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
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> In this edition Rohan Gunaratna's [1] narrative on international terrorism Al-Qaeda in the Asia Pacific is counterbalanced by Michael Laffan in Lectures on the Past. p. 1, 4-5 In A Non-Indian Resident, Martin Mooij helps us find the Colour of Solitude in Sujata Bhatt's poetry. p. 15-16 The verbal strategies underlying shamanic rituals are unveiled as the central ingredient of these rituals in the Gate of Words [2]. p. 17 Sanjoy Bhattacharya [3] shows us the links between public health measures, poverty, and democracy in South Asia. p. 21 Presenting an alternative view on geopolitics, Mehdi Aminesh presents political cooperation in Central Eurasia as the only way out of the current downward spiral. p. 24 Whereas Mao Zedong has branded intellectuals 'the hair on the skin', Chinese intellectuals can be seen to reconsider their role today as well as yesterday, thus describes Nora Sausmikat. p. 31 Anna Beerens [4] cannot hide her utter disappointment with Tornianen's study From Austere Wabi to Golden Wabi. p. 34

> Asian art & cultures Kristy Phillips describes how Vivian Sundaram's digital photomontages in 'Re-take'[5] question his mother's and his own place within Amrita Sher-Gil's world. p. 41 Kenru Izo's photographs along the Silk Road [6] fully exploit the possibilities of black and white photography while strongly building on nineteenth-century work. p. 42 A pioneer in Japan, the Fukuoka Art Museum [7] has always looked at contemporary Asian art within its local context. p. 46 Mega-urbanization in Asia and the role of the director's of urban change are the focus of a new ASEF-Alliance research programme. p. 57 International Conference Agenda p. 58-59

Al-Qaeda in the Asia Pacific: Origin, Capability, and Threat

Forum >
General

14 June 2002
Amsterdam, the
Netherlands

Al-Qaeda al-Sulbah (The Solid Base) is the first multinational terrorist group of the twenty-first century. While past and present terrorist groups generally have a national base, limiting their terrorist campaigns to a single theatre, al-Qaeda is an umbrella organization waging multiple campaigns both against the West and against Muslim regimes friendly to the West. In addition to its core force of 3,000 members, al-Qaeda has established linkages with two-dozen Islamist groups. Driven by the ideal of a universal jihad, al-Qaeda has been able to politicize, radicalize, and mobilize Muslims throughout the world. With its global reach, al-Qaeda presents a new kind of threat hitherto unimagined by counter-terrorism practitioners and security and intelligence professionals.

By Rohan Gunaratna

Between pre-modern Afghanistan and post-modern continental United States via Europe and Asia, al-Qaeda has built a state-of-the-art terrorist network for moving funds, goods, and personnel recruited from around the world to reach its targets. It is the painstaking and steadfast construction of this network over many years that enabled al-Qaeda to mount 9/11. Al-Qaeda's targeting reflects its sophistication as a professional terrorist group. After the East Africa bombing – a land suicide attack on a US diplomatic target – the US strengthened security at all US missions overseas. However, instead of another land suicide operation, al-Qaeda mounted a sea-borne suicide operation. After al-Qaeda attacked the USS Cole in October 2000, the US invested in perimeter security. However, al-Qaeda evaded these measures and struck America's most outstanding landmarks from the sky. Al-Qaeda planned to strike the US once more with a radiological dispersal device using Jose Perdilla, an American Muslim, an operation that was disrupted at the reconnaissance stage. As it is al-Qaeda's doctrine to learn from its experiences and failures, it is most likely to use the lessons learned for a future attempt at destroying its third target, the US Congress. And as terrorist groups employ cost-effective tactics, al-Qaeda is likely to use civilian infrastructure once again to attack Western targets.

In keeping with its founding charter authored by Sheikh Dr Abdullah Azzam in March 1988, al-Qaeda is the 'spearhead of Islam', 'the pioneering vanguard of the Islamic move-

ments'. Because of the inspirational value, al-Qaeda's gives preference to suicide attacks. Attacking highly prestigious and symbolic targets is difficult, requiring extensive planning and preparation over a long period of time across several countries. To strengthen Islamic movements worldwide al-Qaeda – together the Islamic Movement of Taliban and the Maktab al Khidamat lil Mujahidin al-Arab – has trained several tens of thousands of Western, Middle Eastern, African, Caucasian, Balkan, and Asian Muslims.

