers ideas for alternative health care strategies that lie in the sphere of public policy-making and education.

The public debate on genomics must go beyond the mere dissemination of knowledge. Some suggestions on how to organize the debate seem to be unworkable in the short-term. Thus, we cannot expect to realize the ideals of public empowerment, client competency, and democratic decision-making concerning the development and application of new genetic technologies in time to be effective, especially not on a global scale. To illustrate this point, Jing-Bao Nie (University of Otago, New Zealand) discusses the Chinese eugenics project, which relies on ideologies such as social Darwinism, biological determinism, statism, and scientism for its execution, and is reductionist in addressing complex social problems. Nie considers the possible damaging effects of these ideologies, such as the further marginalization of the vulnerable, genetic victimization of the innocent, and the encouragement of authoritarian state policies and technocracy.

To start with, a more feasible target would be to aim at a better understanding of the consideration of issues amongst different interest groups. In this spirit, Tsai Duujian (National Yang Ming University, Taiwan) explores the interactions between these groups, as well as the interaction between such groups and the Taiwanese Government. He proposes a concept of participatory democracy that may avoid potential conflicts between technological development and humanistic interest, and could coordinate industry, medical societies, and patient groups in working collectively to shape genomic policy. Kaori Muto's paper (Shinshu University, Japan) explores the concept of genetic citizenship in her study of Japanese families with Huntington's Disease. The notion of genetic citizenship will gain importance, as genomics will be increasingly socialized through developments in molecular epidemiology. This will require new strategies of public health care. ‹

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IIAS Panels at ICAS3
• The impacts of September 11 on popular political disclosure of Muslims in Southeast Asia (Noorhaidi Hasan, MA)
• Genomics in Asia: Public health care strategies and socio-genetic marginalization (Dr Margaret Sleeboom)
• ASEM as an antidote for unilateralism? (Dr Paul van der Velde)
• Reconstructing Asian popular histories: Problems and issues of oral narratives (Dr Ratna Saptari)
• Rethinking geopolitics in post-Soviet Central Eurasia (Central Asia and South Caucasus) (Dr Mehdi Parvizi Amineh)
• Civil society, religious affiliation and political participation in East Asia (Juliëtte Van Wassenhove, MA)
*Also see the conference agenda (pages 54-55)*

Permanent ICAS Secretariat General
Prof. W.A.L. Stokhof (Secretary), C/o International Institute for Asian Studies
iias@let.leidenuniv.nl / www.icassecretariat.org

'Indisch' Identity and Decolonization

One of the key issues running through all the projects within the NIOD programme 'From the Indies to Indonesia' is the way that political, social, and economic change affected the different ethnic groups in the Dutch East Indies. In this article, Robert Cribb speculates on the reasons the mixed-race 'Indisch' community did not take a more prominent role in the nationalist movement.

Courtesy of KITLV

Left to right: pensioned resident P.W.A. van Spall, his wife, a son, a daughter, a son-in-law, and a daughter in front of his house in Rijswijk, Batavia. Circa 1875.

Report >
Indonesia

By Robert Cribb

The struggle over identity and political destiny in the Indonesian archipelago in the first half of the twentieth century was not just between Dutch and Indonesian ideas of society and of the future. A third identity, which we can call Indisch, hovered in the background.

The meaning of Indisch lurks somewhere between ethnicity – mainly mixed race Indo-European/Eurasian – and culture, standing for the whole complex of cultural adjustments between East and West which took place in the Indonesian archipelago and which involved not only Europeans and indigenes but also Chinese and other Asians. Indisch culture was marked by distinctive uses of language, dress, cuisine, entertainment, recreation, housing, family structure and so on, all of them loosely speaking hybrid between Western and Asian cultures. The term 'identity', however, implies both a collective identity and a sense of the political implications of that identity.

In these terms, it is very difficult to identify an Indisch identity either in the late colonial period or immediately afterwards. There was very little by way of a claim for political rights or political consideration on the basis of being Indisch. In fact, a conscious Indisch identity emerged first in the Netherlands and only from the late 1950s, following the mass expulsion of Dutch citizens from Indonesia in 1957.

It is intriguing to ask, however, just why an Indisch identity – and a corresponding political programme – did not emerge to dominate the political stage at end of the colonial era.

Most European colonies with a settler society followed a different trajectory. In virtually all regions of European settlement, the settler communities began rather quickly to differentiate themselves from the culture of the homeland. In this respect, the rich history of cultural hybridization in the Netherlands Indies, which Taylor, Gouda, and others have described as unremarkable. Most such settler societies, however, passed on to a second phase in which the emerging settler culture became the basis for a new identity distinct from the metropolitan identity both culturally and politically.

In the Philippines, for instance, the term Filipino was once analogous to Indisch. It described the Spanish who had settled in the Philippine archipelago, as opposed to the *peninsulares* from Iberia. During the nineteenth century, however, the term Filipino came to encompass all who lived in the Philippines, including the 'natives' (Indios), as a category separate from (and antagonistic to) the Spanish. This process made the Philippines, at least incipiently, a nation and underpinned the 1898 revolution against Spanish rule. Similarly, 'Australian' once denoted a sub-category of the broader identity known as 'British', but it subsequently developed as an identity which no longer connoted Britishness (at least not to most people). Implicit in this second phase was decolonization. In both cases, moreover, the emergence of a separate identity was related to a political agenda, anti-clericalism in the Philippines and social democracy in Australia. Being Filipino or Australian stood not just for cultural practices but for distinct political values. Ben Anderson has described this phenomenon as 'creole nationalism'.

Indisch identity also failed to develop as a foil to the idea of Indonesia. The striking contrast here is with the Afrikaners in South Africa or the *pieds noirs* in Algeria. In both cases settler identity generated a vision of the future which was as much at odds with indigenous nationalism as it was with colonial rule. Although it is not difficult to uncover examples of Indisch opposition to Indonesian nationalism, the truly remarkable fact is that the Indisch alternative was so weak. Alongside the practical difficulties that plagued the Dutch in their colonial war from 1945 to 1949, the lack of any kind of developed Indisch alternative to Indonesian nationalism was a fundamental weakness.

Just why Indisch identity failed to develop a strong anti-colonial or anti-Indonesian character is difficult to say, especially since we can see the clear outlines of such a character in the name and programme of the Indische Partij, founded in 1911. The Indische Partij, with its slogan, 'The Indies for those who make their home there', represented the beginnings of a creole nationalism which failed to take definitive shape.

The failure of creole nationalism is likely to have had complex causes. The colonial authorities' suppression of the Indische Partij and the exile of its leaders may have been decisive. The Ethical Policy, with its emphasis on protecting native welfare, also drove a wedge between Eurasians and indigenous Indonesians.

It is often argued that the Dutch system of racial classification, which divided the Netherlands Indies population into Europeans, Natives, and Foreign Orientals, entrenched amongst Indonesians a fundamentally racist view of the world in which non-Natives could never be unambiguously Indonesian. Yet, apart from the fact that this observation does not explain why Indisch identity also failed to confront Indonesian identity, it runs counter to what we know about the baroque complexity of Netherlands Indies society. Colonial Indonesia was not an archipelagic South Africa with a system of racial classification that permeated every aspect of society. Class, religion, law, region, and culture all blurred the boundaries in hundreds of ways. Nor does this argument help us to understand the relatively easy acceptance of Indi-ans, Siamese, and Arabs. Classified as 'Foreign Orientals' they were also legally separate from the Indonesian population, though their separate legal status gave them fewer privileges than those enjoyed by the Europeans.

It has also been argued that the Indisch community, like the Chinese, held an intermediate position in colonial society and aligned itself with colonial conservatism because it feared a loss of privilege if independence were achieved. In many colonies, however, the mixed-race intermediate classes were a spearhead of the nationalist movement because they had the most to gain from eliminating the metropolitan authorities.

My suspicion is that an important part of the explanation lies in the fact that the Indisch community, to the extent that it lacked 'Inlands' (Native) status, was largely barred from owning rural land. This lack of access to land was not absolute – the ban on alienation of land came into force only in 1870 and significant tracts of land had come into the hands of Indisch people before that time, but that access had been frozen and lack of land became a powerful perception on both sides of the ethnic divide. It had at least two important consequences.

First, it worked against the development of agricultural attachment to the land as happened in the white settler colonies of North America, Australasia, and southern Africa. Although we now tend to be strongly aware of the ecological destructiveness of the European intrusion into these regions, many of the settlers quickly developed a passionate attachment to their lands, not just as a source and sign of wealth but also as a symbol of belonging.

Lack of access to land also insulated the Indisch community from the single most difficult and controversial issue in Indonesian politics. The issue of land ownership and control lay at the heart of the confrontation between colonialism and nationalism. It was an issue which was to contribute substantially to the massacre of hundreds of thousands of people in parts of Indonesia in 1965-66 and it is a leading source of tension in contemporary Indonesia. Yet the Indisch community, like the Chinese, had no significant interest in this issue. No wonder they seemed like bystanders in the struggle for independence.

The dilemma split the Indisch community. Some confirmed themselves as Dutch, becoming in time the 'Indisch gemeenschap' (Indies community); others chose to be Indonesians and became the *suku* Belanda-Indo (sometimes *suku* Indis). Despite their cultural similarities, each of these identities became lodged firmly within a broader national identity. Perhaps 'firmly' is the wrong word, for each community sits in a zone of uncertainty, not quite local, but not quite foreign. In neither case, however, do these identities become a significant challenge to the broader national identities.

The Indisch and Belanda-Indo communities combine elements from both Western and Asian cultures. The Belanda-Indo community in Indonesia is identified with Christianity in general, with entertainment, with the police and with crime. The community suffers formal discrimination – none of its members can be elected president – but faces few practical difficulties. Although members of the Indisch community faced significant problems of adjusting to life in the Netherlands and have significant grievances over their treatment especially by the authorities, they have suffered relatively little overt discrimination in Dutch society in comparison with other minorities in Europe. Most strikingly, there is an almost complete lack of political engagement between the two communities, despite their common heritage.