Decentralization

Al-Qaeda's training infrastructure has gravely suffered as a result of US intervention in Afghanistan since October 2001. However, al-Qaeda began decentralizing, opening new training facilities for recruits from Mindanao in the Philippines to Pankishi Valley in Georgia, long before 9/11. In forming the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders in 1998, al-Qaeda networked with and in some cases co-opted groups – from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Far East to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Central Asia and the Salafist Group for Call and Combat in North Africa. Telephone intercepts indicated that in early 1999 at the request of al-Qaeda's head of external operations Abu Zubaida, the MILF opened special camps for training foreign recruits. These camps were all situated in what is called the Abu Bakar complex, which was later overrun by the Philippine military. At that point, another al-Qaeda associate – Lashkar Jundullah – established a facility in Poso,

continued on page 4 >



Gunaratna delivering the IIAS Annual Lecture at DeBalie, Amsterdam, 14 June 2002

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Sulawesi, Indonesia. Similar facilities were later established in Algeria and Chechnya. Although the loss of Taliban control in Afghanistan was a massive blow to al-Qaeda, the support it enjoys in the tribal areas as well as its pre-9/11 decentralization is likely to ensure its survival.

Al-Qaeda's post-9/11 pronouncements – including Abu Gaith Sulayman's recorded message – reflect both its intention and will to attack Western and especially US targets. Although it has lost key leaders such as its military commander Mohommad Atef, alias Abu Hafs, al-Qaeda's core leadership is still intact.¹ Furthermore, the Islamist milieu in both the Muslim territorial and migrant communities continues to provide recruits, finances, and other forms of support, allowing it to replenish its human and material losses. As a result, al-Qaeda's global network – with members drawn from 46 countries and activities in 98 countries – is still functional, including its operatives in Europe (according to CIA

Wim Vreeburg

estimates). Although the planning and preparing for attacks by its operational cells have been disrupted in Western Europe, al-Qaeda's support cells are still active in propaganda activities, raising of funds, recruiting, procuring supplies, and mounting surveillance on intended targets. Its collaborators, supporters, and sympathizers are filling the leadership vacuum created by the first wave of arrests of al-Qaeda leaders in Europe immediately after 9/11. The post-9/11 cells are more clandestine, compact, and self-contained, thus hard to detect and disrupt.

Current threat

After 9/11 al-Qaeda attempted but failed to destroy US, UK, Australian, and Israeli diplomatic missions, attack both a US warship off Singapore and US and British warships in the Straits of Gibraltar, and poison the water supply to the US embassy in Rome. In addition to the shoe-bomber, Richard Reid, trying to destroy an aircraft over the Atlantic, al-Qaeda also attempted to bomb the US embassy and American cultural centre in Paris and attack the US base in Sarajevo. A Sudanese member of al-Qaeda fired a surface to air missile at a US warplane taking off from the Prince Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia in December 2001. Al-Qaeda suicide bombers also attacked a French oil tanker off Yemen and US troops in Kuwait in October 2002. To instigate Islamists to strike worldwide Jewish targets, Nizar Seif Eddin al-Tunisi alias Nizar Nouar, a Tunisian al-Qaeda suicide bomber, rammed into Ghriba Synagogue, Africa's oldest Jewish synagogue, with a Liquid Petroleum Gas vehicle, killing 14 German tourists, including one child, and 5 Tunisians in Djerba, Tunisia on 11 April 2002. Al-Qaeda's front, The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Sites, claimed the attack, which was subsequently confirmed as being an al-Qaeda operation in an interview with Abdel Azeem al-Muhajir, an al-Qaeda military commander.

Due to the difficulty of operating in the post-9/11 environment, al-Qaeda has delegated and diffused many of its responsibilities to other Islamist movements (parties and groups) under its umbrella. Al-Qaeda is operating through a number of groups with which it shared training, financial, and operational infrastructures in Afghanistan – a phenomenon most visible in Pakistan. Beginning with the massacre of the Christians in Bhawalpur in the Punjab district in October 2001, al-Qaeda has launched a number of terrorist operations, including the kidnapping and murder of the *Wall Street Journal* journalist Daniel Pearl and a church bombing in Islamabad, killing a US diplomat's wife and daughter. A suicide bomber of Harakat-ul Mujahidin-al-Aalami, an al-Qaeda associate group, killed 11 Frenchmen and 12 Pakistanis on 18 May 2002. The well-planned attack was conducted after mounting surveillance on the Sheraton hotel

and the bus route used by French naval engineers and technicians working on the submarine project in Karachi. The suicide vehicle bomb attack by an al-Qaeda associate group against the US Consulate in Karachi on 14 June 2002 injured a US marine and killed 11 Pakistanis. Using the same vehicle, they also targeted President Musharraf on 26 April, but the remote control failed to detonate the explosives.