The second consequence is darker: because they were seen as not having a natural commitment to either side, the Indisch community faced a deep distrust on the part of Indonesian nationalists, especially at the more militant end of the nationalist movement. The violence they faced in the *bersiap* period, which in fact helped propel many who had been undecided into the arms of the Dutch, reflected a feeling that they could be intimidated into loyalty and should be punished for disloyalty.* <

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Note >

Psychoactive Substances in Ritual and Religion

According to the theory of the 'entheogen' origin of religions, man would originally have known the psychoactive properties of specific plants, and religions would be based on the visions produced by these plants and substances ('entheogens') derived from them. Wasson et al. (1986) presented this theory on the basis of significant examples in ancient Indian religion (Vedic ritual) and ancient Greek religion (Eleusian mysteries).* The theory has become of some interest to a larger public, but has otherwise received relatively little attention, except in discussions of concrete issues such as R.G. Wasson's identification of the Soma plant of ancient Vedic ritual with a hallucinogenic (entheogen) mushroom – which was accepted by some (cf. Staal 2001) and contested by others (cf. Nyberg 1995).

There are examples from other religious and cultural contexts where the use of psychoactive substances is not original but provides a shortcut in vision quests etc. on which others embark without making use of them (cf. Nyberg 1995 and his entirely different view on the Siberian fly-agaric which plays a major role in Wasson's theory). Some of the substances, such as tobacco, are currently well known for their recreational use, but elsewhere have been employed in serious shamanistic contexts, such as in rituals to contact forefathers (Wilbert 1972). A large part of the shamanistic 'experience' of contacting forefathers would seem to be either a product of cultural construction (cf. Katz 1983), or due to specific psycho-physiological preparations which recreational users of tobacco lack, or a combination of both.

The contrasts and controversies briefly outlined above suggest that not only the theories, but also the primary data are problematic, and that they are to be considered by specialists in various domains and disciplines, including anthropology, philology, religious science, archaeology, ethno-botany, ethno-pharmacology, plant systematics, pharmacognosy, and psychophysiology.

The purpose of the 'Psychoactive substances in ritual and religion' symposium is to bring together various disciplines that take on or touch on ethno-botany and ethno-pharmacology. It will deal with specific cases of the ritual or religious use of plants or substances, or even of psycho-physiological preparations (such as fasting and staying awake) that do not require such substances. Contributors may address one or more questions such as:

- What is the identity of the plant or substance used in the religion or ritual?
- Are the plants or substances known to have relevant experimental effects, e.g. hallucinogenic, stimulant, anti-depressant?
- If no direct botanical or chemical identification is possible, which descriptions of the plants, substances, effects and experiences are available which may be conducive to identification?
- Which contexts, procedures, devices can be identified to contribute to the conceptual and emotional construction of experiences associated with the plant or substance? <

Note >
* For full references to the mentioned publications, you may contact the organizers.

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Food & Foodways

The Hong Kong Heritage Museum is presenting the Food Culture Festival in 2003-2004 with a series of exhibitions and public programmes to explore Hong Kong's food culture from different perspectives. To tie in with the festival, an international conference will be jointly organized with the Department of Anthropology, the Chinese University of Hong Kong to explore the food cultures of the city as well as its neighbouring areas.

Food provides a comprehensive insight to social relations, family and class structure, gender roles, and cultural symbolisms, and is one of the most important cultural markers of identity in contemporary Asian societies. This conference looks at the politics of food and investigates how, by whom, when, where, and why different kinds of food are produced, prepared and supplied. We seek papers that examine how food is cultivated, gathered, farmed and mass produced, and how cuisine is invented, conceptualized, and marketed in various Asian societies. We invite scholars who are conducting research on the production of food and foodways on local/regional levels, looking into issues such as transnational exchange, globalization and localization, ecology and natural resources management, transformation of traditions and technical interventions, ideas of fusion food, etc.

Papers should provide an ethnographic description and analysis of the production of one or more significant ingredients and how they interact with the social and political complexities in specific cultural contexts. The conference is intended to be interdisciplinary and we welcome different disciplines, such as anthropology, sociology, history, and gender studies. <

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Dutch and Japanese Encounters since the Pacific War

The Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) has initiated the three-year research programme 'Dutch and Japanese Encounters in Europe and Asia since the End of the Pacific War' within the framework of the historical research programme 'Japan and the Netherlands', which is sponsored by the Japanese-government. This programme, that aims to stimulate Japanese-Dutch scientific cooperation in this field, focuses on the general development of post-war relations between Japan and the Netherlands, and the ways their in which shared war history has influenced Japanese-Dutch encounters in Asia and Europe in the post-war period.

The programme studies different aspects of these post-war encounters. It also intends to chart Japanese and Dutch reactions to a number of post-war social processes in Asia and Europe in a comparative perspective. The results of this research will be made available as a series of English- and Japanese-language publications. NIOD hereby invites proposals for projects within the scope of this programme.

We offer (1) funds for a Japanese-Dutch workshop and publication; (2) writing and publishing subsidies; and (3) 'matching funds' for post-graduate researchers. Proposals must be submitted by 1 September 2003. Requests for one-off subsidies for individual scientific activities from the 'contingency fund' can be made throughout the year. <

More info >
Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD)

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www.niod.nl

Back to the Future

Indonesia and the Netherlands have a rich history in contemporary scientific cooperation. The Open Science Meeting 'Back to the Future' aims to show the impact of this scientific cooperation over the last decades on modern society, specifically in Indonesia.

Examples from recent history illustrate the added value of scientific cooperation for future society. Keynote lecturers and convenors will present case studies of scientific achievements as an introduction to the parallel sessions, where present-day research projects are presented.

The following fields will be concerned; technology (including energy, ICT, aerospace technology, and biotechnology), food and health, marine and coastal sciences, natural and environmental science and resource management, sustainable development and global change, and social sciences and humanities. <

More info >
The Open Science Meeting is supported by:
International Research, Science and Technology Cooperation, Ministry of Research and Technology, Indonesia; Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research; Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research; Scientific Programme Indonesia – Netherlands; Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences

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www.knaw.nl/cfdata/agenda/agenda_detail.cfm?agenda__id=263

Sanskrit Manuscripts in Tibet 11th Gonda Lecture by E. Steinkellner

With the spread of Buddhism in Tibet, from the seventh to the fourteenth centuries AD, numerous Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts on palm leaves and, later, on paper were brought to Tibet and subsequently translated. After their translation, these Sanskrit manuscripts were only rarely used for study and as a rule carefully kept in special chapels. In this way, they survived until the twentieth century, when the Cultural Revolution destroyed an unknown but substantial number of these manuscripts. Interestingly, a great number still survived, mainly due to their protection by the army of the PR China.

These original Sanskrit manuscripts rank among the world's greatest cultural treasures. Their preservation with the best available techniques and providing their accessibility to the scholarly community are of utmost importance and would constitute an invaluable contribution to international cooperation in the area of the humanities. Many of these manuscripts contain texts from the Indian Buddhist tradition that until today have only been known in their Tibetan translations or not known at all. The enormous value of these texts in the history of pre-modern ideas for the world community of scholars, for those Asian societies whose populations are still predominantly Buddhist, and indeed for all mankind goes without say.

For many years, various individual scholars and academic institutions attempted to make the responsible institutions in Beijing and Lhasa aware of the need of making these treasures available to scholarship. Ernst Steinkellner will present a general survey of the history these manuscripts, their origins and present state, and of their possible future return to the world of knowledge. <

More info >
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www.knaw.nl/cfdata/agenda/agenda_detail.cfm?agenda__id=261

> International Conference Agenda

> International Conference Agenda

JULY 2003

2 July 2003
Brisbane, Australia
'Innovation and resistance in Japan'
Japanese Studies Association of Australia 2003 biennial conference
Queensland University of Technology
Panel proposals: Dr Christopher Pokarie
c.pokarier@qut.edu.au
Conference organization: Jason Thomas
jw.thomas@qut.edu.au

4 July 2003
Singapore
Babel or Behemoth: Language Trends in Asia
National University of Singapore
www.ari.nus.edu.sg/LanguageTrends.htm

4-8 July 2003
Singapore
Workshop on Performance Translation
Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore and Theatreworks
www.ari.nus.edu.sg

5-9 July 2003
Moscow, Russian Federation
International conference on South Asia literatures and languages (ICOSAL)
Organizer: Institute of Asian and African Studies, Moscow State University
Contact: Dr Ludmila V. Khokhlova (languages)
khokhl@iaas.msu.ru
Dr Alexander M. Dubyanskiy (literatures)
dubian@iaas.msu.ru

7-8 July 2003
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
'International security and the Asian heartland'
International symposium organized by the School of Foreign Service of the National University of Mongolia, in cooperation with the IIAS and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'
Convenors: Prof. Kh. Bayasakh (the School of Foreign Service of the National University of Mongolia) and Dr Paul Meerts (the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael')
Information: bayasakh@hotmail.com
pmeerts@clingendael.nl

7-10 July 2003
Singapore
'Self and others'
The Australasian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophies 2003 annual conference

SEPTEMBER 2003

1-2 September 2003
Jakarta, Indonesia
Open Science Meeting 'Back to the future'
Joint Working Committee for Scientific Cooperation between Indonesia and the Netherlands
Information: Johan Stapel
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kodijat@ristek.go.id
www.knaw.nl/cfdata/agenda/
agenda_detail.cfm?agenda__id=263

4-6 September 2003
Amsterdam, the Netherlands
People at the sea II: conflicts, threats and opportunities
IIAS/MARE Panels and Roundtable discussion on 'Piracy in the Asian Seas'
Convenor: Dr Derek Johnson, Centre for Maritime Research (MARE), Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Information: djohnson@marecentre.nl
or j.stremmelaar@let.leidenuniv.nl

4-7 September 2003
Jakarta, Indonesia
'Sufism and the "modern" in Islam'
Conveners: Julia Day Howell,
Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia
J.Howell@gu.edu.au
Martin van Bruinessen,
Utrecht University, the Netherlands
Martin.vanbruinessen@let.uu.nl