Taliban and al-Qaeda

While the Taliban is a guerrilla force operating somewhat openly, al-Qaeda remains a clandestine terrorist group. Their combined strategy is to install a regime that is friendly, or at least neutral to the Islamists in Pakistan. As they believe that the future survival of al-Qaeda and the Taliban along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border will depend on their ability to generate sustained support from Pakistan, they are likely to target Musharraf repeatedly. Al-Qaeda also mounted at least two clandestine operations to assassinate President Hamid Karzai and cabinet ministers. On 29 July 2002 an Afghan and a foreigner were arrested when driving through the centre of Kabul in an explosive (Semtex)-laden vehicle. In September 2002, a second al-Qaeda assassination operation was disrupted by Karzai's US bodyguards and, immediately after, an unknown group positioned a claymore mine on a route usually taken by the presidential motorcade.

Primary target

The US remains the principal target of al-Qaeda as reflected when Osama stated: 'The battle has moved to inside America. We will continue this battle, God permitting, until victory or until we meet God.'² Until the US intelligence agencies infiltrate terrorist groups, which cannot be accomplished in the short term, the US will remain as vulnerable as it was before 9/11. Other governments have also earned the wrath of al-Qaeda. After, for example, the Singaporean government disrupted cells of Jamaayah Islamiyah (al-Qaeda's arm in Singapore), the leadership relocated to Indonesia and vowed to crash a plane on to the Changi international airport in Singapore. Similarly, in retaliation for Pakistan's support for the US, several Islamist groups in Pakistan are attacking soft targets nationwide.

With unprecedented security, intelligence, and law enforcement cooperation as well as with heightened public alertness, al-Qaeda is unable to engage in extensive and long-term planning and international preparation, a pre-requisite for conducting coordinated simultaneous attacks. Nonetheless, its super cells are likely to plan, prepare, and execute another mass casualty attack. For the time being due to the limitations of mounting another large-scale operation to attack a population centre, economic infrastructure, and symbolic/prestigious targets inside the US, a range of other

Editors' note >

Dr Rohan Gunaratna presented the 2002 IIAS Annual Lecture entitled 'Al-Qaeda in the Asia-Pacific: Origins, Capability, and Threat'. The above article is a shortened and edited version of Dr Gunaratna's full article, which can be found on: www.iias.nl/iiasn/29/gunaratna.html

Lectures on the Present, Lessons from the Past: al-Qa`ida as the New Pan-Islam

Forum >
General
14 & 25 June 2002
Amsterdam & Leiden,
the Netherlands

Martin van Bruinessen has recently found himself chairing two forums on the al-Qa`ida-S11 nexus. The first was the IIAS annual lecture, given in Amsterdam on 14 June 2002 by a specialist on terrorism, Rohan Gunaratna of St Andrew's University, Edinburgh. The second was given on in Leiden 25 June by the established commentator on Islamist discourse and director of Georgetown University's Centre for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Yvonne Haddad.

By Michael Laffan

Gunaratna presented a well-oiled narrative of the rise, proliferation, and continuing threat of al-Qa`ida, whilst Haddad detailed the position of Muslims in the United States before and after al-Qa`ida's deadliest action. Each lecture was presented in widely divergent circumstances. Gunaratna was placed upon a dais at DeBalie, where he was metamorphosed by ghastly red lighting that gave his presentation a mood of inherent peril. Two weeks later, an understated Haddad stood in an unremarkable classroom of Leiden University's LAK complex and put forward the straight-forward case of a community that was now frightened and vulnerable, leaving little room to anticipate any hope for the future.

Both spoke with ease and conviction.

In the case of Gunaratna, conclusions of clear and present danger left policy-experts and diplomats nodding and some academic specialists of Islam, and particularly those working on Indonesia, shaking their heads and considering the merits of interjection. Certainly, reliable evidence for an al-Qa`ida connection with the spate of bombings in Jakarta in December 2000 is yet to be made publicly available. And even when the recent events on Bali are thrown into the confused mix of information and lies, Gunaratna's simplistic black and white narrative is all the more attractive to those who make the news. Nonetheless, a grey area for some present at his lecture in June was the lack of discussion of the underlying ideology of al-Qa`ida, for it is in this area that Osama bin Laden and his followers differ on many levels with apparently like-minded

Islamists – be they Jihadist Salafis or the Muslim Brothers. On the whole though, Gunaratna seemed to leave little doubt (or at least have none of that worrying feeling) that al-Qa`ida stood behind a large proportion of discontent and direct action in the entire Asian-Pacific region, which is an explanation that will sit easily with some policy-making quarters, and which so easily captivates segments of the media (see for example: www.theage.com.au, 13 October 2002; CNN broadcast, Maria Ressa, 13 October 2002).

By comparison, Haddad – who has had longer experience in researching Islamist ideology – needed no props to convince her smaller audience of the worrying turns taken by the US administration at home as a part of the 'War' on terror. She pointed out that, concomitant with their desire for security,

Americans are increasingly willing to sacrifice some of their freedoms (but not, of course, their right to bear arms). This has meant that whilst Muslims of all persuasions had felt free to speak in the past, or that they even had some influence in political circles, they are now effectively carrying out self-censorship or dissimulation. Meanwhile the administration seeks to foster the right sort of 'moderate' Muslim to assume the leadership of America's least understood religious minority. According to Haddad, this is done by sampling the literature of mosque and madrasa, and by trying to domesticate the imams in the US by recognizing them as a sort of clergy. The whole enterprise, she suggests, is sold to the public as a mission to rescue women from a medieval faith.

Taken together, we can see that the US administration perceives, and is thus prosecuting a physical war on, a network that is omnipresent and, in some respects, equal to its most sophisticated techniques of information-gathering and security. At least that is the view we are not discouraged from hold-

ing. Both at home and abroad this translates into a dual policy of vigorous intervention and sharper surveillance combined with an attempt to steer Muslims towards the privatization of religion – which is ironic coming from what is perhaps the most consciously religious nation-state in the world.

For the observer of colonial history there are remarkable parallels with current US policy and that of the late colonial state in the Netherlands Indies. From the 1870s, when the Netherlands was starting to finalize the borders of what would one day become Indonesia, officials were conscious that their own economic interests were under threat from a seemingly all-pervasive Islamic network. Most palpably Islamic resistance was manifested by the people of Aceh in a struggle that would drag on for thirty years. Seeing tentacles of Islamism everywhere, the Dutch believed that there had to be a head. Their version of al-Qa`ida then was the octopus of pan-Islam, plotted in Istanbul and Mecca, and carried eastward by Arab traders and mystics, Turkish envoys, and returning pilgrims.

options remains open – from ‘going to sleep’ or hibernating, taking opportunity targets, to tasking other groups. Of the dozen medium- and small-scale attacks conducted by al-Qaeda and its associate groups only a few have been successful. They have failed due to tighter international, especially US, security countermeasures and hurried al-Qaeda planning. Nonetheless, al-Qaeda ideology ensures that, like a revengeful and a retaliatory wounded animal, the group is determined to strike back. As a result of a range of countermeasures, the spectrum of threat is expanding to include a wider range of targets as well as a change in the modus operandi. Al-Qaeda is operating through other Islamist groups, providing them trainers and funds, influencing their strategic and tactical direction, and is also likely to operate through associated groups.

Importance of Afghanistan-Pakistan borders

The developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan are central to the survival of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. These two groups are adapting to the security environment and can be seen to have undergone three internal strategic changes. First, Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban and former head of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, has assumed the principal responsibility of fighting the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. In the fight, Osama bin Laden himself has pledged loyalty and allegiance to his leadership. Since Osama went into hiding, as the ‘leader of the Faithful’, Mullah Omar spearheaded the regrouping and re-organizing of the Taliban after 9/11. After re-establishing communication with the scattered units of the Taliban, he regrouped them along secure areas of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Their dream is to consolidate, as they did during the Soviet period, the strength of the Taliban and deepen their strategic influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan by preparing for a campaign of protracted guerrilla warfare. To rebuild support, the Taliban indoctrinates the Afghan people both directly by disseminating propaganda and through supporters and sympathizers scattered throughout Afghanistan.