6-12 September 2003
Oxford, United Kingdom
International Association for Tibetan Studies, 10th seminar
Contact: Charles Ramble, convenor
iats@wolfson.ox.ac.uk
www.wolfson.ox.ac.uk/iats/

11-13 September 2003
London, United Kingdom
'Interweaving medical traditions: Europe and Asia, 1600–2000'
Contact: Duncan McCargo,
School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds
d.j.mccargo@leeds.ac.uk
http://web.soas.ac.uk/aseasuk/index.htm

15-16 August 2003
Melbourne, Australia
'Islam and the West: the impact of September 11?'
Contact: Elena Mogilevski, School of Political and Social Inquiry
Monash University
Elena.Mogilevski@arts.monash.edu.au
www.arts.monash.edu.au/politics/conference/

AUGUST 2003

10-14 August 2003
Kunming, China
'Ethnic cultures and globalization' International conference
Co-organizer: Center for Study of Chinese Southwest's Borderland Ethnic Minorities of China Yunnan University
Contact: Ms Zhang Jinpeng, Center for Study of Chinese Southwest's Borderland Ethnic Minorities of Yunnan University.
ynbzxa@ynu.edu.cn
Mr He Xingliang, Chinese Ethnological Society
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11-12 August 2003
Cambridge, United Kingdom
'Knowledge, pedagogy and citizenship in China'
Contact: Rachel Murphy
ram25@cam.ac.uk
www.crassh.cam.ac.uk/events/events2003/china.html

17-20 September 2003
Kunming, China
'Opening up to the future: the role of visual anthropology in the twenty-first century', Inter-

26 July - 7 August 2003
Los Angeles (CA) United States
'The world of Asian literature', Asia Institute's annual summer seminar for teachers
Information: Clayton Dube
cdube@international.ucla.edu
http://international.ucla.edu/asia

28-30 July 2003
Manassa (Bali), Indonesia
'7th international symposium on Nusantara manuscript'
Organizer: Udayana University, Manassa Bali
Contact : Ida Bagus Jelantik
manassabali@yahoo.com
idabagusjelantik@yahoo.

Contact: Dr Ooi Keat Gin
kgooi@hotmail.com
General Enquiries: Mrs Thilagavathi Vasudevan, Secretary, Organizing Committee
vthila@usm.my

20-21 November 2003
Hong Kong, China
East-West identities: globalisation, localisation, and hybridisation
Contact: Ms Jane Cheung, Office of International Cooperation and Exchange (OICE), lewi@hkbu.edu.hk
www.hkbu.edu.hk/~lewi/conferences/identities.htm

21 November 2003
Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Sanskrit manuscripts in Tibet: a survey of their history and future
11th Gonda Lecture by Ernst Steinkellner
Information: Gonda Foundation
bernadette.peeters@bureau.knaw.nl
chantal.kruizinga@bureau.knaw.nl
www.knaw.nl/cfdata/agenda/agenda_detail.cfm?agenda__id=261

21-22 November 2003
Bonn, Germany
'Art history and art in China'
A symposium about the history of art and art collecting
Concept: Prof. Lothar Ledderose, University of Heidelberg
Information: info@kah-bonn.de
www.bundeskunsthalle.de

21-23 November 2003
Stockholm, Sweden
New perspectives in Eurasian archaeology
ASEF-Asia Alliance workshop
Convenors: Dr Magnus Fiskesjö (Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, Sweden) and Chen Xingcan (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China).
magnus.fiskesjo@ostasiatiska.se

21-24 November 2003
Auckland, New Zealand
Asia: images, ideas, identities
Contact: Dr Xin Chen
x.chen@auckland.ac.nz
www.nzasia.org.nz/conference/ConferenceHomePage.htm

27-28 November 2003
Canberra, Australia
Vietnam Update 2003
Australia National University
Conveners: Dr Philip Taylor, Professor Ben Kerkvliet, Professor David Marr
Information: http://rspas.anu.edu.au/polsoc/Vietnam/

28-30 November 2003
Matara, Sri Lanka

CESSconf@fas.harvard.edu
http://cess.fas.harvard.edu/

8 October 2003
Leiden, the Netherlands
'Sufis, warriors, and merchants: social dynamics in Mughal India'
Seminar in honour of D.H.A. Kolff
Co-sponsored by IIAS
Convenor: Dr Jos Gommans
Information: j.j.l.gommans@let.leidenuniv.nl

9-11 October 2003
Leiden, the Netherlands
'Country trade and European empire in the Arabian seas in the seventeenth and eighteenth century'
IIAS workshop
Convenor: Dr R.J. Barendse
Information: iias@let.leidenuniv.nl
r.barendse@worldonline.nl
www.iias.nl

13-17 October 2003
Leiden, the Netherlands
'Law in Central Asia: an historical overview'
Supported by the Humboldt-Stiftung Bonn and IIAS
Convenors: Prof. Wallace Johnson, Prof. Herbert Franke, and Prof. Denis Sinor
Information: wjohnson@ukans.edu or iias@let.leidenuniv.nl

17 October 2003
Leiden, the Netherlands
'Some Reflections on Multinationality - The Example of Former Empires in East Asia'
IIAS Annual Lecture
by Prof. Herbert Franke
Information: iias@let.leidenuniv.nl