Second, over the past year, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have replaced losses in the rank and file. Except during the first three months of confrontation, there are no signs of mass desertions from the Taliban or al-Qaeda, indicating the state of the morale within the rank and file. To compensate for the total loss of Pakistani state support of the Taliban, Mullah Omar has established Lashkar-e-Omar – a covert network of support organizations in Pakistan – to sustain a low intensity campaign in Afghanistan and in the area. By instigating its associate groups in Kashmir such as Harakat-ul Mujahidin and Jayash-e-Mohammad to intensify the violence in Kashmir, the Taliban forced Pakistan to re-deploy its troops on the Afghan border along the India-Pakistan border. With the

increased porosity of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have re-established their lines of communication, supplies, and recruits into Pakistan. The Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other associate groups are all harnessing the Islamist milieu in Pakistan and overseas (both territorial and migrant) to ensure a revival of support (encouragement, funds, and supplies). Conflicts of international neglect where Muslims are suffering – Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, Maluku, Mindanao, and Algeria, among others – ensure continuity of support.

Third, al-Qaeda’s deputy leader Dr Ayman Al-Zawahiri is playing a more substantial role. To topple Karzai in Afghanistan and Musharraf in Pakistan, al-Qaeda has established networks of collaborators, supporters, and sympathizers in both these countries. To coordinate and conduct operations, al-Qaeda is seeking to re-establish communication with its associate groups and command cells respectively. To revive support al-Qaeda is establishing linkages with its affiliate NGOs and other charities overseas. Although suicide terrorism coupled with conventional attacks has proven to be the most effective, with the failure to strike tactical US, Allied, and coalition targets, al-Qaeda and its associated groups are likely to go down the road of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. Although it is still the ‘spearhead of Islam’ and the ‘pioneering vanguard of the Islamic movements’, al-Qaeda has inspired and instigated a wider constituency of groups and individuals to take on the fight for Allah. These Islamist groups continue to inspire and instigate violence against ‘the enemies of Islam’, ‘the infidels’, and the ‘unbelievers’ both by word of mouth and in over 1,000 sites on the Web. They are operating across a wide spectrum, from low to high tech, stretching government resources, and weakening security countermeasures. This demonstrates the success of al-Qaeda in educating a much wider constituency to challenge the West and Muslim regimes friendly to the West.

Southeast Asian network

Most academics find it difficult to understand al-Qaeda because the group functions both operationally and ideologically.³ In addition to dispatching its operatives to target countries, it provides the experts, training, and resources to other Islamist political and military organizations to advance a common goal. In the same way it has penetrated existing Islamist networks worldwide, al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia penetrated Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI), a regional organization with overground and underground networks extending from southern Thailand to Australia. Among the groups it has infiltrated and influenced are Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia; Jashkar Jundullah, Indonesia; and Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Philippines. When JI wanted to destroy the US, British, Australian, and Israeli diplo-

matic targets in Singapore, al-Qaeda dispatched four Afghan-trained Arab suicide bombers to Southeast Asia. In an interview, an al-Qaeda detainee stated: ‘We did not want to risk using Asian Muslims for a landmark operation.’⁴

By physical and intellectual contact, al-Qaeda members (ideologues, trainers, operatives) and its literature (www.alneda.com) have physically and ideologically strengthened a dozen Islamist terrorist groups, numerous political parties, charities, and individuals. Towards a Darulah Islamiah Raya, about 400 Islamists have been trained in facilities in Afghanistan (Derunta, Khalden, etc.), Pakistan (Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar), Malaysia (Negri Sembilan), Indonesia (Poso, Sulawesi), and the Philippines (Mindanao) since 1993. In the region, it has created a mission and a vision for the Islamists to create a caliphate comprising Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Mindanao.

The future

In many ways, al-Qaeda decentralized before 9/11. With focused targeting on the Afghan-Pakistan border where both al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Mullah Omar Faction) are concentrated, the group will depend on its regional networks, such as its Southeast Asian network, to continue the fight. Al-Qaeda’s disrupted Singapore operation clearly demonstrates the group’s intentions as well as its capabilities and opportunities for attacking target-rich Southeast Asia.

Largely due to the tireless efforts of the intelligence community, especially of the Singaporean service, the region is aware of the existence of a resilient terrorist network. Only a regional approach involving all ASEAN countries can prompt the region to comprehensive and sustained action.