17-19 October 2003
Leeds, United Kingdom
Annual conference of the Association of South East Asian Studies of the United Kingdom
Contact: Duncan McCargo,
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24-25 October 2003
Cambridge (MA) United States
New England Association for Asian Studies 2003 Conference
Contact: Jorge Espada
ne_aas@fas.harvard.edu
www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/neaas/index.htm

Tang dynasty and calligraphy of the Song dynasty'
Convenor: Prof. Wolfgang Kubin, University of Bonn
Information: info@kah-bonn.de
www.bundeskunsthalle.de

16-18 January 2004
Gainesville (FA) United States
Southeast Asian Conference of the Association for Asian Studies
43rd Annual Meeting
Contact: Dr S. Yumiko Hulvey
yhulvey@aall.ufl.edu
www.lib.duke.edu/reference/kenb/sec-main.htm

FEBRUARY 2004

13-14 February 2004
Berkeley (CA) United States
19th Annual South Asia conference
Information: Elizabeth Inouye
csasasst@uclink.berkeley.edu
http://ias.berkeley.edu/southasia/conference.html

13-15 February 2004
Bonn, Germany
'Aesthetics in East and West: Art and identity'
A symposium on the theory of aesthetic and the practice of art
Concept: Prof. Wolfgang Kubin, University of Bonn
Information: info@kah-bonn.de
www.bundeskunsthalle.de

13-16 February 2004
Seattle (WA) United States
'Breaking barriers and building bridges: human rights and the law in South Asia'
National South Asian Law Student Association Conference 2004
Contact: Regina Paulose,
paulosr@seattleu.edu
www.law.seattleu.edu/salsa

MARCH 2004

5-7 March 2004
San Diego (CA) United States
AAS (Association for Asian Studies) annual meeting 2004
Information:
www.aasianst.org/annmtg.htm

18-20 March 2004
Hong Kong, China
'The production of food and foodways in Asia'
Contact: Ms Viki Li
Foodconference@cuhk.edu.hk
www.cuhk.edu.hk/ant/

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MAY 2004

10-14 May 2004
Copenhagen, Denmark
'New Chinese migrants: globalisation of Chinese overseas migration'
Fifth conference of the International Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas (ISCCO)
IIAS sponsored conference
Organizer: University of Copenhagen; NIAS
Contact: Mette Thunoe
w_thunoe@worldonline.dk

20-22 May 2004
Avignon, France
Children and slavery
Contact: Gwyn Campbell
gwyn.campbell@univ-avignon.fr
gcampb3395@aol.com

JUNE 2004

16-19 June 2004
Leiden, the Netherlands
'The Philippines: changing landscapes, manscapes and mindscapes in a globalizing world'
Seventh International Philippine Studies Conference (ICOPHIL)
Convenor: Prof. Otto van den Muijzenberg
ovandenmuijzenberg@fmg.uva.nl
www.iias.nl

JULY 2004

6-9 July 2004
Lund, Sweden
18th European conference on Modern South Asian Studies
Organizers: SASNET and Lund University
Contact: Deputy Director Lars Eklund
Lars.Eklund@sasnet.lu.se
www.sasnet.lu.se/research.html

AUGUST 2004

16-21 August 2004
Moscow, Russian Federation
'Unity in diversity'
ICANAS-37
Organizers: Orientalist Society of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Contact: Professor Dmitry D. Vasilyev
ivran@orc.ru.

SEPTEMBER 2004

14-17 September 2004
London, United Kingdom
10th International conference
European Association of Southeast Asian Archaeologists
Contact: Dr Ruth Prior
Euraseaaio@yahoo.co.uk

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National University of Singapore
Information: phianhtn@nus.edu.sg
http://ap3.fas.nus.edu.sg:8000/appl/webg/ASACP/announcement.htm

7-25 July 2003
Norwich, United Kingdom
'Conflict resolution and peace building in war-torn societies' course
University of East Anglia
Contact: Sarah Scott
sarah.scott@uea.ac.uk
www.odg.uea.ac.uk/pages/training.html

11-12 July 2003
Bonn, Germany
'The restructuring of old industrial areas in Europe and Asia'
ASEF-Asia Alliance workshop
Convenors: Dr R. Hassink (University of Bonn, Germany) and Dr Shin Dong-Ho (National University of Singapore
Information: hassink@giub.uni-bonn.de
www.asia-alliance.org/workshopseries

14-18 July 2003
Helsinki, Finland
12th World Sanskrit conference
Institute for Asian and African Studies, University of Helsinki
Contact: petteri.koskikallio@helsinki.fi
www.helsinki.fi/hum/aakkl/12wsc

20-23 July 2003
Sheffield, United Kingdom
'Tourism and photography: still visions - changing lives'
Sheffield Hallam University
Information: Dr David Picard
slmdp@electra.shu.ac.uk
www.tourism-culture.com

21-27 July 2003
Leh and Kargil, India
'Ladakh: art, culture and languages'
11th IALS Colloquium
Contact: Nawang Tsering Shakspo
sntsering52@yahoo.co.uk

23-26 July 2003
Heidelberg, Germany
'Bhakti in current research 2001-2003'
Ninth international conference on early devotional literatures in New Indo-Aryan languages
Contact: Prof. Monika Boehm-Tettelbach
ang@ix.urz.uni-heidelberg.de

24-27 July 2003
Penang, Malaysia
'Southeast Asia since 1945: reflections and visions'
Organizers: Asia Pacific Research Unit (APRU), School of Humanities, Universiti Sains Malaysia

19-22 August 2003
Singapore
'Third International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS3)'
Organizer: National University of Singapore
Information: icas3sec@nus.edu.sg
www.fas.nus.edu.sg/icas3
www.icassecretariat.org

21-23 August 2003
Copenhagen, Denmark
'Local land use strategies in a globalizing world: shaping sustainable social and natural environments'
In cooperation with the Institute of Geography, University of Copenhagen
Sponsored by IIAS
Convenors: Dr Reed Wadley (University of Missouri)
wadley@missouri.edu
Dr Ole Mertz (University of Copenhagen)
om@serven.geogr.ku.dk

22-23 August 2003
Yogyakarta, Indonesia
'Mini workshop at UGM'
IIAS subsidy
Contact: Patricia Spyer
spyer@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

25-29 August 2003
Dunhuang, Gansu Province, China
'Conservation of ancient sites on the Silk Road'
Second international conference on the conservation of grotto sites
Contact (outside China): Kathleen Louw (The Getty Conservation Institute)
klouw@getty.edu
Contact (within China): Su Boming (The Dunhuang Academy)
cidha@public.iz.gs.cn
www.getty.edu/conservation

27-30 August 2003
Warsaw, Poland
European Association for Japanese Studies (EAJS), 10th international conference
Contact: Bernhard Scheid
bernhard.scheid@oeaw.ac.at
Birgit Staemmler
birgit@staemmler.de
www.eajs.org/whatsnew/warsaw.html

28-31 August 2003
Shanghai, China
'First World Forum on China Studies'
Contact: Secretariat, World Forum on China Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS)
chinaforum@sass.org.cn
www.sass.org.cn/chinaforum

national conference on visual anthropology
Organized by EAIVA and Yunnan University
Dr Karsten Krüger (Vice-Director)
eaivakk@public.km.yn.cn
Andrea Stelzner (Managing Director)
eaivass@public.km.yn.cn
www.eaiva.org

19-20 September 2003
Cambridge, United Kingdom
'Chinese commercial law'
Information: Patricia Mirrlees
pw229@cam.ac.uk
www.eai.cam.ac.uk/conferences/commlaw.html

22-24 September 2003
Veldhoven, the Netherlands
Globalization and National Environmental Policy
Tilburg University
www.tilburguniversity.nl/globalization-conference

23-25 September 2003
Moscow, Russian Federation
'China: chances and challenges of globalization'
Contact: Dr Olga V. Pochagina
pochagina@ifes-ras.ru
www.ifes-ras.ru/graph/konf/defaulteng.htm

24 September 2003
Aalborg, Denmark
'Internet, governance and democracy in Denmark and Asia. Democratic transitions: will the Internet bring about more democracy and better governance?'
Contact: Lars Torpe
larsto@socsci.auc.dk

26-27 September 2003
Canberra, Australia
'Indonesia update 2003: changes and challenges in business'
Indonesia Project, Australian National University
Convenor: Dr Pierre van der Eng
pierre.vandereng@anu.edu.au
pvandereng@econ.seikei.ac.jp

OCTOBER 2003

2-3 October 2003
Copenhagen, Denmark
'Fieldwork methodology and practice in China,
Nordic Institute of Asian Studies workshop
Contact: Anders Hojmark Andersen
anders@nias.ku.dk
www.nias.ku.dk/chinafieldwork

2-5 October 2003
Cambridge (MA) USA
CESS, fourth annual meeting
Contact: John Schoeberlein

24-26 October 2003
Madison (Wisconsin) USA
32nd Annual Conference on South Asia
University of Wisconsin-Madison
www.wisc.edu/southasia/conf/about.html

24-26 October 2003
Cairo, Egypt
'Religious networks between the Middle East and Southeast Asia'
IIAS/KNAW/CNWS/ISIM workshop of the research programme 'Islam in Indonesia' in collaboration with the American University in Cairo and the Dutch Institute in Cairo
Convenors: Dr Mona Abaza and Dr Nico Kaptein
Information: iias@let.leidenuniv.nl
www.iias.nl

29-30 October 2003
Paris, France
'Past as the present: a discourse on South Asian society'
MSH, Paris and ICSSR, New Delhi, UGC, New Delhi and CNRS, Paris.
Information: Dr Badri Narayan, G.B.Pant Social Science Institute, Allahabad
bntiwari-gbpi@rediffmail.com

NOVEMBER 2003

1-5 November 2003
Hanoi, Vietnam
'Forging partnership? A comparative study of institutional responses to Nordic and Japanese aid in Asia'
Contact: Anders Hojmark Andersen or Marie Soderberg
anders@nias.ku.dk or JAPMS@hhs.se
www.nias.ku.dk/activities/conferences/documents/ForgingPartnershipWebsiteText_001.doc