The first step towards reducing the immediate threat to Southeast Asia is to develop and implement a multi-pronged, multi-dimensional, multi-agency approach by ASEAN countries to target al-Qaeda’s support and operational infrastructure at home and in the immediate neighbourhood. ◀

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Notes >

- 1 See pages 288–9 of Gunaratna, Rohan, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, New York: Columbia University Press (2002).
- 2 Interview with Tayseer Allouni, al-Jazeera’s Kabul correspondent, 21 October 2001.
- 3 As al-Qaeda, a secret organization, continues to pose a threat, governments do not wish to make information about the group public.
- 4 The author interviewed a number of al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees, including the American-Taliban John Walker Lindh in US custody.

By way of response measures were taken to gain an eye into the process. The Netherlands consulate in Jeddah took greater interest in the souls passing through its courtyard. The future doyen of Islamic studies and colonial policy, C. Snouck Hurgronje, was even dispatched to the Hijaz in 1884–85 to assess the reality of the threat.

Back in Java in 1882, the administration had already sought to subsume the local Islamic courts by creating their own misnamed ‘Priestly Courts’. Overseen by the local Dutch official, its scholars were now the salaried officials of a Christian state. Of course such measure did not go far enough, and they were already misconceived in many cases. Repeated proposals to limit the pilgrimage, for example, were regularly shelved, and some teachers continued to shun the entire system and its puppet courts. Still, in looking for statist pan-Islamism, officials and their agents became to an extent aware of the nature of a more real and effective spiritual current in Islam, which in some cases promoted an increased emphasis on the outward forms of orthodoxy.

A new approach was required, and following for a time the advice of Snouck and his fellow-travellers, the Dutch attempted to enact what he termed the policy of Association in order to create an Islam that was personalized. Through their exposure to what Snouck called the ‘torch of civilization’, an enlightened elite would lead their people in an enduring partnership with the Netherlands. Indies Muslims were to be ‘emancipated’ from the ‘medieval rubbish they had carried in their wake for far too long’ (Snouck Hurgronje 1915: 79). They were, furthermore, to be stripped of their political aspirations, and especially the idea that armed struggle could be a tool to this end. Still, Snouck’s policies were ultimately made redundant by the course of the Indonesian struggle for independence. Many of the emancipees created by modern education often saw the hollowness of what was on offer from the Netherlands, and in some cases turned back to their faith as a source of difference and empowerment.

But to return to the present. The idea that Islam might be personalized through education and an exposure to ‘Western’ modernity resembles the developmentalist approach still employed by the United States. Yet this has already had its failures which have contributed in part to today’s discourse of discontent. By exposing Muslims from the once left-leaning Middle East to the fruits of Western democracy, many different bodies were created. These include those who have, in America, accepted the benefits of openness and democracy denied to them at home – whether by ancestral houses or military regimes – and found, as professor Haddad pointed out, an opportunity to practice doctrinal tolerance. On the other hand, a well-trained and disaffected twin-body was also created. Many of its members have been skilled engineers and doctors who have seen the Western system of prosperity shored up by poverty elsewhere. According to Haddad, this sense was often brought home to them by the encounter with new refugees from Bosnia or Afghanistan. In order to

actively combat this injustice, they too have used the freedoms available to them in the West and have turned their skills to the new proliferation of Islamic propagation on the Internet. But in today’s climate, it is these people – regardless of the intensity of their feeling or their particular ideological commitment – who have the most to fear in the United States; just as they would in Egypt or Kuwait. Nasr Abu Zaid – who was present at Haddad’s lecture and is himself the target of Islamist threats in Egypt – is right to worry a world in which people are not allowed to say what they want, no matter how stupid it may seem.

Of course, in the case of the Netherlands and its former colony, it was a threat ‘over there’ that impacted upon the Dutch economically more than as a daily threat to personal safety and a continued way of life. The United States and its allies must take action to protect their citizens, but not without considering the fundamental causes of 9/11. On the whole though, international and domestic voices for moderation will continue to be implicitly rejected by the

fateful division of the world into for and against. Washington will most likely stay hamstrung by its choice of international protégés, and an inability to tackle the roots of Muslim (and indeed global) discontent: namely social injustice. This is not to say that it is all America’s fault. The rhetoric of the evil of capitalism is as simplistic as that of the evil of Islamism. Nonetheless, until the question of social justice is honestly addressed, no amount of surveillance, military intervention or sympathetic education can ward off the threat of terrorism. ◀

– Snouck Hurgronje, C., *Nederland en de Islâm* (2e vermeerdeerde druk), Leiden: Brill (1915).

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