14-16 November 2003
Cambridge (MA) USA
'A matter of choice: critical policy studies of China'
Policy Culture Project, Asia Center
Contact: Jing Wang
jing@mit.edu
Tony Saich
anthony_saich@harvard.edu
www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/pc/pc_workshop.htm

17-18 November 2003
Leiden, the Netherlands
Symposium on psychoactive substances in ritual and religion
Co-sponsored by IIAS
Convenors: Prof. Jan Houben (Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris) and Prof. Rob Verpoorte (Instituut Biologie Leiden)
Information: J_E_M_Houben@yahoo.com

'Sri Lanka at crossroads: continuity and change'
Ninth International Conference on Sri Lanka Studies
Coordinator: Professor Sarath Amarasinghe, University of Ruhuna,
Contact: sarathamarasinghe@hotmail.com
www.icsls.org

DECEMBER 2003

1-3 December 2003
Armidale, Australia
'Migrant labour in Southeast Asia: needed, not wanted', International Conference
Sponsors: The Japan Foundation, UNE Asia Centre, School of Economics UNE
Contact: Amarjit Kaur
akaur@metz.une.edu.au

8-12 December 2003
Leiden, the Netherlands
'South-East Asian pop music in a comparative perspective' workshop
Information: Professor Kees van Dijk, KITLV
vdijk@kitlv.nl

11-13 December 2003
Amsterdam, the Netherlands
'Decolonizing societies: reorientation of Asian and African livelihoods under changing regimes' NIOD conference
Information: Ms Els Bogaerts, MA, Coordinator of the Research Programme Indonesia across Orders
indie-indonesie@niod.knaw.nl

17-19 December 2003
Yangon, Burma /Myanma(r)
'Traditions of knowledge in Southeast Asia'
Contact: Dr. Khin Hla Han, Hmwe or Thant Syn
uhrc@uhrc-edu.gov.mm

18-21 December 2003
New Delhi, India
'Religions in the Indic civilisation'
IAHR Regional conference on the study of religions in India
Convenor: Madhu Kishwar
madhuk@csdsdelhi.org
madhukishwar@indicreligions.com
www.indicreligions.com/

JANUARY 2004

3-6 January 2004
Calcutta, India
'Language, consciousness and culture: East-West perspectives'
The Society of Indian Philosophy & Religion
Contact: Dr Chandana Chakrabarti
chakraba@elon.edu

16-17 January 2004
Bonn, Germany
'The art of interpretation: poetry of the

25-27 March 2004
New York City (NY) United States
'Antiquarianism and the early modern age: perspectives on Europe and China'
An interdisciplinary conference at the Brard Graduate Center
Contact: Francois Louis
louise@bgc.bard.edu

MAY 2004

May 2004
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
'Festival of literature and culture of the Islamic world'
Institute of Malay Language and Literature
Contact: Dato'Haji A. Aziz Deraman
aziz@dbp.gov.my
www.dbp.gov.my

7-9 May 2004
The Lake District, United Kingdom
'Generational interaction and change'
Pakistan workshop 2004
Contact: Dr Steve Lyon
S.M.Lyon@durham.ac.uk
Professor Pnina Werbner
P.Werbner@keele.ac.uk
http://psg.anthropology.ac.uk/Workshop2004

OCTOBER 2004

October 2004
Lawrence (KA) United States
'In Godzilla's footsteps: Japanese pop culture icons on the global stage'
The Center for East Asian Studies at the University of Kansas Interdisciplinary Symposium
Contact: William M. Tsutsui or Michiko Ito
btsutsui@ku.edu
mito@ku.edu
www.isop.ucla.edu/eas/cfp/cfp-kansas2003.asp
www.ceas.ku.edu

JANUARY 2005

6-8 January 2005
Leiden, the Netherlands
'Between stress and tone'
IIAS sponsored conference
Convenor: Dr Bert Remijsen
a.c.l.remijsen@let.leidenuniv.nl

Summer 2005

Summer 2005
Leiden, the Netherlands
International association of Chinese linguistics, IIAS conference
Convenor: Dr Rint Sybesma
r.p.e.sybesma@let.leidenuniv.nl

Conference Announcement and Call for Panel Proposals
7th International Conference on Philippine Studies

The Philippines: Changing Landscapes, Manscapes, and Mindscapes in a Globalizing World

16-19 June 2004
Leiden, the Netherlands
7th International Conference on Philippine Studies (ICOPHIL)
'The Philippines: Changing Landscapes, Manscapes, and Mindscapes in a Globalizing World'

Convenor:
Prof. Ot van den Muijzenberg

A list of possible topics is provided on the conference website.
Deadline: October 2003.

For registration and information, please visit
www.iias.nl/iias/agenda/jcophil
Panel proposals should be sent to IIAS:
F +31-71-527 4162
iias@let.leidenuniv.nl

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1 October 1999 – 1 October 2007

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'Ethnolinguistics with a focus on Southeast Asia'
1 September 1998 – 1 September 2004

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'Cultures of Mainland Southeast Asia'
1 September 1999 – 1 September 2004

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